ML20235B825
| ML20235B825 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Browns Ferry  |
| Issue date: | 10/26/1987 |
| From: | TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML082340470 | List:
|
| References | |
| 20600, 20600-V02-R03, 20600-V2-R3, NUDOCS 8902150094 | |
| Download: ML20235B825 (55) | |
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i EMPLOYEE CONCERNS SPECIAL PROGRAM VOLUME 2 ENGINEERING CATEGORY SUBCATEGORY REPORT 20600 AS-BUILT RECONCILIATION UPDATED TVA NUCLEAR POWER
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TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS REPORT NUMBER: 20600 SPECIAL PROGRAM REPORT TYPE:
SUBCATEGORY REPORT FOR REVISION NUMBER: 3 ENGINEERING TITLE:
AS-BUILT RECONCILIATION Page 1 of 21 REASON FOR REVISION:
1.
Revised to incorporate comments from SRP, TAS, and other Category Evaluation Groups.
2.
Revised to incorporate comments from SRP.
3.
Revised to incorporate comments from SRP, TAS, OGC and to add Attachment C (References).
PREPARATION PREPARED BY:
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s TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS REPORT NUMBER:
20600
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SPECIAL PROGRAM REVISION NUMBER: 3 Dage ES-1 of 2 EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY
Subcategory 20600 consists of one element that was applicable to and evaluated for all four of TVA's nuclear power plant sites. This report summarizes those evaluations and examines their resul.ts for significance and broader issues.
The employee concerns that were grouped into this element were about as-built drawing inaccuracies; documents in poor condition or nonexistent; unchecked drawings, drawing errors, inaccurate data in workplans, and drawings not changed in a timely manner to reflect plant changes. The report also I
addresses a concern, applicable only to Sequoyah, that the stress analysis for l
the essential raw cooling water (ERCW) system was not kept current to take into account piping material changes.
Of the five issues at Sequoyah and four at each of the other three nuclear plants, the evaluation team found only one issue at each plant to be invalid.
ij In addition, one valid peripheral issue was identified at each of the plants as a result of the evaluations. Of the 17 valid issues, TVA had already acknowledged eight and had initiated corrective action. The remaining nine valid issues required TVA to develop corrective actions, which included evaluation of ERCW material change effects on stress analysis at Sequoyah and procedure changes at each of the plants.
l A review of TVA's nuclear performance plans by the evaluation team revealed l
that TVA acknowledged that it had formal drawings that did not match actual I
olant configurations.
If TVA had not acknowledged deficiencies in the as-built drawing - configuration control processes and taken corrective action, either prior to, or as a result of, the ECTG evaluation, plant operations could have been affected. New TVA programs, identified in its nuclear performance plans, along with the corrective actions resulting from l
the ECTG evaluations, should correct any deficiencies and preclude their recurring. At Sequoyah, the potential existed for some ERCW piping and/or pioe supports to be stressed higher than documented because the piping stress analysis did not match the actual system configuration. TVA comitted, in the corrective action plan, to evaluate the ERCW system changes for effects on the analysis and to revise drawings to reflect the as-built condition.
The evaluation team has identified the causes of deficiencies in the as-built drawing - configuration control processes as:
o An inordinate time elapsed between physical plant changes authorized by engineering (DCRs, FCRs, and ECNs) and the corresponding formal drawing revisions because procedures did not specify a time limit in which drawings were to be formally revised to show a change.
o A " Fragmented Organization," without clear lines of responsibility, authority, and accountability, resulted in Engineering and Operations or Construction maintaining separate sets of drawings for the same systems.
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TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS REPORT NUMBER:
20600 SPECIAL PROGRAM REVISION NUMBER: 3 Page ES-2 of 2 o
Correlation was not ensured between issued drawings and actual plant configuration. This was the result of procedures'which permitted two sets of drawings depicting the same systems to exist at the same time.
o Poor communication between the engineerir.g and plant organizations resulted in Engineering not being fully cognizant of actual plant l
configuration nor of the degree to which design modifications had I
been implemented by Operations or Construction.
The stress analyses were not being kept current to include material changes in the ERCW system at Sequoyah because procedures were not followed.
At Sequoyah, the evaluation team has verified the completion of corrective action plans that:
o Revised procedures to impose a time limit between a physical change made to a CSSC system and the updating of as-built drawings to reflect that change o
Evaluated ERCW material changes for effects on the stress analysis Causes and other evaluation results are being examined from a wider
- f perspective by the Engineering category evaluation.
2596D-R13 (10/05/87)
Preface. Glossary, and List of Acronyms for ECTG Subcategory Reports HISTORY OF REVISION REV i
NUMBER PAGES REVISED REASON FOR CURRENT REVISION l
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i To clarify that one or more l
attachments will help the reader find where a particular concern is evaluated 1
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TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS REPORT NUMBER: 20600 SPECIAL PROGRAM FRONT MATTER REY:
3' PAGE i 0F viii Preface This subcategory report is one of a series of reports prepared for the Employee Concerns Special Program (ECSP) of the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA). The ECSP and the organization which carried out the program, the Employee Concerns Task Group (ECTG), were established by TVA's Manager of Nuclear Power to evaluate and report on those Office of Nuclear Power (ONP) employee concerns flied before February 1, 1986. Concerns filed after that date are handled by the ongoing ONP Employee Concerns Program (ECP).
The ECSP addressed over 5800 employee concerns. Each of the concerns was a formal, written description of a circumstance or circumstances that an i
employee thought was unsafe, unjust, inefficient, or inappropriate The mission of the Employee Concerns Special Program was to t.horoughly investigate all issues presented in the concerns and to report the results of those investigations in a form accessible to ONP employees, the NRC, and the general public. The results of these investigations are communicated by four levels of ECSP reports: element, subcategory, category, and final.
Element reports, the lowest reporting level, will be published only for j
those concerns directly affecting the restart of Sequoyah Nuclear Plant's reactor unit 2.
An element consists of one or more closely related issues. An issue is a potential problem identified by ECTG during the evaluation process as having been raised in one or more concerns. For efficient handling, what appeared to be similar concerns were grouped into elements early in the program, but issue definitions emerged from the evaluation process itself. Consequently, some elements did include only one issue, but often the ECTG evaluation found more than one issue per element.
Subcategory reports summarize the evaluation of a number of elements.
However, the subcategory report does more than collect element level evaluations. The subcategory level overview of element findings leads to an integration of information that cannot take place at the olement level.
This integration of information reveals the extant to which problems overlap more than one element and will therefore require corrective action j
for underlying causes not fully apparent at the element level.
1 To make the subcategory reports easier to understand, three items have been placed at the front of each report: a preface, a glossary of the terminology unique to ECSP reports, and a list of acronyms.
Additionally, at the end of each subcategory report will be a Subcategory Summary Table that includet the concern numbers; identifies other subcategories that share a concern; designates nuclear safety related, safety significant, or non-safety related cone.orns; designates generic applicability; and briefly states each concern.
Either the Subcategory Summary Table or another attachment or a combination which the issue raised by the concern is evaluated.of the two wil we nyeu enum e wt9 e e veumeep 6 ee es esee s epaup>@mee *ESeebeu*
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i TVA EMPLOYFE CONCERNS REPORT NUMBER: 20600 SPECIAL PROGRAM FRONT MATTER REV: 2 PAGE 11 0F vill The subcategories are themselves summarized in a series of eight category reports. Each category report reviews the major findings and collective significance of the.ubcategory reports in one of the following areas:
management and personnel relations industrial safety construction material control operations quality assurance / quality control welding engineering A separate report on employee concerns dealing with specific contentions of intimidation, harassment, and wrongdoing will be released by the TVA Office of the Inspector General.
Just as the subcategory reports integrate the information collected at the element level, the category reports integrate the information assembled in all the subcategory reports within the category, addressing particularly the underlying causes of those problems that run across more than one subcategory.
A final report will integrata and assess the information collected by all of the lower level reports prepared for the ECSP, including the Inspector General's report.
I i
For more detail on the methods by which ECTG employee concerns were evaluated and reported, consult the Tennessee Valley Authority Employee I
Concerns Test Group Program Manual. The Manual spells out the program's l
objectives, scope, organization, and responsibilities.
It also specifies a
the procedures that were followed in the investigation, reporting, and closecut of the issues raised by employee concerns.
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TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS REPORT NUMBER: 20600 SPECIAL PROGRAM FRONT MATTER REY: 2 PAGE ill 0F viii l
l ECSP GLOSSARY OF REPORT TERMS
- l classification of evaluated issues the evaluation of an issue ?eads to one of the following determinations.:
Class A: Issue cannot be verified as factual Class B: Issue is factually accurate, but what is described is not a problem (i.e., not a condition requiring corrective action)
Class C: Issue is factual and identifies a problem, but corrective action for the problem was initiated before the evaluation of the issue was undertaken Class D: Issue is factual and presents a problem for which corrective action has been, or is being, taken as a result of an evaluation Class E: A problem, requiring corrective action, which was not identified by an employee concern, but was revealed during the ECTG evaluation of an issue raised by an employee concern.
collective significance an analysis which determines the importance and consequences of the findings in a particular ECSP report by putting those findings in the proper perspective, concern (see " employee concern")
corrective setion steps taken to fis specific deficiencies or discrepancies revealed by a negative finding and, when necessary, to correct causes in order to prevent recurrence.
criterion (plural: criteria) a basis for defining a performance, behavior, ce quality which ONP imposes on itself (see also " requirement").
elemeat or element report an optional level of ECSP report, below the subcategory level, that deals with one or more issues.
employee concern a formal, written description of a circumstance or circumstances thet an employee thinks unsafe, unjust, inefficient or inappropriate; usually documented on a K-form or a form equivalent to the
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g TV.'. EMPLOYEE CONCERNS REPORT NUMBER: 20600 SPECIAL PROGRAM FRONT MATTER REY: 2 PAGE iv 0F vili evaluator (s) the individual (s) assigned the responsibility to assess a specific grouping of employee concerns.
findings includes both statements of fact and the judgments made about those facts during the evaluation process; negative findings require corrective action.
issue a potential problem, as interpreted by the ECTG during the evaluation process, raised in one or more concerns.
K-form (see " employee concern")
reautrement a standard of performance, behavior, or quality on which an evaluation judgment or decision may be based.
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root cause the underlying reason for a problem.
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' Terms essential to the program but which require detailed definition have been defined in the ECTG Procedure Manual (e.g., generic, specific, nuclear safety-related, unreviewed safety-significant question).
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FRONT MATTER REY: 2 PAGE v 0F vill l
Acronyms AI Administrative Instruction AISC American Institute of Steel Construction ALARA As Low As Reasonably Achievable ANS American Nuclear Society l
ANSI American National Standards Institute ASME American Society of Mechanical Engineers ASIM American Society for Testing and Materials
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AWS American Welding Society BFN Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant BLN Bellefonte Nuclear Plant l
l CAQ Condition Adverse to Quality j
l CAR Corrective Action Report i
CATD Corrective Action Tracking Document CCTS Corporate Convaitment Tracking System
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i CEG-H Category Evaluation Group Head I
CFR Code of Federal Regulations l
CI Concerned Individual I
CMTR Certified Material Test Report COC Certificate of Conformance/ Compliance i
l DCR Design Change Request 1
DNC Division of Nuclear Construction (see also NU CON)
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TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS REPORT NUMBER: 20600 SPECIAL PROGRAM
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FRONT MATTER REY: 2 PAGE vi 0F vili DNE Division of Nuclear Engineering
'DNQA Division of Nuclear Quality Assurance DNT Division of Nuclear Training DOE Department of Energy DP0 Division Personnel Officer DR Discrepancy Report or Deviation Report l
1 ECN Engineering Change Notice ECP Employee Concerns Program ECP-SE Employee Concerns Program-Site Representative l
i ECSP Employee Concerns Special Program l
1 ECTG Employee Concerns Tast Group EEOC Equal Employment Opportunity Commission i
EQ Environmental Qualification EHRT Emergency Medical Response Team EN DES Engineering Design ERT Employee Response Team or Emergency Response Team FCR Field Change Request FSAR Final Safety Analysis Report FY fiscal Year GET General Employee Training HCI Hazard Control Instruction HVAC Heating. Ventilating, Air Conditioning II Installation Instruction INPO Institute of Nuclear Power Operations IRN Inspection Rejection Notice l
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L/R Labor Relations Staff M&AI Modifications and Additions Instruction l
l MI Maintenance Instruction MSPB Merit Systems Protection Board MT Magnetic Particle Testing NCR Nonconforming Condition Report l
NDE Nondestructive Examination NPP Nuclear Performance Plan NPS Non-plant Specific or Nuclear Procedures System NQAM Nuclear Quality Assurance Manual NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission NSB Nuclear Services Branch NSRS Nuclear Safety Retlew Staff l
NU CON Division of Nuclear Construction (obsolete abbreviation, see DNC)
NUMARC Nuclear Utility Management and Resources Committee OSHA Occupational Safety and Health Administration (or Act)
ONP Office of Nuclear Power l
OWCP Office of Workers Compensation Program PHR Personal History Record PT Liquid Penetrant Testing i
QA Quality Assurance l
l QAP Quality Assurance Procedures 1
I QC Quality Control l
l QCI Quality Control Instruction l
TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS REPORT NUMBER: 20600 SPECIAL PROGRAM FROWT MATTER REY: 2 PAGE vill 0F vill QCP Quality Control Procedure QTC Quality Technology Company RIF Reduction in Force -
l RT Radiographic Testing SQN Sequoyah Nuclear Plant l
SI Surveillance Instruction
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SOP Standard Operating Procedure SRP Senior Review Panel SWEC Stone and Webster Engineering Corporation
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TAS Technical Assistance Staff l
T&L Trades and Labor TVA Tennessee Valley Authority l
TVTLC Tennessee Valley Trades and Labor Council j
UT Ultrasonic Testing i
VT Visual Testing VBECSP Watts Bar Employee Concern Special Prograa WBN Watts Bar Nuclear Plant WR Work Request or Work Rules WP Workplans l
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3, TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS REPORT NUMBER:
20600 SPECIAL PROGRAM REVISION NUMBER: 3 Page 2 of 21 CONTENTS Section Page Executive Summary ES-1 Preface i
ECSP Glossary of Report Terms iii Acronyms v
1 Introduction 3
2 Summary of Issues 4
3 Evaluation Process 4
1 4
Findings 6
l 5
Corrective Actions 9
6 Causes 13 1
7 Collective Significance 14
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19 Glossary Supplement for the Engineering Category Attachments A
Employee Concerns for Subcategory 20600 A-1 B
Summary of Issues, Findings, and Corrective Actions B-1 for Subcategory 20600 C
References C-1 f
TABLES Table Page 1 Classification of Findings and Corrective Actions 16 2 Findings Summary 17 3 Matrix of Elements, Corrective Actions, and Causes 18 l
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TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS REPORT NUMBER:
20600 SPECIAL PROGRAM REVISION NUMBER: 3 Page 3 of 21 1.
INTRODUCTION This subcategory report summarizes and evaluates the results of the ECSP element evaluations prepared under Engineering Subcategory 20600, As-Built l
Reconciliation.
The employee concerns provide the basis for the element evaluations and are listed in Attachment A.
The plant location where the concern was originally identified and the applicability of the concern to other nuclear plants are also identified.
R3 vision 8 of TVA Topical Report TVA-TR75-1A, which is the Quality Assurance Program Description for the Design, Construction, and Operation of TVA Nuclear Power Plants, was the revision available when this element was evaluated.
Revision 9 of the Topical Report (Ref. 8) is available at the writing of this report; its effects on the 206.1 element evaluations have been assessed, but they do not alter the findings and conclusions.
The evaluations are summarized in the balance of this report as follows:
o Section 2 -- summarizes, by element, the issues stated or implied in the employee concerns and addresses the determination of their generic applicability o
Section 3 -- outlines the process followed for the element and subcategory evaluations and cites documents reviewed o
Section 4 -- summarizes the findings by element and identifies those negative findings that must be resolved o
Section 5 -- highlights the corrective actions reouired for resolution of the negative findings cited in Section 4 and relates them to each element and to each plant site o
Section 6 -- identifies causes of the negative findings o
Section 7 -- assesses the significance of the negative findings o
Attachment A -- lists, by element, each employee concern evaluated in the subcategory. The concern number is given along with notation of any other subcategory with which the concern is shared and the plant sites to which it could be applicable. The concern is ouoted as received by TVA, and is characterized as safety related (SR),
safety significant (SS), or not safety related (NO) o Attachment B -- contains a sunnary of the element-level evaluations. Each issue is listed, by element number and plant, along with its corresponding findings and corrective actions. The reader may trace a concern from Attachment A to an issue in 25960-R13 (10/06/87)
TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS REPORT NUMBER:
20600
$PECIAL PROGRAM REVISION NUMBER: 3 Page 4 of 21 Attachment B by using the element number and applicable plant. The reader may relate a corrective action description in Attachment B to causes and significance in Table 3 by using the CATO number wnich appears in Attachment B in parentheses at the end of the corrective action description.
The term " Peripheral finding" in the issue column refers to a finding that occurred during the course of evaluating a concern but did not stem directly from an employee concern. These are classified as finding class "E" in Tables 1 and 2 of this report o
Attachment C -- lists the references cited in the text i
2.
SUMMARY
OF ISSUES i
The employee concerns listed in Attachment A have been examined for each plant, and the potential problems raised by the eight concerns were developed into 17 separate issues. In addition, four peripheral issues were identified. These 21 issues are evaluated for each nuclear plant site and can be summarized as follows:
206.1, As-Built Inaccuracies - As-built drawings are inaccurate or nonexistent, or do not represent the installation, and changes to drawings are not made in a timely manner.
Sequoyah had.the additional issue that actual installed essential raw cooling water (ERCW) piping chanaes may not have been stress-analyzed.
Each specific issue evaluated is stated fully in Attachment B (by plant),
which also lists the findings and corrective actions that are discussed in Sections 4 and 5 of this report. Seventeen of the 21 issues were found to be valid. All of the concerns listed were evaluated for each of the four plants except concern HI-85-094-N02, which was judged to be unique to SQN. This concern was raised at SQN and addresses the SQN ERCW system. This situation existed because of the sequence of events that occurred; i.e., engineering authorized a piping material change from carbon steel to stainless steel, the material changes were physically made to portions of the ERCW system resulting in a system configuration not fully supported by the stress analyses, and the system was operated. The evaluation team judged there was little likelihood of the same sequence of events occurring at other plants. Therefore, there was no basis to suggest a need to evaluate this concern at the other plants.
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3.
EVALUATION PROCESS This subcategory report is based on the information contained in the applicable element evaluations prepared to address the specific em'loyee l
p concerns related to those issues broadly defined in 5'ection 2.
The evaluation process consisted of the following steps:
25960-R13 (10/06/87)
_A.
TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS REPORT NUMBER:
20600 SPECIAL PROGRAM REVISION NUMBER: 3 Page 5 of 21 a.
Defined issues for the element from the employee concerns.
Attachment A of this report lists the employee concerns addressed herein. Attachment B of this report lists the issues, as well as the findings and corrective actions for the issues.
b.
Reviewed documents such as OIE Information Notices (Ref. 6) and INP0 Good Practices publications (Ref. 24) which provide information on as-built / configuration control practices in the nuclear industry.
c.
Reviewed applicable Safety Analysis Report (SAR) (Ref. 7), NQAM (Refs. 9-11), Topical Report (Ref. 9), and Nuclear Performance Plans (NPPs) (Ref. 19) to understand how TVA will accomplish regulatory compliance, and to identify any open issues or TVA comitments related to the design.
d.
Reviewed corporate and site level procedures to determine TVA requirements for configuration control (Refs. 13-18).
e.
Reviewed any other documents applicable to as-built / configuration control and determined to be needed for the evaluation, such as correspondence (Refs. 21-23, 25-28, 30, 34-38, 41-45, 49, 50, 52-54, 56, 61-63, 65, 66), transcripts of interviews (Ref. 23), Condition Adverse to Quality Report (CAQR) (Ref. 32), Nuclear Safety Review Staff (NSRS) reports (Refs. 48 and 51), reports by others (Refs. 47-55, 57, 59, 63), and Corporate Commitment Tracking System l
(CCTS) (Ref. 45) in the NPPs.
i f.
Using the results from steps a through e above, evaluated the issues for the element and documented the findings, a.
Tabulated issues, findings, and corrective actions from the element evaluations in a plant-by-plant arrangement (see Attachment 8).
h.
Prepared Tables 1, 2, and 3 in this subcategory report to permit comparison and identification of comon and unique issues, findings, and corrective actions among the four plants.
i.
Classified the findings and corrective actions from the element evaluations using the ECSP definitions.
j.
On the basis of ECSP guidelines, analyzed the collective significance and causes of the findings from the element evaluations.
k.
Evaluated defined corrective actions to determine if additional i
actions are required as a result of causes found in step j.
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TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS REPORT NUMBER:
20600 1
SPECIAL PROGRAM REVISION NUMBER: 3 Page 6 of 21 l.
Provided additional judgment or information that may not have been apparent at the element level.
4.
FINDINGS 4.1 As-Built inaccuracies - Element 206.1 Findino (for issues "a,"
"b,"
and "c" as shown in Attachment B for all four olants): Investigations by TVA and otner organizations (Ref s. 47-55, 57-60, 62-64) indicate problems in as-built drawings and configuration control and in the management and control of plant change and plant change documentation j
(FCRs, ECNs, etc.). At SQN, WBN, and BFN there was no list, at the time of J
the initial investigation, of those drawings that must be updated before startup (or fuel load) to reflect the as-built configuration of the plant, and j
there was insufficient management attention to engineering practices and to the Quality Assurance function of assuring that procedures for controlling plant changes and plant change documentation are adequate and that they are being followed. This inattention has resulted in extensive inaccuracies in as-built documentation. At WBN, SCR 62975 was written to address an apparent adverse trend related to as-constructed drawing discrepancies based on a series of construction nonconformance reports (NCRs). The evaluation did not identify a significant breakdown in the WBN as-constructed drawing program.
The evaluation team found that none of the procedures defines the time limit allowed between the time an engineering approved physical change is made to a critical structures, systems, and components (CSSC) system in the olant and the formal revision of the as-built drawings to reflect that change, nor do the procedures limit the amount of mark up, or " red-lining," of drawings to show changes before drawings have to be formally revised and reissued.
Discussion (for issues "a,"
"b," and "c" as shown in Attachment B for all four i
plants):
10 CFR 50, Appendix B and Apfendix A (Refs. 1 and 2) and ANSI N4b-2.11 (Ref. 6), committed to by TVA, state that procedures must be developed to specify that as-built drawings for safety-related systems and structures be current and be available at all locations where they are needed. These documents also require periodic inspections or audits of the design, construction, and operational processes to ensure that the procedures are being followed, and that the drawings reflect the current as-built configuration of the plant.
TVA has acknowledged these regulatory requirements, and has stated in the TVA Topical Report (Ref. 8) that drawings for safety-related systems, as defined in the FSAR, will be maintained in a current as-built condition.
In response to these requirements, and to mainta1n configuration control, TVA developed engineering procedures (EN DES-EPs, OEPs, and NEPs) to govern the preparation, approval, and tracking of change-authorizing documents.
In 06/83 the Configuration Control Task Force (CCTF) (Ref. 49) was initiated to ran.e j
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1 TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS REPORT NUMBER:
20600 SPECIAL PROGRAM REVISION NUMBER: 3 i
Page 7 of 21 audit findings in the area of modification control at BFN.
In 07/83, the task force was chartered to investigate configuration management throughout TVA nuclear plants, make recommendations for corrective action, and propose programs to prevent recurrence of drawing update problems. The task force found that configuration control and as-built problems at TVA nuclear plants were mostly due to:
o Lack of management involvement and lack of emphasis on adhering to in-place procedures o
The use of a two-drawing system of as-designed and as-built drawings o
Partial implementation of engineering change notices (ECNs) without updating drawings o
Improper handling of the design change request (DCR) process and documents I
In the two-drawing system, "as-designed" drawings were issued by engineering and "as-constructed" drawings were issued by the plant depicting the same systems without correlation necessarily existing between the two sets of drawings.
Other investigations at the various nuclear plant sites indicated problems in the areas of as-built drawings and configuration control. The "as-designed" drawinas were based on design changes as issued by engineering. Engineering was not always aware of the status of previously issued modifications. The "as-constructed" drawings that were maintained by the plant were based on the actual plant system installations, but were not always maintained up to date to reflect the most current actual system configuration.
A list of drawings that must be brought up to date to reflect the as-built condition of safety systems required to mitigate accidents defined in the PSAR/FSAR is necessary so that TVA will know when the effort has been completed.
Limits on the accumulation of system modification documentation before a drawing is formally revised to incorporate that documentation is desirable so that the drawings remain easily readable and as up to date as possible. This will minimize problems that might be associated with inaccurate drawings.
The control room drawings and those in the Shift Engineer's office are marked up in red to show the change innediately after the change is fully. implemented in the plant.
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TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS REPORT NUMBER:
20600 SPECIAL PROGRAM REVISION NUMBER: 3 Page 8 of 21 Findino (for issue "d" for WBN, BFN, BLN; issue "e" for SON per Attachment B): The evaluation team found no evidence of unchecked drawings and thus no as-built difficulties caused by unchecked drawings.
Discussion for issue "d" for WBN. BFN. BLN: issue "e" for SON per Attachmeat B): The issue pertaining to checking of drawings was cited in Employee Concern IN-85-152-001 received by TVA in May 1985. At that time, the EN DES procedures (EPs) were in effect for issuing original (Ref. 13) and revised engineering drawings. The evaluation team found that the procedure was quite comprehensive and required at least seven signatures, including that of the checker, before the drawing could be issued. The checker's signature s'ignified that (a) the design review is complete; (b) all required interface coordination (including requested review) is done; (c) the design complies with all design input and the necessary assumptions; and (d) calculations (including referenced computer printout) necessary to prove the design on the basis of (c) are approved.
The present procedures (NEPs) (Ref. 14) are somewhat simplified and meet the I
requirements in a different manner, but they also require signatures of creparer, checker, applicable reviewers and approver before a drawing is issued.
The evaluation team reviewed approximately 100 samples of various types of
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drawings for each of the four nuclear plants and did not find any examples of l
unchecked drawings.
l Findina (for issue "d" for SON per Attachment B): The identification of the physically modified ERCW stainless steel piping transmitted to the Rigorous Analysis group was not made in accordance with standard quality assurance crocedures and practices.
Discussion (for issue "d" for SON Der Attachment B): TVA issued ERCW system modifications to change the piping material f rom carbon to stainless steel.
TVA has stated that there is no guarantee that every past configuration of ERCW piping had a design calculation on file demonstrating the qualification of the piping in such configuration before actually being placed in service i
(Ref. 19). TVA has stated that:
1 "All piping which had been changed or was scheduled to be changed through Unit 2 Cycle 3 outage was indicated on a set of drawings prepared by [the] Plant Modifications Section. This piping was reviewed by the Rigorous Analysis section to ensure that all J
Rigorously analyzed piping which had been changed was adequately considered" (Ref. 68).
TVA has also stated that "any replacement done after November 1985 will be under our present program which will have the analysis done before the actual l
oipe replacement."
2596D-R13 (10/06/87) l a
TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS REPORT NUMBER:
20600 SPECIAL PROGRAM REVISION NUMBER: 3 Page 9 of 21 The evaluation team concurs with the TVA approach of (a) identifying piping to be changed by a particular time, (b) assuring that documentation exists showing such changed piping is qualified, and (c) requiring analysis to be complete before future changes are to be made. However, the evaluation team also believes that the performance of these steps must be a quality controlled activity. The drawings prepared by the Plant Modifications Section for the ERCW piping system change were not formally prepared and transmitted (Ref. 69). Therefore, the information provided to the Rigorous Analysis Group could be incomplete or incorrect.
Findino (for issue "e" for WBN, BFN and BLN; issue "f" for SON oer Attachment _
B): As an additional finding, it appears to the evaluation team that the Wimary and Critical drawings listed in the Drawing Control Instructions do not meet the as-built drawing criteria of NUREG-0737 Supplement 1 (Refs. 4 and l
- 12) or of NUREG-0696 (Ref. 3), which require drawings, schematics, and diagrams showing conditions of plant structures and systems down to the I
component level and in-plant locations of these systems.
Discussion (for issue "e" for WBN, BFN and BLN; issue "f" for SQN per Attachment B): The above two NUREG documents provide NRC guidance on meeting requirements for emergency response capability (ERC). The evaluation of TVA compliance with these regulatory documents is beyond the scope of this report.
4.2 Summary of Subcategory Findings The classified findings are summarized in Table 1.
Class A and B findings indicate there Was no actual problem and that corrective action was not recuired. Class C, D, and E findings required corrective actions. The j
corrective action class, defined in the Glossary Supplement, is identified in l
the table by the numeral combined with the finding class. For example, the designation 02 in Table 1 indicates that the evaluated issue was found to be i
l valid (finding Class D) and that a corrective action involving a procedure revision is required (corrective action Class 2) as the result of the ECTG investigation.
The findings are summarized by classification in Table 2.
Of the 21 findings l
identified in Table 1 none requires physical changes to the plant and four require no corrective action. Of the remaining 17 findings, six had corrective actions initiated before the ECTG evaluation, seven had new corrective actions identified, and four were peripheral findings uncovered during the ECTG evaluation which require corrective action.
S.
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS As noted in Section 4 of this report, Table 2 identifies a total of 17 findinos that require corrective action. The corrective actions, along with their finding / corrective action classifications, are sumarized in Table 3.
The corrective action descriptions in the table are a condensation of the l
25960-R13 (10/06/87) 1 1
z l
TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS REPORT NUMBER:
20600 l
SPECIAL PROGPAM REVISION NUMBER: 3 Page 10 of 21
)
detailed corrective action information in Attachment B.
A single corrective action may resolve several individual findings. The table indicates the plant or olants to which a corrective action is applicable by the Corrective Action
]
Tracking Document-(CATD) column where the applicable plant is identified by the CATD number.
From the Finding / Corrective Action Classification column of Table 3, it can be seen that of the five corrective actions identified, all require some type of documentation remedy. A potential for documentation changes exists as the result of the additional peripheral finding regarding TVA compliance with l
specific NUREGs (Refs. 3 and 4). Time limits for updating drawings are addressed in detail in Section 7.
TVA has committed in the Nuclear Performance Plans (NPPs) to replace its l
two-drawing system ("as-designed" and "as-constructed") with a single drawing system under the control of the Division of Nuclear Engineering (DNE) at each of c., nuclear plant sites. This change is intended to prevent the recurrence I
of problems TVA has had in the past with discrepancies between drawings and actual plant configuration. TVA has developed and committed to implement Design Baseline and Verification Programs (DBVP) at SQN, WBN, and BFN to ensure that drawings for safety systems within the scope of the respective proarams reflect '.he actual plant configuration and reconcile the actual system configurations with the design basis and licensing commitments. The plant construction has not been completed at BLN, thus the implementation of a single drawing system is intended to maintain control of plant configuration and comoliance with the design basis and licensing commitments.
The DBVPs at SON (Ref. 39)'and BFN (Ref. 35) are being implemented to revise a defined scope of drawings to match the actual plant configuration and to reconcile these drawings to related engineering documentation in a two-phase program, i.e., orerestart and postrestart for each,init.
In this program, The flow diagrams, electrical single line diagrams, schsmatics, and control diagrams used in the control room (control room dravirgs) depicting the systems, or portions of systems, required to mitigite design basis events and to provide for safe shutdown of the plant will be Jpdated in the PRERESTART j
ohase. The POSTRESTART phase will include implementation of the modifications 1
not recuired for restart, completion and revision of the design criteria i
documentation, completion of other safety systems evaluations not required for restart, and implementation of corrective actions to the other safety systems, 4
as reauired, and formal revision of control room drawings (i.e., configuration control drawings).
The DBVP at WBN (Ref. 40) is being implemented to verify that the WBN unit I construction satisfies licensing commitments and that unit 1 is ready for power operation. The former "as-designed" and "as-constructed" drawings will be merged into baseline drawings for nuclete safety-related systems. A similar program is to be followed for WBN unit 2.
l 4
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TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS REPORT NUMBER:
20600 SPECIAL PROGRAM REVISION NUMBER: 3 Page 11 of 21 TVA has committed to revise applicable procedures at each of the four nuclear plant sites to impose a time limit between the completion of a physical modification to a CSSC system, as authorized by engineering change control documents, and the formal revision of the applicable configuration control drawings to reflect that change.
TVA has also committed to evaluate the SQN ERCW system changes for effects on the analysis and revise drawings to reflect as-built condition.
The Design Basis Program for TVA Nuclear Plants of March 28,1980 (Ref. 34) developed "a method for defining, establishing and maintaining a design basis program for all TVA nuclear plants."
"Desian Basis A design basis (1) identifies and interprets generic upper tier design input documents which are applicable to a specific plant, (2) identifies and evokes commitments made by TVA in licensing documents, (3) defines the general design requirements for the plant as required to satisfy the plant safety analysis, and (4) establishes any other general design input which may be dictated by TVA policy.
" Design Basis Document (DBD)
A DBD consists, as a minimum, of those general design criteria for site, plant, structures, and systems which constitute the upper tier plant-specific design input.
It may also include those detailed design criteria, system descriptions, and design input drawings, discretionary engineering o :cisions and rationale, analysis results, and engineering parameters and associated margins for detailed design.
There is general agreement that a design basis for all of the TVA nuclear plants axists; however, this design Dasis is not always readily retrievable in a verified form. A need exists for a verified, controlled DBD to be maintained throughout the plant life. Such a document should be used to evaluate and control design changes, to respond to abnormal operationsandevents,toevaluate[licensingchangeorder](LCOs),in performing safety reviews (e.g., [unreviewed safety question determination] (US00s), [prouabilistic risk assessment) (PRAs), etc.), to assess conditions adverse to quality, to assess operating experience reports, and to provide an interf ace with outside agencies. The design basis document would be used by design engineers, plant eagineers, shift technical advisers, and auditors and regulators."
i 25960-R13 (10/06/87)
m TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS REPORT NUMBER:
20600 SPECIAL PROGRAM REVISION NUMBER: 3 Page 12 of 21 The TVA Design Change Process Improvement Program (07/86) (Ref. 33) was:
... written to establish a uniform and coordinated approach in making significant changes to the TVA Design Change Process. The revised process as provided herein and entitled DNE's Design Change Process Improvement Program was developed to correct weaknesses in the existing design change process. These weaknesses can be summarized as follows:
1.
Weaknesses in the quality and documentation of engineering reviews for modifications.
2.
Weakness in maintaining an effective relationship between "as-configured" and "as-designed" documents.
" Division of Nuclear Engineering (DNE) Management has concluded that basic changes to the program for controlling design modifications are required.
l "This Improvement Program Plan was developed to accomplish the following:
l 1.
Define authority, responsibility, and accountability for performance of design functions to ensure that effective actions are taken to correct adverse conditions.
2.
Centralize direction and control of design functions to ensure that design integrity is maintained during the plant modification process.
3.
Put in effect design modification methods which provide the coordination among various [0ffice of Nuclear Power] (ONP) groups to ensure accurate and sufficient documentation of plant configuration and effective safety evaluations.
4.
Provide a standard system for accomplishing design modification work on all nuclear projects.
"This program provides for: (1) improving the effectiveness of the engineering organization (see Attachment 1), (2) developing and implementing a transitional (short-duration)(design change process, and (3) developing and implementing a permanent long-range) improved design change process."
Configuration control is addressed in the following sections of the corporate and respective plant-specific NPPs. There is no plant-specific NPP for BLN.
Coroorate Sequoyah Browns Ferry Watts Bar (Volume 1)
(Volume 2)
(Volume 3)
- ( Vt.,1 ume 4 )
VI.E.4 11.3.0 111.2.0 V.7 L
t 25960-R13 (10/06/87) l l
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TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS REPORT NUMBER:
20600 SPECIAL PROGRAM REVISION NUMBER: 3 Page 13 of 21 TVA has acknowledged problems in the area of configuration control in its nuclear performance plans, tnd has committed to procedure revisionr. at both the corporate and plant-site levels to reflect TVA's new organization, to correct documented deficiencies, and to reflect installed plant modifications.
The corrective action plans received for WBN, SON, BFN, and BLN are acceptable to the evaluation team to resolve the negative findings.
6.
CAUSES Table 3 also identifies one or more causes for each negative finding requiring corrective action. Table 3 has 17 column headings (e.g., " Lack of Management Attention," " Inadequate Procedures," etc.) which address possible causes. The problems covered in this report resulted from a combination of causes, each of which is identified. Whenever direct evidence linked a cause with a problem requiring corrective action, such evidence was considered in preparing the data in the table.
The following paragraphs address causes resulting from " Lack of Management Attention."
The most frecuently identified cause is procedural deficiencies (e.g.,
" Inadequate Procedures") that did not ensure correlation between issued drawings and actual plant configuration because they permitted the peaceful (though sometimes warlike) coexistence of two sets of drawings depicting the same systems. This cause applies to four of the five findings for which corrective actions are listed.
" Inadequate Communication" between the engineering and site organizations responsible for maintaining the drawings and TVA's fragmented organizational structure permitted the existence, at the same time, of two sets of drawings for the same systems. One set was maintained by Engineering as the "as-designed" drawings and the other was maintained by Construction or Operations as the "as-constructed" drawings. These two sets of drawings were sometimes in disagreement, and, in some cases, neither set accurately reflected the actual plant configuration.
Certain existing procedures were not followed at Sequoyah, with the result that stress analysis was not kept current to include physical material changes made to the ERCW system.
These causes are in the broader Table 3 classification of weaknesses in
" Management Effectiveness."
" Lack of Management Attention" also permitted the continuation of a situation wherein procedures did not impose a time limit between a physical plant change authorized by engineering (DCRs, FCRs, and ECNs) and formal revision and l
issuance of the applicable engineering drawings to reflect the change.
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TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS REPORT NUMBER:
20600 SPECIAL PROGRAM REVISION NUMBER: 3 Page 14 of 21 7
COLLECTIVE SIGNIFICANCE The last three columns of Table 3 indicate the evaluation team's ' judgment of the significance of the specific corrective actions. Four of the five problems for which corrective actions are listed require changes to documentation. Three of the four problems also have the potential for changes to hardware and design margins. The fifth problem nas the potential for
?
i l
documentation changes.
l l
The causes identified are in the broad classification of " Management l
Effectiveness," which is an indication of deficiencies in TVA's nuclear program management as it relates to as-built drawings and configuration i
l control.
l Because the drawings did not accurately represent the plant configuration, incorrect operational decisions could have been made by control room operators t
in responding to abnormal operating conditions and in safely operating, shutting down, or maintaining the plants in a safe shutdown condition.
TVA has initiated programs such as the DBVP, DBD, and Design Change Process Improvement Program at the corporate level and at the nuclear plant sites which, when fully implemented, should correct the configuration control oroblems that have been identified and should prevent future recurrence.
The lack of consistent direction and proper communication could also result in drawings which are part of the FSAR not reflecting the actual plant configuration and, therefore, jeopardize the licensing status of the plant.
Engineering was not always fully aware of actual plant configuration and the degree to which design changes had actually been implemented in the plant.
This sometimes resulted in inaccuracies in subsequent design changes issued by Engineering and in site problems with implementing those design changes.
Because there were no time limits between a plant configuration change 1
authorized by engineering (DCRs, FCRs, and ECNs) and a formal drawing revision l
to show that change, unlimited physical plant changes could accumulate before the engineering drawings are revised to show those changes. Thus, engineering drawings depicting systems where physical plant changes had been made could j
~
either become difficult to read because of excessive markups, or might not i
reflect physical plant configurations accurately. Either situation could lead to difficulties in plant operation and in the implementation of future plant l
modifications. Also, the lack of accurate as-built drawings and feedback to i
engineering co'ld affect the nature and adequacy of design changes issued by l
u engineering, design margins, and unreviewed safety question determinations.
l 1
TVA has committed to procedural changes at SQN, WBN, BFN, and BLN to impose time limits for drawing updates.
TVA has developed a series of nuclear performance plans- (NPPs) to correct programmatic and management deficiencies that have contributed to the continued poor direction and control of TVA's nuclear activities. Volume.1 of 25960-R13 (10/06/87)
.-----------.----------_-_-J
1 TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS REPORT NUMBER:
20600 SPECIAL PROGRAM REVISION' NUMBER: 3 Page 15 of 21 the NPP describes the measures that TVA has taken and currently intends to take to improve the corporate-level management of its nuclear activities and I
to correct the problems that have occurred in this area. Volumes 2, 3, and 4 address, respectively, Sequoyah, Browns Ferry, and Watts Bar. There is currently no plant-specific NPP for Bellefonte. TVA has committed to specific corrective actions, as delineated in Attachment B, to address the negative I
findings noted herein.
In additions the three plant-specific nuclear l
performance plans describe the actions TVA is taking to improve its nuclear program at those sites. These me&sures, when completely implemented, should l
resolve the identified problem areas and prevent recurrence.
l l
Progress is being made in these areas. For example, at Sequoyah, the l
evaluation team has verified the completion of corrective action plans that:
o Revised procedures to impos6 a time limit oetween a physical change n.ade to a CSSC system and the updating of as-built drawings to reflect that change and j
o Evaluated ERCW material changes for effects on the stress analysis The results of this subcategory evaluation are being combined with the other subcategory reports and reassessed for the Engineering category evaluation.
25960-R13 (10/06/87)
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4 TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS REPORT NUMBER:
20600 SPECIAL PROGRAM REVISION NUMBER: 3 Page 16 of 21 TABLE 1 CLASSIFICATION OF FINDINGS AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS Finding / Corrective Issue /
Action Class
- Element Findino**
SON UPN BFN BLN 206.1 As-Built Inaccuracies a
C2 C2 C2 C2 b
C2 C2 C2 C2 c
D2 02 D2 02 d
D5 A
A A
e A
E3 E3 E3 f
E3
- Classification of Findinos and Corrective Actions A.
Issue not valid.
- 1. Hardware No corrective action required.
- 2. Procedure B.
Issue valid but consequences acceptable.
- 3. Documentation No corrective action required.
- 4. Training C.
Issue valid. Corrective action
- 5. Analysis initiated before ECTG evaluation.
- 6. Evaluation D.
Issue valid. Corrective action
- 7. Other taken as a result of ECTG evaluation.
E.
Peripheral issue uncovered during ECTG evaluation. Corrective action required.
- Defined in Attachment B. Issues / Findings may be different from plant to plant.
l 1
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9 TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS REPORT NUMBER:
20600 SPECIAL PROGRAM REVISION NUMBER: 3 Page 17. of 21 TABLE 2 FINDINGS
SUMMARY
Plant l
Classification of Findings SON WBN BFN BLN Total A.
Issue not valid. No corrective 1
1 1
1 4
action required.
e B.
Issue valid but consequences acceptable.
0 0
0 0
0 No corrective action required.
l C.
Issue valid. ' Corrective action 2
2 2
2 8
l initiated before ECTG evaluation.
D.
Issue valid. Corrective action taken 2
1 1
1 5
as a result of ECTG evaluation.
E.
Peripheral issue uncovered during 1
1 1
1 4
ECTG evaluation. Corrective action required.
Totals 6
5 5-5 21 l
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i TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS REPORT NUMBER:
20600 SPECIAL PROGRAM REVISION NUMBER: 3 Page 19 of 21 1
GLOSSARY SUPPLEMENT FOR THE ENGINEERING CATEGORY l
l Causes of Neaative Findinas - the causes for findings that require corrective l
action are categorized as follows:
j 1.
Fraomented organization - Lines of authority, responsibility, and accountability were not clearly defined.
I 2.
Inadeouate cuality (0) training - Personnel were not fully trained in the procedures established for design process control and in the I
maintenance of design documents, including audits.
I 3.
Inadeouate orocedures - Design and modification control methods and procedures were deficient in establishing requirements and did not ensure an effective design control program in some areas.
i 4
Procedures not followed - Existing procedures controlling the design i
process were not fully adhered to.
5.
Inadeauate communications - Communication, coordination, and cooperation were not fully effective in supplying needed information within plants, between plants and organizations (e.g., Engineering, Construction, Licensing, and Operations), and between i
interorganizational disciO ines and departments.
6.
Untirrely resolution of issues - Problems were not resolved in a
{
timely manner, and their resolution was not aggressively pursued.
l 7.
Lack of management attention - There was a lack of management attention in ensuring that programs required for an effective design process were established and implemented.
l 8.
Inadeauate desian bases - Design bases were lacking, vague, or incomplete for design execution and verification and for design j
change evaluation.
I 9.
Inadeauate calculations - Design calculations were incomplete, used j
incorrect input or assumptions, or otherwise failed to fully j
demonstrate compliance with design requirements or support design output documents.
10.
Inadequate as-built reconciliation - Reconciliation of design and I
licensing documents with plant as-built condition was lacking or incomplete.
j
- 11. Lack of desian detail - Detail in design output documents was i
insufficient to ensure compliance with design requirements.
i 1
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TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS REPORT NUMBER:
20600 SPECIAL PROGRAM REVISION NUMBER: 3 Page 20 of 21 GLOSSARY SUPPLEMENT (Cont'd)
- 12. Failure to document enoineerino judgments - Documentation justifying I
engineering judgments used in the design process was lacking or incomplete.
- 13. Design criteria / commitments not met - Design criteria or licensing commitments were not met.
14 Insufficient verification documentation - Documentation (Q) was insufficient to audit the adequacy of design and installation.
15.
Standards not followed - Code or industry standards and practices were not complied with.
- 16. Engineering error - There were errors or oversights in the assumptions, methodology, or judgments used in the design process.
17.
Vendor error - Vendor" design or supplied items were deficient for the intended purpose.
Classification of Corrective Actions - corrective actions are classified as belonging to one or more of the following groups:
1.
Hardware - physical plant changes 2.
Procedure - changed or generated a procedure 3.
Docun.antation - affected QA records 4
Trainina - required personnel education 5.
Analysis - required design calculations, etc., to resolve 6.
Evaluation - initial corrective action plan indicated a need to evaluate the issue before a definitive plan could be established.
Therefore, all hardware, procedure, etc., changes are not yet known 7.
Other - items not listed above Perioheral Finding (Issue) - A negative finding that does not result directly f rom an employee concern but that was uncovered during the process of evaluating an employee concern. By definition, peripheral findings (issues) require corrective action.
1 25960-R13 (10/06/87) a
TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS REPORT NUMBER:
20600 SPECIAL PROGRAM REVISION NUMBER: 3 Page 21 of 21 GLOSSARY SUPPLEMENT (Cont'd)
Significance of Corrective Actions - The evaluation team's judgment as to the significance of the corrective actions listed in Table 3 is indicated in the last three columns of the table. Significance is rated in accordance with the type or types of changes that may ba expected to result from the corrective action. Changes are categorized as:
o Documentation change (D) - This is a change to any design input or output document (e.g., drawing, specification, calculation, or procedure) that does not result in a significant reduction in design margin.
o Change in design margin (M) - This is a change in design interpretation (minimum requirement vs actual capability) that results in a significant (outside normal limits of expected accuracy) change.in the design margin. All designs include margins to allow for error and unforeseeable events. Changes in design margins are a normal and acceptable yert of the design and construction process as long as the final design margins satisfy regulatory requirements and applicable codes and standards.
o Change of hardware (H) - This is a physical change to an existing plant structure or component that results from a change in the design basis, or that is required to correct an initially inadequate design or design error.
If the change resulting from the corrective action is judged to be significant, either an "A" for actual or "P" for potential is entered into the appropriate column of Table 3.
Actual is distinguished fro 9 potential because corrective actions are not complete and, consequently, tte scope of required changes may not be known. Corrective actions are judged ta be significant if the resultant changes affect the overall quality, performance, or margin of a safety-related structure, system, or component.
l l
25960-R13 (10/06/87)
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1 TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS REPORT NUMBER:
20600 SPECIAL PROGRAM REVISION NUMBER: 3 Page A-1 of 3 ATTACHMENT A EMPLOYEE CONCERNS FOR SUBCATEGORY 20600 l
l Attachment A -- lists, by element, each employee concern evaluated in the l
subc ategory. The concern number is given along with notation of any other subcategory with which the concern is shared and the plant sites to which it could be applicable. The concern is quoted as received by TVA and is characterized as safety related, not safety related, or safety significant.
4 4
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0 0107A-R40 (10/06/87)
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TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS REPORT NUMBER:
20600 SPECIAL PROGRAM REVISION NUMBER:.3 Page.B-1 of 11 l
ATTACHMENT B l
SUMMARY
OF ISSUES, FINDINGS, AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS FOR l
SUBCATEGORY 20600 l
1 l
Attachment B -- contains a summary of the element-level evaluations. Each issue is listed, by elapant number and plant, along with its corresponding i
findings and corrective accions. The reader may trace a concern from i
Attachment A to an issue in Attachment B by using the element number and applicable plant. The reader may relate a corrective action description in Attachment B to causes and significance in Table 3 by using the CATD number which appears in Attachment B in parentheses at the end of the corrective action' description.
The term " Peripheral finding" in the issue column refers to a finding that occurred during the course of evaluating a concern but did not stem directly from a employee concern. These are classified as "E" in Tables 1 and 2 of this report.
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l TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS REPORT NUMBER:
20600 SPECIAL PROGRAM REVISION NUMBER: O Page C-1 of 8 I
ATTACHMENT C REFERENCES 1.
Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations, Part 50 (10 CFR 50),
Appendix B, " Quality Assurance Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants and Fuel Reprocessing Plants," (as amended 01/75)Section VI, " Document Control" l
2.
10 CFR 50, Appendix A, " General Design Criteria for Nuclear Power
' Plants," Design Criterion 5, " Records Requirements" l
{
3.
NRC OIE NUREG-0696, " Functional Criteria for Emergency Response Facilities," Final Heport, (02/81) j 4
NRC OIE NUREG-0737, Supplement 1, " Clarification of TMI Action Plan Requirements," (01/83) 5.
NRC OIE, IE information Notice No. 85-66, " Discrepancies between As-Built Construction Drawings and Equipment Installations," (08/07/85) 6.
ANSI N45-2.11-1974, " Quality Assurance Requirements for the Design of Nuclear Power Plants," Section 7, " Document Control," and Section 8,
" Design Change Control" 7.
Safety Analysis Reports (SARs):
Sequoyah Final Analysis Report (FSAR) updated through Amendment 3 (04/86)
Watts Bar Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) updated throug'h Amendment i
55 (04/15/85) l l
Browns Ferry Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) Amendment 31, and Updated FSAR (UFSAR), through Amendment 4, (08/86)
Bellefonte Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) updated through Amendment 27 (06/20/86) 8.
TVA Topical Report, TVA-TR75-1A, " Quality Assurance Program Description for the Design, Construction, and Operation of the TVA Nuclear Power Plant" Rev. 9 (04/17/86) 9.
TVA NQAM Part V. Section 6.1 (ID-QAP-6.1), " Configuration Drawing Contro?.," Rev. O, (12/31/84)
- 10. TVA NQAM, Part II, Section 3 2, " Plant Modifications: After Licensing,"
Rev.10 (10/28/85) 37710-3 (10/05/8/)
1
e a
TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS REPORT NUMBER:
20600 SPECIAL PROGRAM REVISION NUM8ER: 0 Page C-2 of 8
- 11. TVA NQAM, Part V, Section 2.4 (ID-QAP-2.4) " Control of Modifications,"
Rev. 1, (07/10/85)
- 12. Letter from Darrell G. Eisenhut, NRC, To All Licensees of Operating Reactors... " Supplement 1 To NUREG-0737-Requirements for Emergency Response Capability (Generic Letter No. 82-33)" and its attachment
" Supplement I to NUREG-0737" (12/17/82)
- 13. TVA Division of Engineering Design (EN DES) Engineering Procedures Manual:
EP 4.16, Rev. 5
" Configuration Control by Use of Drawings and Drawing Lists," (11/10/82) and Drawing List (11/10/82)
EP 4.01, Rev. 10
" Signatures / Initials for Preparation, Review, and Approval of EN DES Drawings," (04/25/05)
EP 4.21, Rev. 3
" Revising and Voiding EN DES Engineering Drawings,"
(10/18/83) 14 TVA Division of Nuclear Engineering (DNE) Procedures Manual:
NEP-1.3, Rev. O
" Records Control," (07/01/86)
NEP-5.1, Rev. O
" Design Output," (07/01/86)
NEP-6.1, Rev. O
" Change Control," (07/01/86)
NEP-9.1, Rev. 1
" Corrective Action," (02/20/87)
- 15. SQN Site Procedures:
50EP-08, " Packaging and Controlling of Walkdown/ Test Documentation,"
Rev. 3, (06/27/86) 50EP-11 " Procedure for Identifying and Assembling Change Documentation,"
Rev. 2 (06/16/86)
SOEP-12, " Procedure for Evaluating (07/14/86) Engineering Change Notice and Field Change Notice Documents," Rev. 2, l
SQEP-13. " Procedure for Transitional Design Change Control," Rev. O, l
l (07/24/86)
SQEP-15, " Procedure DNE Interface with Change Control 80ard (CC8),"
l Rev. O, (07/31/86) l 3771D-3 (10/05/87)
i TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS REPORT NUMBER:
20600 SPECIAL PROGRAM REVISION NUMBER: O Page C-3 of 8 SQEP-16, " Procedures f'or Systems Evaluation and Development of Systems Evaluation Report," Rev. O, (06/21/86)
SQEP-17, "Proceaure for Origination and Categorization of Configuration Control Drawings (CCOS)," Rev. O, (06/01/86)
SQEP-18, "Procedur.e for Identifying Commitments and Requirements as Source Information for Sequoyah Design Criteria Development," Rev, 1, (07/08/86)
SOEP-19, " Comparison of Control Room As-Constructed Drawings to As-Designed Drawings," Rev. O, (05/23/86)
'SQEP-29, " Procedure for Preparing the Design Basis Document for Sequoyah Nuclear Plant," Rev. 1,(07/18/86)
SQEP-30, " Control of As-Constructed Drawings," Rev. O, (08/29/86)
SQN-AI-19 (Part III), " Plant Modifications: Modification Requests," Rev.
13,(06/03/86)
SON-Al-19 (Part IV), " Plant Modification Af ter Licensing," Rev.18, (07/07/87)
SQN-AI-25 (Part I), " Drawing Control Af ter Unit Licensing," R14, (05/08/86)
SQN-AI-25 (Part II), " Revision of As-Constructed Drawings," Rev. O, (10/25/86)
- 16. WBN Site Procedures:
Watts Bar Engineering Project, Project Manual, Rev. 1,(01/09/86)
Watts Bar Engineering Project (WBEP) Engineering Procedure (EP)
WBEP-EP 43.02, " Engineering Change Notices," Rev, 0,(09/27/85)
WBEP-EP 43.03, " Field Change Requests," Rev. O, (09/27/85)
WBEP-EP 43.05, "N-5 Data Report Forms," Rev. O, (09/27/85)
- 17. BFN Site Procedures:
Browns Ferry Engineering Project (BFEP) - Project Manual, Rev. 4:
BFEP-PI-86-03, R1, " Preparation and Control of Engineering Change Notice i
(ECN) Modification Package, [B22 870318 301], (03/18/87) l l
1 37710-3 (10/05/87)
8*
TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS REPORT NUMBER:
20600 SPECIAL PROGRAM REVISION NUMBER: O Page C-4 of 8 BFEP-PI-86-20, Rev. 0
" Identification and Assembling of Change Documentation (Design Baseline Program),"
[B22 861022 303], (10/16/86)
BFEP-PI-86-38, Rev. O
" Control of Equipment Information System (E0IS)
Engineering Data Fields (Design Baseline Program),
,B22 861201301], (11/18/86)
BFEP-PI 86-46, Rev. O
" Design Baseline and Verification Proaram Walkdown Interface Procedure," (B22 870123 303],
(11/26/86)
BFEP-PI 86-47, Rev. O
" Packaging and Handling of System Walkdown Documentation,"[822870220301],(02/13/87)
BFEP-PI 87-24, Rev. O
" Procedure for Sorting Engineering Change Notice, Temporary Alteration Control Forms, and Local Design Change Requests," (B22 870211 301],
(02/06/87)
Browns Ferry (BF) Site Director Standard Practice (SDSP)
BF 2.5, Rev. O " Drawing Control," (03/19/86)
BF-SDSP 8.1, Rev. 2
" Plant Modifications / Design Change Approval,"
(01/06/87)
BF-SDSP 8.2, Rev. 4
" Implementation of Plant Modifications,"
(01/07/87)
BF 8.3, Rev. 4 " Plant Modifications," (07/02/86)
BF-SDSP 9.1, Rev. 2
" Processing Drawing Discrepancies," (09/22/86)
BF-SDSP 9.2, Rev. I
" Configuration Control Drawings, (05/09/86)
BF-SDSP 9.6, Rev. 3
" Mechanical and Instrument and Controls System Walkdown," (01/23/87)
- 18. BLN Site Procedures:
Bellefonte Nuclear Plant Standard Practice:
I BLA 5.9, Rev.19,
" Drawing Control Before Receipt of an Operating License," (03/06/87) s 3771D-3 (10/05/87)
l l
i i
TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS REPORT NUMBER:
20600 SPECIAL PROGRAM REVISION NUMBERi 0 Page C-5 of 8
]
BLA 7.1, Rev. 3, "0E-NUC PR-0C Interfaces and Responsibilities 1
During and Following Transition from Design and i
Construction to Operation," (06/11/85)
BLA 7.2, Rev. 4,
" Transfer to Responsibility for the Plant from i
OE and OC to NUC PR," (03/27/86) l BLA 12.1, Rev. 6,
" Initiation of Requests for Modifications,"
l (05/18/87) l l
BLA 12.2, Rev. 19,
" Performance of Modifications Before Licensing,"
l l
(11/19/86)
'BLA 16.5, Rev. 1
" Methods to Report Drawing / Equipment i
Discrepancies,".(05/22/86) l
Corporate NPP, Volume 1, Rev. 4 (03/87) l Sequoyah NPP, Volume 2, Rev. 2 (03/87)
Browns Ferry NPP, Volume 3 Rev. 0 (08/86)
Watts Bar NPP, Volume 4, Draft (03/87)
- 20. Letter from D. Vassallo, NRC, to H. Parris, TVA, " Issuance of Orders Confirming Li.ensee Commitments on Emergency Response Capability,"
1
[A02 840620 vG3], (06/12/84) l l
- 21. NRC Policy Issue from Victor Stello to NRC Commissioners, "TVA l
Preliminary Lessons Learned," [B45 870108 826], (11/12/86)-
- 22. Letter from B. J. Youngblood, NRC, to S. A. White, TVA, " Concerns i
Regarding TVA Nuclear Program," [A02 860224 020), (02/18/86)
- 23. Letter from B. J. Youngblood, NRC, to S. A. White, TVA, with the attached transcript of the investigative interview conducted by the NRC on j
02/21/86 at the First Tennessee Bank Building in Knoxville, TN,
[B45860714832),(06/23/86) 24 Letter from B. J. Youngblood, NRC, to S. A. White, TVA, with the attached-transcript of the investigative interview conducted by the NRC on 02/21/86 at the First Tennessee Bank Building in Knuxville, TN,
[B45860714832],(06/23/86)
- 25. Letter from L. Mills, TVA, to H. Denton, NRC, "In the Matter of Tennessee Valley Authority," [A27 810602 018], (06/02/81) 37710-3 (10/05/87) e.- m....
~_
TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS REPORT NUMBER:
20600 SPECIAL PROGRAM REVISION NUMBER: 0
-l Page C-6 of 8 L
i
- 26. Letter from L. M. Mills, NRC, to E. Adensam'(TVA), " Issuance of Orders Confirming Licensee Comitments on Emergency Response Capability," [A02 I
840620 001] (06/15/84)
- 27. Letter from L. M. Mills, TVA, to Harold R. Denton, NRC, i
Re:
..information pertaining to Radiological Emergency Preparedness for Sequoyah Nuclear Plants Units 1 and 2," [A27 810416 019], (04/16/81) j 1
- 28. Letter from L. M. Mills, TVA, to E. Adensam, NRC, "In the Matter of the
]
Applicability of Tennessee Valley Authority, [A27 830415 015], (04/15/83)
I
- 29. Letter from L. Mills, TVA, to H. Denton, NRC, "In the Matter of Tennessee Valley Authority," [A27 810602 018], (06/02/81) 4
- 30. Letter from L. M. Mills, TVA,.to E. Adensam, NRC, "In the Matter'of the Application of Tennessee Valley Authority," [A27 830415 013], (04/15/83) 31.
INPO Good Practices document, DE-101 "Configurt
- n Management,"
Preliminary,(03/86)
- 32. Significant Condition Report (SCR) 6297-5, R0,-(02/06/86)
- 33. TVA Division of Nuclear Engineering, " Design Change Process Improvement Program," [B01 860801 001], (08/01/86) l 34 TVA memo, W. C. Drotleff to Those Listed, " Design Basis Program for TVA Nuclear Plants," (B44 860402 007], (04/08/86)
- 35. TVA memo from J. P. Stapleton to Those Listed, " Browns Ferry Nuclear 1
Plant - Baseline Program Plan, Revision 0, July 7,1986 "
f
[B22 860714 017] (07/14/86) 36.
TVA memorandum from S. A. White to Those Listed, " Policy Establishing the Nuclear Procedures System," [LO2 860709 859], (07/10/86) 37.
TVA memo from J. A. Coffey to Those Listed, " Modification Control,"
[L68 830628 800], (06/30/83)
- 38. TVA memo from J. R. Parrish to Those Listed (W. C. Adkins et al.),
" Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant - Quality Assurance Program," (located in l
OEDC-0PM-3-73, R1), [no RIMS number], (CG/20/72)
- 39. Sequoyah Nuclear Plant, " Design Baseline and Verification Program," Rev.
)
0, [B25 860506 020], (05/06/86) 40.
Design Baseline and Verification Program (DBVP), Watts Bar Nuclear Plant l
l l
37710-3 (10/05/87)
v c
l l
TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS REPORT NUMBER:
20600 l
SPECIAL PROGRAM REVISION NUMBER: O Page C-7 of 8 1
41.
Letter from R. Gridley, TVA, to J. Nelson Grace, NRC, "Sequoyah Nuclear I
Plant Unit 2 - Restart Program for Drawing Update," [L44 861212 806],
(12/12/86).
- 42. TVA memorandum from G. W. Curtis to Watts Bar Design Baseline and Licensing Verification Program (DB & LVP) Management Staff, Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, [B26 861023 024], (10/23/86) 43, TVA memo from J. A. Kirkebo to Those Listed, "DNE Interim Order -
Supplement to NEP-6.1," [B35 861015 500], (10/15/86) 44.
TVA memorandum from J. W. Coan to G. F. Dilworth, " Watts Bar EngineerNg Project - Office of Engineering Procedures (OEPs) - Request for Varie Ne
[B26 850910149], (09/10/85) 45.
TVA Corporate Commitment Tracking System (CCTS)
- 46. Letter from R. Gridley, TVA, to J. Nelson Grace, NRC, Re: "Sequoyah l
Nuclear Plant Unit 2 - Restart Program for Drawing Update,"
I
[L44 861212 806], (12/12/86) 47.
INPO Evaluation of Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant during weeks of January 20 and 27,1986 1
48.
TVA NSRS Investigation Report I-85-473-NPS " Configuration Control at SQN, BFN and OE," (10/02-11/04/85) 49.
Office of Nuclear Power (ONP), " Configuration Control Task Force (CCTF) l Final Report," [R25 860626 833], (06/30/86)
- 50. TVA Report, " Assessment of Engineering Design Control for the Browns l
Ferry Nuclear Plant," M. Bender et al., (09/85) (TTB 142) l 51. NSRS Investigation Report I-85-637-SQN, " Work Plan Processing," (10-12/86)
- 52. TVA memo from E. G. Beasley to W. R. Beasley, " Quality Management Staff (OMS) Surveillance S85-06, Assessment of the Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant As-Constructed Drawing Procedural Outline," [B05 851022 002), (10/22/85)
- 53. TVA memo from L. L. Jackson to Those Listed, " Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO) Corporate Evaluation Responses," [A02 870813 012],
(08/14/86) 54 TVA memo from R. W. Cantrell to Those Listed, " Browns Ferry Nuclear P1 ant
- Independent Survey Team - Design Control," [B05 850909 007], (09/09/85) l
- 55. Gilbert / Commonwealth, Inc. Report No. 2600, " Asses'sment of the Design Control Program for the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant," (10/85) i 37710-3 (10/05/87)
.s TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS REPORT NUMBER:
20600 SPECIAL PROGRAM REVISION NUMBER: 0 Page C-8 of 8
- 56. Letter f rom R. C. Lewis, NRC, to H. G. Parris, TVA, " Reports Nos. 50-390/84-37 and 50-391/84-31" [A02 840730 006), (07/26/84)
- 57. Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2 - Task Force Report, " Evaluation of Black and Veatch Findings," (03/19/84); TTB 6, (03/22/86)
- 58. OE-0MS Files of Audits performed on SeQuoyah Engineering practices as follows: 86-03, 86-05, 86-09, 86-15, 86-17, 86-24
- 59. Gilbert / Commonwealth, Inc., Report No. 2614 "Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Modifications" (03/03/86) 60.
INPO Evaluation of Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Unit 2, Final Draft, (06/85);
TTB 1, (03/13/86) 61. TVA Memorandum from Henry L. Jones to E. Gray Beasley, " Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2 - Task Force Report," [EDC 840320402],(03/20/84)
- 62. TVA memos from H. N. Culver to G. H. Kimmons, " Major Management Review of the Office of Engineering Design and Construction - Nuclear Safety Review Staff (NSRS) Report No. R-81-14-0EDC (BLN)," [GNS 810930 054], (09/29/81)
- 63. TVA memo from H. L. Jones to E. G. Beasley, "Bellefonte Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2 - Black & Veatch Task Force Report," [B45 850502 263),
(05/02/85) 64 INPO Evaluation of Bellefonte Nuclear Plant during March 1984
- 65. TVA memo, H. L. Abercrombie to W. R. Brown, " SON - Employee Concerns Task Group (ECTG) Element Report 307.13 SQN - Operations Category - Corrective Action Plan (CAP)," [S03 861212 804), (12/15/86) 66.
TVA memorandum from J. W. Coan to G. F. Dilworth, " Watts Bar Engineering Project - Office of Engineering Procedures (0EPs) - Request for Variance
[B26 851018112), (10/18/85) 67 Telecon from Rick Daniels, Augie Manicz, Jim Southers, TVA, to Suresh Chitnis, Jim Leslie, Ro s Wilkinson, Bechtel, inter-office memorandum 275 (09/24/86)
- 68. Reply to Request for Information SQN-554 (09/16/86) received 09/29/86
- 69. Telecon from Ross Wilkinson, Bechtel, to Rick Daniels, TVA, inter-office memorandum 340(10/24/86)
- 70. TVA memo, D. W. Wilson to Those Listed, "Sequoyah. Nuclear Plant, Primary Control Room Drawing List," [B25 870203 005], (02/03/87) 37710-3 (10/05/87)
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