ML20217E426

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Forwards RAI Re Rev 3 of AP600 Certified Design Matl Including ITAAC & SSAR Section 14.3
ML20217E426
Person / Time
Site: 05200003
Issue date: 08/13/1997
From: Joseph Sebrosky
NRC (Affiliation Not Assigned)
To: Liparulo N
WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC COMPANY, DIV OF CBS CORP.
References
NUDOCS 9710070023
Download: ML20217E426 (9)
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D-m3 p-t UNITED STATES

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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION t

WASHINGTON, D.C. 306 @ 4001

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August 13, 1997 l

Mr. Nicholas J. Liparulo, Manager Nuclear Safety and Reguintory Analysis Nuclear and Advanced Technology Division Westinghouse Electric Corporation P.O. Box 355 Pittsburgh, PA 15230

SUBJECT:

FOLLOWON QUESTIONS REGARDING THE AP600 INSPECTIONS, TESTS, ANALYSES' AND ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA (ITAAC)

Dear Mr. Liparulo:

l As a result of its review of the June 1992, a) plication for design certifica-tion of the AP600, the staff has determined t1at it needs additional informa-i tion. Specifically, the enclosure to this letter contains requests for l

additional information concerning Revision 3 of the AP600 Certified Design Material including the ITAAC, and Standard Safety Analysis Report Section 14.3~

which supports the ITAAC.

You have requested that portions of the information submitted in the June 1992, application for design certification be exempt from mandatory public disclosure. While the staff has not completed its review of your request in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 2.790, that portion of 1

the submitted information is being withheld f om public di'.'osure pending the staff's final determination.

The staff concludes that thr:$ followon ques-tions do not contain those portions of the information fc ohich exemption is sought. However, the staff will withhold this letter from public disclosure for 30 calendar days from the date of this letter to allow Westinghouse the opportunity to verify the staff's conclusions.

If, after that time, you do not request that all or portions of the information in the enclosures be withheld from public disclosure in accordance with 10 CFR 2.790, this letter will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room.

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Mr. Nicholas J. Liparulo August 13, 1997 If you have any questions regarding this matter, you may contact me at (301) 415-1132.

Sincerely, 1

j original signed by:

Joseph H. Sebrosky, Project Manager Standardization Project Directorate i

Division of Reactor Program Management Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Docket No.52-003

Enclosure:

As stated cc w/ enc 1: See next page DISTRIBUTION:

  • Enclosure to be held for 30 days PDockettF11e PDST R/F TQuay
  • PUBL1C TKenyon BHuffman JSebrosky DJackson ACRS (11)

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TRQuay -TE4 DATE 08/tt /97 i7 08/ t' 9.9hf TJ 08/ IW97 08/17,/97 OfflCIAL RECORD COPY J

Mr. Nicholas J. Liparulo Docket No.52-003 Westinghouse Electric Corporation AP600 cc: Mr. B. A. McIntyre Ms. Cindy L. Haag Advanced Plant Safety & Licensing Advanced Plant Safety & Licensing Westinghouse Electric Corporation Westinghouse Electric Corporation Energy Systeras Business Unit Energy Systems Business Unit P O. Box 355 00x 355 Pittsburgh, PA 15230 Pittsburgh, PA 15230 Mr. S. M. Modro Nuclear Systems Analysis Technologies Lockheed Idaho Technologies Company Post Office Box 1625 Idaho Falls, ID 83415 Enclosure to be distributed to the following addressees after the result of the proprietary evaluation is received from Westinghouse:

Mr. Russ Bell Ms. Lynn Connor i

Senior Project Manager, Programs DOC-Search Associates Nuclear Energy Institute Post Office Box 34 1776 Eye Street, N.W.

Cabin John, MD 20818 Suite 300 Washington, DC 20006-3706 Mr. Robert H. Buchholz GE Nuclear Energy Mr. James E. Quinn, Projects Manager 175 Curtner Avenue, MC-781 LMk and SBWR Programs San Jose, CA 95125 GE Nuclear Energy 175 Curtner Avenue, M/C 165 Mr. Sterling Franks San Jose, CA 95125 U.S. Department of Energy NE-50 Barton 2. Cowan, Esq.

19901 Germantown Road Eckert Seamans therin & Mellott Germantown, MD 20874 600 Grant Street 42nd Floor Pittsburgh, PA 15219 Mr. Charles Thompson, Nuclear Engineer AP600 Certification Mr. Frank A. Ross NE-50 U.S. Department of Energy, NE-42 19901 Germantown Road Office of LWR Safety and Technology Germantown, MD 20874 19901 Germantown Road Germantown, MD 20874 Mr. Ed Rodwell, Manager PWR Design Certification Electric Power Research Institute 3412 Hillview Avenue Palo Alto, CA 94303

Renuest for Additional Information for the AP600 ITAAC 640.60 In AP600 SSAR Revision 14 dated June 27, 1997, Westinghouse provided Tables 14.3-2 through 14.3-8, which identified important design features that were credited in various analyses to their treatment in Tier 1.- However, these tables do not contain a disposition column which makes it difficult for a reviewer to determine what ITAAC verifies the important design features.

Therefore, the staff requests that Westinghouse provide a mote detailed cross reference that provides a disposition column (i.e.,

verifying ITAAC) for the important design features.

General l

Electric and ABB-CE provided this type of information to the staff for their ITAAC in a March 31-1994, letter, and a June 10, 1994 letter, respectively.

The following RAls are from the Instrumentation and Control Branch 640.61-CDM Section 2.5.1.-Diverse Actuation System a)

Additional design features as follows from SSAR Sec-tion 7.7.1.11, Diverse Actuation System" should be included in CDM Section 2.5.1, item 3 (item 3 is the design features of DAS)

The signal processing block and the output signal conditioning Llock both have barriers against electro-magnetic and radio frequency interference, i

The DAS uses sensors that are separate from those being used by the PMS and PLS.

The DAS actuation devices are isolated from the PMS actuation devices to avoid adverse interactions between the two systems.

The DAS and PMS use independent and separate uninterruptible power supplies.

The manual actuation function of the diverse actuation system is implemented by wiring the controls located in the main control room directly to the final loads in a way that bypasses the control room multiplexers and the DAS 1ogic.

1 The DAS is provided with the ca> ability for channel calibration and testing while tin plant is operating, b)

Add an Item 5: *The DAS is designed to meet the quality

. guidelines established by Generic Letter 85-06,

  • Quality Assurance Guidelines for ATWS Equipment that is not Safety-related" in CDM.

Enclosure g

.. 640.62 CDM Section 2.5.2,

  • Protection and Safety Monitoring System"

)

a)

Figure 2.5.2-1 should be of the PMS system as the title of the figure indicates and not of the PMS cabinets.

i b)

Item 1 of the Design Description should be modified as fol-I lows: "The PMS has four divisions of Reactor Trip and Engi-neered Safety Features Actuation.

Each PMS division is

)owered from its respective Class IE de division. The PMS 1as the equipment identified in Table 2.5.2-1."

l c)

Add the following sentence at the end of item 4: "The design of the protection and safety monitoring system equipment has additional margin to accommodate a loss of the normal HVAC."

l d)

Add the following sentence at the end of item 8.a: "The PMS has redundant divisions of safety-related post-accident l

parameter display."

640.63 The following " Design Features" identified in the referenced SSAR sections were credited in the " Design Basis Accident Analysis" and should be treated as Tier 1 Material.

Verification of these design features may be performed by the plant test program, however, the reference test report, analysis document, or simulator verification results should be listed in the ITAAC Table, a)

Section 7.3.1.2.2, "The in-containment refueling water stor-age tank is aligned for injection upon actuation of the fourth stage automatic depressurization system via the pro-toction and safety monitoring system."

b)

Section 7.3.1.2.3, *The core makeup tanks are aligned for operation on a safeguards actuation signal or on a low pres-surizer level signal via the pratection and safety monitoring system."

c)

Section 7.1.4.1.6, "The ability of the protection and safety monitoring system to initiate and accomplish protective functions is maintained despite degraded conditions caused by internal events such as fire and flooding."

d)

Section 7.3.1, "The ADS valves are powered from class IE de power."

e)

Section 7.3.1.2.4, "The fourth stage valves of the automatic depressurization system receive a signal to open upon the coincidence of a low core makeup tank water level and low reactor coolant system pressure following a preset time delay

I

- 1 after the third stage depressurization valves receive a signal to open via the protection and safety monitoring l

system."

f)

Section 7.3.1.2.4 "The first stage valves of the automatic depressurization s,ystem open upon receipt of a signal gener-i l

ated from a core makeup tank injection alignment signal i

coincident with core makeup tank water level less than the low-1 set point in either core makeup tank via the protection

[

and safety monitoring system."

[

g)

Section 7 3 1.2.4 *The second and third stage valves o timedelaysfollowinggenerationofthefirststageactbenon F

ation signal via the protection and safety monitoring system."

h)

Section 7.3.1.2.5, *The reactor coolant pumps are tripped upon generation of a safeguards actuation signal or upon j

generation of a low pressurizer water level signal."

i)

Section 7.3.1.2.7, "Th9 passive residual heat removal heat 1

exchanger control valves are opened on low steam generator water level or on a CMT actuation signal via the protection and safety monitoring system."

i j)

Section 7.3.1.2.9 "The containment recirculation isolation valves are opened on a safeguards actuation coincident with low in-containment refueling water storage tank water level j

via the protection-and safety monitoring system."

k)

Section 7.3.1.2.14, "The domineralized water system isolation valves close on a signal from the protection and safety 4_

monitoring system derived from either a reactor trip signal, a source range flex doubling signal, low input voltage to the i

lE de and uninterruptible power supply battery chargers, or a i

safety injection signal."

1)'-

Section 7.3.1.2.15, "The chemical and volume control system makeup line isolation valves automatically close on a signal from the protection and monitoring system derived from either l

a high-2 pressurizer level,. high. steam generator level sig-nal - or a, safeguards signal-coincident with high-1 j

pressurizer level."

m)

Section 7.4.3.1, "If temporary evacuation of the main control room is required because of some abnormal main control room condition, the operators can establish and maintain safe shutdown conditions for the plant from outside the main control room through the use of controls and monitoring j

located at the remote shutdown workstation."

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Section 7.4.3.1.1, *The remote shutdown workstation equipment is simiter to the operator workstetions in the main control room and is designed to the same standards.- One remote shutdown workstation is provided.*

o)

Section 7.4.3.1.3, "The remote shutdown workstation achieves and maintains safe shutdown conditions from full power condi-tions and maintains safe shutdown conditions thereafter."

i p)

Section 7.5.4, *The. protection and safety monitoring system i

providessignalconditioningIablesandforCategory2 vari-

-communications, and display functions for Category 1 var L

ables that are energized from the Class IE uninterruptible power supply system."

q)

Section 7.6.1.1, *An interlock is provided for the normally closed motor-operated normal residual heat removal system inner and outer suction isolation valves.

Each valve is interlocked so that it cannot be opened unless the reactor coolant system pressure is below a preset pressure."

r)

Section 5.4.1.2.1, " Resistance temperature detectors (RTD)-

monitor motor cooling circuit water temperature.--These detectors provide indication of anomalous bearing or motor operation.- They also provide a system for automatic shutdown in the event of a prolonged loss of component cooling water."

s)

Section 5.4.1.3.4, "A safety-related pump trip occurs on high-bearing water temperature "

t)

Section 5.4.5.2.3, " Power to the pressurizer heaters is blocked when the core makeup-tanks are actuated."

.u)

Section 6.3.3.2.1, *For a loss of mair. feedwater event, the passive residual heat removal heat exchanger is actuated.

If the core makeup tanks are not initially actuated, they actu-ate later when passive residual heat exchanger cooling suffi-ciently reduces pressurizer level."

v)

Section 6.3.3.2.2, *For a feedwater system pipe failure event, the passive residual heat removal heat exchanger and the core makeup tanks are actuated."

w)-

Section 6.3.3.3.1, *For a steam generator tube rupture event, the nonsafety-related makeup pumps are automatically actuated

- when reactor coolant system inventory decreases and a reactor tr'ip occurs, followed by actuation of the startup feedwater

. pumps. Makeup pumps automatically function to maintain the

. programmed pressurizer level, if they are not already actuated. Actuatio.1 of the core markup tanks automatically actuates the passive residual heat removal system heat ex-changer."

x)

Section 10.3.2.3.2, "In the event of a large steam line break, the main steam isolation valves with associated main steam isolation bypass valves automatically close."

y)

Section 10.4.7.1.1,

Both valves close automatically on main feedwater isolation signals."

z)

Section 10.4.7.1.2, "The booster / main feedwater pumps are tripped simultaneously with the feedwater isolation signal to close the main feedwater isolation valves." The same isola-tion signal closes the isolation valve in the cross connect line between the main feedwater pump discharge header and the-startup feedwater pump discharge header."

aa)

Section 10.4.7.3, *For a main feedwater line break inside the containment or a main steam line break, the MFIVs and the main feedwater control valves automatically close upon re-ceipt of a feedwater isolation signal.'

bb)

Section 10.4.7.3, "For a steam generator tube rupture event, positive and redundant isolation is provided for the main feedwater (MFly and MFCV) with isolation signals generated by the protection and safety monitoring system (PMS)."

cc)

Section 10.4.8.2.2.7,

dd)

Section 10.4.9.1.1, " Double valve startup feedwater isolation is provided by the startup feedwater control valve and the startup feedwater isolation valve.

Both valves close on a startup feedwater isolation signal, an engineered safeguards features signal, within the time established in the Technical Specifications."

ee)

Section 10.4.9.1.1, "For a steam generator tube rupture event, positive and redundant isulation is provided for the startup feedwater system, with isolation signals generated by the protection and safety monitoring system."

O 6-ff)

Section 10.2.2.4.3 *The flow of the main steam entering the highpressureturbIneiscontrolledbyfourstopvalvesand four governing control valves. The stop valves are closed by actuation of the emergency trip system devices."

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