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Proposed Tech Specs,Clarifying Requirements Re Use of Shared Portions of Nuclear Svc Water Sys Vs Use of Sys in Entirety
	ML20236M552
Person / Time
Site:	McGuire, Mcguire
Issue date:	07/31/1987
From:	; DUKE POWER CO.
To:	;
Shared Package
ML20236M525	List: ML20236M522; ML20236M552;
References
	NUDOCS 8708110118
	Download: ML20236M552 (9)
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1 PLANT SYSTEMS _

1 NUCLEAR SE VICE WATER SYSTEM 3/4.7.4 LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION E

' 3.7.4-At least two independent nuclear service water loops shall be O APPLICA81LITY:

MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

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ACTION:

oops to vice water loop OPERA 8LE, re *** STAND 8Y within the next j

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OPERA 8LE status within ou 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months ..-

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f SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS per und-At least two nuclear service water loops #shall be demonstrated OP 4,7.4 At least once per 31 days by verifying that each valve (manual, t

power-operated, or automatic) servicing safety-related equipment t a.

is.not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position is in its correct position; and At lesst once per 18 months during shutdown, by verifying that:

b, Each automatic valve servicing safety-related ecu 1) signal, and Each nuclear service water cumo starts automatically on a Safety Injection and Station Blackout test signal.

2) 8708110110 B70731 DR ADOCK 05000369 p

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3/4 7-11 McGUIRE - UNITS 1 and 2

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With the unit specific portion of only one nuclear service water loop per unit OPERABLE, restore both unit specific loops to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months or place the affected unit at least in HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months , b.

With only one of the shared portions as defined by Figure 3/4 7-1 of the Unit 1 and Unit 2 nuclear service water loops OPERABLE, restore the shared portion of the loops to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months or place both units in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN within

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the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months , j

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i PLANT SYSTIMS i

l BASES 3/4.7'.1.4 hAIN STEAM LINE ISOLATION VALVE _5 The OPERA 8ILITY of the main steam line isolation valves e line more than one staam generator will blow down in the event of a steam (1) minim TP,1s restriction is required to:

effects of the Reactor Coolant System cooldown asso rupture.

The OPERA??L7TY of the main steam rupture occurs within containment.isolat. ion valves within the closure ti consistent with the assumptions used in the a:cident analyses.

STEAM GENERATOR PRESSURE / TEMPERATURE LIMITATION 3/4.7.2 The limitation on steam generator pressure and temperature ecsures thst the pressure-induced stresses in the steam generators do not exceed theThe maximum allowable fracture toughness stress limits.of 10*F and are sufd cient and 200 psig are based on a steam generator RT NOT to prevent brittle fracture.

COMPONENT COOLING WATER SYSTEM 3/4.7.3 The OPERABILITY of the Component Cooling Water System ensures th sufficient cooling capacity is available for The redundant related equipment during normal and accident conditions.

t$e assumptions used in the accident analyses.

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NUCLEAR SERVICE WATER SYSTEM 3/4.7.4 ITY of the Nuclear Service Water System ensurea ion of safety-in. CT "AFI available for contia' y

p,g[oce sufficient cooling condition:.

The redundant re, is consistent witn l

Vd,ytt related equipment dur ng norma i

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assuming a si 0._ _ r eg cooling capacity of tsed in the accid.:.nt conditions within acce.

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ty-STAND 8Y NUCLEAR SERVICE WATER PONO 3/4.7.5 The limitations on the standby nuclear service water pond level and l

ither to:

temperature ensure that sufficient cooling capaci f

accident conditions within acceptable limits.

8 3/4 7-3 McGUIRE - UNITS 1 and 2

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BASES Replacement The, OPERABILITY of the Nuclear Service Water System ensures that sufficient l

cocAing capacity is available for continued operation ofssafety-related equipment during normal and accident conditions. The redundant cooling capacity of this system, assuming a single failure, is consistent with the assumptions used in the accident condf.r.1ons within acedptable limits.

Per-

, iodic flow balarce tests, delta-P tests, and heat balancit tests are performed 3

as required to assure adequate flow to au" essertial heat exch<mgers for which

'" flow fastrumenintion is provided, J

Portions of the Nuclear Servick Water System are common to both units. These chaved portions of the system are indicated on Figura'3/4 7-1 and common 9alves are listed in Table B 3/4 7-1 and include common suction piping and l

cross-connect piping as indicated on the figure.

i With the exception of ORN-1-all shared valves receive emergency power from two essential motor control centers (IEMXA 2EMXH). ORN-1 is normally open with the power removed. Motor Control Center (MCC) 1EMXH can be powered by either Unit 1 or Unit 2 A Train Emergency D/G's via their associated switchgear.

Motor Control Center,2EMXH can be powered by either Unit 1 or 2 B Train Emergency D/C's vfa thdir associated switchgear.

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The four loops (two.per unit) ensure redundancy Land the availability of

, ' coolit.g to both units, even if a single failura were to render two loops inoperable.

(Such a failure would Cnvolves train A of both units or train B of

.T both units, not both trains of the same unit). The Action statements are a

separated to clarify thit,porti(ss of the i6 stems are shared though the hajority*of bach of the four loops is independent.

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In the event of a safet[ fujection or blackout signal on either unit, train A' of both units will align to Lake Norman and train'B of both units will align to the SNSWP. Additionally, all train A to train B cross-connects will close on both uut.ts as will non safety to safety related cross-connects.

These a

actuations assure independence of the 1 cops and the required redundancy under design basis conditions, 9

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TABLE B 3/4 7-1 UNITS 1 AND 2 NUCLEAR SERVICE WATER SYSTEM SHARED VALVES CRN-1 LOW LEVEL INTAKE SUP TO RN ORN-2B TRAIN A RC SUPPLY ORN-3A,C TRAIN A RC SUPPLY l

ORN-4A.C TRAIN B RC SUPPLY ORN-5B TRAIN B RC SUPPLY ORN-7A.C TRAIN A SNSWP SUPPLY ORN-9B TRAIN B SNSWP SUPPLY ORN-10A,C TRAIN B LLI SUPPLY ORN-11B TRAIN B LLI SUPPLY ORN-12A, C TRAIN A LLI SUPPLY ORN-13A TRA 4 A LLI SUPPLY ORN-14A TRAIN A SUCT X-CONNECT ORN-15B TRAIN B SUCT X-CONNECT ORN-147A.C TRAIN A DISCH TO RC ORN-148A,C TRAIN A DIfCH TO RC ORN-149A TRAIN A DIFCH TO RC ORN-150A C TRAIN A DISCH X-CONNECT ORN-151B TRAIN B DISCH X-CONNECT ORN-152B TRAIN B DISCH TO SNSWP ORN-283A,C TRAIN B DISCH TO RC l

ORN-284B TRAIN B DISCH TO RC ORN-301A,C RV SUPPLY FROM LLI ORN-302B RV SUPPLY FROM LLI l

B 3/4 7-3a

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j Justification and Safety Analysis j

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The proposed changes to the McGuire Nuclear Station Technical Specifications

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for the nuclear service water system are to clarify that some portions of the

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system are shared between units while most of the four loops are independent.

The Bases are also revised to clarify the system design. As indicated on the enclosed figure (proposed Figure 3/4 7-1), portions of the systems are shared, j

Specifically, this includes common suction piping (train A of both units share j

suction as do train B of both units), discharge piping, and cross-connect J

piping. Shared valves are listed in proposed Table B 3/4 7-1.

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The proposal to include the figure in the Technical 5 specifications (as opposed

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to the Bases) is due to the unique nature of the nuclear service water system.

The additional level of detail in this specific instance is necessary in order to assure the operators fully understand the implications of an inoperable component in this system which is partially shared between the two units at McGuire. This is a unique situation at McGuire inherent in the system design and thus requires this special treatment. The drawing is simplified from the actual system to make it easy to use and generalized such that Duke does not foresee any changes to the figure.

The proposed Action Statements clarify the actions and allowed outage times (A0T) for the situations in which an inoperable component af fects a single unit or both units. The A0T for an inoperable loop remains the same:

72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months to restore an inoperable loop before initiating a shutdown on the affected unit (s). The expanded Bases provide information to the users of the Technical Specifications further detail on the design and operation of the nuclear service water system, including information that may assist operators in properly determining the operability of the system.

l A furthet clarification provided in the surveillance requirements is proposed.

The change would specify and clarify that two nuclear service water loops per unit are operable, not just two for the station, as it may be interpreted as portions of the system are shared, but not the overall system.

This item has not caused any problems, but is being clarified for consistency with the rest of the specification.

The nuclear service water system is identified in the McGuire Final Safety Analysis Report as being a system that has some shared components between i

units, as described in FSAR Table 1.2.2-1 and the system description in FSAR Section 9.2.2.

Redundancy is assured based upon two trains per unit and two independent suction lines and two independent discharge lines.

Crossover pump discharge piping is provided to add operational flexibility in case of multi-ple failures as discussed in the FSAR, Section 9.2.2.2, paragraph 3.

These crossover lines also allow the filling and pressurization of a stagnant loop j

from an operating loop. The crossover valves automatically close on a safety injection signal to assure channel independence and redundancy as assumed in the safety analysis. The proposed change does not effect these actuations, thus not the required redundancy of the system.

The proposed change would not involve a significant increase in the probabil-ity or consequences of an accident previously evaluated. The proposed changes to the McGuire Nuclear Station Technical Specifications are intended to ensure operability of the nuclear service water system by clarifying the requirements of the specifications, but not changing the actual requirements. As system

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Justification and Safety Analysis Page 2 l

l operability require ents vov14 ust be changed, plant operation ic unaf fected thus the probability of an accident is unchanged.

As the system design requirements are unaffected, the consequences of an accident previously evaluated are unchanged.

The proposed change would not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated. The change is a clarification of the existing specification and does not involve any hardware or operational changes, thus no accident scenarios are created or affected.

The proposed change would not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

The change does not involve any operational changes, design changes, or changes in system requirements. As the change does not affect system operability or performance, no margins of safety are affected.

Based upon the preceding analysis, Duke Power concludes in accordance with 10CFR50.91 that the proposed amendments do not involve a significant hazards consideration as defined by 10CFR50.92.

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ML20236M552

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