ML20234A883
| ML20234A883 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | McGuire, Mcguire  |
| Issue date: | 09/09/1987 |
| From: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20234A882 | List: |
| References | |
| TAC-65437, TAC-65438, NUDOCS 8709180178 | |
| Download: ML20234A883 (4) | |
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UNITED STATES l
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l SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION ~
l REL ATED TO AMENDMENT NO. 75 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NPF-9 i
AND AMENDMENT NO. 56 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NPF-17 q
DUKE POWER COMPANY DOCKET NOS. 50-369 AND 50-370 i
McGUIRE NUCLEAR STATION, UNITS 1 AND ?
INTRODUCTION By letter dated July 2,1987, Duke Power Company (the licensee) oroposed amendments to change the Technical Specifications (TSs) for McGuire Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2 to incorporate the ventilation system of the Equipment Staging Building (ESB) as a new gaseous effluent release point, to speci'y limiting conditions for operation and surveillance requirements for this ventilation system and its monitcring instrumentation, and to add associated requirements to the gaseous waste sampling and analysis program.
Specifically, TS Figure 5.1-3 " Site Boundary for Gaseous Effluents," which shows locations within the Exclusion Area Boundary for radioactive gaseous effluents released to unrestricted areas, would be revised to reflect the addition of the ESB.
Changes to TS Table 3.3-13 " Radioactive Gaseous Effluent Monitoring Instrumentation" would add minimum channel operability requirements applicable during gaseous effluent releases, and associated actions required with the number of operable channels less than specified, for the noble gas activity monitor (EMF-59), flow rate monitor, and sampler minimum flow device of the ESB ventilation system.
Similarly, changes to TS Table 4.3-9 " Effluent Monitoring Instrumentation Surveillance Require-ments" would add surveillance requirements (channel check, source check, channel calibration frequency, and analog channel operational test frequency) for these same three monitors, applicable at all times except when the venti-lation system isolation valve is closed and locked.
TS Table 4.11-2
" Radioactive Gaseous Waste Sampling and Analysis Program" would be revised to reflect the addition of the ESB as new item 4c, and to reflect sampling and analysis requirements corresponding to those presently specified for the Radwaste Facility Vent (item 4a) and Contaminated Materials Warehouse (item 4b).
An additional change would correct inconsistent names for the same structure; the reference to " Contaminated Materials Warehouse" in TS Table 4.11-2 (item 4b) and to " Contaminated Parts Storage Warehouse" in Figure 5.1-3 would both be changed to " Contaminated Parts Warehouse."
The licensee's application of July 2,1987, utilfred information from a ore-vious letter dated May 4,1987.
Additional supporting infonnation was provided by the licensee in a supplemental letter dated August 26, 1987.
870910017e 970909 PDR ADOCK 05000369-P PDR '
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' i EVALUATION The licensee has recently completed construction of an ES8 located outside the Unit 2 Containment equipment hatch and adjacent to the Fuel Building.
The ESB is a steel f ramed structure, built upon a reinforced concrete slot at grade level, with upper walls consisting of metal siding and the lower exterior consisting of brick.
It is designed to withstand seismic events l
and is structurally independent of the adjacent Containment and Fuel Building, being connected to them by flexible joints.
It is approximately 50 feet wide, 100 feet lor,g and 60 feet high.
The ESB serves no function regarding the prevention or mitigation of accidents.
Its purpose is to provide increased laydown area for the Containment during outages; storage of outage equipment; equipment decontamination; disassembly, servicing and assembly of reactor coolant system components; and environmental protection for equipment and personnel during an outage.
The need for the ESS results from limited space for such activities required during an outage and which are presently performed in the Containment, Spent Fuel Building and Hot tiachine Shop. Typical activities which would be conducted inside the ESB include vessel head stud cleaning, valve maintenance, cutting of discontinued piping (such as the upper head injection piping) into smaller sections for storage or shipment, and parts and component repair such as reactor coolant pump internals replacement or motor repair.
The licensee finds that performing such activities in the ESB would result in a reduction in radiation exposure to workers, reduced outage time and a safer working environment.
Because planned ESB activities involve dry brushing, cutting, grinding and welding of contaminated components and such activities create airborne con-tamination, the ESB includes a heating, ventilation and air conditioning (HVAC) system with a pre-filter and a high efficiency particulate absolute (HEPA) filter to collect and remove particulate prior to release of exhaust gases to the atmosphere through the new ESB HVAC discharge vent.
The ESB also includes a contaminated parts wash down area with provisions to route potentially contaminated liquids to existing station liquid radwaste treat-ment systems.
The planned ES8 activities, if not conducted in the new ESB, would be per-formed elsewhere in the plant (as is presently the case).
Thus, the proposed change does not represent a significant change in the amounts or types of radioactive material in effluents releaseo from the station or associated doses.
The gaseous effluents limits of TS 3/4.11.2 which limit the dose rates due to radioactive materials released from the plant in gaseous effluents to areas at and beyond the site boundary are not affected by the change, The only solid waste generated due to ESB usage, that would not otherwise be generated, will result from periodic changeout of the pre-filter and HEPA filter units; this will add less than 100 cubic feet of waste per year. We find this to be an insignificant addition to McGuire's annual solid waste generation total which, in 1986, was 28,194 cubic feet, and therefore to be acceptable.
During fuel movement, the Containment equipment hatch will be closed in accor-dance with existing TS 3.9.4.
This prevents any release from the Unit 2
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- containment to the ESB in the event of a fuel handling accident.
At other times during a refueling outage, control of the open equipment hatch is not acversely affected by the ESB.
When the Unit 2 equipment hatch is open, the Containment purge system will maintain a more negative pressure inside Con-tainment than the negative pressure maintained by the ESB HVAC system.
These negative pressures maintain air flow from outside through the ESB and into Containment. Thus, in the event of a radioactive release inside the Unit 2 Containment with its equipment hatch open, the hatch can be closed in a timely manner w'ile the release is filtered and monitored through the existing Con-tainment purge system. Therefore, we find that the ESB does not adversely affect potential releases from the Containment.
Although the single ESB is located on the Unit 2 side of the station, it will also be utilizec during Unit I refueling outages.
The transport route for items from Unit I will be through the Unit 1 equipment hatch to the outside, along the building exteriors and into the ESB through its truck bay. Any contaminated items will be sealed during transport to prevent the spread of contamination'. Thus, the route does not involve the transport of heavy loaos over or near safety-related equioment or fuel, and the staff's previous con-clusions regarding the handling and transport of heavy loads is not adversely affected by this change.
A pipe trench containing safety-related piping from the refueling water storage tank (RWST) to the safety injection pumps (plus other piping such as the return line to the RWST and piping to and from the reactor makeup water storage tank) penetrates the ESB about floor level.
Seismic separation at the penetration is provided by flexible material in a 3 inch lateral space around the pipe trench.
Within the ESB, the trench is covered with 8 inch I
concrete blocks and 2 inch steel plate as missile shielding.
The covers have no lifting access.
Thus, the safety-related trench is not adversely impacted i
by the ESB and it is protected inside the ESB as well as outside.
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l The changes to Tables 3.3-13 and 4.3-9 add the ESB HVAC system noble gas activity monitor, flow rate monitor, and sampler minimum flow device to the TSs.
The changes add TS requirements on the system identical to items 8 and 9 of the tables (the Contaminated Parts Warehouse ventilation system and the Radwaste Facility ventilation system, respectively). The monitor on the ESB is of similar design and will function under similar conditions as the monitors on the Contaminated Parts Warehouse and the Radwaste Facility.
The specification requires the operability of the monitor during gaseous effluent releases with sampling and flow estimates required if the monitor is
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inoperable. The surveillance required is the same as for the Contaminated i
Parts Warehouse and the Radwaste Facility ventilation systems and again, the I
system and operational conditions are sir.'ilar.
These changes are therefore equally acceptable.
This similarity is also the basis for the proposed change to Table 4.11-2 which requires additional sampling and analysis of the released effluents. This requires that total dose rate as calculated using methodology and parameters of the Offsite Dose Calculation Manual be maintained within the existing limits specified in TS 3.11.2.1.
Because of the similarity and be-cause existing dose rate limits will continue to be met, the change to Table 4.11-2 is acceptable. The change to Figure 5.1-3 to designate the new gaseous effluent release point, coupled with the requirements of existing TS 3.3.3.9
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L (Tables 3.3-13 and 4.3-9) and 3.11.2.1 (Table 4.11-2) means that control of effluent releases from the facility is to be at levels that are as low as is reasonably achievable.
This change is therefore acceptable.
The change to TS Table 4.11-2 (item 4b) and to TS Figure 5.1-3 to correct the name of the Contaminated Parts Warehouse is a purely administrative change to achieve consistency throughout the TS.
It has no adverse safety implication and is, therefore, acceptable.
ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION These amendnents involve changes to the installation or use of facilities' com-I ponents located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20 and changes in surveillance requirements.
The staff has determined that the amend-ments involve no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational exposure.
The NRC staff has made a determination that the amendments involve no significant hazards consideration, and there has been no public comment on such finding, Accordingly, the amendments meet the eligibility criteria for categorical ex-i l
clusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9).
Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b) no environmental impact state.nent or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of these amendments.
CONCLUSION The Commission made a proposed determination that the amendments involve no significant hazards consideration which was published in the Federal Register (52 FR 28624) on July 31, 1987 and consulted with the state of North Carolina.
No public comments were received, and the state of North Carolina did not have any comments.
We have concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that:
(1)
<there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, and (2) such activities will be conducted in cappliance with the Commission's regulations, and the issuance of these amendments will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.
Principal Contributors: Carl S. Hood, PD#II-3 J. Lee,SPLB Dated:
September 9, 1987 1
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