ML20235N718
| ML20235N718 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Grand Gulf  |
| Issue date: | 02/21/1989 |
| From: | Kintner L Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Cottle W SYSTEM ENERGY RESOURCES, INC. |
| References | |
| TAC-69403, NUDOCS 8903010370 | |
| Download: ML20235N718 (6) | |
Text
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February 21, 1989-
- D cket bo.50-416' d
Mr. W..T. Cottle Vice President,-Nuclear Operaticns System Energy Resources, Inc.
P.O. Box.23054 Jackson, Mississippi '39205
Dear Mr. Cottle:
SUBJECT:
~ REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL IllFORMATION - GRAtlD GULF NUCLEAR STATION i
(GGNS),UtlIT1(TACN0.69403)
By letter dated September 23,1988,. System Energy ' Resources (ADHRS}.
The NRC
'Inc.
requested a review of its proposed ' alternate decay heat removal system staff is reviewing this submittal and finds that additional information is needed regarding.the design.of supports for the ADHRS. The request.for additional information is enclosed.
In order to support our review. schedule, you 'are requested to respond to the enclosed request by February. 24, 1989.- This matter was discussed with your representatives by telephone on February 17, 1989.
4 The reporting and or recordkeeping requirements of this letter affect-fewer than 10 respondents; therefore, OMB clearance is not required under P.L.96-511.
Sincerely,
-/s/
Lester L. Kintner, Senior Project Manager i
Project Directorate II-I Division of Reactor Projects - I/II Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Enclosure:
-Request for Additional Information cc w/ enclosure:
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Mr. W. T. Cottle System Energy Resources, Inc.
Grand Gulf Nuclear Station (GGNS) cc:
Mr. T. H. C1Jninger Mr. C. R. Hutchinson l-Vice President, Nuclear Engineering GGNS General Manager and Support System Energy Resources, Inc.
System Energy Resources, Inc.
Post Office Box 756 P. O. Box 23054 Port Gibson, Mississippi 39150 Jackson, Mississippi' 39205 Robert B. McGehee, Esquire The Honorable William J. Guste, Jr.
Wise,. Carter, Child, Steen and Attorney General Caraway Department of Justice P. O. Box 651 State of Louisiana Jackson, Mississippi 39205 Baton Rouge, Louisiana 70804 Nicholas S. Reynolds, Esquire Office of the Governor Bishop, Liberman, Cook, Purcell State of Mississippi and Reynolds Jackson, Mississippi 39201 1400 L Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C.
20005-3502 Attorney General Gartin Building Mr. Ralph T. Lally Jackson, Mississippi 39205 Manager of Quality Assurance Middle South Utilities System Mr. Jack McMillan, Director Services, Inc..
Division of Solid Waste Managenient 639 Loyola Avenue, 3rd Floor Mississippi Department of Natural New Orleans, Louisiana 70113 Resources Post Office Box 10385 Mr. John G. Cesare Jackson, Mississippi 39209
. Director, Nuclear Licensing System Energy Resources, Inc.
Alton B. Cobb, M.D.
P. O. Box 23054 State Health Officer Jacksun, Mississippi 39205 State Board of Health P.O. Box 1700 Mr. C. B. Hogg, Project Manager Jackson, Mississippi 39205 Bechtel Power Corporation P. O. Box 2166 President Houston, Texas 77252-2166 C1.iborne County Board of Supervisors Port Gibson, Mississippi 39150 Mr. H. O. Christensen Senior Resident Inspector Regional Administrator, Region II U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Route.2, Box 399 101 Marietta Street
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Port Gibson, Mississ.ippi 39150 Suite 2900 Atlanta, Georgia 30323 I
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o ENCLOSURE REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION GRAND GULF NUCLEAR STATION UNIT 1 (GGNS-1)
ALTERNATE DECAY HEAT REMOVAL SYSTEM i
1.
Provide the information as presented in the February 14, 1989. meeting in the third refueling cutage schedule (RF03) on pages 4 and 32 of the handout.
Additional information should be provided as follows.
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(a) Indentify which RHR trains are operable, operating and functional (b) Identify alternate means to be used for shutdown cooling and coolant l
circulation if an RHR train is inoperable (c) Identify outage activities which require a TS 3.0.4 exception.
In addition, change the RF03 schedule chart and clarify the inconsistencies regarding of the number of required operable and functional ECCS systems and RHR shutdown cooling mode trains and in the licensee's Technical Specification Position Statement (TSPS-) 121 (Page
- 2) which requires that in addition to meeting the GGNS-1 Technical Specifications (TS) requirements, at least one ECCS and one RHR train must remain functional throughout the refueling outage.
For exanple, it appears from the RF03 schedule that TS 3.5.2 and TS 3.4.9.2 may be violated since two systems ECCS and two RHR trains are required to be operable by TS and one operable and one functional ECCS system is shown on the schedule.
2.
Provide the operator response time needed to place the functional ECCS pumps and RHRs trains into service and justify the adequacy of the operator response time by a supporting analysis showing that the inadequate core cooling (core uncovery) conditions will not occur for both cases with (a) inadvertent RCS drainage and (b) loss of heat removal capability of the ADHRS.
Various combinations of the plant conditions (such as RCS water inventory, decay heat level, RCS drainage size and time of loss of ADHRS should be considered to identify and analyze the worst cases for the Operational Conditions 4 and 5.
3.
Provide a commitment to implement plant operating procedures for operation of the ADHRS including the steps for placing the required functional RHR train into service prior to use of the ADHRS.
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4.
Identify anticipated operational occurrences which would result in loss of' the ADHRS shutdown cooling function (e.g. loss of offsite power, inadvertent iso 4 tion of plant service water, etc.). Provide a connitment I
to modify or prepare new GGNS-1 oifnormal operating procedures for loss of the ADHRS shutdown cooling function to give the steps and time for placing d functional RHR system into operation, including the time required to do i
so as a function of decay heat generation, Operational Conditions and special conditions.
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5.
Describe whether it will be possible for a functional RHR to be placed into operation without entering the auxiliary building or containment, since access to these spaces may not be available following a fuel handling or load drop accident.
If not, describe the maximum dose that
'I would be received for placing the RHR into operation and the basis for its acceptability.
If' the ADHRS would continue to be used, describe the basis for its acceptability for post accident long term cooling.
4 6.
The application-stated that the proposed usage of the ADHRS, a non safety related system is to remove decay heat at any time during Operational Condition 4, " Cold Shutdown," or Operational Condition 5 " Refueling" in place of an operable RHR as required by Technical Specifications Limiting Conditions for Operation.
Provide the bases for your conclusion that such usage provides an acceptable level of safety compared to an operable RHR, for the shutdown cooling safety function.
7.
The application states that administrative controls will be used to assure that a functional RHR will be available at all times during the.use of the ADHRS. Confirm that part of this administrative control will be Administrative Procedure 01-S-15-2, Technical Specification Position Statement (TSPS) No.121.
Change TSPS No.121 to more precisely define functional.
For example include (1) a specific time for placing the functional system into operation, (2) what water level is required in a functional ultimate heat sink basin to maintain net positive suction head (NPSH) if the standby service waster (SSW) system is needed one day after shutdown, and (3) functional requirements for the ADHRS room cooler be included in TSP 101.
8.
Confirm that an operable or functional RHR train means the diesel generator dnd standby service water system for that train are also operable (automatically initiated) or functional (manually placed into operation).
If not, justify any exception.
9.
The radiation monitor in the discharge of plant service water from the ADHRS heat exchangers is used to detect heat exchanger tube leakage or tube rupture when ADHRS is in operation. The monitor has a non-safety grade alarm but does not actuate isolation valves.
Provide a commitment to include an off normal operating procedure or alarm response instruction for actions to be taken when the alarm is actuated.
- 10. Th.e ADHRS is designed for controlling reactor coolant system flow through the ADHRS from 1000 gpm to 3600 gpm. Operation includes throttling of the ADHRS from the, control room.
In the February 14, 1989 meeting it was stated that the reactor coolant temperature measured at the recirculation loop would be used to manually control flow rate.
Is the ADHRS capable of l
removing decay heat at one day after shutdown with 1000 gpm? Describe how mixing of reacter coolant within the reactor been considered in controlling flow rate based on measured temperature without recirculation pumps since ADHRS discharges from the LPCI pipe into the space between fuel assemblies and not into the feedwater ring as does the RHR and reactor water clean up system. Describe how reactor pressure, reactor coolant temperature, and reactor water level will be monitored during use of ADHRS in Operational l-Condition 4.
- 11. Justify why LPCI A, B, and C pumps will not be declared inoperable when ADHRS is in operation.
12.
Provide the revised plant service water (PSW) system P&ID showing location of the branch piping to the ADHRS heat exchangers and the location of the radiation monitor and isolation valves.
13.
Describe the effect on performance of safety related components if ADHRS is operating and a signal is received to transfer cooling water supply from PSW to SSW. During long term isolation of PSW to ADRHS describe measures to be taken to prevent growth of carbicula or mussels, and minimize corrosion.
14.
Your response to staff concerns dated February 6,1989 regarding prying action on supports is not adequate.
Provide additional information regarding consideration of prying action in ADHRS supports as follows:
(a) Describe how prying action has been considered in the design of all type of connections and compare the methods used with the provisions of AISC Standards.
For example, in calculating bolt stresses for a J
bolted connection of the support to a steel column or steel enhedded i
plate, describe how prying action was accounted for (b)
If prying action was not accounted for justify the design of al1 types of connections used in the ADHRS support design by comparing quantitative results for typical connections with results using AISC methods.
15.
Isolation 0F ADHRS from interfacing systems during operational conditions 1, 2, and 3.needs further clarification. Describe the type and location of valves used for isolation purposes, and surveillance performed to assure the operability the safety function of these valves.
- 16. Confirm that the ADHRS modification, which is in general a non-safety-related system, including all controls, interlocks, etc., does not affect or interfere with any of the installed Class 1E instrumentation or systems (such as the existing interlocks in the RHR suction line from the reactor recirculationloop).
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- 17. A safety-related control switch will be provided in the control room to bypass the pump start permissive for RHR A and B pumps when the i
associated E12F066A and B valves are open but a suction path doesn't 1
a 4-exist. Describe how this new feature will not adversely impact the existing pump permissive function.
Is there one control. switch, to bypass the_ permissive for both RHR A and B pumps or is there one control switch for each pump?
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