ML20236V746
| ML20236V746 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Shoreham File:Long Island Lighting Company icon.png |
| Issue date: | 11/30/1987 |
| From: | Johnson G NRC OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL (OGC) |
| To: | Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel |
| References | |
| CON-#487-4959 CLI-86-13, OL-3, NUDOCS 8712070045 | |
| Download: ML20236V746 (18) | |
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, DOLMETEp USNRC UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 87 EC ~3 All:43 0FHce - ~.
BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARIDOCMfi$[3pjhy-BRANCH In the Matter of )
)
LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COMPANY ) Docket No. 50-322-OL-3 ,
) (Emergency Planning)
(Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, )
Unit 1) )
NRC STAFF REPLY TO LILCO AND INTERVENERS VIEWS ON REALISM ISSUES AND THE IMPACT OF THE NEW RULE ON THE REALISM REMAND
- 1. INTRODUCTION in accordance with the Licensing Board's November 9, 1987 Order, the NRC Staff hereby responds to the views of the other parties concerning the issues to be heard pursuant to the CLI-86-13 remand of the realism issues and to their views on the impact of the Commission's J
recent amendment to 10 C.F.R. Section 50.47(c)(1) on the remand proceeding. I As discussed in the Staff's earlier submittals addressing the issues to be heard pursuant to CLI-86-13, O the Commission has remanded the legal authority issues for the purpose of determining whether the LILCO 1
-1/ See, NRC Staff Response to the Board's Memorandum Requesting the Views of the Parties on the Matters to be Decided on the Realism Remand (October 30, 1987) (" Staff Response"); NRC Staff Supple- j mentary Brief on impact of October 29, 1987 Rule on CLI-86-13 !
Remand Proceeding (November 17, 1987) (" Staff Brief"); and NRC 1 Staff Response to LILCO Motion for Reconsideration and Referral of the Board's Ruling on Summary Disposition of the Realism Issue (October 20, 1987). ,
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- Plan _ can be found to be adequate in the areas in which legal authority is '
assumed to be lacking, based on the presumption that in an actual radio-logical emergency at Shoreham, New York State and Suffolk County will participate in emergency response using the LILCO Plan on a best-effort basis. 24 NRC 22, at 30-33. The Commission's direction to "use the existing evidentiary record to the maximum extent possible, but ...
take additional evidence where necessary" in CLI-86-13 (M. at 32), and its determination in its amendments to 10 C. F. R. 9 50.47(c)(1) that "it may be presumed that in an actual radiological emergency state and local officials would generally follow the utility plan" focuses the remand proceeding on a relatively narrow range of questions relating to State and County implementation of the LILCO Plan and the interface between LERO and responsible government officials. See November 17, 1987 Staff Brief at 5; October 30, 1987 Staff Response at 4.
In Applicant's and Interveners' briefing of these issues, b these parties take radically varying positions. Applicant argues that as a result of CLi-86-13 and the new rule, there are no issues left to be litigated on remand, again urging the propriety of summary disposition. '
interveners, for their part, argue that the remand calls for a wide-2/
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LILCO's Views on the issues and Schedule in the Realism Remand, October 30, 1987 ("LILCO Views"); LILCO's Supplementary Brief on l- the New Emergency Planning Rule, November 17, 1987 ("LILCO l Supplementary Brief"); Suffolk County, State of New York, and Town of Southampton Response to Board's Memorandum to Parties of October 8, 1987, October 30, 1987 (" Interveners' Response"); and Brief of Suffolk County, the State of New York and the Town of Southampton on the Effect of the Commission's October 29,1987 Rule on the CLi-86-13 Remand Proceeding , November 17, 1987 (" Inter-venors' Brief"),
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ranging inquiry amounting to a new proceeding, with new contentions, rulings on admissibility, discovery, and summary disposition, in which a l
totally new record will be required. These views are, however, J l
Inconsistent with the language and intent of CLI-86-13 and the recent '
rulemaking, and should not be adopted. ,
i ll. DISCUSSION A. Applicant's Views on the Scop'e and Procedures on Remand j I
in LILCO's Views on the issues and Schedule in the Realism Remand, I I
addressing the scope of the remand without considering the impact of the !
new rule, Applicant stated the fundamental issue to be:
With respect to the nine functions at issue, would New York State and Suffolk County, using their best efforts , act in an emergency so as to lessen significantly the health and safety of the public as compared to the LILCO plan?
LILCO's Views at 3. Further, Applicant stated that each of four propositions must be proven: (1) that information would be communicated to the governments in a timely fashion, (2) the governments could make timely decisions, (3) the governments would not refuse to implement the LILCO Plan if refusal would harm the public, and (4) the governments would either perform or authorize LERO to perform functions within the purview of Contentions 1-10 if necessary to protect the pubilc. Id. at 3-4 A corollary of these propositions is that it must be taken as proven that if the governments are provided the tools and information they need, and are able to use them, that the tools and information would be used.
_Id. at 4. However, taking cognizance of the Licensing Board's rejection
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. of its motion for summary disposition, Applicant interpreted the Board's Scptember 17, 1987 Memorandum and Order as ca!!!ng for additional evidence on "what State and County officials would take action and make decisions in an emergency and how they would be . contacted by LERO."
- y. at 17.
LILCO's Supplementary Brief on the New Emergency Planning Rule, filed November 17, 1987, argues that the October 29, 1987 amendment to Section 50.47(c)(1), when- applied to the facts of this case, shows there are no legal authority issues left requiring evidentiary hearings, and the the new rule " compels the conclusion that the LILCO plan satisfies NRC requirements." in brief, Appilcant argues thet .the new rule's presumption "that in the event of an actual radiological emergency state i
and local officials would generally follow the utility plan" and the failure '
of Interveners to come forward with information to rebut this presump-tion, requires a finding that "there is no . issue for anything other tham (sic) summary resolution." M. at 10.
In a manner reminiscent of Applicant's Marc'h 20, 1987 motion for summary disposition, Applicant, going through each of the legal authority contentions, argues that the only obstacle to meeting NRC regulations (leaving aside, as we may for present purposes, the handful of remaining undecided issues such as the emergency broadcast system), is the lack of legal authority, an intangible resource that can be supp!!ed at will by the State and County governments. Therefore, since there is a complete plan that is fully capable of 4 responding, except for legal authority, the only potential issues are whether the conferring of legal authority would somehow detract from the plan -- that is, whether the adding of the State and County resources would damage the response and increase the hazard to the public, compared to the LILCO-only plan that has been litigated.
LILCO Supplementary Brief at 12.
Applicant's position is that given an acceptable (save for legal authority) utility plan, the only questions are how adding the l_ governments to the response would decrease the effectiveness of that plan, and how muct- harm to the public would thereby accrue. Id.
Further, the burden i,f going forward to demonstrate such degradation in effectiveness and the quantum of harm is on the Interveners. ,l d .
However, rather than granting interveners the option of going forward, Applicant argues that under the new rule, such proffer is now untimely, M. at 13, and that based on the existing record, a decision on the merits of the contentions is now appropriate. M. at 14.
As discussed below , however, Applicant's argument incorrectly portrays the recent rulemaking as eliminating the requirement under CLl-86-13 that the Board proceed to obtain "more information" as to whether the LILCO Plan with an ad hoc best-effort government response using that Plan is adequate under the regulations. While the new rule (10 C. F. P., Section 50.47(c)(1)(iii)) creates a presumption that an available utility plan will be followed in the absence of another timely-proffered adequate plan intended to be followed, the presumption that the utility plan will be followed is not the same as a presumption that the utility plan with a best-effort government response will be adequate.
Finally, while Applicant correctly places on Interveners the burden of going forward with evidence showing that a best-effort response would not be adequate, Applicant incorrectly concludes that Interveners' past conduct now forecloses them from the opportunity to go forward on this issue.
l l B. Intervenor Views on Procedures to be Followed in both Interveners' Response and Interveners' Brief, Interveners, not unexpectedly, take a position directly contrary to the position of the Applicant. Rather than proposing that there is nothing left to litigate, as proposed by Applicant, Interveners argue that the remand is effectively a new proceeding, and that "the unprecedented and broader range of issues in this proceeding requires that the Board follow traditional .N R C practice and require the filing of contentions."
Interveners' Response at 5-6. See Interveners' Brief at 4. Similarly, Interveners argue that since the bulk of the existing record proceeds from the assumption of a LI LCO-only response, the record does not
" address State or County involvement to any significant meaningful degree." interveners' Response at 7. As a consequence, interveners submit that the existing record "is likely to be of little use." id.
Moreover, Interveners maintain that Applicant retains the burden of showing that with a best-effort government response the plan is adequate. Id. at 9. Although Interveners argue for a full-blown pro-ceeding, from contentions to findings, they state in the alternative that, should Applicant wish to use the existing record, Applicant designate promptly those portions to be relied on. M.at8.
In their supplementary filing, Interveners argue that the new rule generally does not alter significantly the course of the proceeding as previously set by CLl-86-13 and the Board's September 17, 1987 Memorandum and Order. Thus, where Applicant argued that under the new rule it is now too late for Interveners to rebut the presumption created that the governments will follow the utility plan , Interveners
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2 argue that under the new rule, as under CL1-86-13, the presumption is l
applied at the Licensing Board's discretion, and in this case, the Board - )
has declined to presume such use. Intervenor Brief at 7. 3/ i i
Thus, Interveners continue to maintain that it is entirely proper for j l
the Board to permit litigation in this remand . proceeding based on the l representation of the Interveners that the State and County will not follow the LILCO Plan.
Finally, Interveners state that Applicant "must produce evidence if it is to meet its burden of proof" in this proceeding. Interveners' Response at 9. However, Intervenor does not specifically state what that burden ought to be, or address the appropriate allocation of the burdens in this proceeding.
As discussed below, Interveners' claims concerning the need for contentions , use of the existing record, and the inapplicability of the presumption that they will follow the LILCO . Plan are without merit.
3/ Interveners also argue that the new rule cannot be applied to the Shoreham proceeding in the absence of approved criteria for FEMA /NRC review. Id. at 2-3. However, Interveners cite no authority for this proposition, nor any reason why, as a matter of law, such criteria affect the applicability of the rule. The new rule provides that the same standards will be applied to a utility-only plan as to any other plan, giving due allowance for those elements in the standards as to which compliance is infeasible due to non-participation of state and local governments in planning, and to the utility's compensating measures. Section 50.47(c)(1)(iii); 52 Fed.
Reg. 42086. As a practical matter, however, the revisions to the NRC/ FEMA evaluation criteria to provide guidance for evaluating a government's best-effort response are available and have been provided separately to the service ilst.
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C. Staff Response The foregoing Applicant and Intervenor views underscore the importance of clarifying the current procedural posture of this case, and explicitly setting out matters that nced to be added to the record in order to make a determination under 10 C.F.R. 9 50.47(c)(1)(lii).
Applicants believe the facts are in and under the presumption of best-effort response, a decision is now appropriate on the merits of Conten-tions 1-10. Interveners helieve that not only are the facts not in, but neither are the issucs, and new contentions and proceedirigs thereon are necessary. There also appears to be disagreement as to who has the initial burden of going forward with evidence. f in reversing the lower boards on realism and immateriality, the Commission in CLi-86-13 instructed the Licensing Board to proceed on the admitted legal authority contentions using certain factual and legal assumptions not entertained by either lower board. First, the Board was to assume that Interveners would in fact respond in the event of an actual emergency at Shoreham in a planned manner. CLI-86-13, 24 NRC 22, at 31, 32. Second, the Board was to assume that such response would be a best-effort response using the only available plan, the LILCO Plan. Id. Third, the Board was to assume that LILCO lacked the legal authority to perform the State and County roles in the ten contention areas. Id. at 30-31. And fourth, the Board was directed to determine whether a best-effort government response using the utility plan provides reasonable assurance that there would be " protective measures that are
generally comparable to what might be accomplished with government cooperation." O g.at32.
Under the recent amendments, in 10 C.F.R. 9 50.47(c)(1)(ill), it is similarly to be presumed in any litigation involving a utility plan "that in !
an actual emergency state and local governments will exercise their best efforts to protect the public health and safety" and "would generally follow the utility plan."
Inherent in the Commission's determinations in CLl-86-13 and further explanation thereof in the recent rulemaking amending Section 50.47(c)(1) is the premise that the LILCO Plan has already been litigated and found, save for the absence of legal authority, to be generally workable. Liti-gation of the Plan itself is barred not only by the doctrine of res judicata, but by the limited scope of the legal authority contentions. The questions rerraining about the LILCO Plan concern the " shortcomings of the LILCO plan . . . assuming a best-effort State and County response using the LILCO plan as the source for basic emergency planning information and options." _I d . at 31-32. These questions are to be addressed usino the existing record "to the maximum extent possible."
,fd. at 32. Thus, contrary to Interveners' argument that the proceeding must start anew, with new contentions and development of a new record, the Commission has directed the Licensing Board to focus its attention on
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4/ Although CLi-86-13 speaks of comparing dose reductions, Id. at 30, i the Commission stated in the recent rulemaking that this language
! should not be interpreted to require findings of precise dose reduction which would be achieved by a utility plan or a comparison of such dose reduction with that which might be achieved if there were a state or local plan with full cooperation. 52 Fed. Reg.
42084-85.
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the adequacy of the LILCO Plan's provision for M hoc best efforts response by State and County officials and to resolve whether, employing the evidentiary presumption that the State and County would gener' ally follow the LILCO Plan , the evidence supports a determination that the best-effort response would be adequata. b As discussed above, the admitted legal authority contentions, as modified by the presumptions created by CLi-86-13 and the new rule, explicitly state the issues which the Commission has determined need be resolvcd at this juncture. See 24 NRC 31. Adopting interveners' approach of providing for new contentions would not see:n to carry with it any benefits not already available through the procedures adopted by the Boa rd. Interveners' approach would , moreover, introduce unneeded procedural complexities. To follow " traditional NRC practice" would require Interveners to address the late-filing requirements of Section 2.714(a)(1), the parties to respond, and the Board to rule on these requirements. In keeping with the presumptions created in the Commission's new rule, each contention need only be read to include an inquiry into whether the State and local governments best efforts to l
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Were interveners to proffer new contentions, they would, of course, be considered unui.- the 10 C.F.R. Section 2.714(a)(1) ('Iteria for late-filed conten' ions. However, it seems clear that given the Comm!ssion's dellt eation of the remaining issues, as well as the evidentiary presumptions to be employed in making determinations as to whether, in the as aa of ec;ch legal authority contention, the Plan can and will be implemes.'od, there is not good cause for fillrig new contentions. In addition, egnding the inquiry beyond what the Commission has directed would unnecessarily broaden the issues and serve to delay the proceeding.
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generally follow the LILCO plan would provide compliance with the 1
requirements set out in the contention. 6_/
LILCO's Supplementary Brief, at 23-39, and the Staff's Response, at l 4-16, summarize the existing record as it relates to the legal authority contentions as modified by the Commission's actions. This evidence i
consists of the LILCO Plan itself, prior findings by the Licensing Board, l evidence in the hearing record, and facts deemed admitted as a result of the Board's September 17, 1987 Memorandum and Order.
Under 10 C.F.R. Section 2.732 and Commission case law, Applicant bears the ultimc.te burden of persuasion on both the factual determination of whether the protective actions encompassed by the contentions can and will be taken in the event of an emergency at Shoreham, and the ultimate conclusion whether those actions provide reasonable assurance. The present pcsture of this proceeding is that Applicant has gone forward with its prima facie case -- through submission of a utility-only plan l
accommod6 ting g hoc State and County participation. Evidence cited in j l
the evidentiary record by Applicant and the Staff, as well as Material Facts deemed admitted, demonstrates that Applicant has gone forward with
-6/ New Section 50.47(c)(1)(lii) states that "it may be presumed that in ]
the event of an actual . radiological emergency state and local officials !
would generally follow the utility plan . " The Statement of Consideration states that Boards "should not hesitate to reject any ,
claim that state and local officials will refuse to act to safeguard the health and safety of the public in the event of an actual emer- 1 gency." 52 Fed. Reg. 42085. It also concluded that the i governmental authorities in the event of an actual emergency would j look to and follow an existing plan. Id. The Commission intended i the presumption be a mandatory one, absent the good faith and {
timely submission of another adequate and feasible offsite plan that I would in fact be relied upon in an emergency. {
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I a showing as to both the manner in which the Plan provides for a particular response to be conducted, as well as a demonstration of known capabilities of offsite authorities to engage in protective actions in an emergency.
Applicant having made its prim _a facie case, the burden of going forward shifts to interveners. It is "encumbent on interveners who wish to participate to structure their participation so that it is meaningful, so that it alerts the agency to interveners' position and contentions."
Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. N.R.D.C., 435 U.S. 519, 553 (1978). Interveners have the pleading burden to specify those aspects of a best-effort response using the LlLCO plan which would result in LILCO's inability to satisfy regulatory requirements . The Licensing Board afforded all the parties the opportunity to specify the realism and immateriality issues pertaining to the contentions and Interveners should have used it to further specify their claims that a best-effort government response using the LILCO Plan would be deficient.
In any event, once the Licensing Board, based on the parties' views concerning those issues, determines the specific issues for litigation here, It is encumbent on the Interveners to assume the burden of going forward j l
with evidence to rebut the prima facie case presented by Appilcant that its plan and the record as it demonstrates State and County capabilities is l
Insufficient to support a finling that there is reasonable assurance that
, the LILCO Plan, with a best-effort government response, can and will be implemented. See, Metropolitan Edison Company (Three Mlle island i
Nuclear Station, Unit 1), ALAD-772, 19 NRC 1193, 1245 (1984), citing I-
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Consumer Power Co. (Midland Plant, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-123, 6 AEC 331, 345 (1973). U Under the recent amendment, Interveners cannot meet that burden by a claim that they would respond, but would not follow the LILCO Plan. i i
Such a claim is precluded by Section 50.47(c)(1)(lii) which presumes that j state and local government officials will generally follow the Plan unless they come forward in a timely and good faith manner with another plan which is adequate under the Commission's planning standards. See, 10 C.F.R. Section 50.47(c)(1)(lii).
Interveners' argument that the Board has already accepted their claim and elected not to apply the regulatory presumption is without merit. First, the Board has yet to determine what the new rule requires.
And second, the application of the rule Interveners would attribute to the Board would be patently inconsistent with the rule itself.
On the other hand, Applicant is incorrect in its claim that the recent rulemaking establishes that the present record is sufficient for a decision
-7/ In the Midland case, the rationale for requiring an intervenor to go forward with evidence is explained in terms applicable to the case at hand:
. . . where, as here, one of the other parties contends that, for a specific reason . . . the permit or license should be denied, that party has the burden of going forward with evidence to buttress that contentions Unce he has introduced sufficient evidenced to establish a prima facie case, the burden then shifts to the applicant, who, as part of his overall burden of proof, must provide a sufficient rebuttal. . .
Id. (Emphasis in original . ) See also, Maine Yankee, supra, XLAB-161, 6 AEC 1003, 1018 (1973); but see, Midland, su pra ,
CLI-74-5, 7 AEC 19, 32 n.27 (1974).
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in this proceeding. g. LILCO Suppl. Brief at 13-15. The presumptions contained in the new rule " establish a framework in which a utility l seeking an operating Ilcense can, in the case of state and/or local l
l non-participation, attempt to demonstrate to the NRC that emergency planning is adequate. . . . " and were not designed to assure the licensing of any plant, including Shoreham. 52 Fed. Reg. 42081. The question of the adequacy of a utility, plan subject to the presumption of state and local government response, is left to determination on the record of each case. ,ld, at 42085. See also CLI-E6-13, 24 NRC. at 31.
Contrary to the claims in Appilcant's Supplementary Brief, Applicant does not demonstrate that the LILCO Plan with the presumed best-effort i government use of the Plan would result in the taking of timely protective actions. Applicant's showing does not provide record support for its position that a best effort government response would be adequate.
For example, with respect to the key issue of whether timely decisions will be made, Applicant argues that " virtually every element that goes into a protective cetion decision has already been litigated" and that " Interveners would always have the option of relying on ine recommendation of LERO, the DOE, the NRC and FEMA." M.at22. See While it is indeed correct that the adequacy of plans for also id. at 31.
protective action decisionmaking has been previously litigated , the timeliness of a State or County response generally following the LILCO Plan has not been litigated. Applicant cites no record reference to support its conclusion that the government best-effort response would, in j fact, be timely.
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l Moreover, while Appilcant might well prevali were interveners to fall to go forward with evidence showing the adequacy of the Plan with a best-effort government response based on the Plan, there is no basis for Applicant's argument that the rule now precludes Interveners from going l forward to show that adding State and County responses would damage the response or increase the hazard to the public, compared to the LILCO-only plan. See LILCO Suppl. Brief at 12.
Applicant's reliance on the presumption that Interveners would follow the Plan to establish the adequacy of a best-effort government imple-mentation of the LILCO Plan is misplaced. See, id,. at 13, 25, 26, 27, 28, 30 n.10. Applicants have failed to distinguish adequately the burden of Interveners to demonstrate that they would follow another plan rather than the LILCO Plan, from the burden of going forward on their conten-tions to show that the LILCO Plan, assuming a best-effort government response, would not meet the requirements of the regulations.
i There is nothing in the recent rulemaking which suggests an Intervenor may not now challenge the adeq'uacy of the utility plan with a best-effort State and County response as not meeting regulatory require-ments. Indeed, Applicant concedes that the Commission contemplated j taking more evidence "if necessary." M. at 114.
Just as interveners have the burden of going forward as to the time needed by the State and/or County to make a protective action decision given what is already established in the record, both CLl-86-13 and the new rule allow Interveners to go forward to demonstrate that such response would not be timely.
This is not to say, however, that, the Boar c' could not entertain renewed motions for summary disposition. As previously argued by the
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f Staff, there are. Issues as to which summary disposition is already appropriate. 8/
However, as set out in the Staff's Response of October 30, 1987, material questions may remain, even using the existing record to the maximum extent possible. The new emergency planning rule would not obviate the need to resolve those limited questions in hearing.
Ill. CONCLUSION Both CLl-86-13 and the recent amendment to 10 C. F. R. Section 50.47(c)(1), as applied to the facts of this case, may require further, but ilmited, evidentiary inquiry into the extent to which introduction of a State and County best-effort response, generally following the LILCO Plan, would degrade the adequacy of emergency response in the event of a radiological emergency at Shoreham. While the ultimate burden of persuasion rests on Applicant, the burden of going forward with evidence in such an inquiry to show such degradation is, at this juncture in the proceeding, on interveners. Neither a new proceeding, based on new contentions and development of a new record, nor prompt summary disposition is called for by the new rule, ant' interveners' and Applicant's respective requests should be rejected.
Resp - tfully submitted, A
eorge E John Cfk%
Counsel r N. Staff Dated at Bethesda, Maryland this 30th day of November,1987 8/ See Staff Response at 12-14.
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DOLKETED l6NiiC UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 87 EC -3 A11:43 BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING bk$GNEN[ih^
unANCH In the Matter of )
1 LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COMPANY ) Docket No. 5 0-322-O L-3
) (Emergency Planning)
(Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, )
Unit 1) ) ,
1 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that copies of "MRC STAFF REPLY TO LILCO AND INTERVENERS VIEWS ON REALISM ISSUE AND THE IMPACT OF THE NEW RULE ON THE REALISM REMAND" in the above-captioned proceeding have been served on the following by deposit in the United States mall, first class or, as indicated by an asterisk, through deposit in the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's internal mail system , this 30th day of November, 1987.
l James P. Gleason, Chairman
- Joel Blau, Esq.
Administrative Judge Director, Utility Intervention Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Suite 1020 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 99 Washington Avenue Washington, DC 20555 Albany, NY 12210 Jerry R. Kline* Fabian G. Palomino, Esq.
Administrative Judge Special Counsel to the Governor Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Executive Chamber U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission State Capitol Washington, DC 20555 Albany, NY 12224 ,
I Frederick J. Shon* Jonathan l' . Feinberg, Esq. l Administrative Judge New York State Department of j Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Public Service j U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Three Empire State Plaza j Washington, DC 20555 Albany, NY 12223 !
i Philip McIntire W. Taylor Reveley 111, Esq. !
Federal Emergency Management Donald P. Irwin, Esq. j l
Agency Hunton S Williams 4 j 26 Federal Plaza 707 East Main Street i Room 1349 P.O. Box 1535 New York, NY 10278 Richmond, VA 23212 f Douglas J. Hynes, Councilman l Town Board of Oyster Bay Town Hall l Oyster Bay, New York 11771 l l
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Stephen B. Latham, Esq. Herbert H. Brown, Esq.
Twomey, Latham & Shea Lawrence Coe Lanpher, Esq.
Attorneys at Law Karla J. Letsche, Esq.
33 West Second Street Kirkpatrick & Lockhart Riverhead, NY 11901 South Lobby - 9th Floor 1800 M Street, NW Atomic Safety and Licensing Washington, DC 20036-5891 Board Panel
- U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Jay Dunkleberger l Washington, DC 20555 New York State Energy i Office Atomic Safety and Licensing Agency Building 2
' Appeal Board Panel
- Empire State Plaza U.S. Nuclear P.egulatory Commission Albany, NY 12223 Washington, DC 20555 Spence W. Perry, Esq.
Martin Bradley Ashare, Esq. General Counsel Suffolk County Attorney Federal Emergency Management H. Lee Dennison Building Agency Veteran's Memorial Highway 500 C Street, SW Hauppauge, NY 11788 Washington, DC 20472 Dr. Monroe Schneider Robert Abrams, Esq.
North Shore Committee Attorney General of the State P.O. Box 231 of New York Wading River, NY 11792 Attn: Peter Bienstock, Esq.
Department of Law Ms. Nora Bredes State of New York Shoreham Opponents Coalition Two World Trade Center 195 East Main Street Room 46-14 Smithtown, NY 11787 New York, NY 10047 Anthony F. Earley, Jr. William R. Cumming, Esq.
General Counsel Office of General Counsel Long Island Lighting Company Federal Emergency Management 175 East Old Country Road Agency Hicksville, NY 11801 500 C Street, SW Washington, DC 20472 'j Dr. Robert Hoffman Long Island Coalition for Safe Docketing and Service Section*
Living Office of the Secretary P.O. Box 1355 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Massapequa, NY 11758 Washington, DC 20555 Mary M. Gundrum, Esq. Barbara Newman New York State Department of Law Director, Environmental Health 120 Broadway Coalition for Safe Living 3rd Floor, Room 3-116 Box 944 New York, NY 10271 Huntin ton, New York 11743
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/Geofge E.//ohns c/ Counsel fy NR taff
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