ML20235Q081

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Proposed Tech Specs Re Reactor Protection Sys Instrumentation
ML20235Q081
Person / Time
Site: Davis Besse Cleveland Electric icon.png
Issue date: 02/21/1989
From:
TOLEDO EDISON CO.
To:
Shared Package
ML20235Q063 List:
References
NUDOCS 8903020487
Download: ML20235Q081 (13)


Text

m Docke.t Number 50-346 i

License Number NPF-3 .

' Serial Number'1634 Attachment 1 f h. . f$ -

' .i d d w de i h h ed a a u wrJhh a t 3/4.3 INSTRUMENTATION 3/4.3.1 REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION l

l 3.3.1.1 As a minimum, the Reactor Protection System instrumentation channels and bypasses of Table 3.3-1 shall be OPERABLE with RESPONSE TIMES as shown in Table 3.3-2.

APPLICABILITY: As shown in Table 3.3-1.

ACTION:

)

As shown in Table 3.3-1. I 1

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.3.1.1.1 Each Reactor Protection System instrumentation channel shall  !

be demonstrated OPERABLE by the performance of the CHANNEL CHECK, CHANNEL l CALIBRATION and CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST operations during the MODES and at the frequencies shown in Table 4.3-1. )

1 4.3.1.1.2 The total bypass function shall be demonstrated OPERABLE at least once per 18 months during CHANNEL CALIBRATION testing of each channel affected by bypass operation.

4. 3 .1.1.'3 The REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME of each reactor l trip function shall be demonstrated to be within its limit at least once per 18 months. Each test shall include at least one channel per function i i

such that all channels are tested at least once every N times 18 months where N is the total number of redundant channels in a specific reactor trip function as shown in the " Total No.-of Channels" column of Table 3.3-1.

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1 Docket Number 50-346 License Numb,er NPF-3 eyJmp "5 Serial Number 1634 g j g{g]'f f Idyp,yph l

Attachment 1 , ,

y M l Page 12 hjj e f5 NO M,h@@(dM OW s P,q, 4 9f,i ti TABLE 3.3-1 (Continued) i TABLE NOTATION

  • With the control rod drive trip breakers in the closed position and i the control rod drive system capable of rod withdrawal.
    • When Shutdown Bypass is actuated.  ;
  1. The provisions of Specifica', ion 3.0.4 are not applicable.
    1. High voltage to detector may be de-energized above 10-10 amps on both Intermediate Range channels.

(a) Trip may be manually bypassed when RCS pressure 1 1820 psig by actuating Shutdown Bypass provided that:

(1) The High Flux Trip Setpoint is < 5% of RATED THERMAL POWER, i

(2) The Shutdown Bypass High Pressure Trip Setpoint of 1 820 1 l psig is imposed, and l (3) The Shutdown Bypass is removed when RCS pressure > 1820 psig.

(b) Trip may be manually bypassed when Specification 3.10.3 is in effect.

(c) The minimum channels OPERABLE requirement may be reduced to one when Specification 3.10.1 or 3.10.2 is in effect.

ACTION STATEMENTS ACTION 1 -

With the number of channels OPERABLE one less than required by the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and/or open the control rod drive trip breakers.

ACTION 2 -

With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Total Number of Channels STARTUP and/or POWER OPERATION may proceed provided all of the following conditions are satisfied:

a. The inoperable channel is placed in the tripped condition within one hour,
b. The Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement is met; however, one additional channel may be bypassed for up to 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> for surveillance testing per Specification 4.3.1.1.1, DAVIS-BESSE, UNIT 1 3/4 3-3

Docket Number 50-346 r License Nutnber NPF-3 b !15 0 d #" ** 'N Serial Number 1634 Attachment 1 E,f y [bj?qsqg y9nitcap c>

% Q'cTLNg"W t hDE[Q? *"$y p/ ', [ L Page 13 ~+d TABU 3.3-1 (Continued)

ACTION STATEMENTS (Continued)

ADDill0NAL CHANGES PitEvl00$LY and the inoperable channel above may be bypassed for PROPOSED BY LETTER up to 30 minutes in any 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> period when necessary Saial No. /'/o 7 Date//k/R to test the trip breaker associated with the logic of the channel being tested per Specification 4.3.1.1.1, and

c. Either THERMAL POWER is restricted to < 75% of RATED RATED THERMAL and the High Flux Trip Setpoint 1 is reduced to < 85% of RATED THERMAL POWER within 4 I hours or the QUADRANT POWER TILT is monitored at j least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.

ACTION 3 -

With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Total Number of Channels STARTUP and POWER OPERATION may proceed provided both of the following conditions are satisfied:

a. The inoperable channel is placed in the tripped l condition within one hour.
b. The Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement is met; however, one additional channel may be bypassed ]

for up to 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> for surveillance testing per  !

Specification 4.3.1.1.1, and the inoperable channel {

above may be bypassed for up to 30 minutes in any 24 l hour period when necessary to test the trip breaker )

associated with the logic of the channel being tested per Specification 4.3.1.1.1. ,

ACTION 4 - With the number of channels OPERABLE one less than re-quired by the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement and with the THERMAL Power level:

a. < 5% of RATED THERMAL POWER restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status prior to increasing THERMAL POWER above 5% of RATED THERMAL POWER.
b. > 5% of RATED THERMAL POWER, POWER OPERATION may i continue. I 1

DAVIS-BESSE, UNIT 1 3/4 3-4

  • Docket Number 50-366 ADDill0NAL CilANGES PREVIOUSLY

. License Number NPF-3 Serial Nt$mber 1634 Attachment 1 PROPOSED SerialNo. /M Date #

BY LET l

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Page 14 TABLE 3.3-1 (Continued) ADDITIONAL Cl!ANCES PREVIOUSLY PROPOSED BY LETTER ACTION STATEMENTS (Continued) Serial No. /539 Date ff :_

ACTION 5 - With the number of channels OPERABLE one less than l required by the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement and I with the THERMAL POWER level:

a.

-O amps on the Intermediate Range (IR) instru-5 10 mentation, restore the inoperable channel to OPER g .

status prior to increasing THERMAL POWER above 10 amps on the IR instrumentation.

b. -10

> 10 amps on the IR instrumentation, operation may continue.

ACTION 6 - With the number of channels OPERABLE one less than required by the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, verify compliance with the SHUTDOWN MARGIN requirements of Specification 3.1.1.1 within one hour and at least once-per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> thereafter.

ACTION 7 - With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Total Number of Channels STARTUP and/or POWER OPERATION may proceed provided all of the following conditions are C3 ?lJe satisfied:

LL: Q.b C@ ldQ a. Within 1 hour:

m.e 7-d 7: n 1. Place the inoperable channel in the tripped LJ KJJJl condition, or Cd XM Chm [lg 2. Remove power supplied to the control rod trip q 4 l= device associated with the inoperative channel. j LM EW", j Cr^ C'l b. One additional channel may be bypassed for up to 2 sc,g C p hours for surveillance testing per Specification g, f 4w 4.3.1.1.1, and the inoperable channel above may be

$M bypassed for up to 30 minutes in any 24. hour period l when necessary to test the trip breaker associated p

Ok. g "gg" with the logic of the channel being tested per Z q7;; Specification 4.3.1.1.1. The inoperable channel above

[- 66 may not be bypassed to test the logic of a channel of the trip system associated with the inoperable channel.

ACTION 8 - With the number of channels OPERABLE less than required by the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, be in at least HOT STANDBY within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.

i DAVIS-BESSE, UNIT 1 3/4 3-5 Amendment No. 108 (Next page is 3/4 3-Sa.)

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Docket Number 50-346 License Number NPF-3 Serial Numb'er 1634 '

i Attacfiment 1 Page 15 TABLE 3.3-1 (Continued)

ACTION STATEMENTS (Continued)

I ACTION 9 - With one of the Reactor Trip Breaker diverse trip features (undervoltage or shunt trip devices) inoperable, restore ,

it to OPERABII status in 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> or place the breaker in i

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trip in the next hour. l ACTION 10 - With one or both channels of SCR Relays inoperable, f restore the channels to CPERABLE status during the next l COLD SHUTLOWN exceeding 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />. '

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Docket Number 50-346 License Number NPF-3 7 3 pq3f~ n=p

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" , -" "9P ,1 p ,y -,- ,y Wi d t L. 5 .. . .c . . 3; TABLE 4.3-1 (Continued)

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1 NOTATION (1) - If not performed in previous 7 days.

(2) - Heat balance only, above 15% of RATED THERMAL POVER.

(3) - When THERMAL POWER [TP] is above 50% of RATED THERMAL POWER

[RTP] and at a steady state, compare out-of-core measured AXIAL POWER IMBALANCE g[ API ] to incore measured AXIAL POVER IMBALANCE (API7 ] as follows:

RTP [ API, - API 7 ] = Offset Error TP Recalibrates

> 2.5%. if the absolute value of the Offset Error is (4) - AXIAL POWER IMBALANCE and loop flov indications only.

(5) - Verify at least one decade overlap if not verified in previous 7 days.

(7) - Neutron detectors may be excluded from CHANNEL CALIBRATION.

(8) - Flow rate measurement sensors may be excluded from CHANNEL CALIBRATION.

calibrated at However, each flov measurement sensor shall be least once per 18 months.

(9) - The CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST shall independently verify the OPERABILITY of both the undervoltage and shunt trip devices of the Reactor Trip Breakers.

Vith any control rod drive trip breaker closed.

    • - When Shutdown Bypass is actuated.

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DaPf IMDMD 6Y U M SerialNMEd_ Date Q DAVIS-BESSE, UNIT 1 3/4 3-8 Amendment No. 43, 108, 123

Docket Number 50-346 y g n, g, , .

Licensa Numbsr NPF-3  ! ., E.J , p :D i; ;ap y

g. 5 . .. y Sarial Number 1634 I B $o a $ [{ p, c.

O lj DEFINITIONS per disintegration (in MeV) for isotopes, other than iodines, with half lives greater than 15 minutes, making up at least 95% of the total non-iodine activity in the coolant.

STAGGERED TEST BASIS 1.21 A STAGGERED TEST BASIS shall consist of:

a. A test schedule for n systems, subsystems, trains or designated 1 components obtained by dividing the specified test interval I into n equal subintervals,
b. The testing of one system, subsystem, train or designated components at the beginning of each subinterval.

FREQUENCY NOTATION 1.22 The FREQUENCY NOTATION specified for the performance of Surveillance l Requirements shall correspond to the intervals defined in Table 1.2.

AXIAL POWER IMBALANCE l.23 AXIAL POWER IMBALANCE shall-be the THERMAL POWER in the pto' half of the core expressed as a percentage of RATED THERMAL POWER minus the THERMAL POWER in the bottom half of the core expressed as a percentage of RATED THERMAL POWER.

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SHIELD BUILDING INTEGRITY 1 g 1.24 SHIELD BUILDING INTEGRITY shall exist when:

a. The airtight doors and the blowout panels listed in Table 4.6-1 are closed except the airtight doors may be used for normal

! transit entry and exit.

b. The emergency ventilation system is OPERABLE.

l c. The sealing mechanism associated with each penetration (e.g.,

welds, bellows er 0-rings) is OPERABLE.

REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME 1.25 The REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME shall be that time interval from when the monitored parameter exceeds its trip setpoint at the channel sensor until power interruption at the cortrol rod drive breakers.

DAVIS-BESSE, UNIT 1 1-5 w _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . - _ _ _ - - - _ _

. Docket Numbar 50-346 License Numbar NPF-?  %

Serial Numbe'r 1634 ADDyigy4 ggg gtV!OU5LY Page 20 Serial No g ,

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3/4.3.1 and 3/4.3.2 REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM AND SAFETT SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION {

The OPERABILITY of the RPS. SFAS and SFRCS instrumentation systems ensure that

1) the associated action and/or trip vill be initiated when the parameter monitored by each channel or combination thereof exceeds its setpoint. 2) the specified coincidence logic is esintained, 3) sufficient redundancy is maintained to permit a channel to be out of service for testing or maintenance, and 4) sufficient system functional capability is available for RPS. SPAS and SFRCS purposes from diverse parameters.

The OPERABILITY of these systems is required to provide the overall reliability, redundance ana diversity assumed available in the facility design for the protection and mitigation of accident and transient conditions. The integrated operation of eacn of these systems is consistent with the assumptions used in the accident analyses.

The surveillance requireneurs specified for these systems ensure that the i

overall system functional capability is maintained comparable to the original design standards. The periodic surveillance tests performed at the minimum l frequencies are sufficient to demonstrate this capability. l The measurement of response time at the specified frequencies provides assurance that the RPS, SFAS. and SFRCS action function associated with each channel is completed within the time limit assumed in the safety analyses. No credit vas taken in the analyses for those channels with response times indicated as not applicable.

Response time may be demonstrated by any series of sequential, overlapping or total channel test measurements provided that such tests demonstrate the total channel response time as defined. Sensor response time verification any be demonstrated by either 1) in place, onsite or offsite test measurements or 2) ,

u:ilizing replacement sensors with certified response times.

An SFRCS channel consists of 1) the sensing device (s), 2) associated logic and output relays (including Isolation of Main Feedvater Non Essential Valves and Turbine Trip), and 3) power sources.

l The SFRCS response time for the turbine stop valve closure is based on the combined response times of main steam line low pressure sensors, logic cabinet deley for main steam line low pressure signals and closure time of the turbine stop valves.

This SFRCS response time ensuresthat the auxiliary feedvater to the unaffected steam generator vill not be isolated due to a SFRCS low pressure trip during a main steam line break accident.

DAVIS-BESSE. UNIT 1 B 3/4 3-1 Amendment No. 73.125 (Next page is B 3/4 3-la)

Docket Numb 2r 50-346 Licznse 'Nombpr NPF-3 Serial Number 1634 I Page 21' I

)

i 3/4.3 INSTRUMENTATION l l

BASES  !

1 3/4.3.1 and 3/4.3.2 REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM AND SAFETT SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION (Continueo)

J j

Safety-grade anticipatory reactor trip is initiated by a turbine trip j (above 45 percent of RATED THERMAL POVER) or trip of both main feedvater '

pump turbines. This anticipatory trip vill operate in ndvance of the l j

reactor coolant system high pressure reactor trip to reduce the peak i reactor coolant system pressure and thus reduce challenges to the power i operated relief valve. This anticipatory reactor trip system was I

installed to satisfy Item II.K.2.10 of NUREG-0737. The justification for  !

the ARTS turbine trip arming level of 45% is given in BAV-1893, October. l 1985.

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1 DAVIS-BESSE Unit i B 3/4 3-la 1 Amandaant No. 73, l 125.128 l

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Docket Number 50-346

. Licensp Number NPF-3 i Serihl'Nember 1634 l

.Aitachment 2 l Page 1 SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION i Description of Proposed Technical Specification Change l

The purpose of this significant hazards consideration is to review proposed I changes to the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, Unit Number 1, Technical Specifications, Table 3.3-2, Reactor Protection System Instrumentation Response Times. The request proposes an increase in the response time requirement for the High Flux / Number of Reactor Coolant Pumps On (pover/ pumps) trip function of the Reactor Protection System (RPS) provided in Table 3.3-2' from 451 milliseconds to 631 milliseconds. The proposed change to component nomenclature is an administrative type change. The Technical Description (Attachment 1) discusses these changes.

i Significant Hazards Consideration l

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission has provided standa: 's in 10CFR50.92(c) for determining whether a significant hazard exists. A p.oposed amendment to an Operating License for a facility involves no significant hazards if operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed changes would not: 1)

Involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated: 2) Create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated; or

3) Involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

The proposed changes do not involve a significant hazards consideration i because the operation of the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station in accordance l l vith these changes would:  !

l 1. Not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated because there have been no hardware changes or design modifications which would affect the probability of an l accident and the analysis performed shows no effect on the consequences of an accident since the USAR DNBR remains bounding. [10CFR50.92(c)(1)]

2. Not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated because there have been no hardware changes or design modifications which would create the possibility of a new accident [10CFR50.92(c)(2)]
3. Not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety because the margin of safety is a minimum DNBR of no less than 1.3 for any normal or accident condition and analysis have proven the DNBR vill exceed 1.3 as required. [10CFR50.92(c)(3)]

Conclusion Based on the discussion above, it is concluded that the proposed changes do not involve a significant hazards consideration.

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