ML20217F415

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Forwards Facility Submittal of Initial/Operating Retake Exam Administered on 980209
ML20217F415
Person / Time
Site: Vermont Yankee Entergy icon.png
Issue date: 04/22/1998
From: Curley V
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To:
NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
NUDOCS 9804280160
Download: ML20217F415 (9)


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1 NOTE T0: NRC DOCUMENT CONTROL DESK M IL STOP 0-5-D-24 FROM: ,'c m[ b,gley, , LICENSING ASSISTANT OP@ATINGLIp5IRGBRANCH_REGIONI

SUBJECT:

OPERATOR LICENSING EXAMINATION ADMINISTERED ON febsMn 9 19W , AT {m ,nf l/an$eV DOCKETN$.he-Jh/ ()

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, .,s a ON[s[cosav_9/ff9 OPERATOR LICENSING ^EXAMINATIONjf WERE ADMINISTERED i ATTHEREFEdNCEDFNCILITY. ATTACHED YOU WILL FIND THE FOLLOWING j INFORttATION FOR PROCESSING THROUGH NUDOCS AND DISTRIBUTION TO THE NRC STAFF, INCLUDING THE NRC PDR.

1 Item #1 a) FACILITY SUBMITTED reeHff ARL INITIAL EXAM SUBMITTAL DESIGNATED FOR DISTRIBUTION UNDER RIDS CODE A070.

b) AS GIVEN OPERATING EXAMINATION, DESIGNATED FOR DISTRIBUTION UNDER RIDS CODE A070.

Item #2 EXAMINATION REPORT WITH THE AS GIVEN WRITTEN EXAMINATION ATTACHED, DESIGNATED FOR DISTRIBUTION UNDER RIDS CODE IE42. .I I

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9804280160 980422 PDR ADOCK 0500 1

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SCENARIO EVENTS Simulation Facility: Vermont Yankee Scenario No.1 Examiner: Candidate:

Scenario Objectives: Evaluate crew ability to swap an operating feedwater pump with the standby pump, respond to an inoperability of two APRMs, determine that a loss of keep fill capability has occurred, and implement abnormal and emergency operating procedures for a feedwater break outside containment with a concurrent loss of high pressure injection. Success path is to emergency depressurize and reflood using low pressure ECCS.

Turnover: 100% reactor power, BOL, C Reactor Feedwater Pump has high vibration and seal leakage. Manar,ement has directed that power be reduced to 98%, the B Reactor Feedwater Pump started and the C Feedwater Pump secured. Power reduction using recirculation flow has been recommended by Reactor Engineering at 1%/ min. APRM A failed downscale during the last shift and troubleshooting is in progress. The A CRD Pump is tagged out and uncoupled with maintenance work in progress.

Initial Conditions: IC 19, APRM A failed downscale NM05A at 0% and bypassed with a caution tag. Place B CRD Pump in service and remove A CRD Pump from service. Rack out A CRD Pump breaker RDR14.

Preinsert: ED12A Failure ofBus 1 to Fast Transfer I/O DI 06A4S05 to OFF Bkr 13 Control Switch Fails to Close l

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No Malf Type Description 1 (:00) NA N Swap ofReactor Feedwater Pumps 2 (:18) NM%D- 1 APRM D inoperable failure 3 (:31) Remotes C Loss of ECCS keep fill. When AO is set to investigate, CSR07 report O that a severe leak on 1 inch Condensate CSR08 Transfer line at strainer S64-3 has been detected.

RHR01 Valves V64-13, V64-14A, and V64-52A must be RH'R02 closed to isolate the leak. Tech Spec determination on i operability of ECCS. If ordered to realign keep fill, it

will not be performed during this scenario 4 (
40) FW21 at MT Feedwater break outside containment 100 %,120 5 (:40) ED12A I Failure of 4KV Bus I to fast transfer and cannot be I/O DI manually transferred.

i 06A4S05 to L

OFF 6 (:42) RDR04 C Close B CRD Pump discharge valve. Simulates clogged pump discharge strainer 5 (:41) RC01 C RCIC Trip when auto stan received i

6 (:41) HP01 C HPCI Trip when auto start received 7 (:45) FWO8C C Trip C FWP if operators attempt to restan 8 (:45) SLR C Close SLC common discharge simulates clogged SLC piping. Insert if operators attempt to inject with SLC i

For the Simulator Operator:

1. Approximately 3 minutes after the pumps are swapped insen APRM D Failure
2. Approximately 3 minutes after the SRO has determined the proper action for the rod block function with the two APRMs inoperable, insert the loss ofkeep fill.
3. Approximately 3 minutes after the operator has determined the proper action for the loss of keep fill, insert the feedwater break.
4. As the high pressure systems auto start or are started by the operators, insert the appropriate malfunction to prevent the system from injecting.

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Op-Test No: 1 Scenario No.1 Event No.1 Event

Description:

Power Reduction and Swap ofReactor Feedwater Pumps Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior ROI Reduces reactor power using recirculation flow at less than or equal to 1% per minute.

ROl/RO When directed to swap feedwater pumps, uses OP 2172 Section D.

2 -

Closes B Feedwater Pump discharge valve (FWD-4B)

Starts B Feedwater Pump verifying pump breaker closes, discharge valve opens, min flow valve opens then recloses, and aux lube oil pump stops

- Runs all three pumps until system and pump parameters have stabilized.

Secures C Feedwater Pump by closing discharge valve, verifying aux oil pump starts, and opening the pump breaker when discharge valve is closed or pump amps are less than 400 amps.

SRO Directs ROI to reduce power to 98% using reactor recirculation flow.

Procedural guidance is OP 0105 Phase 5 reactor Power Decrease.

Power reduction should be approximately 1% per minute.

When power is approximately 98% directs RO1 to place B Feedwater >

l Pump in service and remove C Feedwater Pump from service.

Op-Test No: 1 Scenario No.1 Event No. 2 Event

Description:

APRM D Inoperable Failure l Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior l ROI investigates annuciators on 9-5, L-1 AUTO SCRAM CH B, L-2 l NEUTRON MON POWER H1 and M-2 APRM B, D, F HI-HI/INOP Determines based on indications that no APRM is high therefore one must be inoperable and the back panel must be investigated.

Bypasses D APRM and resets half scram when ordered by the SRO l Receives report from technician that while working on A APRM screwdriver slipped and went bouncing into APRM Cabinet.

SRO Acknowledges inoperable failure of D APRM Directs RO to bypass D APRM and reset the half scram Directs E & C to investigate Enters Technical Specifications Determines that T. S. 3.1.A and Table 3.1.1 are satisfied since each l RPS Channel still has two operable instmments Determines that T. S. 3.2.E and Table 3.2.5 Rod Block Actuation are not satisfied since A and D APRMs are in the same rod block channel. Recognizes plant is in a 7 day LCO and Rod Block B Channel must be inimediately tested for functionality.

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Op-Test No: 1 Scenario No.1 Event No. 3 Event

Description:

Loss of ECCS Keepfill Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior ROl/RO Acknowledge annunciators and relay AO report to SRO.

2 SRO Determines based on 9-3 annunciators J-6, N-6, and M-4 and report from AO sent to investigate that all low pressure ECCS has lost keep ,

fill capability.  !

Enters The Specs and determines that T. S. 3.5.1 Maintenance of Filled Discharge Pipe cannot be met and all ECCS must be declared i inoperable. Per T.S. 3.5.A.6 a 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> shutdown is required.

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Op-Test No: 1 Scenario No.1 Event No. 4 Event

Description:

Feedwater Rupture Outside Containment Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior l ROI Evaluates performance of feedwater control, feedwater system, and l feedwater reg valves. Determines that all components appear to be l operating properly but cannot restore level.

SRO Enters OT 3113 Reactor Low Level i Directs reduction in reactor power (transient too quick to reduce i power) i Directs reactor scram when determines that an automatic scram is

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Op-Test No: 1 Scenario No.1 Event No. 5 Event

Description:

Reactor Scram with No High Pressure Injection Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior ROl/RO Verifies all control rods insened 2 Verifies EDG staned Verifies PCIS isolations have gone to completion Controls reactor pressure 800 to 1000 psig Opens all SRVs when emergency depressurization is ordered

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l Determines HPCI and RCIC have tripped.

Inhibits ADS when ordered.

Starts injection systems as ordered (condensate, SLC, CRD, RHR, CS, condensate transfer, fire system, RHR Service Water) and recognizes failure of high pressure systems to inject.

Injects with available systems when ordered.

Attempts to manually transfer Bus 1. Identifies and reports failure of bus to manually transfer.

SRO Enters OT 3100 Reactor Scram and OE 3101 RPV Control on low g reactor waterlevel SRO Determines in response to OT 3100 that scram has occurred and power is less than 2%.

When steam flow is less than .5 mlbm directs mode switch be placed in REFUEL or SHUTDOWN.

Determines that all control rods are inserted to 02 or beyond.

Directs operators to verify PCIS isolations.

Directs operators to verify ECCS systems start on low-low reactor water level.

Verifies EDGs started on low-low water level.

Confirms or directs turbine trip.

SRO For power control in OE 3101, goes to bottom of power leg when determined that all control rods are 02 or beyond.

SRO For pressure control Directs ROl/RO2 to maintain pressure 800 to 1000 psig with SRVs.

Direct cooldown at rate ofless than 100 degrees per hour based on all rods inserted.

Directs ADS be inhibited.

When Emergency Depressurization is required exits pressure control leg and enters OE 3102 Alternate Level Control RPV-ED Determines that MSIVs are closed and adequate toms level (5.5 ft) exists and orders all SRVs opened. Must be performed before water level reaches -43" Critical Task SRO For level control. Directs RPV level be maintained 127" to 177".

Determines that level cannot be maintained above 127" based on feedwater system failure, and trips of HPCI and RCIC.

Order restart of CRD and maximize injection to the vessel.

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Attempts to augment level control with SLC as only high pressure augmentation system available.

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Determines that level cannot be maintained above TAF and enters OE 3102 Alternate Level Control Alternate Injection.

SRO For Alternate Injection Determines that condensate system is not available based on break but may or may not consider low pressure ECCS available based on loss of keepfill and failures ofHPCI and RCIC. Should identify that no Core Spray Low Pressure Annunciators were received and start two core spray pumps.

Iflow pressure ECCS not available then will commence lining up alternate injection systems (RHR Service Water, Fire System, Condensate Transfer, SLC)

When water level reaches TAF determines emergency depressurization is required.

Injects with condensate / low pressure ECCS/ alternate systems and restores level to TAF within 5 minutes after reactor pressure reaches 250 psig. Critical Task SRO Enters OE 3104 on high torus level.

Monitors torus temperature.

Commences actions to verify RHR is filled and use RHR to lower j torus level.

Scenario is finished when the reactor is depressurized and RPV level is above TAF and is being restored to 127".

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