Letter Sequence Other |
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Results
Other: ML20195C233, ML20209G130, ML20209G166, ML20209G183, ML20209G226, ML20209G235, ML20212H039, ML20236G894, ML20236G900, ML20236G904, ML20236N590
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MONTHYEARML20195C2331986-05-21021 May 1986 Informs That Revised SPDS Design Will Be Submitted by 861231,per 860407 Ser.Design Currently Under Review to Remove Human Engineering Discrepancies within Sys & Change Displays Project stage: Other ML20210G2431986-09-15015 September 1986 Forwards Audit Plan for Safety Evaluation of Facility Action Plan for Performance Improvement of Control Room Design & Spds.Audit Should Be Conducted in Early Oct to Preclude Impact on Proposed Restart Date Project stage: Approval ML20209G2261986-12-0505 December 1986 Rev 1 to Final Rept,Qualification Test of Isolation Device for SPDS Multiplexers Rancho Seco Nuclear Generating Station Project stage: Other ML20209G2351986-12-30030 December 1986 Preliminary Results of Central Control Unit Isolation Devices Test,Rancho Seco Plant Project stage: Other ML20209G1831986-12-31031 December 1986 Rev 1 to Availability Evaluation for SPDS at Rancho Seco Plant Project stage: Other ML20209G1661986-12-31031 December 1986 SPDS Safety Analysis for Rancho Seco Nuclear Generating Station Unit 1 Project stage: Other ML20212H0391987-01-12012 January 1987 Responds to Questions Discussed During 861216 Telcon Re SPDS & Main Feedwater (MFW) Indication in Control Room.Util Will Revise Action Plan,Section 4B.19 Re MFW Pump Trips Project stage: Other ML20209G1301987-01-12012 January 1987 Forwards Listed Documentation,Including 47-1139815-01, SPDS Safety Analysis for Rancho Seco Nuclear Generating Station Unit 1 & Rev 1 to BAW-1753, Availability Evaluation for Spds..., Per NRC Request Re Project stage: Other ML20212N3381987-01-14014 January 1987 Forwards Audit Plan for 870210-12 Safety Evaluation of SPDS in Lynchburg,Va Project stage: Approval ML20206S2681987-04-17017 April 1987 Forwards Description of SPDS Isolation Methodology Based on Discussion at 870407 Meeting.Method Will Provide Isolation When Exposed to Max Credible Fault.One Oversize Drawing Encl Project stage: Meeting ML20236G9041987-07-24024 July 1987 Rev 0 to Test of Ccu/Csu Interface Devices for Data Acquisition Sys (Anatec) Project stage: Other ML20236G9001987-07-24024 July 1987 Rev 0 to Test of Isolation Devices for Data Acquisition Sys (Anatec) Project stage: Other ML20236G8941987-07-24024 July 1987 Forwards Evaluations of Preliminary Test Results of SPDS Isolation Devices,Including Isolators 4,5,8,9 & 10 Project stage: Other ML20236N5901987-11-0909 November 1987 Discusses SPDS Safety Evaluation Issues Re Fire Protection, Software Validation & Verification & Electrical Isolation. Listing of Status of Each Issue & Comparison of Nonlinear Data Points in Final Acceptance Test Encl Project stage: Other 1986-09-15
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Category:CORRESPONDENCE-LETTERS
MONTHYEARML20217M8851999-10-0808 October 1999 Informs of Staff Determination That Listed Calculations Should Be Withheld from Public Disclosure,Per 10CFR2.790, as Requested in 990909 Affidavit ML20211J7731999-08-31031 August 1999 Forwards Insp Rept 50-312/99-03 on 990802-06.No Violations Noted.Insp Included Decommissioning & Dismantlement Activities,Verification of Compliance with Selected TS & Review of Completed SEs ML20211H7481999-08-13013 August 1999 Forwards Amend 126 to License DPR-54 & Safety Evaluation. Amend Changes Permanently Defueled Technical Specification (PDTS) D3/4.1, Spent Fuel Pool Level, to Replace Specific Reference to SFP Level Alarm Switches with Generic Ref 3F0799-22, Provides Update & Rev to Submittal Made by Util Ltr with Regard to EAL Classification Methodology for Unit 3.Reponses to NRC Staff Questions Provided as Attachment D to Ltr & Reflects Discussions Held1999-07-13013 July 1999 Provides Update & Rev to Submittal Made by Util Ltr with Regard to EAL Classification Methodology for Unit 3.Reponses to NRC Staff Questions Provided as Attachment D to Ltr & Reflects Discussions Held ML20210H9541999-07-0707 July 1999 Informs NRC of Change to Rancho Seco Decommissioning Schedule,As Described in Licensee Post Shutdown Decommissioning Activities Rept ML20209D2501999-06-24024 June 1999 Informs That Util Has Revised All Sections of Rancho Seco Emergency Plan (Rsep),Change 4,effective 990624 ML20196G0431999-06-22022 June 1999 Forwards Certified Copies of Listed Nuclear Liability Endorsements for Smud Rancho Seco Nuclear Generating Station ML20195D1851999-05-27027 May 1999 Forwards Rancho Seco Annual Rept, IAW Plant Permanently Defueled TS D6.9.4 & D6.9.6b.Rept Contains Shutdown Statistics,Narrative Summary of Shutdown Experience,Er Info & Tabulation of Facility Changes,Tests & Experiments ML20195B8511999-05-27027 May 1999 Forwards Change 4 to Rancho Seco Emergency Plan, Incorporating Commitments Made to NRC as Outlined in NRC .Emergency Plan Includes Two Listed Supporting Documents ML20207E9181999-05-27027 May 1999 Informs That Effective 990328,NRR Underwent Reorganization. within Framework of Reorganization,Div of Licensing Project Mgt Created.Reorganization Chart Encl ML20206U7411999-05-18018 May 1999 Provides Summary of 990217-18 Visit to Rancho Seco Facility to Become Familar with Facility,Including Onsite ISFSI & Meeting with Representatives of Smud to Discuss Issues Re Revised Rancho Seco Ep,Submitted to NRC on 960429 ML20206M1611999-05-10010 May 1999 Forwards Listed Proprietary Calculations to Support Review of Rancho Seco ISFSI Sar.Proprietary Encls Withheld ML20206E8591999-04-12012 April 1999 Provides Info Re High Total Coliform Result in Plant Domestic Sewage Effluent Prior to Confluence with Combined Effluent.Cause of High Total Coliform Result Was Broken Flow Rate Instrument.Instrument Was Repaired on 990318 ML20204H6751999-03-19019 March 1999 Forwards Insp Rept 50-312/99-02 on 990309-11.No Violations Noted.Portions of Physical Security & Access Authorization Programs Were Inspected ML20204E4031999-03-16016 March 1999 Submits Rept of Status of Decommissioning Funding for Rancho Seco,As Required by 10CFR50.75(f)(1).Plant Is Currently in Safstor, with Operating License Scheduled to Expire in Oct 2008 ML20204E6661999-03-11011 March 1999 Forwards Rancho Seco Exposure Rept for Individuals That Received Greater than 100 Mrem During 1998,IAW TS D6.9.2.2 & NRC Regulatory Guide 1.16 ML20204E6441999-03-11011 March 1999 Forwards Individual Monitoring Repts for Personnel That Required Radiation Exposure Monitoring During 1998 ML20207L1711999-03-10010 March 1999 Informs of Staff Determination That Supporting Calculations & Drawings Contained in Rev 2 of Sar, Should Be Withheld from Public Disclosure,Per 10CFR2.790 NL-99-002, Submits Info About Property Insurance for Rancho Seco Nuclear Generating Station,Iaw 10CFR50.54(w)(3)1999-03-10010 March 1999 Submits Info About Property Insurance for Rancho Seco Nuclear Generating Station,Iaw 10CFR50.54(w)(3) ML20207D4431999-03-0101 March 1999 Forwards Annual Radioactive Effluent Release Rept, for Rancho Seco Nuclear Generating Station for 1998 ML20207H6181999-02-18018 February 1999 Provides Attached Metrix & Two Copies of Rancho Seco ISFSI Sar,Rev 2 on Compact Disc,As Requested in 990209 Meeting. First Rounds of RAIs Dealt Primarily with Use of Cask as Storage Cask.Without Compact Disc ML20203D0761999-02-10010 February 1999 Ltr Contract:Task Order 37 Entitled, Technical Assistance in Review of New Safety Analysis Rept for Rancho Seco Spent Fuel Storage Facility, Under Contract NRC-02-95-003 ML20155D4431998-10-27027 October 1998 Forwards Amend 3 to Rancho Seco Dsar,Representing Updated Licensing Basis for Operation of Permanently Shutdown & Defueled Rancho Seco Nuclear Facility During Permanently Defueled Mode.With Instructions & List of Effective Pages NL-98-032, Forwards Certified Copies of Listed Nuclear Liability Endorsements for Util1998-09-30030 September 1998 Forwards Certified Copies of Listed Nuclear Liability Endorsements for Util ML20237A6031998-08-0707 August 1998 Forwards Insp Rept 50-312/98-03 on 980706-09.No Violations Noted ML20237A9481998-08-0303 August 1998 Forwards Smud 1997 Annual Rept, IAW 10CFR50.71(b),which Includes Certified Financial Statements ML20236Q9461998-07-15015 July 1998 Ack Receipt of Informing NRC of Steps Taken to Correct Violations Noted in Insp Rept 50-312/98-02 ML20236J6331998-06-30030 June 1998 Forwards Response to Violations Noted in Insp Rept 50-312/98-02.Corrective Actions:Util Revised RSAP-1003 to Clarify District Security Staff Responsibilities Re Handling & Review of Criminal History Info ML20236E8211998-06-0303 June 1998 Forwards Insp Rept 50-312/98-02 on 980519-21 & NOV Re Failure to Review & Consider All Info Obtained During Background Investigation.Areas Examined During Insp Also Included Portions of Physical Security Program ML20217G8391998-04-20020 April 1998 Forwards Copy of Rancho Seco Monthly Discharger Self-Monitoring Rept for Mar 1998 IR 05000312/19980011998-03-25025 March 1998 Ack Receipt of Informing NRC of Steps Taken to Correct Violations Noted in Insp Rept 50-312/98-01 on 980205 ML20217F1891998-03-18018 March 1998 Forwards Signed Original & Amend 7 to Rancho Seco Long Term Defueled Condition Physical Security Plan & Rev 4 to Long Term Defueled Condition Training & Qualification Plan.Encls Withheld,Per 10CFR2.790 ML20217G6661998-03-18018 March 1998 Forwards Discharge Self Monitoring Rept for Feb 1998, Which Makes Note of One Wastewater Discharge Permit Violation ML20217H0451998-03-18018 March 1998 Submits Rancho Seco Exposure Rept for Individuals Receiving Greater than 100 Mrem During 1997,per TS D6.9.2.2 & Guidance Contained in Reg Guide 1.16.No One Exposed to Greater than 100 Mrem in 1997 ML20216K1091998-03-11011 March 1998 Forwards NRC Form 5 Individual Monitoring Repts for Personnel Who Required Radiation Exposure Monitoring,Per 10CFR20.1502 During 1997.W/o Encl ML20217N9531998-03-0505 March 1998 Responds to Violations Noted in Insp Rept 50-312/98-01. Corrective Actions:Radiation Protection Group Wrote Potential Deviation from Quality (Pdq) 97-0082 & Assigned Radiation Protection Action to Determine Cause & CAs ML20203H7001998-02-25025 February 1998 Forwards Annual Radioactive Effluent Release Rept for Jan- Dec 1997, IAW 10CFR50.36a(a)(2) & TS D6.9.3.Revs to Radiological Environ Monitoring Manual & off-site Dose Calculation Manual,Encl ML20202G0131998-02-12012 February 1998 Forwards Certified Copies of Listed Nuclear Liability Endorsements & Master Worker Policy Certificate of Insurace for Facility NL-98-006, Submits Annual Rept of Property Insurance Levels for Rsngs, IAW 10CFR50.54(w)(3)1998-02-12012 February 1998 Submits Annual Rept of Property Insurance Levels for Rsngs, IAW 10CFR50.54(w)(3) ML20202C4641998-02-0505 February 1998 Forwards Insp Rept 50-312/98-01 on 980105-08 & Notice of Violation.Insp Included Decommissioning & Dismantlement Work Underway,Verification of Compliance W/Selected TS & Main & Surveillance Activities Associated W/Sfp ML20199A5881997-11-10010 November 1997 Responds to NRC Re Violations Noted in Insp Rept 50-312/97-01.Corrective Actions:Reviewed SFP Water Temp & Instrument Calibr Records,Generated Otr 97-001 to Document out-of-tolerance Instrument & Generated Pdq 97-0064 ML20198R9501997-11-0505 November 1997 Requests Interpretation of or Rev to NUREG-1536, Std Review Plan for Dry Cask Storage Sys, Re Compliance W/ 10CFR72.236(e) & 10CFR72.122(h)(4) for Dry Fuel Storage Casks ML20198K5391997-10-21021 October 1997 Forwards Insp Rept 50-312/97-04 on 970922-25 & Notice of Violation.Response Required & Will Be Used to Determine If Further Action Will Be Necessary ML20217D3101997-09-25025 September 1997 Forwards Update of 1995 Decommissioning Evaluation, for Rancho Seco Nuclear Generation Station & Annual Review of Nuclear Decommissioning Trust Fund for Adequacy Re Assumptions for Inflation & Rate of Return ML20211F0991997-09-23023 September 1997 Forwards One Certified Copy of Mutual Atomic Energy Liability Underwriters Nuclear Energy Liability Insurance Endorsement 120 for Policy MF-0075 for Smud Rancho Seco Nuclear Facility ML20198G8141997-08-22022 August 1997 Forwards Amend 125 to License DPR-54 & Safety Evaluation. Amend Permits Smud to Change TS to Incorporate Revised 10CFR20.Amend Also Revises References from NRC Region V to NRC Region IV ML20151L0281997-07-29029 July 1997 Provides Response to NRC Request for Addl Info Re TS Change,Relocating Administrative Controls Related to QA to Ufsar,Per NUREG-0737 ML20149E5031997-07-10010 July 1997 Second Partial Response to FOIA Request for Documents. Forwards Records Listed in App C Being Made Available in Pdr.Records in App D Already Available in PDR ML20148P5161997-06-30030 June 1997 Second Partial Response to FOIA Request for Documents.App B Records Being Made Available in PDR ML20141A1721997-06-17017 June 1997 Forwards Insp Rept 50-312/97-03 on 970603-05.No Violations Noted.Areas Examined During Insp Included Portions of Physical Security Program 1999-08-31
[Table view] Category:INCOMING CORRESPONDENCE
MONTHYEAR3F0799-22, Provides Update & Rev to Submittal Made by Util Ltr with Regard to EAL Classification Methodology for Unit 3.Reponses to NRC Staff Questions Provided as Attachment D to Ltr & Reflects Discussions Held1999-07-13013 July 1999 Provides Update & Rev to Submittal Made by Util Ltr with Regard to EAL Classification Methodology for Unit 3.Reponses to NRC Staff Questions Provided as Attachment D to Ltr & Reflects Discussions Held ML20210H9541999-07-0707 July 1999 Informs NRC of Change to Rancho Seco Decommissioning Schedule,As Described in Licensee Post Shutdown Decommissioning Activities Rept ML20209D2501999-06-24024 June 1999 Informs That Util Has Revised All Sections of Rancho Seco Emergency Plan (Rsep),Change 4,effective 990624 ML20196G0431999-06-22022 June 1999 Forwards Certified Copies of Listed Nuclear Liability Endorsements for Smud Rancho Seco Nuclear Generating Station ML20195B8511999-05-27027 May 1999 Forwards Change 4 to Rancho Seco Emergency Plan, Incorporating Commitments Made to NRC as Outlined in NRC .Emergency Plan Includes Two Listed Supporting Documents ML20195D1851999-05-27027 May 1999 Forwards Rancho Seco Annual Rept, IAW Plant Permanently Defueled TS D6.9.4 & D6.9.6b.Rept Contains Shutdown Statistics,Narrative Summary of Shutdown Experience,Er Info & Tabulation of Facility Changes,Tests & Experiments ML20206M1611999-05-10010 May 1999 Forwards Listed Proprietary Calculations to Support Review of Rancho Seco ISFSI Sar.Proprietary Encls Withheld ML20206E8591999-04-12012 April 1999 Provides Info Re High Total Coliform Result in Plant Domestic Sewage Effluent Prior to Confluence with Combined Effluent.Cause of High Total Coliform Result Was Broken Flow Rate Instrument.Instrument Was Repaired on 990318 ML20204E4031999-03-16016 March 1999 Submits Rept of Status of Decommissioning Funding for Rancho Seco,As Required by 10CFR50.75(f)(1).Plant Is Currently in Safstor, with Operating License Scheduled to Expire in Oct 2008 ML20204E6441999-03-11011 March 1999 Forwards Individual Monitoring Repts for Personnel That Required Radiation Exposure Monitoring During 1998 ML20204E6661999-03-11011 March 1999 Forwards Rancho Seco Exposure Rept for Individuals That Received Greater than 100 Mrem During 1998,IAW TS D6.9.2.2 & NRC Regulatory Guide 1.16 NL-99-002, Submits Info About Property Insurance for Rancho Seco Nuclear Generating Station,Iaw 10CFR50.54(w)(3)1999-03-10010 March 1999 Submits Info About Property Insurance for Rancho Seco Nuclear Generating Station,Iaw 10CFR50.54(w)(3) ML20207D4431999-03-0101 March 1999 Forwards Annual Radioactive Effluent Release Rept, for Rancho Seco Nuclear Generating Station for 1998 ML20207H6181999-02-18018 February 1999 Provides Attached Metrix & Two Copies of Rancho Seco ISFSI Sar,Rev 2 on Compact Disc,As Requested in 990209 Meeting. First Rounds of RAIs Dealt Primarily with Use of Cask as Storage Cask.Without Compact Disc ML20155D4431998-10-27027 October 1998 Forwards Amend 3 to Rancho Seco Dsar,Representing Updated Licensing Basis for Operation of Permanently Shutdown & Defueled Rancho Seco Nuclear Facility During Permanently Defueled Mode.With Instructions & List of Effective Pages NL-98-032, Forwards Certified Copies of Listed Nuclear Liability Endorsements for Util1998-09-30030 September 1998 Forwards Certified Copies of Listed Nuclear Liability Endorsements for Util ML20237A9481998-08-0303 August 1998 Forwards Smud 1997 Annual Rept, IAW 10CFR50.71(b),which Includes Certified Financial Statements ML20236J6331998-06-30030 June 1998 Forwards Response to Violations Noted in Insp Rept 50-312/98-02.Corrective Actions:Util Revised RSAP-1003 to Clarify District Security Staff Responsibilities Re Handling & Review of Criminal History Info ML20217G8391998-04-20020 April 1998 Forwards Copy of Rancho Seco Monthly Discharger Self-Monitoring Rept for Mar 1998 ML20217H0451998-03-18018 March 1998 Submits Rancho Seco Exposure Rept for Individuals Receiving Greater than 100 Mrem During 1997,per TS D6.9.2.2 & Guidance Contained in Reg Guide 1.16.No One Exposed to Greater than 100 Mrem in 1997 ML20217F1891998-03-18018 March 1998 Forwards Signed Original & Amend 7 to Rancho Seco Long Term Defueled Condition Physical Security Plan & Rev 4 to Long Term Defueled Condition Training & Qualification Plan.Encls Withheld,Per 10CFR2.790 ML20217G6661998-03-18018 March 1998 Forwards Discharge Self Monitoring Rept for Feb 1998, Which Makes Note of One Wastewater Discharge Permit Violation ML20216K1091998-03-11011 March 1998 Forwards NRC Form 5 Individual Monitoring Repts for Personnel Who Required Radiation Exposure Monitoring,Per 10CFR20.1502 During 1997.W/o Encl ML20217N9531998-03-0505 March 1998 Responds to Violations Noted in Insp Rept 50-312/98-01. Corrective Actions:Radiation Protection Group Wrote Potential Deviation from Quality (Pdq) 97-0082 & Assigned Radiation Protection Action to Determine Cause & CAs ML20203H7001998-02-25025 February 1998 Forwards Annual Radioactive Effluent Release Rept for Jan- Dec 1997, IAW 10CFR50.36a(a)(2) & TS D6.9.3.Revs to Radiological Environ Monitoring Manual & off-site Dose Calculation Manual,Encl NL-98-006, Submits Annual Rept of Property Insurance Levels for Rsngs, IAW 10CFR50.54(w)(3)1998-02-12012 February 1998 Submits Annual Rept of Property Insurance Levels for Rsngs, IAW 10CFR50.54(w)(3) ML20202G0131998-02-12012 February 1998 Forwards Certified Copies of Listed Nuclear Liability Endorsements & Master Worker Policy Certificate of Insurace for Facility ML20199A5881997-11-10010 November 1997 Responds to NRC Re Violations Noted in Insp Rept 50-312/97-01.Corrective Actions:Reviewed SFP Water Temp & Instrument Calibr Records,Generated Otr 97-001 to Document out-of-tolerance Instrument & Generated Pdq 97-0064 ML20198R9501997-11-0505 November 1997 Requests Interpretation of or Rev to NUREG-1536, Std Review Plan for Dry Cask Storage Sys, Re Compliance W/ 10CFR72.236(e) & 10CFR72.122(h)(4) for Dry Fuel Storage Casks ML20217D3101997-09-25025 September 1997 Forwards Update of 1995 Decommissioning Evaluation, for Rancho Seco Nuclear Generation Station & Annual Review of Nuclear Decommissioning Trust Fund for Adequacy Re Assumptions for Inflation & Rate of Return ML20211F0991997-09-23023 September 1997 Forwards One Certified Copy of Mutual Atomic Energy Liability Underwriters Nuclear Energy Liability Insurance Endorsement 120 for Policy MF-0075 for Smud Rancho Seco Nuclear Facility ML20151L0281997-07-29029 July 1997 Provides Response to NRC Request for Addl Info Re TS Change,Relocating Administrative Controls Related to QA to Ufsar,Per NUREG-0737 NL-97-030, Forwards Endorsement 132 to Nelia Policy NF-0212 & Endorsement 118 to Maelu Policy MF-0075 for Smuds Rsngs1997-05-13013 May 1997 Forwards Endorsement 132 to Nelia Policy NF-0212 & Endorsement 118 to Maelu Policy MF-0075 for Smuds Rsngs ML20138F5321997-04-28028 April 1997 Forwards Response to RAI Re License Amend 192,updating Cask Drop Design Basis Analysis,Per NRC 960510 Request for Addl Info on 960318 Application NL-97-027, Forwards Certified Copies of Listed Nuclear Liability Endorsements for Utility1997-04-17017 April 1997 Forwards Certified Copies of Listed Nuclear Liability Endorsements for Utility ML20137W8091997-03-20020 March 1997 Forwards Biennial Update to Rancho Seco Post-Shutdown Decommissioning Activities Rept ML20137S3571997-03-19019 March 1997 Provides Notification of Use of Revised Quality Manual for Activities Re Rancho Seco ISFSI ML20137D0981997-03-18018 March 1997 Submits Rancho Seco Exposure Rept for Individuals Receiving Greater than 100 Mrem During 1996.Provided IAW TS D6.9.2.2 & Guidance Contained in NRC Reg Guide 1.16.No One Exposed to Greater than 100 Mrem in 1996 ML20137D1221997-03-18018 March 1997 Submits,Iaw 10CFR20.2206 & TS D6.9.2.1,1996 NRC Form 5 Individual Monitoring Repts for Personnel Requiring Radiation Exposure Monitoring Per 10CFR20.1502 During 1996. W/O Encl NL-97-012, Submits Rept of Listed Current Levels of Property Insurance for Plant,Iaw 10CFR50.54(w)(3)1997-02-11011 February 1997 Submits Rept of Listed Current Levels of Property Insurance for Plant,Iaw 10CFR50.54(w)(3) ML20138L1091997-01-29029 January 1997 Informs of Schedule Change Re Decommissioning of Rancho Seco.Incremental Decommissioning Action Plan,Encl NL-97-005, Forwards Certified Copies of Listed Nuclear Liability Endorsements for Utility1997-01-22022 January 1997 Forwards Certified Copies of Listed Nuclear Liability Endorsements for Utility NL-96-056, Forwards Certified Copies of Listed Nuclear Liability Endorsements for Util1996-12-16016 December 1996 Forwards Certified Copies of Listed Nuclear Liability Endorsements for Util ML20134E0041996-10-23023 October 1996 Forwards Response to NRC GL 96-04, Boraflex Degradation in Spent Fuel Pool Storage Racks ML18102B6871996-08-0606 August 1996 Informs That Util Will Revise Loading & Unloading Procedures & Operator Training as Necessary ML20149E4491994-05-16016 May 1994 Forwards 1993 Annual Rept of Sacramento Municipal Utility District,For Info ML20149E3971994-05-10010 May 1994 Forwards Re Updated Decommissioning Cost Estimate for Rancho Seco & Attached Rept by Tlg Engineering,Inc. W/Svc List ML20059H6731994-01-20020 January 1994 Forwards Revised Rancho Seco Quality Manual, Reflecting Current Rancho Seco Pol Phase Nuclear Organization Changes ML20059E1221994-01-0303 January 1994 Forwards Amend 7 to Long Term Defueled Condition Physical Security Plan.Encl Withheld (Ref 10CFR73) ML20059C1681993-12-22022 December 1993 Forwards Suppl Info to Support Review & Approval of 930514 Proposed License Amend 186 Re Nuclear Organization Changes, Per NRC Request 1999-07-07
[Table view] Category:UTILITY TO NRC
MONTHYEARML20059L5431990-09-20020 September 1990 Requests Exemptions from Certain Requirements of 10CFR50.47(b) & 50,App E & Proposes New Emergency Plan That Specifically Applies to Long Term Defueled Condition ML20059J9161990-09-13013 September 1990 Notification of Change in Operator/Senior Operator Status for R Groehler,Effective 900907 ML20059J9221990-09-13013 September 1990 Responds to Generic Ltr 90-03, Relaxation of Staff Position in Generic Ltr 83-28,Item 2.2,Part 2, 'Vendor Interface for Safety-Related Components.' No Vendor Interface Exists for Spent Fuel Pool Liner NL-90-442, Forwards Endorsements 13 to Nelia Certificate N-49 & Maelu Certificate M-49,Endorsements 91 & 92 to Maelu Policy MF-75 & Endorsements 103 & 104 to Nelia Policy NF-2121990-09-12012 September 1990 Forwards Endorsements 13 to Nelia Certificate N-49 & Maelu Certificate M-49,Endorsements 91 & 92 to Maelu Policy MF-75 & Endorsements 103 & 104 to Nelia Policy NF-212 ML20059G0791990-09-0606 September 1990 Forwards Supplemental Fitness for Duty Performance Data, Omitted from 900725 Rept Re Random Drug Testing Results ML20059E0031990-08-30030 August 1990 Forwards Semiannual Radioactive Effluent Release Rept,Jan- June 1990, Corrected Repts & Revs to ODCM ML20059C2491990-08-27027 August 1990 Advises That M Foster & B Rausch Leaving Util Effective on 900810 & 17,respectively & Will No Longer Require Active Operator Licenses ML20056B2591990-08-20020 August 1990 Forwards Long-Term Defueled Condition Security Training & Qualification Plan. Encl Withheld (Ref 10CFR2.790) ML20056B2961990-08-10010 August 1990 Discusses 900731 Meeting Re Future of Util & Closure & Decommissioning of Facility.Request for Possession Only License Pending Before Commission ML20058Q2811990-08-0909 August 1990 Forwards Updated Listing of Commitments & long-range Scope List Items Deferred or Closed by Commitment Mgt Review Group Since Last Update ML20058N0911990-08-0707 August 1990 Notifies of Minor Change in List of Tech Specs Applicable in Plant Defueled Condition.Determined That Surveillance Requirements Table 4.1-1,Item 63 Not Required to Be Included in List of Tech Specs Applicable in Defueled Condition ML20056A1131990-07-30030 July 1990 Apprises of Status of Plans to Use 3 of 4 Emergency Diesel Generators as Peaking Power Supplies & Responds to Questions in .Util Obtained Authorization for Operation of Diesel Generators for No More than 90 Days Per Yr ML20056A2041990-07-30030 July 1990 Provides Response to NRC Bulletin 90-001, Loss of Fill Oil in Transmitters Mfg by Rosemount. Pressure & Differential Pressure Transmitters 1153 & 1154 Do Not Perform Any safety-related Function in Current Plant Mode ML20055J0311990-07-25025 July 1990 Forwards fitness-for-duty Performance Data for Facility from 900103-0630 ML20055J0331990-07-25025 July 1990 Notifies of Change in Operator/Senior Operator Status. Operators Terminating Employment & No Longer Require License ML20055H8081990-07-24024 July 1990 Forwards Decommissioning Financial Plan for Plant,Per 10CFR50.33(k)(2) & Requests Interim Exemption Re Requirement to Have Full Decommissioning Funding at Time of Termination of Operation,Per 10CFR50.12 ML20055H7561990-07-24024 July 1990 Requests Exemption from Performing Annual Exercise of Emergency Plan,Activation of Alert & Notification Sys & Distribution of Public Info Brochures,Per 10CFR50.12 Requirements ML20055F8421990-07-13013 July 1990 Forwards Application for Proposed Decommissioning of Plant. Util Needs Relief from Equipment Maint,Surveillance,Staffing & Other Requirements Not Necessary to Protect Public Health & Safety During Defueled Condition ML20055G9821990-07-12012 July 1990 Advises That Environ Exposure Controls Action Plan Will Be Provided by Sept 1990,per Insp Rept 50-312/90-02 ML20055E5111990-07-0606 July 1990 Notifies of Change in Operator/Senior Operator Status for D Rosenbaum & M Cooper,Effective 900622 & 29,respectively ML20055C3541990-02-14014 February 1990 Forwards Updated Response to Insp Rept 50-312/88-30. Calculations for Liquid Effluent Monitors Completed & in Use & Rev to Reg Guide 4.15 in Procedure RSAP-1702 Scheduled to Be Completed & Implemented by Apr 1990 ML20055C3511990-02-14014 February 1990 Forwards Addl Info Re 900306 Response to NRC Bulletin 88-003, Inadequate Latch Engagement in Hfa Type Latching Relays Mfg by Ge. Util Will Replace Only Relays Found Not to Meet Insp Criteria ML20248H2571989-10-0606 October 1989 Responds to NRC Re Addendum to Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 92 to License DPR-54 Re Reactor Vessel Vent Valve Testing.No Testing of Reactor Vessel Vent Valves Will Be Performed ML20248H2391989-10-0606 October 1989 Requests Exemption from Requirements of 10CFR26 Re Fitness for Duty Programs Based on Present & Future Operational Configuration ML20248A8271989-09-25025 September 1989 Requests Permission to Submit Next Amend to Updated FSAR W/Decommissioning Plan Submittal.Extension Will Allow District to Incorporate Plant Closure Status in SAR Update to Reflect Plant Conditions Accurately ML20248D4611989-09-13013 September 1989 Responds to 890906 Request for Assessment of Util Compliance W/Ol & Associated Programs & Commitments,Per 10CFR50.54(f). Staffing Requirements for Emergency Preparedness Will Not Be Violated & Future Shortfalls Will Be Remedied ML20247G1991989-09-11011 September 1989 Requests Extension for Time Period Equivalent to That of Current Shutdown.Extension Would Result in Revised Final Expiration Date of Not Earlier than 900318.Plant Would Not Be Brought Above Cold Shutdown W/O NRC Prior Concurrence ML20247H3551989-09-0707 September 1989 Informs That Util Stands by Commitments of 890621 & 0829 Re Implementation of Closure Plan in Safe & Deliberate Manner in Compliance W/License & W/All Applicable Laws & Regulations ML20247H5541989-09-0101 September 1989 Responds to Violations Noted in Insp Rept 50-312/89-14. Corrective Actions:Stop Order on Fuel Movement Issued & Action Plan Generated on 890908 to Address Broader Issues 05000312/LER-1988-010, Forwards Rev 1 to LER 88-010,due to Change in Commitment Date for re-evaluating Fire Zones.Date Changed to 901001. Zones re-evaluated in Conjunction W/Mods to Fire Detection Annunciator Sys1989-08-23023 August 1989 Forwards Rev 1 to LER 88-010,due to Change in Commitment Date for re-evaluating Fire Zones.Date Changed to 901001. Zones re-evaluated in Conjunction W/Mods to Fire Detection Annunciator Sys ML20246A4011989-08-16016 August 1989 Forwards Rev 5 to Inservice Testing Program Plan. Changes Identified Consistent W/Guidance Provided by Generic Ltr 89-04 NL-89-593, Forwards Plant Closure Organizational Charts & Administrative Procedure RSAP-0101,per 890802 Request1989-08-15015 August 1989 Forwards Plant Closure Organizational Charts & Administrative Procedure RSAP-0101,per 890802 Request ML20245H4781989-08-10010 August 1989 Requests Exemption from Generic Ltr 89-07, Power Reactor Safeguards Contingency Planning for Surface Vehicle Bombs Because on 890607,util Board of Directors Ordered That Plant Cease Operation ML20245H1781989-08-0909 August 1989 Notifies of Change in Operator/Senior Operator Status. J Dailey & J Reynolds Terminated Employment on 890721 & 890802,respectively ML20245L1831989-08-0808 August 1989 Informs That Official Correspondence Must Be Directed to Listed Individuals Due to Reorganization of Util Following 890606 Election ML20247L9221989-07-26026 July 1989 Provides Revised Response to NRC Re Violations Noted in Insp Rept 50-312/88-33.Corrective Action:Portable Shield Walls Inspected Every 6 Months to Ensure All Safety Factors Met & Area Surveys Conducted on Weekly Basis ML20247M4121989-07-24024 July 1989 Requests Exemption from 10CFR50,App E,Section IV.F.2 to Allow Util Not to Perform Annual Emergency Plan Exercise for 1989.Request Results from Transitional Mode of Plant from Operating Plant to Plant Preparing for Decommissioning NL-89-541, Requests That Completion Date for Addl Training of Personnel Involved in Performing Work on Environ Qualified Equipment Be Extended from 890616 to 8912151989-07-14014 July 1989 Requests That Completion Date for Addl Training of Personnel Involved in Performing Work on Environ Qualified Equipment Be Extended from 890616 to 891215 ML20246P4011989-07-14014 July 1989 Informs That Evaluation of Contracts & Agreements Identified No Restrictions on Employee Ability to Provide Info About Potential Safety Issues to NRC NL-89-547, Forwards Amend 110 to License DPR-54,issued on 890609, Identifying Discrepancy in Tech Spec Page X (Table of Contents) Which Does Not Reflect Changes Approved in Amend 1061989-07-0606 July 1989 Forwards Amend 110 to License DPR-54,issued on 890609, Identifying Discrepancy in Tech Spec Page X (Table of Contents) Which Does Not Reflect Changes Approved in Amend 106 ML20246A9751989-06-30030 June 1989 Advises That Concerns Addressed in Generic Ltr 89-08 Inapplicable,Since Util Intends to Defuel Reactor.Generic Ltr Will Be Reviewed Prior to Placing Facility in heatup-cooldown Operational Mode for Return to Power ML20246A5171989-06-30030 June 1989 Forwards Rancho Seco Closure Plan, Per 890621 Request for Addl Info Re Plan CEO-89-289, Notifies of Change in Operator/Senior Operator Status.Listed Operator/Senior Operator Terminated Employment on Listed Effective Date1989-06-27027 June 1989 Notifies of Change in Operator/Senior Operator Status.Listed Operator/Senior Operator Terminated Employment on Listed Effective Date NL-89-526, Lists Discrepancies Noted in Amend 109 to License DPR-54,per 890615 Discussion W/S Reynolds.Tech Specs Encl1989-06-22022 June 1989 Lists Discrepancies Noted in Amend 109 to License DPR-54,per 890615 Discussion W/S Reynolds.Tech Specs Encl ML20245H4181989-06-21021 June 1989 Discusses Util Plans Re Overall Closure of Plant,Per 890615 Meeting W/Nrc.Util Will Request Appropriate Changes to Tech Specs to Reflect Defueled Mode & Will Evaluate & Request Changes to Emergency Plan ML20245D9281989-06-21021 June 1989 Discusses Activities Underway Re Plan for Closure of Plant Discussed During 890615 Meeting W/Region V.Util Intends to Continue Use of Essential Programs,Such as Preventive Maint Program,For Sys within Scope of Closure Process ML20245A0981989-06-16016 June 1989 Responds to NRC Bulletin 89-001, Failure of Westinghouse Steam Generator Tube Mechanical Plugs. No Westinghouse Plugs Used at Plant ML20248B5751989-06-0202 June 1989 Advises That Util Anticipates That Final Analysis of Thermal Striping Will Conservatively Support Surge Line Lifetime Significantly Longer than June 1994 Date,Per NRC Bulletin 88-011, Pressurizer Surge Line Thermal Stratification NL-89-468, Submits Justification for Absence of Functional Testing Requirement in Proposed Tech Spec 4.14(f) Re Snubber Svc Life Monitoring,Per 890517 Request1989-05-30030 May 1989 Submits Justification for Absence of Functional Testing Requirement in Proposed Tech Spec 4.14(f) Re Snubber Svc Life Monitoring,Per 890517 Request ML20247N2601989-05-25025 May 1989 Requests Guidance Re Whether NRC Concurs W/Arbitrator Order Concerning Employee Access to Plant 1990-09-06
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g'3SMU=
~ SACRAMENTO MUNICIPAL UTILITY DISTRICT O P, O. Box 15830. Sacramento CA 95852-1830,(916) 452-3211 AN ELECTRIC SYSTEM SERVING THE HEART OF CALIFORNIA
'JUI. 2 4 1987 GCA 87-341 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn: Frank J. Miraglia, Jr.
Associate Director for Projects Philips Builsiing 7920 Norfolk Avenue Bethesda, MD 20014 DOCKET NO. 50-312 RANCHO SECO NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION LICENSE NO. DPR-54 REQUEST FOR INFORMATION ON SPDS ISOLATION DEVICES
Reference:
Letter from J.E. Hard to F.J. Miraglia, dated April 17, 1987
Dear Mr. Miraglia:
Attached is an evaluation of the preliminary test results of the Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS) isolation devices. The attachment and its associated enclosures provide a discussion of each isolator for which credit is taken in the SPDS. The specific isolators addressed herein are numbers 4, 5, 8, 9 and 10 as shown on the block diagram provided the NRC in the District's April 17, 1987, submittal (referenced).
If there are any questions, please contact John Atwell of my staff.
Sincertly, An n Chief. Executive Officer, Nuclear Attachment cc: G. Kalman, NRC, Bethesda (2)
A. D'Angelo, NRC, Rancho Seco [
QB040414g7o7p4 t \
p ADOCK 05000312 PDR g HANCHO SECO NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION O 1444o Twin Cities Road, Hera:d, CA 95638-9799;(209) 333 2935 L_____________
ATTACHMENT ISOLATOR TESTING DISCUSSION Discussions will be provided in this attachment for isolators #4 (Anatec Multiplexer Digital Input Printed Circuit Board Optical Isolator), #5
( Anatec Multiplexer Analog Input Printed Circuit Board Transformer Coupled Isolator), #8 (Anatec Bus Isolator), #9 (Anatec Central Control Unit interface with IDADS Transformer coupled with 1/16 amp fuses) and
- 10 (Anatec Central Control Unit to Select Unit interface Optical Isolator). All of these isolators have been tested by Eigen Engineering using the test criteria previously discussed with the NRC and described in-the enclosures.
- 1. ISOLATOR TESTING
- a. Tests for Isolators #4 and #5:
These isolators were tested in the forward direction to show isolation of the multiplexer from the non-1E signal inputs. The test results for 'solator #4 are summarized in paragraph 2.6 of Enclosure #1. The results show that the optical isolator is not damaged by either the 120 Vrms (340 Vp-p) or the 140 Vdc maximum credible voltage (MCV) application at the input terminals of the printed circuit board.
The test also indicated that the higher than normal voltage input only causes the light emitting diode to operate normally with the only effect being an erroneous signal being transmitted to the multipl3xer backplane and eventually to the data buses. The effect of such an erroneous signal would be a single piece of bad data to the IDADS and/or the SPDS computer (s). Since the inputs to these non-1E nultiplexers are not Class lE, the erroneous information would be undesirable but would not present a safety problem.
The test results for isolator #5 are summarized in paragraph 2.5 of Enclosure #1. The results show that the input differential impedence of the analog printed circuit board is high enough (40,000 ohms for the test board) to cause the voltage across the primary of the transformer isolator, due to MCV applied at the input, to be reduced sufficiently to insure that failure of the primary coil does not occur. As a result, the output of the printed circuit board would present a full range digital signal i to the multiplexer backplane and eventually to the data buses.
For example, if the maximum credible voltage was applied to an input from a pressure transmitter with a range of 0 to 400 psig, the computer would read a value of 400 psig. The test report l l
also states that the printed circuit board was not damaged and 1 remained functional after the test.
NRC005(E3.2) _. __ . _ _ _J
L ISOLATOR TESTING DTSCUSSION (CONTINUED)
- b. Test for Isolator #8:
The test results for isolator #8 are summarized in paragraph 2.1
, of Enclosure #1. Isolator #8 is the bus isolator that protects the data bus from failures internal to a multiplexer or protects the multiplexer from failures on the data bus. This isolator was tested in both directions using two maximum credible l
voltages (120 VAC and 140 Vde). It should be understood that each multiplexer communicates with both data buses and, therefore, both channels of the data acquisition system. Thus, each channel of the SPDS and IDADS has input data from all plant sensors which provide input to the Anatec multiplexer system.
If one data bus (or channel) of the data acquisition system is damaged or fails, the remaining channel has good data from all plant sensors assuring no loss of train A or B sensor data. For the situations where a multiplexer inputs data to the Class 1E data bus, the data has to pass through at least one #8 bus isolator. In most cases, prior to being input to the final Class 1E data bus, multiplexer input data must pass through two
- 8 bus isolators.
' Prior to the tests on the #8 bus isolators it was believed that very low current fuses could be substituted for the jumpers that select the attenuation for each isolator thus improving isolation. During the tests,1/8 ampere fuses were inserted in the jumper positions for circuits A and D (17db and 47 db attenuation circuits respectively). For all maximum credible voltage tests, the current through the fuses was so low (3 ma maximum) that none of the fuses were ever blown. Based on this result the District does not consider the addition of fuses to be necessary to provide adequate isolation.
In performing the maximum credible voltage tests two resistance values were chosen to provide load impedance that would simulate the primary of a transformer at the end of the data bus at the Central Control Unit and at the multiplexer. All data bus terminations are transformer coupled. These values of resistors were chosen to be 100 ohms and 20 ohms. Both of these values would represent a worst case condition since the primaries of the transformers would be a lower impedence value to 60 hertz than to the normal approximate 8 megahertz data frequency. At 140 Vdc the transformer would be a very low resistance value, probably 2 or 3 ohms.
The results of this test show that very low levels of voltage, i at 60 hertz, were seen at the load side of the #S bus isolator.
The maximum voltage across the 100 ohm load was 0.238 volts peak to peak which would not be enough to cause a problem either at 4 the CCU or at any multiplexer. The 0.238 volt value was with l the fuses in the A jumper positions which would be in the low NRC005(E3.2) .
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ISOLATOR TESTING DISCUSSION (CONTINUED) attenuation circuit. The low attenuation circuit provides 17 db attenuation at 8 megahertz but it should be evident that at 60 hertz the attenuation has greatly increased (i.e., to approximately 63 db). The following calculation verifies the change in attenuation:
V input 340 P-P Attenuation in db = 20 log ------- = 20 log -----
Y output 0.238 P-P
= 20 log 1428.57 = 20(3.1549)
= 63.098 db The data bus is designed to operate with a transmitter power from 2 to 8 watts of RF power. The Rancho Seco system operates at 2 watts. The power allowed through the bus isolator (ignoring cable attentution of I db/100 f t) under normal conditions at the 8 MHZ frequency is on the order of:
Pout = Pin / anti-log 17/10
= 2 watts / anti-log (1.7)
= 2/50.12 = 0.0399 watts.
The power allowed through the bus isolator during the test was approximately:
P = Vrms2; where Vrms = Vp-p = .238 R 2 V"Y 2.828
= 0.084V therefore P = 0.0842 = 0.00007W 100 This low power level could not damage either the multiplexer (if originating at the bus) or the bus (if originating at the multiplexer) since normal operating power is much higher. In addition to bus isolator attenuation, the receiver inputs have 2200 pf capacitors rated at 500 V in each leg of the coupling transformer (installed as blocking capacitors). Each capacitor !
represents approximately 1.2 M ohm additional impedance to the 60 l hertz frequency.
To assure that a longer exposure of the bus isolator to the MCV would not have a detrimental effect, the test applied the 120 Vac for a continuous 20 minute period without any damage occurring to the bus isolator.
NRC005(E3.2) _ __ . _ _ _ _ . _-____ ___ - _ _ -
J ISOLATOR TESTING DISCUSSION I (CONTINUED) j i
l
- c. Test for Isolator #9:
The transformer coupled isolator (#9) between the Anatec Central ,
Control Unit and the Interim Data Acquisition and Display System l was tested with two encapsulated 1/16A fuses in the transformer j legs (one fuse in each leg). The results of the tests are ^
summarized in paragraphs 2.3 and 2.4 of Enclosure #1. The tests show that the protective fuses properly protect the Class lE circuit from the application of the MCV. Although the attached test results do not describe the short or open tests, these tests were performed previously ( Attachment #4 of Reference #1) and found not to cause any damage to the transformer or receiver / driver. The tests in Enclosure #1 were primarily made to prove proper fuse operation with encapsulated fuses. The fuses were encapsulated with General Electric RTV 162 silicone rubber adhesive sealant. The final report will show that the encapsulation material will not deteriorate, it adheres to the printed circuit board and is not easily removed.
- d. Test for Isolator #10:
The test results for isolator #10 are summarized in paragraph 2.2 of Enslosure #1. This test result shows that the MCV fault burns up the light emitting diode but does not cause any short of the MCV across the isolation module. Special attention was given to the +5Vdc power source to assure that no damage or readable change l could be seen.
- e. Multiplexer #1:
l In the case of multiplexer #1 (H4CDAR1),where the class 1 data bus is located, concentrated effort nas been applied to design and install properly separated and isolated data buses. The two buses )
are routed on opposite sides of a 30" seismically qualified cabinet. In addition to separation, each bus isolator in multiplexer #1 will be covered so that no bus terminations and/or circuit board components can be subjected to maximum credible voltage faults internal to the multiplexer cabinet (Attachment 3, Ref. 2). The A-C power cables that are routed inside the cabinet are separated from the date buses by no less than 6" as required by Reg. Guide 1.75 and/or IEEE-384 Due to the separation of the '
two data buses and the protective covers on each bus isolator j there is no credible single failure that can cause the loss of either or both data buses as a result of being physically located in the seismically qualified H4CDAR1 cabinet. The data buses and their individual bus isolators are independent of multiplexer #1 operation since they are passive devices and do not require power from the multiplexer's power supply.
NRC005(E3.2) - . .. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _
1SOLATOR TESTING DISCUSSION (CONTINUED) 1 The only communication between the data buses and multiplexer #1 are the data signals that are transmitted and received through bus isolators BI #1 and BI #12 located on opposite walls of the cabinet. This pathway is the only multiplexer input in the entire system that has only one bus isolator between the multiplexer and the class 1 data bus. The attenuation selected for these particular bus isolators is 47 db.
Based on the above, the District considers the design of multiplexer #1 to be acceptable. The cabling from the multiplexer to the bus isolator is routed internally to the H4CDAR1 cabinet and not in any conduits or cable trays external to the cabinet thus precludina potential interactions. Also, care was taken in the routing .o insure separation as required. Since the two bus isolators in Multiplexer #1 are feeding identical data to both buses, if a failure occured internal to the multiplexer affecting one of the cables to either bus isolator, it would not cause a loss of data to SPDS. Class 1 data buses are separated by approximately 30 inches. In addition, no single f ailure can cause a failure of both data buses and since the data on each bus is identical, no data is lost to SPDS. As a result of the foregoing evaluation. SMUD intends to continue to power the H4CDAR1 cabinet with non-1E power rather than upgrade it to 1E power as described in the District's previous submittal.
- f. CSU/CCU Interface:
The following is a discussion and analysis of the interface between the two channelized Central Control Units and the CCU Select Switch (CSU).
Enclosure #2 is intended to clarify previous information provided during the NRC audit meeting held at Rancho Seco (September-October 1986). These sketches have been re-arranged and drawn to show the duplication of control signals that has been designed into the Anatec Data Acquisition System. Each sheet consist of figures that are separated into three sections representing CCU #1, CCU #2 and the CSU.
In both CCUs, the interface with the CSU is accomplished by the CCU Select Interf ace printed circuit board. Internal to the CSU, the interf ace is accomplished by the CCU Select Unit printed circuit boards.
The CSU contains two printed circuit boards each of which communicates with both CCUs (Select Interface printed circuit board) by way of separate input connectors. As shown in enclosure
- 2, the various cir Jits that originate in the CCUs, and interface with the CSU, have duplicate signals that go to separate printed circuit boards in the CSU. The printed circuit boards in the CCUs have two (2) ceparate sections with independent +5VDC regulators to provide power to the duplicate circuitry.
NRC005(E3.2)
ISOLATOR TESTING DISCUSSION (CONTINUED)
The +5VDC regulators have a common source of +8.5VDC from the CCU backplane. This +8.5VDC is an output of the class 1 power supply. Additional tests were performed to determine the effect of a maximum credible voltage fault on the cables routed between the CSU and the CCUs. These tests were conducted at 120VAC even though care has been taken to route cables inside the class 1 cabinet to insure proper separation (at least 6") between A-C power cables and signal cables. The results are included in Enclosure #3. The circuits tested are those shown in Enclosure #2 without optical isolation. It should be noted that signal destinat ans are optically isolated whether the origin is in the CSU or the CCU. Also, the circuits have optical isolation devices in either the CCU or the CSU for all loops. This isolation should preclude a MCV fault from damaging both the CCU and the CSU.
The tests performed show that if 120VAC is applied across two conductors of a cable going to CCU #1 (pins J1-29 and J1-28 of the SELECT Al circuit) the transistor, 47,160 and 750 ohm resistors will burn open. As a result of these 1/4 watt resistors burning open the +8.5 VDC source or the inverter chip did not suffer any damage and were functional after the test. The +5.0 VDC power source for the inverter chip also was undamaged. In all cases, the resistors in the logic circuits are 1/4 watt and when connected directly to a 120 VAC power source are of low enough resistance that they burn up usually within a 5 to 10 ms time period. These results have been documented and will be forwarded as soon as available, Enclosure #3 includes preliminary results.
Loss of any single sigtal loop will only affect one channel of operation. That is, for worst case failure only one CCU would be lost and the other would continue to function, providing signal information to the remaining channel of SPDS.
The duplication of signal loons, in most cases, will prevent a failure of the CCU or CSU, ha for this analysis, it is assumed that one channel is caused to fail. Tests on the actual equipment have been performed to simulate a loss of input / output signals from/to the CCUs and the CSU. During normal operation with the CSU in the "AUT0" mode of operation, one cable connection at a time was disconnected with the resulting loss of all signals associated with that cable. For example, cables connected to J5 and J7 have nine (9) signal loops connected between the CCUs and tne CSU. The cables connected to J4 and J6 have duplications of these nine (9) signal loops plus the control signal from the key-lock switch that selects modes of operation. The results of the cable removal tests are tabulated as follows:
J4 Connector Removed - CCU #2 is selected continuously while selector switch is in "AUT0" mode
- CCU #2 can be selected manually
- CCU #1 can not be selected manually
ISOLATOR TESTING DISCUSSION (CONTINUED)
J4 Connector Replaced - CCUs #1 & #2 selected alternatively after pushing RESET pushbutton J5 Connector Removed -
Same result as J4 Connector removed J5 Connector Replaced -
CCUs #1 & #2 selected alternatively after RESET J6 Connector Removed -
CCU #1 is selected continuously while Selector Switch is in "AUT0" mode CCU #1 can be selected manually
- CCU #2 can not be selected manually J6 Connector Replaced -
CCUs #1 & #2 selected alternatively after RESET J7 Connector Removed -
Same Result as J6 Connector removed J7 Connector Replaced -
CCUs #1 & #2 selected alternatively after RESET These tests show that if the CSU is operating in the "AUT0" mode, a loss of a critical input / output signal (or signals) on a particular cable would always allow opposite CCU to operate properly.
As stated above, the selector switch on the CSU is a key switch and it would be locked in the "AUT0" mode except for maintenance purposes. Maintenance would only be performed on an emergency basis or during scheduled maintenance outages.
If a channel of the SPDS fails as described above, the operator would be informed that the display was not updating for the affected channel and thereby would monitor plant operation by using the other display that would still be functioning properly.
The remaining CCU would still be displaying all of the SPDS parameters.
The above test verifies proper operation of at least one CCU for all open circuit faults.
An analysis of circuit diagrams in Enclosure #2 will show that a MCV fault on the circuits shown on figures 1, 2, 5, 6, 7, 8 & 10 of 10 would not cause f ailure of both CCUs since there are no paths from one CCU to the other. Circuits shown on figures 3, 4 and 9 of 10 do have paths that connect between both CCUs. These circuits have been tested in the plant and operation of at least one CCU was maintained as in the cable removal tests.
1 l
NRC005(E3.2) I J
l 1
L_._____________.____.. _
ISOLATOR TESTfNG DISCUSSION (CONTINUED)
As a part of the SPDS upgrade, the CCU cabinet H4CDAL was re-arranged to provide required separation between channels. In doing this separation, cabling internal to the cabinet was routed to insure separation between power cables and signal cables in ,
each channelized portion of the cabinet. Channel B components; l consisting of CCU #1, Receiver / Transmitter #1, and power supply #1 { '
are located in the upper portion of the cabinet. Channel A components; consisting of CCU #2, Receiver / Transmitter #2, power supply #2, CCU Select Unit (CSU), and fans are located in the lower portion of the cabinet.
Separate sources of class 1E power are brought into circuit breakers on opposite sides of the cabinet (30" cabinet). Channel A comes from the bottom and channel B from the top of the j cabinet. There are four (4) cables routed f rom'the CSU. Two cables each are routed to separate CCU's. These cables are routed to each CCU in such a way as to maintain required separation between channels and also between signals and power. The cable connectors are mounted at the rear of the CSU. They are MS type connectors that provide a barrier between cable terminations where minimum separation is not maintained.
The possibility of a MCV fault of 120 VAC occurring anywhere in the cabinet is reduced to an absolute minimum by the following design characteristics:
The cabinet and all components are class 1 seismically qualified, which reduces the possibility of wires or components becoming loose or free.
Minimum physical separation is maintained where possible.
Where minimum separation distance is not possible, barriers are provided.
The low voltage digital components in each CCU are isolated from the 120 VAC source by the DC power supply providing low level ,
voltages to the approprite CCU. The D-C power supply is of a very i rugged design. These power supplies employ several convers'?n stages to provide the required D-C voltages. The A-C input 120 VAC 0 60 hz is applied through an EMI filter, a 10 A fuse, a silicon controlled rectifier (SCR) pulse-width modulator (PWM) pre-regulator and converted to +70 VDC. The output of the pre-regulator is chopped into the primary of the 50 khz transformer by the 50 khz PWM inverter. The multiple outputs of the 50 khz transformer are rectified, filtered and regulated for final output voltages. Sense inputs are provided for shutdown of PWM and 50 khz transformer upon overvoltages, thus effectively assuring power supply shutdown. Therefore, the possibility of the 120 VAC feeding through the power supply to the digital components is not credible. The power supplies are also used in the
. multiplexer cabinets and are auctioneered in those cabinets.
NRC005(E3.2)
ISOLATOR TESTING D8SCUSS80N (CONTINUED) l A single five volt power supply provides the logic voltage for the CSU. This is a power supply which has two amp fuse protection on the input line. It incorporates a foldback technique for overload protection, and overvoltage protection which crowbars the .
output on a rise of output voltage. The possibility of 120 VAC ,
propagating through the supply to the digital components in the !
CSU is not credible.
Distribution of the 120 VAC inside the CSU enclosure to the fuse, power switch and fans is accomplished by terminating the 120 VAC on a terminal block mounted on the side of the enclosure. The power switch on the front panel is completely enclosed providing a barrier against any exposure. Termination to the fans is on the i side of the enclosure, remote f rom any other termination. The ,
fuse is located at the bottom rear of the enclosure, separated from other terminations. Terminations to the power supply are on a terminal block inside the confines of the supply.
Due to the care taken in the design and manufacture of the CSU, it is the District's position that the CSU will not cause a f ailure l of both CCU's and that the CSU can provide its necessary function without causing a failure of both channels of the SPDS.
- 2.
SUMMARY
In summary, the isolators tested have been shown to provide sufficient isolation to ensure the safe operation of the SPDS. The evaluations performed above provide a detailed analysis of the areas of concern describing that no single failure will cause a loss of the SPDS functionality. Thus, the District considers the design of the SPDS to be acceptable. Final test reports will be forwarded in August 1987.
i
- 3.
REFERENCE:
- 1. Letter from J.E. Ward to F.J. Miraglia, Dated January 12, 1987
- 2. Letter from J.E. Ward to F.J. Miraglia, dated April 17, 1987 I
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NRC005(E3.2) j 1
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ENCLOSURE NO. 1 PRELIMINARY TEST RESULTS ISOLATOR N0'S 4, 5, 8, 9 AND 10
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