ML20215H548

Review of Wind & Tornado Loading Responses,Yankee Nuclear Power Station, Technical Evaluation Rept

ML20215H548
Person / Time
Site:	Yankee Rowe
Issue date:	04/16/1987
From:	Carfagno S, Okaily A, Triolo S CALSPAN CORP.
To:	NRC
Shared Package
ML20214F429	List: ML20215H548 NUREG-0825, Safety Evaluation Supporting Util 840709,1231 & 851024 Repts Re Evaluation of Plant for Wind & Tornado Events as Requested in Integrated Plant Safety Assessment Rept, Sections 4.5 & 4.8.Risk from Wind/Tornado Events Assessed
References
CON-NRC-03-81-130, CON-NRC-3-81-130 TAC-41602, TER-C5506-433, NUDOCS 8704200396
Download: ML20215H548 (32)

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TECHNICAL EVALUATION REPORT e

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, NRC DOCKETNO.50-029 FRC PROJECTC5506

., NRCTACNO. 41602 FRC ASSIGNMENT 17 NRC CONTRACT NO. NRC-03-81-130 FRC TASK 433 7

M REVIEW OF WIND AND TORNADO LOADING RESPONSES

.l YANKEE ATOMIC ELECTRIC COMPANY YANKEE NUCLEAR POWER STATION TER-C5506-433 I

l Prepared for l

a Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 FRC Group Leader: s. Triolo NRC Lead Engineer: P. Y. Chen April 16, 1987 l

U This report was prepared as an account of work sponsored by an agency of the United States

, Government. Neither the United States Government nor any agency thereof, or any of their

}' employees, makes any warranty, expressed or implied, or assumes any legal liability or

!) responsibility for any third party's use, or the results of such use, of any information, appa-ratus, product or process disclosed in this report, or represents that its use by such third 4 party would not infringe privately owned rights.  !

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Prepared by: Reviewed by: Approved by:

PrificipWAuthor f

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' Department Dir tor Date: 0 M j t Date: Date: b~

FRANKLIN RESEARCH CENT DIVISION OF ARVIN/CALSPAN i xm a ance sTeetts.mtAcetmA.m 19 e 3

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{ TER-C5506-433 T .-

1 CONTENTS Ik:.

., Section Title Page a 1 INTRODUCTION . . . . . _. . . . . . . . 1-1.1 Purpose of Review'. . . . . . . . . . . 1' 1.2 Generic Issue Background . . . . . . . . . 1 1.3 Plant-Specific Background . . . . . .. . . . l' 2 REVIEW CRITERIA. . . . .

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. . . . . . . . -4 1 3 TECHNICAL EVALUATION . . . . . . . . . . . 7 3.1 General Information . . . . . . . . . . 7 3.2 Effective Tornado Loadings. . . . . . . . . 8 3.3 Structural Acceptance Criteria. . . . . . . . 13 3.4 Structural Systems. . . .

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. . . . . . . 16 1 4 CONCLUSIONS. . . . . . .

24 5 REFERENCES . . . . . .

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I-5 TER-C5506-433-t FOREWORD E .e 3 This Technical Evaluation Report was prepared by Franklin Research Center

. under a contract with the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation) for technical assistance in support of NRC operating reactor licensing actions. The technical evaluation was conducted in accordance with criteria established by the NRC.

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'i 1. INTRODUCTION' '

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4 1.1 ' PURPOSE OF REVIEW

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.4 A study of the Yankee Nuclear Power Station was undertaken by Yankee' ,

i4- Atomic Electric Company (YAEC) to examine the ability of the plant's civil

. engineering structures to resist a windstorm or a tornado strike. Tha purpose >

of this review is to provide a technical evaluation of the approach, analysis, f, and conclusions of the YAEC study.

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1.2 GENERIC ISSUE BACKGROUND , fy L i /g The current design criteria for nuclear power plant structures contain

,p 3 provisions for protection against windstorms and tornadoes. These require-

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j ments were not in effect at the time that some of the older nuclear plants i were designed and licensed. Due to concerns regarding'the extent to which these older plants can satisfy the current wind loading licensing criteria', j l

j' the Nuclear Regulatory Conunission (NRC), as part of the Systematic Evaluation

Program (SEP), initiated Topic III-2, " Wind and Tornado Loadings," to investi-i il!2 gate and assess the structural safety of existing designs.'

The SEP encompasses a broad range of safety-related issues, many of which' i '

r i ' are concerned with the integrity of plant structures. The Franklin Research s l Center (FRC) provided technical assistance to the NRC in,the. review of several 3

{ SEP topics and was responsible for technical evaluations for Topic III-2 under t - ..

i't Assignment 17 of NRC Contract No. NRC-03-81-130. <

'E 1.3 PLANT-SPECIFIC BACKGROUND 1L In a previous Technical Evaluation Report-(TER) [1], the_ structures at h the Yankee plant were examined for resistance to high wind and tornado 6

loadings. This effort determined that most of the structures at the plant jl l could not withstand the postulated 300-mph design-basis tornado loads. Conse-quently, YAEC proposed in its SEP Integrated Assessment to the'NRC staff's ,

g topic evaluation that the median value 10 ~$ wind speed be used as the ]

i design-basis tornado. This proposal was. based on risk levels determined in i

YAEC's probabilistic risk assessment (PRA). The Licensee also proposed that 4

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TER-C5506-433 ik the'fo11owing safety objectives are a~ sufficient basis to demonstrate the

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LI- - plant's adequacy in resisting tornado wind loads and tornado-generated

i. Lmissiles:  :

ga. The reactor coolant pressure boundary is maintained intact.  !

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b. The secondary system pressure boundary is maintained intact to

. function as a heat sink.

c. The, capability of the plant's redundant systems to supply steam J generator feed and primary system makeup is maintained. ,

l1, According to the NRC's Integrated. Plant Safety Assessment [2], YAEC's ,

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proposed method is acceptable provided the following actions are taken: .

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1. Determine the. capability of the struct'ures, spstems, and components '

. necessary to ensure the ability to reach hot ro tdown to withstand the NRC's determined 10-4 and 10-5 upper 95% icentidence-level '

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,- wind speed. The. upper 95% confidence-level wind speed is to be used  ;

to compensate for inaccuracy in determining hazard probabilities. ~

( ' 2. Determine the plant modifications necessary to protect against both.

.l wind speeds.

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3. . Estimate the cost of any necessary modifications for each value of wind speed. i

4. Perform a cost-benefit analysis to support a determination of which modifications should be made.

, Consequently, the Licensee submitted References'3, 4, and 5, which n .sddressed the above issues. These submittals were reviewed for information

... .rslating to the analysis of plant structures under wind and tornado loads. As 7 ;t .a result of this review, a Request for Additional Information (RAI) was sent to the Licensee on March 14, 1986. The responses to the RAI were discussed in

k. a meeting and site visit on May 20 and 21,1986 between the NRC, its consul- '=

1. tants, and YAEC [6]. Issues pertaining to tornado missiles were also discussed 7-at the meeting. 7a addition, a calculation audit was conducted to clarify YABC's method of structural analysis. Several action items resulted from this meeting, ano,:as a result of a review of information provided at the meeting, additional questions arose. The Licensee responded to the action ~ items and additional questions in a submittal dated September 5, 1986 [7), in a meeting

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j on November 21, 1986 [8), and a submittal dated December 17, 1986 [9].

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j- As a result of the evaluations for wind and tornado loading and subse- .

? 1 1 . quent discussions, the Licensee has committed to the following actions:

.1 : 1. Analyze and upgrade, if necessary, the main steam and feedwater

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piping for a 178-mph tornado. Any additional supports riequired due to wind loads will be integrated with seismic upgrades. Modification

, . design will be performed'in 1987 and modifications wi.ll be installed i 'in 1988.

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2. Upgrade the wind capacity of the primary auxiliary building (PAB) upper level west wall by adding structural steel reinforcements. . The

- - modified wind capacity will be 134 mph (straight wind) and 121. mph (tornado):to protect.the' emergency feedwater (EFW) piping. Installa-

q. tion was scheduled for 1989.

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3. Evaluate and upgrade, ifsnccessary, connections of.the PAB upper

. level roof-deck to supporting steel between' column lines 6 and 8.

4. Upgrade'the ultimate-capacity of the cable spreading room to 196 mph

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(straight wind)-and.186 mph-(tornado) by adding structural. steel bents connected to the existing conduit support framing.  ;

5. Upgrade the diesel generator building (DGB) west wall-(D11053) to a capacity of-134 mph (straight wind) and 121 mph (tornado)' -Imple-1 ,

mentation is scheduled for 1989.

This TER reviews the Licensee's procedures, criteria, and conclusions relating to the analysis of the structures at the Yankee plant under high wind i and tornado loads. The review items are identified and evaluated in Section 3 of this report, and the conclusions of the review are auramarized in Section 4.

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] REVIEW CRITERIA-

s I The purpose of code regulations is to ensure the safety of systems vital

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to'the' safe shutdown of a reactor. The General Design Criteria (GDC) of  :

-i :10CFR50, Appendix A [10] regulate the designs of these safety systems;'in i.

a -particular, GDC 2' requires that. structures housing safety-related equipment be ,

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able to withstand the effects.of natural phenomena such as tornadoes. The

' design basis must consider the most severe postulated tornado, as well as the combined effects of tornadoes, and normal and accident conditions.

-.The Nuclear Regulatory Guide 1.76([11] defines the design-basis tornado-(DBT) in' terms'of six descriptive parameters: the maximum wind speed, the-F ,

rotational _ speed, the translational speed, the maximum atmospheric pressure 3

drop,-the rate'of pressure drop, and the core radius. The specified magni-

) ' tudes of these regional _ parameters (listed with respect to geographical

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location) are the acceptable regulation levels. However, where appropriate, additional meteorological analysis-may be performed to justify the selection of a less conservative DBT. In Reference 12, the NRC established the tornado parameters to be used in the SE2 Spady of the Yankee plant.

Regulatory Guide 1.117 [13] identifies the structures and systems that should be protected from the effects of a DBT. This information is delineated in Branch Technical Position AAB 3-2 of Standard Review Plan (SRP), . Section 3.5.1.4 (NUREG-0800) [14]. The YAEC analysis reviewed in this report-included most of the structural systems at the Yankee plant necessary for safe shutdown.

A velocity pressure model of a windstorm'can be constructed from the pressure and airflow assumptions stated in Section 3.3.1 of-the SRP [15] and in the American National Standards Institute (ANSI) design loa'ing d guide g (16]. A velocity pressure model of a tornado strike-can be constructed from I

the DBT characteristics, based on'the guidance of Section 3.3.2 of the SRP

[17] and the engineering literature [18, 19].

The actual loads acting on a structure are calculated from these models through the use of: experimentally determined pressure coefficients [16, 15]. The loads affect the structural-surfaces as positive and negative pressures induced by'the change in momentum

.. of the wind and in the atmospheric pressure.

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.} An additional tornado load is .the impact of windborne missiles against structures. The potential missiles are listed in the missile spectrum of a . Section 3.5.1.4 of the SRP (14), and the particular missiles to be included -in i this study were identified by the NRC [12]. References 20 and 21 assist in

. the determination of the structural. effects of missile' impact, whereas'the

. guidelines of the SRP [17] indicate acceptable combinations of impact effects.

with the loads resulting from wind and differential pressures.

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f Since the DBT.as considered an extreme environmental event, tornado-induced loads are part of the loading combinations to be used in extreme envi-'

1 g ronmental design -(see Article CC-3000. in the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code (22] and Section 3.8.4 of the SRP~[23]). The structural effects of these i" loading combinations are determined by analysis. Stresses are calculated' i

either by a working stress or an ultimate strength method, whichever is appro-priate for the structure under consideration. The ASME Code specifications C

for an extreme environmental event permit the application of reserve strength factors to allowable working stress design limits. The specifications also i

permit local strength capacities to be exceeded by missile loadings-(concen-trated loads) provided that this causes no loss of function in any safety-related systems.

1 1-The sources of criteria described above and other source documents used  ;

in the evaluation are listed below:

, NRC Regulatory Guide 1.76, " Design Basis Tornado for. Nuclear Power j , Plants" (11] '

,1 NRC Regula

ory Guide 1.117, " Tornado Design Classification"'[13]

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_i NUREG-0830, Standard Review Plan l 1

Section 3.3.1, " Wind Loadings" (15]

1 Section 3.3.2, " Tornado Loadings" (17]

i' Section 3.5.1.4, " Missiles Generated by N ta ural Phenomena" (14]

Section 3.5.3, " Barrier Design Procedures" (24]

Section 3.8.1, " Concrete Containment" (25]

Section 3.8.4, "Other Seismic Category I Structures" (23]

Section 3.8.5, " Foundations" (26]

AISC Specification for Design, Fabrication, and Erection of Structural Steel for Buildings, Eighth Edition (27]

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ACI-318-77, " Building Code Requirements for Reinforced Concrete" [28)

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ASME Boiler and Pressure vessel Code,'Section III, Division 2 (ACI-359),

" Standard Code for Concrete Reactor Vessels and Containments" [22]

2 SGEB, " Criteria for Safety-Related Masonry Wall Evaluation, (Developed by the Structural and Geotechnical Engineering Branch (SGEB] of the NRC),

t 1981 [29]

- ACI-307-79, " Specification for the Design and Construction of Reinforced Concrete Chimneys" [30]

A ACI-531-79, " Building Code Requirements for Concrete' Masonry Structures"

[31].

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] 3. TECHNICAL EVALUATION i 3.1 GENERAL INFORMATION' d' .e The structures included in Section 3.4 of this report are the PAB, the ,

l diesel generator building, the control room, the cable spreading room, the . .

fire-water tank,.the domineralizedl water tank, the safety injection tank,'and the chimney-(main vent stack).. These structures are critical to the safe i

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.[ . shutdown of the plant and were included in Section 3.4 because questions concerning their adequacy arose during the review process. The buildings are -'

[ -hollow masonry-block and steel-frame structures. The masonry-block walls are 1

typically the limiting components.

4 According to NRC's Integrated Plant Safety Assessment Report (IPSAR) [2],

the Licensee must determine the capability of critical structures.to withstand- J the 10- and 10~ upper 95% confidence level wind speeds (110-mph straight wind:and 165-mph tornado wind, respectively). A cost-benefit analysis is also required to determine which modifications should be made to protect the plant i

against these wind speeds. YAEC's coct-benefit-analysis [3] established the-most cost-effective modifications to be the existing safe 'hutdown s system f

I (SSS)* modifications with additional upgrades to the cable spreading room.

Subsequently, the Licensee agreed to additional wind and tornado upgrades to the main steam and feedwater piping, the PAB upper level west wall,-the PAB-4 roof-deck connection between column lines 6 and 8, and the~DGB west wall.

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3 Design-basis missiles C and F are from the Etandard Review Plan, Section-3.5.1.4 missile spectrum.

J Missile C: Steel rod: 1-in diameter, 3 ft long,-8 lb, and 220-ft/sec

j. velocity. Strikes at all elevations.

Missile F: Utility pole: 13.5-in'diame'ter, 35~ft long, 1490 lb, 147-ft/sec velocity. Strikes in a zone limited to'30 ft above grade.

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] *A safe shutdown systen was installed at the plants independently of the cost-benefit analysis. The installation resulted in modifications to certain critical structures for seismic loads. These modifications also increased the windspeed capacities of the affected structures.

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.. 'l T TER-C5506-433-L l r The Licensee, however, did not consider missile.Ioads in'its analysis k; because these' missiles would not become' airborne at the design-basis' wind

.c speed.[3].. Also, a probabilistic evaluation showed that the risk of damage due to missiles at the Yankee plant was 10- .or less. See Section 3.2.3 of; this report for further discussion of this topic.

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-3.2 EFFECTIVE TORNADO LOADINGS-3.2.1 Atmospheric Pressure Change Evaluation u Associated with any tornado is a drop _in ambient air pressure [that reaches its maxjtmum value at.the center of the tornado's core. Because of this atmo-spheric pressure change, an enclosed structure may experience a pressure loading caused by the difference between internal and external pressures. The severity of the effect depends on the magnitude of the pressure drop'and the  !

venting capability of the structure. The Licensee assumed that the atmospheric pressure change did not produce a controlling load for structures at this plant because i

a. The atmospheric pressure drop develops over 5 to 6 seconds for pertinent tornados. Since most of the critical plant structures are I not airtight, venting'would occur before any significant pressure l

_g differential could build up. For instance, a detailed analysis of i 5 the battery room showed that the room's ventilation system can relieve i the pressure drop differential to the point where the differential g pressure loading is negligible for the 10-5 upper 95% (165-mph) g tornado. <

b. For the tanks, the atmospheric pressure drop loading is small compared to the hydrostatic loading when the tanks'are full. 'The tanks are also vented.

I "a 3 Calculations of the venting capabilities of the buildings at this plant- ,

were reviewed at the meeting on May 20, 1986 and were found to be adequate. l Conclusion Engineering calculations have demonstrated that there would be sufficient venting of the buildings at the Yankee plant before.significant atmospheric pressure change loads could develop. Therefore, the wind and tornado loading combinations need not include the atmospheric pressure change (differential.

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! pressure) Ioad. Since the tanks are designed for' full hydrostatic loading,.

a which is greater than the atmospheric pressure change, it is not necessary to evaluate the tanks for'windspeed capacity associated with atmospheric pressure

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g 3.2.2 Wind Velocity Pressure

' Evaluation

'(. J All reported windspeed capacities [3] are based on the wind. velocity pressure. To obtain windspeed capacity, the Licensee determined the allowable

'h load in terms of an ultimate pressure (psf) for the structure under considera--

tion, then calculated the wind speed associated with this pressure using the methods delineated in' Sections 3.3.1 and 3.3.2 of the SRP and ANSI A58.1--1982 for windstorms and tornadoes.

Because of the topography of the specific plant site (wooded), Exposure Category B from ANSI A58.1-1982 was used in calculating windspeed capacities for straight wind. Also, a size factor per Reference 32 was used in the calculation of tornado capacities to account for horizontal variations'in the tornado windfield. The following basic equation was used to calculate

.I , straight-wind velocity from pressure:

p = 0.00248 Kz V (GCp) where p = velocity pressure Kg = height coefficient (Exposure B) ' l f

V = wind velocity  !

i GCp = pressure coefficient and gust factor

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1 The constant, 0.00248, reflects air mass density at the plant site

- elevation.

The following basic equation was used to calculate tornado-wind velocity from pressure:

.p = 0.00248 V C C

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'where(=sizefactor'[32]

C = pressure coefficient p-y: ~'

Sample calculations.were reviewed and the equations, factors, and;

.j coefficients'that were used-to calculate wind-velocity pressure were adequate 2

4 and consistent with ANSI.A58.1-1982.- ,

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Conclusion

3 The windspeed capacities corresponding-to the wind-velocity pressure of

[- the critical structures for the safe.~ shutdown of.the' Yankee plant were-calculated in accordance with the applicable criteria.

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3.2.3 Windborne Missiles

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Evaluation The Licensee's tornado missile analysis consisted of two evaluations:

(1) a determination of tornado missile speeds during 85-mph and 165-mph (10 - and 10- upper 95% confidence level) tornadoes, and-(2) a probabi-listic assessment of tornado missile impact. The NRC-recommended missiles, the steel rod and utility pole, were considered.

4 Missile Speeds i

a SRP 3.5.1.4 presents two missile spectra, Spectrum II, developed by the National Bureau of Standards [36), and the Rev. 0 spectrum.' : Spectrum II was

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chosen because it was based on a detailed scientific. study, whereas the Rev. O spectrum was undocumented in the SRP. Also, the Rev. O spectrum predicts g: questionable high missile speeds for low tornado ' wind speeds. The Spectrum II

'l relationships between tornado wind speed and missile speeds for the utility lg pole and steel rod were extrapolated to include the wind speeds in considera-i tion at the Yankee plant. According to this extrapolation, the wind speeds

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associated with the 10 and 10 upper 95% confidence level will not' cause the steel rod or utility pole to become airborne.

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p TER-C5506-433 v- Probabilistic Assessment ~ ,

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l r The evaluation of the annual probability that a. tornado missile will i

• strike a structure at the Yankee plant was basedion case studies f,ound in ,

d -Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI)' reports NP-768 [37]'and NP-2005-(38]

,- and a.Seabrook site-specific study [39). The-probability results of these

! j.. case studies were adjusted for the specific missile parameters (target size, )

number of: potential missiles) of the Yankee plant. Using the two case studies b in NP-768, the Licensee calculated annual missile strike probabilities of:2.4 x'10-6 (Case'I) and 2.8 x 10~ (Case II). Using the case study in.

EPRI NP-2005, the missile strike. probability was determined to be 8.9 x 10-

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Based on the Seabrook study, which involved probabilities of missiles entering i target. openings, the risk of missile entrance was 3 x 10- .

Given the-above estimations of the annual probability that a tornado j missile will strike a structure, it can be concluded that the probability that a missile will strike with enough force to cause damage to a critical ,

component is on the order of 10- to 10- . This is-less than the risk I objective of the Licensee's cost-benefit evaluation, which was 10- .

The EPRI reports were examined to determine the validity of the results g

B, presented therein.- The major questionable issues associated with.these-i reports involve the windspeed ranges for each classification of tornado o t t do.

The windspeed ranges for the F' scale tornado intensities were supported l, by "near ground" observations of the May 11, 1970 Lubbock tornado. 'However,

! since tornado classifications are based on a reference elevation of 33 ft, the ,

,n i j F' wind speeds estimated near the ground may be too low due to the variation

of wind velocity with height. According to L. A.' Twisdale [40], principal

%) . author of the EPRI reports, the term "near ground" is misleading since the-I l

l] average height of the structures observed at Lublock was about 30 ft.-

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i Therefore, the wind speeds associated with the F' scale tornado intensities I can be considered to occur approxirately at the reference elevation of 33 ft.

4 The Licensee was also asked to discuss the reduction of wind speeds at ground level for the particul'ar wind velocity profile chosen in the EPRI

! studies, and the sensitivity of the missile strike analysis to changes in the

, velocity profile. The Licensee responded that the EPRI' studies and the j ,

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j. Seabrook study used a 75% reduction in tornado wind speed at ground level i

.because of boundary layer-effects. According to Twisdale (40), this profile c

i 'is reasonable and conservative when compared to profiles used for ordinary j winds. Also,-in a probabilistic study, the tornado strike probability is the

. dominant factor in determining missile impact probabilities. Therefore*,

changes in the tornado wind velocity profile are not expected to have a l significant effect on the probabilistic missile strike analyses in the EPRI' reports.

4 W Conclusion 1

Windborne missiles are not a factor in the evaluation of the capability

[ of the structures at the Yankee plant to withstand the '10-4 and 10 ' -

2-upper 95% confidence level wind speeds.

3.2.4 Combined Tornado Loadings g Evaluation

R Specific combinations of the basic tornado-related loadings are given in g Section 3.3.2 of the SRP'as follows

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(i) Wt Ww

' (ii) Wt W

' (iii) Wt W (iv) WtWw + 0.5 Wp (v) Wt Ww+Wm

,b (VII WtWw + 0.5 Wp+Wm ,

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where Wt ... total tornado load, p where Ww... tornado wind load, j where W I

where Wf....tornado total differential missile load. pressure load, and

)'I Because neither windborne missiles nor atmospheric pressure change loads q

were considered (refer to Sections 3.2.1 and 3.2.3), the governing load j

craination was (i), tornado-wind load.

This is the load due to wind-velocity pressure.

Conclusion The Licensee's use of the load due to wind-velocity pressure as the governing tornado-load combination is adequate.

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F 3.3 STRUCTURAL ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA

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'3.3.1 Masonry iBlock Walls Y Evaluation ,e-j-

For the critical structures at the Yankee plant, masonry walls are the'

b. -limiting component. The basic allowable masonry stresses are in accordance a.

with ACI 531-79:[31] and are based on a specified mortar strength-(m,)-of 750-psi.

The basic allowables for masonry tension normal and parallel to the bed

[ joint are'14 psi and~27 psi', respectively.- For.the cost-benefit analysis, the Licensee used the ultimate capacity of the masonry and arrived at the ultimate allowables by increasing the basic allowables by 1.67. However, the NRC criteria (29). allow an. increase factor'of only 1.3 for-tensile stresses normal-to the bed' joint and 1.5 parallel t'o the bed joint.

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" According to Reference 9, testing of existing block and mortar was per- -

formed. The test results indicate an actual mortar strength of 1386 psi. ,

I Using this value in the ACI 531-79 specifications for allowable stresses and the NRC increase factors, the ultimate tensile ~allowables'would be 24 psi normal to the bed joint and 55.8 psi parallel to the bed joint. The ultimate

'i values used in the Licensee's cost-benefit analysis were 23 psi and 47 psi,-

L respectively.

Conclusion ,

The allowable masonry stresses used in the Licensee's evaluation of wind-speed capacities of masonry structures are acceptable.

g- 3.3.2 Structural Steel

\

Evaluation l'

\

The basic allowable stresses for structural steel were taken from Part 1 of the AISC, " Specification for the Design, Fabrication, and Erection of Structural Steel for Buildings." An increase factor of 1.6 or 1.7 was applied-to these allowables in accordance with SRP 3.8.3 to obtain the design limits

for tornado and high-wind loadings. Analysis of structural steel systems were d based on elastic-working stress techniques.

... - ., .. . . - - . . . ~ _ ., ..

.  : r

3. g :.-

,Y 7 3 ... TER-C5506-433  !

L

^j. Conclusion 1

The ' structural analysis of steel components for' tornado and wind loads is

.in compliance with the applicable criteria.

.F J ,

I s

[ 7,- . '3.3.3 Connections Evaluation In typical engineering designs, of'which the structures of-the Yankee plant are representative, connections are designed to meet the limiting' i.-

allowable c'apacity of members. In this' case, given the manner in which loads i

are resisted in the Yankee steel structures, it is concluded that the r

connections will not be the limiting components of steel frames if they were i

designed in accordance with good engineering practice. Also, the Li'ensee c has committed to evaluate the PAB roof connections between column lines 6 and 8, and will upgrade them, if necessary, to the capacity of the roof' deck [7].

[ Conclusion This item is not critical for the structures at the Yankee plant.

LI 3.3.4 Roof Decks Evaluation Steel roof decks were analyzed for uplift-pressure capacity, assuming ,

simple spans and an allowable flexural stress of-1.6 times the elastic allowable per SRP 3.8.4. The minimum failure wind speed of the roofs at the j if plant is 122 mph (straight wind) for the PAB roof. However, this is for failure at the corners; the main roof would not fail until a. wind speed of 207 I mph. Further, the mode of failure is outward and would not affect equipment 3- .,

located in the interior of the building. Also, safety injection piping and--

N emergsncy feedwater piping in the PAB are shielded from the roof deck by steel i framing and a conduit running beneath the roof. All.other safety-related

l. equipment in the PAB is located'beneath the upper pipe chase and is not

~

j exposed to the roof deck.

j No equipment in the diesel generator building (DGB) is credited in the l

[ cost-benefit evaluation after the failure of wall D1XI at 134 mph (straight l

i, wind) and 121 mph (tornado). The DGB roof has a capacity of 160 mph (straight i

_ ._ n , _, - . - _ , . _ . . _ _ - _ , . . - ,

- __..,____._.___,__._._.-_,c_.,_.._,..,_._,__ . ~ , - _ _ _ _ - _ , _ . - - , _ .

p.. .

j -

TER-C5506-433 y-

] wir.d) and 167 mph-(tornado). Therefore, failure of the' roof deck would not-affect the cost-benefit evaluation.

e

(- ,.

.e.

I- ~ Conclusion.

Roof decks at the-Yankee plant were adequately evaluated and are not  !

l " critical in the cost-benefit evaluation. ,

~

. I 3.3.5 -Siding e Evaluation

i g-l At the Yankee.. plant, the turbine building is the only major structure fn' 1

4 with metal-siding panels. The structural adequacy of.these panels was not-  :

, . evaluated in the Licensee's submittal. However, the turbine building is not.a i

t- Class I structure, and the areas of the turbine building that were designated as crucial to the safe shutdown of the plant,'such as the control. room and

~

i battery rooms, were analyzed individually for the effects of wind and tornado' I loadings.

l- Conclusion This item is not critical for the evaluaton of the structures at the' .:

Yankee plant.

4

)

3.3.6 Load Combinations ,

i j Evaluation I.-

i[ The load combinations for various types of structures under extreme

! environmental conditions are specified in'SRP 3.8.4. ' To properly assess the j adequacy of structures under tornado-related loads, these loads must be j'3 a

combined with other applicable loads, such as piping, thermal, and snow loads. However, with the exception of the non-return valve structure, there

[]

are no significant piping or thermal loads on the critical structures at this i

!, plant.. The non-return valve structure was originally designed considering i I

, significant piping loads. In addition, the average design-wind pressure for .

this structure (20.7 psf) was conservatively increased by a factor of 1.3.

Snow loads will be considered under a separate SEP topic.

! 4 1 - - - ~ - - . . ~ , - _._..,m.. . . _ , .

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f E.;

4-TER-C5506-433 -

Conclusion'-

1- ,

This. issue was discussed and resolved'in the meeting of May 20, 1986. ,

p With the exception of snow loads,.which will be considered under another SEP

.W

~ topic, the loads considered in the wind and tornado analysis of the structures at this plant are in accordance with the-SRP~ criteria.

1 3.4 STRUCTURAL SYSTEMS 3.4.11 Chimney (Main Vent Stack) c.

~

a Evaluation

{} The chimney at the Yankee plant is a 1/4-in-thick plate metal stack, 5 ft J' in diameter, and in close proximity to the PAB. An ANSYS finite element computer (see Figure 3-1) was used to evaluate the vent stack and supports for i

a static tornado-wind load of 165 mph. The stack and supports were modeled as linear beam elements. Allowable stresses for the stack, bolts, and supporting steel members were taken from the American Institute of Steel Construction Manual, Eighth Edition. Embedded anchor bolts for the support' steel were i evaluated according to ACI 349-76. Stress results and related calculations  ;

t~-

were audited at the November 21, 1986 meeting [8). The^ maximum stress +

interaction was 0.66 for a W18 x 50 beam in the lower support frame. A-

}_ maximum stress interaction of 0.18 for the vent. stack shell occurred just i

5-above the upper supports.

j Dynamic effects, including vortex shedding and flexural vibration were l also evaluated. The natural frequency of the vent stack was determined to be ,

i+  !

iP 4.6 Hz from the seismic evaluation of the plant. Using the-relationship

L between frequency of the stack, wind velocity, Strouhal number, and stack

,.J-

<' diameter found in Reference 32, the critical wind' speed that would. excite y resonant vibration was calculated to be 63: mph. .Since the stack was found to ,

)

be well within allowable limits for a -165-sph static wind load, it is unlikely  ;

that reasonance will cause stresses generated by a 63-sph wind to be amplified )

j j

to the level of the allowables. Flexural vibration (ovaling) was similarly .

{ [' evaluated. The fundamental frequency for this type of vibration was calcu-i

?

lated to be 6.8 Hz. The corresponding resonant wind speed was 22 mph. As in j m' the case of vortex shedding, stresses at this low wind speed would not be

[l significant even if amplified by resonance.

l l 'I l _ ._ _

~

.. _ _. . ...n .

_ . - , . _ , - . _ .._.m _ . . . . _ , . -- _ . . _ _ _ . _ _ - . = - . _ . . - , _ , . _ _ . . . _ _ - - , - _ . . _ . , , _ , _ , _ _ . _ _ . - -

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l TER-C5506-433 l e

eari a

i B5--(NODE NUMBER) b -VENT STACK ,

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7

{. TER-C5506-433

-?

.0 Meteorological data indicated that-the stack was subjected to wind speeds a

in the range of the resonant wind speeds noted.above. No structural ~ damage-was observed in the stack since the start of plant operations in 1960.

a .a Conclusion A finite element analysis adequately demonstrated that the vent stack is capable of withstanding a 165-mph static wind load. A dynamic evaluation and the actual record of the structural integrity of the stack since 1960 indi-

cated that dynamic wind effects are insignificant. Therefore, with respect to wind and tornado loadings, the main vent stack is adequate.

y 3.4.2 Tanks.

1 Evaluation c) p

.a The original design of the aluminum demineralized water, safety injection, and primary water storage tanks (TK-1, TK-2, and TK-29) was based on the American Petroleum Institute (API) Standard 12G for aluminum tanks with a design lateral-wind pressure of 25 psf. The ultimate lateral-wind pressure, 30 psf, used to derive windspeed capacities was based on an increase in allow-u able stress of 1.66, which is consistent.with the Aluminum Association,.

" Specifications for Aluminum Structures," Third Edition,1976. The capacities for these tanks were 179 mph (straight wind) and 164 mph (tornado).

The windspeed capacity of the steel fire-water tank was based.on the g

ultimate lateral pressure calculated according to the American Water Works 4

' I' Association (AWWA) Standard D100-79 for welded steel tanks [33].The capacities for this tank are 191 mph (straight wind) and 161 mph (tornado).

I Conclusion The windspeed capacities of the tanks were reviewed at the May 20, 1986 meeting. It is concluded that the windspeed capacities of the tanks are valid and are based on acceptable NRC criteria.

O s -O

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'TER-C5506-433 i

j 3.4.3 Cable Spreading Room i

Evaluation

'i

,1 The cable spreading room is a masonry-block structure with pYan dimensions of 15 ft x 60 ft and a height of 8 ft. This structure is located on top of

[ the control room area of the turbine building. ~The cable spreading room is - .

critical because its failure could result in the loss of instrumentation needed to control and monitor the plant. As a resdit of its cost-benefit analysis, the Licensee proposed structural modifications to the cable spreading room,

., which would put its windspeed capacity at 196 mph for straight wind and 186

} ' mph for tornado wind. These modifications consist of the addition of structural steel bents attached to the existing conduit support framing (see Figure 3-2). These bents provide lateral support for the masonry walls, which span horizontally between the vertical steel members. The south wall is attached to the existing vertical framework of the conduit support structure and to intermediate vertical cantilevers supported off the turbine building south wall. To provide the root with adequate tie-down capacity, channels and I tension bars were added inside the cable spreading room and connected through the walls to the exterior steel bents. The modification design was evaluated by finite element computer analysis and was summarized in Reference 34, which reported that the cable spreading room could withstand the 10 ' tornado ~

event after modification. The modification design criteria in Reference 34 were reviewed and found to be adequate. After modification, the ultimate lateral pressure capacity of the walls was calculated to be 64.7 psf. Calcu-lations deriving the ultimate lateral windspeed capacities were provided for

{

L review and were found to be satisfactory.

Conclusion I

,,The reported windspeed capacities [3] for this structure with modifica-tions are valid and are based on NRC accepted criteria.

_, 3.4.4 Primary Auxiliary Building (PAB) North Wall and Upper Level West Wall i Evaluation

] -

The north wall of the PAB is constructed of concrete masonry units and is approximately 45 ft long and 35 ft high. It consists of four sections or j

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l Figure 3-2. Cable Spreading Room Wind Modification, Typical Bent g i

I l

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4

l  ; or. .

s TER-C5506-433-

q. e -

E e og - -panels: P2F1, P2F2, PIEl, and PIE 2~. The-entire wall was modified for seismic l'

i loads with the installation of the safe shutdown s'ystem. The modification

. consists'of vertical steel beams. supporting the~ wall at-. intervals to reduce d the: effective horizontal span of the' wall.

In analyzing panel P2F1, which is the critical panel, for ultimate

. - lateral. pressure, the Licensee assumed simple one-way horizontal spans and used-the working stress method. Using the masonry wall criteria mentioned in Section 3.3.1 of this report, the. ultimate lateral pressure for this wall was calculated to be 38.2 psf. -The ultimate windspeed capacities were 165 mph 5 (straight wind) and 186 mph (tornado).- Calculations which derived these-b values were provided for review and were found to.be satisfactory.

The Licensee also committed to upgrade the upper PAB west wall in a manner similar to the north wall.' The' modified west wall will have a capacity

.g of 134 aph (straight wind) and 121_ mph (tornado) because the emergency

• feedwater piping, which runs along this wall was assumed to fail at these wind speeds in the cost-benefit evaluation. Modifications will be designed in I accordance with Reference 35 and are scheduled for implementation in 1989.

Conclusion The ultimate windspeed capacities reported for the north wall.are valid and based on NRC accepted criteria. The Licensee's comittment to upgrade the upper level west wall according to Reference 35 resolves' this issue with' respect to the scope of this report.

~[ 3.4.5 Control Room L

Evaluation 5 The control room is a reinforced concrete structure located in the j ,

auxiliary bay of the turbine building. In a previous TER [1], the. control  !

l <

room was evaluated for tornado-wind velocity pressure and differential pressure l

1 associated with atmospheric pressure change. The. reinforced concrete piers, '

I which support the east and west control room walls, were found to be the limiting components with a windspeed rating of 120 mph for the differential ]

pressure conditions. These piers have since been modified by the addition of two reinforced concrete shear walls that tie the piers to the control room's j -  :-. . - - . ~ - - . - - ~

9._ . . s-

,p . p .- . . .

,[ ; '

- ;; TER-C5506-433

=

[ Lsouth shield. wall. This modification substantially increases the tornado-1 resistant capability of the control. room.

.m. Conclusion '

r Because of substantial modifications to the reinforced concrete piers

.z . supporting the east and west walls of the control room, the control room is t

not a critical structure in the evaluation of the' Yankee plant with respect to _ '

'k

3. 3 wind and tornado effects.

,'h k ,3.4.6 Diesel Generator-Safety Injection Building North Wall (DlX1)  ;

1

Evaluation i

b' The north wall of the diesel generator-safety injection building (DlX1) j ,.

is an 8-in-thick, hollow masonry-block wall, which was evaluated in a previous TER [1] for wind and tornado loads. The windspeed ratings that'resulted from  !

this evaluation are as follows: 87 mph for tornado- and wind-velocity f pressure and 63 mph for straight-wind velocity pressure. The Licensee has-since claimed windspeed capacities of 134 mph.for straight-wind velocity pressure and 121 for tornado-wind velocity pressure. This discrepancy is due i

in part to the Licensee's use of a higher mortar' strength, based on tests, and corresponding higher allowables (see Section 3.3.1). Also, the Licensee used

,E Exposure Category B and the corresponding exposure coefficient from ANSI A58.1-82 [11), which is more appropriate for this plant than Exposure Category C from ANSI A58.1-72, as the criteria for calculating straight-wind speed.

! Reference 1 conservatively. assumed the latter in its windspeed calculations.

o t

a For tornado wind, the Licensee used a size coefficient to account for the nonuniformity in the horizontal direction of the tornado-wind field per

g Reference 30. This is not considered in the Reference 1 calculations. The

'A increase in allowables, the use of Exposure Category B, and the use of a size

,- factor tend to increase the calculated windspeed capacities over those calculated in Reference 1.

i .,

,1 Conclusion Windspeed capacities for wall DlX1 were calculated based on acceptable lj NRC criteria. Calculations in Reference 1 for this wall were based on conser-vative assumptions, t-3

_ _ _ .~ . _ ___ . - __ _ __

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.[

.3.4.7 -Diesel Generator-Safety Injec' tion' Building West Wall (D11053)

. Evaluation f Wall D11053 is an exterior masonry wall enclosing one of three diesell

~

generators. . Failure of this wall under wind or tornado loads could damage the_.

'l diesel generator. Since the two interior walls, D11043 and D11054f are similar in dimension and construction to wall D11053, the same wind speed that fails 4

wall D11053 could successively fail walls D11043 and D11054 and damage all~

A three diesel generators. 'The windspeed capacities for' wall D11053 are 91 mph (straight wind) and 69 mph (tornado). - However, in the cost-benefit evaluation,_

j the Licensee assumed that wall D1X1 (see Section 3.4.5) with capacities of 134-mph (straight wind) and.121 mph (tornado) was the controlling wall in this

~

building because its failure could impact vital cabling and simultaneously knock out all three generators. This issue was discussed at the meeting on-

, November 21, 1986, in which the Licensee committed to upgrade wall D11053 to the same capacity.as wall D1X1. .The_necessary modifications, which will be Implemented in 1989, will be designed in accordance with the criteria in Reference 35.

Conclusion Modification of wall D11053 to the same windspeed capacity as wall D1X1 assures that the wind speeds governing the failure of all three diesel genera-tors are 134 mph (straight wind) and 121 mph (tornado). The Licensee's

. coenitment to upgrade this wall according to Reference 35 resolves this issue with respect to the scope of this report I

s i

J w

e

• e 23-b.. - - -

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'? TER-C5506-433 i

j 4. CONCLUSIONS 1

, Yankee Atomic Electric Company's wind and tornado analyses of the j critical structures at the Yankee Nuclear Power Station were revie'wed for technical adequacy. In general, the Licensee addressed all of the issu~es raised in the IPSAR [2), and the reported windspeed capacities for the structures-investigated were valid and calculated according to NRC accepted criteria. However, as a result of its wind and tornado analysis, the Licensee committed to the following actions:

)u o Analyze main steam and feedwater piping for a 178-mph tornado and upgrade if necessary. Any required modifications are scheduled for installation in 1988.

T

{ o Upgrade the wind capacity of the PAB upper level west wall to 134 mph (straight wind) and 121 mph (tornado) by adding structural steel y reinforcements. Installation is scheduled for 1989.

i o Evaluate and upgrade, if necessary, the connections of the PAB upper level roof deck to supporting steel between column lines 6 and 8.

o Reinforce the cable spreading room by adding structural steel bents connected to the existing conduit support framing. The reinforced structure will be able to withstand a straight wind of 196 mph and a tornado wind of 186 mph.

o Upgrade the diesel generator building west wall (D11053) to a capacity of 134 mph (straight wind) and 121 mph (tornado). Design .

and installation are scheduled for 1989. l T, -

L The conclusions of the review of Yankee Atomic Electric Company's wind and tornado analyses of the structures at the Yankee Nuclear Power Station are a

y summarized in Tables 1 and 2.

I ,

i 1

i e

9 l

I

, a se .

sh

? TER-C5506-433 L

• Table 1. Load and Review Criteria Summary a

Review Item Status ("' ,

2 1 1 3 4 Effective Tornado Loadings

. Atmospheric Pressure Change X Wind Velocity Pressure ,X Windborne Missiles X Combined Tornado Loadings X 1

11 o

Structural Acceptance Criteria 1

Masonry-Block Walls X Steel Components X t Connections X(c)

(

A Roof Decks X Siding X Concrete Components X Load Combinations X(d)

a. The status of each item is defined as 1, 2, 3, or 4 as follows:

1 = The review item is in conformance with or more conservative than the 7 accepted criteria. -

i 2 = The review item is not in conformance with the accepted criteria.

3 = The review item is in conformance with accepted criteria but will be

, . , upgraded.

I 4 = The review item is not applicable.

L b. Atmospheric pressure change loads are negligible due to venting,

c. Certain PAB roof connections will be evaluated and upgraded if necessary.

) <

d. Snow loads will be considered under another SEP topic.

I e

1o " a e TER-C5506-433 Table 2. Structures and Components Summary

'd Review Item Status ("I Structural Sistems 1 2 3 A.

.a Chimney (Main Vent Stack) X ,

Fire-Water Tank X Domineralized Water Tank X Safety Injection Tank X Primary Water Storage Tank X 1 Cable Spreading Room X 21 PAB North and Upper West Walls X Control, Room X

U Diesel Generator-Safety X Injection Building North Wall-D1X1 Diesel Generator-Safety Injection Building West Wa11-D11053 X

a. The status of each item is defined as 1, 2, 3,.and 4 as follows:

1 = The review item is in conformance with or more conservative than the accepted criteria.

2 = The review item is not in conformance with the accepted criteria.

i[ 3 = The review item is in accordance with accepted criteria but will be '

.E upgraded.

4 = The review item is not applicable.

I n IT

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l.

i, .

i

• ?

.6 1

i_ _ . . . _ - _ _ _ . _

l .o '. 8. o

-? TER-C5506-433 i

, 5. REFERENCES

.\

'1. R. Caruso (NRC), Letter with Attachment to J. Kay (iT.AC),

Subject:

SEP Topic III-2, Wind and Tornado Loading, TER-C52)7-407 a August 31, 1982

2. . Integrated Plant Safety Assessment, Yankee Nuclear Power Station, Final Report, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, NUREG-0825, June 1983

3. J. A. Kay (YAEC), Letter with Attachments to J. A. Zwolinski (NRC),

Subject:

SEP Topics III-2 and III-4.A, Cost-Benefit Evaluation for Wind and Tornado Loadings and Tornado Missiles for the Yankee Nuclear Power Station, Revision 1, December 31, 1984

s U 4. J. A. Kay (YAEC), Letter with Attachments to J. A. Zwolinski (NRC),

Subject:

SEP Topics III-2 and III-4.A, Cost-Benefit Evaluation - Sample Calculations, February 13, 1985

5. J. D. Haseltine, Letter with Attachment to J. A. Zwolinski (NRC),

Subject:

SEP Topics III-2 and III-4.A, Additional Information on Tornado Cost-Benefit Evaluation, Yankee Atomic Electric Company, October 24, 1985

6. Meeting and Site Visit Between NRC, Its Consultants, and Yankee Atomic Electric Company at Framingham, Mass., May 20 and 21, 1986 (Meeting i Summary, E. McKenna, June 6, 1986)

.g 7. G. Papanic, Jr., Letter with Attachment to E. McKenna (NRC),

Subject:

-l Response to Request for Additional Information, SEP Topics III-2 and III-4.A, Yankee Atomic Electric Company, September 5, 1986

8. Meeting Between NRC, Its Consultants, and Yankee Atomic Electric Company at Framingham, Mass., November 21, 1986 (Meeting Summary, E. McKenna, November 25, 1986)

. 9. G. Papanic, Jr., Letter with Attachment to E. McKenna (NRC),

Subject:

Response to Request for Additional Information, SEP Topics III-2 and III-4.A, Yankee Atomic Electric Company, December 17, 1986

10. Code of Federal Regulations, Title 10, Part 50, Appendix, " General Design Criteria"

11. Regulatory Guide 1.76, " Design Basis Tornado for Nuclear Power Plants,"

NRC, April 1974

12. R. Caruso (NRC), Letter with Attachments to J. Kay (YAEC),

Subject:

Topic III-4.A SER, Tornado Missiles August 31, 1982

13. Regulatory Guide 1.117, " Tornado Design Classification," NRC, Rev. 1, April 1978

~

l o ee o e TER-C5506-433 i

b

14. Standard Review Plan, Section 3.5.1.4, " Missiles Generated by Natural I Phenomena," NRC, July 1981, NUREG-0800

15. Standard Review Plan, Section 3.3.1, " Wind Loadings," NRC, July 1981, NUREG-0800 a

16. " Building Code Requirements for Minimum Design Loads in Buildings,and Other Structures," New York: American National Standards Institute, 1982, ANSI A58.1-1982

17. Standard Review Plan, Section 3.3.2, " Tornado Loadings," NRC, July 1981, NUREG-0800 2

18. Mcdonald, J. R., Mehta, K. C., and Minor, J. E., " Tornado-Resistant

]g Design of Nuclear Power Plant Structures," Nuclear Safety, Vol.15, No. 4, August 1974

, 19. Mehta, K. C., Mcdonald, J. R., and Minor, J. E., " Tornadic Loads on Structures," Proc. of U.S.-Japan Research Seminar on Wind Effects on

'] Structures, 1976

20. Williamson, R. A. and Alvy, R. R., " Impact Effect of Fragments Striking a Structural Elements," Holmes and Naruer, Inc., Revised November 1973

21. " Full-Scale Tornado-Missile Impact Tests," Palo Alto, CA: Electric Power 1 Research Institute, July 1977, Final Report NP-440, Project 399

22. ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code,Section III, Division 2, " Standard Code for Concrete Reactor Vessels and Containments," New York: American Society of Mechanical Engineers, 1973, ACI-359

23. Standard Review Plan, Section 3.8.4, "Other Seismic Category I Structures," NRC, July 1981, NUREG-0800

24. Standard Review Plan, Section 3.5.3, " Barrier Design Procedures," NRC, July 1981, NUREG-0800 -

25. Standard Review Plan, Section 3.8.1, " Concrete Containment," NRC, July 1981, NUREG-0800

26. Standard Review Plan, Section 3.8.5, " Foundations," NRC, July 1981, NUREG-0800

27. " Specification for Design, Fabrication, and Erection of Structural Steel for Buildings," New York: American Institute of Steel Construction, 1978

28. " Building Code Requirements for Reinforced Concrete," Detroit: American Concrete Institute, 1977, ACI 318-71

29. Standard Review Plan, Section 3.8.4 Appendix A, " Interim Criteria for Safety Related Masonry Wall Evaluation," NRC, July 1981, NUREG-0800 p.m,=se -emee m. #.. . m --+ -

r ,

,.s> s s

TER-C5506-433

30. " Specification for'the Design and Construction of Reinforced Concrete ']'

Chimneys," American Concrete Institute, 1979, ACI 307-79 '

j

31. American Concrete Institute, " Building Code Requirements' for Concrete

-Masonty Structures," ACI 531-79 (Revised 1981)

32. " Wind Effects on Structures: An Introduction to Wind Engineering,"Lby; Simiu and Scanlan, Wiley and Sons, 1978

33. American Water Works Association "AWWA Standard for Welded Steel Tanks for Water Storage," ANSI /AWWA D100-79 ,

34. G. Papanic, Jr. (YAEC),

Letter with Attachments to E. McKenna (NRC)," !! arch ~ ;9,1987 '

Attachmeat: " Summary Design Report for Block Modifications at Primary ,

Auxiliary Building, North Wall, Upper Pipe Chase, and Cable Spreading Room," Report ER-2648-10-2, Chas. T. Main, Inc., Boston, Mass.,' April 3,  ;

. 1986 >

35. G. Papanic, Jr. (YAEC), . .

Letter with Attachments to E. McKenna - (NRC), . !! arch f.9,1987

Attachment:

" Structural Design Criteria for Evaluation and Modification of Existing Masonry Walls," Report DCD-2648-6-1, Revision 0, Chas. T.

Main, Inc. , Boston, Mass.

36. " Tornado-Borne Missile Speeds," NBSIR 76-1050, National Bureau of Standards, April 1976

", 37. Electric Power Research Institute, Tornado Missile Risk Analysis, EPRI NP-768, May 1978

38. Electric Power Research Institute, Tornado. Missile Simulation and, Design

• Methodology, EPRI NP-2005, August 1981

39. Seabrook Nuclear Power Plant, Tornado Missile Analysis, Applied Research i

[ Associates, Inc. , Final Report C569, September 1983 ,

40. G. Papanic, Jr. (YAEC),

Letter with Attachment to E. McKenna (NRC), December 17, 1986

Attachment:

L. A. Twisdale, Applied Research Associates, Raleigh, NC, Letter to Dr. Emil Simiu, National Bureau of Standards,

Subject:

Comments on EPRI Missile Simulation and Design Methodology, November 16, 1983 l

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