ML20235T400
| ML20235T400 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Shoreham File:Long Island Lighting Company icon.png |
| Issue date: | 10/05/1987 |
| From: | Christman J HUNTON & WILLIAMS, LONG ISLAND LIGHTING CO. |
| To: | Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel |
| References | |
| CON-#487-4569 OL-3, NUDOCS 8710130074 | |
| Download: ML20235T400 (14) | |
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hk .,LILCO; October 5;1987 ,
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Dg UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION.
51 (CT -8 P} $9 t
CFF!OE OF GECMf,W Befora the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board MCKfijfy A :DV:' fl unAnw In the Matter of )
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LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COMPANY ) Docket No. 50-322-OL-3
) (Emergency Planning)
(Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, )
Unit 1) )
LILCO'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION AND ALTERNATIVE R_E_Q_UEST FOR REFERRAL TO THE COMMISSION (REALISM ISSUE)
LILCO hereby moves the Board to reconsider certain aspects of its recent deci-sion on LILCO's motion for summary disposition of the " legal authority" issues. Memo-
. randum and Order (Ruling on Applicant's Motions of March 20, 1987 for Summary Dis-position of the Legal Authority Issues and of May 22,1987 for Leave to File a Reply and Interpreting Rulings Made by the Commission in CLI-86-13 Involving the Remand of the Realism Issue and Its Effect on the Legal Authority Question), ASLBP No. 86-540-08-OL (Sept.17,1987) (hereinaf ter " Memorandum and Order"). In the alternative, LILCO asks that the Board refer these aspects of its ruling to the Commission. Finally, regardless of the disposition of this motion, LILCO asks the Board immediately to set a schedule for further proceedings, and to give this motion expedited consideration.
I. The Board Should Reconsider and Grant LILCO's Motion for Summary Disposition LILCO's summary disposition motion of March 20, 1987, asked the Board to re-solve the " legal authority" issues, Contentions EP 1-10, on the basis of the Commission's decision CLI-86-13, the evidentiary record in this case, and a statement of f acts at-tached to the motion. The Board denied the motion, finding that Cuomo v. LILCO, 8710130074 871005 PDR ADOCK 05000322 O PDR OSO3
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- Consol. Inder No. 84-4615 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., Feb. 25, 1985), holds that the " applicant can-not be delegated the authority to perform the functions enumerated in Contentions 1-10." Memorandum and Order at 25. Also, the Board found that there is a " genuine dis-pute" as to what the Interveners would do with respect to various matters in an emergency, Ld. at 27, because the Interveners had presented affidavits that dispute "each claim that LILCO makes as to how they would react," i_d. at 26.M The Board based this finding on its belief that "[t]he Commission in its remand in CLI-86-13 ex-pects the Board to determine what the Interveners' response will be." I_d. at 27.
LILCO respectfully urges that the Board re-examine the following aspects of its Memorandum and Order:
- 1. The correctness of its understanding that the Commission's remand in CLI-86-13 requires it to focus en an attempt to predict what the specific reactions of New York State and Suffolk County would be in the event of an actual emergency at Shoreham, rather than on assessing the effect, if any, of those governments' refusal to participate in preplanning on the effectiveness of their best-efforts contribution to the protective action measures for Shoreham set out in the LERO offsite plan.2/
- 2. The assumption that the holding of New York State courts that New York and its political subdivisions cannot " delegate" their emergency preparedness responsibilities under New York law to LILCO (or any other private organization) dis-ables those governments from making use of LILCO's or LERO's capabilities in responding to an emergency.
l 1/ Those disputes involved 5 of the 63 statements of material facts presented by l LILCO in support of its motion for summary disposition. Interveners did not dispute the
!' remaining 58 statements -- most of which went to issues invciving the capabilities of New York State and Suffolk County rather than to their stated intentions -- and the Board correctly decided these in LILCO's favor.
2/ A prime example of this inquiry would be a comparison of population doses expe-rienced in controlled versus uncontrolled evacuations, on the basis that an uncontrolled evacuation - which presupposes no governmental participation and no authority on LILCO's part to assist -is the worse case.
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- 3. The likely effectiveness of a proceeding that counsel for Interveners has characterized as making it impossible for LILCO to ever obtain a full power license for Shoreham.W For the reasons stated below, LILCO urges the Board to reconsider and reverse its September 17 Memorandum and Order on these issues, or, in the event it declines to do so, promptly to refer its decision as to them to the Commission.
A. Any Remand Should Focus Parametrically on the Capabilities of State and Local Governments to Participate in an Actual Response and on the Effect of Their Refusal to Participate in Pre-Emergency Planning, Not on Speculative Predictions of State and Local Response The Commission decision on which the Board relles in its Memorandum and Order, CLI-86-13, sets issues for a Licensing Board to prove on remand. Specifically, the Commission stated:
Nevertheless, we are unwilling to assume, as LILCO would have us, that this kind of best-effort government re-sponse would necessarily be adequate. In point of fact, there are questions about the familiarity of State and County offi-cials with the LILCO plan, about how much delay can be ex-pected in alerting the public and in making decisions and ree-commendations on protective actions, or in making decisions 1 and recommendations on recovery and reentry, and in achiev- (
ing effective access controls. The record tells us that an evacuation without traffic controls would be delayed from if to 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br />, but how important is this time delay? For which scenarios, if any, does it eliminate evacuation as a viable pro- )
tective action? I To answer these questions, more information is needed j about the shortcomings of the LILCO plan in terms of possible j lesser dose savings and protective actions foreclosed, assum- J ing a best-effort State and County response using the LILCO j plan as the source for basic emergency planning information <
j 3/ One of counsel for Suffolk County, Mr. Lanpher, has been quoted as believing j that the Board's ruling is dispositive of the entire Shoreham licensing case. He is )
quoted in the September 24, 1987 Nucleonics Week as saying "This is a significant i ruling. It lays out the roadmap everyone should know. LILCO will never get a license for this plant." Id. at 12. 4 l
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. and options. Accordingly, we remand LILCO's realism argu-ment to the Licensing Board for further proceedings in accord with this Decision. The Board should use the existing eviden-tiary record to the maximum extent possible, but should take additional evidence where necessary.
24 NRC at 31-32 (footnote omitted; emphasis in original). These issues do not require a Board to attempt to plumb the precise intentions of presently hostile State and local governments at an undetermined point in the future. Rather, LILCO submits, CLI-86-13 instructs the Board to attempt to determine the potential range of effects of best-effort, but essentially ad hoc, contributions by those governments to imple-mentation of LILCO's existing plan with existing resources. Thus the decision focuses on governmental capabilities and presumes definitively that those capabilities will be harnessed with good f aith, rather than on present prediction of future intentions, to be gleaned from the testimony of the litigation-wise leaders of the political opposition to Shoreham. LILCO believes that assessment of capabilities is a realistic task and shaped its motion for summary disposition on that theory. LILCO fears that focus on present statements of future intentions from hostile officials, by contrast, both is inherently speculative and, in the context of Shoreham, runs the risk of revealing little informa-tion of value.
These apprehensions are amply illustrated by the responses given to repeated re-quests in this proceeding to State and county officials for statements of how they would react in the event of a radiological emergency at Shoreham. The Interveners have been given many opportunities to say what they would do in a real emergency. They have adamantly refused to do so, taking the position that "no one knows" what they would do.
For over f our years now the Interveners have insisted that no one knows, and no 1
one can know, what they would do in an emergency. In their answers to discovery re-quests in 1983 Suffolk County dismissed as " speculation" any attempt to predict what County officials would do even before an emergency, assuming an emergency plan were approved by the NRC:
. l The County cannot describe what action (s) might be taken by a government when and if speculative future events take place. If events take place in the future, the County govern-ment will evaluate the events and take the action (s) which are agreed to be appropriate in light of the events which in fact occur. We, of course, do not know what actions might be taken until those events occur. ,
Suffolk County's " additional responses" to LILCO's informal discovery requests (Aug. 3, 1983), at 18 (Att. C to LILCO's Second Renewed Motion of March 20, 1987). Similarly, when asked by the Board in 1984 to address what they would do in an emergency, the Interveners again labeled any such attempt " speculation,":
1 The Board has asked the parties to speculate whether an unplanned response to a Shoreham emergency by the County or State "would result in chaos, confusion and disorganization l so as to compel a finding that there is no ' reasonable assur- )
ance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken j in the event of a radiological emergency' at Shoreham." ;
October 22 Order at 3-4. In our view, no possible benefit !
could result from such speculation and, certainly, based on !
such speculation, there could be no reliable finding of fact at all . . . . ;
i Suffolk County and State of New York Response to ASLB Memorandum and Order dated October 22,1984 (Nov.19,1984), at 88-89. Now, in their Answer to LILCO's Second Renewed Motion, the Interveners have reaffirmed their agnostic position. For exam- l ple:
Presumably, even the Commission felt that it cannot predict, much less declare as a " presumption," what sovereign govern- ,
ments would do in exercising their police powers on an ad hoc j basis. '
Answer of Suffolk County, the State of New York and the Town of Southampton to "LILCO's Second Renewed Motion for Summary Disposition of the ' Legal Authority' Is-sues (Contentions EP 1-10)" (hereinaf ter " Interveners' Answer") (May 11,1987), at 20.
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[ A] Government "best efforts" response, whatever it would be, clearly would not include an acceptance of the planning i zone concept Iashioned by LILCO, . . . . l Id. at 58 (emphasis in original).4/
l 4/ Note that this response asserts a refusal to accept the 10-mile EPZ upon which l federal emergency planning is premised.
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, [T]he truth is that no one knows what an ad hoc "best ef-forts" Government response to Shoreham accident would be . . . .
I_d. at 60.
Thus the Board noted the open question of "what the participation by the Gov-ernment will be," Memorandum and Order at 23, of "how the Governments will re-spond," id., and of "what the State and County response to a radiological emergency would be," i_d. at 26. In particular, the Board found such unresolved questions as "whether, when, or by whom the sirens would be activated," i_d. at 30, what EBS will be used, i_d. at 31, what messages it will broadcast, id., who will assume charge, Ld. at 33, who will decide when protective actions are required, Ld., what criteria will the deci-sionmaker or decisionmakers use, Ld., and several others.
The Board has stated its expectation that the Interveners "will be fully forth-coming so that the facts will be developed." Ld. at 29. LILCO fears that this will prove an exercise in frustration. No matter how forthcoming the Interveners are, if they truthfully "do not know" what they would do in an emergency, then all they can do is to say again that they do not know. Since they are opposed to planning for an emergency at Shoreham, and since deciding what they would do in an emergency is a form of plan-ning, they may have no choice but to adhere to this position. It is unlikely to be helpful to hold a hearing to hear the Interveners repeat once again that they do not know what they would do.
For these reasons, LILCO submits.that while there may be further issues as to the capability of State and local governments to contribute on a good-f aith ad hoc basis to a preplanned emergency response, productive evidentiary hearings cannot have as 1
their core issue the present determination of actual future response of the governments l of New York State and Suffolk County. This is particularly true if, as LILCO under- i I
stands the Board's Memorandum and Order, (1) that response is to be measured by l
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present intent,-(2) the evidence of that intent is to be the testimony of officials of those governments, and (3) LILCO has the burden of establishing what that response will be. It is for these reasons that LILCO structured its motion for summary disposi-tion around the concept of capabilities,E and LILCO requests that the Board reconsider this aspect of its Memorandum and Order.
B. "Delegatinst the Police Power"Is Not at Issue LILCO believes also that the Board should reconsider its apparent ruling that Cuomo v. LILCO, which says that the State cannot " delegate its police power," is de-terminative of the summary disposition motion.E See, el, Memorandum and Order at
- 25. When the State or County directs a private party, by phone or otherwise, to per-form certain specific actions (for example, activating sirens), that is not " delegating j the police power."II LILCO has never argued that the State would simply hand over an 1/ Under this theory, the least effective response definitionally would be the one predicated on the absence of State and county participation, e&, that leading to an uncontrolled evacuation.
g/ Cuomo v. LILCO is not dispositive of the " realism" issue, as the Interveners sug-gest. Cuomo v. LILCO presents the issue of whether LILCO could lawfully respond to an accident in the total absence of State and County participation, assuming for the sake of argument that the two governments were to mystically vanish at the time of an emergency. " Realism" points out that this is a false hypothesis.
2/ Interveners argue that the State and County "as a matter of law" could not au-thorize LILCO personnel to perform the functions identified in Contentions 1-10. In-tervenors' Answer at 30. The Interveners sustain this argument by cloaking it in ab- j stract terms like " delegate the police power" and " implement the LILCO Plan."
The Interveners' vague assertions that they could not " implement the LILCO Plan" miss the point. " Implementing the LILCO Plan" as a whole is not at issue in Con-tentions 1-10. What are at issue are rather ten specific functions that the Interveners claim cannot be done because of legal barriers. If one looks, as one has to, at each of these ten functions, it becomes clear that none of them would be prevented either by LILCO's lack of authority or the Intervernors' lack of planning.
Take the matter of sounding the sirens. The Interveners are arguing the proposi-tion that, in an emergency, the Governor would be unable to alert the public solely be-cause he could not legally ask a private party to sound an existing siren system. The In-tervenors cannot possibly believe this.
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l l emergency response to LILCO, in the manner of a contractor subcontracting a job to another party.EI Rather, the State and County would be involved to the maximum ex-tent possible given the timing and other circumstances of a particular accident. It can-not be seriously argued that any State or local government is prohibited by law from di-recting a private party to take actions that the government lacks the ability to perform and that are necessary to protect the public health and safety.EI l l
C. The Offsite Authorities May Not Reclassify an Accident l
The Board should also reconsider its ruling on LILCO's Second Renewed Motion in l light of a letter of May 28, 1987, to LILCO from the Chief. Emergency Preparedness l
l and Radiological Protection Branch, Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards, NRC, Region I, which has been served on the parties to this proceeding. The letter states that "[t]he licensee's declared emergency classification cannot be changed by offsite officials." Since, particularly in a fast-breaking emergency, protective action recom-l mendatior.s are determined by plant conditions, this NRC position makes it all the more !
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implausible that the State or County would act independent of the utility in a destruc- !
tive manner. .
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1/ The Interveners' arguments in response to LILCO's summary disposition motion i suffer from a misleading dualism that they have clung to from the beginning -- namely j the view that an emergency response would be done either by government officials (acting alone) or by LERO (acting alone) but not both. In Cuomo v. LILCO they have i established, thus f ar, that LERO acting alone would lack legal authority. In this pro- l ceeding they argue that government officials, acting alone, would lack the ability and knowledge. This mistaken worldview misses the point of the realism principle: it takes both LERO and the governments together to accomplish a lawful emergency response, given the restraint of Cuomo v. LILCO.
2/ The Interveners' statements that they would not "use" LILCO's plan (see, e.g., In-tervenors' Answer at 32), are directly contrary to the Commission's finding that the In-tervenors would "use the LILCO plan as the only available comprehensive compendium of emergency planning information and options." CLI-86-13,24 NRC 22,33 (1986). To accept such statements as raising litigable issues is inconsistent, LILCO submits, with the scope of remand permitted by CLI-86-13.
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, For the above reasons,N LILCO urges the Board to reconsider and grant l
LILCO's summary disposition motion.
l l II. The Board Should Refer Its Ruling to the Commission If the Board decides this motion against LILCO, LILCO asks the Board to refer its ruling to the Commission pursuant to 10 CFR S 2.785(b)(1). In its 1981 Statement of Policy on Conduct of Licensing Proceedings, CLI-81-8,13 NRC 452,456, the Commis-sion stated:
If a significant legal or policy question is presented on which Commission guidance is needed, a board should promptly refer or certify the matter to the Atomic Safety and Licensing Ap-peal Board or the Commission.
LILCO believes that the Board's denial of summary disposition does present "significant legal or policy questions." One is what is the burden of proof that must be borne by the sponsor of a " utility plan." Another is the important threshold issue of the construction of the " realism" doctrine outlined in CLI-86-13.
Moreover, the expense and delay that will be occasioned by litigation under the terms of the Memorandum and Order argue in favor of referral. The Appeal Board has said this:
Almost without exception in recent times, we have under-taken discretionary interlocutory review only where the ruling below either (1) threatened the party adversely affect-ed by it with immediate and serious irreparable impact which, 10/ Besides the two matters argued above in sections A and B, the Board's decision has other features that should.be reconsidered. One of these is the conclusion that a feature of the plan, like providing fuel to stranded motorists, must be litigated because it is a " safety feature," even though it is not required by NRC regulations. Memoran-dum and Order at 39. This is a far-reaching conclusion that has significant legal and policy implications.
Another such feature is the Board's determination that activities taken in the af-termath of an accident, when there is plenty of time to provide " legal authority," nev-ertheless raise litigable issues. Ld. at 36-39. LILCO cannot imagine any plausible sce-nario in which " legal authority" would prevent water supplies from being monitored, food from being interdicted, or people from being advised when to return home.
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. as a practical matter, could not be alleviated by later appeal or (2) affected the basic structure of the proceeding in a per-vasive or unusual manner.
Public Service Co. of Indiana (Marble Hill Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1 and 2),
ALAB-405, 5 NRC 1190,1192 (1977) (footnote omitted). LILCO believes both these tests are met in this case.
A referral is proper when the public interest will suffer or unusual delay or ex-I pense will be encountered. See Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-271,1 NRC 478,483 (1975). In this case the public interest test is met by the unquestionable importance of a proper construction of the scope of remand under CLI-86-13. Furthermore, the delay and expense of litigating what the State hnd County would do in an emergency, in the teeth of their unrelenting insistence that they do not know and refuse to decide, is bound to entall unusual delay and expense.N Dis-covery will be time-consuming and burdensome; the hearing will be likewise. It is true that the fact that the asserted error below may lead to delay and increased litigation expense is not a controlling consideration in favor of interlocutory review. Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co. (Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-805, 21 NRC 596,600 & n.16 (1985) (denying a motion for directed certification under 10 CFR 11/ In Duke Power Co. (Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-768,19 NRC 988 (1984), the Appeal Board dismissed as improvident a Licensing Board referral under 10 C.F.R. S 2.730(f), stressing that in the absence (as here) of a potential of truly exceptional delay or expense, the risk that a licensing board's interlocu-tory ruling may eventually be found to have been erroneous, and that because of the error further proceedings may have to be held, is one which must be assumed by that board and the parties to the proceeding.
1 I_d. at 992, quoting Commonwealth Edison Co. (Zion Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-116,6 I AEC 258, 259 (1973). In this the fif th year of the Shoreham emergency planning pro- I ceedings, the prospect of a major litigation on what the Interveners would do in an emergency is truly exceptional.
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. S 2.718(1)). But in this case both the exceptional delay and expense and the importance and novelty of the question at issue justify interlocutory review.
Ordinarily the Appeal Board hears a referral. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. (Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station), ALAB-56,4 AEC 930,931 (1972). But there is a suggestion in one case that a ruling might be referred directly to the Com-missioners. See Southern California Edison Co. (San Onofre Nuclear Generating Sta-tion, Units 2 and 3), LBP-81-36,14 NRC 691, 701 (1981). In this case the issues ad-dressed above should be referred to the Commission, because application of a decision of the Commission itself, CLI-86-13, is at issue. LILCO therefore urges the Board to refer its ruling to the Commission.
III. The Poard Should Set a Schedule for Further Proceedings Regardless of the disposition of LILCO's motion to reconsider and request for re-ferral to the Commission, above, the Board should promptly set a schedule for further proceedings and should as soon as possible specify the issues to be heard. The Board's Memorandum and Order says that the parties will be afforded, at the appropriate time, the opportunity to present their views on the issues which are to be heard in the re-manded CLI-86-13. Memorandum and Order at 47. Accordingly, LILCO asks that the Board begin the scheduling process by establishing October 16, 1987, as the date by which all parties must state their views on (1) the issues to be heard and (2) the sched-ule for discovery, written testimony, and hearing.
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12/ The same effect has been achieved previously in this case when the Board denied the County's motion to terminate this proceeding in 1983. The Board referred its ruling to the Appeal Board, which in turn promptly referred it without decision to the Com-mission. See Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), CLI-83-13,17 NRC 741,742 (1983).
U IV. The Board Should Decide this Motion on an Expedited Schedule LILCO asks for expedited treatment of this motion in light of the fact that the Shoreham plant has been ready to operate for some years and that the Interveners have indicated in recent pleadings that they intend to litigate every conceivable issue as te- ,
naciously as possible. Unless vigorous case management is exercised, the litigation of the " realism" issue (and the related immateriality issue), the school bus drivers issue, 1
and the EBS issue could take many more months. There is every reason both to give this motion expedited treatment and to set a schedule promptly, as requested above.
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s l-l Respectf ully submitted,
' Donald P. Irwin
, James N. Christman Hunton & Williams 707 East Main Street P.O. Box 1535 Richmond, Virginia 23212 DATED: October 5,1987
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- LILCO, October 5,1987 BOLKETE0 I l U$NPC j l
'87 OCT -8 P1 :59 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
- FFICE as 5[ Lit wy M CKEhba & SLtvitt BRANCH In the Matter of LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COMPANY (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1)
Docket No. 50-322-OL-3 I hereby certify that copies of LILCO'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION AND ALTERNATIVE REQUEST FOR REFERRAL TO THE COMMISSION (REALISM ISSUE) were served this date upon the following by telecopier or by hand as indicated by one asterisk, by Federal Express as indicated by two asterisks, or by first-class mail, post-age prepaid.
Morton B. Margulies, Chairman
- Atomic Safety and Licensing Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board Panel Board U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Past-West Towers, Rm. 407 4350 East-West Hwy. Atomic Safety and Licensing Bethesda, MD 20814 Board Panel U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Dr. Jerry R. Kline
- Washington, D.C. 20555 Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Richard G. Bachmann, Esq.
- U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission George E. Johnson, Esq.
East-West Towers, Rm. 427 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 4350 East-West Hwy. 7735 Old Georgetown Road Bethesda, MD 20814 (to mailroom)
Bethesda, MD 20814 Mr. Frederick J. Shon
- Atomic Safety and Licensing Herbert H. Brown, Esq.
- Board Lawrence Coe Lanpher, Esq.
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Karla J. Letsche, Esq.
East-West Towers, Rm. 430 Kirkpatrick & Lockhart 4350 East-West Hwy. South Lobby - 9th Floor Bethesda, MD 20814 1800 M Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036-5891 Secretary of the Commission Attention Docketing and Service Fabian G. Palomino, Esq.
- Section Richard J. Zahnleuter, Esq.
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Special Counsel to the Governor 1717 H Street, N.W. Executive Chamber Washington, D.C. 20555 Room 229 State Capitol Albany, New Ycrk 12224
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J 4 Mary Gondrum, Esq. Jonathan D. Feinberg, Esq.
Assistant Attorney General New York State Department of I 120 Broadway Public Service, Staff Counsel i Third Floor, Room 3-116 Three Rockefeller Plaza l New York, New York 10271 . Albany, New York 12223 Spence W. Perry, Esq.
- Ms. Nora Bredes William R. Cumming, Esq. Executive Coordinator Federal Emergency Management Shoreham Opponents' Coalition Agency 195 East Main Street 500 C Street, S.W., Room 840 Smithtown, New York 11787 Washington, D.C. 20472 Gerald C. Crotty, Esq.
Mr. Jay Dunkleberger Counsel to the Governor New York State Energy Office Executive Chamber Agency Building 2 State Capitol i
' Empire State Plaza Albany, New York 12224 Albany, New York 12223 Martin Bradley Ashare, Esq. **
Stephen B. Latham, Esq. ** Eugene R. Kelly, Esq.
Twomey, Latham & Shea Suffolk County Attorney 33 West Second Street H. Lee Dennison Building P.O. Box 298 Veterans Memorial Highway Riverhead, New York 11901 Hauppauge, New York 11787 Mr. Philip McIntire Dr. Monroe Schneider Federal Emergency Management North Shore Committee Agency P.O. Box 231 26 Federal Plaza Wading River, NY 11792 New York, New York 10278 1
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James N. Christman Hunton & Williams 707 East Main Street P.O. Box 1535 Richmond, Virginia 23212 DATED: October 5,1987
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