ML20215N436
| ML20215N436 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Beaver Valley |
| Issue date: | 10/29/1986 |
| From: | DUQUESNE LIGHT CO. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20215N430 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8611050403 | |
| Download: ML20215N436 (7) | |
Text
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BWII II REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM SAFETY VALVES - SHUTDOWN
- LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION
_ - __ - ___ _ - -_ - __ _ _ ~ __
3.4.2 A minimum of one pressurizer code safety valve shall be OPERABLE with a lift setting
- of 2485 PSIG +1% -3%.**
l APPLICABILITY:
MODES 4 AND 5.
ACTION:
With no ' pressurizer code safety valve OPERABLE, immediately suspend all. operations involving positive reactivity changes and place an OPERABLE RHR loop into operation in the shutdown cooling mode.
l SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.4.2 No additional requirements other than those required by Specification 4.0.5.
The Lift setting pressure shall correspond to ambient conditions of the valve at nominal operating temperature and pressure.
- Within 11% following pressurizer code safety valve testing.
BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 1 3/4 4-5 PROPOSED WORDING 8611050403 861029 DR ADOCK 03000334 PDR
REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM SAFETY VALVES - OPERATING LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.4.3 All pressurizer code safety valves shall be OPERABLE with a lift setting
- of 2485 PSIG +1% -3%.**
APPLICABILITY:
MODES 1, 2 and 3.
ACTION:
With one pressurizer code safety valve inoperable, either restore the inoperable valve to OPERABLE status within 15 minutes or be in HOT SHUTDOWN within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.4.3 No additional requirements other than those required by Specification 4.0.5.
The Lift Setting pressure shall correspond to ambient conditions of the valve s.t nominal operating temperature and pressure.
- Within i 1% following pressurizer code safety valve testing.
BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 1 3/4 4-6 PROPOSED WORDING l
L
3/4.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3/4.7.1 TURBINE CYCLE
' SAFETY VALVES LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.7.1.1 All main steam line code safety valves associated with each steam generator of an unisolated reactor coolant loop shall be OPERABLE' with Lift Settings within +1% -3% of the value specified in Table 3.7-3.**
APPLICABILITY:
MODES 1, 2 and 3.
1 ACTION:
a.
With 3
reactor coolant loops and associated steam generators in operation and with one or more main steam line code safety valves inoperable, operation in MODES 1, 2 and 3 may. proceed provided, that within 4
hours, either the inoperable valve is restored to OPERABLE status or the Power Range Neutron Flux High Setpoint trip is reduced per Table 3.7-1; otherwise, be in at least HOT STANDBY within.the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within'the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.
b.
With 2
reactor coolant loops and associated steam generators in operation and with one or more main steamline code safety valves associated with an operating loop inoperable, operation in MODES 1,
2 and 3 may proceed provided, that within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />, either the inoperable valve is restored to OPERABLE status or the Power Range Neutron Flux High Setpoint trip is reduced per Table 3.7-2; otherwise, be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.
The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable.
c.
i SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.7.1 No additional surveillance requirements other than those required by Specification 4.0.5.
Within i 1% of the value specified in Table 3.7-3 following main steamline code safety valve testing.
BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 1 3/4 7-1 PROPOSED WORDING l
i
TABLE 3.7-3 l
STEAM LINE SAFETY VALVES PER LOOP LIFT ORIFICE VALVE NUMBER SETTING ***
DIAMETER l
a.
SV-MS101A, B & C 1075 psig 4.250 in.
b.
SV-MS102A, B & C 1085 psig 4.515 in.
c.
SV-MS103A, B & C 1095 psig 4.515 in.
d.
SV-MS104A, B & C 1110 psig 4.515 in.
e..
SV-MS105A, B & C 1125 psig 4.515 in.
The Lift Setting pressure shall correspond to ambient conditions of the valve at nominal operating temperature and pressure.
i BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 1 3/4 7-4 4
PROPOSED WORDING
- - - - ~
BASES relieve any overpressure condition which could occur during shutdown.
In the event that no safety valves are OPERABLE, an operating RHR
- loop, connected to the
4 During operation, all pressurizer code safety valves must be j
OPERABLE to' prevent the RCS from being pressurized above its safety limit of 2735 psig.
The combined relief capacity of all of these valves 'is greater than the maximum surge ' rate resulting from a complete loss of load assuing no reactor trip until the first Reactor Protective System trip set point is reached (i.e., no credit is taken for a
direct reactor trip on the loss of load) and also assuming no operation of the power operated relief valves or steam dump valves.
I Demonstration of the safety valves' lift settings will occur only during.
shutdown and will be performed in accordance with the provisions of Section XI of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Code, s
3/4.4.4 PRESSURIZER The requiremen.t.that (150)kw of pressurizer heaters and their associated controls be capable of being supplied electrical power from an emergency bus provides assurance that these heaters can be energized during a
loss of offsite power condition to maintain natural circulation at HOT STANDBY.
3/4.4.5 STEAM GENERATORS One OPERABLE steam generator in a non-isolated reactor coolant loop provides sufficient heat removal capability to remove decay heat after a
reactor shutdown.
The requirement for two OPERABLE steam generators, combined
- with other requirements of the Limiting Conditions for Operation ensures adequate decay heat removal capabilities. for RCS temperatures greater than 350*F if one. steam generator becomes inoperable due to single failure considerations.
Below 350*F, decay heat is removed by the RHR system.
i 4
BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 1 B 3/4 4-2 PROPOSED WORDING 1
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ATTACHMENT B
Proposed Technical Specification Change No. 109 No Significant Hazard Considerations i
Description of amendment request: Change Request No. 109 would revise the pressurizer and main steam safety valve specifications to reflect the Standard Technical Specification (STS) requirements, change the allowable valve setpoint
'i.
tolerance from 11% to
+1%, -3% and revise the pressurizar safety valve bases to delete reference to the specific ASME Section XI edition and subsection applicable for safety valve testing. The current 1% safety valve tolerance is restrictive.
A tolerance of
+1%, -3% would allow more flexibility when testing the valves and potentially reduce the number of LER's that result when valve setpoints are found outside of th'e tolerance. A LER would be required only if the valve setpoint were found outside of the +1%, -3% range. This would provide a wider allowable range to accommodate setpoint drift without compromising the analyzed safety valve relief capability.
f The essential function of the safety valves is the protection of the primary and -secondary systems from overpressure. Since the upper tolerance band remains the same, the safety margin remains unchanged within the system since the upper limit where the valve will open has the same tolerance.
In addition, the implication of retaining a lower band of -1% on the valve setpoint is the possibility of unnecessary valve testing.
In accordance with the technical specifications, if any of the valves fail to meet the -1% set pressure tolerance, an additional sample of valves must be tested.
If any of these valves fail, then the remainder of the valves must be removed and tested.
This.would unnecessarily increase the length of the test period and would increase the man-rem exposure required during the additional valve removal and installation. The following changes are proposed:
4 vase Chance a
3/4 4-5 Revise section 3.4.2, change the tolerance from 21% to +1%,
-3%; add note
- to reflect the STS; add a note ** to require i
re-setting the valve within 1% following valve testing.
Revise 4.4.2 to reflect the STS.
3/4 4-6 Revise Section 3.4.3, change the tolerance from 1% to +1%,
-3%; add a note
- to reflect the STS; add a note ** to require re-setting the valve within 21% following testing.
Revise 4.4.3 ta reflect the STS.
l 3/4 7-1 Revise Section 3.7.1.1 to require operable main steam line code safety valves with lift settings within +1%, -3%, and add a note l
to require re-setting the valve within 1% following testing.
3/4 7-4 Revise Table Number 4.7-1 to 3.7-3 to reflect the STS; and add a l
note *** to reflect the STS.
B3/4 4-2 Revise the pressurizer bases to delete reference to the specific ASME Section XI edition and subsection applicable for safety valve testing.
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Attachment B Page 2 Basis for no significant hazard determination:
Based on the critecia for i
determining whether a significant hazards consideration exists'as setforth in 10CFR50.92(c), plant operation in accordance with the proposed amendment would not:
(1) Involve a significant-increase in the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident previously evaluated because: The RCS and main steam overpressure limits as previously analyzed have not been changed and are not affected by the proposed changes. The safety valve setpoints also remain unchanged and during testing the setpoint will be adjustad within the current 11%
tolerance to maintain system pressure within the allowable limits of system design. The +1%, -3% tolerance will act as an l
LER reporting tolerance, such that if the setpoint is found outside of this range then an LER would be required and if the setpoint is found outside the 1% tolerance the valve would be reset to within this tolerance.- The
+1%,
-3% tolerance will allow more flexibility when testing the valves by limiting ALARA concerns since man-rem exposure would be reduced as a result of fewer additional valves being tested. The number of LER's would also be reduced since the wider tolerance would tend to limit the number of valves i
found outside the reporting tolerance.
The safety analyses assume the safety valves begin to open at a system pressure 1% above the valve 1
setpoint, this is the limiting case, since the valves act as overpressure i
limiting mechanisms.
During an overpressure event, should the valve lift at a lower system pressure, then the resultant event peak pressure would be maintained within the bounds of the limiting case. Therefore, the proposed changes allow a
wider allowable range for setpoint drift without compromising the analyzed - safety valve relief capability without significantly increasing the probability of occurrence or the consequences of accidents previously evaluated.
(2) Create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously-evaluated because: No safety valve setpoint is being changed and no va'Ives are being removed.
Full overpressure protection is being maintained and no new accidents are-postulated, therefore, none of the accident analyses will be affected.
(3) Involve 'a significant reduction in the margin of safety because: The main steam and pressurizer safety valves will continue to perform the intended function, to limit system pressure, and will be maintained in accordance with design requirements.
The pressurizer bases are being revised to delete reference to the specific ASME Section XI subsection and edition to be used for safety valve testing. This is consistent with the STS and will require safety. valve testing in accordance with the current applicable edition of ASME Section XI.
Conclusion The proposed changes do not involve.any physical changes to plant safety related systems, components or structures, will not increase the likelihood of a malfunction of safety related equipment, increase the consequences of an accident previously analyzed, nor create the possibility of a malfunction different than previously evaluated. The function, operation and setpoints of i
the safety valves are not changed.
Therefore, based on the above, it is proposed to characterize the change as involving no significant hazards consideration.
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