ML20236E686
| ML20236E686 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Shoreham File:Long Island Lighting Company icon.png |
| Issue date: | 07/27/1987 |
| From: | Latham S, Letsche K, Palomino F KIRKPATRICK & LOCKHART, NEW YORK, STATE OF, SOUTHAMPTON, NY, SUFFOLK COUNTY, NY, TWOMEY, LATHAM & SHEA |
| To: | NRC COMMISSION (OCM) |
| References | |
| CON-#387-4107 OL, NUDOCS 8708030049 | |
| Download: ML20236E686 (22) | |
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Julv 27, 1987 !
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 6Fr;_ >
, 3, Before the Commission D' g,4 F 'l
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In the Matter of )
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LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COMPANY ) Docket No. 50-322-OL
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(Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, )
Unit 1) )
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-SUFFOLK COUNTY, STATE OF NEW YORK, AND TOWN OF SOUTHAMPTON RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO LILCO MOTION FOR DESIGNATION OF LICENSING BOARD AND l SETTING EXPEDITED SCHEDULE TO RULE ON LILCO'S 25% POWER REOUEST On July 14, 1987, LILCO filed with the Commission a Motion for Designation of Licensing Board and Setting Expedited Schedule i l
I to Rule on LILCO's 25% Power Request (the " Appointment Motion").
On the same date, LILCO also filed with the Margulies OL-3 Licensing Board a Motion for Authorization to Increase Power to 25% (the "25% Power Motion").
By Order dated July 17, 1987, the Commission directed the Governments to respond by July 27 to that part of the Appointment' Motion dealing with the need for appointment of a new Board. The Staff is tc respond by July 30. The Commission did not request responses to the portion of the Appointment Motion relating to fffB03OOA9970y97 G ADOCK oSoooopy -
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d LILCO's proposed expedited schedule; as explained briefly in Part II below, no response to that matter is appropriate or possible at this time, noe should the Commission consider that portion of the Appointment Motion. In accordance with the Commission's July 17 Order, in this Response the Governments address solely the issue of whether the Commission should appoint a new Licensing Board to consider LILCO's 25% Power Motion.
I. "he Commission Should Dismiss the LILCO Accointment Motion A. Introduction LILCO's Appointment Motion has several alleged bases, including: (1) that it is not clear that the Margulies Board has jurisdiction over the 25% Power Motion; (2) that even if the Margulies Board has jurisdiction, the Margulies Board's. heavy work load requires appointment of a new Board; and (3) that the Margulies Board's familiarity with Shoreham emergency planning issues is not relevant (and therefore, it presents no problem to appoint a new Board unfamiliar with those issues) because the 25%
Power Motion does not clearly raise emergency planning issues.
None of these asserted bases is valid. At the outset, however, several points must be emphasized.
First, the Appointment Motion represents yet another LILCO attempt to create special rules and procedures, outside those in the NRC's regulations, for LILCO's benefit in this proceeding.
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In the past the Commission has refused to depart from its rules for LILCO, as has the Margulies Board. See, e.o., Lono Island Lichtina Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Utiit 1), CLI 11, 23 NRC 577, 581 (1986) (Commission rejects LILCO's proposed new rules for admissible contentions); Memorandum and Order (Prehearing Conference, July 8, 1986) (July 11, 1986) at 7-8 (Margulies Board rejects LILCO proposal to change rules for i
summary disposition and discovery). The same result is required l here. The Appointment Motion should be summarily dismissed because it is outside the scope of the NRC's normal procedures, it seeks, in effect, reconsideration and reversal of CLI-87-04, and it seeks determinations and actions by the Commission which, if appropriate at all, should be taken by the Margulies Board, t
Second, the Appointment Motion is a thinly disguised attempt to obtain Commission rulings on portions of the merits of the 25%
Power Motion. Given the present posture of the matter, that l I
attempt is plainly improper and illegal. The Appointment Motion !
l is premised entirely upon three things: (1) LILCO's own self-serving characterization of its 25% Power Motion; (2) the accuracy of that Motion's premises; and (3) the arrogant presumption that the ultimate findings and rulings soucht in that Motion are in fact correct. Thus, in arguing that appointment of l 6
a new Board is necessary, LILCO asserts that the Margulies Board's familiarity with Shoreham emargency planning issues, the l 1
realism issue, and the adequacy and deficiencies of LILCO's Plan are unimportant because the 25% Power Motion " presume (s) that (emergency planning] issues (whose dispositive resolution would pave the way for issuance of a 100% license) can remain unresolved at 25% power . . . . Appointment Motion at 8 (emphasis in original). That proposition states the ultimate conclusion LILCO seeks in its 25% Power Motion: it is a succinct statement of the ruling on the merits which LILCO desires, and which the' Governments intend to contest on substantive grounds (when and if the issues are properly presented and appropriate procedures consistent with the NRC's rules for dealing with them are established). Thus, the Appointment Motion constitutes a classic bootstrap argument. It.is wholly premised on an assumption that LILCO will prevail on the 25% Power Motion --
i.e., that there will be a finding that outstanding emergency planning issues, including legal authority, can remain unresolved. Accordingly, to grant the Appointment Motion would, in effect, constitute premature and improper consideration of the merits of the 25% Power Motion, without having accorded the Governments their due process right to contest those merits in a procedurally appropriate context.
Finally, the Governments emphasize that the filing of this Response to the Appointment Motion is not intended to indicate a j belief that the 25% Power Motion can be properly considered by l
the Margulies or any other Licensing Board. LILCO's mere 1 addition of a covering "25% Power Motion" to its previously filed
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25% Power " Request," does nothing to address, much less remedy, the characteristics of that Request which required its summary rejection. geg, e.o., the Governments' Response in Opposition to LILCO's Motion for Expedited Commission Consideration (April 27, 1987). The recent 25% Power Motion, like the original Request it now accompanies, is a blatant attack on the regulations. It seeks unprecedented authority to operate Shoreham in violation of the regulations, without even acknowledging the need for, much less demonstrating entitlement to, an exemption from the regulations it so blithely ignores. Other than its being addressed to t v Margulies Board and its " Motion" title, it contains_no new procedural or substantive justification for its unprecedented regulation-thwarting request. The Margulies Board has jurisdiction to do nothing but dismiss the new Motion.
We set forth in more detail below why the Commission must dismiss the Appointment Motion.
B. The Appointment Ection Seeks Reconsideration and Reversal of CLI-87-04 LILCO's Appointment Motion is a thinly veiled attempt to ,
obtain Commission reconsideration of CLI-87-04. It should be rejected on that basis alone. It must be remembered that LILCO accompanied its April 14, 1987 " Request for Authorization to l Increase Power to 25%" with a " Motion for Expedited Commission Consideration." The Appointment Motion with its accompanying request that the Commission " instruct" a new Board about a p
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proposed LILCO schedule, is simply a repackaged plea for j Commission, rather than licensing board, consideration of its I
request. In CLI-87-04, however, the Commission made clear that l if LILCO wished to pursue its Request for Authorization to Operate at 25% Power, it needed to file, with the licensina board, a motion which set forth how such a request could be considered and adjudicated consistent with the NRC's regulations and the law. CLI-87-04, at 2. There is no ambiguity on that l point. Accordingly, any action by the Commission short of outright rejection of the Appointment Motion would be inconsistent with CLI-87-04, and would in effect constitute reversal of that decision. LILCO has stated no basis to justify reconsideration, much less reversal, of CLI-87-04. Therefore, LILCO's Appointment Motion should be rejected.1 C. The Appointment Motion Is Procedurally Improper; Raises Issues Which Can Only Be l Dealt With By The Marculies Board; And Is Premature LILCO's Appointment Motion is improperly filed with the Commission for several reasons in addition to that identified in Section B above. Not only did the Commission direct LILCO to submit to the licensing board any future attempts to have its 25%
1 It is particularly inappropriate.for LILCO to be seeking reconsideration of CLI-87-04, since LILCO only one day prior to filing the Appointment Motion, had argued to the Commission that motions for reconsideration of Commission action are not i permitted. Egg LILCO's Answer to Interveners' Motion for Reconsideration of Portions of CLI-87-05, July 13, 1987, at 1.
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Power Request considered, but only such a board could make informed decisions on the matters raised in the Appointment Motion.
Specifically, the only reason LILCO urges appointment of a j new board is the alleged " heavy workload" of the Margulies Board.
Clearly, the only persons in a position to determine whether that i.
I board's workload is such that it would or would not impact its ability to deal with the 25% Power Motion are the Margulies Board members themselves. They, and they alone, are knowledgeable concerning the extent of their existing workload and the likely time demands of that workload in the future. In addition, as discussed further in Section D below, they are also in the unique position of being able to meaningfully and knowledgeably evaluate the issues involved in the 25% Power Motion and the amount of j 1
time necessary to adjudicate those issues (assuming, arouendo, !
j such adjudication is found to be legally permissible under the regulations), due to their long term familiarity with the issues- l l
involved. Thus, in attempting to bypass the Margulies Board in l
its Appointment Motion, LILCO seeks to have the Commission make decisions on subjects as to which it has no knowledge, information, or other basis for reasoned determinations.
i Furthermore, there is precedent in this proceeding for i
exactly the kind of orderly process which LILCO should have followed, and which the Commission directed in CLI-87-04, i.e.,
l directing matters to the sitting licensing board. Following the February 13, 1986 Shoreham Exercise, when it became clear that i
there would be an adversary proceeding concerning the results of !
that Exercise, the Commission provided initial procedural guidance 2 (similar to its action last month in CLI-87-04), and
'thereafter the Licensing Board conducted pre-hearing activities.
It was only following the conduct of pre-hearing conferences and 1 l the admission of Exercise contentions by the Margulies Board, that it became clear that the Exercise proceeding would be complex and extensive. At that point, after consultation with the Margulies Board members who, by then, knew and understood the likely contours of the Exercise litigation, Chief Administrative Judge Cotter established a new board because the Margulies Board had indicated it was too busy to handle all matters related to the Exercise.
Consistent with past practice then, the appropriate procedure here is for the Commission to dismiss the Appointment l Motion and for the Margulies Board to convene a conference of counsel to discuss the procedures to be followed in dealing with !
the LILCO 25% Power Motion. Based upon that discussion and the Board's related determinations (including deciding the threshold issue of whether the 25% Power Motion can be legally considered at all), the Board would be in a position to decide whether it could continue to preside over.the matter. Based upon its 2 Egg Lono Island Lichtino Co x (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), CLI-86-11, 23 NRC 577 (1986).
knowledge of its current workload, the issues raised in the 25%
Power Motion, how those two are related, and the views of the parties concerning the necessity, extent, and nature of future proceedings, the Margulies Board could establish appropriate procedures and schedules to deal with the Motion or, if it believed it necessary, it could consult with Judge Cotter concerning a new board.
l It should be emphasizeF- however, that at this point, )
neither the Commission nor the Margulies Board is in a position to make an informed decision on the Appointment Motion. It is plainly premature. Thus, the question whether the Margulies I Board is too busy to handle the 25% Power Motion turns critically on the following factors, at a minimum: (1) whether the Board i decides it is appropriate to conduct proceedings on that motion i 1
at all (as noted above and as the Commission is aware, it is the Governments' position that no consideration of the Motion is appropriate in the absence of a request for an exemption from the regulations); and (2) assuming arcuendo that proceedings of some {
l sort are determined to be appropriate, the type of proceedings ]
determined to be necessary and appropriate, and their order, nature and extent. Moreover, the nature and extent of future proceedings are, in turn, totally dependent upon how many matters are at issue, what they are, their nature and extent, and how j
they will be addressed by the parties. Clearly, it is impossible l
at this point for anyone, including the Margulies Board, to I i
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predict the outcome of any of these matters, much less what demands would be placed on a licensing board as they become known. It would be purely speculative and wholly arbitrary to rule on'the Appointment Motion in the current information vacuum.
Therefore, the Motion should also be denied as premature.
D. The Accointment Motien Must Be Denied on the Merits LILCO's Appointment Motion must also be denied on its merits because its basic premise is plainly at odds with the facts.
LILCO argues that the Margulies Board's jurisdiction over the 25%
s Power Motion is " dubious" because the motion "does not clearly raise emergency planning issues," "it takes emergency planning issues . . . as given," and it " presumes" that outstanding emergency planning issues "can remain unresolved . . . .
Appointment Motion at 7-8.3 These assertions are false. l While LILCO does its best in the Appointment Motion to downplay the significance of emergency planning issues with respect to its 25% Power Motio , even a cursory examination of the 25% Power Request reveals that emergency planning-related issues, and LILCO's so-called " premises" and self-serving l l
assumptions about them, are in fact the crux of the 25% Power Motion.
3 See also id at 9 ("the premise of the 25% operation request is that, because of the reduction in risk at 25% power, existing emergency planning measures are clearly satisfactory for j operation at 25% power"). 1 g
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l First, since the 25% Power Motion is supposedly based upon )
4 10 C.F.R. S 50.47(c)(1), determinations as to whether the l i
criteria in that section have been satisfied will be one central element of a decision on the 25% Power Motion. It is absurd to i
suggest that such determinations do not involve precisely the emergency planning issues with which the Margulies Board has been dealing for the past few years.
1 Whoever presides over the 25% Power Motion must decide {
j whether LILCO has demonstrated that deficiencies in its emergency plan are not significant. The Margulies Board is the Board which has presided over litigation concerning such deficiencies, and )
has itself identified deficiencies in LILCO's Plan. Clearly, the Margulies Board is uniquely qualified to determine whether such deficiencies are or are not significant for the plant in question, as required by S 50.47(c)(1).
Similarily, whoever presides over the 25% Power Motion must ;
1 determine whether LILCO has demonstrated that actions proposed as
" interim" and " compensating" are in fact adequate to meet the regulations' reasonable assurance standard for the Shoreham plant. Again, adequacies and inadequacies in the LILCO Plan, as well as what constitutes adequate preparedness given the needs and nature of the area and the population around the Shoreham plant, are issues with which the Margulies Board has been dealing for several years. Thus, LILCO's suggestion that its alleged l
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1 demonstration that it meets the criteria in Section 50.47(c)(1), i which constitutes a central part of its 25% Power Motion, "does not clearly raise emergency planning issues," is without basis.
1 To the contrary: the 25% Power Motion raises precisely the types l 1
of issues with which the Margulies Board has become intimately I 1
I familiar over the past few years.
Second, a review of LILCO's 25% Power Request itself reveals 1
the centrality of emergency planning issues over which the J l
Margulies Board clearly has jurisdiction. For example, pages 11-18,81-102, and Appendices 9, 10 and 11 of the 25% Power Request, deal with nothing but emergency planning matters. l l
Furthermore, the 25% Power Motion is totally dependent upon j i
LILCO's apparent belief that it will obtain a Margulies Board I decision in LILCO's favor on the legal authority contentions (the so-called " realism" issues).4 Thus, in asserting that its so-called " interim compensating measures" are sufficient to overcome identified deficiencies in LILCO's Plan, as the 25% Power Motion does, LILCO apparently assumes.that the Margulies Board will issue a decision finding that LILCO's lack of legal authority to implement major portions of its emargency plan is a deficiency 4 LILCO athached its summary disposition motion on the legal authority contentions as Appendix 11 to its 25% Power Request, which is further evidence of its reliance upon the success of that Motion in seeking 25% power operating authority. The summary disposition motion was strenuously opposed by the Governments in an opposition served upon the Commission on May 14, 1987. See Answer of Suffolk County, the~ State of New York and the Town of Southampton to "LILCO's Second Renewed Motion for Summary Disposition of the ' Legal Authority' Issues (Contentions EP l-10)" (May 11, 1987).
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.. 1 which does not matter, and that despite its acknowledged ]
inability to implement its Plan, the Board will nonetheless make the'S 50.47(a)(1) reasonable assurance finding required for any operation above 5% power. Egg, e.o., Appointment Motion at 11, n.13. There is no basis for these LILCO assumptions, yet they are the lynchpins of the LILCO 25% Power Request.5 l
LILCO acknowledges that its Motion for Summary-Disposition i of the Legal Authority Contentions is presently pending before the Margulies Board. Because the 25% Power Motion is premised upon LILCO's desired disposition of the legal authority l l
contentions, now pending before the Margulies Board, it is preposterous for LILCO to suggest that the Margulies Board's jurisdiction over its 25% Power Motion is " dubious."
Finally, LILCO's Appointment Motion for the most part ignores the pendency of the Exercise litigation before the Frye (OL-5) Board, and the impact of that proceeding upon its 25%
Power Motion. Other than ascerting that it. desires a quick decision on the Exercise litigation so LILCO can be eligible to 5 LILCO asserts in its Appointment Motion that the primary matter at issue in the 25% Power Motion is "the level of risk extent at 25% operation." Appointment Motion at 8. Egg also id.
at 9. While that subject is one raised by the LILCO PRA upon which the 25% Power Request relies,-and one which will be contested by the Governments should it be determined that LILCO's PRA and its results can properly be considered in ruling on a licensing request, it is by no means the " primary" issue raised, ,
nor can it be considered in a vacuum. . It has meaning only in the context of the NRC's emergency planning regulations, the LILCO emergency plan, and tha realities of emergency preparedness around the Shoreham plant.
receive a full power license by February 1988 -- an argument which itself appears to significantly diminish the supposed dire need for expedited consideration of the 25% Power Motion -- LILCO fails to mention that the results of the Exercise proceeding must also be taken into account by whoever deals with the 25% Power Motion. Thus, the purpose of the Exercise litigation was to determine whether the Exercise demonstrated fundamental flaws and deficiencies in the LILCO Plan. The Governments contend, and submit that they established at trial, that the Exercise did reveal substantial deficiencies in the LILCO Plan and in LILCO's and "LERO's" ability to implement it, far beyond those identified in the 1983-84 litigation. Clearly, any attempt by LILCO to demonstrate that it has " compensated" for existing plan deficiencies, as it alleges in its 25% Power Motion, must also take into account the deficiencies revealed during the Exercise.
Thus, the Frye Board, as well as the Margulies Board, possesses valuable familiarity, experience and understanding concerning the emergency planning issues material to the 25% Power Motion.
In sum, it'is simply wrong for LILCO to suggest that the Margulies Board's jurisdiction over the 25% Power Motion is
" dubious." According to the Notice of Reconstitution of Board:
Clarification (October 17, 1986), the Margulies Board clearly has jurisdiction over all issues related to emergency planning except those concerning the February 13, 1986 Exercise. Because the 25%
Power Motion revolves centrally around emergency planning issues i
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-- including satisfaction of the S 50.47(c)(1) criteria, the I
legal authority contentions, and the entire question of whether I emergency preparedness as Shoreham is adequate at any power level above 5% in light of identified Plan deficiencies -- the Margu]ies Board is the appropriate forum for that motion. It can also be argued that in light of its year-long exposure to emergency planning issues and LILCO Plan deficiencies identified during the Exercise, the Frye Board as well has substantial i
familiarity with the issues involved in the 25% Power Motion, and i 1 therefore it too would be capable of dealing with the 25% Power Motion. Since there already exist two fully educated and knowledgeable licensing boards, it would make no sense whatsoever to appoint a totally new board, the members of which would have to familiarize themselves with over four years worth of background and substantive information about the issues central to the 25% Power Motion, and then to preside over proceedings which would in large part duplicate proceedings pending before the other two more knowledgeable boards. Thus, the Appointment Motion should be denied on its merits.
i II. It Would be Inappropriate to Require Responses to LILCO's Proposed Schedule or to the 25% Power Motion As the Commission appears to have recognized in its July 17 Order, it clearly would be inappropriate to require responses at I
this time to the 25% Power Motion or to that portion of the !
Appointment Motion which argues for an extraordinarily expedited schedule. Briefly, the reasons are as follows.
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First, LILCO itself has said that proceedings on the 25%
Power Motion should be held in abeyance.6 Indeed, LILCO I
expressly states that it "does not request the Board to take any action" on the 25% Power Motion. 25% Power Motion, at 6, 8.
Since no relief on the merits has even been requested by LILCO, there is no reason for the Governments to respond on the merits i at this time. See also Suffolk County, State of New York, and Town of Southamptom Statement Concerning LILCO's July 14, 1987 Motion to Increase Power to 25%, filed today with the Margulies Board. ?
Second, until the Margulies Board convenes a conference of counsel,. determines whether to accept the Motion as filed, and establishes appropriate procedures to deal with it, it is clearly premature to address the merits of the 25% Power Motion. As noted above, prior to such threshold determinations, it is not even possible to identify what constitutes the " merits or the
" issues" which are raised by that Motion.7 6 LILCO states: "Pending Commission action on (the Appointment Motion], LILCO is not requesting this Board to tale any specific steps to activate this proceeding." 25% Power Motion at 2.
7 We note that LILCO's " offer" to conduct informal discovery at this time is also inappropriate. The Governments have finite (footnote continued)
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Similarily, it is inappropriate to discuss LILCO's schedule proposal set forth in the Appointment Motion. Given the new material factual issues, not to mention the unprecedented technical and legal issues raised by the Motion, neither the Commission nor the Margulies Board can possibly be in a position at this time to know whether an " expedited" proceeding is appropriate or, if so, what the contours of such " expedition" should be. Indeed, since the 25% Power Mocion and the relief it seeks are without precedent in Commission practice, it seems obvious that very careful consideration, with input from the parties and knowledgeable licensing board members, will be necessary before any detailed schedule could be rationally considered, much less adopted. That is appropriately a matter for a licensing board to take up.8 (footnote continued from previous page) resources and are not about to start expending those resources until it is decided whether LILCO's 25% Power Motion even can be ,
considered absent a request for an exemption, and if so how.
Only after the Margulies Board decides that threshold matter (following briefing by the parties), and only if it decides it in LILCO's favor, can the issues be defined so that meaningful discovery can proceed. There is no basis in the NRC's rules or precedents, nor is there any logical reason, to conduct
" discovery" on a unilaterally filed " Motion" or " Request." It is only when and if the matters at issue have been defined and agreed upon, that discovery has some basis and can proceed as contemplated by the NRC's regulations. We refer the Commission to the 1984 low power proceeding, during which LILCO convinced the Miller Licensing Board to proceed on its low power request without having first given careful attention to the need for an exemption from GDC-17. It was almost two months later when that issue was resolved (sgg Lono Island Lichtina Comoany (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), CLI-84-8, 19 NRC 1154 (1984)),
with much time lost and unnecessary expense incurred because of an initial attempt to cut procedural corners to favor LILCO.
8 We note, however, that LILCO's schedule is a clear (footnote continued) i l
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III. Conclusion j
For the foregoing reasons, the Commission should dismiss j LILCO's Appointment Motion and leave it to the Margulies Board to I establish appropriate procedures, under the Commission's rules, for considering in the first instance whether a new Board needs to be convened.
I Respectfully submitted, )
l Martin Bradley Ashare l Suffolk County Attorney Building 158 North County Complex Veterans Memorial Highway i Hauppauge, New York 11788 1
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l (footnote continued from previous page) invitation for the deprivation of the Governments' due process rights. Sag, e.o., Affidavit of Gregory C. Minor and Steven C.
Sholly, filed with the Commission on April 27, 1987, as Attachment 2 to the Governments' Response in Opposition to LILCO's Motion for Expedited Commission Consideration (April 27, 1987). That affidavit sets out multiple, unrebutted reasons why the Governments will need far more time even for discovery than LILCO's schedule suggests. The other new procedures suggested by LILCO (e.o., no contentions, testimony filed by the Interveners prior to filing by the applicant) are also without basis and fly in the face of the NRC's Rules of Practice.
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Herbeyt H. Brown s/ " f Lawrence Coe Lanpher {
Karla J. Letsche !
-KIRKPATRICK & LOCKHART 1800 M Street, N.W. ^
South Lobby - 9th Floor Washington, D.C. 20036-5891 Attorneys for Suffolk County A -- ,
Fabian G. Palomino Special Counsel to the Governor of the State of New York ;
Executive Chamber, Room 229 !
Capitol Building Albany, New York 12224 i Attorney for Mario M. Cuomo, Gover r of the State of New York
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/
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Stephb4 B. Latham Twomey, Latham & Shea .
P.O. Box 398 I 33 West Second Street Riverhead, New York 11901 Attorney for the Town of i Southampton ]
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Comm. Kenneth M. Carr* Alan S. Rosenthal, Chairman U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Atomic Safety and Licensing Room 1103 Appeal Board 1717 H Street, N.W. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Washington, D.C. 20555 Mr. Howard A. Wilber Gary J. Edles, Esq.
Atomic Safety and Licensing Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board Appeal Board U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Washington, D.C. 20555 Morton B. Margulies, Chairman
- John H. Frye, III, Chairman
- Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Atomic Safety and Licensing Board U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Washington, D.C. 20555 Dr. Jerry R. Kline* Oscar H. Paris
- Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Atomic Satety and Licensing Board U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Washington, D.C. 20555 Mr. Frederick J. Shon* Anthony F. Earley, Jr., Esq.
Atomic Safety and Licensing Board General Counsel U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Long Island Lighting Company Washington, D.C. 20555 175 East Old Country Road Hicksville, New York 11801 Ms. Elisabeth Taibbi, Clerk W. Taylor Reveley, III, Esq.**
Suffolk County Legislature Hunton & Williams Suffolk County Legislature P.O. Box 1535 Office Building 707 East Main Street Veterans Memorial Highway Richmond, Virginia 23212 Hauppauge, New York 11788 Mr. L. F. Britt Stephen B. Latham, Esq.
Long Island Lighting Company Twomey, Latham & Shea Shoreham Nuclear Power Station 33 West Second Street North Country Road Riverhead, New York 11901 Wading River, New York 11792 Ms. Nora Bredes Docketing and Service Section Executive Director Office of the Secretary Shoreham Opponents Coalition U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm.
195 East Main Street 1717 E' Street, N.W.
Smithtown, New York 11787 Washington, D.C. 20555 s
"" i July 27, 1932 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION of ; j Before the Commission U"E"
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In the Matter of )
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LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COMPANY ) Docket Nos. 50-322-OL
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(Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, )
Unit 1) )
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l CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE i
I hereby certify that copies of SUFFOLK COUNTY, STATE OF NEW YORK, AND TOWN OF SOUTHAMPTON RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO LILCO MOTION FOR DESIGNATION OF LICENSING BOARD AND SETTING EXPEDITED I SCHEDULE TO RULE ON LILCO'S 25%P 'OWER REQUEST have been served on the following this 27th day of July 1987 by U.S. mail, first class, except as otheruf,se noted. l Lando W. Zech, Jr., Chairman
- Comm. Thomas M. Roberts
- U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Room 1114 Room 1113 1717 H Stree',r N.W. 1717 H Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20555 Washington, D.C. 20555 William C. Parler, Esq.* Comm. Frederick M. Bernthal*
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission IJ.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission luth Floor Room 1156 171'l H Street, N.W. 1717 H Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20555 Washington, D.C. 20555
i Comm, Kenneth M. Carr* Alan S. Rosenthal, Chairman U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Atcmic Safety and Licensing Room 1103 Appeal Board 1717 H Street, N.W. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Washington, D.C. 20555 Mr. Howard A. Wilber Gary J. Edles, Esq.
Atomic Safety and Licensing Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board Appeal Board U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission U.S. Nuclear Ecqulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Washington, D.C. 20555 Morton B. Margulies, Chairman
- John H. Frye, III, Chairman
- Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Atomic Safety and Licensing Board U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Washington, D.C. 20555 Dr. Jerry R. Kline* Oscar H. Parise Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Atomic Safety and Licensing Board U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Washington, D.C. 20555 Mr. Frederick J. Shon* Anthony F, Earley, Jr., Esq.
Atomic Safety and Licensing Board General Counsei U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Long Island Lighting Company Washington, D.C. 20555 175 Cast Old Country Road Hicksville, New York 11801 Ms. Elisabeth Taibbi, Clerk W. Taylor Reveley, III, Esq.**
Suffolk County Legislature Hunton & Williams Suffolk County Legislature P.O. Box 1535 Office Building 707 East Main Street Veterans Memorial Highway Richmond, Virginia 23212 Hauppauge, New York 11788 Mr. L. F. Britt Stephen B. Latham, Esq.
Long Island Lighting Company Twomey, Latham & Shea Shoreham Nuclear Power Station 33 West Second Street North Country Road Riverhead, New York 11901 Wading River, New York 11792 Ms. Nora Bredes Docketing and Service Section Executive Director Office of the Secretary Shoreham Opponents Coalition U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm.
195 East Main Street 1717 H Street, N.W.
Smithtown, New York 11787 Washington, D.C. 20555
5 Mary M. Gundrum, Esq. Hon. Michael A. LoGrande New York State Department of Law Suffolk County Executive 120 Broadway, 3rd Floor H. Lee Dennison Building Room 3-116 Veterans Memorial Highway New York, New York 10271 Hauppauge, New York 11788 MHB Technical Associates Dr. Monroe Schneider 1723 Hamilton Avenue North Shore Committee Suite K P.O. Box 231 San Jose, California 95125 Wading River, New York 11792 Martin Bradley Ashare, Esq. Fabian G. Palomino, Esq.
Suffolk County Attorney .Specisi Counsel to the Governor Bldg. 158 North County Complex Executive Chamber, Rm. 229 Veterans Memorial Eighway State Capitol Hauppauge, New York 11708 Albany, New York- 12224 Richard G. Bachmann, Esq.* David A. Brownlee, Esq.
Oreste Russ Pirfo, Esq. Kirkpatrick & Lockhart George E. Johnson, Esq. 1500 Oliver Building U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 13222 Office of General Counsel Washington, D.C. 20555 Mr. Jay Dunkleburger Mr. Stuart Diamond-New York State Energy Office Business / Financial Agency Building 2 NEW YORK TIMES l Empire State Plaza 229 N. 43rd Street Albany, New York 12223 New York, New York 10036 Joel Blau, Esq. Mr. Philip McIntire Director, Utility Intervention Federal Emergency Management N.Y. Consumer Protection Board -
Agency Suite 1020 26 Federal Plazs Albany, New York 12210 New York, Net! York 10278 Douglas J. Hynes, Councilman William R. Cumming, Esq.
Town Board of Oyster Bay Spence W. Perry, Esq.
Town Hall Office of General Counsel Oyster Bay, New York 11771 Federal Emergency Management Agency 500 C Street, S.W., Room 840 Washington, D.C. 30472
/Y N :nel 6A Lawrence Coe Lanpher KIRKPATRICK & LOCKHART 1800 M Street, N.W..
South Lobby - 9th Floor Washingt.on, D.C. 20036-5891 i
By Hand ;
- By Federal Express '
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