ML20237D184
| ML20237D184 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Fort Saint Vrain  |
| Issue date: | 12/16/1987 |
| From: | Stello V NRC OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS (EDO) |
| To: | Thomas W HOUSE OF REP. |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20237D187 | List: |
| References | |
| TAC-66365, NUDOCS 8712230098 | |
| Download: ML20237D184 (5) | |
Text
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The Honorable William M. Thomas United States House of Representatives Washington, DC 20515
Dear Congressman Thomas:
This is in response to.your request of November 10, 1987, in which you cnclosed a letter from your constituent, Mr. Walter G. Schmidt of Taft, California.
Mr. Taft expressed concern about a fire that took place on October 2, 1987 at the Fort St. Vrain Nuclear Power Plant in Colorado and suggested a method to mitigate similar fires in nuclear power plants.
l The Fort St. Vrain fire was initiated by a hydraulic oil system leak onto a hot pipe. Mr. Taft suggests that a collection system be installed to direct leaking hydraulic oil away from the hot pipe. A collection system similar to that suggested by Mr. Taft is required by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and is in place at Fort St. Vrain to collect leakage and direct it away from hot pipes.
However, in this instance the capacity of the collection system was exceeded and hydraulic oil overflowed onto the hot pipe, initiating a fire. The fire was detected, put out, and the plant was safely shut down without endangering the public health and safety.
The safety concept governing the design and operation of nuclear power plants in the United States employs multiple features and systems to protect the public health and safety. With regard to fires, the plants are designed and operated to minimize the enance of fire. Noncombustible materials are used to the greatest extent possible in construction. Administrative procedures are utilized during plant operations to control introduction of other combustibles into sensitive areas of the plant. Additionally, means are provided to promptly detect and put out any fire that should occur. To this end, automatic fire detectors are installed in those areas with large concentrations of combustibles (such as insulation on electrical cables and combustible hydraulic or lubrication oil systems) and automatic and/or manual fire fighting capability is provided for all areas of a plant.
A contributing factor to the fire at Fort St. Vrain was the absence of a flow limiting device to control the amount of hydraulic oil going to the collection system. This flow limiting device was inadvertently left out of the hydraulic system. As a result of this flow limiting device being left out, hydraulic oil flow was about seventeen gallons per minute rather than the intended one gallon per minute. The oil collection system could not handle this excessive flow and oil spilled out.
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i The Honorable William M. Thomas -
immediately after the fire, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the licensee formed. independent investigatory groups to. determine the cause and'effect of the fire and the need for corrective measures.- Before authorizing restart,-
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission will ensure-that appropriate measures are in place' to minimize the potential for a similar fire in the future.
We appreciate this opportunity'to respond to your constituent's concern.
Sincerely,
. Signed) T. A,lichm
(
Victor Stello, Jr.
Executive Director for Operations i
DISTRIBUTION Centrabfile
.J. Richardson D. Mossburg GT 003293 CA PDR L. Shao GT 003293 C. Paul 87-80 SECY 87-1298 ECEB Reading File R. Starostecki EDO R/F ED0 3293 ECEB Subject File F. Miraglia F. Gillespie D. Notley T. Murley C. McCracken V. Stello C. Thomas J. Blaha i
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Fourth, even with these other three levels of Defense-in-Depth, we assume that a TfFe'may occur and burn out of control for an extended period of time.
Therefore, means must be provided to ensure that a large fire in a nuclear power plant will not endanger the public. This is accomplished by requiring that redundant safety systems be located in different areas of the plant so that a fire involving a safety system area will not endanger the redundant system that is located in another area.
A contributing factor to the fire at Fort St. Vrain was-the absence of a flow limiting device to control the amount of hydraulic oil going to the collection system. This flow limiting device was inadvertently left'out of the hydraulic system. As a result of this flow limiting device being,.left out, hydraulic oil flow was about seventeen gallons per minute rather,than the intended one gallon per minute. The oil collection system could-~not handle this excessive flow and oil spilled out.
Immediately after the fire, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the licensee formed independent investigatory groups to determine the cause and effect of the fire and the need for corrective measures. Before authorizing restart, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission will ensure that appropriate measures are in place to minimize the potential for a similar fire in the future.
We appreciate this opportunity to respond to your constituent's concern.
Sincerely, Victor Stello, Jr.
Executive Director for Operations DISTRIBUTION Central File J. Richardson C. Paul 87-80 PDR L. Shao GT 003293 CA (3)
ECEB Reading File R. Starostecki SECY (871298)
ECEB Subject File T. Murley DMorris (ED0-003293)
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==______________________
FROM:
DUE: 12/02/87 EDO CONTROL.: 003293 DOC ~DT: 11/10/87 REP. WILLIAM M.
THOMAS FINAL REPLY
- TO '
OCA s
'FORI~ SIGNATURE OF:
- ' GREEN SECY NO: 871298 LEXECUTIVE DIRECTOR DESC:
ROUTING:
ENCLOSES LETTTER FROM WALTER SCHMIDT SUGGESTING
'A METHOD TO MITIGATE THE POSSIBILITY OF FIRE IN
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. Qc-NUCLEAR PLANTS
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Id~ l DATE: 11/17/87 d)
ASSIGNED TO: NRR CONTACT: MURLEY j,y
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SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS OR REMARKS:
NRR RECEIVED: NOVEMBER. 18, 1987-
' ACTION:
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NRR ROUTING:
MURLEY/SNIEZEK MIRAGLIA ACTION STAROSTECKI GILLESPIE DUE TO NRR DIRECTOR'S OFFICE
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OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY CORRESPONDENCE CONTROL TICKET PAPER NUMBER:
CRC-87-1298 LOGGING DATE: Nov 16 87 ACTION OFFICE:
EDO l
e AUTHOR:
W.M. Thomas--Const Ref AFFILIATION:
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES LETTER DATE:
Nov 10 87 FILE CODE:
SUBJECT:
Method to mitigate the possiblity of fire in'nue plants ACTION:
Direct Reply DISTRIBUTION:
OCA to Ack SPECIAL HANDLING: None NOTES:
Walter Schmidt DATE DUE:
Nov 25 87 SIGNATURE:
DATE SIGNED:
AFFILIATION:
Rec'd Off. ED0 Date I / - / 7' R 7 Time IO E DO --- 00J293
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