ML20214K647
| ML20214K647 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Millstone  |
| Issue date: | 08/07/1986 |
| From: | Opeka J NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY CO., NORTHEAST UTILITIES |
| To: | Thadani A Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| RTR-NUREG-0737, RTR-NUREG-737, RTR-REGGD-01.097, RTR-REGGD-1.097 A02959, A04470, A2959, A4470, NUDOCS 8608220006 | |
| Download: ML20214K647 (32) | |
Text
V O
N UTILETIES conomi Orric.. seioen sir.t. seriin. connecticut 3
IbYsiY$ ".
C P.O. BOX 270 e
HARTFORD. CONNECTICUT 06141-0270 k
k J
(203) 665-5000
,,0.
..a. c August 7,1986 Docket No. 50-336 A04770 A02959 Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Attn:
Mr. Ashok C. Thadani, Director PWR Project Directorate #8 Division of PWR Licensing - B U.S Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Gentlemen:
Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 2 Supplement I to NUREG-0737 Revision 2 to Regulatory Guide 1.97 In a letter dated March 14,1985,(I) the NRC Staff provided an interim report regarding the conformance status of Millstone Unit No. 2 with Regulatory Guide 1.97. This report indicated that NNECO's positions on Regulatory Guide 1.97 were acceptable to the NRC Staff except for certain items for which further justification was requested.
Northeast Nuclear Energy Company (NNECO) hereby provides the requested information as Attachment No. I to this submittal.
A second Order confirming NNECO's commitments regarding the provisions of Supplement I(2)to NUREG-0737 was issued by the NRC Staff in a letter dated July 27,1985.
This Order imposed implementation schedules for various Regulatory Guide 1.97 items. All of those items which were required to be implemented by December 31, 1985 have been implemented. In addition, one l
item (i.e., Item No. A-1:
Pressurizer Level) which was not required to be implemented until the start of Cycle 8 or by December 31,1986, whichever is later, has already b en implemented. Attachment No. 3 to NNECO's letter 9
dated April 9,1984t3) has been revised accordingly and is included here as Attachment No. 2. Other minor changes have also been made. Change bars in the right hand margin highlight those items which have been revised.
(1)
- 3. R. Miller letter to W. G. Counsil, dated March 14,1985.
(2)
E. 3. Butcher letter to 3. F. Opeka, dated July 27,1985.
(3)
W.
Counsil letter to D.
M.
Crutchfield/3.
R.
Miller, dated 1
v.
April 9,1984.
c)$
8608220006 860807 1h j
PDR ADOCk 05000336 I RV F
PDR t
o-o Several of the Regulatory Guide 1.97 items which were required to be implemented by December 31,1985 relate to the inadequate core cooling (ICC) instrumentation system. The installation of the ICC system was essentially completed during the 1985 refueling outage with the ICC system declared operational on December 30,1985. In a letter dated August 14,1984,(4) NNECO informed the NRC Staff that the ICC system was planned to be installed, tested, and calibrated by the end of the 1985 refueling outage. In addition, in a letter dated July 17, 1984(5) NNECO provided implementation schedules for various Regulatory Guide 1.97 items that we would be willing to accept in an Order. The implementation schedule pertaining to the ICC system items was prior to the start of Cycle 7 (i.e., prior to start-up from the 1985 refueling outage) or December 31, 1985, whichever was later. Since the Reference (5) schedule was included in the Reference (2) Order, December 31, 1985 became the completion date for the ICC system.
In a letter dated May 30, 1985,(6) NNECO informed the NRC Staff that appropriate revisions to our Emergency Operating Procedures (EOPs) related to the ICC system would be implemented within sixty (60) days after successful completion of the ICC system testing and calibration. Since ICC testing and calibration was completed on December 30, 1985, revised EOPs were implemented by I<ebruary 27,1986.
We trust that this submittal adequately responds to the items identified in Reference (1) and confirms the completion of those Regulatory Guide 1.97 items required to be implemented by December 31,1985.
Very truly yours, NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY COMPANY l
l L F. Os
- 3. F. Opeka u
l Senior Vice President 1
(4)
W. G. Counsil letter to 3. R. Miller, dated August 14, 1984.
(5)
W.
G.
Counsil letter to 3.
R.
Miller /D.
M.
Crutchfield, dated July 17,1984.
(6)
- 3. F. Opeka letter to 3. R. Miller, dated May 30,1985.
l
r b.:
+4,.
gy
.. 0-a Docket No. 50-336 A04770 Attachment No. I Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 2 Response to Request for AdditionalInformation Pertaining to Our Positions on Regulatory Guide 1.97 4
4 i
1 I,
i August,1986 l
f 4
..n~
~,,,,,,,
_,n-.
A Na I
. Response to Request for AdditionalInformation Pertaining to Our Positions on Regulatory Guide 1.97 Conclusion 1 Environmental. qualification there. are 14 Category 2 variables for which envircnmental qualification should be: addressed - in accordance with 10 CFR 50.49 (Section 3.3.1).
Response
10 CFR 50.49(b)(3) requires that "certain post-accident. monitoring equipment "'
be environmentally qualified.
That equipment which is required to. be environmentally qualified in accordance. with 10 CFR 50.49(b)(3).has been identified. to the NRC Staff on several occasions, and most recently in -
Reference (1), as part of our environmental qualification program's master list.
This master list has been reviewed by the NRC Staff and has been the subject of 7
l
NRC Staff Safety Evaluation Reports as well as a meeting'between the NRC i
Staff and NNECO in April,1984.
It is our understanding that Category I and 2 variables in Regulatory Guide 1.97, Revision 2, are not specifically required to be environmentally qualified pursuant to 10 CFR 50.49(b)(3).' We expect the qualification of these variables to be 4
addressed during the resolution process of Regulatory Guide 1.97, Revision 2.
Deviations from-the environmental qualification aspects of Regulatory Guide
~
1.97 were identified and justified in Reference (2). Reference (2) justifications, as well as some additional justifications, are included in Attachment No. 2. We intend to work with the NRC Staff to resolve any items for which the NRC Staff
- does not concur with our position.
Our understanding that deviations from the environmental qualification aspects of Regulatory Guide 1.97 will be addressed during the resolution process of Regulatory Guide 1.97 and not 10 CFR 50.49, is supported by the following excerpt from the NRC Staff's Safety Evaluation on Environmental Qualification i -
of Electrical Equipment (Reference (3)):
" The Staff has not yet completed its review for conformance to Regulatory Guide 1.97. In its April 9,1984 letter the licensee specifies exceptions to the guidance, justifications, proposed modifications, and the schedule for r
the upgrade.
The Staff will determine the acceptability of these justifications as part of its review for conformance with Regulatory Guide 1.97."
The Regulatory Guide 1.97 instrumentation requiring environmental qualification will be qualified pursuant to the qualification requirements of 10 CFR 50.49.
However, it is our interpretation of 10 CFR 50.49 that the schedular requirements of 10 CFR 50.49 only apply to the list of post-accident monitoring i
instrumentation identified in our environmental qualification program's master list. Therefore, the schedular requirements of 10 CFR 50.49 were not applied to additional instrumentation requiring environmental qualification.
Such l
- Instrumentation will be qualified in accordance with the schedule to implement l
the provisions of Regulatory Guide 1.97.
4
=
p, f_
to
~
Conclusion 2 -
RCS cold leg water temperature-the licensee'should verify that these channels are redundant (Section 3.3.3).
- Response:
As stated in Section 3.3.3 of Reference (4), "there is redundancy in that the coolant temperature delivered to the core and leaving the reactor is measured by independent instruments." We have verified that the' instrumentation for the cold leg temperature indication of the two loops is powered by independent power supplies.
Conclusion 3 -
RCS hot _ leg water temperature-the licensee should verify that these channels are redundant (Section 3.3.4).
Response
At stated in~ Section 3.3.4 of Reference (4), "there is redundancy in that the coolant temperature delivered to the core and leaving the reactor is measured by independent instruments." We have verified that the power supplies for the hot leg temperature indications are independent.
Conclusion 4 RCS pressure-the licensee should commit to. Install redundant Category 1 instrumentation with a range to coincide with the resolution of the ATWS issue (Section 3.3.5).
Response
Regulatory Guide 1.97 presently recommends that redundant pressure indication be provided with a range of 0-4000 psig for Millstone Unit No. 2.
Existing pressure instrumentation at Millstone Unit No. 2 provides redundant Category 1 indication between 0-2500 psig and a single. non-Category 1 indication with a range of 0-3000 psig. For some design basis accidents (excluding ATWS) peak RCS pressures approach 2600 psig. The primary safety valves have a nominal set pressure of 2500 psig which limits these pressure excursions to relatively short i
duration transients. Following the initial pressure increase, the primary safety valves will limit RCS pressure to 2500 psig for all design basis accidents.
Based on the above discussion, it is concluded that the present redundant j.
pressure channels which provide indication to 2500 psig are adequate for long-term post-accident monitoring for all design basis accidents. Although the 0-3000 psig indication is not redundant, it provides adequate range to monitor and/or record the entire pressure transient for design basis accidents (excluding ATWS). Since pressure transients above 2500 psig are short, it is not considered necessary to provide redundant Category 1 pressure indication above 2500 psig at this time. The necessity to upgrade the capability to monitor RCS pressure due i
2 l
If 3l m
.3 to an ATWS event will be evaluated as part of our process to implement the requirements of the ATWS rule..
' Conclusion 5.
Containment hydrogen concentration-the licensee should provide additional
- justification for not complying with the recommended operating pressure envel-ope, or. they should provide instrumentation capable of functioning over the recommended pressure range (Section 3.3.9).
Response
In Reference (2), we referred the~ NRC Staff to Reference (5). We believe that Reference (5) adequately justifies this deviation from Regulatory Guide 1.97.
Conclusion 6 Pressurizer heater status-the licensee should provide the recommended current measuring instrumentation (Section 3.3.13).
Response
The design of Millstone Unit No. 2 meets the criteria in Item II.E.3.1 of NUREG-0737. There are two banks of proportional heaters, each having a capacity of 150 kw. Each bank is powered from redundant emergency busses powered either from an offsite power source or emergency power sources. These heaters have the capacity necessary to establish and maintain natural circulation at hot standby conditions. The loads associated with these heaters are included in the original design of the emergency diesel generators.
We believe the discussion in Section 3.3.13 of Reference (4) regarding Item
~
II.E.3.1 - in NUREG-0737 is inappropriate. As indicated in NUREG-0737, the criteria in Item II.E.3.1 did not change the previous criteria in Item 2.1.1 in NUREG-0578 and the implementation of Item II.E.3.1 was considered complete for operating reactors. In fact, the NRC Staff concluded in its evaluation of our implementation of Category A TMI Lessons Learned Items (Reference (6)) that our pressurizer heater power supply is in conformance with the position in Item 2.1.1 in NUREG-0578.
7 We submitted, in Reference (7), a license amendment request in response to Reference (8). The NRC Staff approved the request by issuance of Amendment No. 66 to our operating license (Reference (9)).
Therefore, we consider ItemII.E.3.1 completed. It is noteworthy that Item II.E.3.1 does not contain any criteria related to pressurizer heater electric current instrumentation.
Notwithstandin' the above, during the Millstone Unit No. 2 Control Room Design Review (CRDR), the lack of pressurizer proportional heater status was identified as a Priority 1 Human Engineering Discrepancy (HED). This HED was identified L
during performance of the Task Analysis " walk-through" of the Millstone Unit No. 2 Emergency Operating Procedures (EOPs). NNECO has outlined the process for addressing all HEDs in Reference (10), the Implementation Plan for the i
e
.------,--.A
~
4
~
CRDR.. Final resolution of this item will be detailed in the CRDR Summary Report scheduled for submittal to the NRC Staff at the end of September,1986.
' Conclusion 7 Quench tank level - the licensee should show that the existing range is adequate or provide the recommended range (Section 3.3.14).
Response
Regulatory Guide 1.97 recommends level indication from the top to the bottom of the tank. The Millstone Unit No. 2 quench tank is a 60 in. O.D. horizontal cylindrical tank with level indication over the middle 40 inches. This range covers approximately 74 percent of the tank volume. The quench tank is sized to accommodate the steam release for those design basis transients resulting in primary system pressurization and subsequent steam discharge through the primary safety and/or relief valves. The gas volume in the quench tank is sufficient to limit the maximum tank pressure following the above events to 35 psia. The present level span is adequate to allow the operator to take action to restore normal operating level following the design basis events. The quench tank is not designed to accept a continuous safety and/or relief valve discharge.
A rupture disc with a setpoint of 100 psig is provided as a backup to the quench tank relief valve.
Following rupture of the disc, the quench tank vents to containment.
Following an uncontrolled or continuous release through the rupture disc, quench tank pressure is controlled by containment pressure and not design basis events, as well as events that may lead to rupture of the tank i
rupture disc. The small increase in span with level indication from bottom to top of the quench tank as recommended by Regulatory Guide 1.97 would provide no additional benefit to the operator following design basis events. The Millstone l
Unit No. 2 CRDR process evaluated this instrument and determined it to be in l
compliance with the operator information and control requirements review performed by the NSSS vendor and NUREG 0700 criteria.
l In addition, control and monitoring of tank level would not be required for tank pressure control during continuous uncontrolled safety or relief valve discharge events which may lead to rupture of the tank rupture disc. With isolation of the safety or relief valve flow, the existing level span would be sufficient to allow the operator to restore tank level to the desired value.
Conclusion 8 Steam generator level - the licensee should provide the recommended instru-L mentation (Section 3.3.16).
Response
Regulatory Guide 1.97 recommends steam generator level indication from the top of the tube sheet to the separators. Since there are no level taps in the vicinity of the tube sheet, Millstone Unit No. 2 currently only provides redundant Category 1 indication from the top of the tube bundles to the separators. During t
i
the Millstone Unit No. 2 CRDR, the lack of wide range steam generator level indication was identified as a Priority 1 HED. This HED was identified during performance of the Task Analysis " walk-through" of the EOPs and in the operator information and control requirements review performed by the NSSS vendor. In accordance with the CRDR Implementation Plan, Reference (10),
NNECO is in the process of defining.a course of action that will resolve the HED and which we anticipate will be responsive to this Reg. Guide 1.97 issue.. The resolution of the issue will be detailed in the CRDR Summary Report scheduled for submittal to the NRC Staff at the end of September,1986.
The following describes the current response to the described transient in absence of wide range level indication. Although steam generator level typically drops following a reactor trip, restoration to normal operating levels, as required by the Millstone Unit No. 2 Emergency Operating Procedures, can be accom-plished either by the main feedwater pumps ramping to 5 percent flow or by the auxiliary feedwater system. The auxiliary system is automatically actuated on a low level signal and provides sufficient flow with a single failure to ensure adequate secondary heat sink while restoring level to normal operating indica-tion.
Additional instrumentation is available to the operator to verify an adequate secondary heat sink. These include primary temperature and pressure, as well as indication of main and auxiliary feedwater flowrate to the steam generators. In addition, there is sufficient inventory in the secondary side to maintain adequate heat sink without feedwater flow for approximately 22 minutes.
Conclusion 9 Heat removal by the containment fan heat removal system - the licensee should either provide instrumentation for this variable or provide further justification showing why compliance is not needed (Section 3.3.17).
Response
Regulatory Guide 1.97 recommends " plant specific" Category 2 instrumentation for this variable. The Regulatory Guide provides no additional specific guidance for the recommended instrumentation. As this is classified as a Type D variable, the purpose of the instrumentation is to " monitor the operation" of heat removal by the containment fan heat removal system.
The function of the containment air recirculation and cooling system (CARCS) at Millstone Unit No. 2 is to remove heat from the containment atmosphere during normal operation. In the event of a LOCA, the system provides a means of cooling the containment atmosphere to reduce the containment building pressure and thus reduce the leakage of airborne and gaseous radioactivity. The CARCS is independent of the safety injection and containment spray system. It is sized i
such that, following a LOCA, three of the four containment air recirculation units limit the containment pressure to less than the containment design pressure even if the containment spray system does not operate. The compor.ents of the CARCS are designed to operate in the most severe post-accident environment as described in Section 6.1 of the Millstone Unit No. 2 FSAR.
{
t
-f-The heat sink for the CARCS is the reactor building closed cooling water (RBCCW) system. Instrumentation within RBCCW is available to the operator to
- monitor the operation of the CARCS during normal as well as post-accident
- conditions.
Temperature sensors (T-6031, T-6032, T-6033) at the discharge. of the three RBCCW heat exchangers have a range of 0-2000F and provide indication of the RBCCW temperature entering each of the four containment air recirculation fan coolers. Temperature sensors (T-6082, T-6086,' T-6090, T-6093), with a range of 0-2000F, are also available to measure the RBCCW flow temperature at the exit of the containment air recirculation fan coolers. Flow elements (FE-6081, FE-6085, FE-6089, FE-6094) are available at the exit of the fan coolers, with a range of 0-3000 gpm, to directly monitor RBCCW flowrate through each of the fan coolers. The above instrumentation has indication in the control room and allows the operator to monitor the operation of the containment air recirculation and cooling system while providing sufficient information for the operator, if 4
desired, to determine the heat removal capability of each of the containment air recirculation fan coolers. These instruments are not environmentally qualified.
They are powered from reliable power supplies.
~
To assess the performance of the containment heat removal system, the key variable to observe is containment pressure. In addition, containment tempera-ture is also monitored by high quality "off-the-shelf" instrumentation. Failure of the monitoring instrtiments does not jeopardize the function of the system itself.
Based on this, it is concluded that the existing instruments that monitor containment heat removal are adequate.
Conclusion 10 Containment sump water temperature--the licensee should either provide instru-i mentation for this variable or provide further justification showing why com-l pliance cannot be accomplished (Section 3.3.19).
l'
Response
l Regulatory Guide 1.97 recommends Category 2 instrumentation for this variable with a range of 50 to 2500F. There is no existing instrumentation for this variable at Millstone Unit No. 2.
Such instruments would have no safety function.
With respect to equipment protection, the high pressure safety injection (HPSI) pumps operating in the containment sump recirculation mode are subject to NPSH requirements. As described in Section 6.3.2.1 of the Millstone Unit No. 2 FSAR, conservative calculations have shown that the available NPSH exceeds the required NPSH for the HPSI pumps when operating in the recircula-tion mode. These calculations conservatively assumed maximum sump water temperature (saturated) and minimum containment pressure (atmospheric).
Therefore, indication of containment sump water temperature is not required for HPSI pump protection in the recirculation mode. Based on the above, it is i
concluded that compilance with the Regulatory Guide 1.97 recommendation is not warranted for Millstone Unit No. 2.
- e
+ -, -
-r--
- .--.o
.,m
-.-n--,%,,-,-
--,r---,---,,---m-w---r,-,,,,vte-----
-. - - -<v w -., - - - - - - - - - - -
,--,------,---w.+=
v v-
-c-,
-y,
--ey
. ~
Conclusion 11 Radioactive gas holdup ta'nk pressure--the licensee should either provide instru-mentation with.the recommended range for this variable or provide justification
- showing why compliance cannot be accomplished (Section 3.3.20).
Response
The gaseous waste processing system is operated locally and is equipped only with local indication instrumentation. In the event of any abnormality, a common alarm condition is indicated in the control room, and an auxiliary operator is dispatched to perform any necessary actions.
Gaseous waste from various sources is collected in the surge tank, which has a design pressure of 20 psig. The pressure is monitored by a pneumatic pressure transmitter with a range of 0-25 psig and indicated locally. The pneumatic signal is also converted into an electrical signal and input to the process computer where it can be displayed on demand in the control room.
When the pressure in the surge tank reaches 3 psig, the contents are automatically transferred to any one of the six waste decay tanks as selected by the operator. These decay tanks have a design pressure of 165 psig and tank pressure is monitored by pneumatic pressure transmitters with ranges of 0-200 psig and location indication.
Since the - gaseous waste processing system is operated locally and any abnormality is annunciated in the control room, it is concluded that existing l
instrumentation is adequate.
l L
f
, - - + -
s.
--.--- r w-
...-c
,,,c_.,w
,m
.--,_my,p-n,,7,r_m
-,,,,,,.-9-q.---,,,,,,,-7,--
O References (1)
W.G.Counsil letter to D.G. Eisenhut, dated December 18, 1984.
(2)
W.G.Counsil letter to D.M.Crutchfield/3.R. Miller, dated April 9,1984.
(3) 3.R. Mille-letter to W.G.Counsil, dated March 10,1985.
(4) 3.R. Miller letter to W.G.Counsil, dated March 14,1985.
(5)
W.G.Counsil letter to 3.R. Miller, dated March 27,1984.
(6)
R.W.Reid letter to W.G.Counsil, dated February 25,1980.
(7)
W.G.Counsil letter to D.G.Eisenhut, dated September 16,1980.
(8)
D.G.Eisenhut letter to All Pressurized Water Reactor Licensees, dated July 2,1980.
(9)
R.A. Clark letter to W.G.Counsil, dated April 7,1981.
(10)
W.G.Counsil letter to James R. Miller, dated February 26,1985.
i
{I Docket No. 50-336 A04770 Attachment No. 2 Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 2 Status of Compliance with Revision 2 to Regulatory Guide 1.97 a
i f
r 1
4 5
August,1986
L
' This attachment presents a table summarizing the status of compliance of Millstone Unit No. 2 with' Regulatory Guide 1.97, Revision 2. The following is an explanation of the terminology used in the various columns.
VARIABLE - A single asterisk ("*") after a variable number indicates that the variable is monitored but not considered part of the post-accident monitoring system.
A double asterisk ("**") after a variable number indicates that the variable is-not monitored and is not considered part of the post-accident monitoring system.
INSTRUMENT RANGE - Where the NRC and Millstone Unit No. 2 instrument ranges are not directly comparable due to unit differences, the Millstone Unit No. 2 ranges meet or exceed the NRC ranges unless otherwise noted.
EQ (ENVIRONMENTAL QUALIFICATION) - A "yes" entry means that the instrument is or will be qualified in accordance with the qualification requirements of 10CFR50.49.
SEISMIC QUALIFICATION - A "yes" entry means that the instrument is or will be qualified to present licensing commitments.
QA (QUALITY. ASSURANCE) - A "yes" entry means that the instrument is considered Cat.IE by NNECO. Maintenance and spare parts procurement are in accordance with NNECO's QA program.
SCHEDULE - If this column is left blank, Northeast Nuclear Energy Company considers ' the existing instrument to be c.dequate for the intent of the regulatory guide. A " year" entry means the refueling outage of that year when 3
replacement is scheduled to be completed.
l POWER SUPPLY - A "REL" entry means reliable. This power supply is backed l
up by the diesel. "lE"- power at Millstone Unit No. 2 is the vital ac which is a l
non-interruptible power supply.
LOCATION OF DISPLAY:
CONTROL ROOM, TSC AND EOF - An "1" entry means it has continuous indication, and "R" is continuous recording unless otherwise noted.
"R*"
indicates the provision of the guide which could either be continuous recording or stored in computer memory and displayed on demand. The "ERIS" entry, which stands for the Emergency Response Information System, should be disregarded at this time.
We are continuing our evaluation to determine whether additional information needs exist in the TSC and EOF.
6 s.
.--.---i..--m
f i
LOCATION OF SENSOR:
CNMT - Containment A.B. - Auxiliary Building T.B. - Turbine Building For Category 2 variables, the location of sensors is further classified as harsh or non-harsh environments.
(
)
J f
f I
t i
I l
t 4
--c---
r,
,-ve-e
,-a.
1 e
t
=
\\
MILLSTimE IMf 4T NO. 2 SteetART f* E:leWLl*%E WtTN kkWL.ATORT GUIDIE I.97 kkV. 2 Locatsee of Deeplay Seleone Power f.eestiee of
-Teg,neete Catea*rf test. Reage Eg q.ote.
g Echedene pdendent Seyy g C g.
TSC EnF
__Seneer g
TTFT 4
~~
A-1, pac 1 -
Tea fee
. Tee fee IE Ildl*
Pressertser
~
~
- 1p.2 1
0-300s Yess Yes Tee Te.
REL I&a (tals)
(Ents) Cintf (Note 40f"
a-2 WRC I
Tea fee Tee fee IE lit
- Pressertaer Pressere w.2 3
0-3,000 pass Tee fee Tee Tee IE I&R (Bals)
(EasS) Cleff (mete 4)
(Enis)
I t
A-3 NRC 1
Teo Tee Yes Tee IE I&a*
DCS Net Les Watee Temperature MP-2 3
150*F*F50*F Yes Yes Tee fee IE I&R (ERIS)
(ESIS) Cleff (Note 27)
(ERIS)
A-4 Inc I
Tee Tee fee fee It I&R*
ACS Cold Leg Water Temperatore IIP-2 1
0-600*F Tee Yee Tee fee it I&R (EBIS)
(Emis) Cleff (Note 27)
(ERIS)
A-5 Nec 8
Tee fee Yes Tee SE I&R*
Steen Generater Pressere IIP-2 8
0-I.000 pets Tee Teo Tee Tee IE 8&(Bals)
(tals)
(Ests) Cleff (mese 86)
A-6 IIRC 1
Tee Yes Tee Yes IE Isa*
Steen Generater Levet it-2 3
Top of Tobe Yes Tee fee Yes IE I6(ERIst (Esis)
(Emis) CIBff tus44e te (pete 20)
Separatore A-7 IIRC 3
Tee fee fee fee IE I6R*
Assiliary Feeduster Flow W-2 1
0-600 spe fee Yes Tee fee IE I6(ERIS)
(ERISS (EBIS) 4 B.
(mete 20)
A-8 NRC l
Teo Tee fee Teo IE Iam*
Centeiseest Pressere N-2 8
-5 to 250 pois Tee fee Tee fee IE Isa (Ents)
(Ents)
A.B.
(ERIS)
A-9 NBC 1
Tea fee Tee Tee It Isa*
me.rees.e 1 200SF Sub-Yes
.-2 ge, c,,,,
cooling to
(83 35 F superheat
e tJ Eeestema el Deeplay seneese re-es Leeessee se I et maan.
E9 948.:
9e verse 61e Casemerr 5 hedelt hed=ade==
5=rr8r C:#:
T$c Ed
- _5* **=e.
Jt _u t
a-30 onC 3
Tee fee fee Tee E
e6ee e,dreees neeste.
RP-2 3
0-90%
(ESIS) a.B.
(m.t. 33)
(mais) a-:
enc i
Tee fee fee fes E
isme Centasseest Radiettes NP 2 8
l-808 S/br Tee fee fee Tee It IER (talS) -
(ERIS) CNNT (ERIS)
TYPE D Reertivity Centrol B-I pec I
10' to IDDE Tee fee fee fee SE IERe meetree Fell Power NP-2 3
30 to 8501 fee Teo Tee Tee SE I6(EstS)
(EaIS)
(ERIS) meector Fell Power (mete 20) 8-2 NRC 3
Fell In er De De De No I
Centrol set Fell le Red Pseitten NP*2 3
Fell la er me se fee Tee DEL.
I6 (ERIS)
(ERIS)
CENT pet Full te (Kats) i j
B-3*
NRC 3
0-6,000 pre ha Ne he We I
BCS Selsble Deren Concentretles fr-2 3
0-2,050 pre to me No No REL.
I (Bete 8)
B-4 NBC 1
50-750*F Tee Yes Yes Tee IE IER*
RCS Cold a
Les Water Temperatore MP-2 1
0-600*F Tee Tee Tea Tee It thm (EAIS)
(ERIS)
CUNT (mete 2)
(EasS)
Cnet CooLtwo e-S unC l
50-750er Tee Yes Tee fee it 36m*
mc8 not Les watee Tempeestere NP-2 3
350-750*r
$(ggg 5(eg Tee fee lE s6a (En8)
(La:S) cionr (note 3)
(Ens 3) a-6 aCS Cold
~
Les thier (s, Tarseble a-4)
Temperetore i
e-7 umC l
D-4,000 pets Tea fee fee fee at Isme RCS Pressere MP-2 3
0-3,000 pels Tee fee fee fee IE IER (ERIS)
(EDIS)
CNNT (Bete 4)
(ERIS) i 1
d 4
'N 4
=_.
W.'
+
e t
l.ase et smee 61 lu hrl*T heemmat l'inse r Leastsee el 98'!fbl*
CdleS*'y I"*l k* age 69 quo t o qA
- 3. he.lu l e kc. hem.14et bergly
(*. N.
Tv Dee Seesee s
3-a NNC 4
2po.8,6%O'F No No We W.e Rt L.
I Lore Estt Thermoremple MP-2 I
e-2,Spu*F Tee fee Tee Yes SE 16(ikis)
ILR159 (6 mas)
Reerter (Note $3 (Note %) (Note del 3-9 NRC
-l Dettee of Tee fee fee Tee IE ikN*
Coelant Core to top Level te
+
et vessel Reetter up
- I Top et Core Yes Yes Yes Yes IE n
(EstS>
<!RiS)
Re.et.r.
to Top of (EklS)
Vessel (Note 6) 8-10 NRC 2
200*F Sub-Yes Yes Ne IE-1 4
des'ees of
<*elles to S
cesi...
3s r S.,er-nest
-i ne-2 1
200 F Sub-Tee ve.
Te.
Yes it is EmiS)
(TRIS)
CNNT cooling to 350 Super hea t MAINT4INING REACTOR COOLANT STATEM INTkCRITY l
I B-II l
- (See Verteble B-7) crese.re
_c.
I l
B-12e NRC 5
bettee of CNNT Tee Tee Yes Tee it I6R*
j Coatsimment to 600.000 i
Seemp Watee gel. equiv.
4 Level (W.B.)
'MP-2 3
-22'4" to Yes Teo Yes Yes It I&R (LRIS)
(ERIS) Clos?
l
-IS'6" (ERISI (lSete 30)
B-52b' NRC 2
Semp Depth Tee No No REL.
I Centaeament Sump Watee Leeet (N.R.)
MP-2 2
6-8005 No No lle No REL.
I CNNT (Note 43)
B-13 NRC I
O to Design Tes Tee fee Yes it S&H*
Centainment Pressure Pressere HP-2 8
O-60 peig Tee Yes Teo Teo IE laat IERIS)
(SRIS)
A.B.
(LBIE) leAINTAINING CONTAllSENT INTSCRITT B-84 NRC 3
Cleoed.
Yes Tee Yes Tee R
W Ceststament IIet Cleoed leelettee Velve Peettles IW-2 8
Closed -
Tee Tee fee fee lg I
CINff/A.S.
Not Cleoed i
l
e s
1 teressen es on.plet sesseer reeer ter. tion of
.e v.es.mie C.n es.g test, naase 19 VaalC 94 8'h'dal.'
med*e 8+at Sarr's C 8:
Tsc sur semeer a-ts seC I
le pose to T..
Tee fee Tee Is asp +
coet sement o.sese Freesere Free. ore ne-2 I
(see v.es.nle e-li)
(note 2sl TYPE C runt Claeolmo C-8 unC l
20e*r to Tee Te.
Tee fee la fam+
Core rest le w r Temperature str2 (see vers.ble e-s)
C-2**
WRC I
l/2 T.S.
Yes Tee Tee Tee SE I4R*
Radioactietty tielt ' 4 Coec. Cire.
800 K T.S.
l Framery Lleite Coeleet ne-2 (m. le.tresset - See Note 8)
C-3 NBC 3
IO asC1/el to Ne We No Ne
=
I Amelyste IO C8/el of Fraeory Coel.es itP-2 P.A.S.S.
(Games Spectree)
(See Note B)
REACTOR C00BAff PRES $ tele BOUNDARY C-4 BCS (See Verteble B-7)
Pressure C-S Ceetelament (Bee Vertebte 9-83)
Pressere (Bete 28)
C-6 Caetateneet (see Vertebles B-52s & Sal 26)
Buey Water I4 eel C-T imC I
I te le* R/hr Tee Tee Yes Teo Ft 14A*
Cantalement Aree Radiaties NP-2 8
1 te le p/hr Tee Yes Tee fee IE laa
'(tals)
(tals) CIstr s
(EslS)
C-8 NRC 3
IO*
to 80' No 4.
Na Ne
=
I Eff. Radio-esc 4 /CC actietty Weble ces Fra.
l Ceedesser Air nP-2 3
BO' t o 10' We No No Ne
=
$4 (Fals)
(ER$$)
7.R.
Renneel Esheeet esc d /CC (ENIS)
Tee
e o-i.or.te en on.,se, setseer Power Leesttem of v.r..ete c.tes*ca se.e. m*=se El gestC g4 s g dene new.s.n s=rt'r r m.
vsC Eor
_ sees.r_
CONTAIEM NT i
C-s ecs (s. versette e-7) rressere C- 0 NaC 0-ses tes vee ve.
v-e E
isme Centesameet (oper.mie free nydvesee 30 pese to n.e.)
C.eceeteettee ne-2 3
0- 01 Ne tes ve.
ve.
E asa (sais)
(sais)
A.s.
(n.se 33)
(m.t sn (sats)
C-unC no Ps:A t.
vee vee ves vee E
sno C.etesameet 3x oees e s
Preseene Freesere MP-2 3
-5 te tes vee vee ves it Isit (tals)
(tals)
A.B.
250 pets (ERIs)
-2 C-82 NC 2
30' to 14 ve.
Ne No ItEL.
I4A Centelement pCA/CC Eff. Redte-actietty Nehle IIP-2 (see Vertente C-84) see from Identified Reteese Potete
- I 0
C-13**
NBC 2
10 to 10 vee No No ML.
I Radlettee R/hr.
Espesure Rate (leesde Oldge.) IIP-2 (see Note 9)
C-14 NC 2
10' to 30' vee Ne lle REL.
163 Eiflueet pct /CC Radleectivity (seesde sidse.) nr-2 2
SE 10'I to 10' We No Iso No REL.
Ian (tans)
(Ents)
A.s.
pct /CC (Ents)
Noaharsh tvPE D REsIBUAL MAY REn0 VAL STSvtM
~
D-R Nec 2
0-1801 D.F.
vee No We ML.
I DIIA Systee Flow HP-2 2
0-7,000 spo No Ne he Ile ML.
I A.B.
(Note 3%)
Woroh D-2 NRC 2
32-3S0*F vee We No ML.
I INm Ev.
Es. Outlet reaperatore 99-2 2
0-400*F Ne We No Be DEL.
1 A.S.
(18ete 30)
Netch
4 e
e a
d s r.:a.e er Deepte?
s, e..e reser versente Cainen het. m.eae Eg go.ies qA Sen 4ese N., pee.seet sear 8s C;n.
TSC Et*
t.orete.e et sArETT INnCTsop STSTEMS 5ee*e' D-3e*
NaC 2
30-901 Tee Ne No ML.
I Aermentater Velmee Teek Leset 4
NP-2 2
3" to 327" Ne No Me No IE I
Cast?
(Note 32) harsh D-3be NRC 2
0-750 yea 9 fee No Aceteeleter es.
ML.
3 Teek Pressere 0-250 pass NP-2 2
(Note 30)
We No No No REL.
I CNNT (Note 32)
Nerek D-4 NBC 2
Cleoed-opes Tee Ne Accue=leter No ML.
I see. valse Poestase W-2 2
Cleoed-Open Tee Ne fee No ML.
1 C3Bff Nerob D-5 Nmc 2
0-1801 D.F.
Tee No Berte Acid No stEL.
I CharSteS Flow NP-2 2
0-140 Spa No No No No SEL.
IEA (ERIS)
(ERIS)
A.B.
(Etis)
Noahorch a
D-6 WRC 2
0 110% D.F.
Tee Ne No ML.
I Flow Is NPI NP-2 2
0-300 Syn No No De De REL.
B&
(EalS)
(BRIS)
A.S.
(Note 35)
(Ents)
Neret D-7 IIRC 2
0-8101 D.F.
Tee Ne Flow In No AEL.
I LPI 19-2 2
14 (ERIS)
(ERIS)
A.S.
(mete 35) i (EasS)
Nersh D-9 Inc 2
Top to Dettee fee Ne WST We ML.
I i
Lese!
IEP-2 3
4.3 to 1001 No Tee fee fee SE 16 (ERIS)
(Bals) Tard (EAls)
IIsehersh M1. TART C00EMT SYSTEN 1
1 D-9 Inte 3
Noter Current No lie No Ne j
meester I
Ceetent 1
% States 19-2 3
0-600 Aspe.
to No No No IE (ERIS)
(ERIS)
A.o.
j
\\
(EasS)
D-RO MnC 2
Cleoed =
Tee We No RFL.
I PeteerT llot Cleoed Byetse I
SRT NP-2 2
Cleoed -
Tee Ile fee No ML.
IE (ERIS)
(ERIS)
CINff Net Cleoed (Note II)
I (ERIS)
Nereh D-II NRC 1
Settee to Top Tee fee Teo Tee IE laae j
Presseelser Resel NP-2 (See Verteble A-Il s
1
e s
e.
Lecetten el Desplay Seiseie Pe.er Leestsee er verteble Cates *'2 l**l-E**A' 33 b*1[
ga Schedule seduetent Supg. l y Ca Tsc EOF
_Seeser j
D-82 NAC 2
Electr6r Teo We
=
Ne ktL 3
Pressortaer Currest Neoter Statue itP-2 2
(See Note 12) Ne sie No No REL.
l A.B.
Neebersh D-13*
WaC 3
Top to Settee No No No No 3
Quench 3
Test 19-2 3
0-40" No No
.
- No Ile REL.
I CNNT teeet (Note 13)
D-14*
Nec 3
50-730*F No No No No I
Quench i
Test MP-2 3
0-300*F We No No No REL.
I CISff Temperature (Note 84)
D-IS*
NBC 3
0-Dees e No Ne We We s
I Quench Teek Pressure NP-2 3
0-164 pelg No No No No REL.
I CWlf 1
i SECOISART SYSTSN (STRAM GEM AATDA)
D-16 WRC l
Free Tube fee Tee fee fee 1E IM*
~
Stese Sheet to Generator Seperatere Leeel W-2 (See Verteble A-6 Note 15)
D-87 NRC 2
0-8.200 pets Tee Ne No ML.
I steen Generater IIP-2 2
0-8.200 pets Tee fee Tes Tee SE I&
(5313)
(tals)
A.B.
Pressere (emIS)
Norst D-18 BRC 2
Cleoed =
Tee No No ML.
I Saw Not Cie.e4 Peettlee W-2 (IIe Eatsties Isetriseest. Note 17)
(tr 4)
(2)
Ca (To.)
(N.)
(T.s) (1989)
(We)
(,,t.)
(s
,3 (i iS3 Not Ct e4 tuss)
D-i, umC 3
0-1 05 D.r.
N.
No No No ase te.e s.,
ree W-2 3
6-4.3 its No Te.
W.
N.
ML.
inn (anie)
(saiS) 7.s.
Flow Ibe/br (ERIS)
AMEILI4RT fBEDeanTsa ca EleaCENCY FREatseTER SYSTEst i
D-10 IRtc 2
0-1105 D.F.
Tee We No ML.
I heettlery Feeduster Flow W-2 2
0-600 spe Tee fee Yee Tee EE I&
(ERIS)
(ERIS)
A.B.
(SRIS)
Nerek D-Il NBC 1
Plant Teo Tee Yes Tee SE REA*
Ceedeneste Spectfte Storsee fast Eneet MP-2 1
0-334*
We We No Tee IIEL.
36 (ERIS)
(RAIS) Tora (Prereced)
(IBete 18)
(Tee)
(Tee)
(Tee)
(5906)
RE (ERIS)
(
e
~
e e
se tee **
- a
.k e '
e T*
.k
.h
.k
.n
.b e'
e o
e o
o s.r 5 B.
N r
B. e S. r B. e
- s. r B. e r
r r
e i*
e e
AN C*
AN AN AW AN AA
)
)
)
)
S S
S S
I I
I R
a a
S E
B E
E e
t'
(
(
(
(
tp e.
D
)
)
)
)
S S
S s
I R
l i
R a
h E
E t
t
(
(
(
(
e.
e 8
)
s "'
)
)
N S
S S
C I
Ibl k
I I
i' I
I 16I 6I I
S I
R 3
I I
E E
3E I
I
(
(
(
r t8 t
L L
L t.
L L
t L
L L
L L
L L
L
.e a u
k E
E E
E R
a i
R R
R k
E t
t E
E E
E m
m I
R I
k E
t a
R A
R I
a es ta*
d*
e o e
e e
8e o e o o o
o e
Be le
'aa N
N N
W M
1 N
N N
N N
N N
N I
I dem e
t u
de ht C.
9 o
o o
o o
e 9
=
N N
=
N N
N N
ll th
= o o
o o) e o o o o e
l N
N)
W N
N N
N N
N N
N le o
o e
o n
N N
N u4 1
2 4
4
)
)
)
)
5 6
7 5
3 3
3 3
e e
e o
e e
s e
e e
e 8'
Y l t T
T N
T
)
T Nt T
Nt f
N T
Wt Y
Wt I
e eee e
e o t e
e oe o oe e
o e
e e
ee o
t fe Ie o
o o
N N
N n
I
(
e
(
I e
N
(
(
m
(
m e
e u
t
(
y e
. r r
F.
a F.
F.
t F.
g a
t m
o e
+
S c
F F
o D
o D
p B
F D
0 a
ri s
s, s
r 0
8 0
i
'0 1
0 f
0 I
5 E
o
'5 0
1 0
0 0
0 0
t 0
0 0
0 0
t4 0
0.
5 8
4 l
4 2
2 0
8 0
ne 4
5 t.
2 g
t 8
S ae a
p 0
- N 0
3 I
1 p
1 2
1 8
3 n
8 a
1 o
2 I
0 0
lPS 4
0(
5 i
0 0
0 0
T e
3 0
0 0
ts is 2
E
't o
s N
3
(
2 2
2 2
2 2
2 2
2 2
2 2
2 2
2 C
N E
T S
Y S
L N
O E
R T
T s
2 2
2 2
N 2
2 2
2 2
T C
c c
C O
C C
c C
C N
N B
H I
fr B
s F
n R
P s
i I
I I
eg W
99 C
R P
S R
t n
r n r R
P N
N E
N N
N g
E E
e T
N L
I S
i L
Y u
O S
o l el V
C t
eee t
e t
e R
e eF e eer nrr D
l E
s rr e eeo N
e T
T e
s. n u e t.
leea pe se l e M
e lFm W
m s
mt t A
t A
p w
a eT e eh o
a k
BNp e pe t e A
e me 4
TSe FS e m
r L
Ul wO eel eFs e
h.
e sy N
e I
eew 5
os e
s n
t e w
- tCtt C
ew ew ut t h
Et
- smm h e t e
- l ss I
W E t.
W s
t e
- t pp I
4 ei 7 ei 0 oae L
9C or 0C oy a
er o
- s as ot oee e M
s T
2 a pl 3 eyey 4
2Nt 2Lt 2VCT 0
2Ct S 3 cts r
N 2CSF 2NBBS 2 CAT 2 CST m
0 e
O v
C 9
D D
D C
D D
D C
D D
a.
lt 1:ll4
?
C
~ ~ ~ ~ " ' '
t 8
s Lae et ense of Dneplay seie..r P-e Lo***8*a *8 V.re.6:e cA*a*r2 la*t-Naase Eg q.si..;
g4 hked.if Ned=ad=at barr's CW-nasunsTE sTsTEn
-5'"?*f - - -
s-3:e unC s
Top to settes N.
We N.
N.
Nien te.en ned. Lag =ad t eet nP-2 3
o-6a-No N.
N.
N.
Mt.
CNuf e-32e umC 3
e-isos No No No No I
ne4. see seesee Meteep feet Pressere nr 2 3
9-25 Pete No No We No ML.
I
" E-WENTILATI0lt SYSTEns 3-33 NBC 2
Opes-Cleoed Tee Ile lie ML-I Emergesey Ventanets.e nP-2 2
oPee-Cieeed Yes W.
Yes Yes
. Et.
i T.s.
Deeper Poe.
1E 3
m ret PotER SUPPLIES D-34 NBC 2
Volte. W., Tee No No ML.
I statue et Pressures S/S Power med Other 99-2 2
Vette. AePe.,
No No Ile Ile ML.
IE (EAIS)
(RAIS)
Emersy Pressere Seerees (ERIS)
(Bete 22)
TYPE E CONTAIINRJrF RABIATION E-l Centelament (See Verlette C-7)
Reetetsee 4 ARA RADIATICII
~
E-2 Pac 2
10'I -10 Tee No modsatten Ise itEL.
I R/br Espeeere Sete fur-2 3
(Note 23)
No Na We Ile ML.
I AIRSORM RADI0 ACTIVE n4TERIALS MIAASED Frul PtANT E-Se Ceemen (See Verteble C-14)
Veet-Boble See
'l r.
e '
e Leestles of Steplay Seteese Pe=er Lacettee of verseu e Catenerr feet. menee E
go.ie[
g semedene med eases s=ratz C1 755 EE
_5*=en J
E-u C.et'd) umC 2
e-ties Tee n.
No mEL.
I ri.et o.r.
Test flew IW-2 2
0-80 No se No No ML.
(I.ecel IM)
A.D.
SCFM Berek
- I I
J E-M IaC 2
10 to le Tee se Be No ML.
IM weet free pCs/CC s/s er Stees Smay IW-2 2
(De Estettee leatru est)
(propeeed)
(note 24)
(Tee)
(No)
(Tes)
(1986)
(We)
(ML. )
(IM)
(Emis)
(5318)
(ERIS)
E-4 NBC 3
10 ' to 102 g,
y, Particulatee pC1/CC and yelegees 19-2 3
(See sete 25) We me se me 1
SNVIRGES RADIATI k A S GAB 104CTIV;TT E-Se**
(This to est e reet-effeettee eyotes per utaEC/CR 2eee)
Red.
Espeeere (teleted en R.G. 1.97. Ree. 3)
IIeters E-58 yac 3
10'I to it'I Be We se No
=
Airberse ytt/CC 1
Redie Belegese Persteelstee 19=2 3
(Note 26)
No no We IIe l
l E-SC MC 3
leetopte We No Be IIe (Portable feetruseste)
Plant and Amelyste Beestene l
Redteetttetty ID=3 3
(Note 26)
No No Be Me I
t i
3-6 1
4 Ibeteorelegy NBC 3
As Specified Be Bo Be se R.4. l.97, t
Ree. 2 g
19-2 3
As Spectised We so No IIe ML.
IM (RAIS)
(BBIS) Yard
'~
B.G. l.97 (tals) hee. 2 (mete 39)
I E-r 1
Accident NBC 3
Ae Spectited No Be No Be Seeptsee Cepebsitty so-2 3
As speelfied Be De IIe 3e e
e i-(Note 34) l i
y-NOTES:
Note 1: The present 2,050 ppm range is sufficient to monitor beyond the Technical Specification limit of 1,720 ppm. In cases where higher range is required, the Post Accident Sampling System (PASS) will be utilized.
Note 2: Based on the safety analysis of the plant, the existing range of 0-6000F is sufficient to monitor cold leg fluid temperature conditions following all design basis accident scenarios.
Note 3: Since 2120F is the saturation temperature at atmospheric pressure, the 1500F lower range provides sufficient margin to monitor the approach to saturation in a cold shutdown situation in the event of a loss of shutdown cooling.
Note 4: The full range is covered by several instruments with ranges of 0-1,600 psig, 1,500-2,500 psig and 0-3,000 psig.
The 1,500-2,500-psig instruments are Cat. IE instruments. The 0-1,600 range instruments were upgraded during the 1983 outage. The 0-3,000-psig instrument is a non-Cat. IE single-channel instrument powered from a re!!able nonvital power supply with continuous recording. NNECO considers the upper range of 3000 psig adequate for all design basis events.
Note 5: Deleted.
Note 6: The proposed range has been justified in NNECO's reply, dated March 11, 1983 to D. G. Eisenhut letter to all licensees of operating
~
Westinghouse and CE PWRs (Generic Letter 82-28) dated December 10, 1982. : Also, Revision 3 to Regulatory Guide 1.97 only requests a range from the bottom'of the hot leg to the top of the vessel..
Note 7: Deleted.'
- Note 8: No existing in-line monitor. The Post Accident Sampling System (PASS) will be utilized. The PASS was recently installed in accordance with NUREG-0737, Item II.B.3.
The required range of - activity can be analyzed.
Note 9: This parameter has been deleted in Regulatory Guide 1.97, Rev. 3.
Note 10: The tank design pressure is 250 psig.
-Note 11: The Acoustic Valve Monitoring System (AVMS) was upgraded during the 1983 refueling outage.
Note 12: The pressurizer heaters are monitored by breaker status indicating lights.
Note 13: This is a horizontal cylindrical tank with a 60-inch O.D. The instrument measures 40 inches of the center of the tank.
l Note 14: The range of 0-3000F is sufficient to monitor normal as well as design basis accident scenarios.
w-Note 15: There are no instrument taps in the S/G to allow direct wide-range level measurement.
9 Note 16: Steam generator pressure is recorded by Category 2 instruments. See variable D-17.
Note 17: There -is no existing instrument to indicate the safety relief valve position. New instruments will be installed.
l Note 18: The condensate storage tank level instrumentation consists of an electronic level instrument loop with alarm and continuous indication in the control room. In addition,.a pneumatic level controller with i
local indication and high and low alarms is also available in the control room. The electronic loop will be upgraded while the pneumatic loop will be kept as is because of the inherent reliability of pneumatic instruments.
These instruments are located in a non-harsh environment Note 19: There are several RTDs that go to a selector switch in the control room. A single indicator is used to indicate the selected RTD. The maximum predicted containment temperature is less than 3000F.
i Note 20: This parameter is an input to the plant process computer, and can be recorded on demand.
Note 21: Deleted.
i
.e-Note 22: The status of the diesels are indicated by voltmeters, ammeters and.
power meters. The status of the starting air for the diesels is alarmed 1
at the control room. The emergency bus voltages are continuously indicated at the control room., All sensors are located in a mild environment.
Note 23: The area radiation monitors are located throughout-the radiological control areas of the plant. However, most of them have an upper range of 104 to 106 mr/hr. The function of the fixed area monitor is to warn of changing or unusually high radiological conditions. This can be accomplished with the existing instruments. Personnel access to areas under accident conditions would be allowed. only with appropriate portable survey instruments. Also, Rev. 3 of Regulatory Guide 1.97 classifies this parameter as Cat. 3.
Note 24: The present method of determining noble gas release is by sending an individual under the main steam line with portable instruments. To meet the provisions of the regulatory guide, NNECO will install Area Radiation Monitors at the east steam line and the west steam line.
These monitors will indicate and record at the control room. The flow will be calculated using steam generator pressure and valve specifications and will meet the instrument range specified in the guide.
Note 25: The stack monitors are equipped with Particulate and Iodine filters which are utilized for laboratory analysis.
The required range of concentrations will be met.
i
s D
Note 26: The plant is equipped with portable instruments which are capable of -
meeting all the provisions of the guide.
INote 27: There is only one wide range temperature instrument in each of the hot legs and cold legs.
Note 28: The lower range of 10 psia is covered by the wide ' range -
instrumentation.
Note 29: Deleted.
Note 30: Design verification indicates that this level range can measure up to 565,000 gallons.
This is acceptable because the maximum post-accident containment water volume will not exceed approximately 563,800 gallons. Details are provided in the W. G. Counsil letter to R.
A. Clark, dated March 8,1983.
s
-Note 31: The analyzers are designed for operation under a positive containment pressure up to 10 psig. The Millstone Unit No. 2 containment will not see a negative pressure under any FSAR analyzed accident conditions.
This pressure range is presently being addressed under NCREG-0737, 4
Item II.F.1, Attachment 6. (See W..G. Counsil letter to 3. R. Miller, I
dated March 27,1984).
i Note 32: The pressure and level indications for the safety injection tanks are important in verifying the operability of the system during normal l
operations. However, their importance is diminished during and after i
an accident, for the following reasons:
i i
L
O e'
D
- a. They provide no automatic function.
- b. No operator actions are based on their indication.
- c. The system is passive and functions early in an accident (LOCA).
Note 33: The hydrogen analyzers were modifed in response to NUREG-0737, Item II.F.1, Attachment 6.
The sensitive electronic parts of the system were moved from a potentially harsh environment to the l
control room.
Note 34: The PASS does not have the capability to analyze for dissolved O.
2 The NRC Staff concluded our PASS was acceptable in the Safety Evaluation on NUREG-0737 Item II.B.3, transmitted in 3.R. Miller's letter to W.G. Counsil, dated June 14,1984.
Note 35: Motor ammeter readings in the control room are utilized to back up the flow indication. The sensors for the ammeters are located in mild environments.
In addition, failure of the flow indication does not jeopardize the operability of the system it is monitoring.
Note 36: Charging header pressure can be used to back up the charging flow l
indication. -
Note 37: Pressurizer level or differential pressure across the letdown filter can be utilized to back up the letdown flow indication.
r 6
9 d.
Note 38: RHR heat exchanger outlet temperature can be verified by trending reactor coolant temperature.
Note 39: This information is displayed in the Millstone Unit No. I control room.
Note 40: The pressurizer level instruments were upgraded during the 1985 refueling outage to meet EEQ requirements. The instruments are part of the cabinets which were procured mainly for the feedwater control system. These cabinets are powered from an instrument power supply that is highly reliable but not category lE. Although this power source is not classified as category lE, the diesel generators provide backup power. The only difference between a category lE power supply and this instrument power supply is that the category IE supply is backed by the station batteries via the inverters which ensures that there is no momentary power interruption during transfers from " normal" to
" emergency" power and vice versa. The design of the instrument power supply will result in a momentary interruption during transfers, however, the pressurizer level instruments are designed to tolerate these momentary interruptions.
Based on the above, it is concluded that the pressurizer level instru-mentation, as modified, is adequate for post-accident monitorinb functions.
Note 41: The key variable required to assess the condition of the containment is containment pressure. Containment temperature is utilized only in a
-c n.
diagnostic capacity.~ Based on the above, it is concluded that this parameter is category 3 which is a "high quality, off-the-shelf" instrument powered from a highly reliable power supply.
Note 42: CCW to ESF systems is provided by the RBCCW system. The RBCCW outlet temperature is the CCW temperature to ESF system. These instruments have no safety function and their failure does not jeopar-dize the operability of the RBCCW system. Based on this, the existing instruments are judged to be adequate.
Note 43: The narrow range sump level instruments are utilized during normal operation to indicate level and initiate an alarm for the operator to manually start the sump pumps. During an accident, the sumps would be filled and the operators will not start the sump pumps, to avoid transferring contaminated water outside the containment.
To monitor containment water level following an accident, the wide range containment level instruments are utilized.
J