ML20238B594
| ML20238B594 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | McGuire, Mcguire  |
| Issue date: | 08/26/1987 |
| From: | Tucker H DUKE POWER CO. |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION & RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (ARM) |
| References | |
| GL-87-12, TAC-65437, TAC-65438, NUDOCS 8709010300 | |
| Download: ML20238B594 (2) | |
Text
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4 DUKE POWER GOMPANY P.O. DOX 33180 CHARLOTTE, N.C. 28242 l
HALILTUCKER TELEPHONE
,,,,neenom (7o4) 07:.F4531 wtuman emonwnow August 26, 1987 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 1
1 Document'Contro11 Desk Washington, D.C.
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Subject:
McGuire Nuclear Station Docket Nos. 50-369 and 50-370 Proposed Technical Specification Change for Equipment Staging Building (TACS 65437/65438) i Gentlemen:
l By letter dated July 2, 1987, Duke Power submitted propoced changes to the McGuire l
Nuclear Station Technical Specifications to permit operation of the Equipment l
Staging Building Ventilation System.
Subsequent discussions between j
Mr. D.S. Hood, et al of the NRC Staff and Mr.
J.B. Day, et al of the Duke Power Staff on August 25, 1987 has determined that further information is needed to i
complete the review.
The first information involved identification of the safety related items in the vicinity of the equipment staging building and how these systems or items could be assured to maintain their integrity and prevent an uncontrolled release should the
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equipment staging building become degraded during a seismic event.
While the equipment staging building is not nuclear safety related (i.e., it is not involved in the prevention or mitigation of postulated accidents which could cause undue risk to the health and safety of the pubife), it is identified as Duke QA Condi-tion 4 (non-nuclear safety related, but whose deterioration could adversely affect a safety related item).
As this is the case, the building is designed to with-stand seismic events and is seismically separated from the reactor building, the fuel building, and the pipe trench.
Seismic separation between these components is accomplished by flexible joints between the buildings and flexible material in the three inch lateral separation around the pipe trench.
The pipe trench is safety related as it contains piping from the refueling water storage tank (RWST) to the safety injection pumps; other piping in the trench includes the return line
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to the RWST and piping to and from the reactor makeup water storage tank.
Within l
the build.ing, the trench is covered with eight inch concrete blocks and two inch steel plate as missile shielding.
The covers have no lif ting access, thus the trench is at least as protected inside the building as outside.
A second area of concern regarded the control of the Unit 2 equipment hatch in light of Generic Letter 87-12 (Loss of RHR while the RCS is partially filled).
The equipment staging building is not expected to have a major effect on control of the equipment hatch, as prevention of the spread of contamination is a primary consideration.
In any event, the hatch can normally be closed and bolted in
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Document Control Desk August 26, 1987 Page 2 1
fif teen minutes.
Additionally, the containment purge system maintains air flow from outside through the equipment staging building and into containment.
- Thus, should a loss of RHR occur (or any event requiring hatch closure), the equipment hatch may be closed in a timely manner while any release is filtered and monitored j
through the containment purge system.
For the specific case of a loss of RHR (which will be addressed in more detail in Duke's response to the Generic Letter),
a time lag between loss of RHR and any release is inherent, as the water in the
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primary system must be heated to boiling prior to any significant release, al-lowing time to close the equipment hatch (if required) and restore RHR.
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The transport of items from the Unit i equipment hatch to the equipment staging building (which is on the Unit 2 side of the station) will be accomplished out-i side, around the buildings and in through the equipment staging building truck bay. Any contaminated items will be sealed during transport to prevent the spread j
of contamination.
Additionally, effluent calculations as presented in earlier submittals are based on the one building servicing both units.
Finally, the building is not designed to withstand tornado loadings.
Adjoining safety related systems and structures are designed to withstand tornado missiles 4
as described in Section 3.5.2.8 of the McGuire FSAR and associated Tables 3.5.1-1 and 3.5.1-2.
Dispersal of contents by a tornado is not considered to be a signi-ficant concern as contamination levels are expected to be low and the building will be decontaminated af ter each outage, coupled with the low probability of a tornado (recurrence interval of 4405 years, FSAR Section 2.3.1.3) at the site.
We believe that this information should be sufficient to complete the review.
However, if any additional information is needed, please contact us through normal licensing channels.
Very truly yours, y
l Hal B. Tucker l
JBD/213/jgc l
l xc:
Dr. J. Nelson Grace I
l Regional Administrator, Region II U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 101 Marietta St. NW, Suite 2900 Atlanta, Georgia 30323 Mr. Darl Hood Mr. W.T. Orders U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission NRC Resident Inspector Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation McGuire Nucleer Station i
Washington, D.C.
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