ML20236Y393
| ML20236Y393 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Catawba  |
| Issue date: | 12/04/1987 |
| From: | DUKE POWER CO. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20236Y392 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8712110292 | |
| Download: ML20236Y393 (7) | |
Text
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ATTACHMENT I TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION CHANGES f
i 8712110292 871204ADOCK 05000413 PDR PDR p
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PLANT SYSTEMS 1
STEAM GENERATOR POWER-OPERATED RELIEF VALVES LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.7.1.6 Four steam generator power-operated relief valves (PORVs) and associated remote manual controls, including the safety-related gas supply systems, shall be OPERAELE.
APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.*
ACTION:
a.
With one less than the required steam generator PORVs OPERABLE, restore the inoperable steam generator PORV to OPERABLE status within 30 days; or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.
b.
With two less than the required steam generator PORVs OPERABLE, restore at least one of the inoperable steam generator PORVs to OPERABLE status within j
7 days or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.7.1.6 Each steam generator PORV and associated remote manual controls l
including the safety-related gas supply systems shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:
k a.
At least once per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> by verifying that at least one of the two nitrogen bottles associated with each PORV has a pressure greater than or equal to 2l00 psig, and b.
At least once per 18 months and prior to startup following any refueling shutdown by verifying that all steam generator PORVs will operate through one cycle of full travel using remote manual controls and safety-related gas supply.
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- When steam generators are being used for decay heat removal.
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CATAWBA - UNITS 1 & 2 3/4 7-9a l
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c-PLANT SYSTEMS BASES E 4.7.1.2' AUXILI RY FEEDWATER SYSTEM The OPERA 8ILITY of the Auxiliary Feedwater System ensures that the Reactor Cociant. System can be cooled docn to less than 350*F from normal operating
. conditions in the event of a feedwater line-break accident.with a' worst case
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-. U The Auxiliary Feedwetar Systas is capahie oft del.ivering a total feedwater flow of at least 492 gpa at a pressure of 1210 psig to the e67 trance of at least two of the steam generators.
This capacity is sufficient to ensure that adecuate feedwater flow is available to remove decay heat and reduce the Reactor Coolant System temperature to less than 350*F woes the Residual Heat. Removal Systes.may.
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. be.prlaced-foto. operation.-
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3/4.T.1.3 SPECIFIC ACTIVITY The Ifmitations on Secondary Coolant Systemt specific activity ensure that.
the resultant offsite radiation dose will be limited to a small fraction of &
10 CFR Part 100 dose guideline values in the event of a-steams line rupture. I-This dose also includes the effects of a coincident 1 gper reactor to secondary tune leak in. ther steas generator of the affseted stsas if ne.
These values are consistent with the assumptions used in the safety analyses.
3/4.7.1.4 MAIN STEAM LINE ISOLATION VALVES The QPERA8ILITY of the main staan line isolation valves ensures that no more than one steam generator will blow down in the event of a steam line This restriction is required to:
(1) minimize the positive reac-rupture.
tivity effects of the Reactor Coolant System cooldown assoctated with the
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blowdown, and (2) limit the pressure rise within containment in the event the steam line rupture occurs within containment. The OPERA 8ILITY of the main steam isolat'ioa valves within the closure times of the Surveillance Require-ments are consistent with the assumptions used in the safety analyses.
-3/4.7.1.5 CONOENSATE STORAGE SYSTEM
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The OPERASILITV of the Condensate Storage Systas with the minimum water volume ensures that sufficient water is available to maintain the Reactor Coolant system at HOT STAN08Y conditions for 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> followed by approximately 5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> cooldown with steam discharge to the atmosphere concurrent with total The contained water volume limit incivdes an allowance h
loss-of-offsight power.for water not usuable becauss of tank discharge line tocation or other physica aracteristics.
3/4.7.2 STEAM GENERATOR PRESSURE / TEMPERATURE LIMITATION The limitation on steam generator pressure and' temperature ensures that
' he pressure-induced stresses in the steam generators do not exceed the maximum t
The limitations of.70*F and allowable fracture toughness stress limits.
200 psig are based on a steam generator RTNOT *#
to prevent brittle fracture.
CATAWBA - UNITS 1 AND 2 8 3/4 7-2
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INSERT FOR PAGE B 3/4 7-2:
The Surveillance Requirement for the Main Steam power-operated relief valves l
(PORV's) nitrogen supplies' ensures that the PORVs will be available to mitigato the consequences'of a steam generator tube rupture accident concurrent with loss of offsite power. This assumes that.the PORV on the ruptured steem generator is unavailable, anC that the other three are used to cool the Reactor Coolant Sydten. inventory to less than the saturation temperature of the ruptured steam generator.
Concurrent with the requirement that a specific number'of PORVs ba OPERABLE is tne requirement.that the associated PORV block valves upstream be open or OPERABLE. Should an associated PORV block valve be closed and inoperable, the PORV downstream of that' block valve should also be considered inoperable and the applicable ACTION statement shall be entered until such time'that the ble>ck valve is opened or returned to OPERABLE status.
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ATTACHMENT 2 i
DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS OF NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARD CONSIDERATIONS t
I JUSTIFICATION AND DISCUSSION OF NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION This amendment is in response to License Conditions 16 (Unit 1) and 10 (Unit 2) concerning the Steam Generator Tube Rupture analysis. The proposed amendment would add Action Statements, Surveillance Requirements and Bases to the Technical Specifications for the steam generator (S/G) power-operated relief valves
( PORVs ).
The proposed Technical Specification Limiting Conditions for Operations, Action Statements and Surveillance will require that the safety grade gas (nitrogen) supply be operable for each of the operable S/G pORVs.
Surveillance Requirements have been proposed to verify the availability of the nitrogen supply and to verify that the S/G pORVs are capable of being opened and closed via their remote manual controls.
The S/G pORVs are already required to be operable per Technical Specification 3/4.6.3 in order to satisfy containment isolation requirements. Inerefore, appropriate controls are already in place.
10 CFR 50.92 states that c proposed amendment involves no significant hazards considerations if cperation in accordance with the proposed amendment would not:
(1) Involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated; or (2) Create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated; or (3) Involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.
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The proposed amendment does not involve an increase in the probability or consequences of any previously evaluated accident. The probability or consequences of an accident is not increased because these changes involve addition of requirements for components required to mitigate the consequences of previously evaluated accidents.
This Technical Specification amendment will not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated since the amendment will be adding additional Technical Specification requirements for components already in place. No change in design and no new mode of operation is introduced by this change.
This amendment request does not involve any reduction in a margin of safety.
The proposed changes would add restrictions to equipment already in place and thus would potentially increase the margin of safety.
In publishing the interim final rule for new procedures for providing public notice concerning issuance of amendments to operating licenses, the Commission provided several examples of license amendments which would not involve significant hazards considerations (48 FR 14870). One of the examples listed was example (ii), "A change that constitutes an additional limitation, restriction, or control not presently included in the technical specifications:
for example, a more stringent surveillance requirement." This amendment is similar to exam'ple (ii).
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JUSTIFICATION AND DISCUSSION OF NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION (Cont.'d) i 1
For the above stated reasons, it is concluded that the proposed amendment does j
not involve significant hazards considerations.
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