ML20215E034
| ML20215E034 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 12/11/1986 |
| From: | Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards |
| To: | |
| References | |
| ACRS-T-1565, NUDOCS 8612170201 | |
| Download: ML20215E034 (157) | |
Text
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UlN11ED STATES INUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION IN THE MATTER OF:
DOCKET NO:
ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON REACTOR SAFEGUARDS 320TH GENERAL MEETING o
O LOCATION:
WASHINGTON, D.
C.
PAGES:
1 - 109 DATE:
THURSDAY, DECEMBER 11, 1986 ABRSCFRCED0PY
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1 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
$_h) 2 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 3
ADVISORY COMMITTEE ~ON REACTOR SAFEGUARDS 4
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5 6
Nuclear Regulatory Commission 7
Room 1046 1717 H Street, N.W.
8 Washington, D. C.
9 Thursday, December 11, 1986 10 The 320th General Meeting convened at 3:00 p.m.
yy 12 ACRS MEMBERS PRESENT:
('-
13 N-MR. DAVID A. WARD, Chairman 14 MR. JESSE C.
EBERSOLE 15 MR. HAROLD ETHERINGTON DR. MAX W. CARBON 16 DR. WILLIAM KERR DR. HAROLD W. LEWIS DR. J. CARSON MARK 77 MR. CARLYLE MICHELSON DR. DADE W. MOELLER 18 DR. DAVID OKRENT MR. GLENN A. REED 19 DR. FORREST J.
REMICK DR. PAUL G.
SHEWMON 20 DR. CHESTER P. SIESS MR. CHARLES J. WYLIE 21 22 23 24
()
25 4
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PUBLIC NOTICE BY THE UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSIONERS' ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON REACTOR SAFEGUARDS FRIDAY, DECEMBER 11, 1986 The contents of this stenographic transcript of the proceedings of the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission's' Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS), as reported herein, is an uncorrected record of the discussions recorded at the meeting held on the above date.
No member of the ACRS Staff and no participant at
()
this meeting accepts any responsibility for errors or inaccuracies of statement or data contained in this transcript.
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. PROCEEDINGS 2
MR. WARD:
Our next topic is a report of the 3
Reactor Operations Subcommittee, Mr. Ebersole.
4-I think I will review what takes place now with a 5
ritual that's pretty well set up.
6 Last week I had about a 2-1/2 telethon with the 7
fellows that are here'today and others, in which we went 8
over a quite substantial list of operating events that have 9
happened over the past 60 days.
We agreed on what is ten or 10 so of these to be discussed at a meeting in Bethesda, which 11 occurred Tuesday morning.
12 I went out to Bethesda for about half a day es
'w d 13 preceding the ACRS meeting.
We went over some of the 14 events, the list of events, which were then boiled down to 15 the ones you are going to hear today, and we tried to pick 16 the best ones from a variety of viewpoints to be brought to 17 the full committee.
18 To get into it another way, I would like to 19 comment that we were keenly aware of the problems at the 20 last meeting, due to the dedication of the field 21 representatives that came in and went to quite elaborate, 22 thorough and lengthy presentations.
Maybe Ed Jordan can 23 tell us something about that, but I'd like to turn this over 24 to Ed and Jack and get on with the presentation of these 25 events.
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I think we have a spectacular one that occurred 2
late yesterday at Livermore.
I understand you want to talk 3
about that.
4 MR. ROSENTHAL:
We will add a review on the Surry 5
event.
We would prefer to go down the agenda as shown and 6
anticipate about 20 minutes a piece for Oyster Creek, Byron 7
and ANO.
Then we will pick up the pace somewhat for the 8
other topics.
9 (Slide.)
10 MR. DONOHEW:
My name is Jack Donohew, the 11 Project Manager for Oyster Creek.
I want to give a 12 presentation on the drywell shell corrosion on the drywell
,3 13 shell for Oyster Creek.
14 Staff became aware of it on November 20th about 15 the wastage of the drywell shell in the lower part of the 16 shell superficially around and just below the downcomers.
17 We had meetings December 1st and December 10th, yesterday, 18 on the problem.
The concern that the Staff has had is the 19 fact that the corrosion of the shell would be below the 20 thickness for which the containment for the drywell would be 21 ;
sound for structural loads, including the design basis 22 accident.
i 23 (Slide.)
(~]
24 l This is a picture of the drywell shell.
The t
25 problem is in the areas down here and all the way around, I
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just below the downcomers.
2 (Slide.)
3 A closer picture is here.
We see the sand cavity 4
down here, where water has been leaking down between the 5
shell and the biological shield going through the sand 6
cavity and out the drain below in five of the ten 7
dowrcomers.
The corrosion has occurred because of the sand 8
being damp up against the drywell shell.
9 MR. MICHELSON:
The X'd in area is filled with 10 what?
11 MR. DONOHEW:
That is firebar D.
That is an 12 installation which was attached to the shell, was
,_s 13 compressible.
14 MR. MICHELSON:
It is not urethane foam then.
15 Some plants use urethane foam.
16 MR. DONOHEW:
I think Oyster Creek is the only 17 one that uses firebar D.
18 MR. S!!EWMON:
Is it permeable to oxygen?
19 MR. DONOHEW:
No, but we have found out from 20 measuring the water that is passed down here that we believe 21 the sand was collecting chlorides and sulfates that were 22 leached out from the firebar D by the water, passing down.
23 f tR. MICI!ELSON:
Is the firebar bonded to the
'~1 24.
shell?
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25 MR. DONOHEW:
Yes.
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MR. MICHELSON:
So you don' t believe there is any 2
water between that and the shell?
3 MR. DONOHEW:
But there could be cracks in the 4
installation.
We don't believe the water just would be 5
passing down the surface.
6 MR. MlCHELSON:
You think it came down along the 7
concrete, in other words?
8 MR. DONOHEW:
It could.
It also could be from 9
the fact of the facts actually getting down and passing 10 through the installation.
11 What this was for is, it was the outer form or 12 the inner form, excuse me, for the biological shield, and 13 then after the shield, the biolcgical shield was in place, 14 the vessel was pressurized, and this was compressed.
And 15 then when the vessel returns to its original dimension 16 again, it turned out there was a gap of about half an inch.
17 MR. MICHELSON:
The word "firebar" infers that 18 this is a fire-resistant installation?
19 MR. DONOHEW:
It was mainly picked because of the 20 fact of compressibility.
21 MR. MICHELSON:
Let me ask you, will it burn?
22 MR. DONOHEW:
No.
23 DR. MOELLER:
The drain that you show is f^)
24 permanent, it is installed?
I 25 MR. DONOHEW:
This is permanent.
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DR. MOELLER:
So you anticipate water?
2 MR. DONOHEW:
Yes.
It would be standard 3
procedure that if you have any area for which you could 4
possibly collect water that you put a drain in.
5 Now this design is different from other 6
licensees.
We surveyed the licensees within my practice, 7
which are the old boilers.
What we find is, this is not the 8
typical design.
Typically, there has been a plate or 9
barrier between the gap up here, where water would come 10 down, and the sand.
There is a drain that comes off, either 11 along in this area or down like this, that would collect the 12 water that would be above the sand.
There would still be 13 this drain, because standard procedure would be to put in a 14 drain at the lower part of the cavity, but I would say, all 15 of the water that would come down for the other sides would 16 come out not having gone into the sand.
17 MR. MICHELSON:
But water can come down and hang 18 up in various areas, if there's cracks or whatever in those 19 barriers.
That doesn' t assure that you can' t have wastage 20 elsewhere.
21 MR. DONOHEW:
The thing being, is that the water 22 !
coming down here would not go through the sand.
23 MR. MICHELSON:
That is right.
True.
^'s 24 MR. SHEWMON:
Tell me again why the sand is i
25 there.
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MR. DONOHEW:
What this is, this was the standard 2
means of providing a transition region between the bottom of 3
the shell.
4 (Slide.)
5 The bottom of the shell, which is physically 6
restrained, held in place.
The remaining part of the shell 7
is not physically restrained.
So the transition region was 8
through that cavity, and the sand acted like a spring to 9
lessen the stresses through here.
10 In the meeting yesterday, in which the licensee 11 was giving us some additional information on measurements 12 that were made on the wall thickness by an ultrasonic 13 device, plus borings that were made through the shell in 14 seven places, there was a presentation where, by removing 15 the sand, the membrane stresses would be much higher, if the 16 sand wasn't there.
It acts as a spring and prevents 17 unrestrained movement of the shell.
18 MR. MICHELSON:
But it is still a movement of the 19 shell at that point.
20 MR. DONOHEW:
Yes.
But this is partially 21 restrained.
This is unrestrained.
22 l MR. ETHERINGTON:
What is the source of the i
23 water?
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24 l MR. DONOHEW:
Originally, in terms of what led to
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surveillance by ultrasonic measures through this, it was the 2
fact that there was a leak, which has now been determined is 3
a leak -.
4 (Slide.)
in this area.
5 6
During resealing there is a seal that is put 7
across here to hold the water, so the water tb.
would be in 8
the refueling cavity wouldn' t go down.
There was a leak 9
through that, and it was draining down through here.
It was 10 coming out at least through two of the penetration drains up 11 here, but also coming down through here.
When it was 12 determined where this was, and the problem was solved, they 13 then went and took measurements at the 51st elevation and 14 also down here below the downcomers, because they knew it 15 would drain through the cavity, and there was no indication 16 of wastage at the 51st elevation, but then they found 17 indications of wastage down below the downcomers.
18 And you have now gone all the way around, 19 hundreds of measurements all the way around the drywell.
20 They have taken seven plugs out.
21 MR. MICHELSON:
Is that an inflatable bellows or 22 a metallic?
23 MR. DONOHEW:
Me tallic bellows, but also this fm 24 floor, they chipped up moved troughs in this floor to make l
25 i measurements down in this area, which is below the concrete ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
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barrier.
- 2 MR. WYLIE:
This material goes all the way from 3
the drain all the way to the top of the containment?
4 MR. DONOHEW:
Yes.
There is other insulation
.5 here, which is ' fiber glass around the downcomers, but it 15 goes all the way up to the top of the drywell.
7 MR. WYLIE:
Is that electrical insulation, as 8
well as thermal?
9 MR. DONOHEW:
It should be, because it is like 10 concrete.
So I don't think it would be electrically 11 conductive.
12 MR. WYLIE:
If that is the only place it can flow O
13 of f --
14 MR. MICHELSON:
That is one of the places it will 15 flow off, unless they have put in some kind of grounding 16 system.
17 MR. DONOHEW:
There have been measurements of the 18 ground potential between the sand and the shell and the 19 drain and the ground.
There is not indications of any 20 potential.
21 DR. SHEWMON:
You don' t happen to know where the 22 cathode is, do you?
The annodes, where you are forming the 23 rust and chewing up metal?
The electrons have to go 24 someplace.
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25 MR. WYLIE:
All of these plants have got coffer ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
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ground nets below them.
If they are connected to that 2
coffer ground net, you've got an annode there with the 3
coffer ground net.
4 DR. SHEWMON:
The cathode is what I am interested 5
in.
6 MR. WYLIE:
I am sorry.
That is your annode.
7 The cathode is the coffer.
8 MR. DONOHEW:
At this point, the licensee has 9
given to the staf f through two meetings the measurements 10 they have made.
There is general wastage in two of the bays 11 which are below the downcomers on the order of 1/4 of an 12 inch.
Right now what the licensee is doing, he is 13 assimilating the measurements he's made to determine what 14 would be an average thickness, what additional corrosion 15 would be allowed for for whatever period of time that he 16 would consider operating for another inspection, and then he 17 would come back to Staff with the fact that if he decides to 18 restart without the fix, he has not come up with a plan at 19 this point, in terms of a fix, a repair to the shell.
20 MR. MICHELSON:
Have they actually looked at 21 the other areas where they have seen water coming outtof the i
22 1 drain, to see if there is any wastage?
23 MR. DONOHEW:
They have looked all the way around
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24 the drywell at that elevation.
They have looked at the 51st 25 elevation, and they have looked at every other bay.
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MR. MICHELSON:
They have looked at various 2
points up the elevation.
3 MR. DONOHEW:
They have not gone up the side.
4 They have just --
5 MR. MICHELSON:
Why do you believe it's only 6
where the sand is?
Why do you believe the wastage potential 7
is only where the sand is?
8 MR. DONOHEW:
I guess I don' t have an answer to 9
that.
10 MR. MICHELSON:
Is there any reason to believe 11 that the water in the process of coming down, in fact, isn't 12 drained out at other locations, as you said, that it can' t 13 corrode the containment anywhere else?
14 I guess the main argument might be the bonding of I
15 that insulation to the metal.
If it is a good bonding, and 16 it hasn' t cracked, it's protecting the metal, so to speak.
17 MR. JORDAN:
This is Ed Jordan.
18 I also understand that there is a red lead 19 coating on that portion.
20 MR. DONOHEW:
I expect there is red lead down 21 where the sand is too.
22 MR. DONOHEW:
There is red lead for about half of 23 the area, going all the way around.
The indications of r'
24 corrosion would also be where there was the red lead paint.
25 MR. MICHELSON:
It was not a major factor.
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MR. DONOHEW:
The licensee has not seen it, I 2
would say, from what I've looked at.
There wouldn' t be an 3
indication where you could say above where the red lead 4
paint was, that there is even less corrosion.
It just looks 5
-- it is not all the way around.
It is like in two bays, 6
not directly opposite, but not adjacent, in which there has 7
been the general wastage.
8 DR. SHEWMON:
What defines a bay?
9 MR. DONOHEW:
In front of each downcomer, there 10 is a sector.
11 DR. SHEWMON:
How many downcomers are there?
12 MR. DONOHEW:
Ten.
13 DR. SHEWMON:
So two out of ten have experienced 14 this corrosion and the other eight have not?
15 MR. DONOHEW:
There has been, I'd say, five that 16 have not.
There's been two to maybe part of three, which 17 has been significant wastage, and then the two others have 18 had minor wastage.
19 MR. EBERSOLE:
Could you comment on the net 20 reduction in pressure capability and the intent now of the 21 operator to operate during an interim period?
22 MR. DONOHEW:
The licensee hasn' t presented his 23 program, as far as the restart.
He has to do that first.
24 As he stated in the meeting yesterday, a lot of the
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night.
They haven' t had a chance to go through it to come 2
up with results that they would present to the Staff.
They 3
went through what they saw was their plan and what w >uld be 4
the average thickness of the shell to the calculations they 5
would be doing, but they haven' t made that decision yet that 6
they would restart the plant before repairing the areas.
7 MR. EBERSOLE:
It is in a high stress area, 8
because that is what the transition material is for.
9 So I guess they will come up with some estimate 10 of the degradation pressure capability and get it repaired 11 on whatever they are going to do.
12 MR. DONOHEW:
They gave results of one
~ '
13 calculation, which was not intended to be the basis for 14 anything, but they give the Staf f a feeling about how thick 15 or how thin the shell could be.
They did calculations for 16 7/10 of an inch, in which they had a notch in the vessel, in 17 this area right here.
18 (Slide.)
19 Where this was 7/10, and then the remaining shell 20 was the thickness that either they had measured, or it was 21 nominal, and the calculations seemed to indicate -- at the 3
l 22 {
moment I think that is the best we can say -- seemed to 23 indicate that the 7/10 of an inch would be sufficient.
'N 24 Now the licensee would be basing the 7/10 plus an s
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operate before there would be another inspection or the 2
actual repair, but it appeared to be that a number as small 3
as 7/10 of an inch, where the average wastage or the average 4
thickness in the areas may be.8 to.9, maybe.95.
I am not 5
sure.
No numbers have actually been calculated.
6 It appears to have a basis that they could start 7
up.
8 MR. MICHELSON:
On your slide, you indicate three 9
dif ferent materials in the annulus up above.
10 Can you tell me, does that means, depending on 11 the location, it is one or another, or what?
I thought it 12 was the firebar, but there is fiber glass alone, fiber glass
~
13 ducted insulation and firebar D.
14 Does that mean there is a laminar build up of 15 those?
The slide I've got in my hand -- maybe it is off the 16 slide you produced, though.
There's three indicated 17 materials there.
18 MR. DONOHEW:
The fiber bar D is the one that the 19 licensee identified as being on there.
I don't know about i
20 the fiber glass.
What the licensee was identifying was 21 fiber bar D.
22 MR. MICHELSON:
It's all just that?
Godd.
23 MR. DONOHEW:
Let's see.
The vapor seal duct.
~'
24 It's not the Corning fiber glass or the vapor seal duct.
25 I
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MR. EBERSOLE:
Thank you.
Anything further?
Is 2
that it?
We're probably going to patch it, Arthur, but we 3
don't know that yet.
4 MR. WYLIE:
These thin places, they're all down 5
in this region here.
6 MR. DONOHEW:
That's right.
7 MR. EBERSOLE:
I have no way of estimating what 8
the cure will be.
Do you?
9 (Slide.)
10 MR. DONOHEW:
This runs about three feet.
What 11 you would find in the areas where the general wastage would 12 be like two feet, they're quite large.
13 MR. EBERSOLE:
In response to a question here, if 14 they need to, they can patch the whole perimeter if they 15 have to?
16 MR. DONOHEW:
Yes.
What they would have to do is 17 put a doubler plate here with the f act that the calculations 18 showed the effect of the stresses for, I guess, either 19 partial circumvention around or complete circumvention 20 around.
21 The only thing is it would take a very long 22 time.
I think the licensee is looking at the fact can they 23 themselves believe they have enough remaining thickness to go to the 12 R outage, where then they will have had~all the 24 '
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like that during the 12-hour outage.
2 MR. ROSENTHAL:
Jack, perhaps you'd like to just 3
use your last slide.
We wanted to bring the issue before 4
the ACRS because it was a threat to containment at a time 5
when people are talking about taking credit where 6
containment strengths are in excess of design.
7 This is an area where I, for one, know of no 8
requirements for testing, and we're clearly not going to fix 9
the problem this afternoon.
10 (Slide.)
11 DR. SIESS:
Can they repair that without stress-12 relieving?
)
13 MR. DONOHEW:
I don' t know.
14 DR. SHEWMON:
Harold, you wouldn't take any 15 stress relief on that, would they?
16 MR. ETHERINGTON:
I don't think so.
17 DR. SHEWMON:
Knowing Hans had a problem, they 18 decided to go fix the outside rather than the inside.
19 MR. DONOHEW:
We have no access to it from the 20 outside.
1 21 DR. SIESS:
They didn' t either.
They cut 22 through six feet of concrete.
23 MR. DONOHEW:
Unfortunately, on this one --
's 24 -
MR. ROSENTHAL:
Excuse me.
Should the committee
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25 desire, we would be glad two months from now, at our next i
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meeting, to give you a short followup on how this issue was 2
resolved at this plant.
3 Jack, you had some conclusions about plants in 4
general based on this slide.
5 MR. DONOHEW:
At least from the plants with no 6
boilers, the design was different.
The other boilers always 7
treat the design dif ferently.
And where measurements had 8
been made, like Dresden II and III and Monticello, and in 9
Quad Cities I and II, I don't know how many measurements 10 were made.
11 I do know there were several, not in just one 12 area.
And on Monticello is part of looking at the plant
~s 13 operate for longer than their present operating period.
14 There wasn't any indication of wastage.
15 And I think the thing is, the fact that Oyster 16 Creek allowed the water to go through the sand, and the fact 17 of that area not being specifically protected, or at least 18 better protected than just red lead paint for part of the 19 surface, I think, makes the difference.
20 I think the sand has been wet and damp for 21 probably the entire operating lifetime.
The licensee said 22 there were large amounts of water that went through that 23 area during construction.
~,
24 I think that sand has always been damp.
And the 25 fact that the corrosion rates which they are measuring, if ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
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you average them over 17 years, are like 20 mils per year.
2 That's the numbers that were reported by the licensee as 3
being what you would expect for a carbon steel vessel in an 4
aqueous environment, at the temperatures you would expect 5
fromr there.
6 So I think this is what they suffered.
7 MR. ROSENTHAL:
The next speaker is Roger 8
Woodruff of IE.
9 DR. OKRENT:
It would be interesting at some 10 future time to see whether the staff thinks there tre any 11 broader implications on containment integrity.
12 In other words, there may be other ways in which 13 you could have an attack that was undetected and 14 unmonitored.
15 MR. EBERSOLE:
Would it include vessels and 16 pipes?
17 DR. OKRENT:
I'm just thinking of things 18 essential to containment.
19 MR. MICHELSON:
Are you aware of whether 20 utilities have evidence of water draining from other 21 penetration drain points?
Is this the only leaky seal in 22 the country, or are there others?
23 MR. JORDAN:
I'm sure there have been others.
As rx 24 you know, Dresden got wet because of the fire.
So the staff t
.a 25 is clearly sensitive to the issue of the fact that there's ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
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not an IST program of looking at those vessel shelves.
2 We'll give you a report back on this plant.
- And, 3
in two months, we'll give you a report on the other actions 4
the staff is taking.
5 MR. WYLIE:
Do you attribute this to basically 6
what chemical corrosion and probably galvanic corrosion?
7 MR. DONOHEW:
At this point, that's under review 8
by the licensee.
They've got G.E. working on it as 9
consul tan ts.
That's part of what we want to know if we go 10 through a process of restudying the plant.
11 They're also looking at microbiology attack 12 because they did find evidence of microbes in the soil.
At 13 the moment, the licensee is not ready to say it's one type 14 of corrosion or another.
That's part of the review that's 15 going to be done for the restart.
16 DR. OKRENT:
While I'm asking the staff to look 17 into things, I wonder if they would check into a paper which 18 was given at the last ANS meeting in Washington.
It's on 19 page 348 of the transactions.
It's by T.L.
Chu and 20 S.
Stoyanov of BNL, Brookhaven National Laboratory.
21 It's called A New Scenario For Intersystem LOCAs 22 in BWRs, a new scenario for intersystem LOCAs in BWRs.
23 The final paragraph says:
24 "To summarize, the frequency of intersystem LOCA s
25 in the feedwater line of a BWR is estimated to be of the ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
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order of 10 to the minus 3 per year."
2 So that's an intriguing number.
I didn't read 3
anything about it in NUREG 1150.
4 Should I be concerned about this?
Is the 5
question:
If so, why?
If not, why not?
6 MR. JORDAN:
We'll pass it on.
7 DR. OKRENT:
Thank you.
8 MR. WOODRRUFF:
My name is Roger Woodruff, with 9
the Office of Inspection and Enforcement.
I'm going to 10 addrress a recent event at Byron II, which occurred on 11 November 20th of this year and involves the loss of all 12 component cooling water.
13 Byron II has not operated.
They are preparing 14 the plant for its first criticality.
In the course of this 15 event, they discovered that a single failure could cause 16 loss of all componei. cooling water and thereby jeopardize 17 for a short period of time the residual heat removal 18 system.
19 A safety valve on the component cooling water 20 side of an excess let-down heat exchanger lif ted during an 21 evolution that involved shutting down one component cooling 22 water pump and starting up another, which had resulted in a 23 pressure surge.
<~
24 i The relief valve stuck open.
The component 25 cooling water pump continued to pump.
Water was pumped out ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
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of the system into the floor drain.
2 The pump continued to operate until its half of 3
the surge tank was tripped, until the pump tripped on low 4
pressure in its half of the surge tank.
5 A second pump started automatically and pumped 6
until it, too, stopped on low level.
There was, of course, 7
no jeopardy to the system, since it had not operated.
8 However, the licensee was concerned and notified 9
the Commission promptly.
The licensee manually isolated 10 that portion of the system which was responsible for the t
11 leak, refilled the component cooling water system and return 12 to normal.
13 The component cooling water was lost for about 12 14 minutes.
15 (Slide.)
16 This obviously is a very, very simplified 17 schematic of the system.
Byron has a group of five 18 component cooling waters which are cross-connected on a 19 section on the discharge sides which supply water to three 20 component cooling water heat exchangers; again, cross-21 connected on both sides.
22 These component cooling water heat exchangers 23 supply water to both units one and two.
For unit two, there 24 are two redundant residual heat removal trains which are 25 connected back to the component cooling water pumps.
ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
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Here the component cooling water is serving the 2
2R/HR heat exchangers and provides cooling for the two RHR f
3 pumps.
4 This portion of the system has been designed to 5
accommodate the single active or passive failure.
The same 6
is true up on the unit one side of the plant.
This portion 7
of the system from here out and back to this point cannot 8
accommodate either the single active or the single passive 9
failure.
10 Within containment, cooling is being provided to 11 the reactor coolant pumps, specifically to their thermal 12 barriers and seals, and to the two excess let-down heat 13 exchangers.
14 The excess letdown heat exchanges and to the 15 reactor coolant pump thermal barriers are provided with 16 relief valves sized such that if this line were blocked and 17 this line were blocked that the heat load could be 18 accommodated without rupturing the heat exchanger.
19 So we have here then at least six known paths, 20 two for excess letdown heat exchangers and four for the 21 pumps for a single failure to drain component cooling water 22 to the floor drains.
23 We have here and here containment isolation x
24 valves.
In the event of a safety injection, this portion of v
25 the system would be isolated.
No jeopardy to the component ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
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cooling water system.
2 However, if there were to be a break in this 3
single pipe or in that single pipe, there would be loss of 4
component cooling water, which would require, to the best of 5
my knowledge, manual action by the operator.
6 (Slide.)
7 We and IE have looked at the FSAR and the system 8
as it exists does conform to the FSAR.
We do intend to 9
issue an information notice on this topic.
And we have had 10 discussions with NRR and NRR is reviewing the conformance of 11 the system to regulatory requirements.
12 They want the opportunity to rethink this a 13 little bit.
14 Questions?
15 MR. ETHERINGTON:
The original concept of the 16 filtered cooling systems was that they would be two 17 completely separate systems, preferrably with senarate 18 sewage stack.
19 But the fact that you lose all the cooling water, 20 does tl.at mean that this concept of separate systems is 21 broken down by the interconnection?
22 MR. WOODRUFF:
That's true.
23 MR. ETHERINGTON:
Then there's something
,~
24 philosophically wrong, isn' t there?
25 MR. WOODRUFF:
I can' t defend it, but I think the ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
3G 347-37f X)
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notion that's been taken is that isolation here with the 2
containment isolation valves makes the system okay.
3 And I think the question that needs to be 4
addressed is:
What about this line and this line?
5 I'm sure that's a question that NRR will 6
address.
7 MR. ROSENTHAL:
I'd like to point out this is a 8
Sargent and Lundy plant and Sargent and Lundy plants 9
typically have sharing of CCW systems, and rather intricate 10 piping arrangements.
11 We saw problems at Zion.
We tried to analyze 12 Zion also.
There's Zion, Byron, Braidwood.
Those are the 13 ones specifically.
14 But, in any case, you have five pumps in parallel 15 to multiple headers, a lot of cross-ties and a lot of 16 isolation valves.
And by proper closing of the isolation 17 valves, you can make this into what looks like a two-train 18 system with the isolation valves not open and two pumps 19 running.
20 And two in standby plus a swing-in standby.
It's 21 very hard to look at this as a two-train system.
22 MR. ETHERINGTON:
It doesn' t look like a good 23 idea at all.
24 MR. MICHELSON:
It's inferred that the essential 25 service water backs up somehow to the CCW.
Is that correct?
ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
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MR. WOODRUFF:
The essential service water 2
providers go into into the CCW heat exchangers.
3 MR. MICHELSON:
Okay.
I'm sorry.
Just to the 4
heat exchangers.
5 MR. ROSENTHAL:
At Byron, the things like the 6
diesels are cooled directly from the essential service 7
water.
On the other hand, the SI pumps are cooled by loop 8
oil coolcrs, which are cooled off the CCW.
9 MR. MICHELSON:
What is on the CCW on the list, 10 to give an idea if it's important?
11 MR. ROSENTHAL:
SI charging.
RHR.
All the good 12 stuff.
13 MR. MICHELSON:
But not the diesels?
14 MR. ROSENTHAL:
The diesels are directly on 15 '
essential service water and the auxilliary feedwater is 16 independent of CCW.
17 MR. MICHELSON:
How about the environmental 18 controls, the chilled water systems?
Are they component 19 cooling water?
20 MR. ROSENTHAL:
CCW.
CCW is an engineered safety 21 feature.
22 MR. EBERSOLE:
Could you comment on the effect of 23 the reactor coolant pump seals when you execute blowdown?
~
24 Do they start to leak?
(_)
l 25 j MR. WOODRUFF:
The presumption is that the pumps l
l ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
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are shut down.
2 MR. EBERSOLE:
Shutting down a pump sometimes 3
makes leaking worse.
Now you don' t have a spiral pattern of 4
leaking.
So that doesn' t make me believe the seal pump 5
would leak cooling water.
6 MR. MICHELSON:
If they lost CVC for the cooling 7
water, they'd lose sealed cooling anyway.
8 MR. EBERSOLE:
In the process of isolation, it 9
may cause the seals to be lost.
Does anybody know whether 10 it does?
11 MR. ROSENTHAL:
The coal, we looked at this at 12 Byron.
And the seal cooling comes from a charging system 13 and from a CCW system.
The charging system in turn depends 14 on the CCW such that, given f ailure of CCW, you do fail the 15 two -- the barrier coolers.
16 MR. EBERSOLE:
It seems to me this is clearly a 17 deficient design.
What is contemplated to fix it?
18 MR. WOODRUFF:
Bill LeFerre in NRR will be doing 19 the review on this, which will be starting shortly.
20 DR. OKRENT:
It presumably meets the SRP, I have 21 to assume.
22 MR. MICHELSON:
At one time, CCW wasn' t all that i
I 23 important.
In fact, there was a time when we almost wanted
~
24 to make it a nonsafety system.
But, then things started 25 creeping in.
Environments.
They held more things on it, ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
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partly because it's nice, clean water instead of dirty 2
water.
3 And the first thing you know, it became safety.
4 I think there's at least one plant I'm very f amiliar with in 5
the country that is not unlike this.
It has the same 6
problems, same deficiencies.
You've got to move fast.
7 8
9 10 11 12 i
v 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 1
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25 ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
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MR. EBERSOLE:
It sounds like Brown's Ferry.
2 MR. MICHELSON:
No.
Sequoya.
It doesn' t have 3
things hanging n it.
4 MR. EBERSOLE:
But it looks like this inside of 5
containment?
6 DR. KERR:
Does this system meet existing 7
regulation, or is that yet to be determined?
8 MR. ROSENTHAL:
It meets existing regulations as 9
we now understand it.
The plant is being looked at again.
10 Please note that the event happened on Novemberr 20th.
11 We're trying to bring you a selection.
12 DR. KERR:
I was not being critical.
13 MR. WOODRUFF:
Let me answer it this way.
The 14 plant was reviewed, this area was reviewed.
The plant was 15 licensed.
NRR has said to us:
Please give us time to go 16 back and look at this again and rethink.
17 MR. EBERSOLE:
I wonder if we could close this 18 off by saying that we're going to follow up on it.
Okay?
19 MR. ROSENTHAL:
Yes, sir.
20 MR. EBERSOLE:
That keeps us on schedule.
21 MR. ROSENTHAL:
The next presenter is Henry 22 Bailey, to talk again about a material / chemistry type 23 problem.
x 24 MR. EBERSOLE:
Thank you.
25 (Slide.)
ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
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DR. OKRENT:
All you guys who think that existing 2
plants are okay, just keep in mind this presentation.
3 That's all I say.
4 DR. KERR:
It's one of the safest plan s in the e
5 country.
It doesn' t-have any fuel in it.
6 DR. OKRENT:
I'm sorrry, but there are others
'7 we've heard who have been running with similar systems.
The 8
same goes for the previous instance, which I think is very 9
interesting and not, in my opinon, it's not an unexpected 10 event.
11.
What we saw at Oyster Creek.
12 DR. SHEWMON:
If you put it on auxilliary scram
, 's.d 13 circuit or a vent containment on it, all these problems 14 would go away?
Is that what you're saying?
15 Oh, let's go on with the presentation and we'll 16 take this up on our own time.
17 DR. OKRENT:
Let me think....no.
18 (Laughter.)
(.
19 DR. OKRENT:
It wouldn' t help either of those.
20 MR. BAILEY:
I'd like to discuss a problem that 21 occurred at ANO-I back on October 22nd.
It involved the 22 operation injection nozzle, some corrosion that occurred due 23 to boric acid.
24 The plant was in cold shutdown through its 25 performance surveillance of the HPI nozzle thermal sleeves.
ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202-347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-336-(M6
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.I believe you're familiar with the thermal 2
sleeves that are in these nozzles.
There have been some 3
problems with those in the past.
So there's a commitment 4
from the licensee to radiograph these periodically.
5 The insulation was removed from the A-nozzle.
6 That's when the wastage was revealed.
Maybe I should show 7
you a picture of this thing.
8 (S l ide. )
9 This is the diagram.
This is the reactor coolant 10 cold leg.
And there you have the nozzle and each one of the 11 four cold legs is carbon steel down to this weld here.
This 12 is carbon steel.
).
13 The reactor cold leg is carbon steel.
The nozzle 14 is carbon steel, or low alloy carbon steel.
Pyretic steel, 15 actually.
This is stainless from this weld back up here.
16 The mechanism apparently was we had an isolation 17 valve up here that was leaking.
The coolant leaked out of 18
-the valve down under the insulation.
The insulation came up 19 to just about where the valve is here.
20 It leaked from the bonnet under the metallic 21 insulation, down the stainless steel line.
It dribbled over 22 under this nozzle to this carbon steel and caused the 23 corrosion wastage to about the bottom 20 percent of this r~s 24 nozzle here.
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25 This darkened area here is meant to indicate the ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202 Nationwide Coserage 800 336-6646
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area with the corrosion, or wastage extended out six inches 2
on down to the cold leg itself.
3 The deepest corrosion was about a half inch here, 4
right where this weld is, adjacent to this weld.
The entire 5
thickness here, including cladding on the inside, was only 6
about three-quarters of an inch.
7 The cladding is about three-sixteenths inch 8
nominal, so you're getting very close to the cladding at 9
this one place here.
10 MR. MICHELSON:
How much of the circumference was 11 involved?
12 MR. BAILEY:
I'd say the bottom 20 percent.
I
%)
13 had some pictures that I'd hoped to bring, but another party 14 has them.
15 DR. SHEWMON:
You referred to a thermal sleeve.
16 What of this is called the thermal sleeve?
17 MR. BAILEY:
The thermal sleeve is inside the 18 nozzle here.
I have another diagram if anyone's interested 19 in looking at it now or later, of the thermal sleeve 20 itself.
21 There's a thermal sleeve in here to cut down on 22 the thermal stresses this nozzle sees.
23 DR. SHEWMON:
The leak in this came from the 24 valve?
25 MR. BAILEY:
The leak was external leakage from t
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the valve bond here.
2 DR. SHEWMON:
So you don' t have a thermal sleeve, 3
except that's where you found it?
4 MR. BAILEY:
The only reason I mentioned the 5
thermal sleeve was that they had the insulation off this 6
entire area due to an NDT or a radiograph of this thermal 7
sleeve in the nozzle.
8 DR. OKRENT:
It shows we need more thermal 9
10 (Laughter.)
11 MR. EBERSOLE:
Even if you would have been out 12 looking for trouble in thermal sleeves, we might not have 13 seen this one.
14 MR. BAILEY:
That's true, at least for this 15 case.
We've seen a lot of boric acid-induced wastage over 16 the years.
But, most of it, almost all of it up to this 17 point, except for one or two other cases, has been on 18 threaded fasteners.
19 And the threaded fasteners have been cases where 20 you've got a stainless steel line, then you have a threaded 21 fastener, which is a low alloy carbon steel, which is 22 !
acceptable to boric acid corrosion.
l 23 That's where the problem generally has been.
24 We've only seen a couple of cases like this.
Back in
'82,
^'
~s 25 there was an I&E bulletin put out which discussed boric acid ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
2tC-347-3700 Nationwide Coserage Mn 346M6
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$0600306 DAV/bc 1
corrosion and threaded fasteners.
And in '83, in 2
recognition of this problem, ASME Code Section 11 was 3
revised to require more extensive examination of systems 4
containing boric acid.
5 And part of that said, if you've got a threaded 6
f astener that's covered up with insulation, you've got to 7
take the insulation off periodically and look at it.
And it 8
says if you've got any joints of insulation that show any 9
red oxide or discoloration, you've got to take that off 10 whether you've got the threaded fastener or not.
11 MR. MICHELSON:
That's every three years though, 12 isn' t it?
13 MR. BAILEY:
I don't remember any time frequency 14 on that.
It turns out, after this problem was discovered, 15 they went back and looked at the insulation along here, and 16 along the seams there was plenty of discoloration.
17 It was trying to tell them something, but it was 18 missed.
And they had to take the insulation off.
19 MR. MICHELSON:
What kind of bonnet fasteners, if 20 any, were there on that?
21 MR. BAILEY:
I think that's a low alloy high i
22 strength carbon steel.
23 MR. MICHELSON:
It was a bolted bonnet.
(^)
24 MR. BAILEY:
Yes, it's a bolted bonnet.
L.J l
I 25 MR. MICHELSON:
And there was no evidence whether l
ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
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boric acid was leaking?
2 MR. BAILEY:
The' darned insulation was up here so 3
- closo.
4
-MR. MICHELSON:
It just didn' t happen to drip 5
over any fasteners maybe.
6 MR. BAILEY:
As it turned out, it didn' t do any-7 appreciable damage to the fasteners in this case, and it 8
only had a short way to go until it got under the 9'
insulation.
So it was just out of sight, out of mind almost 10 from the point of leakage.
11 The other three nozzles, of course, were 12 immediately inspected and there wasn' t any indication of O
13 damage to those.
This nozzle has been repaired by grinding 14 out all indications, then rebuilding by welding to get up to 15 the minimum wall thickness for the codes.
16 And in addition to, as a followup, we have an 17 information notice which is currently under preparation and 18' about ready to go out.
19 MR. MICHELSON:
In view of the temperature that 20 that nc emally operates at, isn' t it a little surprising that 21 boric ac:d, laden water, ever got to the nozzle?
22 MR. BAILEY:
That was a little bit of a puzzle 23 for a while.
(~g 24 MR. MICHELSON:
You' re talking about awfully
\\-)
25 small leaks.
l ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
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MR. BAILEY:
This line doesn't normally have a 2
flow through it.
The nozzle's hot.
The thinking is --
3 MR. MICHELSON:
That safe end is certainly hot.
4 MR. BAILEY:
That's the close tolerance here.
5 See, the insulation lies on the top of this and it has a 6
little gap under here.
The water came in here and the hot 7
nozzle started evaporating the water.
8 That caused boric acid crystals to form and that 9
caused the area in here to sort of dam up and create a 10 little pool.
And the pool of borated water concentrated and 11 the ph got lower.
And it got to be a stronger solution.
12 MR. MICHELSON:
It's all metallic insulation.
13 MR. BAILEY:
Apparently, it was hot enough to do 14 some evaporation but i t was not hot enough to completely 15 keep the surface dry.
16 The experience has been that this corrosion is 17 greatly enhanced where the surface is wetted.
18 MR. EBERSOLE:
This and the Oyster Creek case 19 have a commonality in that we're kind of looking at the 20 things we always want to look at to find, if we may, and we 21 just found them.
22 Does this promote a view toward further 23 inspection being driven by things other than just the 24,
primary purpose here, which is to look at the thermal f
' _J l
25 I sleeve?
We found something else.
{
ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
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What was the original reason you looked at 2
Oyster Creek?
What promoted looking at that?
3 MR. JORDAN:
We had seen evidence of water 4
leakage.
5 MR. EBERSOLE:
Here it was just a routine 6
investigation.
The whole thing suggests maybe we should 7
look more extensively at things hidden by insulation that 8
are not normally ever looked at.
,,l 9
It seems to me these are two lessons of looking 10 into areas that we would otherwise not be looking at.
11 MR. ROSENTHAL:
Will you address the rapidity?
12 MR. BAILEY:
I knew there was a point that I 13 needed to make.
This valve was first found leaking in 14 August of
'85.
It was repaired in September of
'85, while 15 they were down.
About eight days later during plant 16 s ta r t-up, the leak was observed again.
And the leak was 17 very small.
When it was measured again, it was like.09 18 gallons per minute.
19 So, at that point, the decision was apparently
~
20 made to operate for a while with the valve leaking.09 gpm, 21 which is well within tech specs, identified.
And the valve 22 leaked until the following February, when the plant was shut 23 down.
~x 24 At that time, the valve was repaired and the 25 plant continued to operate.
However, no one took off any ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202447-37th)
Nationwide Cos erage 8(XL31MM6
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insulation to do an inspection at that time.
2 Then, in October, when they did take off 3
insulation, is when the corrosion or wastage was observed.
4 So we're talking about a period here like six months that 5
this occurred in.
6 This is one of the things that makes this 7
serious.
We view it as the fact the quickness with which 8
this apparently occurred.
[
9 MR. EBERSOLE:
It's going to leak again, so what 1
10 are you going to do about it.
f r
11 MR. BAILEY:
I'm sure if this leaks again, they
'2 will be vigilant,
+
1 is j'i e'
' 13 MR. EBERSOLE:
We need a controlled leakoff.
14 MR. BAILEY:
That's a good point.
For this 15 particular nozzle, the insulation comes right up to the 16 valve.
They designed what's called a collar here that fits 17 snugly around the pipe.
And then slopes down to cover the
/
18 top of the insulation so that any leakage there would shed 19 off the insulation and not go on to this.
20 They've done this for all four.
21 MR. MICHELSON:
A lot of valves in similar cases 22 will be totally insulated.
That could also add leaks that y
/
23 would get under and run back to the lower points.
I 24 MR. BAILEY:
The 1983 version of the ASME Code 25 says that if you've got a valve that's totally isolated and e
1 ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
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$0600311 DAV/bc 1
you see any evidence of leakage, you've got to take it off 2
and observe it.
3 MR. MICHELSON:
Nothing is saying that in a 4
totall insulated valve, that4you will observe the leakage.
5 At least where it's leaking..You might eventually observe 6
it so many feet away. +
7 MR. BAILEY:
The code is a little weak in this 8
place.
The code.'says:
You take it off and look here.
But 9
it doesn' t say you try to trace wh'ere the leakage is going 10 to.
11 MR. MICHELSON:
Apparently, you can?t see it even 12 when you're.looking right at it without the insulation 13 covering.
14 MR. BAILEY:
I think the' code there could stand 15 some improvement.
16 MR. EBERSOLE:
Any comment on the event or the 17 action?
Is there any further action other than the repair?
18 DR. SHEWMON:
What will the repair be?
Can they 19 butter that over?-
20 MR. BAILSY:
They've already done the repair.
21 They ground it out and built it out by rewelding.
And 22 they've already done the UT to verify that it was good 23 welding.
em 24 MR. MICHELSON:
Did they have to heat-treat that?
25 MR. BAILEY:
No, they didn' t hea t-treat it.
ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
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MR. EBERSOLE:
Any questions?
2 DR. OKRENT:
We'll hear in the future whether or 3
not there are generic implications, or not?
4 MR. JORDAN:
This is a case where we issued an 5
information notice to advise industry.
And then I think the 6
other actions would be possibly through code type things.
7 The unique thing here is to have the boric acid 8
solution that's coming down on carbon steel in sections.
9 Most of the piping elsewhere is stainless steel.
10 In this particular case, the section we' re on is 11 carbon steel.
12 DR. OKRENT:
I can' t really tell whether I should 13 assume that because you've put out an information notice 14 advising industry the issue will be dealt with at all plants 15 in the proper way, how do I ascertain that?
16 MR. JORDAN:
There is not a closed loop on every 17 plant with information notices.
So we are conveying the 18 info rma tion, and it is more their consideration if a 19 regulatory fix is needed in terms of code standards or 20 regulation changes.
21 Then the staff still has that to do.
But, for 22 the alert licensee, it should bring it to their attention to 23 put it into the system.
3 24 Many of the reports we get subsequent to one 25 event are based on followup actions that the licensees take ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202-347 3700 Natioilwidt Courage muk33Mw
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on the information notices.
They've been very productive, 2
but it is not a closed loop.
3 MR. MICHELSON:
The ADOD study was issued a while 4
back about how well industry was responding to items which t
5 do not require action, which the information notice does 6
not.
The response apparently hasn' t been very good 7
according to that report.
8 Maybe you' re saying that's not good.
9 MR. JORDAN:
The ADOD report stated that the 10 response was good for the information notices.
11 MR. MICHELSON:
Requiring licensee actions.
Does s
12 this one require a licensee action?
13 MR. JORDAN:
The information notices never 14 require a licensee action.
15 MR. MICHELSON:
Some day we'll have a meeting of 16 the appropriate subcommittee that deals with that and we can 17 get into that ADOD report.
18 Dr. Moeller read it and had a great deal of 19 interest in it also.
I d id.
And I'd like to get the views, 20 because it leaves one with a very cold feeling about how 21 well industry responds to information notices.
22 l 2 3 l-s 24 x
25 ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
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$0600401 41 DAVbur 1
MR. JORDAN:
You have to read it again because it 2
is the operating events that they weren' t responding to.
3 MR. MICHELSON:
This is an operating event, I 4
thought.
5 MR. JORDAN:
I am sorry, the publication from 6
ADOD called Operating Events was not getting a response.
7 MR. MICHELSON:
They cited information notices 8
among things that were cited as not being responded to.
We 9
need to discuss it in detail.
10 I think that is the crux of the question.
f 11 DR. OKRENT:
I am not sure at the moment how the 12 staf f decides that giving out an information notice is 13 adequate.
14 Let me push that a little bit.
15 Does the backfitting rule in any way inhibit you 16 f rom going beyond an information notice?
17 MR. JORDAN:
The backfitting rule certainly 18 causes the staff to consider carefully what the costs and 19 the benefits are, to decide whether there is a need for a 20 new regulatory requirement or a specific requirement of the 21 licensees.
We do take that seriously.
22 There are very large numbers of actions that 23 industry takes based on information that is provided that 24 don' t have loop closure, and the risk that we all have is 25 l not having a record that each licensee has done this ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
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particular thing.
2 MR. ROSENTHAL:
I&E bulletins and/or generic 3
letters are backed up by regulatory analysis and 4
cost / benefit studies.
5 IN's are issued based on our judgment of the 6
significance of an event and how broad-scale it might be.
7 MR. JORDAN:
For instance, there were about 100 8
information notices issued last year.
If we required each 9
licensee to respond to each of those, to tell us what they 10 were doing with respect to each of those, and to have a 11 continuous follow-up on each of those issues, then we have 12 created a very large paper burden.
13 One has to weigh the safety benefits of that 14 degree of loop closure.
So we have developed a scheme.
15 MR. ROSENTHAL:
One does go out to the regions 16 then to ask are resident inspectors and inspectors looking 17 at licensing programs and following up on notices and 18 bulletins.
19 DR. OKRENT:
One can do a lot of things.
20 MR. ROSENTHAL:
And we do do that.
21 DR. OKRENT:
But right now I have in my hand an 22 information notice on degradation of containments concerning 23 Oyster Creek.
As far as I can tell, that is the only action
,r y 24 the NRC plans to take to give the licensees this information 25 notice.
1 ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
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MR. ' JORDAN:
That is not clear at this point..
We 2
try to get the information notice out promptly with respect 3
tx) an issue, an<i then if a bulletin or a generic letter or 4
some other action is warranted, we have got the information 5
out, then we can cause or require further action.
6 So in this particular case, of course, we haven' t 7
made that final decision.
8 DR. OKRENT:
I have another request to the NRC 9
staff, and I would like CRGR to also respond to it in-terms 10 of this specific information notice.
11 How was it decided whether or not there should be 12 a closed loop or something else and in f act the CRGR look at
.O 13 these to see whether the NRC staff has not brought it to 14 their attention where they should have?
15 Okay, that is two different questions..
16 MR. JORDAN:
I can help a little because I have 17 been a member of the CRGR up until about two months ago, and i
18 the information notice is not required to be examined by the 4
i 19 CRGR.
Since it doesn' t put requirements on, the CRGR does l
20 not normally review those but does receive copies.
21 DR. OKRENT:
You understand the question?
22 MR. HERNAN:
Dr. Okrent, Ron flernan with the 23 staff.
4 24 Are you talking about the Oyster Creek event or 25 the ANO-1 event?
ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
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DR. OKRENT:
Oyster Creek.
2 MR. HERNAN:
The staff has said it is under 3
preliminary investigation.
Neither NRR nor I&E have made a 4
decision whether to issue an I&E bulletin.
We made the 5
statement to the committee that it does have generic 6
implications for Mark I.
7 The answer is we have not made a decision yet 8
what the corrective action will be.
9 DR. OKRENT:
Let me tell you what I am getting 10 at.
It is my suspicion, Ron, that there indeed is a 11 chilling effect on the staff in getting information from 12 licensees in the current atmosphere which exists in the 13 NRC.
14 I am willing to be quoted to that effect, and it 15 concerns me that the staff may not try to close a loop on --
16 whether it is Oyster Creek or ANO -- boric acid or other 17 things equivalent to this because of the difficulty in 18 showing a positive cost / benefit.
19 And so if that may be the case, I am asking is 20 there somebody in the NRC who looks at the NRC staff to see 21 in fact has the pendulum swung so far that in fact we are 22 degrading safety because the staff is afraid to close the 23 loop because of this chilling effect.
'N 24 And it seems to me CRGR is the one, in effect, t
25 who has to look at proposed information requests, and so ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
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forth.
They should also look at the potential that some 2
have not been asked that should have been, and if they are 3
not doing it, I don't know who is.
4 MR. JORDAN:
Such a concern was raised about a 5
year ago, Dr. Okrent.
There was that OI review of that 6
issue, interviews with staff and of the CRGR members.
A 7
report was issued.
8 I don't have a reference to the report, but we 9
will provide it to you.
10 So that review was done.
11 DR. OKRENT:
Well, I will be interested in the 12 report, but I have little doubt that there is a chilling 13 effect.
14 MR. EBERSOLE:
Okay.
15 MR. ROSENTHAL:
If you will indulge me, I would' 16 like to alter the order of the presentations just slightly.
17 (Slide.)
{
18 In going over the events with Mr. Ebersole, he 19 correctly noted that many of the events that we are bringing 20 forward to him were f rom design deficiencies, some in older 21 plants, and he was right.
22 We have been trying to collect events in various 23 manners and have what we call a design deficiency data base 24 that we have been collecting since August.
-^
25 For the period August 1st through October 14th, ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
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we received roughly a thousand events in the form of 5072 2
reports and daily reports.
That is a crude estimate.
3 50 or so of those we, in our judgment, would 4
classify as design problems as distinct from construction, 5
operation, test, maintenance, et cetera.
6 One can sort the data base in many ways, by 7
system.
8 It is not surprising that we find a lot of 9
electrical problems because a large percentage of the parts 10 count in a plant will be electrical parts, and it is not 11 surprising that Comanche Peak was high or even Perry, but I 12 personally was disappointed in Palisades.
It looks evenly 13 split between B's and P 's.
{
14 On AE it is not in my mind that the most would 15 turn up at Bechtel, since Bechtel has the greatest share of 16 the business.
I was surprised to see Sargent & Lundy's name 17 appear because they have relatively few plants.
18 DR. KERR:
When you say "a problem," could you 19 perhaps define what you meant by a problem?
20 Was this an LER?
21 MR. ROSENTHAL:
Whether it was LER or a 5072 22 report or a daily, it is finding out that some aspect of the 23 plant has been miswired or a critical part has been ex 24 undersized or a valving arrangement is incorrect -- things 25 that hopefully would have been picked up in the design ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
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reviews long ago.
2 DR. KERR:
That is enough.
Thank you.
3 MR. ROSENTHAL:
These events are followed up on, 4
on a case-by-case basis through other mechanisms, but we are 5
doing various kinds of sorts to try to get some 6
perspective.
Eventually, this will become a supplement to 7
the performance indicator program that we are working on, 8
and right now we are keeping it within our branch, but that 9
will eventually become part of the corporate data network.
10 The bottom line message is that even with 11 licensed plants, some of the oldest plants would continue to 12 define what we would class as design problems, perhaps 5 13 percent of all the reports that we get.
14 DR. SIESS:
What was that last number?
15 MR. ROSENTHAL:
5 percent.
16 Of the reports that we have looked at, I would 17 say that some small fraction are design problems as distinct 18 from maintenance or test error, and we will be developing 19 these schemes in terms of maintenance, testing, et cetera.
20 That work is underway.
21 But Mr. Ebersolo thought this might give you a 22 perspective that complemented the individual looks.
23 MR. MICHELSON:
When you do these counts, do you r
24 go back and look to see if the reviewer did pick up on it or 25 wrote it off for whatever reason?
ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
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MR. ROSENTHAL:
We did not in this instance.
2 MR. MICHELSON:
There might be a few cases in 3
which the reviewer recognized the same problem and maybe it 4
was accepted on some basis by the staff.
5 MR. EBERSOLE:
This is being derived from the 6
late coming inspection of plants in their new configuration 7
which already passed muster during all the regulatory 8
processes, and you find these snakes in place.
9 MR. MICHELSON:
Some of these snakes have been 10 recognized by the agency.
I just wondered what f raction of '
11 them might be in that category.
It would be a nice thing
~
12 just for internal auditing purposes.
13 (S lide. )
14 MR. ROSENTHAL:
Okay.
In getting on to Pilgrim, 15 I have two slides and I will be terse.
16 On November 19th, Pilgrim sustained the loss of 17 all offsite power.
It was bad weather in the area -- snow, 18 high winds, and salt spray buildup on insulators in the 19 switchyard.
20 The plant is located on Cape Cod near the ocean 21 and is subject to salt spray.
It has had salt spray o
22 problems in the past.
23 In 1983 they put in a high pressure spray system J'
24 that uses steaming water.
They use that system to spray 25 down insulators that think have accumulated salt.
At this ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
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point they don' t have a routine PM program using that 2
system.
3 The plant had been shut down and the reactor 4
coolant system temperature was low and many loads on the 5
pool were also low and there was plenty of diesel fuel 6
around.
7 MR. WYLIE:
Jack, you say they don' t have a 8
program of spraying.
9 Why is that?
It they put the system in, why 10 don' t they use it?
11 MR. ROSENTHAL:
I can' t defend that.
12 (Slide.)
13 MR. WYLIE:
It is not unusual to see in those 14 plants.
15 MR. ROSENTHAL:
Right.
16 Pilgrim had a loss of offsite power on December 17
- 19th,
'84.
That one went less than 15 minutes.
This one 18 las t three hours.
It should be at least an order of 19 magnitude less of a problem.
20 They lost the 345 volt lines to the plant.
It 21 looks like Breaker 104 right over here was subsequently 22 confirmed to be salted.
That was a critical break with 23 respect to providing offsite power.
24 They have a line coming from the Manomet Station, 25 23 KV, part of which is buried.
It is buried onsite, but ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
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.1
.it comes from offsite.
It was hoped that that would be a 2
backup to the 230 KV lines because of concern over loss of 3-offsite power.
D4 That line has proven to be one of the least 5
reliable lines they have, and that line was also lost during 6
the snowstorm.
7 DR. REMICK:
Well, those offsite lines for'the 8
last few miles are on common towers?
9 MR. ROSENTHAL:
On the 345, but I believe the 23 10 KV line comes in that way.
Those of us who found heart in 11 the insulation of that line now have concern.
12 I speak for myself.
.,-q U
13 DR. REMICK:
Hasn' t Pilgrim had a number of cases 14 in the past of loss of offsite power due to lightning 15 strikes?
16 MR. ROSENTHAL:
I don' t specifically recall, but 17 the LOP in '84 and then this one in '86 truly makes one 18 concerned.
19 DR. REMICK:
I don' t remember its being at 20 Pilgrim.
l 21 In.1980, af ter they lost power to lightning, in 22 going over that event, I was very impressed with how well 23 the operators responded, and the reason they responded so 24 well, they were quite familiar with that experience.
\\
25 MR. ROSENTHAL:
The dispatcher has a system of ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
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trying to find faults, the load dispatcher.
They have what 2
they call -- on that morning there were several multiple 3
faults and multiple targets.
4 The load dispatcher thought that the f ault was in 5
the station.
The station people thought that the problem 6
was outside the plant.
7 The load dispatcher had the plant -- or the lines 8
flown by helicopter and ultimately and slowly restored pcwor 9
to the switchyard.
10 Both diesels of course worked.
If there had been 11 more problems, it is possible that they would have restored 12 power sooner.
13 MR. MICHELSON:
Why were the diesels parallel to 14 the network?
15 MR. ROSENTHAL:
To run them up to full load.
16 MR. MICHELSON:
Before the loss of power event I 17 assume they were parallel.
18 Is that what that meant?
19 MR. ROSENTHAL:
No, I am sorry.
There was the 20 LOP.
Power was restored to the switchyard.
Then before the 21 l diesels were secured, they had been running now at reduced l
22 l load, they were run up to load, and effectively the grid was l
23 used as the big resistor to clean it out, and that is common 24 practice.
25 MR. EHERSOLE:
I would like to have you comment ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
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on your view and the staff's view of that commonality of 2
that practice in view of the potential for complexing both 3
diesels when they are facing an unsteady grid.
4 I personally think it is poor practice, and I 5
wonder if you have investigated whether one should look into 6
letting the diesels have a potential common load outage.
7 Will they be able to protect themselves?
8 You just don' t look at the load in parallel 9
unless you have true protection.
10 We talked about this at the meeting.
Was it 11 talked about any further?
12 MR. ROSENTHAL:
We did do some checking.
It m
13 looks like common practice is to put the diesels on the 14 grid, parallel them with the grid, and use that grid as the 15 load.
16 There was one plant that we found which had a 17 routine way of using some of its large horsepower motors as 18 a load and then would run up the diesels on that isolated 19 from the grid, but it is common practice to do this.
20 MR. EBERSOLE:
Then one can just look at the 21 single failure criterion in that configuration to see if you 22 have got some diesels left.
23 MR. JORDAN:
I think I would comment, at the end 24 of an event in which they had had a power loss, if they
~y) l 25 j paralleled both units before shutting them down back on that ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
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I same grid, I would think the risks were greater.
2 I happened to be sitting in the Boston Airport in 3
the airplane while the storm was going on.
So I can 4
guarantee you it was very windy'and a lot of wet snow 5
blowing, and it did blow out to sea rather sharply.
So it 6
may have been that they felt. confident that their problems 7
were over.
8 But I don' t like the practice of having the two 9
diesels tied to the grid.
10 11 12 O
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MR. EBERSOLE:
By the way, this also gets into t
2 the area of A44.
At the time we were considering upgrading 3
the reliability of diesels, even putting more diesels in at 4
a site, it was at the worst end of a spectrum of off-site 5
grids.
One of the worst.
It was at the bottom end of 6
Florida, and it has unreliable grid sources, and the CRGR 7
put its foot on that proposal, which I think was unfortunate 8
to require an upgrading of on-site power.
9 MR. ROSENTHAL:
Now, let me choose my words 10 carefully.
It is my understanding that General Electric is 11 doing studies for Pilgrim.
One study, in association with l
l 12 A44 and another study associated with severe accident considerations, and that the licensee is considering adding 13 l
l 14 a third diesel.
There is no regulatory requirement at this 15 time, nor.is there any licensee commitment.
A44 station 16 blackout did go out as a rulemaking for public comment.
The 17 public comment period is over.
The comments have been 18 collected.
19 MR. HERNAN:
We have been discussing the final 20 station blackout rule in relation to A44, proba'bly in 21 November 1987.
22 MR. EBERSOLE:
What vintage is Pilgrim?
What 23 kind of plant?
How old is it?
24 MR. ROSENTHAL:
It is 15.
25 MR. EBERSOLE:
Lower tower, isn't it?
A boiler?
l ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
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-1 Thank you.
2 MR. ROSENTHAL:
Okay.
'3 I was asked to speak about the recent event at 4
Surry, Tuesday night's event at Surry.
And the information 5
that I have is preliminary.
There is an AIT that has been 6
dispatched to Surry.
Information will be forthcoming, and 7
they will write a report, and they may well, depending on 8
the subcommittee of one review, bring that before the full.
9 committee.
So I bring you the information, as we now know 10 it, and I just have one slide and a couple of diagrams, and 11 the story is somewhat changing from Tuesday night to 12 Wednesday till now, as the investigation proceeds, but I 13 will share what we have with you.
14 (Slide.)
I 15 Surry sustained a feedwater pipe break.
We now 16 attribute that break to a combination of wall thinning of 17 that pipe and the pressure transient.
I will get into that 18 a little bit more.
We believe, if my count is right, that 19 eight workers were injured.
Two were flown by helicopter to 20 a burn unit.
Two others were taken to a regular hospital 21 and then very quickly moved to that same burn unit.
l l
22 As I now know it, two have died and some others 23 are in serious condition.
24 The reactor was operating at 100 percent power.
25 As we now understand the scenario, the main steam line ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
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isolation valve on Steam Generator C closed.
Earlier in the 2
day, they had been having problems with the air header 3
pressure to that valve, and we will ultimately know more.
4 MR. MICHELSON:
When you say " closed," you mean?
5 MR. ROSENTHAL:
Slammed shut, as the initiator of 6
the event.
Given that that valve slammed shut, you 7
effectively have a void distribution, a redistribution in 8
the steam generator, which appears to the steam generator 9
level instruments as low level, or as in this case, low, 10 low level.
11 The low, low level tripped the reactor.
All the 12 rods did go in.
As we understand it, there was a question 13 about a rod bottom light on one rod.
On Tuesday evening, 14 the main feedwater pump trips, given the reactor trip.
The 15 MSIVs on the A and B Steam Generator close, as a result of 16 feed flow mismatch signals.
So that all the steam 17 generators get isolated.
18 Now let me go to the pressure transient.
Let me 19 show you the piping for a minute.
20 l (Slide.)
21 I will come back to the slide.
22 Just to bring you through.
Steam generators, 23 feedwater control valve, check valve inside containment, x
24 check valve outside containment, feodwater valve, common 25 l header, heaters and the two feedwater pumps.
Okay.
- Now, ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
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DAVbw-1 let's follow these feedwater pumps a little bit more.
2 (S lide. )
3 Here are the two feedwater pumps again.
They 4
come to a 24-inch header.
They are supplied through 5
feedwater heaters, and all the way back down through 6
condensate booster pumps, and there's check valves on the 7
' condensate booster pumps, and in red, there is just one 8.
train that is'the parallel other train.
But they do come to 9
a common 24-inch header and the suction lines come off.
It 10 is on a straight line.
An isometric would show several 11 elbows, et cetera.
12 As we now understand it, there are some elbows O
13 about the pipe break of 360 degrees circumferential pipe 14 break, broke in the vicinity of the weld in the vicinity of 15 a T or an elbow, I am not sure.
But it was apparently the 16 pipe rather than the weld or the fitter.
And that is 17 upstream of an isolation valve.
Given that these two are in 18 parallel, you lose both feedwater pumps.
19 DR. SHEWMON:
Is there anything that would have 20 caused cavitation down there?
This was operating on solid 21 water then.
22 MR. ROSENTHAL:
Yes.
Although you have --
23 DR. SHEWMON:
Is there anything that would have 24 caused cavitation?
O
%/
25 MR. JORDAN:
I think the answer is possibly, yes, l
l ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
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because you are downstream of the heaters, and you are on 2
the suction side of the pump, and you have a changed cross 3
section of the pipe.
So there would be a local pressure 4
that could be causing cavitation and erosion.
5 MR. EBERSOLE:
What is the pressure and 6
temperature at this point?
7 MR. WOODRUFF:
The pressure, the temperature is 8
about 270 degrees.
9 MR. EBERSOLE:
I guess the pressure is about 400 10 pounds.
11 MR. ROSENTHAL:
It is about 400 pounds.
12 MR. WOODRUFF The rise across the pump must be 13 around 700 pounds.
14 MR. ROSENTHAL:
The piping here is 675 psi and 15 the piping on the upstream side of the feedwater pumps is 16 designed to 1500 psi.
17 MR. MICHELSON:
The downstream side or upstream?
16 MR. ROSENTHAL:
On the discharge side of the 19 feedwater pumps, if you trip the reactor, I'm sorry.
If you 20 induce a pressure pulse by closing the MSIV or the turbine 21 stop valves.
There is lots of ways to get there.
Then 22 there's two check valves between the steam generator 23 ;
feedwater pump.
You trip the feedwater pump.
Those two 24 check valves have to work or with the upstream piping.
We z
25 will see that.
ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
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MR. EBERSOLE:
This is the first time I have 2
heard of those check valves having to do their job against a 3
catastrophe pressurization upstream of them.
I take it they 4
slammed shut in a few microseconds, and they remained 5
intact, happily.
6 MR. ROSENTHAL:
The check valves closed, surely.
7 MR. EBERSOLE:
That is the most violent maneuver 8
they have ever seen.
9 MR. ROSENTHAL:
The AIT will be looking at the 10 check valves on the affected steam geneators, I understand.
11 Also at the check valves on the unaf fected, on the AMV, 12 because they have to try to understand what the check valves 13 did, given the break.
Those check valves, surely, were 14 forced to shut.
15 What we would like to do is better understand the 16 operations in the transient.
17 Okay.
Let me get to this piping some more.
18 MR. MICHELSON:
If your other drawing is correct, 19 all of the check valves on the steam generators look back to 20 a common header.
21 MR. ROSENTHAL:
Yes.
22 !
MR. MICHELSON:
And all of them had to close.
23 MR. ROSENTHAL:
Yes.
Y 24 MR. MICHELSON:
And all of the did almost equally f ]
25ll well, because this break is way buried behind that header, i
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and all the E check valves are equally accessible or not at 2
all.
3 MR. ROSENTHAL:
Okay.
4 Now, we believe, as I'll explain, that wall 5
thinning contributed to this event.
We also believe that 6-the pressure dynamics, and one should look at it in a 7
pressure shock wave type time scale, as well as a lower time 8
scale, played a role in the event.
9 I can' t tell you which played what portion of the 10 event, but let me get back to piping.
11 MR. MICHELSON:
Do you know for sure what came 12 firs t?
?
~'
13 MR. ROSENTHAL:
No.
14 MR. MICHELSON:
You don't know whether it broke 15 firs t?
16 MR. ROSENTHAL:
I am sorry.
The first out was 17 the MSIV closure.
We know that.
18 MR. MICHELSON:
You know for certain?
19 MR. ROSENTHAL:
We know the reactor tripped.
We 20 know the feedwater pump tripped.
21 MR. MICHELSON:
But do you know for a fact that 22 the pipe broke after the valve closed?
23 MR. ROSENTHAL:
After the MSIV closure, that we 24 know.
25 MR. EBERSOLE:
The biggest load would come from ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
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the main steam feedwater valve closure, wouldn' t it?
2 That would be the shock you get, because there is 3
a cushion on the steam?
4 MR. ROSENTHAL:
Yes, but at first we thought that 5
the feedwater reg valve was a contributor and the AIT will 6
be looking at i t, and Surrey has had a history in the past 7
of problems with it.
8 Apparently, they have been working to five those 9
problems to reduce that trip frequency, and we are not quite 10 sure what the role of the feedwater reg valve was in the 11 story.
We do know that that MSIV closed first, as the 12 initiator this time.
Okay.
13 Now on the pipe side of that, the pipe did 14 rupture.
15 DR. OKRENT:
Do you know why the MSIV closed?
16 MR. ROSENTHAL:
We don't know why the MSIV 17 closed.
We do know that earlier in the day, they had been 18 having problems with the air pressure that provides the 19 motive force to those valves.
The pressure is supposed to 20 be 90 psi and was low at 75 psi.
The air supply for those i
21 valves.
But we do not know why that valve closed at that 22 :
time today.
23 On the piping side, the piping did break 24 somewhere betwoon a 6-and a 12-foot section of the pipe, I
^
25 l am not sure, deflected about 60 degrees and came to rest ace-FEDERAI REI'ORTERS, INC.
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against the other feedwater piping, the suction piping, we 2
now understand.
3 MR. MICHELSON:
You are saying it whipped, in 4
other words?
5 MR. ROSENTHAL:
Pipe whip.
6 A piece of the pipe, about 2 foot by 3 foot, 7
separated and came to rest on a cable tray.
That piece of 8
pipe has been marked and will receive our further 9
examination.
10 MR. ETHERINGTON:
There's a separate section of 11 pipe, 2 to 3 feet long; is that what you are saying?
12 MR. ROSENTHAL:
No.
A piece of pipe, 2 feet by 3 O
13 feet, and the pipe is an 18-inch pipe.
14 MR. MICHELSON:
You mean a whole section of the 15 pipe came ou t?
16 MR. WOODRUFF There's a piece of pipe wall.
17 DR. SHEWMON:
You mean there was a longitudinal 18 split, and it opening up and broke in two places?
19 MR. WOODRUFF:
It sounds like a piece of wall was 20 blown from the pipe and the lateral force resulting from 21 the fluid leaving the system caused the rest of the 22 separation.
23 DR. S!!EWMON:
So not only 360, but there was a 24 section of the pipe came out and went in a different 25 direction?
ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
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MR. WOODRUFF:
Right.
2 MR. ROSENTHAL:
Yes.
Again, the story is now 3
being constructed.
Measurements at the middle.
The pipe is 4
nominal half-inch wall thickness.
Measurements about the 5
middle of that section of metal are about a quarter of an j
6 inch.
Measurements at the edge are like 61 mills.
Bu t we 7
don' t know how much of that 61 mills is strained, as it 8
broke, as distinct from thinning prior to the event.
9 By the way, the other unit's been shut down and 10 will be examined.
11 MR. EBERSOLE:
Let me ask you this question.
12 This sounds like to me, a mixture of wall 13 thinning and water hammer.
I would ask you to examine, when 14 you trip the reg valve, does it snap shut real quick?
Does 15 it impose a real load of substantial character to the pipe, 16 cr is it deliberately damped, so it does not impose a big 17 mode?
If it snapped shut, that would be hydraulic load?
18 MR. MICHELSON:
Jesse, there was a lot of pipe 19 between the regulating valve and back where the break 20 occurred.
21 MR. EDERSOLE:
I am saying, it is critical as to I
22 l whether that valve is permitted to snap shut or not.
23 MR. MICHELSON:
But it is also important to cm 24 recognize there is a lot of damping possibilities between 1
i i
25 where the break occurred and where the valve snapped shut.
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There is lots of energy absorption occurring there.
2 MR. EBERSOLE:
The water is going forward when it 3
is shuts to the boiler.
It snapped shut.
4 MR. MICHELSON:
But it is going through all these 5
common headers, and so forth.
Well downstream before the 6
break occurred.
7 MR. ROSENTHAL:
We just don' t have the answers.
8 So I think we shouldn' t speculate at this point.
9 A team was dispatched, which was subsequently, 10 the next day, relabeled as an SAO, led by Vince Pensiera of 11 Region 2.
They have an operations man, rad protection, a 12 Surry senior resident, a systems man, a North Anna i
13 resident.
They have metallurgy expertise added to the team 14 and water hammer.
Water hammer is perhaps the wrong name 15 for this.
Water hammer / pressure transient.
A man from 16 NRR.
This person has joined that team.
17 MR. MICHELSON:
Could you comment on why this is 18 an AIT instead of an IIT?
19 MR. JORDAN:
In terms of the plant safety, the 20 plant didn' t shut down properly, and this is a balance of 21 plant issue.
So that was the basis for that.
22 MR. MICHELSON:
That is the basis, then, because 23 l it is not in the nuclear island portion, then it is not I
l thought to be a safety significant at this time.
7 24 i
25 MR. JORDAN:
This still could be upgraded to an 26 IIT, if it warrants, but that was the initial basis.
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I can say one other thing.
That the pipe crack 2
study group is also geing to the site to look at it in terms
,3 of whether there is any feedback.
They'll be there i
4 tomorrow.
5 DR. SHENMON:
This means Vance Bush, Ed Rodebaugh 6
and some of those.
7 MR. ROSENTHAL:
Specifically.
8 DR. OKRENT:
So, at some future time, you'll tell 9
us, you'll confirm or not whether this broad scope rule 10 would have ruled this one out?
11 MR. JORDAN:
Yes.
That should be in the
.12 discussion we have two months from today.
13 MR. MICHELSON:
The key question we have to ask 4
14 ourselves is are we aware of where erosion might be 15 occurring in those regions where leak before break is being
,16 applied.
And we're not aware of the operation.
17 That's the one to worry about.
18 MR. ROSENTHAL:
Because the heat removed by the 19 consenser, of course the preferred path was lost, the plant 20 was cooled on the atmoseric dump valves, a very slow, long 21 process.
22 !
The radiation levels were like 1 times 10 to the I
23 minus 5 microcuries per millimeter, very clean.
24 Let me just back up to one other --
25 DR. KERR:
You said 1 times 10 to the minus 5 ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
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microcuries?
2 MR. ROSENTHAL:
Per milliliter, as l'now know 3
it.
When the break occurred, the operators k'new that the 4
turbine hold was full of steam.and they isolated all high 5
energy lines to that area.
6 The alert was called because of the personal 7
casualties isolating the high energy lines to the turbine 8
hole; in turn, you lose an inch of vacuum and dump the heat 9
that way.
10 We' re also looking at where the steam and water 11 went.
Halon and CO2 systems' were actuated.
We don't know 12 if they were actuated by the steam coming in contact with 13 sensors or, if there's a more obscure way through wetting 14 down the ledger panels.
We don' t know yet.
15 Nevertheless, with a spray of halon and CO2 in 16 switchgear areas and cable tunnel areas, the licensee 17 thought it prudent, and we would agree with them, to blow 18 all that material out before they had people go back in.
19 In this event, every piece of essential safety 20 feature worked.
In some other event, it might have been 21 nice to get to those areas.
22 So we'll also look at the system interaction type 23 questions that this brings forth.
But I have no answers for
~
24 you now.
25 MR. MICHELSON:
I'm not sure what you've said ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
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there a little earlier.
Did they deactivate the electrical 2
switchgear and other things in those areas?
3 MR. ROSENTHAL:
No.
All that worked, it was just 4
sprayed with CO2 and halon.
5 MR. MICHELSON:
Did they get spurious operations 6
of any of it?
7 MR. ROSENTHAL:
Everything was fine.
8 MR. MICHELSON:
They all got sprayed with super-9 heated steam and everything and nothing happened?
10 MR. ROSENTHAL:
I'm sorry.
The switch gear was 11 sprayed with CO2 and halon.
12 MR. MICHELSON:
In other words --
13 MR. ROSENTHAL:
That was all out of the turbine f
14 hall.
We don't have the answers now.
We want to understand 15 where the steam did go and what that steam interacted with 16 and what happened.
17 Just the questions you' re asking, we just don' t 18 have the answers.
19 MR. ETHERINGTON:
What does that do to the 20 concept of '.3ak before break criteria?
When a high 21 temperature steam pipe breaks, we say, well, this couldn't 22 happen.
23 Now we have another break and we say that, yes, 24 that this didn' t break, only we assumed it would in the leak before break criteria.
But, yet, it did break.
25 ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
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So where do we stand on the true criterion for 2
Only if it breaks according to Hoyle?
3 MR. MICHELSON:
As long as you don' t have 4
erosion, corrosion or water hammer.
5 MR. ETHERINGTON:
But, then can we justify it on 6
that basis?
7 MR. MICHELSON:
Do we know for certain we aren' t 8
getting corrosion erosion?
Or potential damage?
9 DR. SHEWMON:
You'll have to come back and see us 10 again, Harold, to get the answer to this question.
11 MR. JORDAN:
This will be coming up again in two 12 months.
13 DR. OKRENT:
Maybe you can testify to a 14 Presidential Commission, Harold.
15 MR. ROSENTHAL:
The last thing is that we thought 16 we'd introduce just a small amount of followup into the 17 meetings.
Henry Bailey.
18 Two months ago, the Oconnee loss --
19 MR. MICHELSON:
Excuse me.
You're leaving this 20 event now?
21 MR. ROSENTHAL:
Yes, sir.
22 MR. MICHELSON:
Could I make one observation?
23 I think your basic source of potential water 24 hammer you're claiming was the regulating valves.
- x P
25 MR. ROSENTHAL:
No.
I'm not using the word water ACE-FEDERAL. REPORTERS, INC.
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hammer.
I'm using the words pressure perturbation.
2 MR. MICHELSON:
Keep in mind that between that 3
regulating valve and the break location was a large heat 4
exchanger and at the tube size you're dealing with, I just 5
doubt you' re going to get pressure transmission through all 6
the tubing and so forth back all the way to this location.
7 It just doesn' t seem likely.
8 MR. HERNAN:
Before we move on, I would like to 9
answer Dr. Okrent's question as far as the broad scope 10 rule.
I just talked to our people on that rule.
This is 11 not one of the systems we would have considered to be 12 covered under the broad scope rule.
\\
13 DR. SHEWMON:
It certainly isn' t today.
Is it 14 also one which wasn' t considered or was considered and ruled 15 out at Beaver Valley?
16 MR. HERNAN:
I don' t think Beaver Valley got 17 anywhere near that far.
I do not believe that was a system 18 that Beaver Valley was considering an exemption on.
19 MR. ROSENTHAL:
The last speaker is Mr. Bailey 20 for just a short followup on the Oconnee event.
21 (Slide.)
22 MR. BAILEY:
To refresh your memory, back in 23 October, we talked about an event at Oconnee where we were 24 doing some load shed tests on unit two.
And they had shed e
I f some condenser circuit water pumps and expected to have 25 ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
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a siphon flow to their low pressure service water pumps.
2 They lost the siphon flow after about an hour.
3 I want to give you a little bit of followup on 4
that.
This is a schematic diagram of the condenser circuit 5
water system.
You've got the 12 pumps here.
Each one of 6
them just charges.
Four of them discharge to separate 7
condensers.
8 They all combine and it goes down to the tail 9
race.
And this particular diagram doesn' t show the low 10 pressure service water system, but the low pressure service 11 water system takes such a cross-over valve -- it lies 12 somewhere in here and I'll show you a diagram in a minute.
13 There's a high point in this piping about right 14 in here.
And what this high point does is cause a siphon 15 effect.
So, if the condenser circuit water pumps trip off, 16 then the siphon will continue and the water will close by 17 siphon.
18 Gravity will flow through the condensers and also 19 we'll supply water to the low pressure service water pump 20 suctions.
21 During the event in October, these pumps tripped 22 off as a result of a planned load shed test.
However, this l
23 '
piping here didn' t stay flooded where the high point was, 24 and they lost siphon and they lost to the low pressure 25 service water pumps, which was completely unexpected.
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And they found out the reason that they lost the 2
low pressure service water pump or loss of suction, it's 3
because they had an air leakage in the discharge flange of 4
one of these pumps.
Actually, several of them had some 5
leakage.
6 MR. EBERSOLE:
Could you elaborate on the 7
critical aspects of the service water pumps as a backup
-8 system?
9 MR. BAILEY:
The low pressure service water pumps 10 supplied many safety grade, safety loads in the plant.
The 11 auxilliary feedwater pump, the lube oil coolers, decay heat 12 removal coolers -- I have a list here of what all they do 7-
-V 13 supply, if you're interested.
14 (Slide.)
15 What this event -- the thing that we learned in 16 this event was that w'e've got a system that relies on the 17 siphon to operate.
You'd better be sure that the system is 18 airtight so you don' t get air leakage in.
19 In the past, the discharge of these pumps had 20 always been under water apparently from the tests we've run; 21 because of draft conditions, the discharge was above water.
22 So you had a different situation.
You had a 23 flange that was now above water with air and leakage, 24 whereas, in the past, you had it under water.
25 So the big thing we learned from it was that if ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
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1 you've got a system and it depends on siphon, you'd better 2
be sure. it's airtight or you might not get that siphon.
3 DR. KERR:
Is that something that is surprising?
4 It seems fairly obvious to me.
5 MR. BAILEY:
It sounds simple in hindsight.
The 6
licensee came in on October 14th, a few days after I was 7
down here before, and made a presentation to the staff'where 8
they reported that they had repaired the flanges on the 9
pumps.
10 (Sl ide. )
11 The pump looks something like this.
They had 12 repaired all the flanges on the pump to make them airtight.
,,)
tv 13 I believe it was this flange right here that was not 14 airtight.
15 Looking at it, it looks like it might be the 16 section flange, but it's really not.
This is a vertical 17 propellar pump.
The propellar is down here.
It discharges 18 up through here and out the side.
This is the motor up here 19 and it really sits here on top of the flange and it's really 20 just bolted down.
It was not designed to be airtight.
21 There was never really any problem as long as it 22 was under water.
So there's been a rather elaborate 23 modification made on this flange to make it airtight.
I
(~N 24 won't go into it.
%)
[
25 It's a skirt that's put around the base of it, l
l ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
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basically.
So that the skirt goes down and into the water.
2 MR. MICHELSON:
How low a level is this thing 3
supposed to be able to pump out?
4 MR. BAILEY:
The tech specs allowed the level in 5
the lake to get down as low as 775.
6 MR. MICHELSON:
There must be a design basis 7
accident perhaps, the break in a downstream dam or 8
something.
'9 MR. BAILEY:
There were tech specs on the level 10 of the lake, but it turns out the tech spec allotted to get 11 below the level of that flange.
12 MR. MICHELSON:
You missed my point.
There may U-;
13 be accident analyses that postulate even lower levels than 14 the tech spec level for which the earthquake conditions that 15 bust dams and whatever, and drain water, it may be that this 16 pump doesn' t operate under those conditions, in which case, 17 the split has to go down to seal the pump.
18 MR. BAILEY:
I think we got into this.
I believe 19 the d am, this is Lake Kiawee, is designed for a seismic 20 event.
21 MR. MICHELSON:
What is the design basis 22.
requirement on the pumping?
23 DR. KERR:
I thought, when we heard about this 24 before, it turned out that there were alternative methods of 25 supplying the water to the site.
Is that not the case?
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l MR. BAILEY:
Yes.
As it turns out, these circuit 2
water pumps have many ways of getting power, including 3
emergency power from the Kiawee hydro unit.
There's both an 4
overground feeder and an underground feeder.
5 And during --
6 DR. KERR:
I'm not referring to the electrical 7
supply.
I thought there was an alternate source of water so 8
thet this siphon was not required, necessarily was used.
9 MR. BAILEY:
An alternate way to get water to the 10 suction.
11 DR. KERR:
That's what I thought.
Am I mistaken?
12 MR. ROSENTHAL:
Henry, will you describe the
(
13 remote shutdown f acility?
14 MR. BAILEY:
Yes.
That may be what you're 15 talking about.
There was some question about the remote 16 shutdown facility.
17 l
(S l ide. )
18 There's a diagram here.
During the course of 19 this investigation, as you see here, the remote shutdown 20 facility cools cooling water from the CCW piping and runs 21 it, uses the cooling water for this diesel generator and 22 puts it back to the piping.
23 It turned out that it was discovered that, under r
24 these conditions, if you didn' t have flow through this l
25 piping, if you broke your vacuum, this water here wouldn' t ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
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be able to act as a heat sink for the full 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> it was 2
supposed to.
3 So there has been a modification which is due to 4
be completed in a few days.
Whereas, for this standby 5
shutdown f acility there's going to be a pump, a separate 6
pump put out in the suction that will supply this and get 7
around this problem.
8 I don' t know if that's what you were talking 9
about or not.
10 MR. EBERSOLE:
The prior impression was that that 11 was adequa te, but the finding has been made that it isn't.
12 MR. BAILEY:
This was something that was
~
13 discovered in the course of investigating the other 14 problem.
But that's in the process of being rectified.
15 MR. EBERSOLE:
Are you going to put some rubber 16 hoses out in the river to pick up some water?
17 MR. BAILEY:
Let's see.
The meeting on the 14th 18 cleared up a number of things.
Of course, the big thing was 19 that the flanges had been designed to prevent the air 20 leakage.
21 MR. EBERSOLE:
May I ask this?
If the water's 22 aeriated, you build up the breaker anyway, depending on how 23 high the inversion is.
24 MR. BAILEY:
There are suction pumps to hold the 25 vacuum also, priming pumps.
These are built into the system ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
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also priming pumps.
These are built into the system also.
2 There was some question about the seismic 3
analyses.
On the CCW piping, I've got a slide here that 4
shows that there has been quite a bit of seismic work done 5
in this area.
6 (Slide.)
7 This comes from a couple different sources.
One 8
was the Oconnee PRA.
The others were some work that the NRC 9
had done at one of the national labs.
And this shows the 10 fragility bases for various components here.
11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
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Even the main condenser itself has a capacity 2
from.2 G.
3 MR. EBERSOLE:
Does that include the rubber neck 4
that hooks it to the turbine?
5 MR. BAILEY:
I am not sure.
There has been a 6
good deal of seismic analysis done here.
7 Of course, the licensee Duke has pointed out that 8
the only time they would lose this CCW pump to begin with 9
due to all these sources of power is if they had a complete 10 blackout.
11 The staff has not completely agreed with that.
12 They have said we want to make sure that you have the 13 capability to siphon.
14 So in their meeting of October the 14th, they 15 convinced the staff to at least our satisfaction at that 16 time that they had rectified the problem and they did have 17 the capability for the siphon.
So even if they did lose the 18 pump, they had the siphon capability.
19 But it has been their position that the only time 20 that you lose the CCW pumps to begin with would be a 21 blackout.
But it is sort of a moot point as long as they 22 have shown the capability to get the siphon.
23 All three units, of course, started back up a few r',
24 l days after the meeting on the 14th, and we have an i
1/
t 25 '
information notice which is under preparation to alert all ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
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licensees of this event.
2 MR. EBERSOLE:
Do they contemplate an emergency 3
suction system of some sort, as I said, in which they pick 4
the suction right out of the river directly?
Is that just 5
one of the options they have?
6 MR. BAILEY:
They haven' t proposed it to us.
7 They may have it under consideration, but they haven't 8
proposed it.
9 MR. EBERSOLE:
Well, any questions?
10 MR. MICHELSON:
I have a question not related to 11 the event.
I wanted to ask Ed Jordan how many AITs -- how 12 often does an AIT perform?
13 MR. JORDAN:
It certainly seems to be random to 14 the numbers, but it seems that there would be on the order 15 of a dozen a year.
16 MR. MICHELSON:
One of the things I was a little 17 concerned was the Hatch event, the leak, you know, of over 18 100,000 gallons of water.
That wasn' t on our discussion 19 today.
I realize it is attached, but not in the 20 discussion.
Yet an AIT was formed.
21 I would think that generally if an AIT is formed 22 that the ACRS ought to be aware of the event by 23 presentation.
r-24 MR. EBERSOLE:
One of the reasons for not doing 25 that is it is in motion yet.
a ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
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MR. MICHELSON:
So are a lot of these others in 2
motion.
3 MR. EBERSOLE:
That is more in motion.
4 MR. MICHELSON:
I don't know, maybe not.
But we 5
will hear about it.
6 MR. EBERSOLE:
Yes.
7 MR. ROSENTHAL:
That event was briefed at the 8
subcommittee on Mark I.
9 MR. MICHELSON:
That doesn' t help the full 10 committee.
11 MR. WARD:
We may hear about it at a future 12 meeting.
13 MR. EBERSOLE:
Oh, sure.
14 MR. MICHELSON:
The reason is because that one 15 got a lot of questions out in the world.
I even got a 16 telephone call on it.
17 MR. WARD:
But the committee is not responsible, 18 I don't think, for an immediate reaction.
19 MR. MICHELSON:
It indicates that the agency has 20 an elevated concern of some sort.
21 MR. EBERSOLE:
Carl, have you seen where the 22 clock is?
23 MR. MICHELSON:
I can give you a case for perhaps 24 moving one of the others.
v 25 MR. EBERSOLE:
I would like to call the ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
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$0600704 DAVbur 1
committee's attention that there is about 12 extra items in 2
this handout which you can peruse, and we will deal with the 3
Hatch business at the next session.
4 Any further remarks?
5 MR. ROSENTHAL:
No, sir.
6 MR. EBERSOLE:
Dave, that concludes our 7
presentation.
8 MR. WARD:
Thank you very much.
9 Le t' s turn immediately to the next item, which is 10 No. 10, originally scheduled for tomorrow morning, 11 pressurized thermal shock.
12 Dr. Shewmon.
13 DR. SHEWMON:
Pressurized thermal shock all of 14 you are familiar with, but let me remind you that this takes 15 at least three simultaneous occurrences or events or 16 problems.
17 One, there has to be a long term overcooling.
18 This is matters of decades of minutes, but whatever it is, 19 half an hour up to certainly tens of minutes.
During this 20 j time the high pressure, the system pressure has to be 21 I maintained at or above operating pressure or at least high.
22 Finally, you have to have a vessel which, due to 23 irradiation, has had a large increment in its original 24 ductile brittle transition temperature.
u-25 Paced with this series of things, that could lead ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
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to a very severe accident, but it takes a variety of kinds 2
of events that have to occur simultaneously.
3 What the staf f did was to say, well, we will try 4
to calculate the PTS probability due to all the different 5
sorts of transients that could get to this.
Oak Ridge did 6
this for them.
7 What finally was arrived at and put out in the 8
PTS rule were trip points or what were called screening 9
limits, and all licensees were then told that if they 10 projected to come within that screening limit before they 11 wanted to close down the plant, then they had to have a 12 report in which would explain why, what they were going to 13 do about this, and the report would have to be in three 14 years before the screening limit was likely to be met.
15 Now, the PTS rule is out, but the reg guide 16 defining how these analyses would have to be done went out 17 for public comment sometime ago.
We saw that, sent it to 18 consultants.
Public comments are back in, and the person 19 responsible for it is Roy Wood, who will talk to us in a few 20 minutes.
21 '
What we have him down here for today is to hear 22 what changes have been made or what has been the result of 23 j the public comment on this reg guide and also to give us a i
fm 24 l chance to bring up any other questions that we might have
/
i 25 about how this was done.
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Dave Okrent, in particular, was concerned 2
about -- at least at one time a couple of months ago --
3 about the substantial uncertainty that there was -- at least 4
on the first report that Oak Ridge put out -- they did three 5
of them -- and any other thing that people wanted to talk 6
about, but the main thrust is for Roy to give an overview of 7
the reg guide and the public comments that have come from 8
that.
9 Why don' t you go ahead?
10 (Slide.)
11 MR. WOOD:
Dr. Shewmon said part of what I 12 already wanted to say on this.
13 (Slide.)
14 The pressurized thermal shock rule was l
15 promulgated July 23rd,
'85, some while ago.
We had several 16 meetings with you gentlemen.
There were a million people 17 involved in that, and we finally got it like you described.
18 The rule does require extensive analyses.
Three 19 years before the screening limit defined in the rule is 20 reached, extensive analyses are required from the licensee 21 in that position.
22,
We promised detailed guidance as to how to do 23 those analyses.
It was promised actually in the rule.
That 24 came out in the form of a reg guide, which we published for 25 public comment in January of this year.
ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
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The Metal Subcomponents Subcommittee met in 2
February to provide comments.
The full committee provided 3
comments to us in March, and we have taken those comments 4
and the public comments that were submitted into 5
consideration.
6 You have, I think, before you, or it was mailed 7
and I think it was passed up to you at some time, another 8
detailed discussion of all the public comments.
9 DR. SHEWMON:
It is in the folder, I think.
10 MR. WOOD:
I know you have it.
I don' t know 11 exactly physically where it is on the table here, but it has 12 been before you.
13 It is a multi-page discussion of exactly what the 14 comments were, including the comments that came from 15 Dr. Ca tton, the consultant.
16 So I am just going to summarize them here.
But 17 we did take all those comments into account.
18 We put them in the proposed final guide that is 19 now before you, and basically what I want to do tonight is 20 summarize what changes we made since the last time you saw 21 it as a result of public comments.
In particular, I want to 22 give you some changes that we made as the result of the CRGR 23 meeting and some staff comments in the final stages of
<~
24 review.
v 25 DR. SHEWMON:
Let me ask you to answer one other ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
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question by way of history.
2 One other thing that has gone out is that all 3
licensees were asked a year ago to say whether or not they 4
projected reaching the screening points before end of life.
5 Those letters must be all back in right now.
I have seen 6
many of them many months ago.
7 Also, some people have changed and reconfigured 8
their cores as a result of that.
That I don' t think will 9
come later necessarily.
10 MR. WOOD:
That wouldn' t come later as part of 11 this because I am talking about the one provision of the 12 rule that requires these analyses which the reg guide before 13 you tonight addresses.
14 There are two other provisions of the rule that 15 are already in effect, as you point out, one of which was to 16 come in and tell us exactly what the RTPTS values are.
17 Those reviews are nearing completion.
18 In your package there is a backup slide, the very 19 las t slide, which is this one.
20 (Slide.)
21 This is the status of the reviews.
I think it 22 got passed out to you, the very last one.
The status of the 23 reviews.
(^q 24 The bottom line is, according to the licensees, KJ 25 with the flux reductions that they have committed to, no i
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one is saying that they will reach the screening limit 2
before the end of the present license.
3 Now, we have six reviews underway at Brookhaven 4
of plants that have proposed large reductions, and BNL is 5
checking the results.
We don' t know yet whether we agree 6
that we think they will achieve the degree of flux reduction 7
that they are taking credit for in their objectives.
8 There are, as you see up here, nine plants that 9
have made some commitment to flux reduction, a lesser 10 commi tme n t, and we didn' t think it necessary to send it to 11 BNL to review.
Nevertheless, there is a commitment.
12 I note down here at the bottom that all the flux 13 reductions we will keep a watch on it and verify it as we 14 proceed through the years.
15 They have to submit periodic capsule surveillance 16 reports, you know, redo the Appendix G limits, and that sort 17 of thing, based on the irradiation.
So that sort of thing 18 is contemplated.
19 But, anyway --
20 DR. SHEWMON:
What is the large reduction 21 proposed?
Is that in terms of 20 years?
22 MR. WOOD:
I am thinking of the flux reduction 23 like H.
B.
Robinson reduced the flux factor by 10.
That is r
24 what I am talking about.
25 MR. ETHERINGTON:
Are those reported on the old ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
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Reg Guide 1.99, revising the calculations for the new one?
2 MR. WOOD:
That is an entirely different 3
subject.
Let me see if I can relate that for you.
4 You are talking about Reg Guide 1.99, and there 5
is a NUREG, too, out for public comment.
6 The way the PTS rule is written, there is a 7
correlation in the PTS rule that says for PTS purposes, the 8
purposes of this screening limit, you must use the 9
correlation that is built into the PTS rule.
That is 10 entirely separate.
11 MR. ETHERINGTON:
Right.
It is a formula, right, 12 and that really is -- really based somewhat lately very like 13 the 1.99.
They both take account of the nickel.
14 MR. WOOD:
They do, but in different ways.
You 15 get a slightly dif ferent result.
16 In fact, I meant to say to you I hope this is the 17 last time I come before you for USIA-49, but it won' t be the 18 last time you hear about pressurized thermal shock because 19 there will be some further discussions about whether or not 20 the rule or the limit or whatever should be changed as that 21 new correlation comes out in Reg Guide 1.99, but I hope that 22 is not the subject for tonight.
23 DR. SHEWMON:
That was something I missed in my 24
- preamble, j
25 MR. WOOD:
I am through with this, but all these ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
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are based on the correlation of the PTS rule.
It really has 2
nothing to do with Reg Guide 1.99.
3 DR. SHEWMON:
The question is partly whether the 4
reg guide is ever likely to be used.
5 MR. WOOD:
Personal speculation?
Yes, I think it 6
will.
7 You mean this reg guide?
Now, you have changed 8
subjects on me.
9 DR. SHEWMON:
The question is whether this one 10 is.
If nobody ever comes to the screening point, this will 11 never be used.
12 MR. WOOD:
I carefully said by the end of their 13 present license, and everybody is going to come in -- almost 14 everybody -- and ask for a license extension.
I personally 15 think this reg guide would be critically important as part 16 of the licensing process.
17 A lot of people are going to be really close to 18 that limit at the end of their present license.
They are 19 not going to have achieved the 32 effective full power years 20 that they originally intended to design.
They are going to 21 come in and ask for an extension.
22 That is when you will see all sorts of discussion l
23 '
of this sort.
24 DR. MOELLER:
Your bottom line was that the flux 25 reductions are to be verified.
1 i
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How much uncertainty is there in the flux and in 2
the reductions?
3 MR. WOOD:
There is a whole lecture that I am 4
sure you have had at some time or other on that, where we 5
don' t allow them to use just one capsule, for example.
All 6
that is put into a data base, and there is a correlation 7
that you plug into in a certain way.
8 I believe they are talking in the neighborhood of 9
like 5 and 10 percent, but I am not -- unfortunately, he was 10 going to be here tomorrow and he is not here tonight.
11 DR. MOELLER:
But it is in that realm?
12 MR. WOOD:
I believe it is in that realm.
13 DR. MOELLER:
How about the reductions?
Do you 14 estimate that initially and then base it on the measurements 15 later?
16 MR. WOOD:
That is correct.
It is a calculation 17 initially, and that would have to be verified by future 18 counsels that come out.
19 MR. EBERSOLE:
Along the same line, how much 20 uncertainty is there in the thermal hydraulic matter because 21 we have a consultant who is a little bit caustic about the 22 accuracy?
23 DR. SHEWMON:
This is one of the things he will 24 get into as he discusses what they have done with the
-^
25 l comments.
So why don' t we proceed?
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2 MR. WOOD:
This is just a summary of what we 3
got.
We had six letters -- two from utilities, one from 4
Westinghose, two from one of our contractors, Pacific 5
Northwest.
6 One of the letters with the most extensive 7
comments came from your old consultant which, since it came 8
not directly through ACRS, I treated it as a public letter 9
from Dr. Catton.
I don' t know that it makes any dif ference, 10 but it really wasn' t of ficial ACRS comments, but you will 11 find those as the first 12 comments, the first 12 responses 12 in the detailed discussion that was passed out much earlier 13 in your package of the comments.
The first 12 were his.
14 In the review process, going through the CRGR, 15 and so forth, a couple of months ago we got a memo from 16 Dr. Ross in RES, which I will get into.
We made some 17 changes because of that, and as I point out here, this is a 18 letter that we sent them, which I believe you have a copy 19 of, with all of this detail attached to it.
20 21 22 23 24 25 ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
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I am really summerizing this for you.
If not, 2
you can look at the details.
3 (Slide.)
4 Ilere are the public comments that we got, which, 5
after deliberation, and so forth, we decided did not warrant 6
a change for one reason or another.
7 First, there was the comment that the Guide is 8
premature.
9 Well, I am ahead of myself.
The PTS rule is not 10 adequately conservative.
That may or may not be.
We 11 believe it is, but it is not a subject.
It is not really 12 relevant to the Reg Guide, which merely tells you how to do 13 the analyses, once you trigger the requirements of the 14 rule.
15 DR. OKRENT:
I have a question.
Realizing that 16 what you've just said about not relevant and the Reg Guide, 17 the 5 times 10 to the minus 6, is larger than the safety 18 policy goal of 10 to the minus 6 per reactor year.
It is 19 not quite a goal.
10 to the minus 6 per year for a large 20 release.
It is my understanding ti.at the studies done by your contractors that suggested that if you get through all 21 l
22 cracks, the odds are more than 50-50 that you will have the 23 vessel go, which maybe not means that 50-50, you'll have a 24 large release.
I don' t know.
This one screening criterion, 25 if it were the real value of the plant when people i
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calculated it, would exceed that suggested limit of the 2
Commission.
3 In view of that, this is 85, and the Commission 4
safety policy statement is 86, has anyone pointed out that there is a possible inconsistency here or rationalized it in 5
6 a way in which there is no inconsistency or what?
7 VOICE:
I am not sure I know the answer to that 8
question, Dr. Okrent.
People are working on the 9
implementation policy, the implementation of the safety goal 10 policy.
I guess it is still an open question.
That is one 11 of the things the Staff is supposed to study and has not 12 answered, and I guess you brought up something.
I gather 13 you have something in a rule which may be inconsistent, and 14 a possible policy that we would look at in the future.
15 MR. WOOD:
The PTS is leaning more and more 16 heavily toward the prevention; however, we did some 17 preliminary consequence calculations.
You have the right, 18 maybe you are all the way right, but I think you are half 19 right, in that if you get a PTS through-wall crack, you are 20 in a factor of two of having a core melt.
21 We don' t believe that you are anywhere near 22 within a factor of two of the other factor you mentioned, 23 the large release.
('
24 MR. EBERSOLE:
I haven' t seen the study that
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1 25 tells me how to judge that latter one.
I have seen the ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
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study that says that given the through-wall crack, I put it 2
at more than 50-50 that the vessel would go, and I would 3
like to see the study that shows.
4 MR. WOOD:
The verison of the PTS reg guide that 5
was put out for public comment has a number of references 6
cited in the back of it.
There was a paper given by Barrett 7
and Throm last year at the conference.
That is the best 8
place to find the study that you are asking for.
It is 9
referenced there; it is available.
We are no longer 10 referencing it, for reasons I will get into in a moment.
11 DR. OKRENT:
Tell me, this will toll me that for 12 the existing family of PNRs and not exclusively Indian 13 Point and Zion, that you can have a catastrophic vessel 14 rupture, and you know, what about the integrity of the 15 containment?
16 MR. WOOD:
It will tell you, using methods which 17 we believe are mot applicable to large dry containments, it 18 will tell you that there is a very, very small conditional 19 f ailure probability of the containment, given the f ailure of 20 the vessel.
21 DR. OKRENT:
So you would write off the ice 22 conde nsors ; is that it?
23 MR. WOOD:
We have not done studies of the ice
,em 24 conde nso rs.
If many of the ice condensors get close to this L) 25 criterion, they may chose, on their own devices, outside of ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
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this reg guide, to do this study.
2 DR. OKRENT:
There is nothing in the rule that 3
distinguishes, for example, between PWRs?
4 MR. WOOD:
No.
In fact, we quite specifically c6 5
want to aim it at the convention.
6 DR. OKRENT:
Well, I will just say, it seems to s
7 be something you may want to reflect on outside of the 8
regulatory guide.
9 VOICE:
The policy statement was selected, I 10 think, not by going through and saying what is possible or 11 what was already in the requirements or guidance, but they 12 picked what they thought was a feature.
It was one of the 13 things that you look back and say, does that contradict some 14 of the things that we are already doing?
15 DR. OKRENT:
You know, we just heard earlier 16 today that something in the standard review plan may not be 17 all that perfect in protecting against failure.
18 DR. KERR:
Dave, what is it that you wanted to 19 look at, that they haven' t looked at yet?
It was not clear 20 to me.
21 DR. OKRENT:
The screening criterion is 5 times 22 10 to the minus 6.
If there is, le t's say, an 80 percent 23 chance -- I will invent a number -- an 80 percent chance
'24 that, given a crack, you get early containment failure, that c'
25 is 4 times 10 to the minus 6, which is a number bigger than ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
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10 to the minus 6.
That is all I am saying.
2 MR. WARD:
We don' t believe it is that big, based 3
on our preliminary numbers.
We don't have the money to do 4
the study which you are suggesting.
That is not under way, 5
I can tell you that, and I don' t know what to say.
6 VOICE:
I am not sure that either 5 times 10 to 7
the minus 6 or 4 times 10 to the minus 6 are some magic 8
numbe rs.
They are both -- I will use the word " arbitrary."
9 I guess that is one of the things the Staff would have to do 10 in looking at whether the events are proper containment 11 performance guidelines, is whether somebody picked a number 12 out of the air.
13 DR. SHENMON:
You've raised the question.
They 14 don' t have an answer.
They have given you some references 15 where you can get more information on it, where it has been 16 considered.
17 Can we get on with the presentation now?
18 DR. OKRENT:
Just one question.
19 You indicated there has been a study which looks 20 at the likelihood of containment f ailure, given catastrophic 21 vessel failure.
22 Is the Staff backing that study, or are you just 23 saying somebody gave a paper?
^]
24 There is a difference.
25 MR. WARD:
The person who did the study, the ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, lNC.
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people who did the study were on the Staff.
We are not 2
putting that out as Commission policy, no, if that is your 3-question.
4 In fact, there are people on the Staff in 5-different areas -- I think they are looking more at the 6
methods that would be applicable to things like ice 7
condensors.
They are disagreeing with the study.
It is not 8
unanimous.
9 I have to say it is not unanimous.
10 DR. OKRENT:
In any event, I will ask for a copy 11 of whatever the reference is.
12 MR. WOOD:
I can help you with that.
'~'
13 Okay.
Well, the next group of comments were in 14 the vein that the guide is premature, incomplete and no one 15 needs it now.anyway, so why not just wait?
In fleshing that 16 out, the criteria and the methods are still evolving well.
17 That is true of anything, I suppose.
Thermal hydraulic code 18 specifications are too loose.
Nodalization schemes and air 19 estimation techniques are not specificed well enough.
20 Well, all this is part of the comments.
21 My answer really is, considering the purpose of 22 this guide, you can't nail things down in concrete.
You 23 don' t want to.
You want to allow a fair amount of 24 flexibility, because you don' t know what method would be 25 most applicable to some guy who is doing it many years from ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
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now.
2 So we purposely left a great deal of flexibility 3
in it.
And even if we hadn' t wanted to, we would have had 4
to, I suppose, because we don' t know what methods they may 5
have.
6 Regarding the second part, no one needs it now.
7 It almost sounds like I am contradicting myself, but it does 8
look like people have taken enough flux reduction actions to 9
avoid exceeding the limit during the present license; 10 however, there was a great hue and cry at the time we were 11 going out with the rule, saying, everybody's got to do flux 12 reductions, strongly bending arms, and so forth, in that 13 direction.
14 They said, why do that?
Why can' t we do 15 something else, if we want to, instead of flux reduction?
16 Well, we agreed that we could, but the only way 17 you could evaluate the safety benefit or some other 18 corrective action would be to do an analysis like we are 19 describing in the reg guide.
20 So we felt that if people really did want to have 21 that option available to them, they should have a reg guide 22 in order to do these analyses.
So we felt there was a need, 23 and we still feel there is a need to have the guide now,
-x 24 unless someone wants to propose some other corrective 25 action.
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Some people commented that the design basis 2
accident approach should be allowed.
3 Our answer is, we started out that way.
That was 4
our first line of thought.
When we started the PTS effort 5
some years ago, we couldn' t find the DBA that covered the 6
sequences.
We also believed that if you had some sort of 7
DBA, it could lead you to falsely evaluate corrective 8
actions.
You need a PTS that takes all the types of events 9
into account, in order to prope.ly judge what corrective 10 actions you should apply.
11 So we disagree with this comment.
12 We have asked -- as background, we have asked in 13 the reg guide for deterministic and probabilistic fracture 14 mechanic analyses.
We got two different comments.
- One, 15 that only deterministic, and one, that only probabilistic 16 fracture mechanics should be used, but we believe you need 17 both.
18 You can' t use only deterministic, because 19 somebody said, well, gee, why should we do probabilistic, 20 when there is a situation where no crack is possible?
21 You know, you are taking best estimates values, 22 and there is a variation on each of the values, like the 23 presence of a crack, how big the crack is, how cold it got, 24 exactly how much copper is there, with the median value, you 25 may be able to show that the deterministic calculation, no ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
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crack is possible, but that is really not the whole answer.
2 You need a probabilistic calculation to find out how likely 3
you are to be off those median values and still no crack 4
might be possible.
So that is the approach that's been 5
taken.
6 Then they turned around and said the other, that 7
you shouldn' t need deterministic calculations also, given 8
that I just argued the probabilistic ones, but you do, 9
because it turns out, in the probabilistic fracture 10 mechanics, you need to know such parameters as how long is 11 available for the operator to take action.
12 So you need a deterministic calculation to sort 13 of say, well, if it goes more than an hour and 20 minutes, 14 the operator better have done something, and in the 15 probabilistic calculation, you can assign a human factor 16 statement of some sort to the probability of having an 17 operator action in that time.
18 So we did find that that we needed both types of 19 calculations.
20 So we left them in the reg guide.
21 (Slide.)
22 We did get some comments that resulted in f airly 23 minor changes.
There was a comment that there was no e
24 mention of the necessity of handling condensation outside of 25 the pressurizer, and in fact, in some cases, you would need ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
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such a capability.
So we now have got this in quotes, 2
because the reg guider doesn' t require anything.
It simply 3
suggests on what we think the proper way to do it is, but we 4
now have the suggestion that it should be able to do that.
5 Likewise, pressure control was mentioned.
It was 6
mentioned that we didn' t have some sort of pressure control 7
system on the list of potential corrective actions, so we 8
have added -- certainly, it is thoroughly thought out on the 9
downside and the upside, that it should be considered.
It 10 was pointed out that we never really did a rigorous 11 calculation of the vessel failure probability due to 12 circumferential flaws.
We only bounded it.
So we changed 13 the words to say we bounded it instead of rigorously 14 calculating it.
15 It was suggested that effective full power years 16 is not a good way to characterize exposure.
That is 17 certainly true, because effective full power years are worth 18 varying amounts with varying loadings.
19 So if you change the core loading, then all of a 20 sudden all the graphs that you have are wrong.
21 So it would be better to use fluence or RT PTS.
22 We have suggested that.
23 In today's regulatory climate, where you don' t 24 want to require more than you have to require, it was 25 suggested that a lot of what we were requiring already ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
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exists elsewhere, and they ought to be able to reference it, 2
and sure, that is fine.
3 We would rather have everything be referenced 4
rather than provided to us again.
5 (S l ide. )
6 In the process of going through the approval, 7
before we got to CRGR, particularly from Denny Ross and 8
Research, it was pointed out that the guide might be taken 9
to emphasize mitigation.
All that means is, that we've got 10 all this stuff in there, that we want the vessel thermal 11 crack failures to be low, but then we have these 12 calculations that were asked about a short while ago, 13 containment failure, and so forth.
14 If you took that literally, it would look like, 15 gee, it really doesn' t matter, if the vessel fails, because 16 the containment failure probability appears to be so low 17 that, so what, let it fail?
But we didn' t intend that.
We 18 wanted to greatly deemphasize the mitigation.
19 So basically, what we have done is, we have 20 deleted the chapters that are regarding the vessel failure 21 !
modes, the containment performance and the person-rem.
I That is in the version that you have.
It is 22 23 deleted and relegated to providing the material by 24 reference.
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25 It is the references that we talked about a few ACE-FEDERAL, REPORTERS, INC.
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minutes ago.
They are still there as references in the 2
version that you have.
3 DR. MOELLER:
Excuse me.
What is the person-rem 4
aspec t?
5 MR. WOOD:
Just the f act -- I am just trying to 6
get to what you do after you calculate the containment 7
failure.
You calculate early and late fatalities.
8 DR. MOELLER:
Oh, okay If a f ailure occurs.
9 MR. WOOD:
Right.
That is no longer in the 10 guide.
Yes, sir, 11 DR. OKRENT:
A moment ago, I thought you said --
12 MR. WOOD:
I thought you were asleep!
13 (Laug hter. )
14 DR. OKRENT:
A moment ago, I thought you said 15 that whatever this paper is on containment performance 16 giving catastrophic vessel failure, was not an official 17 Staff position.
18 Am I correc t?
19 MR. WOOD:
That is correct.
20 DR. OKRENT:
What does it mean, when you 21 reference something in this document and don't have a 22 qualification that says, this is not an official staff 23 position, but it happens to be an NRC document?
24 MR. WOOD:
It depends on how you reference it and i
25 l the way we have referenced it is, as an example of one ace-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
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method that someone might want to look at, when they are 2
trying to justify their own containment calculations.
3 We have taken that out now, though.
4 So your question is, maybe less --
5 DR. OKRENT:
Taken what ou t?
The reference?
6 MR. WOOD:
I am going to get to that.
7 (Slide.)
8 As a result of the CRGR meeting --
9 DR. SHEWMON:
Back to one thing on prevention, 10 before you do that.
11 It came out reasonably early in this, that, if 12 the operators knew they had an overcooling event and could s
13 reduce the pressure over these tens of minutes, that there 14 was not a concern about pressurized thermal shock.
15 Could you tell me how that has been factored into 16 the plans that are out there?
Is this now part of the 17 training?
Is there different instrumentation to tell when 18 they, indeed, have overpressurization events instead of 19 something else, and overcooling?
20 MR. WOOD:
We have not required any new 21 instrumentation.
We have looked at improved training N
procedures, and with credit for the improved training, we 22 23 evaluate what we thought the expecte1 trequency of PTS 24 l events would be, and it was on the basis of that kind of
-m 25 consideration that we set the screening criteria.
It was 26 not on the basis of any credit for new instrumentation.
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DR. OKRENT:
Just a moment.
2 A minute ago I think you said that there was 3
something which would imply to the innocent licensee that 4
even if a PTS occurred there was only a small probability 5
that it would result in -- I don' t know whether you said 6
containment failure or early containment failure.
7 MR. WOOD:
Either one.
8 DR. OKRENT:
What is interesting to me is in 9
1965, when the question of pressure vessel failure was a red 10 hoc issue, and in the several years after that, when people 11 looked at the possibility of surviving a catastrophic vessel 12 failure without a major release of radioactivity, it was in 13 the end pretty much judged to be too hard to do.
14 People tried to build containers around the first 15 vessel.
The Germans had a major program on this, and so 16 forth.
And now, almost magically, doing nothing, the 17 probability is very, very low.
18 01,. SilEWMON:
The probability of what?
19 DR. OKRENT:
Given a catastrophic failure of the 20 vessel, the probability in a large dry PWR, which is what we 21 were talking about then, also -- this ice condenser wasn' t 22 in the picture -- what we are told is some of the staf f 23 recommended that people look at these reports which led to 24 !
the conclusion that the probability of containment failure, 25 given catastrophic vessel f ailure, was very, very low.
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DR. SHEWMON:
Are you suggesting we haven't 2
learned anything about severe accident propagation through a 3
plant since 1965?
4 DR. OKRENT:
My guess is that the level of effort 5
that has gone into these studies is less than the level that 6
was going in those days.
7 The first study that was done, I think to 8
people's dismay, concluded that the probability of vessel 9
f ailure, given a throughwall crack, was pretty high because 10 people were hoping that that was going to be low.
11 MR. WOOD:
We thought that it would be much 12 lower.
7,
13 DR. OKRENT:
In fact, they said it would be low 14 in discussing the PTS rule, and now, based on some report, 15 which is not an official staff report, there is a 16 suggestion, though, that the containment can withstand it, 17 and I am happy that the world is turning out so hunky-dory, 18 but I don't know that I believe it.
19 MR. ETHERINGTON:
There is a difference, Dave.
20 Thermal shock f ailure would be a low energy failure.
That 21 is, the water would be relatively cold.
It wouldn' t have 22 anything like the energy that you have on a postulated 23 rupture under operating pressure -- operating temperature.
24 DR. OKRENT:
I will concede that difference, but
-~
l 25 '
it is still -- what they expect is a full separation of the ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202 347 3701)
NJtlOfl%IJe Co urige 234tu
r 1
60 09 03 105 1
DAVbur 1
vessel, and in fact I think they predict a circumferential 2
rupture.
3 DR. KERR:
Is there any of this core on the floor 4
thing?
5 DR. SHEWMON:
I bet you a dime that was what was 6
done in '65.
7 MR. WOOD:
You are saying there is a lot of 8
uncertainty in your statement, in the calculations, and we 9
agree.
That is why we don' t want to base the safety of one 10 of these plants on them, and that is why we took them out.
11 VOICE:
As Roy was saying, we took all the 12 material about consequences -- containment f ailure and what 13 the source term would be and what the distribution in the 14 environment would be -- we took that all out of the guide, 15 but we can' t say that it is not there.
But we have tried to 16 deemphasize it and discourage people from taking it as part I
17 of their argument.
18 We think we know with reasonable certainty what 19 all these effects would be, and we can begin to predict what 20 would happen in the environment.
Bu t they don' t want you to 21 do that.
22 :
The way to come to us is to show us that the 23 vessel won' t crack.
That is what we want to show, f'
24 There isn' t any way in the world that anyone can 25 prevent licensees from studying anything they want to.
If ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
~ _ m e-
60 09 04 106 1
DAVbur 1
they want to submit consequences analyses, I guess we would 2
be the first to review them, especially since there is a 3
safety goal policy which discusses safety goals.
4 But we have tried very hard to deemphasize that.
5 MR. WOOD:
That is relative to this slide, 6
Warren.
The lawyers pointed out to us at the CRGR meeting 7
that the PTS rule in f act addresses the necessity of doing 8
vessel failure calculations.
9 I can read you the several parts, but the 10 submittals that are described by the rules and by this reg 11 guide address vessel failure calculations.
12 Now, there is one final -- the very last 13 paragraph.
I think it is paragraph B(6) in the rule.
It 14 would help me if I had it memorized by now.
But it does say 15 that if the staff or the Commission does not approve the 16 analyses, that before the licensee is allowed to operate 17 above the screening limit he must have the Commission's 18 approval based on further analyses or corrective actions, 19 and at that point it doesn' t say any longer vessel f ailure 20 calculations.
It just says calculations.
I 21 ;
So at that point, at the last stage of the appeal l
22 I process, we left the door open for the licensee to come in 23 with a risk calculation where you would say, look, okay, the 24 vessel f ails, we don' t really care that much because it 25 doesn' t really hurt anybody all that much.
ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
xemm s_ ammm, m o w.
60109 05 107 T
DAVbur 1
The risk is low, but we have decided that is 2
beyond the scope of the reg guide that we want to play up, 3
.and we have taken all that stuff out, and that is the reason 4
we have taken it out.
5 DR. OKRENT:
Excuse me one minute.
6 Harold, I assume the temperature is, what, 400 7
instead of 550 or something like that?
8 MR. ETHERINGTON:
No, it is about 200 or so.
9 Isn' t that where you did it?
10 MR. WOOD:
The problem with all those arguments 11 is we are talking now for PTS purposes about the temperature 12 in the downcomer, and there would still be a lot of normal O
13 water elsewhere.
14 DR. OKRENT:
I am not sure.
There is some 15 reduction, you are right.
16 MR. WOOD:
There is some reduction.
17 DR. OKRENT:
But it would not be huge?
18 MR. WOOD:
I don' t know.
19 Okay.
The other significant comment we got from 20 CRGR, they believed we hadn' t said enough in here about 21 apple pie and motherhood.
22 Gee, if you prefer corrective actions, you had j
23 better not just look at PTS; you had better look at the 24 downside and some other things, like if you want the valvo 25 closed to prevent open cooling, because that can keep you ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
3-o,
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$0600906 DAVbur 1
from having the system available when you need it to cool 2
the core.
3 We had all that in there, but we put a few more 4
words in there to make it more clear, so that we were taking 5
a total look at the right factors.
6 That is what I am saying.
7 DR. MOELLER:
And that last word was correct --
8
" emphasized"?
9 MR. WOOD:
No.
You ought to put an ' h' in 10 there.
Thank you.
11 (S l ide. )
12 My summary.
13 We did not change the guide significantly since 14 you saw it.
We pu t i t ou t for public comment.
It has 15 received broad acceptance.
We needed it to complete the 16 USIA-49 issue.
17 I don' t teally want to say that it completes PTS, 18 but it will complete the USIA rule.
The rule is not 19 complete until the guide is out.
20 Analysis can' t be required until a year af ter the 21 guide is published, and we are requesting the ACRS give us a 22 letter recommending issuance of the final reg guide.
23 That is the end of my remarks.
I don' t have as
('
24 many people as I had hoped to have to answer questions.
We I
25 '
do have a couple, and I will try to answer what I can.
ace-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
1
- . m m.,
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60 09 07 109 1
DAVbur 1
DR. SilENMON:
Why do you want an ACRS letter 2
recommending issuance?
Did we recommend against it earlier, 3
or do you just think it would be nice to have one in your 4
file, or what?
5 MR. WOOD:
I think in the letter that I send over 6
to Research that is responsible for publishing reg guides, I 7
think I must say that this has received the blessing of the 8
ACRS.
I would certainly like to say it, and I think that is 9
something they expect to see.
10 I don't know that I need a letter.
If you would 11 like to tell me verbally that it is okay?
12 DR. SilEWMON :
Nobody speaks for this body except 13 in the form of collegial letters.
14 MR. WOOD:
That is why I need a letter.
15 DR. SilEWMON :
Thank you.
16 Any other questions?
17 (No response.)
18 DR. SilEWMON :
Mr. Chairman, we have got 15 19 minutes.
Do we powder our nosos or do something else?
20 MR. WARD:
We are finishing half an hour early 21 unless somebody wants to bring something up.
22 '
(Whereupon, at 5: 4 5 p.m., the committee was 23 recessed, to go into unrecorded session.)
24 25 ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
- o2 m. m,
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CERTIFICATE OF OFFICIAL REPORTER
'J This is to certify that the attached proceedings before the UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION in the matter of:
NAME OF PROCEEDING:
ADVISORY COMMICTEE ON REACTOR SAFEGUARDS 320Tl! GENERAL MEETING DOCKET NO.:
PLACE:
WASIIINGTON, D.
C.
DATE:
TilURSDAY, DECEMBER 11, 1986 4
were held as herein appears, and that this is the original transcript thereof for the file of the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
/
(sigt) m (TYPED)
DAVID L.
IlOFFMAN Official Reporter blYatYori R
rt r s O
o nU AGENDA FOR ACRS MEETING Friday December 11, 1986 3:00 p.m.
Room 1046 H-Street Washington, D.C.
RECENT SIGNIFICANT EVENTS Presenter / Office Date Plant Event Telephone Page 11/20 Oyster Creek Drywell Shell Corrosion J. Donohew, NRR 3
29421 11/20 Byron 2 Loss of Both Component R. Woodruff, IE 7
Cooling Water Pumps 27205
$0/22 ANO-1 HighPressureInjection H. Bailey, IE 7
Nozzle External Surface 29006 Damage Due to Boric Acid Corrosion
/!
11/19 Pilgrim Loss of Offsite Power J. Rosenthal, IE 24193 O
8/1-10/14 -------
Design Problems at Plants R. Woodruff, IE Operating and Under Constr 27205
/b 12/9 Surry 2 Failure of Main Feedwater J. Rosenthal, IE Pye 24193 10/1 Oconee 2 Loss sf Low Pressure Service J. Rosenthal, IE
~
Water (UPDATE) 24193 O
OTHER EVENTS PRESENTED TO J. Ebersole b.i Meeting on December 9, 1986 (Tuesday) 8:30 a.m.
Room P-422 Phillips Building Bethesda, Md RECENT SIGNIFICANT EVENTS Presenter / Office Date Plant Event Telephone Page 10/23 Indian Pt. 2 Auxiliary Feedwater Problems R. Woodruff, IE
/7 27205 10/4 Clinton Fuel Handling Problems M. Wegner, IE
/7 24511 11/5 Nine Mile Pt. 2 Problems During Initial M. Wegner, IE 31 Fuel Load 24511 10/28 McGuire 1&2 Both Trains of ECCS A. Dromerick, IE 13 Inoperable 24784 1/22 Point Beach Scram with Complications T. Colburn, NRR 1Y 29787 11/3 Pilgrim Stanby Gas Treatment System R. Auluck, NRR 37 Design Deficiencies 29476 10/21 Trojan Potential EQ Deficiency of T. Chan, NRR 30 Safety System Components 27136 10/21 Trojan Low Temperature Overpressure T. Chan, NRR 3/
Protection 27136 8/19 WNP 2 No Analysis of Potential J. Bradfute, NRR p
Flooding Due of Fire 29414 12/4 Hatch 1 & 2 AIT for Leak from Spent E. Weiss, IE 33 Fuel Pool 29005
.2
DECEMBER 1, 1986 v
(O OYSTER CREEK - DRYWELL SHELL CORROSION l'
NOVEMBER 20, 1986 (J. DON 0 HEW, NRR) i i
PROBLEM:
SIGNIFICANT REDUCTION OF DRYWELL SHELL OUTSIDE THICKNESS, AROUND CIRCUMFERENCE AT FLOOR OF DRYWELL CAUSE:
LICENSEE THEORIZES CAUSE IS CORROSION DUE TO MOISTURE t
ENTRAINED IN SAND IN SMALL CAVITY AROUND CIRCUMFERENCE.
SIGNIFICANCE:
DEGRADED SHELL MAKES CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY UNCERTAIN.
DISCUSSION:
WATER LEAKED THROUGH BELLOWS SEAL BETWEEN OUTSIDE SHELL AND BIOLOGICAL SHIELD WHEN REFUELING CAVITY FLOODED FOR REFUELING.
j LEAKAGE COLLECTED FROM DRAINAGE CHANNEL EELOW DOWNCOMERS.
WATER QUALITY INDICATED THIS WAS REACTOR GRADE WATER.
- (...O*
SEAL BETWEEN SHELL AND CONCRETE FIXED IN CYCLE 11R OUTAGE.
WATER DRAINED DOWN OUTSIDE OF SHELL TO CAVITY, FILLED WITH SAND, AND OUT DRAINAGE CHANNEL.
SAND USED IN CAVITY IS SAME AS SAND USED IN MAKING CONCRETE AT OYSTER CREEK UT USED TO MEASURE SHELL THICKNESS.
MEASUREMENTS RANGE FROM 0.38" l
TO 1.09".
AVERAGE READING IS 0.92".
NOMINAL WALL THICKNESS j
IS 1.15 "
il
(
FOLLOWUP:
MEETING WITH GPU NUCLEAR ON DECEMBER 1, 1986 IN PROGRESS.
OYSTER CREEK RESTART FROM CYCLE 11R OUTAGE DELAYED.
LICENSEE MAY REMOVE ONE OR TWO PLUGS FROM SHELL IN CORROSION l
AREAS TO INVESTIGATE OUTSIDE OF SHELL.
PROBLEM HAS GENERIC IMPLICATIONS FOR MARK I CONTAINMENTS.
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i GPU NUCLEAR CORPORATION GENERAL ARRANGEMENT
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OYSTER CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION REACTOR BUILDING SECTION C4 UPDATED FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT l
REV.1. 2/98 l
FIGURE S.21E 4
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St'PVEY OF PLANTS IN BWD1/ DEL /NRR MARK I CONTAINMENT SHELL CORROSION i
ULTRASONIC (UT)
^
PLANT DESIGN MEASUREMENTS DRESDEN ?/3 WATER DOES NOT. DRAIN WITHIN DPYWELL THP0 UGH SAND CAVITY SPECIFICATIONS MONTICELLO WATER DOES NOT DRAIN WITHIN DRYWELL THROUGH SAND CAVITY SPECIFICATIONS NINE MILE POINT 1 WATER DOES NOT DRAIN NONE
(~'>,
THROUGH SAND CAVITY R-0YSTEP CREEK WATER DOES DRAIN WASTAGE OF i
THROUGH SAND CAVITY DRYWELL SHELL PILGRIM WATER DOES NOT DRAIN
,NONE THROUGH SAND CAVITY OVAD CITIES 1/?.
PATER DOES NOT DRAIN HTTHIN DRYWELL THROUGH SAND CAVITY SPECIFICATIONS 1
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'1 BYRON 2 - LOSS OF ALL COMPONENT COOLING WATER (CCW)
NOVEMBER 20, 1986 - R.
WOODRUFF, IE PROBLEM:
DURING PREPARATION FOR INITIAL CRITICALITY, ALL CCW WAS LOST FOR 12 MINUTES CAUSE:
l THE SAFETY VALVE ON THE CCW SIDE OF AN EXCESS LETDOWN HEAT EXCHANGER (ELHX) LIFTED AND STUCK OPEN SIGNIFICANCE:
SEVERAL SINGLE ACTIVE FAILURES COULD CAUSE TEMPORARY LOSS OF ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES (ESFs)
DISCUSSION:
ON 11/20, ONE OF FIVE CCW PUMPS WAS STOPPED AND ANOTHER WAS STARTED A PRESSURE SURGE CAUSED THE SAFETY VALVE ON ONE OF TWO ELHXs TO OPEN THE SAFETY VALVE STUCK AND CCW WAS PUMPED TO A FLOOR DRAIN UNTIL THE OPERATING PUMP TRIPPED ON LOW WATER LEVEL IN THE 1
4 SURGE TANK THE BACKUP CCW PUMP STARTED ON LOW PRESSURE IN THE PUMP DISCHARGE HEADER AND PUMPED UNTIL IT TRIPPED e
THE LICENSEE MANUALLY ISOLATED THAT PART OF THE CCW SYSTEM SERVING COMPONENTS WHICH ARE NOT ESFs AND REFILLED THE CCW SYSTEM FOLLOWUP:
4 THE SYSTEM CONFORMS TO THE FSAR IE IS PREPARING AN INFORMATION NOTICE NRR IS REVIEWING THE CONFORMANCE OF THE CCW SYSTEM TO REGULATORY REQUIREMENTS
/
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ANO-1, HIGH PRESSURE INJECTION (HPI) NOZZLE EXTERNAL SURFACE DAMAGE
('S DUE TO BORIC ACID CORROSION
(-)
OCTOBER 22, 1986 (H. BAILEY, IE)
PROBLEM:
HPl NOZZLE HAD EXTENSIVE WASTAGE DUE TO BORIC ACID CORROSION CAUSE:
EQUIPMENT FAILURE AND INADEQUATE SURVEILLANCE SIGNIFICANCE:
DEGRADATION OF RCS PRESSURE BOUNDARY.
CIRCUMSTANCES:
PLANT IN COLD SHUTDOWN PERFORMING SURVEILLANCE OF HPl NOZZLE THERMAL SLEEVES.
INSULATION REMOVED FROM THE "A" NOZZLE REVEALED EXTENSIVE WASTAGE.
HPl ISOLATION VALVE, DIRECTLY ABOVE HAD PREVIOUSLY BEEN LEAKING (.09 GPM) FROM BONNET FOR SEVERAL MONTHS.
THE VALVE LEAKAGE KEPT THE NOZZLE WETTED AND THAT RESULTED IN ACCELERATED CORROSION.
DISCUSSION:
()
IE BULLETIN 82-02 DISCUSSES THREADED FASTENER WASTAGE DUE TO BORIC ACID.
ASME CODE, SECTION XI, WAS REVISED IN 1983 TO PROVIDE MORE RESTRICTIVE VISUAL INSPECTIONS OF SYSTEMS CONTAINING BORATED WATER.
FOLLOWUP:
OTHER THREE HPl NOZZLES WERE INSPECTED AND SHOWED NO EVIDENCE OF VALVE LEAKAGE OR ANY DAMAGE.
THE DAMAGED HPI NOZZLE REPAIRED BY GRINDING OUT AND REBUILDING BY WELDING.
AN lE INFORMATION NOTICE IS UNDER PREPARATION.
7
1 O
O O
i Figure 1: ANO-1 HPI Line/ Nozzle Configuration i
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ELGRIM - LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER
//,
NOVEMBER 19, 1986, (J. ROSENTHAL, IE) j-hl (fROBLEM:
DURING SNOW STORM ALL THREE OFFSITE POWER LINES ARE LOST
./,
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'CAUSE:~,
COMBINATION OF HIGH WINDS, SNOW AND SALT BUILD-UP ARE 0
x
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PROBABLE CAUSE oQ
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i SIGHiFICANCE:
SALT BUILD-UP HAS CAUSED RECURRING PROBLEMS AT
^
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DISCUSSION:
,fq' joFFSITE FOWER LOST AT ABOUT 0805 j-SHU,TDOWN COOLING LOST OPEN TELEPHONE LINK ESTABLISHED BETWEEN HQ, REGION AND SITE O
SHUTDOWN COOLING RESTORED AT ABOUT 0920 l
PLANT HAS BEEN SHUT DOWN SINCE APRIL (RCS TEMP 114*F)
- I HEAVY WET SNOWFALL OF ABOUT 4 INCHES WITH WINDS OF 45 TO 50 MPH WITil GUSTS TO 60 MPH I
'[
SITE LOCATED ON CAPE COD BAY BOTH DIESEL GENERATORS START AND LOAD 20,000 GALS OF DIESEL FUEL AVAILABLE, WHICH IS ADEQUATE FOR MORE THAN 100 HOURS 345 KV LINE FROM NORTH RESTORED TO YARD BUT NOT PLANT AT 1103
'r
, 'SAhETY BUSES REMAIN ON DIESEL GENERATORS UNTil LOAD
/
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/
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OFFSITE POWER RESTORED TO PLANT AT ABOUT 1130
',OlESEL GENERATORS PARALLELED TO GRID PRIOR TO SHUTDOWN j
DG SHUTDOWN AT 1238 FOLLOWUP:
LIKELIHOOD OF OCCURRENCE WARRANTS ATTENTION MUST BE INTEGRATED WITH BLACKOUT RULE
(
f-
O DESIGN PROBLEi1S AT PLANTS OPERATING AND UNDER CONSTRUCTION AUGUST 1 THRU DCTOBER 14, 1986 - R. WOODRUFF, IE PROBLEM:
50 DESIGN PROBLEMS AND 4 POSSIBLE DESIGN PROBLEMS WERE IDENTIFIED FRDM 50.72 AND REGIONAL DAILY REPORTS DISCUSSION:
DESIGN PROBLEMS AS OPPOSED TO FAILURES TO CONSTRUCT, DPERATE, TEST, MAINTAIN, AND MODIFIY THE PLANT AS REQUIRED BY DESIGN SYSTEM PROBLEMS 12 ELECTRICAL (6 DIESEL GENERATOR, 3 BUS, AND OTHERS)
S CONTAINMENT 7 ECCS 5 HEATING, VENTILATING, AND AIR CONDITIONING
- PLANT PROBLEMS p
6 COMANCHE PEAK V
6 PERRY 4 PALISADES NSSS PROBLEMS 23 GE 21 WESTINGHOUSE AE PROBLEMS 16 BECHTEL (PALISADES, HOPE CREEK, SUSQUEHANNA, GRAND GULF, AND OTHERS) 9 SARGENT & LUNDY (FORT ST VRAIN, ZION, AND OTHERS) 6 GIBBS & HILL (CDMMANCHE PEAK) 6 GILBERT (PERRY)
THESE EVENTS HAVE BEEN GIVEN THE SAME SCRUTINY BY NRR, AEOD, IE, AND THE REGIONS AS OTHER EVENTS (OPERATING, MAINTENANCE, ETC)
FDLLOWUP:
MAINTAIN THE DATA BASE ON AN INTERIM BASIS UNTIL THE CORPORATE DATA NETWORK IS AVAILABLE O
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SURRY 2 - FAILURE OF MAIN FEEDWATER PIPE DECEMBER 9, 1986 - J. ROSENTHAL PROBLEM:
AN 18-INCH MAIN FEEDWATER PIPE ON THE SUCTION SIDE OF FEEDWATER PUMP "A" FAILED CATASTROPHICALLY PROBABLE CAUSE:
PIPE WALL THINNING AND SYSTEM PRESSURE TRANSIENT SIGNIFICANCE:
5 WORKERS INJURED DISCUSSION:
AT 2:40 PM ON 12/9/86, THE REACTOR WAS OPERATING AT 100% OF FULL POWER MAIN STEAM ISOLATION VALVE "C" CLOSED REACTOR TRIPPED ON LOW LOW LEVEL IN STEAM GENERATOR "C"
PRESSURE TRANSIENT IN MAIN FEEDWATER SYSTEM RESULTED IN BREAK OF SUCTION PIPING TO FEEDWATER PUMP "A" CPCRATORS CLOSED VALVES IN ALL LINES SUPPLYING HIGH ENERGY FLUIDS TO THE INUNDATED AREA STEAM GENERATOR LEVELS WERE MAINTAINED WITH AUXILIARY FEEDWATER AND STEAM WAS DUMPED TO ATMOSPHERE AT 2 AM, THE RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL SYSTEM WAS PUT IN SERVICE UNIT REACHED COLD SHUTDOWN DURING THE MORNING OF 12/10/86 FOLLOWUP:
THE LICENSEE DECLARED AN ALERT THE REGION DISPATCHED AN AUGMENTED INSPECTION TEAM j
THE LICENSEE SHUT DOWN UNIT 1 FOR EXAMINATION PRELIMINARY INFORMATION ATTRIBUTES CAUSE OF PIPING FAILURE TO EROSION OF PIPE WALL AND A PRESSURE TRANSIENT WHICH OVERLOADED THE THINNED WALL SECTIION O
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INDIAN POINT 2 - AUXILIARY FEEDWATER PROBLEMS OCTOBER 20 & 23, 1986 - R.
WOODRUFF, IE PROBLEM:
THREE DEFECTIVE COMPONENTS CAUSED LOSS OF SOME AUXILIARY FEEDWATER (AFW) CAPABILITY (10/20)
THE GOVERNOR VALVE ON THE AFW TURBINE-DRIVEN PUMP WAS IMPROPERLY SET (10/23)
CAUSE:
IMPROPER MAINTENANCE (10/20 & 23)
AGING AND WEAR LIKELY (10/20)
SIGNIFICANCE:
MARGINAL NAINENANCE DISCUSSION:
ON 10/20, THE REACTOR WAS AT 100% OF FULL POWER O'
DURING SURVEILLANCE, A LOOSE WIRE IN THE REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM WAS DISTURBED A SPURIOUS SIGNAL WAS GENERATED INDICATING THAT SAFETY INJECTION HAD OCCURRED THE REACTOR SCRAMMED IN RESPONSE TO THE SIGNAL BOTH MOTOR-DRIVEN AFU PUMPS STARTED BUT ONE TRIPPED ON SPURICUS OVERCURRENT BECAUSE ON A DEFECTIVE CARD TURBINE-DRIVEN AFW PUMP STARTED AND RAN ALTHOUGH THE STEAM SUPPLY RELIEF LIFTED BECAUSE THE PRESSURE CONTROL VALVE WAS DEFECTIVE THE LOOSE WIRE WAS TIGHTENED THE OVERCURRENT PROTECTION CARD WAS REPLACED AND THE SETPOINT WAS INCREASED BY 10%
THE GOVERNOR VALVE WAS RESET FROM A CORRECT VALUE OF 0% TO AN INCORRECT VALUE OF 20%
THE UNIT WAS RESTARTED AT 38% POWER, MAIN FW WAS LOST AND THE REACTOR WAS MANUALLY SCRAMMED
/ 17
O THE TURBINE-DRIVEN AFW TRIPPED ON OVERSPEED 1
THE GOVERNOR VALVE WAS RESET TO 0%
FOf.LOWUP:
IE OBTAINED AN INTERPRETATION OF REGULATORY REQUIREMENTS O
i O
IS
~~
-s CLINTON - FUEL HANDLING PROBLEMS t c 0CTOBER 1986 - (MARY WEGNER, IE)
PROBLEM:
WRONG ENRICHMENT BUNDLES HAVE BEEN PLACED IN CORE LOCATIONS, MISSED SUB-CRITICALITY VERIFICATIONS, AND FUEL TRANSFER CARRIAGE FAILURE, HAVE OCCURRED IN THE PERIOD OF OCTOBER 4-8, 1986.
CAUSE:
PERSONNEL ERROR SIGNIFICANCE:
FAILURE TO FOLLOW FUEL LOADING PROCEDURES SIGNIFIES AN INATTENTION TO A MOST IMPORTANT OPERATION CIRCUMSTANCES:
> ()
OCTOBER 4 - TWO MEDIUM ENRICHMENT BUNDLES WERE PLACED IN HIGH ENRICHMENT BUNDLE LOCATIONS FUEL LOADING SPECIFICATIONS ARE FOR ENRICHMENT TYPE (HIGH, MEDIUM, NONE) RATHER THAN BUNDLE NUMBER OCTOBER 7 - THE FUEL TRANSPORT CARRIAGE FAILED TO STOP AT THE REQUIRED POSITION'DURING TRANSPORT OF TWO NEW FUEL BUNDLES
- THE CARRIAGE TRAVELED FOUR FEET BEYOND ITS UPPER STOP
- MINOR MECHANICAL DAMAGE RENDERED THE CARRIAGE IN0PER-ABLE UNTIL OCTOBER 9 WHILE THE FUEL TRANSFER CARRI AGE WAS IN0PERABLE, THE LICENSEE DEVIATED FROM THE SPIRAL LOADING PATTERN OCTOBER 7 - THE LICENSEE FAILED TO CONDUCT A SUBCRITICALITY TEST FOLLOWING THE LOADING 0F BUNDLE 248
- BUNDLES 249 AND 250 WERE LOADED BEFORE DISCOVERY OF THE OMISSION
[])
- BUNDLES 249 AND 250 0FF-LOADED AND TEST COMPLETED
/9
~
CLINTON - FUEL HANDLING PROBLEMS O~
OCT0Bea 1988 - (MAay weGNEa, iE)
- OCTOBER 8 - THE LICENSEE IDENTIFIED A MEDIUM ENRICHMENT BUNDLE ABOUT TO BE PLACED IN A LOCATION FOR A HIGH ENRICHMENT BUNDLE NO ADDITIONAL PROBLEMS REPORTED SINCE BUNDLE 261 F0LLOW-UP:
FUEL HANDLING CONCERNS DISCUSSED WITH THE REGION O
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NillE MILE POINT 2 FUEL HANDLING PROBLEMS
(])
NOVEMBER, 1986 (M. S. WEGNER, IE)
PROBLEM:
RPS ACTUATIONS, TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION (TS) VIOLATIONS, AND OTHER PROBLEMS DURING FUEL LOADING CAUSE:
PERSONNEL ERRORS AND EQUIPMENT FAILURE j
SIGNIFICANCE:
DEGRADED RPS DURING FUEL LOAD, LOSS OF RAD DETECTION, UNNECESSAR CHALLENGES TO RPS SEVERAL VIOLATIONS OF TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS DISCUSSION:
ON 11/05 INTERMEDIATE RANGE MONITOR (IRM)
"D" SPIKED CAUSING SCRAM SIGNAL - APPARENT CAUSE WAS BUMPING BY FUEL BUNDLE
- SCRAM DISCHARGE VOLUME HIGH LEVEL SCRAM OCCURRED WHE FAILED TO FOLLOW PROCEDURE FOR RESETTING SCRAM ON 11/07 SOURCE RANGE MONITOR (SRM) "C" TRIP FUNCTIONS WERE BYPASSED TO PERFORM FUNCTIONAL CHECKS AND LEFT IN THIS CONDITION
(])
HOURS.
- WITH ALL TRIP FUNCTIONS OF SRM "C" IN0PERABLE, 19 FUEL BUNDLES WERE LOADED IN THE QUADRANT, CONTRARY TO TS REQUIREMENTS ON 11/08, THE RAD MONITOR FOR THE REACTOR BUILDING BELOW THE REFUELING FLOOR WAS REMOVED FROM SERVICE FOR MAINTENANCE WHILE FUEL LOADING WAS IN PROGRESS; CONTRARY TO TS REQUIREMENTS, THE STANDBY GAS TREATMENT SYSTEM WAS NOT PLACED IN SERVICE ON 11/09, TWO APRM-HI TRIPS ON CHANNEL "C" WERE RECEIVED.
- THE FIRST WAS ATTRIBUTED TO WELDING IN THE AREA 0F THE LPR
- AFTER THE SECOND OCCURRED WITH NO WELDING IN PROGRESS, A FAULTY CARD IN THE LPRM CIRCulTRY WAS FOUND.
DURING FUEL LOADING, R0D BLOCKS WERE BYPASSED CONTRARY TO TS REQUIREMENTS FOLLOWUP:
REGION IS FOLLOWING OPERATIONS CLOSELY AND DISCUSSING EVEN WITH LICENSEE ENFORCEMENT CONFERENCE ON TS VIOLATIONS TO BE SCHEDULED IN
([)
EARLY DECEMBER LICENSEE IS TAKING CORRECTIVE ACTIONS, (E.G. DISCIPLINARY ACTION)
MCGUIRE 1 8 2 - BOTH TRAINS OF ECCS INOPERABLE OCTOBER 28, 1986 - (A. DROMERICK, IE) b)
i PROBLEM:
LICENSEE CHANGES TO M0V TORQUE SWITCH SETTING FROM THOSE SET AT FACTORY MADE VALVE POST ACCIDENT OPERABILITY QUESTIONABLE CAUSE:
INSTALLATION ERROR, LICENSEE MADE CHANGES TO MOV TORQUE SWITCH SETTINGS WITHOUT CONSULTING VALVE OPERATOR VENDOR SIGNIFICANCE:
POTENTIAL COMMON MODE FAILURE OF A SIGNIFICANT NUMBER OF SAFETY-RELATED VALVES DISCUSSION:
WHILE LICENSEE PERFORMING IEB 85-03 EVALUATIONS, IT WAS DETERMINED THAT TORQUE SWITCH SETTINGS MAY NOT BE CONSERVATIVE ON ROTORK MOV LICENSEE CONCLUDED THAT TWO CHARGING HEADER ISOLATION VALVES AT EACH UNIT MIGHT NOT CLOSE WHEN REQUIRED LICENSEE LOCKED VALVES CLOSED AND SHUT DOWN BOTH UNITS LICENSEE HAS VERIFIED THAT VALVES AT MCGUIRE AND OTHER DUKE PLANTS HAVE CONSERVATIVE TOROUE SWITCH SETTINGS
(~)
REGION II AND IE ISSUED AN INFORMATION NOTICE TO ALL CP AND OL PLANTS (THIS IS SECOND IN ISSUED AS A RESULT OF INFOR-MATION OBTAINED BY BULLETIN ACTIONS),
NPRDS DATA INDICATES THE F0LLOWING APPROXIMATE DISTRIBUTION FOR VALVES WITH ROTORK OPERATORS UNIT NUMBER OF VALVES MCGUIRE 1 & 2 275 EACH CATAWBA 1 & 2 175 EACH OCONEE 1, 2, & 3 15 EACH 3 ADDITIONAL 30-40 EACH 15 ADDITIONAL 10 EACH ROTORK INFORMATION INDICATES THAT 29 PLANTS OTHER THAN DUKE PLANTS HAVE VALVES WITH THEIR OPERATORS FOLLOW-UP:
rx REGION II FOLLOWING LICENSEE ACTIVITIES kJ IE IS REVIEWING BULLETIN RESPONSES.
A3
O.
P0 INT BeACs 1 - toss OP RED iNSTRunENT Bus REACTOR SCRAM NOVEMEER 17, 1986 - (T. COLBURN, NRR)
PROBLEM:
LOSS OF RED INSTRUMEhT BUS SIGNALED 1 0UT OF 2 LOGIC FOR FEED FLOW STEAM FLOW MISMATCH RESULTING IN REACTOR TRIP CAUSF:
SHCRTED DIODE IN INVERTER SUPPLYING RED INSTRUMEET BUS CAUSES 4 BLOWN OUTPUT FUSES AND LOSS OF BUS SIGNIFICANCE:
BRIEF TEMPORARY LOSS OF ONE OF THREE AUXILIARY FEEDhATER SOUF.CES (ONE AIR-0PERATED AFK PUMP DISCHARGE VALVE CONTROLLER IS POWERED FROM RED INSTRUMENT BUS)
ONE SOURCE RANGE NUCLEAR INSTRUMENT DETECTOR FAILED LOW ONE INTERMEDIATE RANGE DETECTOR APPARENTLY FAILED LOW DISCUSSION:
-O*
POWER RESTORED TO INSTRUMENT BUS VIA ALTERNATE INVERTER IN 4 l
MINUTES
$UBSEQUENT CHECKS OF FAILED IR DETECTOR INDICATED INCORRECT i
COMPENSATlhG VOLTAGE SET FOR LOW POWER, NOT A DETECTOR FAILURE ANY LOSS OF AN INSTRUMENT BUS WILL RESULT IN A REACTOR TRIP (4 FEED FLOW STEAM FLOW MISMATCH CHANNELS, 2 PER LOOP, EACH PChERED FR0h SEPARATE INSTRUMENT BUS)
LOSS OF RED OR BLUE INSTRUMENT BUS ALSO CAUSES LOSS OF PCKER TO A OR B AIR-0PERATED AFW PUhP DISCHARGE VALVE CONTROLLER.
TURLINE DRIVEN AFW PUMP UNAFFECTED j
REACTOR CRITICAL - 4 HOURS AFTER EVENT f
FOLLOWUP:
RESIDENT INSPECTOR FOLLOWING LICENSEE ACTIONS J
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.26
OTHER EVENT OF INTEREST PILGRIM - STANDBY GAS TREATMENT (SBGT) SYSTEM DESIGN l
DEFICIENCIES NOVEMEER 3, 1986 - (R. AULUCK, NRR)
PROBLEM:
SINGLE ACTIVE FAILURES WHICH DIMINISH THE ABILITY OF SEGT SYSTEM TO PERFORM ITS SAFETY FUNCTION CAUSE:
DESIGN DEFICIENCY - REDUNDANCY NOT PROVIDED SIGNIFICANCE:
POTENTIAL FOR RELEASE EXCEEDING 10 CFR PART 100 LIM GIVEN A SINGLE FAILURE IN STANDBY GAS TREATMENT SYS DISCUSSION:
ON AUGUST 27, 1986, THE LICENSEE (BEC0) CONCLUDED THAT SINGLE ACTIVE FAILURE OF SBGT DELUGE SYSTEM DURING POSTULATE
(]
LOCA OR FUEL HANDLING ACCIDENT COULD RESULT IN OFFSITE DO EXCEEDING PART 100 LIMITS.
- INADEQUATE SBGT SYSTEM / DELUGE SYSTEM INTERACTION CON THE ORIGINAL DESIGN,
- DELUGE SYSTEM PROVIDES COOLING AND FIRE PROTECTION SPRAY,IN RESPONSE TO HIGH TEMPERATURES IN SBGT CHARC0AL FILTERS,
- INITIATION OF THE DELUGE SYSTEM DUE TO FAILURE OF ANY OF COMPONENTS WILL RESULT IN SOAKING OF CHARC0AL BEDS AND TH RENDERING THAT TRAIN INCAPABLE 0F FURTHER 10 DINE FILTRAT SYSTEM CANNOT MEET DESIGN BASIS ON OCTOBER 30, 1986, THE LICENSEE (BECO) INFORMED NRC ABOUT TWO ADDITIONAL DESIGN DEFICIENCIES
- FAILURE OF THE CROSS 0VER DAMPER RESULTING IN NO COOLING GASES THROUGH THE STANDBY TRAIN.
- SINGLE FAILURE RESULTING IN A HEATER FAILURE AND LACK 0F H CONTROL O
27
7 9
- Q-DISCUSSION: - C0tiTINUED DAMPER FAILURE I
- GROSS TIE DAMPER PROVIDES THE REQUIRED FLOW PATH THROUGH EITHER FILTER TRAIN WHEN THAT TRAIN IS IN STANDBY.
- PARTIAL OR FULL CLOSURE OF THE DAMPER COULD LEAD TO ELEVATE!
TEMPERATURES OR FIRE IN THE STANDBY TRAIN,
- PARTIAL OR FULL CLOSURE WILL INTERRUPT FLOW THROUGH BOTH THUS SYSTEM CANNOT MEET DESIGN BASIS,
~
HEATER FAILURE
- FOR CHARC0AL FILTERS T0 flAINTAIN THEIR EFFICIENCY FOR FILTERING OUT RADIO 10 DINES THE HUMIDITY OF THE AIR STREAM MUST BE CONTROLLED FOR BOTH PRIMARY AND STANDBY TRAINS, j
- IN THE PRESENT DESIGN, THE HEATERS DO NOT HEAT THE. AIR PASSING THROUGH THE STANDBY TRAIN ONCE FAN IS DE-ENERGIZED: THUS, SYSTEM O
CANNOT MEET DESIGN BASIS i
- FAILURE OF THE HEATER AC POWER OR TEMPERATURE SWITCH ON THE!
ACTIVE TRAIN COULD ALSO IMPACT OPERABILITY FOLLOW-UP:
LICENSEE WILL RE-EVALUATE DESIGN BASIS DESIGN MODIFICATIONS WILL BE COMPLETED AS NECESSARY 1
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TROJAN - POTENTIAL E0 DEFICIENCY OF SAFETY SYSTEM COMPONENTS OCTOBER 21, 1986 - (T. CHAN, NRR)
PROBLEM:
AUXILIARY FEEDWATER (AFW) PUMPS, EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOP (EDG) CONTROLS AND REMOTE SHUTDOWN PANEL MAY NOT BE QUALIFIED FOR A HARSH ENVIRONMENT CAllSE:
IMPROPER ASSUMPTIONS IN ANALYSES SIGNIFICANCE:
POTENTIAL FAllllRE OF SYSTEM / COMPONENTS RE0lilRED FOR MITIGATION OF A STEAM OR FEEDWATER LINE BREAK IN THE TURBINE BUILDING.
DISCllSSION:
OCTOBER 1985 - LICENSEE'S INTERNAL EQ REVIEW REVEALS P0TENTIAL OVERPRESSURE OF ROOMS ENCLOSING SAFETY RELATED EQUIPMENT DUE TO STEAM /FEEDWATER LINE BREAK IN TURBINE BUILDING, AND ERRORS IN ORIGINAL HELB ANALYSIS JUNE 1986 - SUBSEQUENT INVESTIGATIONS FOUND ROOMS NOT SEALED FOR e
HARSH ENVIRONMENTS AS DESIGNED AND ASSUMED IN HELB ANALYSIS -
k (TNGRESS THROUGH VENTILATION OPENINGS)
LICENSEE INITIATES NEW ANALYSIS TO RECONCILE OVERPRESSURE AND TEMPERATURE CONCERNS 1978 BECHTEL ANALYSIS AND 1986 LICENSEE /IMPELL ANALYSES UTILIZE DIFFEPENT ASSUMPTIONS, PESULTING IN DISPARITING ENVIRONMENTAL CONCLUSIONS AS AN INTERIM MEASURE, LICENSEE REMOVED LARGE PORTIONS OF THE TURBINE BilILDING SIDING TO ALLEVIATE DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE AND TEMPERATURE CONCERNS UNTIL DIFFERENCE IN ANALYSES ARE RESOLVED EQUIPMENT IS OPERABLE: JUSTIFICATION FOR CONTINUED OPERATION HAS BEEN WRITTEN FOLLOW-UP LICENSEE PERFORMING ADDITIONAL ANALYSES LICENSEE HAS TEMPOPAPILY SEALED ROOMS AND WILL REVIEW REVISED HIGH-ENERGY LINE BREAK ANALYSIS LICENSEE TO DETERMINE ROOT CAUSE OF DEFICIENCY IN ANALYSIS ASSUMPTIONS
,0 REGION V TO FOLLOW-UP ON CORRECTIVE ACTIONS 30
TROJAN - LOW TEMPERATURE OVEP PRESSURE PROTECTION (LTOP)
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OCTOBER 71, 1986 - (T. CHAN, NRR)
PROBLEM:
POWER OPERATED RELIEF VALVE STR0KE TIME EXCEEDS LTOP SAFETY ANALYSIS ASSUMPTION CAUSE:
FAILURE TO TRANSLATE ANALYSIS ASSUMPTIONS INTO TEST REQUIREMENTS SIGNIFICANCE INADEQUACY OF RCS OVERPRESSURE PROTECTION BELOW 290*F WITH THE POTENTIAL FOR EXCEEDING 10 CFR 50 APPENDIX G LIMITS DISCUSSION:
AMENDMENT 78 STATED ACCEPTABILITY OF THE OVERPROTECTION MITIGATION SYSTEM BASED ON PORV OPENING STR0KE TIME OF 0.28 SEC, OCTOBER 21, 1986 - LICENSEE DISCOVERED THAT LTOP ANALYSIS ASSUMPTION FOR PORV STR0KE TIME HAD NOT BEEN MET
([)
- ACTllAL STROKE TIME IS APPR0XIMATELY 8 SECONDS TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION APPLICABLE ONLY AT OR BELOW 290*F LICENSEE CilRRENTLY IS NOT IN AF ACTION STATEMENT LICENSEE HAS DECLARED SYSTEM INOPEPABLE PORV SilRVEILLANCE TESTING REQUIREMENTS BASED ON ASME CODE FOLLOW-UP:
LICENSEE IS PERFORMING NEW ANAYSIS TO REANALYZE STROKE TIME AND SETTING REQUIREMENTS REGInN V FOLLOWING LICENSEE'S ACTION 3/
4 WNP NO ANALYSIS OF POTENTIAL FLOODING DUE TO FIRE
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MAIN BREAKS AUGUST 19, 1986 - JOHN 0 BRADFUTE, NRR PROBLEM:
NO FLOODING ANALYSIS CONDUCTED FOR WET-SPRINKLER SYSTEM ADDED TO CONTROL ROOM COMPLEX NO FLOODING ANALYSES EVER CONDUCTED FOR FIVE OTHER AREAS OUTSIDE REACTOR BUILDING AND CONTAINING SAFETY RELATED EQUIPMENT CAUSE:
0VERSIGHT DURING DESIGN OF CONTROL ROOM COMPLEX SPRINKLER SYSTEM BURNS AND R0E FAILED TO COMPLETE ANALYSES IN 1983 (BURNS AND R0E COMPLETED FLOODING ANALYSES FOR REACTOR BUILDING)
SIGNIFICANCE:
([);
FLOOD IN CONTROL ROOM FROM ADJ0INING AREAS COULD PREVENT PLANT SHUTDOWN FROM CONTROL ROOM
- NO DRAINS
- CABLING UNDER FLOOR
- PROCEDURES CHANGED TO EVACUATE CONTROL ROOM IN EVENT OF FLOODING
- REMOTE SHUTDOWN PANEL CABLING INDEPENDENT OF CONTROL ROOM CABLING
- SAFE SHUTDOWN FROM REMOTE SHUTDOWN PANEL IS ASSU. RED PRELIMINARY EV,ALUATIONS OF OTHER AREAS INDICATE FLOODING WILL NOT ENDANGER EQUIPMENT ESSENTIAL FOR SAFE SHUTDOWN CONCLUSION - THE PUBLIC IS NOT AT RISK DISCUSSION:
AREAS AFFECTED:
- CONTROL ROOM (IN RAD WASTE BUILDING)
- CABLE SPREADING ROOM (IN RAD WASTE BUILDING) 32.
DECEMBER 8, 1986 O
HATCH 1 AND 2 - AIT FOR LEAK FROM SPENT FUEL POOL DECEMBER 4, 1986, (E. WEISS, IE)
PROBLEM:
141,000 GALLONS LEAKED FROM SPENT FUEL P0OL TRANSFER CANAL CAUSES:
AIR SUPPLY INADVERTENTLY SHUT TO INFLATABLE SEALS IN CANAL DRAINS ON LEAK DETECTOR INADVERTENTLY LEFT OPEN SIGNIFICANCE:
LEAK NOT IDENTIFIED FOR HOURS (AIR SUPPLY SHUT 2200 CST DEC 2)
LEAKAGE PATH TO ENVIRONMENT AND CAUSE NOT IMMEDIATELY APPARE IF FUEL BUNDLE HAD BEEN IN TRANSIT, POTENTIAL FOR UNC0VERY EXISTS DISCUSSION:
UNIT 1 AT 100% POWER THROUGHOUT EVENTS UNIT 2 SHUTDOWN
- O TRANSFER CANAL SEAL IS INFLATED DURING REFUELING INFLATABLE SEAL IS USED IN GAP BETWEEN REACTOR BUILDINGS FOR SEISMIC CONSIDERATIONS l
DOUBLE INFLATABLE SEAL ON GATE IS IN PLACE DURING REACTOR OPERA SEAL LEAK DETECTION DRAIN VALVES (F238 AND F239) LEFT OPEN PRIOR TO l
EVENT - SEAL LEAK DETECTION ALARM DID NOT WORK l
PROBLEM WITH PRESSURE REGULATOR; AIR VALVE THROTTLED l
AIR VALVE MOVED TO CLOSED POSITION WHILE RESTORING FROM CLEARANC 1430 CST DEC 3, THIRD LOW LEVEL ALARM IN FUEL POOL 2200 CST DEC 3, COULD NOT OPEN DOOR TO NITROGEN ROOM, WATER POURING INTO CABLE TRAYS, LEAK FOUND LEVEL DOWN ABOUT 5 FEET ALARM ON SPENT FUEL P0OL LEVEL WORKED 17,000 GAL TO RAD WASTE 40,000 GAL CONTAINED BETWEEN REACTOR BUILDINGS 84,000 GAL TO STORM DRAIN AND SWAMP 1.26 X MPC CS-134, CS-137, ZN-65, C0-60, MN-54
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DIKES BUILT FROM OUTFALL TO SWAMP l
RIVER RISING BECAUSE OF RECENT RAINFALL l
TANKER TRUCKS USED TO REMOVE WATER CLEANUP OF WATER BY RECIRCING THRU DEMINS TO TANK TRUCK 33
HATCH - CONTINUED 2
O FDLLOWUP:
HATCH AIT SCOPE IS TO DETERMINE ROOT CAUSES OF EVENT AND FAILURE OF ALARM DETERMINE AMOUNT OF SPILL AND RELEASE LICENSEE RESPONSE TO IEB 84-03 AND IN 84-93 POTENTIAL RISK IN DRAINING BOTH POOLS POTENTIAL FOR LOSS OF SECONDARY CONTAINMENT LICENSEE'S KNOWLEDGE OF PRECURSOR EVENTS PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS BY AIT RELATE TO:
ADMIN CONTROLS FOR PRESSURE REGULATOR AND LACK DEFICIENCY REPORT CLOSING OF AIR SUPPLY VALVE WITHOUT PROCEDURE PROCEDURE TO CALIBRATE LEAK DETECTION PROCEDURE TO CHECK AIR PRESSURE DID NOT INCL
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OCONEE - LOSS OF LOW PRESSURE SERVICE WATER (LPSW)
OCTOBER 1, 1986 (HENRY BAILEY, IE)
FOLLOWUP (12/11/86):
REPAIRED FLANGE ON ALL 12 CCW PUMPS TO PREVENT AIR INLEAKAGE WITH LOW LAKE LEVEL.
CCW AND LPSW SIPHON FLOW TESTED.
STANDBY SHUTDOWN FACILITY DESIGN REVIEWED SEISMIC FRAGILITY ANALYSIS FOR CCW AND OTHER BOP SYSTEMS REVIEWED.
EMERGENCY POWER FOR CCW PUMPS EVALUATED.
MEETING WITH NRC ON OCTOBER 14, 1986 ALL 3 UNITS RESTARTED IE INFORMATION NOTICE UNDER PREPARATION.
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ACRS REVIEW MEETING i.-
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~J PTS RULE PROMULGATED 7/23/85 (10CFR50,61) i,
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REQUIRES EXTENSIVE ANALYSES 3 YRS. BEFORE RT l
SC GUIDE PROMISED IN RULE
- PUBLISHED FOR PUBLIC COMMENT 1/17/86
- ACRS METAL SUBCOMPONENTS SUBCOMMITTEE MET TO PROVIDE COMMENTS ON 02/28/86 r
- ACRS FULL COMMITTEE PROVIDED COMMENTS BY 03/18/86 LETTER
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- PROPOSED FINAL GUIDE NOW BEFORE YOU
-CONSIDERS PUBLIC COMMENTS
-CONSIDERS RECENT NRC-STAFF AND CRGR COMMENTS s
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2'-FROM PNL (0UR CONTRACTOR) a 4' II' I
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PUBLIC COMMENTS THAT RESULTED IN NO RECOMMENDED CHANGE PTS RULE NOT ADEQUATELY CONSERVATIVE NOT RELEVANT TO REGULATORY GUIDE GUIDE IS PREMATURE AND INCOMPLETE, NO ONE NEEDS NOW, WAIT
- (CRITERIA AND METHODS EVOLVING)
- (T-H CODE SPECIFICATIONS ARE T00 LOOSE)
- (N0DALIZATION SCHEMES AND ERROR ESTIMATION TECHNIQUES ARE NOT SPECIFIED)
- GUIDE SHOULD ALLOW FLEX SILITY
- DO NEED NOW - SEVERAL PLANTS COULD EXCCED RT
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SC DBA APPROACH SHOULD BE ALLOWED
- NO DBA COVERS ALL SEQUENCES
- NEED PRA TO EVALUATE FIXES ONLY DETERMINISTIC FRACTURE MECHANICS (F.M.) ANALYSES SHOULD BE REQUIRED "WHERE NO CRACK II POSSIBLE"
- CRACK ALWAYS "POSSIBLE" NO DETERMINISTIC F.M. ANALYSES SHOULD BE REQUIRED (ONLY PROBABILISTIC F.M. NEEDED)
- NEED DETERMINISTIC F.M. TO DETERMINE PRA PARAMETERS O
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'74 V PUBLIC COMMENTS THAT RESULTED IN CHANGES CONDENSATION OUTSIDE PRESSURIZER
- NOW " REQUIRED" BY GUIDE PRESSURE CONTROL
- NOW LISTED AS POTENTIAL CORRECTIVE ACTION a
CIRCUMFERENTIAL FLAWS
- 300*F RT NOW STATED TO BE BOUNDING, NOT CALCULATED PTS O
EFPY, FLUENCE, AND RTPTS
- NO LONGER SUGGEST USING EFPY TO CHARACTERIZE EXPOSURE CERTAIN MATERIALS ARE NOW OK TO INCORPORATE BY
REFERENCE:
- PORTIONS OF UNCERTAINTY ANALYSIS
- PROJECTED FLUENCE CALCULATIONS
- T. H. CODE BENCHMARKING
- OPERATOR GUIDANCE, TRAINING
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STAFF COMMENTS THAT RESULTED IN CHANGES
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GUIDE OVER-EMPHASIZED MITIGATION
- STAFF WISHES TO EMPHASIZE PREVENTION
- DELETED CHAPTERS REGARDING:
VESSEL FAILURE MODES CONTAINMENT PERFORMANCE PERSON-REM GUIDE PRESENTED TO CRGR (AND TRANSMITTED TO ACRS)
(-)
PROVIDED THAT MATERIAL BY REFERENCE F
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CRGR COMMENTS AND RESULTING CHANGES PTS RULE REQUIRES VESSEL FAILURE PREVENTION ANALYSES, DOES NOT PROVIDE FOR " RISK" ANALYSES WE HAVE NOW DELETED THOSE REFERENCES GUIDE NOW SAYS SUCH ANALYSES A) MIGHT BE SUBMITTED, ON APPEAL, TO COMMISSION, BUT B) ARE BEYOND SCOPE OF REG. GUIDE CORRECTIVE ACTIONS MUST BE EVALUATED CONSIDERING OVERALL
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PLANT SAFETY, NOT JUST PTS FURTHER WORDS ADDED THROUGHOUT TO FURTHER EMPASIZE t
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SUMMARY
AND RECOMMENDATION GUIDE NOT CHANGED SIGNIFICANTLY RECEIVED BROAD ACCEPTANCE NEEDED TO COMPLETE PTS ISSUE REQUEST ACRS LETTER RECOMMENDING ISSUANCE 0F FINAL PTS REGULATORY GUIDE O
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- BACKUP -
f-STATUS OF PLANT RT REVIEWS PTS I40 SERS ISSUED 31 - NO FLUX REDUCTION 9 - FLUX REDUCTION COMMITMENT 1
SER DRAFTED
- NO FLUX REDUCTION 6
REVIEWS UNDERWAY AT BNL O
LARGE REDUCTIONS PROPOSED BNL CHECKING RESULTS I
'16 ADDITIONAL SERS TO BE ISSUED BY 2/28/87 (63 TOTAL)
NOTE:
FLUX REDUCTIONS TO BE VERIFIED O