ML20236S209

Proposed Tech Spec Re RCS Pressure Isolation Valve

ML20236S209
Person / Time
Site:	Beaver Valley
Issue date:	11/12/1987
From:	DUQUESNE LIGHT CO.
To:
Shared Package
ML20236S202	List: ML20236S200 ML20236S206 ML20236S209
References
NUDOCS 8711240294
Download: ML20236S209 (14)

Text

r-A'T.T'A C;H M E.N T A

i Revise the Technical Specifications..as follows:

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' REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM PRESSURE ISOLATION VALVES i

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.4.6.3 Reactor Coolant System pressure isolation valves as shown in Table 4.4-3 shall be OPERABLE.

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APPLICABILITY:

MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4 l

ACTION:

1 1.

With any -Reactor Coolant System Pressure Isolation Valve leakage greater than the limit stated. in Table 4.4-3, isolate the high pressure portion of the.affected system j

from the low. pressure portion within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> by.use of a closed manual or deactivated automatic valve, or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6

hours andiin COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.*

2.

The provision of Specification 4.0.4 is not applicable for entry into MODE 3 or 4.

l SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.4.6.3.1 Leakage testing ** of each va?.ve listed in Table'4.4-3 shall be accomplished prior to entering MODE 2 after every time the plant is placed in the COLD SHUTDOWN condition for refueling and prior to returning the valve to service after each maintenance, repair or l

replacement work is performed; and l

4.4.6.3.2 Additional leakage testing of each valve identified by note (d) listed in Table 4.4-3 shall be accomplished prior to entering i

MODE 2

after each time the plant is placed in COLD SHUTDOWN for 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> if testing has not been accomplished in the preceding 9 months.

l Motor operated valves shall be placed in the closed position and power supplies de-energized.

1 To satisfy ALARA requirements, leakage may be measured indirectly (as from the performance of pressure indicators) if accomplished l

in accordance with approved procedures and supported by computations showing that the method is capable of demonstrating compliance within the valve leakage criteria.

I BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 1 3/4 4-14a PROPOSED WORDING

TABLE 4.4-3 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM PRESSURE ISOLATION VALVES Leakage Rates (a)

System Valve No.

Allowable / Maximum Loop 1, Cold leg, LHSI SI-23

< 3.0/< 5.0 gpm(b)(d)

SI-12 1 3.0/1 5.0 gpm(b)(d)

Loop 2, Cold leg, LHSI SI-24

< 3.0/< 5.0 gpm(b)(d)

SI-11 1 3.0/1 5.0 gpm(b)(d)

Loop 3, Cold leg, LHSI SI-25 1 3.0/1 5.0 gpm(b)(d)

SI-10 1 3.0/1 5.0 gpm(b)(d)

Loop 1, Hot leg, LHSI SI-15 1 3.0/1 5.0 gpm(b)-

Loop 2, Hot leg, LHSI SI-16 1 3.0/1 5.0 gpm(b)

Loop 3, Hot leg, LHSI SI-17 1 3.0/1 5.0 gpm(b)

Common, Hot leg, LHSI SI-13 1 3.0/1 5.0 gpm SI-14 1 3.0/1 5.0 gpm l

Loop 1, Cold leg, SIACC SI-48

< 5.0/< 5.0 gpm(b)

SI-51 1 5.0/1 5.0 gpm(b)

Loop 2, Cold leg, SIACC SI-49 1 5.0/1 5.0 gpm(b)

SI-52 1 5.0/1 5.0 gpm(b)(d) 1 l

Loop 3, Cold leg, SIACC SI-50 1 5.0/1 5.0 gpm(b)

SI-53 1 5.0/1 5.0 gpm(b)(d)

Loop 1, Hot leg, RHS MOV-RH-700 1 5.0/1 5.0 gpm(b)

MOV-RH-701 1 5.0/1 5.0 gpm(b) j Loop 2, Cold leg, RHS MOV-RH-720A 1 5.0/1 5.0 gpm(b)(c)

Loop 3, Cold leg, RHS MOV-RH-720B 1 5.0/1 5.0 gpm(b)(c)

(a) At function pressure:

1.

Leakage rates less than or equal to 0.5 gpm/ inch diameter are acceptable.

2.

Leakage rates greater than 0.5 gpm/ inch diameter but less than or equal to 5.0 gpm are considered acceptable if the latest measured rate has not exceeded the rate determined by the previous test by an amount that reduces the margin between measured leakage rate and the maximum permissible rate of 5.0 gpm by 50 percent or greater.

BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 1 3/4 4-14b PROPOSED WORDING

TABLE 4.4-3 (Continued) l 3.

Leakage rates greater than- 0.5 gpm/ inch diameter but less than or equal to 5.0 gpm are considered unacceptable if the l

latest measured rate exceeded the rate determined by the previous test by an amount that reduces the margin between j

measured leakage rate and the maximum permissible rate'of

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5.0 gpm by 50 percent or greater.

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Leakage rates greater than 5.0 gpm are considered i

unacceptable.

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Observed leakage rates shall be adjusted to the function j

maximum pressure in accordance with'ASME XI IWV 3423.

l (b) Minimum test differential pressure shall not be less than 150 psid.

(c) Leakage rate continuously. monitored.during. plant operation, no other leakage rate testing. required.

Leakage rate acceptance criteria shall be as stated in (a) and (b) above and shall be recorded at intervals as noted in paragraph 4.4.6.3.1 as a l

minimum.

I (d) Both surveillance 4.4.6.3.1 and 4.4.6.3.2 are required.

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l BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 1 3/4 4-14c PROPOSED WORDING

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ATTACHMENT B

Proposed Technical Specification Change No. 142 Safety Analysis l

Description of amendment request:

The reactor coolant system pressure isolation valve specification 3.4.6.3 has been revised in accordance with our response to Generic Letter 87-06 dated June 10, 1987.

In the subject response we committed to adding those valves which perform an important pressure isolation function to the technical specifications to provide consistency with the guidelines used to determine the valves applicable to Beaver Valley Unit 2.

Therefore, also included in this proposed change are the revised LCO, action and surveillance requirements similar to those provided in the Beaver Valley Unit 2 technical specifications.

Section 3.4.6.3 has been revised to reference Table 4.4-3 which lists the reactor coolant system pressure isolation valves.

Action statements 1,

2 and 3 have been replaced by Action 1 which requires isolation of the high pressure portion of the affected system from I

the low pressure portion within 4

hours or shutdown the plant if excessive valve leakage is present.

This is similar to the current actions statements 1, 2 and 3, however, the revised wording provides clarification and is more consistent with other specification action statements.

Surveillance Requirement 4.4.6.3.1 and 4.4.6.3.3 have been replaced with similar surveillance requirements, however, the wording has been revised for clarification and consistency with other surveillance requirements.

The new 4.4.6.3.1 requires valve leakage testing prior to entering MODE 2 after the plant has been in cold shutdown for refueling or after maintenance has been performed on the valve.

The new 4.4.6.3.2 requires additional leakage testing, on the Event V

valves identified by note (d) on Table 4.4-3, prior to entering MODE 2

after the plant has been in cold shutdown for 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> unless testing has been performed within the previous 9 months.

Note (a) on page 3/4 4-14a has been re-identified with an *, note (a) on page 3/4 4-14b has been re-identified with a ** on page 3/4 4-14a.

Table 4.4-3 has been revised to include additional pressure isolation valves identified in response to Generic Letter 87-06 which perform an important pressure isolation function.

Note (b) remains unchanged, note (c) is applicable to the loop 2 and 3 cold leg residual heat removal isolation valves and specifies that leakage is continuously monitored during plant operation and no other leakage

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rate testing is required.

Note (d) applies to the Event V valves and j

requires performance of both surveillance 4.4.6.3.1 and 4.4.6.3.2, if the check valves have been cycled or maintenance has been performed on these valves.

Generic Letter 87-06 provides guidelines and defines pressure l

isolation valves for each interface as any two valves in series within the reactor coolant boundary which separate the high pressure reactor coolant system from an attached low pressure system.

The fifteen valves added to Table 4.4-3 reflect the new guidelines for evaluating valves that perform an important pressure isolation

ATTACHMENT B Page 2

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function.

These additional valves meet the new guidelines since they provide the pressure isolation interface between the RCS and a low pressure connecting system.

The function and operation of these valves remain unchanged and the additional technical specification requirements ensure that adequate surveillance is performed to minimize valve leakage and ensure RCS integrity.

Therefore, the proposed change provide additional assurance that the RCS will be maintained in a

safe condition, will not reduce the safety of the plant and does not affect the UFSAR or any regulatory basis.

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ATTACHMENT C

No Significant Hazards Evaluation Proposed Technical Specification Change No. 142 Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration l

determination:

The Commission has provided standards for determining l

whether a

significant hazards consideration exists (10 CFR 50.92(c)].

A proposed amendment to an operating license for a facility involves no significant hazards consideration if operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not (1) involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated; (2) create the possibility of a i

new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated; or (3) involve a

significant reduction in a margin of safety.

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The proposed changes do not involve a

significant hazards consideration because:

1.

The proposed changes incorporate additional reactor coolant system pressure isolation valves into the technical specifications to reflect our response to Generic Letter 87-06 which provides new guidelines for evaluating valves that perform an important pressure isolation function.

Fifteen valves have been added to Table 4.4-3 in addition to the six Event V valves currently listed.

A review was' performed (DLC response to Generic Letter 87-06, dated June 10, 1987) to evaluate each interface with the reactor coolant system within the reactor coolant pressure boundary as defined in 10 CFR 50.2.

The valves selected herein were determined applicable based on the guidelines used in selecting the applicable pressure isolation valves for Beaver Valley Unit 2.

The Limiting Condition for Operation,

Action, surveillance requirements and applicable notes have been revised to reflect the Beaver Valley Unit 2

specification and to provide clarification and consistency.

The proposed changes also provide additional criteria for determining acceptable valve

leakage, however, 5 gpm remains the limiting acceptance criteria.

Therefore, the probability of occurrence or consequences of an accident previously evaluated will not be affected.

2.

No change in plant operations or to equipment or components is required.

Adding these valves to the technical specification and incorporating the other changes to specification 3.4.6.3 is consistent with the Beaver Valley Unit 2 requirements and will not affect the safe operation of the plant.

Therefore, these changes will not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from those described in the UFSAR.

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ATTACHMENT-C-l Page.2 q

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Specification-3.4.6.3 i s : b e i n g 'r e v i s e d t o c l a'r i f y. t h e H

' requirements for consistency with' the. Beaver Valley; Unit 2 ; wording and ~ to add additional; reactor coolant 1 system pressure isolation-valves.in-accordance'with ourE 3

. response ; to Generic Letter 87-06.: The proposed changes" I"

add. more : valves, that.haveLbeen determined to perform-an important pressure ' isolation function,stoLtheilist:

of valves subject to the requirements of this: technical-specification ~.

The proposed: change willlnotireduce the-3 basis for this orLany other. technical specification and i

will not ; involve a.significant' reduction'in the margin-of safety of the plant.

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Therefore, based. on the above considerations,-it is proposed to

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the' change as involving no significant' hazards consideration.

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