ML20214J257

Proposed Revised Tech Specs,Permitting Operation of Drywell & Suppression Chamber Purge Sys

ML20214J257
Person / Time
Site:	Hope Creek
Issue date:	11/21/1986
From:	Public Service Enterprise Group
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ML20214J203	List: ML20214J201 ML20214J257 ML20265A872 ML20265A877
References
NUDOCS 8612010231
Download: ML20214J257 (63)

Text

l D

EHCLOSURE 1 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS DRYWELL AND SUPPRESSION CHAMBER PURGE SYSTEM LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION plNWRTll 3.6.1.8 Th: 25 *n:h drywell purge ;upply :nd :xh:::t i:01:ti:n v:1v:: :nd th; 2'-inch :uppr:::i n ch::ber purg; upply :nd exh:::t i:05:11 be OPEPASLE :nd ::: led cle 01: tion v:1v :

5-inch nitregen cupply valv:

APPLICABILITY:

OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1, 2 and 3.

ACTION:

g.ygl a.

-With a 20-inch dryacil purg; :upply or exh:::t i:01:tien valve, Or :

2'-inch ;uppra :fon ch::ber purg: upplyer:xh:::ti::g:rv:1ve:rthe e.

er :::1 the Open Or n:t :::1:d :100:d, ineh nitreg:n upply v:1v:

v:!v::(c) er othe wit: i:01:t: the p:netr: tier with*- feur heur er be 4-at le::t 40T SHUT 00* withi-the next 12 hour: :nd in COLD SHUTD0 " within th: f:ll: wing 24 heur:(

b.

With a drywell purge supply o.r exhaust isolation valve, or a suppression chamber purge supply or exhaust isolation valve or.the nitrogen supply :

valve, with resilient material seals having a measured leakage rate exceed-ingthelimitofSurveillanceRequirementf4.6.1.8.2-nd/or'.S.1.0.3,re-store the inoperable valve (s) to OPERABLE status within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN vithin th'e following 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS NmeTA 4.6.1.8.1 peach 25-inch drya ll purge supply nd exhssst i: lation v:'ve, and inch :uppre::ica ch::bcr purg upply :nd exhau:t i:01: tion valv 2nd the 4nch ritregen :upply valve, :t.211 50 ver fied te b; ::aled 10:0 8 @_ !eact i

,.,,.,,,-__n_o, r..

GIN %RT 4-l isas Cenes per S :sath; on : STACCERED TEST SASIS ::ch ::aled 4.6.1.8.2d n;

~

';;;d 2S inch drywell purge supply and exhaust isolation valve, and supp chamber purge supply and exhaust isolation valve e 6-inch nitrogen supp e, with resilient material seals e demonstrated OPERABLE by verifying e measured leak e is less than or equal to 0.05 L, per penetration when pr o P,48.1 psig.

4.6.1.8.3 At least er 92 days the 26-inch 1 purge inboard exhaust isolation v h resilient material seals shall be dem ted OPERABLE by ver' hat the measured leakage rate is less than or equal to er

,,:nctr:tien wher pr:::uri: d t: P,19.1 p;ig.

I 1;Ihi % RT 6 3

25-inch dryacil p cge inbeerd exhau;t valve i; not required te be ;caled

[cle: d :nd :y be Op:ntd i h

l n : rie: "ith the 2 i ch vent 'in: byp::: valve dur-n j

-ing p ried: Of contai ment precture 20-tr:1 r

HOPE CREEK 3/4 6-11

%GolO93 /

Stell2 /

ROR Aooc*. osoco ny u

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ENCLOSURE 1 INSERTS TO TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION REVISION INSERT 1 The drywell and suppression chamber purge system, including the 6-inch nitrogen supply line, may be in operation for up to 120 hours0.00139 days <br />0.0333 hours <br />1.984127e-4 weeks <br />4.566e-5 months <br /> each 365 days # with the supply and exhaust isolation valves in one supply line and one exhaust line open for containment prepurge cleanup, inerting, deinerting, or pressure control.*

INSURT 2 With a drywell or suppression chamber purge supply and/or exhaust isolation valve and/or the nitrogen supply valve open, except as permitted above, close the valve (s) or otherwise isolate the penetration within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.

INSERT 3 Before being opened, the drywell and suppression chamber purge supply and exhaust, and nitrogen supply butterfly isolation valves shall be verified not to have been open for more than 120 hours0.00139 days <br />0.0333 hours <br />1.984127e-4 weeks <br />4.566e-5 months <br /> in the previous 365 days.*

INSERT 4 At least once per 6 months **, but no more than once per 92 days ***, the 26-inch drywell purge supply and exhaust isolation valves and the 24-inch suppression chamber purge supply and exhaust isolation valves and the 6-inch nitrogen supply valve with resilient material seals shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by verifying that the measured leakage rate is less than or equal to 0.05 La per penetration when pressurized to Pa 48.1 psig.

INSERT 5 Prior to blow-out panel installation, cumulative operation is subject to a 40-hour nonrenewable limit.

Valves open for pressure control are not subject to the 120 hours0.00139 days <br />0.0333 hours <br />1.984127e-4 weeks <br />4.566e-5 months <br /> per 365 days limit, provided the 2-inch bypass lines are being utilized.

Provided that the valve has not been operated since the previous test.

• • • Applies only to a valve which has been operated since the previous test.

_z_

ENCLOSURE 1 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS BASES 3/4.6.1.5 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY This limitation ensures that the structural integrity of the-containment will be maintained comparable to the original design standards for the life of the unit. Structural integrity is required to ensure that the containment will withstand the maximum pressure of 48.1 psig in the event of a LOCA. A visual inspection in conjunction with Type A leakage tests is sufficient to demonstrate this capability.

3/4.6.1.6 DRYWELL AND SUPPRESSION CHAMBER INTERNAL PRESSURE The limitations on drywell and suppression chamber internal pressure ensure that the containment peak. pressure af 48.1 psig does not exceed the design pressure of 62 psig during LOCA conditions or that the external pressure differential does not exceed the design maximum external pressure differential of 3 psid.

The limit of -0.5 to +1.5 psig for initial positive containment pressure will limit the total pressure to 48.1 psig which is lessa than the design pressure and is consistent with the safety analysis.

3/4.6.1.7 DRYWELL AVERAGE AIR TEMPERATURE The limitation on drywell average air temperature ensures that the containment peak air temperature does not exceed the design temperature of 340*F during LOCA conditions and is consistent with the safety analysis.

The 135'F average temperature is conducive to normal and long term operation.

3/4.6.1.8 DRYWELL AND SUPPRESSION CHAMBER PURGE SYSTEMM ItWERT lo l

--Yhe eutbeerd 2C inch end e.tbeerd 24-inch dry ;11 and ;;.ppr;;;i;n h.dcr and exhaust isolation valves are required to b3 sealed c uring purge plant operation these valves have not been demonstrate e of closing during a LOCA or steam ak accident.

Mainta' ese valves sealed closed during plant operations e th s ve quantities of radioactive materials will not be released v co nt purge system.

To provide assurance that the 26-1 the 24-inch valves be inadvertently opened, they are seal

,in accordance with Standarc Review

.4, which inc1 c anical devices to seal or lock the valve closef, or pre ower

..e;;. b;in;; : pplied t: the V:!ve perater.

Ir s

I t

~ HOPE CREEK B 3/4 6-2

ENCLOSURE 1 INSERT TO TECIINICAL SPECIFICATION REVISION INSERT 6 The 120 hours0.00139 days <br />0.0333 hours <br />1.984127e-4 weeks <br />4.566e-5 months <br /> /365 days limit on purge operation is intended to reduce the probability that a LOCA will occur when the purge valves are open.

Blow-out panels are being installed in the CPCS ductwork to provide additional ~ assurance that the FRVS will be capable of performing its safety function subsequent to a LOCA.

These blow-out panels will be installed within 120 days of the effective date of this Technical Specification.

The 40-hour l imit is the annual proration of purge operation until the blow-out panels are installed.

e e

y

---_.,_w

l' ENCLOSURE 1 r

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS BASES DRYWELL.AND SUPPRESSION CHAMBER PURGE SYSTEM (Continued)

(so(Sicien+14 choke fhe glow -

The use of the drywell and suppression chamber purge lines for pressure un controlisgrestrictedwithth: f:! he'ng ::::ptien, th: inb :rd 25 *n h :h: :n i

Outht v:nt 'i e when used in conjunction with the 2-inch J

the drp :1 pur;:

n E+hg pur;c : thi ventJ4cc by;= ::h: sincethe2-inchvalveswillicloseduring a LOCA or steam line break accident and therefore the site boundary dose guidelines of 10 CFR Part 100 would not be exceeded in the event of an accident.

during purging 0; ration:.

Ir :dditi:r de: te th: ' -it:d 'ha r:t: through th:

2-inch byp::: v;h;, the int;;rd 25-inch :h: i: ch: ::p:bh Of Ch ing under th::: c nditieng The design of the 2 *n:h purge supply and exhaust isolation T valvelmeets the requirements of Branch Technical Position CSB 6-4,

" Containment Purging During Normal Plant Operations".

"and +bc. 6-inch ni+rogen supply vo.tve Leakage integrity tests with a maximum allowable leakage rate for purge supply and exhaust isolation valves will provide early indication of resilient material seal degradation and will allow the opportunity for repair before gross leakage failure develops.

The 0.60 L leakage limit shall not be exceeded when theleakageratesdeterminedbythellakageintegritytestsofthesevalves are added to the previously determined total for all valves and penetrations subject to Type B and C tests.

3/4.6.2.

DEPRESSURIZATION SYSTEMS The specifications of this section ensure that the primary containment pressure will not exceed the design pressure of 62 psig during primary system blowdown from full operating pressure.

The suppression chamber water provides the heat sink for the reactor coolant system energy release following a postulated rupture of the system.

The suppression chamber water volume must absorb the associated decay and structural sensible heat released during reactor coolant system blowdown from 1020 psig.

Since all of the gases in the drywell are purged into the suppression chamber air space during a loss of coolant accident, the pressure

.of the liquid must not exceed 62 psig, the suppression' chamber maximum internal design pressure.

The design volume of the suppression chamber, water and air, was obtained by considering that the total volume of reactor coolant to be considered is discharged to the suppression chamber and that the drywell volume is purged to the suppression chamber.

Using the minimum or maximum water volumes given in this specification, containment pressure during the design basis accident is'approximately 48.1 psig which is below the design pressure of 62 psig.

Maximum water volume of 122,000 ft results in a downcomer submergence of 3.33 ft and the minimum volume 3

of 118,000 ft3 results in a submergence of approximately 3.0 ft. The majority of the Bodega tests were run with a submerged length of four. feet and with

. complete condensation.. Thus, with respect to the downcomer submergence, this

~

specification is adequate.

The maximum temperature at the end of the blowdown HOPE CREEK 8 3/4 6-3

l TABLE 3.6.3-1 (Centinued)

B i

A PRIMARY CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES

}

n l

M MAXIMUM l

l p

PENETRATION ISOLATION TIME i

VALVE FUNCTION AND NUMBER NUMBER (Seconds)

NOTE (S)

P&ID i

i Outside:

l Loop A:

HV-9531A1 (GB-V048)

P88 60 3

j Loop B: Hy-9531A3 (GB-V070)

P38A 60 3

l (b) Chilled Water from Drywell Coolers Isolation Valves M-87-1 1

Inside:

1 Loop A:

HV-9531B2 (GB-V082)

P8A 60 3

Loop B:

HV-953184 (G8-V084)

P38B 60 3

Outside:

1 5:

Loop A:

HV-9531A2 (GB-V046)

P8A 60 3

8 Loop R:

HV-9531A4 (GB-V071)

P388 60 3

l e

i h

11. Group 11 - Recirculation Pump System (a) Recirculation Pump Seal Water Isolation Valves M-43-1 1

]

Outside:

l Loop A:

HV-3800A (BF-V098)

P19 45 3

Loop B:

HV-38008 (BF-V099)

P20 45 3

12. Group 12 - Containment Atmosphere Control System (a) Drywell Purge Supply Isolation Valves M-57-1.

Outside:

l HV-4956 (GS-V009)

P22 4'T 6 3, 8 i

HV-4979 (GS-V021)

P22/220 M6 3, 8 i

j (b) Drywell Purge Exhaust Isolation Yalves M-57-1 5 l

Outside:

c=

HV-4951 (GS-V025)

P23 15 3

5 HV-4950 (GS-V026)

P23 E6 3, 8 g

j HV-4952;(GS-V024)

P23

,15r F 3, 8 i

I

TABLE 3.6.3-1 (Continued) f PRIMARY CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES m

Q MAXIMUM A

PEHETRATION ISOLATION TIME VALVE FUNCTION AND NUMBER NUMBER (Seconds)

NOTE (S)

P&ID (c) Suppression Chamber Purge Supply Isolation Valves M-57-1 Outside:

I HV-4980 (GS-V020)

P22/P220-yf F 3, 8 HV-4958 (GS-V022)

P220 J!f 6 3, 8 i

(d) Suppression Chamber Purge Exhaust Isolation Valves M-57-1 Outside:

HV-4963 (GS-V076)

P219 15 3

HV-4962 (GS-V027)

P219 Mr F 3, 8 g

HV-4964 (GS'V028)

P219 yf F 3, 8 4

I T

(e) Nitrogen Purge Isolation Valves M-57-1 1

Outside:

HV-4974 (GS-V053)

J70/J202 45 3

HV-4978 (GS-V023)

P22/P220 Jff F 3, 8

13. Group 13 - Hydrogen /0xygen (H2/02) Analyzer System (a) Drywell H2/02 Analyzer Inlet Isolation Valves M-57-1 3

l Outside:

Loop A:

HV-4955A (GS-V045)

J9E 45 3

HV-4983A (GS-V046)

J9E 45 3

HV-4984A (GS-V048)

J10C 45 3

z HV-5019A (GS-V047)

J10C 45 3

p

)

c$

Outside:

Lobp B: HV-49558 (GS-V031)

J3B 45 3

R HV-49838 (GS-V032)

J3B 45 3

l HV-49848 (GS-V034)

J70/J202

'45 3

j HV-50198 (GS-V033)

, J70 45 3

i 1

l

ENCLOSURE 2 VENT / PURGE VALVE QUALIFICATION AND OPERABILITY The enclosures to this submittal include the Hope Creek FSAR and Technical Specification revisions that reflect the qualification

-and operability of the drywell and suppression chamber vent / purge valves within the Containment Atmosphere Control System (CACS) during plant operational conditions 1, 2,

and 3.

These changes are a result of our analysis and evaluation of the effects of a LOCA during containment purging on the safety-related equipment outboard of the 24-inch and 26-inch containment vent / purge pipe connections from the drywell and pressure suppression chamber (torus).

In addition, our analysis evaluates the radiological dose impact at the site boundary and in the control room resulting from a LOCA during containment purging.

The containment vent / purge isolation valves were analyzed based on the short-term containment pressure response following the DBA recirculation line break LOCA, Hope Creek FSAR Figure 6.2-3; maximum drywell peak pressure 48.1 psig (62.8 psia) with a blowdown mixture of steam-water-gas.

The maximum time for valve closure was limited to five seconds to assure that the purge valves would be closed before the onset of fuel failures following a LOCA and to limit the pressurization in the reactor building.

Our initial analysis indicated that the rapid pressurization of the drywell and torus due to the DBA recirculation line break LOCA would have caused the rupture pressure limit of the Containment Prepurge Cleanup System (CPCS) ductwork_t'o be exceeded and may cause pressurization of the Filtration, Recirculation and Ventilation System (FRVS) dampers, HD-9372A&C, and/or ductwork.

To provide additional assurance that the FRVS ductwork will remain functional, blow-out panels, set to open at a du;twork to room pressure differential of 1 psi, are being added in the CPCS ductwork upstream of the supply purge valves and downstream of the exhaust valves.

These panels will lower the pressure rise across the FRVS dampers, HD-9372A&C, and/or ductwork to within acceptable limits and maintain the integrity of the FRVS ductwork.

Based on structural analysis of the CPCS ductwork with blow-out panels, rated at 1.00 + 0.25 PSID (using 1.25 PSID), an evaluated peak pressure of 0.2 PSID is expected in the FRVS ductwork.

The CPCS ductwork without blow-out punels is expected to rupture at 3-4 PS I D.

Extrapolating the evaluated peak pressure (0.2 PSID) in the FRVS ductwork with, blow-out panels, with the expected rupture pressure (3-4 PSID) of the CPCS ductwork, the estimated peak pressure in the FRVS ductwork without blow-out panels ( <l PSID) is not expected to affect the recirculation function of the FRVS significantly; the designed flow balances may be af fected minimally.

The filtration, as well as the exhaust and drawdown functions of the FRVS, are not expected to be affected.

(See attached Reactor Building air flow diagram for CPCS and FRVS ductwork sizes).

o.

ENCLOSURE 2 These blow-out panels will be installed within 120 days of approval of this Technical Specification change.

Operation with the purge valves open during this 120 day period prior to blow-out panel installation, subject to the limitations of the revised Technical Specification, does not involve a significant hazard for the following reasons:

1.

The CPCS ductwork is expected to rupture before the FRVS ductwork experiences significant damage.

2.

The FRVS is not in operation during CPCS, purging, or inerting and thus all of the FRVS fan / filter units are protected from the pressure surge by closed inlet and outlet dampers on each unit.

3.

The probability that the plant will experience a large break LOCA during this very limited time period is acceptably small.

The blowdown of the drywell/ torus fluid through these blow-out panels will pressurize the room in which the blowdown takes place and any connecting compartments.

(See Attachment 1) The analysis showed that during the purging and CPCS operations, the flow paths from the torus and drywell areas must be limited to a total of one supply line and one exhaust line from both areas to avoid overpressurization.

To prevent isolation of the FRVS ducts to the torus (and connected compartments) following a LOCA, the FRVS isolation dampers (See PD-9438H on sheet 1 of Attachment 1 for typical example) that are currently activated by a 2-inch water gauge dif ferential pressure between the torus compartment and the adjacent compartments, are being refitted with similar model pressure differential switches with a set point slightly greater than 1 psid.

The analysis showed that if a LOCA occurred and vented for 5 seconds, the maximum differential pressures in the torus compartment and connecting rooms, and in the FRVS rooms

(

would reach 0.97 psi and 0.64 psi, respectively.

There fore, FRVS performance is unaffected because these pressures will not close the isolation dampers.

Also, secondary containment is maintained because these pressures are below the 1.5 psi differential set pressure of the main torus compartment blow-out panels.

Hope Creek has evaluated the effects of the room pressurization discussed above on other ducts and equipment in the subject rooms t

subsequent to overpressurization, and concludes that there will I

l be no unacceptable effects on the integrity of these ducts or operability of equipment.

The effect on the FRVS filter units by the steam and nitrogen blowdown from the CPCS ducts during the 5 seconds of purge valve closure was evaluated.

At the time that the FRVS filter units start, the rooms where blowdown takes place are conservatively considered to reach 100% RH due to the steam. release.

Because of l

--.c

ENCLOSURE 2 mixing in the FRVS inlet ductwork, this will result in relative humidity at the FRV5 filters of less than the design conditions.

Our evaluation also included the radiological dose assessment due to the LOCA mass blowdown through the CPCS duct blow-out panels.

Assuming that the releases are unfiltered from the drywell to the environment during the 5 second purge valve closure time, with the coolant concentrations based on data in FSAR Chapter 15 and using a calculated pre-existing iodine spiking factor, it is estimated that the resultant thyroid dose at the site boundary is 0.015 Rem.

The control room thyroid dose is estimated to be 1.7 X 10-5 Rem.

These doses are well below the 10CFR100 and GDC19 dose criteria. summarizes this calculation.

Furthe rmore, this assessment recognizes that the top of active fuel is not uncovered until approximately 25 seconds after the DBA LOCA (See HCGS FSAR Figure 6.3-20).

In order to minimize the probability that a LOCA could occur while the purge valves are open, a limit of 120 hours0.00139 days <br />0.0333 hours <br />1.984127e-4 weeks <br />4.566e-5 months <br /> /365 days for combined purging, inerting, and CPCS operation is included in the proposed Technical Specification revision.

Pressure control using the 2-inch bypass flowpath is not included in the 120 hours0.00139 days <br />0.0333 hours <br />1.984127e-4 weeks <br />4.566e-5 months <br /> /365 days limit.

Because HCGS utilizes a unique atmosphere recirculating Containment Prepurge Cleanup System (CPCS) to maintain offsite doses ALARA in lieu of purging through charcoal filters, an operational limit of 120 hours0.00139 days <br />0.0333 hours <br />1.984127e-4 weeks <br />4.566e-5 months <br /> /365 days for the vent / purge valves is necessary to allow HCGS operational flexibility similar to plants with 90-100 hours /365 days limitations.

Analyses based on CPCS flow rate, CPCS filter efficiency and drywell volume have determined that the CPCS will reduce the initial drywell equilibrium radiciodine concentration to a new, lower equilibrium concentration in approximately four hours.

Any additional CPCS operation will not significantly lower the containment atmosphere radioiodine concentrations while in operational conditions 1, 2,

and 3.

These analyses also show that operation of the CPCS in through the torus and out through the drywell does not reduce the time required for CPCS operation.

In addition, PSE&G's discussions with the NRC regarding consideration of CPCS operation in this mode indicated that PSE&G had discovered only one Mark I BWR plant that operated this way (because it was their plant specific preference), and that the Hope Creek Operations staff prefers not to operate the CPCS in this mode for reasons which include equipment considerations.

PSE&G concludes that operation of the Hope Creek CPCS will be in compliance with BTP CSB 6-4 as presented in this submittal.

Had Hope Creek been designed without the benefit of a CPCS system, a 90-100 hour limit would permit about six inert /deinert cycles per year.

The additional four hours per deinert cycle for CPCS operation requires an additional 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> with the purge valves open.

This results in a limit of 120 hours0.00139 days <br />0.0333 hours <br />1.984127e-4 weeks <br />4.566e-5 months <br />.

[

ENCLOSURE 2 Prior to blow-out panel installation, which will be within 120 days of approval of this Technical Specification change, this limit shall be 40 hours4.62963e-4 days <br />0.0111 hours <br />6.613757e-5 weeks <br />1.522e-5 months <br /> as indicated in'the limiting condition for operation in the technical specification.

This interim limit is in accordance with the NRC position regarding the reduction in probability of occurrence of a large break LOCA during purge valve operation.

That is; 120 days divided by 365 days times 120 hours0.00139 days <br />0.0333 hours <br />1.984127e-4 weeks <br />4.566e-5 months <br /> (yearly operational limit) equals approximately 40 hours4.62963e-4 days <br />0.0111 hours <br />6.613757e-5 weeks <br />1.522e-5 months <br />.

In addition, no significant affect on the function of the FRVS is expected during this interim period as evaluated above.

The containment vent / purge isolation valves (See Attachment 2 previously submitted June 4, 1986) were procured from the BIF Valve Company with Matryx air-actuators.

Even though these valves differ in size, they have been manufactured using similar materials, valve body styles and air-actuator models (See Vendor Drawings previously submitted June 4, 1986).

To assure that the 26-inch and 24-inch valves close in less than 5 seconds, the tubing size was increased from 1/2-inch to 3/4-inch between the solenoid and the actuators' hydraulic cylinde r, and tubing was rerouted to decrease the number of fittings.

Based on the closure time documented in the Wyle Laboratories Test Report No.

47962-1 (Attachment 3 previously submitted June 4, 1986) and Hope Creek's surveillance testing, all the containment vent / purge valves close in less than 5 seconds.

These safety-related, ASME Section III, Class 2, NON-NSSS active containment vent / purge valves (See FSAR Figure 6.2-29), meet the design criteria indicated in FSAR Section 3.9.3.2.7.2 which includes seismic qualification.

These vent / purge valves were included within the NRC PVORT and SQRT audits performed at Hope Creek.

To demonstrate valve operablity, the 26-inch valve was tested to the postulated recirculation line break LOCA condition at Wyle Laboratories as documented in Test Report No. 47962-1.

The 26-inch test specimen included a 26-inch BIF butterfly valve with a Green Rotary Actuator, Model No. 45122-SR-80 and a 3/4-inch ASCO solenoid valve to control the actuator.

This test setup resembled the components used at Hope Creek.

(See the attached piping / valve configuration isometric drawing associated with the HCGS vent / purge valves along with a table to identify valve orientation within the piping).

The tubing design between the hydraulic actuator cylinder and solenoid was revised to resemble the Hope Creek plant modifications stated above.

Note that Matrix sold their product line of air-actuators to Greer Company.

As documented in Table I of the Wyle Report, the 26-inch valve assembly, subjected to saturated steam against the curved side of the valve disk, closed against a differential pressure ranging from 57.7 psia to 131.7 psia in 3.92 seconds.

(previously submitted June 4, 1986) is a graphical diagram comparing the recirculation line break LOCA pressure curve with the pressure output data obtained from the Wyle test.

l ENCLOSURE 2 Upon completion of each test run, the 26-inch BIF butterfly valve assembly was cycled from the closed position to the open position to relieve steam trapped between it and the 10-inch steam flow control valve within the test assembly.

The 26-inch valve and actuator assembly was physically examined subsequent to all testing as follows:

a)

Resilient rubber seat for cuts or tears b)

The exposed shaft for cracks and deformation c)

Both sides of the disk for cracks or failure d)

The internal surface of the body of the valve for cracks e)

The external air-actuator surface for cracks and deformation No physical damage or failure was noted.

In conclusion, the referenced test has demonstrated the conservatism in the design of the containment vent / purge valve assemblies at Hope Creek and thus demonstrates valve operability. _

9 ATTACHMENT I (SHEE.T 1) z CPCS y

VENT PURGE Y!

y TO ATMOS.

g(PSI FRVVRBVS

-> HV-4978 HV-4951 a

FxHAUST 2

gAgy HEADER X

TORUS BLOW-007 PANEL HV-4950 g

g__y;26 c__

HD-9$72A HV-4952 I

HV-4919 l

l PSI DRYWELL M,I 1I I-1/1 I

r --------1

)

l 1

FRVS/RBV5 j

g l

l HV 4956 l

SUPPLY n

'8 I

l g

l psi I

HEADER I

L

".49go I

(12TYR) l HV-4962!/H/l '+,, -- 7

- - -8

/

gy zc

/F_y!

e i

HV 4%+

I l

j HW4156 o

a 3pg TORUS l HD-9372C M'

4 TORUS i

i PD-9438H COMPARTMENT

_ _ _ _ _ _ _]

g AMD CONNECTING ROOMS 3

FRVS f

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I IJOT AN FSAR CUAfd68.

ONLY RWCU VENTING COMPARTMENTS ARE SHOWN FOR CLARITY.

HOPE CREEK ENERATING STATION f

FETY J@YSIS REyRT f

] - DVcT. wloRK. Blowl-OUT PANEL V VRESSU MMPER T E

e VRANSIE ALYSIS L OR u

.%E FSAP. FIGOIEE 3 fo - 17 A

E BRE OUTSID f5TAINME VJITHerd THE. EM CLoSELD F5AR cguseG FIGURE 3.646 AMENDMENT 7,08/84

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^----

- ^^---- ^- - ----

ATTACHENT S

~

g CALCULATION OF DOSES RESULTING FROM A LOCA WHILE THE PURGE VALVES ARE OPEN ASSUMPTIONS 1.

Releases are assumed to be unfiltered f rom the containment to the environment during the time that the valves are open.

2.

Valves are assumed to close in five seconds.

3.

No fuel failure is assumed to occur.

~

4.

A pre-existing iodine spike which increases the I-131 equivalent coolant concentration to 0.2u/Ci/gm (HCGS j

Technical Specification 3/4.4.5) is assumed to determine the coolant concentration.

5.

The total activity released was calculated' assuming that the mass released carried all of the dissolved iodine.

6.

For added conservatism, all four purge paths (2 supply, 2 exhaust) were assumed to be open even though only 2 paths will be allowed to be open at any given time (one supply and one exhaust).

OFFSITE DOSES The Exclusion Area Boundary (EAB) doses were calculated as follows't Dth =

M DCFi.Ci. X/O. BR r.

i Where:

Dth is the total thyroid dose in rem, M

is the total mass released through the purge r

valves, 1694 lbs DCFi is the thyroid dose conversion for isotope, i, per Reg. Guide 1.109 Rev.1 Ci is the coolant concentration for isotope, i, theEABagmosphegicdispersionfactor, X/O is 1.9 X 10-sec/m BR is the breathing rate, 3.47 X 10-4 m3/sec 4.

y

x ATTACHENT 5 U

is the unfiltered air inleakage, 10 cfm Fr is the recirculation flow, 3000 cfm X/Q/s the c 4.39 x 10-gntrol room atmospheric dispersion factor, sec/m3 kDi is the decay constant for isotope, i V

is the control room volume, 54,200 ft3 Using:

F+U F

+

T i

V V

and fy= F (1-e)

+U The solution to the differential equation becomes:

For 0 < t <~ 5 sec; kt T

fr. X/Ocr. Ri (1-e

)

Ai (t)

=

hT For t > 5 sec, Ri = 0; T

Ai(t) =Ai(5)e The dose rate at any time, t,

in the control room is given by:

bth (t) = b DCF BR.Ai(t) i i

The total thyroid dose from the accident is:

oe Dth

• th (t)dt = BR [ DCF i Ai (t) dt I

I o

o 5

- hT t f.X/Ocr. R1 (1-e

.)

+

I

=BR b DCFi NT i

o J'A(5)

A ' "-' 'dt 4 i

e

(

5 The resultant doses to the thyroid are:

EAB 1.5 X 10-2 rem Control Room 1.7 X 10-5 rem ATTACHMENT 5

~

The coolant concentrations were determined as follows:

Ci=Cio. SF Where:

Cio is the normal coolant concentration SF is the spiking factor The spiking factor was calculated assQming a 0.2 pCi/gm I 131 dose equivalent concentration:

0.2pCi/gm = SF

• DCFi Cio DCF -131 I

CONTROL ROOM DOSES To calculate the control room doses, a release rate was determined as follows:

Ci Ri=Mr T

Where:

Ri is the re' lease rate for isotope, i, in Ci/sec T

is the valve closure time, 5 seconds The activity in the control room was calculated using the following differential ~ equation:

dAi=fF (1-e)

+U X/Ocr Ri- )\\Di i - (F+U)*Ai-FreAi A

dt V

V Where:

Al is the activity of isotope, i, in the control room in curies, F

is the filtered air intake, 1000 cfm e

is the intake charcoal filter efficiency, 0.99

ENCLOSURE 3 SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION The proposed Technical Specification changes for operation of the Hope Creek Generating Station drywell and suppression chamber purge system has-been evaluated pursuant to 10CFR 50.92:

(1)

Will the operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?

The-proposed changes do not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated, based upon the proposed design changes to relieve any overpressurization in excess of that caused by the

. worst case LOCA as previously evaluated in the HCGS FSAR, and, demonstration and analysis that all the containment vent / purge valves close in less than 5 seconds, thereby limiting radiological dose to well below the 10CFR100 and GDC19 dose criteria.

See Enclosure 2 to this submittal for the proposed design changes and valve operability analysis.

(2)

Will the operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment-create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?

The proposed changes do not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previ-ously evaluated.

Although this change allows certain qualified vent / purge valves to be open for periods while the. plant is in operational conditions 1, 2 or 3, analysis has shown the operation of these valves is within existing analyses i

reflected in the proposed revised technical specification requirements.

See Enclosure 2 to this submittal for radi-ological dose. assessment information associated with the proposed amendment.

(3)

Will the operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety?

The proposed changes do not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

This has been discussed in Item (1) above as safety analyses regarding overpressurization and radiological dose assessment.

Consequently, the proposed changes do not involve a significant hazard.

s

, y2 g.,

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,,wv.,.m---mm

- - - + - - -

ENCLOSURE I4 HCGS FSAR REVISIONS l

l l

l l

l

2 9

HCGS FSAR 4/84 (o,

24-ud ait" The 24-and 26-inch containment purge and vent butterfly valves 3

are :: 1;d ;!:::d :

under administrative control to ensure that they cannot be nadvertently opened.

As discussed in r 49/*44 1

Section6.2.5.2.f,te26-inchinboardventvalves(1-GS-HVp952),

4tle3f in coniunction with X 2-inch-meter-operated globe valves (1-GS-HV-J4951)7'Ja' opened to vent'as required for thermal

.espansion ::d c :t ::ti: Q The ::1 : ;::it10: irdicetie- !i;htr-a

.: the crir :::te:1 :::: e.e,ch;;h;d ;;;;y 2i h:::: t:

ify

._6.

.. ; :1;;;M ~ 7h,, page sugg)g W enou.;s+ w.lves thrt th:

M0 CXQLn CenkoIe

% lico ofexeck os 04her-kws as fMM b_y % Tecksicut 5 Pec\\ q,'caMon s.

II.F.1 ACCIDENT MONITURING INSTRUMENTATION ATTACHMENT 1, Noble Gas Effluent Monitor Position Noble gar effluent monitors shall be installed with an extended range designed to function during accident conditions as well as during normal operating conditions.

Multiple monitors are considered necessary to cover the ranges of interest.

(1)

Noble gas effluent monitors with an upper range capacity of 10s nCi/cc (Xe-133) are considered to be practical and l

should be installed in all operating plants.

(2)

Noble gas effluent monitoring shall be provided for the total range of concentration extending from normal condition (as low as reasonably achievable (ALARA))

concentrations to a maximum of 105 n/Ci/cc (Xe-133).

Multiple monitors are considered to be necessary to cover the ranges of interest.

The range capacity of individual monitors should overlap by a factor of 10.

It is important that the displays and controls added to the control room as a result of this requirement not increase the potential for operator error.

A human-factor analysis should be performed taking into consideration:

(1)

The use of this information by an operator during both normal and abnormal plant conditions; (2)

Integration into emergency procedures; 1.10-49 Amendment 5

e-l HCGS FSAR 10/84 i

l 1.14.1.71 Containment Purce Svetem, LRG I/CSB-3 I

Y 1.14.1.71.1 Issue l

Containment purge systems often ha.ve small vent l'ines that are

)

used to bleed off excess primary containment pressure during i

normal operation.

Because the lines provide an open path from

. d t

the containment to the environs, they must be evaluated against l

the requirements of Branch Technical Position CSB 6-4.

l INSeg.T A Pgtoydcjort^6,p W 1.14.1.71.2

Response

des,t3ded l

The containment inerting and purge system (CIPS) is -s4 sed. to purge the primary containmen t duri_; refr-li=0 eperetirr-'rf t:r -

1f:::n =ad reld :h td;u.745 The requirements outlined in"BTP CSB l

6-4 pertain to the use of CIPSrduring normal power operation.

/CPCS During normal operation thej24-and 26-inch containment isolation valves will be-saMed closed as defined-in SRP 5.2.y N 6j l

-S:: tic: !!.'.f.

They will b; administratively controlled to l

assure tha,t they are,not,ined> Ort::tly opened exceg a.s F "'D h M

us. +echni ca l specifi catio ns.

g To relieve the initial containment pressure buildup caused by the temperature increase during reactor power ascension and to reduce l

pressure as required during other normal operating transients,.

2.

s l

the first containment isolation valve from the drywellff may be-opened under administrative control to permit the use'bf the 2-inch vent lines that bypass the second isolation valve.

nd/or 50gw5900 clum The frequency of operation of the 2 inch bypass vent paths used (p.r-to reduce containment pressure during normal plant operation will depend on operating experience at HCGS.

The operator will open the 2 inch bypass vent paths if the drywell normal operating pressure approaches the technical specification limit.

The containment isolation valves and the bypass lines are shown on Figure 6.2-29.

/CPCS The following is an evaluation of CIPS with respect to the 4

criteria specified in BTP CSB 6-4, when used during normal power l

operation.-t 51; 2 cff-excess pri=:ry-contMnment-presensed" The s

I evaluation is keyed to the Criteria of BTP CSB 6-4.

1.14.1.71.2.1 Criterion 1.a The reliability and performance capabilities of the containment isolation valves should be commensurate with the importance to safety of isolating the system penetrating the, primary containment boundary.

O 1.14-58 Amendment 8 4

q Q OB999M 94*

M

____--_________-_-___,,,.,-_.--,.--,w,--,,v.,,--..-,ey,.,.--.c---,.--,.,y-----,.

,yw

_.-,-.-,r,m,w,.r.7

--ww.ym.,,,

,..v-

- INSERT A FOR PAGE-1.14 58 The containment pre purge-cleanup system (CPCS) is designed to reduce the level of atmospheric halogen radioactivity to within I

radiological effluent technical specification limits prior-to j

- purging the primary containment.

i 4

6 t

i e

i i

1 i

a j

i

,__,,.,-....,_._-,--.,,4

.__.._m,--,,,

' INSERT A FOR PAGE 1.14-58

. The containment pre purge cleanup system (CPCS) is designed to reduce the level of atmospheric halogen radioactivity to within radiological effluent technical specification limits prior to purging the primary containment.

l

HCGS FSAR S/83 1.14.1.71.2.1.1

Response

c, esteecs The ;rr;r ry ter raf isolation valves, bypass vent valvesand interconnecting piping are designed as ASME Section III Class 2 components.

The design criteria for these components include the pressure, temperature, flow, and other environmental conditiions-associated with closure following a DBA in the containment.

Therefcre, the HCGS design complies with this criterion.

1.14.1.71.2.2 Criterion 1.b The number of supply and exhaust lines should be limite'd to one supply line and one exhaust line to improve the reliability of i

the isolation function.

1.14.1.71.2.2.1

Response

OnIy one_ Sopplq l(ne pM"4 @x hdUUSE lin O WIII E>C 0 8h r

'forthe,rywelladanotherfs)

One by ss ven path i provid i

provi d for he supp ssion c amber.

ly the v tpathfpm the ywell ill be ened d ing powe operatio.

This f are gemen satisfi the i ent of 1

1. ting t number 9f lines pe etratin primar contai ent that xpose trye environjs' to j c ntainme atmos here.

/

oN@ fo/t i firee cW Mg f0W6( OfMcM SEM h 0F

(

o.Ir 3

h0E Sh" Ed W "

• 1.14.1.71.2.3 Criterion 1.c l

The size of the vent lines should not exceed eight inches in diameter.

1.14.1.71.2.3.1

Response, n e logi w o wn.19 5 P re* *M I" S*< #' " 1.14. l.71 2. II.1 0

-The functiensi intent of th: *-in9 li it i=; met bi using 2-inch-and;rrr. rrat lin s j usBRe.s +he oGe. of 2/a-th ch, Pu r ge suppl 3 by e.g.ha.oW line wiW he Pwge, vcdves clostnjc tuih'n 9'

deconds o f & c.

e o se f~

o f a.

LOCA.

1.14.1.71.2.4 Criterion 1.d The containment isolation provisions for the purge system lines should meet the appropriate standards of engineered safety features.

1.14-59 Amendment 1 t

=

=v' N

q g g y,

__,___..,._,,-_,_,--_.-----,_.-_______-_.__.,.,__.,___,,____,____._m,._,,_.-_._._,_,_

HCGS FSAR 07/85 1.14.1.71.2.4.1

Response

C.T PS /C F'CS The isolation provisions for the by;::: vent prth fully comply with the required standards of an engineered safety feature.

The redundant isolation valves and the bypass vent valvesare designed to Seismic Category I standards, classified as Quality Group B, protected from missiles, and are powered and actuated by diverse means, thus allowing them to accommodate a single failure.

1.14.1.71.2.5 Criterion 1.e The instrumentation and control systems provided to isolate the vent systes lines should be independent and actuated by diverse parameters.

Motive power to close the isolation valves should also be from diverse sources.

1.14.1.71.2.5.1

Response

l Crf.5 /C PCS The instrumentation and controls provided to isolate the bypsee vent path comply with the stated criterion.

l 1.14.1.71.2.6 Criterion 1.f l

The isolation valve closure times should not exceed five seconds to facilitate compliance with 10 CFR 100.

1.14.1.71.2.6.1

Response

5-includiAS The isolation ' valves' maximum closure time is f seconds, e:cluding-instrument delay time. 4he-t,yp;;: velve clerure-time-is-less --

th:

15 ::: nde.

J.1though the hyp::= velve-elosure time-exceed. -

"h; XRCs-er-iterie, the van & path deee net :llow-celeases-that --

-eaceed-th: r:diel:gie:1 li=it

.......,..., because-of--the-f-low-

-sesintanw f fceded by-the--2 4nch vent 1in:.r 1.14.1.71.2.7 Criterion 1.g Provisions should be made to ensure that isolation valve closure will not be prevented by debris which could potentially become entrained in the escaping air and steam.

1 1.14-60 Amendment 11 1

1 r

_ m _ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ _.-e.~,---

- - L

=r

- - ~.

- ~

--~

l l.

HCGS FSAR 10/83 1.14.1.71.2.7.1

Response

Mbrir protection is provided :lth;,s#. signi-fic:nt-amounts-ef-d:bri: :: ::t ticip:ted.

In ddition, any d bric th:t mighL

iet is net erp ctM te b; pr:ble=.

Th; 2 inch bypser 11==-

-ceretitute: : rejer fler rectrictien, thus making the approach vel::iti-ve 7 le= and :: king it unlikely t.t:t sny debri: = i 1 L-

~ It is also unlikely that~any debris will be thrown

( directly into the vent line opening since there is only one high

/

energy line in the immediate vicinity of the containment penetration and any postulated breaks in it will not be favorably oriented to project any debris into the ope.ning.

IDebris protection for the containment vent and purge lines is 3 discussed in Section g.2.4.3.2.1.

6 1.14.1.71.2.8 Criterion 2

=

The purge system should not be relied on for temperature and humidity control.

1.14.1.71.2.8.1

Response

The purge system and the bypass vent path are not relied on for temperature and humidity control within the containment.

The drywell coolers perform this function.

1.14.1.71.2.9 Criterion 3

. Containment atmosphere cleanup systems should be provided within containment to minimize the need for purging.

1.14.1.71.2.9.1

Response

4h pur0= =ad v-at Syst

net u: M for contairment cir-

\\.

cle nur during nere:1 p

Oper:tien_

ucqg previger ne eyet:

3 f:r th:t purper:( The containment prepurge cleanup systep(CFC5 \\

i located in the reactor building, is connected to the primary

/

(containmentasshowninFigurej6.2-29and9.4-3, and is used for i

cleanup, f ter reactor shutdown. Loca.New of ec. C PCS wifki1 %e. y/i conbiome.Mb q con %6voed is not gaufica_l A. BW R. Muk. I OyaAim 4 ne.

C.PCS will be.

lWik3 fo &c m in'i mo m time f '*j Me*nNe^nE2 ne4essq fo o.tkw Pvqi^j 1.14-61 Of f^6 o^b w% de.-inuWng c4 4e. pd.q conkinmed is pla.^ned.

_.._.._. m___m ___o

HCGS FSAR 05/85 1.14.1.71.2.10-Criterion 4 4

Provisions should be made for testing the availability of the isolation function and the leakage rate during reactor operation.

1.14.1.71.2.10.1

Response

Operation of individual actuators can be independently verified during normal operation.

Provisions have also been made to perform leakage tests in :: ;11:20: rith 10 Cm 30, J.pp:-dir 3.

" : rer, th e preritirer de ::t includ; t;; tin; during reactor operation.

1.14.1.71.2.11 Criterion 5.a An analysis of the radiological consequences of a LOCA should be l

performed.

Radiological consequences should be within 10 CFR 100 limits.

=

t d

h 1.14.1.71'.2.11.1

Response

C.IPS/C.FGS An analysis of the radiological consequences, associated with a e

LOCA occurring while operating the bygre

t 11=

has been

(

performed.

The resultant site boundary dose to the thyroid,

( which is the most limiting dose due to the bygre vent lin: Porge. duc.t alone, isW.4 : ; 0^

rem.

This dose is a very small fraction of l

d the 10 CFR 100 guideline value of 300 rem - thyroid.

The 1

resultant dose is based on the realistic release assumptions d

given in BTPCSB 6-4 (SRP 6.2.4) for showing acceptable purge valve closure times.

The analysis ::: ervatively--assumes that 3

-both the drywell : d : ;;ree:ien th--'er bypare ventpalves are go g e. g I

open when the LOCA occurs u -It 2100 2 ::::: : fa-Hue: Of the--

g 9g-i

-int::rd i:Olitien velve: ';;; 1 cle in; ti== 5--s : cad ),- thp

1. gA cle;;;

ef the 2-inch t,yp;;; :: t. valve e RMn--29--:::: d=,

that--

-thes-ler e =re vaM 1 tar =d, sMd that serie flows-::: generated--

l ty the beildup Of pr ::::: in th: :::ta+ ::sts l

-Th: 2-inch by; :: v t v:ler: tre air :; rsted velv : th:t ci;;;^.--

-in le;; th:2 ?5 e:crie_

The deze r--elt; di: cure:d b;re ar W th;;;f;;; :en;;;veti.o*

1.14.1.71.2.12 Criterion 5.b Protection of safety related equipment downstream of the vent-path isolation valves shall be provided to prevent the effects of l

a LOCA from adversely affecting their ability to function.

4 l

1.14-62 Amendment 10 t

INSERT C FOR PAGE 1.14-62 These valves take 5 seconds to close following a LOCA, (including instrument delay time), and the releases are assumed unfiltered.

This analysis bounds the case of a LOCA occuring when the 2-inch bypass vent valves are open and the outboard isolation valves are closed.- The total mass released is 1694 pounds.

r t

..m.

HCGS FSAR 10/84 1.14.1.71.2.12.1

Response

id6ERJ D

ard isolation valve /o a 32-inch, purge duc/}1

'The 2-ifich bypads vent ine discpdrges int t

downst' ream ofjthe out The pupge duct in turn / exhausts into t reactoy' building pentilation system

'(RSVS).

The large pressure, drop across'the 2-inch line wi1Ynot pyrmit sufficient,Wass f1ps to cause, the loss 'of function /6f any safety slatedfans, filters,orductwork,,1ocateddowngreamof the by ss valvp.

/

/

1.14.1.71.2.13 Criterion 5.c

(

The affects on ECCS of a loss of containment atmosphere through the containment purge during a LOCA should be analyzed.

1.14.1.71.2.13.1

Response

=

There will be no significant reduction in containment pressure resulting from the blowdown.th:: ;h the by ::: ;;nt lin;#

Furthermore, this reduction would have no effect on ECCS performance, since the ECCS pumps are sized for atmospheric suction pressure.

No credit is taken for containment pressure

~

acting on the pump suction.

1.14.1.71.2.14 Criterion 5.d l

l l

The maximum allowable leak rate of the purge isolation valves shall be specified based on proper consideration of valve size, t-I allowable containment leakage, and bypass leakage limitations (if l

applicable).

{

1.14.1.71.2.14.1

Response

Leakage rates on the purge : d fert-isolation valves are based on complying with the limits established by the HCGS Technical Specifications and 10 CFR 50, Appendix J, and are periodically tested to verify their performance.

I N s E R.T E fAltpBTP,,SB bypase( vent,4alve d,oes not comply explicitly,to]

ugh e HC all crite(la, design'and operation of/this b pass Lt'ne p ets fungt'ional ntentA the epi' feria. rWhen copp ed /;

1.14-63 Amendment 8 m

. - - m

-. =

HCGS FSAR 1/85 gg g g pg]

Iwi t

est el unlik j evW of a occdrring wh le t e

t noen is ing ve t is e cluded at-an equ j

j af yd ign sists ea ontrol vent ode the gh pu

_gy em net tion.

J 1.14.1.72 Combustible Gas Control LRG I/CSB-4 t

1.14.1.72.1 Issue The proposed combustible gas control system is designed in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.44, we require the applicant to commit to the following:

1.

When the containment pressure is above 15.3 psig and the hydrogen concentration is 3.3 volume percent, the containment spray system must be actuated to reduce ths containment pressure.

2.

Following a LOCA, the recombiner system becomes an extension of the containment boundary.

We require the applicant to demonstrate the leaktight integrity of the recombiner system.

3.

Apolicants for which the recombiner system design pressure is less than the predicted containment design pressure; the applicants commit to actuate the contaic. ment spray system as listed on the individual docket 4.

Applicants agree to perf.orm system leak tests.

l 1.14.1.72.2

Response

l 1.

The HCGS FSAR Section 6.2 does not postulate containment pressure greater than 15.3 psig concurrent with hydrogen concentration greater than or equal to l

l 3.3 volume percent.

Even without containment spray, Figure 6.2-7 (Case C) shows that 15.3 psig conteinment pressure (after the initial spike) occurs at 8.33 hours3.819444e-4 days <br />0.00917 hours <br />5.456349e-5 weeks <br />1.25565e-5 months <br />.

While Figure 6.2-32 shows hydrogen concentration of 3.3 volume percent is not reached l

unt!.1 approximately 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />.

l 1

1.14-64 Amendment 9

INSERT D POR PAGE 1.14-63 The effects of a LOCA, with the purge isolation valves open, on the safety-related equipment downstream of the valves has been analyzed and evaluated.

The FRVS fan and filter units are normally isolated f rom the RBVS ducts and are not used during cleanup or purge operations.

Blowout panels have been added to the CPCS ducts before the RBVS/FRVS isolation dampers.

These blowout panels limit the pressure pulse in the ducts required for FRVS operation. ~The integrity of the FRVS ducts and equipment

-due to the resulting pressurization was verified.

The FRVS air handling units are individually isolated.from the ducts on the inlet and outlet'ing dampers at the fan / filter 1 units.

These dampers will remain closed during the pressure pulse due to a LOCA during purging.

The pressure pulse will have ended before the FRVS fans are started.

The effects of steam release during the blowdown were. also evaluated.

The evaluation verified that the steam will not adversely affect the performance of the FRVS.

i l

l I

e INSERT E FOR PAGE 1.14-63 O

1.14.1.71.3 Summary As discussed above, the HCGS purge supply and exhaust valves comply, to the maximum extent practical, with the criteria of BTP CSB 6-4.

When coupled with the extremely unlikely event of-a LOCA occurring while the drywell or suppression chamber valves are open, it is concluded that an adequate safety design exists for limited operation of the CIPS/CPCS

'during modes other than cold shutdown or refueling.

O l

l 4

i l

l i

a-

m NCGS TSAR 1/86 j

TABLE 3. 6-5 Page 1 ot 2 PRESSURE-TEMPERATURE TRANSIENT ANALYSIS RESULTS FOR HIGR ENERGY PIPE BREAKS OUTSIDE PRIMARY CONTAIPMENT Calculated Peak Ir.itial Conditioa &)(1)

Temper-Relative Pressure ature Temp.

Hamid 4

gaae Break Room Psh

• F.

(* F) _

(1) l i

1 HPCI Steam Supply 4111: HPCI Pump Rm.

-tr9-2.f 300 85 90 Line (Rm) 2 HPCI Steam Supply 4102: Tsrus Rm.

-+rt I 9 904383 90 90 l

Line (Chase) 4327: HPCI Pipe Chase 3.2 40430.3 75 90 l

j 4329: North Pipe Chase 4r4 l T 4043o3 90 90 4409: Steam-Vent 4r9-f.9 4043o3 90 90

')

3 RCIC Steam Supply 4110: RCIC Pump Ilm.

-++ 2.1 -304 277 8 0 90 i

Line 4

PWCU 6* Line Break 4319: <RCIC Pipe Chase

-tr1-I 7 -304 289 95 90 fI 4321: South Pipe Chase 8 r4-1.5 -29918 9 9 5 90 4402: South Pipe Chase 4r3-i.7 -399287 95 90 5

RWCU 3* Disch Line 4405: RWCU Pump Rm.

+y4-l Io 4 44 217104 50 i

Break 4403: RWCU Ptanp len.

4rt-l.b 44(r-D7104 50 I

6 d RWCU 6" Line Break 4505: South Pipe Chase Sc3-I 7 40&287 95 90 7

RWCU F/D Line Break 4502: RWCU Valve 5 2.8 215 115 50 l

Pump Rm.

8 4503: RWCU Valve &

3.7 217 120 50 Pump Rm.

187 RWCU Rz Line Break 4506: RWCU Rt Rm.

-3v4-14 -t95+*+120 50 l

1 9

1 (4" line break) l-t 10 RWCU F/D Line Break 4620: RWCU F/D Rm.

3.4 227 104 50 l

(4" line break) 4621: RWCU F/D Pm.

5.4 227 104 50 l

11 Main Steam Line 4316 MST Penetration 16.3 315 120 30 Break in the 14n.

l penetration 4518:

MST. Unit Cooler 16.3 315

'120 30 chamber of the MST 14n.

12 Mair Steam Line MST S Emergency vent 10.0 297 120 30 Break in the Stack i

Main Steam Tunr.el Amendment 14 i

9 CI,'j 2

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L/A=0.0769fFt C=0.66 C=0.60 C=0.71 g

W CU Beat ta Pipe Case EWCU Valve 6 WCU valve 6 asear km 45N.,

n 145 Ft

- Fump asse 4 Fump asese,e Ase3 a

lun!!'

P=ti548 F#

P. tim 8 re n2t!'J0,t3 s

A=410.0 t3 L/A=0.251 FC A=40.1 Ftg

.96 a.34,1 Ft2 t./A=0.05!/Fe L/A=0.055/?e R 4 CU 44o g g), Pipe Chase CU u 132 Ft V = 5.700 Ft3 u 132 Ft Y = 2.780 Ft3 (Em4402.)

V = 2.*00Pt, A=98.0 Ft' A=53.0 Ft2 L/A=0.226/Ft L/A=0.139/Ft Q

C=0.84 C=0.84 j

Atasspgerg l

V = 10 Ft Pipe Qiase h (Mi319 h

% 431? O El 102 Ft RCIC Fipe Chase RFCIFipe Chai e V = 1$000 Ft3 E1 102 Ft u 102 Ft W Anth J = 4.000 Ft J =3.700 Fe 3

3 A= 44-Pt 870II L/A-0."S :/n g.Dili/Ft C= Gree 0. 8 38 A=400.0 Ft2 A=83.0 Ft2 A=95 Fe2 80P4 W Ib PSd L/A=0.0338/Ft L/A=0.144/Ft L/A=49 5 3 2, rt 5tema Vent O i'.iph (E% 4 32 C=0.96 C.e.10 6 7 El 102 Ft.664 V = 28.500 Ft3 Pipe Chase-A=.,,,,,.$. I 3

n e

g.ggg t

L/A=0.1611/Ft

• /= C;);/=p ca+-etS'r731 0= -- W 6

U 54 Ft Torus Chamber Compartment V = 4.8x105 Fe3 BOP kP l30p I nod 21.25 psig RHR Pump am Q

?"='bH/4E4 FYP. of Internal Panels Ha Rh RFCI'Fump RCIC F

/

RIIA Fump

, s MI RM 4tll RM filO

{ *and HI 84 i

n 54 Fe(77F l

t u 54 Ft u 54 Ft n $4 Ft4 V = 37.000 Ft3 V = 35.000 Ft3 V=18.000 Ft3

[=

Ft3 A=48.4 Ft2 A=48.4 Ft2 i i7.

7d A=48.4 Ft1 L/A=80885/rt 1,4A=,HM/pt C= 8212 e 522i ht10.6Ft' HOPE CREE K N'O 33N GENER ATING STATION p

Cs o. 8197 FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT PRESSURE - TEMPERATURE TRANSIENT SCHEMATIC DIAGRAM i

FOR HPCI, RCIC AND RWCU LINE l

BREAKS OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT FIGURE 3.617 AMENDMENT 7. 08/84

)

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5.00 10.00 15.00 20.00 25.00 30.00 35.00 40.00 TIME (s')

l i

COMPARTMENT TEMPERATURE vs. TIME 320 -

l f

300 -

280-260 -

HPCI PUMP RM 4111 240-

,C 220-C i

5 l

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E TORUS 3

CHAMBER e-COMPT.

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l I

I 180 -

STEAM VENT h RM 4409 140 -

N 120 -

f 100 -

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10

10 '

10 35 L.

HO9E CREEK GENERATING STATION "L AScrf FINAL SAFETY ANALYSl5 REPORT TEMPER ATUR E TRANSIENT ANALYSIS FOR HPCI STEAM SUPPLY LINE BREAK IN THE HPCI PUMP ROOM FIGURE 3.6 21 Amendment 10,05/85

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l 300 -x N

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(

TIME (SEC)

HOPE CREEK GENERATING STATION 105fr FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT

~

I TEMPERATURE TRANSIENT ANALYSIS FOR RCIC STEAM SUPPLY LINE l

BREAK IN THE RCIC PUMP ROOM FIGURE 3.8-25 AMENOMENT 7, S/84

m u

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TIME (SEC)

(-

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HOPE CREEK NOTE:

GENERATING STATION SEE FIGURE 3.617 FOR FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT IDENTIFICATION OF NODES PRESSURE TRANSIENT ANALYSIS FOR A RWCU F/D LINE j

BREAK IN THE F/D ROOM l

FIGURE 3.6 47 AMENDMENT 7,08/84

+

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1 COMPARTMENT TEMPERATURE vs. TIME

/

240-

/

j i

h

/

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DEMINERALIZER RM 4621 MWCU FILTER f

220 -

D MINERALIZER RM 4620 3 RWCU VALVE &

PIPEWAY RM 4502 200 -

SOUTH PIPEWAY RM 4505 EL 145'

/

7 SOUTH PlPEWAY RM 4402 EL 132' l - 180 -

s.

l a-9 RCIC PIPEWAY RM 4319 3

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l 10**

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to l

f TIME (SEC) l

/

h l

HOPE CREEK GENERATING STATION FINAL SAFET f ANALYSIS REPORT I (1 SF i

~

l ;

TEMPERATURE TRANSIENT ANALYSIS N M *.

FOR THE RWCU F/D LINE BREAK SEir RGUltE 3.6-11 FOft IN.THE F/O ROOM IbalTIFicAmo# OF MODES FIGURE 3.648 AMENDMENT 7,8/84

i 8

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- - - - - - - ~

~

HCGS FSAR 10/84 1

In addition to the containment isolation for the main drywell porge vent line, there is an inlet line to the A train containment hydrogen recombiner that connects to the vent line between the primary containment and the first containment isolation valve.

This line is isolated by two motor-cperated i

gate valves.

All isolation val.ves receive a containment

~

isolation signal.

Also connected to the primary containment purge vent line is a 2-inch exhaust line that connects to the vent line between the two main isolation valves.

This line is isolated by the isolation valve on the purge line and by an air operated globe valve.

The valve is normally closed and is maintained closed by a containment isolation signal.

For a detailed evaluation of the primary containment venting operation against BTP CSB 6-4 requirements see Section 1.14.1.71.

IMSERT F

)l f During rmal operation, he 26-an 24-inch containment purge valve re seal closed xcept fo the inb rd valve o the drywe,11 purge tiet ve line (G -V034).

his 26-in valve ca l

be periodical y opened o permi venting o the prim y

coptainment o reliev pressur.

This 2 Linch valv is qualif ed l

t to close ag inst the low the gh the 2 nch valve o11owing p6stulate /LOCA.

T e 2-inch alve is so qualif ed to clo jegainst is flow.

All the 26-inch a 24-inch ontainmen 1

isolation valves ill be ynder admin trative ntrol to ssure

~~ "

that t ey canno be inad rtently o ned.

Th valve po tion indic ting lig, hts in th main cont I room w 11 be che ed per dically o verify that the s aled clo d valves emain c1 ed.

The limitin condition or openi the 24 nch and 6

inch contai ment i ation valv s will b in acco ance wi the (Technical pecific tions.

To prevent the unlikely event of a containment purge valve being prevented from closing by. debris that could be entrained in the containment purge lines, the drywell purae lines di cer::d ir.

Oectien 6.2.4.3.2.10 are provided with debri8 screens.

Debris screens are not provided for the suppression pool purge lines for the following reasons:

a.

There are no high energy lines in the suppression pool.

b.

.There is no insulation or other loose debris in the suppression pool to become entrained in exiting fluid.

The debris screens are designed based on the following criteria:

6.2-52 Amendment 8

}.....

.-,._. _.__.. -..-_ _ g -

1 l

I INSERT F-FOR PAGE 6.2-52

(

During normal operation, the 6, 24, and 26-inch containment purge valves are administratively controlled closed, except as permitted by the technical specifications.

These valves are qualified to close within 5 seconds against the flow following a postulated LOCA.

i s

(

HCGS FSAR 10/84.

6.2.4.3.2.14 Suppression Chamber To Containment Prepurge Cleanup Lines and Suppression Chamber Vacuum Relief The suppression chamber to containment prepurge cleanup lines are isolated by two redundant valves outside the primary containment.

The valves are normally closed.

To limit the possibility of an uncontrolled release of radioactivity, the valves till be ::: led aro closed during reactor operation W rill i: ferified CI;;;d.r In ocimid*aMy ;'

addition, there are connections to the containment hydrogen conbulkd recombiners between the first containment isolation valves and the primary containment.

These lines are isolated by two motor-operated gate valves.

All isolation valves receive a containment isolation signal.

% c e p 4-a s perevtR4e2 by he. techica.(

specWid,ons.

A suppression chamber vacuum breaker assembly is attached to each of the above two 24" lines.

Each assembly consists of a check-1 type vacuum relief valve and a pneumatically operated butterfly valve.

These assemblies are located outside the primary containment.

Their operation is discussed in Section 6.2.1.1.4.1.

6.2.4.3.2.15 Suppression Pool Cleanup Lines The suppression pool cleanup lines are isolated by redundant containment isolation valves that close upon a containment isolation signal.

l 6.2.4.3.2.16 Post-Accident Sampling System Lines The post-accident sampling system penetrates the primary containment in seven locations, One line is for gathering liquid samples and it forms part of the RCPB.

Two lines are sampling return lines to the suppression chamber.

The other four lines sample the primary containment atmosphere at different locations within the drywell and suppression chamber.

Isolation for these lines consists of two solenoid-operated valves in series, located outside of primary containment.

The valves are normally closed, and the penetrations are designed to be a sealed closed system.

Administrative procedures prevent the valves from being inadvertently opened by ensuring that power is not supplied to the normally deenergized solenoids until the system is required to operate.

1 2

6.2-58 Amendment 8

=

=

HCGS FSAR 8/3.:

c.

The capability for a controlled venting of the primary containment following a LOCA as a backup system to the

-containment hydrogen recombiner system.

The containment atmosphere control system (CACS) is composed of':

a.

Hydrogen / oxygen analyzer system (HOAS) l b.

Containment hydrogen recombiner system (CHRS' c.

Vacuum relief valve system (VRVS'.

d.

Containment inerting and purging system (CIPS)

The CACS interfaces with the reactor building ventilation system (RBVS), with the filtration, recirculation and ventilation system (FRVS), and with the containment prepurge cleanup system (CPCS).

6.2.5.1 Desion Bases i

The CACS is designed to the following criteria:

a.

The CACS is designed to remote-manually introduce nitrogen gas into the primary containment at a high flow rate, thereby displacing air originally in the containment volume for the purpose of reducing the oxygen concentration in the containment atmosphere to 4% by. volume in less than 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> prior to power t

operation.

~

b.

The CACS, operating through remote-manual control and in conjunction with the RBVS, is designed to provide a

~9000-cfm of filtered outdoor air purge flow to the drywell and suppression chamber to provide a safe atmosphere for personnel access.f;!!c"ing ::Id shutd:ur.

-cf th: rc::tcr; c.

The CACS is designed to control the containment pressure within the design specification limits of 22 psig and to maintain the oxygen concentration below I

g.

6.2-66 Amendment 7

HCGS FSAR 1/85 4% durii-g all normal modes of reactor operation by supplying nitrogen gas to and/or releasing gases from the primary containment in a controlled manner.

8 d.

The CACS, through the remote-manual operation of the CPCS 4er up to 30 h;;;;( and the. VS are designed to remove radioactive contaminants from all primary containment gas prior to its release to the environment.

- fter reac+ar shutd:ena-2.0 S.8 e.

Following a LOCA, the CACS is designed to continuously monitor and, if necessary, alarm upon high concentration of hydrogen or oxygen in the primary containment (

hydrogen or oxygen by volume).

The CACS is also designed to be available to monitor the hydrogen and oxygen content of the primary containment atmosphere during normal operation.

f.

The CACS is designed to recombine hydrogen and oxygen after a LOCA with sufficient capacity to prevent the accumulation of a combustible concentration of gases

()

inside the primary containment in excess of that specified in Regulatory Guide 1.7.

g.

The CACS is designed to permit, through remote-manual control, a controlled venting of the primary containment atmosphere at a low flow rate following a LOCA.

The TRVS is used in this situation to remove l

radioactive contaminants from this vented gas prior to l

its release to the environment.

h.-

The CACS is designed to automatically isolate all. lines l

that penetrate primary containment to ensure the l

integrity of the containment boundary during accident l

conditions.

The isolation valves are designed to allow remote-manual reopening by pushbutton override switches protected by guards to prevent any accidental actuation.

i.

The CACS is designed to monitor the pressure in the suppression chamber and the temperature in both the drywell and suppression chamber under post-LOCA conditions.

6.2-67 Amendment 9

HCGS FSAR 1/85 and performance data.

All safety-related portions of the CACS are environmentally qualified to normal and accident environments according to Section 3.11 requirements.

The CACS is shown schematically on Figure 6.2-29.

The system.is located within the reactor building except for the nitrogen vaporizer, which is' located in the auxiliary building; the HOAS hydrogen bottles, which are located on the reactor building roof; and the control cabinets, which are located in the auxiliary building.

6.2.5.2.1 Nitrogen Inerting ed Pug During normal power operation of the reactor, the oxygen content l

of the primary containment atmosphere is maintained at a concentration no greater than 4% by volume by the containment inerting and purge system (CIPS).

This limit is established to preclude the attainment of a combustible gas mixture inside the containment if combustible gases are released into the containment atmosphere following a postulated accident.

Oxygen monitoring during normal operation is done by analyzing grab samples taken by the plant leak detection system located in the l

reactor building and discussed in Section 11.5.2.

(

ir)

This low oxygen atmosphere is achieved by displacing air in the primary containment with nitrogen gas.

"rier t: ::::ter

p

: tienf *he nitrogen is supplied from a liquid nitrogen facility, w$ich consists of two liquid nitrogen storage tanks and l

one steam-heated water bath vaporizer.

_ c,4,gleg (low akt Gaseous nitrogen [from the discharge of the vaporizer is supplied r

to the drywell and/or the suppression chamber as-;;1ected by the operator. -The fle" r:t; of nitregen 1: centrolled te ; velse -

-thet is alsv.;1erted by the Oper:te:4' Displaced gases released from the primary containment during nitrogen inerting are processed through the HEPA filters of the RBVS exhaust system and VI monitored for radioactivity before release to the environment.

b.

The RBVS is discussed in Section 9.4.2.

M ono During the inerting operation nitrogen is supplied to the y 2

containment through the~t": RBVS supply purge penetrationg, and gases are released from the containment through-the tuexRBVS 0"O

(

exhaust purae penetrationgf$ 3 ::::e the 2e and 20-inch

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-r Stricted te==':sp vy.cstien under the:: ::ndL4tenes' During the makeup operation, nitrogen is supplied to the containmentrThe throughtheoneinchnitrogenmakeupling$.andtgasesarereleased from the containment to the RBVS exhaust system by opening the

'I inboard 26-inch,and/or 24-inch purge :nd vent-valve and the 2-EYkmast 6.2-69 Amendment 9 wxmmv-

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. The 6-inch nitrogen supply butterfly valve (HV-4978)-has been qualified _to close against the dynamic effects associated with.a LOCA.

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t valve (Reference Figure 6.2-29).

Once the 4% by volume oxygen concentration in the primary containment has been achieved, nitrogen flow is terminated and the isolation valve in the purge lin s

~

The nitrogen vaporizer receives liquid nitrogen from the offgas treatment system liquid nitrogen tanks.

Sufficient nitrogen is available to inert the primary containment one time (where inerting requires two volume changes) plus an equivalent 1/4 containment volume for makeup purposes that may be required to keep the oxygen concentration below 4% by volume during reactor operation.

The nitrogen vaporizer has the capability to provide sufficient gaseous nitrogen to satisfy the demand of the CIPS during inerting and makeup operation.

Process conditions for the vaporizer are tabulated in Table 6.2-17.

The CIPS is capable of reducing the oxygen concentration in the primary containment atmosphere to less than 4% by volume in less than 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />.

Makeup nitrogen will be supplied through the

..i nitrogen vaporizer at approximately 100 cfm during makeup and' s

2500 cfm during inerting.

Post-cccident operation is not required.

- 6.2.3.2.2 Posging f W.S The CFC5, cperating in ;;njuncti-- rith th

"""Sf is capable of purging the primary containment atmosphere 7after each react.or shutdown.

Prior to purging, the CPCS filters the containment atmosphere at a rate of 3000 cfm.

The_CPCS and RBVS are discussed in Section 9.4.2.

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• N h N The 24-and 26-inch containment vent and purge butterfly valves are ::; led closed and under administrative control during normal h.

j plant operating conditions.

DuringFpower ascension and woM cP ony descension the;26-inch inboard vent valves (1-GS-HV-4952), in conjunction with X 2-inch air-operated globe valves %4 f (1-GS-HV-4951),d s ;;rn to vent the containment as required for thermal expansion and contraction of the air volum.

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o INSERT H FOR PAGE 6.2-70 Purging is performed during periods of reactor shutdown to maintain a well-ventilatJd environment for personnel occupancy of the primary containment.

Purging may also be performed during tne operational modes of startup, power operation, and hot shutdown for the purpose of inerting, prepurge cleanup, and de-inerting the primary containment.

Purging during the latter three operational modes will be restricted as follows:

A.

Inerting will be terminated within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> after reactor thermal power exceeds 15 percent of rated thermal power following startup.

B.

De-inerting (i.e. purging) will be initiated no more than 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> prior to reducing reactor thermal power to 15 percent of rated thermal power prior to a planned reactor shutdown.

C.

The Containment Prepurge Cleanup System (CPCS) operation will be initiated no more than 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> before the start of de-erting.

The number of purge lines in use (i.e., both inboard and outboard valves open) during the operational modes of startup, power operation and hot shutdown will be limited to one supply (inlet) line and one exhaust (vent) line.

HCGS FSAR 11/85 corre ndi g out ard yent valye is I ked c1 ed, so the flop f

2-inchvalvej[sless/han choked low th ough the thro gh 1-S-HV-952 is limit d to t

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J qualified as d@ crib in Sec ions 3.V and 3 1, to lose njder DBA conditions descri ed abov6f 6.f.6.2.2 (De.leM. CombMecl tdiO b 2 6 2. b 6.2.5.2.3 Containment Pressure Control-Normal Operation The CIPS controls thermal expansion of the containment atmosphere resulting from normal operating transients through the operation j

from the main control room of the inboard RBVS purge exhaust isolation valve at the drywell-nd/or ::ppre icr.-charber-and the 2-inch bypass valve around the outboard isolation valve.

Flow is directed to the RBV3 exhaust ductwork.

The VRVS limits pressure differentials between the suppression chamber and drywell.

Eight 24-inch vacuum relief valves are sized to prevent the drywell pressure from falling 2.5 psid below the suppression chamber pressure.

The VRVS vacuum valves are

~ t' fully open when the drywell pressure falls below that of the suppression chamber by 0.25 psid.

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Page 33 of 33 _ HCGS - FSAR TABLE 6.2-16 (Cont'd) (9) Post-Accident valve position (open or closed) is the position during the initial 10 minutes after an accident. (10) Shutdown valve position (open or closed) is the position beyond the initial 10 minutes after an accident. (11) The ESF System designation is applied to primary containment penetrations that are a part of an ESF System and where that part of the system provides f or aids a function that is characteristic of an ESF System. Although re-activity control systems are not usually characterized as being ESF Systems, J' in this table reactivity control system penetrations are given the ESF system designation. (12) Manual indicates remote manual initiation of valve closure from the main control room. (13) The secondary mode of operation is AC motor. (14) Operation is by local manual, hand wheel. (15) Deleted l (16) The valve actuator is only used to exercise the valve disk during testing. (17) This is a spring loaded piston-actuated check valve. When the valve operator is in the open position, it will not resist valve closure.. In this position the valve will function much like a simple check valve. In the de-energized position, the spring-loaded piston will assist in closing the valve. However, it will not close the valve against flow from the normal direction. (18) The isolation signals for his valve are generated to provide proper system alignnient for ECCS injection. By assuming the ECCS injection position, the valves also provide a containment isolation function. (19) % closq -h-es for 1ke Gllad.g vcJes ik cl A wh-e# 4s-voo9, Es-voze, 4 s vou,4s-Von, 45 v oz3, de% 6e.s 64-vo24, Gs vo26, Ss vo17, s 5 von i i i i T1002775 Amendment 14, 01/86

i HCGS FSAR 5~ 9.4.2.2.2 Containment Prepurge Cleanup System B 9.fter the reacter is shut der, and Mefore the drywell and torus are purged by the RBVS, the drywell and torus atmosphere is first recirculated f;r p i: 2ppre i :tely 30 h:::: by the containment prepurge cleanup system (CPCS)gto reduce the level of atmospheric radioactivity to within radiological effluent technical 7 as ec40ered specification limits.cf 10 CT." 20J This system is located inside the reactor building, connected in parallel with the RBVS ductwork, and consists of supply and return air isolation dampers, low efficiency filters, electric heating coil, HEPA filters, charcoal filters, high efficiency filters, and a centrifugal fan with modulating discharge damper. After the prepurge cleanup process, the RBVS provides supply and exhaust air to and from the drywell and torus for purge purposes. 9.4.2.2.3 Equipment Area Cooling System Each EACS unit cooler recirculates and cools within its respective ECCS compartment and is capable of removing the total compartment heat load. Two 100%-capacity coolers are provided s

l y per compartment.

Each unit consists of a cabinet with a cooling coil and a direct-drive vaneaxial fan. The unit coolers are mounted adjacent to the pumps they serve. 9.4.2.2.4 Steam Tunnel Cooling System The steam tunnel cooling system (STCS) provides supplementary cooling for the main steam pipe tunnel during normal plant operation. This system is located above the main steam pipe tunnel and consistn of one full-capacity unit cooler provided with two redundant vaneaxial fans, two redundant chilled water cooling coils, and associated controls and instrumentation. The primary ventilation and cooling is provided by RBVS supply and exhaust. 9.4.2.2.5 Electric Unit Heaters At grade elevation and above, supplementary heating is provided by electric unit heaters that are controlled by individual local thermostats. O 9.4-23

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l HCGS FSAF. 8/B' 9.4.2.2.6 Normal System Operation During normal plant operation, the reactor building HVAC cystems maintain the design air quality temperatures and pressure in the reactor building and is started locally. The RBVS provides-c constant flow rate of outdoor air to and from all levels in the reactor building. Inlet vanes at the supply fans are modulated by flow controlle;s to maintain a constant flow rate less than exhaust to achieve a negative pressure in the reactor building. The supply syster for the RBVS is provided with two air temperature controllers (one for heating and one for cooling) tc control the temperature of the air leaving the fans at 600? during summer and 400F during winter. Chilled water flow throug; the cooling coils is modulated by three-way mixing valves. Tne cooling coils are used only during high outside air temperature. The chilled water cooling coils are protected from freezing by c low temperature switch mounted downstream of the steam coil. The electric duct heaters are energized by room temperature indicating controllers, to reheat the supply air, as required to maintain the HPCI pump room and RCIC pump room at 600F, and the standby liquid control room at 700F. Two of three 50%-capacity fans of the supply and exhaust systems for the RBVS operate during normal plant operation. When low flow is detected at an operating fan, the respective standby fan starts automatically. Upon failure of a fan or any of its dampers, the design air flow pattern is not affected. The standby supply and exhaust fans also operate during refueling operations and manual duct dampers are repositioned to provide a greater ventilation rate to the refueling floor. If the RBVS exhaust f ils to establish airflow, an automatic lockout of the RBVS supply results. Ogglge (;[hygd %e. REVS ponjes &c. conMnmm+ abes phue. Af ter rc:ctor chutdcr74 the containmentV s cleaned +qr by the CPCS3

nd ther purgri at a rate of 9000 cfm. -The purge air is supplied frc-the supply syrter of the REV5e'y The purge exhaust air is filtered through the exhaust system HEPA filters of the RBVS and directed to the plant vent.

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con 4dmment The RBVS exhaust ducts and exhaust plant vent are equipped with a radiation sampler. A high radiation level in the exhaust plant 9.4-24 Amrndment 7

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? VENT / PURGE VALVES - ORIENTATION PIPE DIAMETERS DISK DISK VALVE NO. FROM ELBOW ORIENTATION ROTATION TO VALVE (1) (2) 1-GS-HV-4978 > 5 AWAY AIDS 1-GS-HV-4964 < 5 AWAY AIDS l-GS-HV-4958 < 5 AWAY HINDERS (3) 1-GS-HV-4952 NO ELBOW TOWARDS N/A l-GS-HV-4956 <.5 AWAY AIDS NOTES: (1) Disk position is the orientation of the flat side of the valve disk relative to the source of the post-LOCA flow 1.e., - Towards: Flat side of valve disk is oriented towards the source of post-accident flow (i.e. towards containment). (2) Disk rotation is the relative effect of the post-LOCA flow upon the closure of the valve i.e., - Aids: Post-LOCA flow aids the closure of the valve. (4) (3) Valve 1-GS-HV-4958 sees LOCA pressure associated with the wet well (29.1 PSIA). (4) Aiding and hindering of valve closure due to the elbow is a result of the net effect of flow velosity increases at the upstream side of the valves. l f l

OVERSIZE DOCUMENT PAGE PULLED i SEE APERTURE CARDS NUMBER OF OVERSIZE PAGES FILMED ON APERTURE CARDS A l l APERTURE CARD /HARD COPY AVAILABLE FROM RECORD SERVICES BRANCH,TIDC FTS 492-8989

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