ML20237E847

Lilco Motion for Summary Disposition of Hosp Evacuation Issue.* Issue Should Be Decided in Util Favor on Ground That No Genuine Triable Issue of Matl Fact Exists & That Util Entitled to Judgment as Matter of Law

ML20237E847
Person / Time
Site:	Shoreham File:Long Island Lighting Company icon.png
Issue date:	12/18/1987
From:	Matchett S HUNTON & WILLIAMS, LONG ISLAND LIGHTING CO.
To:	Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel
Shared Package
ML20237E848	List: ML20237E847 ML20237E857 ML20237E860
References
CON-#487-5128 OL-3, NUDOCS 8712290220
Download: ML20237E847 (29)

Text

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LILCO, December 18, 1987 ED UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 00hPJC NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

'87 DEC 21 m) 54 Before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board FFICE 0 SLCiW OCKEitNG A SEiEf.

BRAN?i In the Matter of )

)

LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COMPANY ) Docket No. 50-322-OL-3

) (Emergency Planning)

(Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, )

Unit 1) )

LILCO'S MOTION FOR

SUMMARY

DISPOSITION OF THE HOSPITAL EVACUATION ISSUE LILCO hereby moves, pursuant to 10 C.F.R. S 2.749, for summary disposition of the hospital evacuation issue. LILCO asks that the Board decide this issue in LILCO's f avor, and against the Interveners, on the ground that no genuine triable issue of mate-rial fact exists, and that LILCO is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. LILCO bases this Motion on the Board's earlier Partial Initial Decision, LBP-85-12,21 NRC 644 (1985) ("PID"), on the evidentiary record that has already been compiled in this pro-ceeding, on the Commission's decision in CLI-87-12, 26 NRC (1987), and on 10 C.F.R. S 50.47(c)(1), which allows a licensing board to issue an operating license despite an applicant's inability to meet all the emergency planning standards of 10 C.F.R.

\

5 50.47(b)if the deficiencies in the plans "are not significant for the plant in question."

I. Applicable Law The law applicable to summary disposition was summarized by this Board in its Order Ruling on LILCO's Motions for Summary Disposition of Contentions 24.B. 33, 45, 46, and 49, dated April 20, 1984, and by the Vogtle Board in its unpublished memoran-dum and order of October 3,1985. Memorandum and Order (Ruling on Motion for Sum-mary Disposition of Contention 8 re: Vogtle Quality Assurance), Georgia Power Co.

l (Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, Units 1 and 2), ASLBP No. 84-499-01-OL, Doc. Nos.

8712290220 871218 gDR ADDCK 05000322 PDR DS c6 L

q g 50-424 OL and 50-425 OL (Oct. 3,1985), slip op. at 2-3. A licensing board is empowered to grant summary disposition on the pleadings if it finds that "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a decision as a matter of law." 10 C.F.R. 5 2.749(d). The party seeking summary disposition has the burden of proving the absence of any genuine issue of material fact. Cleveland Electric

• Illuminating Co. (Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-443,6 NRC 741,753 (1977). However, an opponent of the motion "may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his answer"; his answer must " set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue of fact." 10 C.F.R. 5 2.749(b); Virginia Electric and Power Co. (North Anna Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-584,11 NRC 451, 453 (1980). A party cannot avoid summary disposition "on the basis of guesses or suspicions or on the hope that at the hearing the licensee's evidence may be discredited or that something may turn up." Memorandum and Order (Ruling on Motion for Summary Disposition of Contention 8 re: Vogtle Quality Assurance), slip op. at 2-3, citing Gulf States Utilities

% (River Bend Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-75-10,1 NRC 246,248 (1975). All material facts set forth in the movant's statement of facts are deemed admitted unless contro-verted by the opponent's statement of specific facts.10 C.F.R. 5 2.749(a). The Com-mission has encouraged the use of summary disposition where no genuine issue of mate-rial fact exists "so that evidentiary hearing time is not unnecessarily devoted to such issues." Statement of Policy in Conduct of Licensing Proceedings, CLI-81-8,13 NRC l 452, 457 (1981).

Summary disposition is particularly appropriate here because the hospital evacu-ation issue is before the Board on a limited remand from the Commission. A remand is not an invitation to relltigate an issue from scratch; it is instead a narrow proceeding designed to fill specified gaps in a record that has already been made, in as expeditious a manner as is consistent with fairness to the parties. S_e_e Philadelphia Electric Co.

(Limerick Generating Station, Units 1 and 2), A LAB-863, 25 NRC 273, 277 l

s 4, (1987)(Remands, especially in the final stages of a proceeding, should be addressed -j promptly and not be allowed to languish). The scope of the remand is prescribed by the -

remand order. In this case, the Commission's remand order simply instructs the Licens-ing Board to consider further the record on hospital evacuation plans in light of 10 C.F.R. 5 50.47 (c)(1), and to approve the existing plans (without further evidentiary '

hearings) if the conditions of 5 50.47(c)(1) are satisfied. Long Island Lighting Co.

(Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), CLI-87-12, 26 NRC , slip oA at 23 I I,Nov. 5,1987).

II. Background There are three hospitals at issue in this proceeding. Two (the John T. Mather '

Memorial and St. Charles Hospitals) are located just inside the 10-mile boundary, and the third (Central Suffolk Hospital) is outside the 10-mile boundary. PID at 829; LILCO Test. Cont. 24.J, N, 72.C, D, and 96.B (Planning for Special Facilities), ff. Tr. 9017, Vol.

II, at 14. The John T. Mather and St. Charles Hospitals are located in Port Jefferson, almost due west of Shoreham; the Central Suffolk Hospital is located in Riverhead, to the east-southeast of Shoreham. See LILCO Test. Cont. 24.J.N, 72.C, D, and 96.B. ff.

Tr. 9017, Vol. II, at A tt.1.

The LILCO Plan does not provide for automatic evacuation of the three hospitals at the same time as the rest of the EPZ. Instead, LILCO recommends sheltering the l hospital patients as a first choice of protective action. PID at 841-46. This recommen-dation is based on the distance of the hospitals from Shoreham, the sheltering benefits offered by the hospital buildings, and the potential health risks in moving hospital pa-tients. Id_. at 829. It is also based on the extremely low probability of a Shoreham acci-dent severe enough to indicate evacuation as the appropriate protective action for the hospitals. E at 841-42.

If (contrary to all expectations) LERO were to recommend that the hospitals evacuate, the decision would be made by the hospital administrators af ter consultation i _ _ _ _

, with LERO. PID at 841. If the administrators decided to evacuate their patients, l

LILCO would use the same 63 ambulances and 130 ambulettes already under contract to j evacuate the homebound and special f acilities. M at 829.Il The hospitals would require transportation for about 630 patients if all three were evacuated. & The homebound and special facilities would be evacuated first, because they are located closer to j l

Shoreham. E f The Licensing Board found that LILCO had " planned thoughtfully for the difficult problem of protective actions for hospitals," and that LILCO's plan was not ad hoc be- j cause "LILCO knows what it will do regarding hospitals in the case of a radiological emergency at Shoreham." PID at 843. The Board found that LILCO's plan to recom-mend sheltering for hospitals in almost all cases, given the location of the hospitals and the high shielding factors for their heavy masonry buildings, "is consistent with the planning basis of NUREG-0654," PID at 844, and that evacuation of the three hospitals is only "a backup protective action." E at 840. The Board concluded that "LILCO's Plan for protective actions for hospitals is a reasonable one." Ld. at 842.

LILCO did not submit specific evacuation time estimates for the three hospitals, since evacuation would be unnecessary in practically all cases. PID at 837. The Board found that evacuation times for at least some patients in the three hospitals would be comparable to those required fc ambulance evacuation of the Suffolk Infirmary (8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />, 50 minutes). Id_. at 837, 845. However, the Board made the need for specific l

l hospital evacuation time estimates contingent on the adequacy of LILCO's sheltering plans. g at 837-38. The Board found those plans adequate, stating that LILCO's prede-termined sheltering choice was " realistic" and "well-founded," g at 846: thus, the l

l 1/ As the Licensing Board found, there are 61 ambulances belonging to towns and l volunteer fire districts within 20 miles of Shoreham that could be called upon if needed during an emergency. PID at 829. LILCO chose not to rely on these additional ambu-lances, however, because it already had a sufficient number of private ambulances l under contract for emergency purposes. &

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, Board concluded that LILCO need not provide more specific evacuation time estimates for hospitals.W Finally, LILCO conceded that it did not have agreements with potential recep-tion hospitals. But the Board found that "LILCO has done all that could reasonably be expected in its attempt to find relocation centers for hospitals that might be evacu-ated." PID at 840. LILCO had contacted hospitals outside the EPZ to determine wheth-er they would accept patients evacuated from the EPZ hospitals during an emergency.

The hospitals agreed to accept as many patients as possible in the event of an emergen-cy but declined to specify in advance the precise numbers of patients they would ac-cept because they could not foresee what space or facilities they would have available.

PID at 840. The Board found that The reception hospitals' dec!sion not to commit to specific numbers results from a realistic assessment of what they can and cannot commit regarding their future actions. Letters of agreement could not alter that situation. Therefore, we do not find the Plan deficient as regards identification of recep-tion hospitals or letters of agreement with them . . . We .

therefore find that no additional benefit to public health and ]

safety could be obtained by requiring letters of agreement be-tween EPZ hospitals and potential receiving hospitals.

Id:

The Appeal Board reversed, holding that the Licensing Board "should have re- )

quired [LILCO] to fulfill the same planning obligations with regard to possible hospital 1

2/ The Board found with respect to evacuation times that "for some hospital pa-tients delay in evacuation could create an additional increment of risk from radiation j dose that is somewhat greater than that of the general public." PID at 846. But the Board concluded that the unquanuffed incremental risk to health and safety of some hospital patients under the LILCO Plan is small. Con-sidering the severity of the accident that would have to occur and the location of hospitals, we conclude that the ad-ditional. increment of risk to hospital patients over that of the general public does not stand as a barrier to licensing.

Id:

J

evacuation as the Board imposed in connection with the nursing / adult homes." Long Island Lighting Company (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1) ALAB-832,23 NRC 135, 157 (1986). In particular, the Appeal Board determined that LILCO must provide specific evacuation time estimates for the hospitals, and that those estimates cannot be made "without an awareness of the extent of the transportation that might be required to remove the patients from the EPZ, as well as an understanding of how and when the evacuation would be accomplished." IA at 156-57.

The Commission took review of the question of whether the NRC's regulations in 10 C.F.R. S 50.47 (including 10 C.F.R. S 50.47(c)(1)) require evacuation plans for hospitals in the EPZ even though sheltering would be the preferred option in most circumstances.

Commission Order (Sept. 19,1986), at 2. The Commission agreed with the Appeal Board and ruled that, as a general legal proposition, "the regulations require the appli-cant to fulfill the same planning obligations with regard to hospital evacuation as the Licensing Board imposed in connection with other like segments of the EPZ, such as nursing / adult homes." Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), CLI-87-12, 26 NRC , slip op at 22 (Nov. 5,1987). Specifically, the Commission stated that under the regulations hospital evacuation plans must be detailed enough to provide a basis for making evacuation time estimates. IA However, the Commission found that its legal conclusion "does not necessarily end the inquiry as to whether LILCO's Emergency Plan is adequate with respect to these hospitals," M at 22-23, and, as the Frye Boatd noted in its Partial Initial Decision on the Exercise issues, " indicated I

that the Licensing Board might again conclude that hospital evacuation need not be considered." Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1),

LBP-87-32,26 NRC (Dec. 7,1987). That is, Under 10 C.F.R. S 50.47(c)(1), the Licensing Board could still approve the LILCO Plan if it is found that the deficiencies re-lated to the hospitals were not significant for Shoreham. In fact, the Licensing Board did identify factors that may have relevance to this question, such as distance from the plant

a and construction characteristics of the hospitals. However,it is not clear to us that this was a matter adequately presented to or considered by the Licensing Board, since the Licensing Board did not specifically discuss 10 C.F.R. S 50.47(c)(1). On remand, LILCO and Staff are free to raise the issue for appro-priate resolution.

CLI-87-12, slip op. at 23.E Thus, the Commission clearly invited the Licensing Board to consider LILCO's existing hospital plans under 10 C.F.R. S 50.47(c)(1), without further hearings, and find them adequate if it determines that any deficiencies in them are "not significant."

In part III.A of this Motion, below, LILCO demonstrates that summary disposition is the appropriate resolution of the hospital evacuation issue because, as the Commis-sion suggested, the existing record contains - and the Licensing Board previously iden-tified - several factors that chow that any deficiencies in LILCO's hospital evacuation plans are not significant under 10 C.F.R. S 50.47(c)(1). In LILCO's view, the Board need not go beyond part III.A of this motion to resolve this issue. The Board should not admit new contentions, allow more discovery, or conduct additional hearings. The Board need only consider part III.A and the extensive existing record in light of 10 C.F.R.

S 50.47(c)(1) in order to determine this issue in LILCO's favor. In the alternative, part III.B of this Motion demonstrates that the existing record, when considered along with the additional details that will be contained in Revision 9 to the LILCO Plan, satisfies the concerns that the Appeal Board and Commission expressed about the LILCO Plan.

Thus, if the Board does not rule in LILCO's f avor based on 10 C.F.R. S 50.47(c)(1), the 3/ This ruling is entirely consistent with the Commission's prior determination in CLI-86-13, and in the " realism" amendments to 10 C.F.R. S 50.47(c)(1), that its emer-gency planning rules were "necessarily flexible," that "there is no uniform ' passing grade' for emergency plans," and that "the acceptability of a plan for one plant is not measured against plans for other nuclear plants." Evaluation of the Adequacy of Off-l Site Emergency Planning for Nuclear Power Plants at the Operating License Review l

Stage Where State and/or Local Governments Decline to Participate in Off-Site Emer-gency Planning, Final Rule, 52 Fed. Reg. 42,078, 42084 (November 3,1987); see Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), CLI-86-13, 24 NRC 22, 30 (1986).

t

, Board should grant summary disposition on the alternative ground that there are no sig-nificant deficiencies in LILCO's hospital evacuation plans.M III. Discussion A. The Lack of More Detailed Hospital Evacuation Plans Is Not Significant for Shoreham Section S 50.47(c)(1) authorizes the issuance of an operating license, notwith-standing the existence of unresolved emergency planning issues under S 50.47(b), if the applicant demonstrates to the Commission's satisfaction "that deficiencies in the plans are not significant for the plant in question." 10 C.F.R. S 50.47(c)(1). The overall stan-dard against which " significance" under 10 C.F.R. S 50.47(c)(1) is measured is the gener-al S 50.47(a)(1) standard of " reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a radiological emergency." Final Rule, 52 Fed.

]

Reg. at 42,080. Since 10 C.F.R. S 50.47(c)(1) was promulgated to implement the second of two licensing tiers established by Congress in the NRC Authorization Act,b the

,4_/ The Appeal Board stated that, even assuming the low probability that the hospi-tais would be evacuated, "it does not follow that the emergency response plan need not concern itself with how such an evacuation would be carried out if it should be di-rected." ALAB-832, 23 NRC 135,155 (1986). LILCO demonstrates in this Motion that, first, the LILCO Plan does in fact " concern itself" with how hospital evacuation would be carried out and, second, that the lack of any further details about hospital evacua-tion in this case is not significant. But it should also be noted that no NRC regulation requires an applicant to show that every EPZ facility could or would be evacuated under certain conditions. Seg Consolidated Edison Company of New York (Indian Point, Unit No. 2), LBP-83-68,18 NRC 811 at 993, 995 (1983) (the Licensing Board found plans for protecting institutionalized mobility-impaired persons adequate in most respects, despite New York State's sheltering-only plans for the inmates at Ossining Correctional Facility).

5/ Section 50.47(c)(1) was promulgated following passage of the NRC Authorization Act of 1980, in which Congress adopted a two-tiered approach for nuclear power plant licensing. Pub. L. No.96-295,94 Stat. 780,784, S 109(b)(1)(B)(1)(1980). In the Authori-zation Act, Congress authorized the Commission to issue operating licenses if it found that:

(I) there exists a state or local radiological emergency re- l l sponse plan which provides for responding to any ra- )

l diological emergency at the facility concerned and which (footnote continued) i 1

t

. ,. ~ S 50.47(a)(1) standard is satisfied by a showing of " reasonable assurance that public health and safety is not endangered by operation of the facility concerned." Final Rule, l 52 Fed. Reg. at 42, 081, 42,083. The Commission - and Congress - intended this stan-

' dard to be applied with more flexibility than the general 5 50.47(a)(1) standard. See Final Rule,52 Fed. Reg. at 42,079, 42,082, 42,084; Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), CLI-86-13,24 NRC 22,29 (1986).EI LILCO demonstrates in this motion that, because of the'special characteristics of the hospitals at issue, LILCO's existing hospital plans provide " reasonable assurance that public health and safety is not endangered" by Shoreham operation.

LILCO offered two key reasons for its " calculated choice" to recommend shel-tering as the preferred protective action for hospitals, and to maintain less-detailed

- evacuation plans for the hospitals. First, the hospitals are located right at or beyond the 10-mile EPZ boundary, and therefore the probability of a Shoreham accident severe enough to warrant hospital evacuation is exceedingly low. PID at 829,841-42. Second, the hospitals' heavy masonry construction gives them very high shielding effectiveness.

(footnote continued) complies with the Commission's standards for such plans under subparagraph (A), or (II) in the absence of a plan which satisfies the requirements of subclause (I), there exists a State, local, or utility plan which provides reasonable assurance that public health and safety is not endangered by operation of the facility concerned.

& . Section 50.47(c)(1) was promulgated to effectuate the second part of Congress' di-rective. See " Evaluation of the Adequacy of Off-Site Emergency Planning for Nuclear Power Plants at the Operating License Review Stage Where State and/or Local Govern-ments Decline to Participate in Off-Site Emergency Planning," Final Rule,52 Fed. Reg.

42,078, 42,079-80 (Nov. 3,1987).

!/ The Commission has stated that "it is generally clear that in Congress' view, there could be emergency planning under a utility plan that to some degree fell short of the ideal but was nevertheless adequate to protect the health and safety of the public."

Final Rule,52 Fed. Reg. at 42,079.

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% at 842.E These factors, which make it reasonable to provide for sheltering as the anticipated protective action in most cases, also support a finding that the absence of more detailed evacuation plans is not significant for Shcreham.

The three hospitals in question "are indisputedly near the 10-mile EPZ boundary."

PID at 846. In fact, two of the hospitals are just inside the 10-mile boundary and the other is totally outside the boundary; all are over 9 miles from Shoreham. PID at 829; LILCO Test. Cont. 24.J. N, 72.C, D, and 96.B (Planning for Special Facilities), ff. Tr.

9017, Vol. II at 14, 26, Att. 73. The hospitals are also about 180" apart (two are in Port Jefferson and one is in Riverhead), making it extremely unlikely that they would all be evacuated at once. S_ee LILCO Test. Cont. 24.J. N, 72.C, D, and 96.B, ff. Tr. 9017, Vol.

II, at Att.1. In any case, the hospital outside the EPZ, Central Suffolk Hospital, "would ordinarily not be evacuated on a preplanned basis," but instead would be evacuated on an ad . hoc basis. PID at 829. This is consistent with the NRC's emergency planning reg-ulations, &

Moreover, the hospital buildings offer substantial sheltering benefits. As the Li-censing Board found, LILCO will recommend that the hospitals shelter instead of evac-uate, unless LERO projects that the hospital sheltering dose would be excessive and the hospital administrators, af ter consultation with LERO, decide to evacuate their pa-tients. PID at 829, 841-46. The sheltering dose calculation would take into account the fact that the hospital buildings are constructed primarily of brick, stone, or cement block, giving them a shielding factor of 0.2. This means that each patient would be >

protected from 80% of the whole body dose that he would receive if he were outside.

7/ There is another reason why LILCO does not make a planning commitment to evacuate the hospitals under a given set of circumstances, e, that evacuation brings with it the risk of trauma and further injury to hospital patients. S_ee PID at 829,841, 843. Although this consideration is not unique to the Shoreham EPZ hospitals, it goes hand-in-hand with the first two factors and contributes to the presumption toward sheltering, and thus helps demonstrate why the absence of further evacuation details is not significant for Shoreham.

S_ee PID at 842; Tr. of 5/10/84 at 8885 (Miele); LILCO Test. Cont. 24.J. N, 72.C, D, and ,

96.B (Planning for Special Facilities), ff. Tr. 9017, Vol II, at Atts. 73,78,81,86. .

LILCO has worked with each hospital to determine how best to implement a sheltering recommendation. See e LILCO Test. Cont. 72.C, D. and 96.B (Planning for Special Facilities), ff. Tr. 9017, Vol. II, Atts. 73,74,81,86. LILCO has visited the hos-pitals, reviewed their blueprints, and discussed sheltering suggestions with hospital staffs. Id.; PID at 777. The best sheltering areas at each hospital have been chosen by health physicist specialists from LILCO and its consultants, and special needs for food and equipment have been taken into account. PID at 777. In particular, LILCO has agreed to provide special equipment such as portable oxygen and suction equipment, 1 PID at 777: Tr. of 6/5/84 at 10,060 (Miele).

LILCO witnesses testified that the likelihood of hospital patients receiving an excessive dose when they are sheltered is exceedingly remote, given the hospitals' dis-tance from the plant and the high shielding benefits of the hospital buildings. PID at 841-42. A dose of at least 25 rem in the environment at 10 miles from the plant would have to exist in order for the upper Protective Action Guideline (PAG) figure of 5 rem I whole body to be exceeded inside the hospitals. PID at 842; Tr. of 5/10/84 at 8885 (Miele). That is an " extremely low probability event." Tr. of 5/10/84 at 8885 (Miele).

The Licensing Board agreed with LILCO. It found that "LILCO's conclusions that i sheltering as a predetermined protective action will be the one required in practically all cases, given the location of the hospitals in question and the shielding factors for large buildings, is consistent with the planning basis of NUPEG-0654," especially given the " low likelihood of excessive doses and the possibility of physical harm to hospital patients." PID at 844.

These same factors that the Board considered in approving LILCO's Plan - the hospitals' distance from the plant, high shielding capabilities, and the risk in moving patients - support a finding that more detailed planning is unnecessary, and that any a

', technical deficiencies in the plans under NRC regulations are not significant in this case. Indeed, the Licensing Board in effect made such a finding, although not in the context of 10 C.F.R. S 50.47(c)(1), when it concluded that "the additional increment of risk to hospital patients over that of the general public does not stand as a barrier to 11-censing." PID at 846.

In addition, the absence of written agreements with reception hospitals is not significant for Shoreham. LILCO sut'mits that the Licensing Board was correct in its determination that agreements with reception hospitals are unnecessary and useless, see PID at 840, and that, therefore, the lack of agreements is not significant under 10 C.F.R. S 50.47(c)(1).

The Licensing Board concluded as follows with regard to reception hospitals:

LILCO has done all that could be reasonably expected in its attempt to find relocation centers for hospitals that might be evacuated. Hospitals in Suffolk County have been contacted and they have agreed to accept as many patients as possible in the event of an emergency. They decline to specify in ad-vance the numbers of patients that they would accept in an emergency because they cannot foresee what space or facill- ,

ties they would have available. The reception hospitals' deci- i sion not to commit to specific numbers results from a realls-tic assessment of what they can and cannot commit to regarding their future actions. Letters of agreements could not alter that situation. Therefore, we do not find the Plan deficient as regards identification of reception hospitals or letters of agreement with them . . . . We therefore find that no additional benefit to public health and safety could be ob-tained by requiring letters of agreement between EPZ hospi-tais and potential receiving hospitals. These hospitals are on notice that they could be called upon for assistance and the Board accepts that they will do all they can to assist.

PID at 840. There can be no better support for a 10 C.F.R. S 50.47(c)(1) "not signifi-cant" finding than the fact that adding the emergency planning item lacking - in this case agreements with reception hospitals -- would do no good at all. This is precisely what the Licensing Board previously found, M, that because of all the variables associ-ated with hospital populations (such as the amount of surgery being performed at any given time, unpredictable patient recovery times, and unpredictable hospital

, l populations), hospital officials can only assess their ability to accept additional patients 1

at the time they are asked to do so, and agreements to that end "could not alter that situation." PID at 839-40; s_ee LILCO Test. Cont, 24.J. N, 72.C, D, and 96.B (Planning

for Special Facilities), ff. Tr. 9017, Vol. II, at 15. If agreements with reception hospi-tals would have no effect on public health and safety, then certainly the absence of such agreements in the LILCO Plan is not significant.

B. Further Codification of Planning Details for Hospital Evacuation is an Appropriate Matter for Staff Oversight The existing record shows that LILCO has planned extensively for hospital evac-uation. Specifically, the record contains details concerning the LERO personnel wno would coordinate a hospital evacuation, the procedures they would follow in identifying reception hospitals, the vehicles that would be used, and general estimates as to how long it would take. PID at 829, 831, 835-47. The record also shows that LILCO's Plan contains a list of all potential reception hospitals along with their addresses, phone numbers, and the names of the persons to contact at each. E at 839-40; s_ee LILCO ,

Plan, OPIP 3.6.5, Att. 5.

LILCO will soon file with the NRC and all parties copies of Revision 9 to the LILCO Plan. Revision 9 will contain hospital evacuation time estimates and a few more details concerning the implementation of hospital evacuation than were in previous re-visions (Material Facts 11, Dreikorn Affidavit 12).EI Rev. 9 will expand on existing plans by detailing further the actions that certain LERO officials must take to imple-ment hospital evacuation, detailing how ambulance and ambulette drivers would be di- i rected to the evacuating hospital (s), and adding the specific time estimates that the Appeal Board and Commission found lacking (Material Facts 11, 4 Dreikorn Affidavit 1/ Throughout the rest of this motion, the numbers referenced in parentheses rep-resent the numbers of the paragraphs in the " Statement of Material Facts" and perti-nent affidavit, respectively, that support the statement.

1 2, 5). The Rev. 9 changes will not materially alter information concerning hospital evacuation that is already on the record in this case. For that reason, there is no need i or justification for allowing new contentions or holding more hearings on the adequacy of LILCO's hospital evacuation plans. The Board should instead instruct the Staff to re-view the Rev. 9 enhancements and confirm that they comport with NRC require-ments.E As noted above, the Appeal Board found that an applicant must provide evacua-tion time estimates for hospitals, and that "such an analysis cannot be made for the hospitals without an awareness of the extent of the transportation that might be re-quired to remove the patients from the EPZ, as well as an understanding of how and when the evacuation would be accomplished." ALAB-832, 23 NRC 135,156-57 (1986).

As set forth more fully below, the existing record, with the additional detail that will be supplied in Revision 9 of the LILCO Plan, contains the information deemed missing by the Appeal Board.O

1. The LILCO Plan Defines the Transportation that Might be Required to Evacuate the Hospitals The Board has already found that "the physical capability for evacuating patients exists if needed." PID at 831. Transportation of hospital patients would be 1

9/ This would be consistent with the Waterford case, which adjures licensing boards l to concentrate on planning issues and not the details of implementation. Louisiana Power and Light Co. (Waterford Steam Elec. Station, Unit 3), ALAB-732,17 NRC 1076, 1103-04,1106-07 (1983) ("the Commission never intended the implementing procedures i to be required for the ' reasonable assurance' finding and thus to be prepared and subject to scrutiny during the hearing").

M/ LILCO still does not have signed agreements with reception hospitals. For the reasons stated in part III.A, above, LILCO believes that the lack of such agreements is  ;

not significant under 10 C.F.R. S 50.47(c)(1). As the Board found, LILCO has contacted i each of the potential reception hospitals, and they have agreed to accept as many pa- i tients as possible in the event of an emergency. PID at 840. The reception hospitals decline to enter into specific written agreements in advance, however, because of their

" realistic assessment of what they can and cannot commit to regarding their future ac-tions." & The Board found that " letters of agreement could not alter that situation."

E Nevertheless, LILCO will continue its efforts to contact and obtain written agree-ments with the reception hospitals (Material Facts 111, Dreikorn Affidavit 18). j i

, l accomplished using the same 63 ambulances and 130 ambulettes that LILCO already has

{

under contract. PiD at 829.M These vehicles would become available af ter completing the evacuation of nursing and adult homes, which would be evacuated first because of their closer proximity to Shoreham. &

The existing Plan already states, for each hospital, the total bed capacity. OPIP 3.6.5, Att. 2 (Rev. 8) (Material Facts 12, Dreikorn Affidavit 13). Revision 9 of the LlLCO Plan further defines the transportation requirements for a hospital evacuation by quantifying the number of beds that would ordinarily hold ambulatory patients, wheelchair patients, and patients that would require stretchers (Material Facts 12, Dreikorn Affidavit 13).' The numbers are as follows:

Total Beds A mbulatory Wheelchair Stretcher Central Suffolk 142 40 57 45 Hospital St. Charles 271 62 149 47 Hospital John T. Mather 238 60 118 60 Hospital (Material Facts 12, Dreikorn Affidavit 13). - Revision 9 of the Plan also translates these numbers into vehicle requirements, using the same vehicle capacity assumptions that were used in calculating the existing evacuation time estimates for special facili-ties (including the Suffolk Infirmary) and litigated on the record. See LILCO Test.

Cont. 72.A and E, ff. Tr. 9101, at 6., Att.1: PID at 829, 830-31 (Material Facts 13, Dreikorn Affidavit 14).EI Of course, the vehicle requirements are only estimates:

11/ Additional ambulances would be available to help evacuate the hospitals. There are 61 ambulances belonging to towns and volunteer fire companies that are not relied upon in the LILCO Plan. PID at 829. The Board found that "these ambulances could be called by special facilities or individuals if needed." % In addition, it is reasonable to l assume that ambulances and ambulettes owned by or under contract with Suffolk Coun-l- ty would be released for use in evacuating the hospitals, consistent with the "best ef-forts" response that LILCO is entitled to expect under the October 29,1987 amend-ments to 10 C.F.R. 5 50.47(c).

12/ LILCO assumes the following vehicle capacities: 2 stretchers per ambulance,7 j wheelchairs per ambulette (average), and 40 ambulatory patients per bus. S_ee_ LILCO (footnote continued)

because of the hospitals' fluctuating populations, their actual transportation needs would have to be determined at the time of an emergency. S_ee PID at 844-45; LILCO Test. Cont. 72.A and E, ff. Tr. 9101, at 11-13. In addition, since the pool of vehicles to be used is already established, the vehicle requirements to be provided in Rev. 9 really represent the number of trips that contracted vehicles would have to make to evacuate hospital patients af ter first evacuating other special f acility populations, not the num-ber of separate vehicles required.

2. The LILCO Plan Provides an Understanding of How Hospital Evacuation Would be Accomplished The existing record says a great deal about how a hospital evacuation would be accomplished. Revision 9 to the LILCO Plan will merely specify in greater detail the procedures that would be used and the LERO personnel who would use them.

The existing record provides ample details about implementing hospital evacua-tion. As the Licensing Board found, the Plan calls for a sheltering recommendation for the hospitals, even if the general population has been asked to evacuate, unless LERO projects that the hospital sheltering dose would be excessive and the hospital adminis-trators decide to evacuate their patients. PID at 829; 841-46. 5 If the hospital admin-istrators decide, af ter consulting with LERO, to evacuate their hospitals, LERO person-nel would arrange for transportation. PID at 829, 845. The LERO Health Facilities (footnote continued)

Test. Cont. 72.A and E, ff. Tr. 9101, at 6, Att.1. The resulting vehicle requirement es-timates are as follows: Central Suffolk Hospital- 1 bus,23 ambulances,12 ambulettes; St. Charles Hospital - 2 buses, 24 ambulances, 22 ambulettes; John T. Mather Hospital

- 2 buses,30 ambulances,17 ambulettes (Material Facts 13, Dreikorn Affidavit 14).

l

, 13/ In defining what an excessive dose is, LILCO would be guided by the exposure l levels prescribed in the EPA guidelines. PID at 842. LILCO would use the EPA PAGs as guidelines and not as triggering thresholds for evacuation. Id. The EPA manual specifies that in some circumstances different criteria than the normal protective ac-tion guides apply to special groups including bedridden and critically ill patients. Id. at 841. The decision whether to evacuate the hospitals wmid be based on judgments made at the time of an accident rather than on predetermined criteria. @ at 842.

l Coordinator would contact the hospitals to determine their exact transportation needs. l

@ at 845. This information would be relayed to the Transportation Support Coordinator and the Ambulance Coordinator, who would direct vehicles to each hospi-tal. & The Hospital Coordinator, meanwhile, would contact the potential reception hospitals listed in OPIP 3.6.5 Att. 5 to determine where there is available space for hos-pital evacuees. S_ee OPIP 3.6.5,5 5.5.1 (Rev. 8). This information would be provided to the Health Facilities Coordinator, who would assign evacuating patients to reception hospitals. S_e_e OPIP 3.6.5 SS 5.5.4,5.5.5 (Rev. 8). The Hospital Coordinator would then contact each reception hospital to inform them that evacuating patients will be arriv-ing. OPIP 3.6.5 S 5.5.5 (Rev. 8).

Revision 9 will add a few more details to hospital evacuation planning without materially changing the existing procedures (Material Facts 14, Dreikorn Affidavit 1 5). For example, under Rev. 9 the Hospital Coordinator, when contacting potential reception hospitals, will verify that each is or is not capable of monitoring incoming evacuees. OPIP 3.6.5 5 5.5.1 (Rev. 9)(Material Facts 14, Dreikorn Affidavit 15). Also under Rev. 9, the Hospital Coordinator will assign evacuating patients to reception hos-pitals, ask the reception hospitals to have personnel from their nuclear medicine or ra-diology staffs monitor the incoming patients, and offer monitoring assistance to any re-ception hospital that requests it. OPIP 3.6.5 5 5.5.5 (Rev. 9) (Material Facts 1 4, Dreikorn Affidavit 15). In addition, Rev. 9 will add the hospital evacuation time esti-mates, which are discussed in part III.B.3 below, to the factors to be considered in deciding whether to recommend evacuation for the hospitals under OPIP 3.6.1 (Material l

Facts 14, Dreikorn Affidavit 15). Finally, OPIP 3.6.5 S 5.6.6(c) (Rev. 9) will instruct the Ambulance Coordinator to direct each ambulance or ambulette driver who is evacuating a hospital to contact him upon arrival at the reception hospital. The Ambu-lance Coordinator will tell the driver to return to the evacuating hospital for more pa-tients, without stopping off at the Brentwood EWDF, if more patients remain to be

evacuated. OPIP 3.6.5 5 5.6.6. (c) (Rev. 9) (Material Facts 14, Dreikorn Affidavit 15).

These changes constitute the universe of substantive additions that Rev. 9 makes to LILCO's hospital evacuation plans, aside from the hospital occupancy figures added to OPIP 3.6.5 Attachment 2 and the time estimates added to Appendix A (Material Facts 15, Dreikorn Af fidavit 16). See part III.B.1, supra.

The LILCO Plan still contains a list of all the potential reception hospitals in Suffolk and Nassau Counties, along with their addresses and phone numbers. OPIP 3.6.5, Att. 5. The only change Rev. 9 makes to this list is that it will contain only those hospitals at least 5 miles beyond the edge of the 10-mile EPZ that can treat contami-nated individuals, as indicated by their JCAH (Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals) accreditation in nuclear medicine and/or radiology. See FEMA Guidance Memorandum MS-1, " Medical Services," at 2 (Nov.13,1986)(Material Facts 1 6, Dreikorn Affidavit 17). As with the three hospitals in or near the EPZ, however, spe-cific information about their occupancy (and thus their ability to receive patients of a given type) is unavailable in advance of an actual emergency, given the daily flux in hospital populations. _Se_e PID at 839-40.El Finally, it should be remembered that the hospitals themselves are required to have their own internal evacuation procedures. The Board has already found that M/ In the Shoreham Exercise (OL-5) proceeding, Intervenor witnesses Harris and Mayer complained that Attachment 5 to OPIP 3.6.5 (listing the potential reception hos-pitals) contains blank spaces where specific information concerning each hospital's oc-cupancy would be filled in. Tr. of April 8,1987 at 3019-22. (Harris, Mayer). Judge Shon opined that it was unreasonable to expect LILCO to fill in that information prior to an emergency:

I wonder why you would expect the data to be filled in on these forms considering the nature of the data. It seems to me to be of the nature of information as to how many of vari-ous kinds of beds are available at the moment. I would think it would not be possible to fill it in until the day of the emer-gency...

Tr. 3022 (Judge Shon).

i

. _ig.

hospitals and nursing homes are required by the New York State Hospital code to have written emergency and disaster preparedness plans rehearsed and updated at least twice a year. PID at 839; see LILCO Test. Cont. 24.J. N,72.C, D and 96.B (Planning for Special Facilities), f f. Tr. 9017, Vol. II, at 16. Intervenor witness Dr. Harris has testified more recently that "all these facilities have to have in place a co. 'ingency plan for evacuation in case of a natural disaster." Tr. 3027 (Harris)(Exercise OL-5 pro-ceeding, April 8,1987) (see Att.1). The same evacuation procedures could be used dur-ing a radiological incident at Shoreham. Thus, there is no need for LILCO to develop separate procedures for the actual handling and moving of hospital patients during an evacuation, because the hospital staffs will perform those functions according to the hospitals' existing emergency plans.

In short, the existing record already provides an adequate description of how an evacuation of the hospitals would be accomplished. Ravision 9 will add a few additional details, and will clarify the functions of LERO personnel previously identified as being responsible for implementing hospital evacuation. These additional details do not re-quire the expenditure of more hearing time, however; they are implementation details that the Waterford case says should be relegated to the Staff for review and confirma-tion. The Board should simply instruct the Staff and FEMA to confirm that the LILCO Plan in fact provides an understanding of how a hospital evacuation would be accom-plished.

3. The LILCO Plan Provides an Understanding of When Ho_sgital Evacuation Would Be Accomplished Both the Appeal Board and the Commission found that NRC regulations require an applicant to provide evacuation time estimates for hospitals in the EPZ. ALAB-832, 23 MRC 135,154-57; CLI-87-12, slip op, at 22 (Nov. 5,1987). LILCO will provide the NRC with those estimates in Rev. 9 of the LILCO Plan (Material Facts 17, Lieberman Affidavit 12). They show that all three hospitals could be evacuated in, at most,12-121 hours under normal conditions (Material Facts 110, Lieberman Affidavit 15).

The record already contains most of the information upon which these hospital evacuation time estimates are based (Material Facts 18, Lieberman Affidavit 13).

Many of the same assumptions and procedural steps were used in calculating time esti-mates for the special faellities and the Suffolk Infirmary, which is treated just like the hospitals for purposes of evacuation under the LILCO Plan. LILCO Test. Cont. 72.A l

and E, ff. Tr. 9101, at 5-10; se_e PID at 835-38, 845-46.E/ LILCO testified that the Suffolk Infirmary could be completely evacuated in 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />,50 minutes, and the Board l

found that "the evacuation of hospitals could well take similar amounts of time at least with regard to ambulances." PID at 845-46. The assumptions used in calculating the time estimates for the Suffolk Infirmary and other special facilities were fully litigated and were found acceptable by the Board. PID at 838 ("LILCO's calculations of evacua-tion times for special f acilities that rely on ambulances and ambulettes are based on re-alistic assumptions.")

The only new assumptions used in calculating specific evacuation time estimates for the hospitals concern the reception hospitals used. Specifically, it was assumed that (1) the reception hospitals used are at least 5 miles beyond the edge of the EPZ,EI (2) the reception hospitals are capable of handling contaminated individuals, (3) the re-ception hospitals have 14% of their total capacity available to accommodate home-bound handicapped and hospital evacuees,EI and (4) af ter delivering evacuees to 1_5/ The travel speeds for areas west of the EPZ were updated to reflect those speeds used in LILCO's testimony in the reception centers remand proceeding. See LILCO Ex-hibit 1 (" Written Testimony of Charles A. Daverio, Dale E. Donaldson, Edward B.

Lieberman, Roger E. Linneman, Michael K. Lindell, Dennis S. Mileti, and Richard J.

Watts on the Suitability of Reception Centers"), ff. Tr.17,421, at 7 (Material Facts 18, Lieberman Affidavit 13).

1_6/ This assumption arises out of the NUREG-0654 requirement that emergency plans include " relocation centers in host areas which are at least 5 miles, and pre-ferably 10 miles, beyond the boundaries of the plume exposure emergency planning zone." NUREG-0654 5 II.J.10.h. (Material Facts 19, Lieberman Affidavit 14).

1_7/ The 14% figure is based on information concerning national hospital occupancy rates received by a member of the LERIO staff from the American Hospital Association (Material Facts 19, Lieberman Affidavit 14).

i

, reception hospitals, the vehicle drivers are immediately available for additional trips, if necessary (Material Facts 19, Lieberman Affidavit 14). Of course, the selection of re-ception hospitals depends on their ability to accept evacuating patients, which (as dis-cussed above) cannot be predicted in advance. In short, calculation of time estimates for hospital evacuation was largely a ministerial exercise based on procedural steps and assumptions that were fully litigated on the record, and on additional assumptions that follow logically from the selection of reception hospitals.

IV. Conclusion For the reasons set out above, the Board should grant LILCO's motion for sum-mary disposition of the remanded hospital evacuation issue.

Respectfully submitted, A at a .

N Donald P. Irwin James N. Christman Scott D. Matchett DATED: December 18, 1987

1

(

l l STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS AS TO WHICH l LILCO CONTENDS THERE IS NO GENUINE ISSUE TO BE l HEARD ON THE REMANDED HOSPITAL EVACUATION ISSUE

1. LILCO will soon file with the NRC and all parties copies of Revision 9 to the LILCO Plan. Revision 9 will include a few more details concerning the imple-1 mentation of hospital evacuation than were in previous revisions. Revision 9 will also contain evacuation time estimates for the hospitals and a list of the procedural steps and assumptions used in calculating them.

2. The existing LILCO Plan already states the total bed capacity for each of the three hospitals in OPIP 3.6.5 Att. 2 (Rev. 8). Revision 9 adds a breakdown of that number for each hospital into the estimated numbers of potential ambulatory patients, wheelchair-bound patients, and patients that would be moved on stretchers. These numbers were obtained in telephone riiscussions between hospital officials and a mem-ber of the LERIO staff. The numbers are as follows: Central Suffolk Hospital--40 am-bulatory,57 wheelchair, 45 stretcher; St. Charles Hospital-62 ambulatory,149 wheel-chair, 47 stretcher; John T. Mather Hospital--60 ambulatory,118 wheelchair, 60 stretcher.

3. Revision 9 of the Plan also translates the patient occupancy estimates into vehicle requirements, using the same vehicle capacity assumptions that were used in calculating the existing evacuation time estimates for special f acilities and the Suffolk Infirmary. Those assumptions have already been litigated and approved by the Board; they were contained in LILCO's Testimony on Contentions 72.A and E, ff. Tr. 9101, at 6 and Att.1, and are discussed in the PID at pages 830-31 and 835-38. The vehicle capac-ity assumptions are as follows: 2 stretchers per ambulance, 7 wheelchairs per ambulette (average), and 40 ambulatory patients per bus. The resulting vehicle require-ment estimates are as follows: Central Suffolk Hospital-1 bus, 23 ambulances,12 ambulettes; St. Charles Hospital-2 buses, 24 ambulances, 22 ambulettes; John T.

Mather Hospital-2 buses,30 ambulances,17 ambulettes.

.g.

4. Revision 9 does not contain any major substantive changes in the proce-

^

dures that would be used to implement a hospital evacuation. Revision 9 does add a few additional details concerning LERO's initiation and coordination of an evacuation. For example:

a. When contacting reception hospitals, the Hospital Coordinator will verify that each is or is not capable of monitoring incoming evacuees for radiological contam-ination. OPIP 3.6.5 5 5.5.1 (Rev. 9). If the hospital staff is capable of monitoring evacuees, the Hospital Coordinator will ask them to do c. If the hospital staff does not have sufficient monitoring capabilities and requests monitoring assistance from LERO, the Hospital Coordinator will have a LERO monitor (s) sent to that hospital. OPIP 3.6.5 5 5.5.5 (Rev. 9),

b. Under Rev. 9 the Hospital Coordinator, not the Health Facilities Coordinator, assigns evacuating patients to reception hospitals, starting with those reception hos-pitals closest to the EPZ. OPIP 3.6.5 5 5.5.5 (Rev. 9).

c. Revision 9 adds hospital evacuation time estimates to the factors to be considered in deciding whether to recommend evacuation for the hospitals under OPIP 3.6.1.

d. Under Rev. 9, the Ambulance Coordinator will direct each ambulance or ambulette driver who is evacuating a hospital to contact him at the EOC upon arrival at the reception hospital. The Ambulance Coordinator will tell the driver to return to the evacuating hospital for more patients, without stopping off at the

r

l. l l

Brentwood EWDF, if more patients remain to be evacu-ated. OPIP 3.6.5 S 5.6.6(c) (Rev. 9).

1

5. Aside from the hospital evacuation time estimates, which are being added to Appendix A of the LILCO Plan, and the hospital occupancy figures added to OPIP 3.6.5 Att. 2, the details specified above are the only substantive additions or changes that Rev. 9 makes to the hospital evacuation procedures in the LILCO Plan.

6. The list of reception hospitals in OPIP 3.6.5, Att. 5 has been modified slightly so that it now includes only those hospitals at least 5 miles beyond the edge of the 10-mile EPZ that can treat contaminated individuals, as indicated by their JCAH (Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals) accreditation in nuclear medicine and/or radiology.

7. LILCO has calculated specific evacuation time estimates for the three hos-pitals in or near the Shoreham 10-mile Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ). They will be i contained in Rev. 9 of the LILCO Plan.

8. Most of the procedural steps and assumptions used in calculating the hospi-tal evacuation time estimates are identical to the ones used previously to calculate evacuation time estimates for the special facilities in the EPZ, including the Suffolk In-firmary. Those time estimates, and the procedures and assumptions used in calculating l

them, have already been litigated in this proceeding. They were contained in LILCO's Testimony on Contentions 72.A and E., ff. Tr. 9101, and were discussed in the Licensing Board's Partial Initial Decision (PID), at pages 835-38. Travci speeds for areas west of the EPZ boundary were modified to reflect the updated speeds used in LILCO's testimo-ny in the reception centers remand proceeding. S_ee, e.g., LILCO Exhibit 1 (" Written Testimony of Charles A. Daverio, Dale E. Donaldson, Edward B. Lieberman, Roger E.

Linneman, Michael K. Lindell, Dennis S. Mileti, and Richard J. Watts on the Suitability of Reception Centers"),it. Tr.17,421 at 7.

l l

, 4 i

9. The only new assumptions used in calculating hospital evacuation time esti-

! mates concern the reception hospitals used. Specifically, it was assumed that:

a. Patients were allocated among reception hospitals (listed in the LILCO Plan at OPIP 3.6.5, Att. 5) starting with those located at least 5 miles beyond the Shoreham EPZ boundary. This assumption arises out of NUREG-0654 S II.J.10.h, which requires emergency plans to include " relocation centers in host areas wh!ch are at least 5 miles, and preferably 10 miles, beyond the boundaries of the plume exposure emergency plan-ning zone."

b. Only reception hospitals capable of handling contami-nated individuals were used,

c. Reception hospitals were assumed to have 14% of their total capacity available to accomodate evacuated hos-pital patients and the homebound handicapped. This figure is based on information about national hospital occupancy rates received by a member of the LERIO staff from the American Hospital Association.

d. Af ter delivering evacuees to reception hospitals, the vehicle drivers are immediately available for additional trips,if necessary.

10. The hospital evacuation time estimates, under three sets of conditions, are as follows:

Normal Conditions Summer Winter Central Suffolk 12:19 15:52 16:51 Hospital St. Charles 12:20 16:13 17:14 Hospital John T. Mather 12:00 15:42 16:41 Hospital

11. LILCO will continue its efforts to contact and obtain written agreements with reception hospitals.

Attachment 1 UhllEU STATES 1WCLEAR REGULATORY COMNESSION IN THE MATTER OF: . DOCKET NO: 50-322-oL-5 SHOREHAM NUCLEAR PCWER STATION, UNIT 1 (EP EXERCISE)

LOCATION: EAUPPAUGE, NY PAGES: 2987 - 3138 DATE: WEDNESDAY, APRIL 8, 1987 ACE-FEDERAL REFoRi ci<s, LNc.

c p =i. w m m 444 North Camtol Street Washmeten, b.C. 20001 (20'2) 347-3700 NAUCNWCE COVERACE

I 3 I- ,

\  ;

r 3026 d'c0400 3 18U i;, Police Department or County. l j ! 2;l You know, LERO is not an official agency. If I 3

was an administrator of a nursing home, I would worry about !

legal liability in evacuating sick people on the word of a 5

private agency. I have legal problems with that. I'm in l 6

charge of those persons. It's my legal responsibility.

7 0 To the best of your recollection, have special I 8

facilities and/or hospitals ever been evacuated during any kind of natural disaster emergency in Suffolk County? l

• f

'O MS. LETSCHE: That has been asked and answered Ii f

' 1 l believe.

I 12 l JUDGE FRYE: Overruled. ,

'3 MR. MATCHETT: I don't think it was. l JUDGE FRYE: Overruled. .

i 1 15 WITNESS HARRIS: I was going to say, I believe  !

'6l they have. I'm not quite sure of the dates, and undoubtedly 4 l "l

I will get the date of this hurricane wrong. But, it was within the last two decades.

Hurricane Belle which I --

0 WITNESS MAYER: '76.

2' WITNESS HARRIS: '76. There was sc.me evacuation 22 of adult homes and maybe a nursing home or two along the ,

23 South Shore, and I believe that occurred during that

'4 Hurricane Belle or before, before the hurricane.

f 25 BY MR. MATCHETT: (Continuing) l l 1

1 .

.R f l

0404 3027 d

alsh l 3l Q Do you happen to remember the extent of the i1 2 evacuation, what kinds of -- what numbers of facilities 2

evacuated? 4 i

A (Witness Harris) No. And, my recollection is 5I hazy for it. But, I do believe that they were evacuated 6

under supervision by State Health and County Health people 7

to a specific destination chosen. ,1

'3 Q Were the evacuation procedures used, again to I

7 the best of your recollection, part of the County's plan to !

'O so evacuate those populations or was the evacuation i procedure implemented ad hoc on the day of the emergency? '

12 l A My recollection is that all these facilities

'3 l have to have in place a contingency plan for evacuation in Id case of such a natural disaster. And, it is my recollect 3 15 that they proceeded along the lines of that pre-conceived 16 and established plan.

Whether there were any changes in the plan at 8

the last minute to deal with the reality or not, I don't

' recall. So, there may have been some departures from the 20 plan. But, I think they evacuated in accordance with a  :

21 preset plan. .

22 Q Okay. On the same page, Page 21, in the next i 23 paragraph beginning with the word "Second," do you see that?

24 A Yes. ,!

25 Q Where you say that it is not easy to register, l l

i I

i I

_