ML20214F138
| ML20214F138 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | South Texas  |
| Issue date: | 05/08/1987 |
| From: | Bundy H, Carpenter D, Constable G, Cummins J, Kelley D, Reis T NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20214F006 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-498-87-03, 50-498-87-3, 50-499-87-03, 50-499-87-3, IEB-74-07, IEB-74-7, IEB-77-08, IEB-77-13, IEB-77-8, IEB-78-07, IEB-78-7, IEB-80-10, IEB-80-12, NUDOCS 8705220427 | |
| Download: ML20214F138 (13) | |
See also: IR 05000498/1987003
Text
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APPENDIX B
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION IV
NRC Inspection Report:
50-498/87-03
Construction Permits:
CPPR-128
50-499/87-03
CPPR-129
Dockets:
50-498
Expiration Date:
December 1987 and
50-499
December 1989
Licensee:
Houston Lighting & Power Company (HL&P)
P. O. Box 1700
Houston, Texas 77001
Facility Name:
South Texas Project, Units 1 and 2 (STP)
Inspection At:
Inspection Conducted:
January 3 through March 8, 1987
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Inspectors:
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. R. Carpenter, Senior Resident Inspector
Date
Project Section C, Reactor Projects Branch
(Y0
T. Reis, Resident Inspector, Project
Dhte
Section C, Reactor Projects Branch
Y
5/7/S1
H. F. Bundy, Project liispector, Project
Date
Section C, Reactor Projects Branch
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f7
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pProjectSectionB,ReactorProjectsBranch
. E. Cummins, Senior Resident Inspector
Date'
8705220427 e7051s
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DR
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ADOCK 0500049G
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2
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/[T. L. Kelley, Senior Resident Inspector-
D(te '
r J:omanche Peak Task Group
Other NRC
Personnel:
J. F. Lara, C0-0P Student
Approved:
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G. L. Can' stable, Chief, Project Section C
Ddte'
Reactor Projects Branch
Inspection Summary
Inspection Conducted January 3 through March 8,1987, (Report 50-498/87-03;
50-499/87-03)
Areas Inspected:
Routine, unannounced inspection including' licensee action on
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previous inspection findings, new fuel receipt, IE bulletins and circulars,
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review of Unit 1 proof and review draf t of Technical Specifications,
preoperational test witnessing, training review - general employee
training (GET), preoperational test procedure review, and! site tours.
Results: - Within the areas, inspected, one violation of: NRC. requirements was
identified (failure to follow procedures, paragraph 3).
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DETAILS
1.
Persons Contacted
Principal Licensee Employees
- W. H. Kinsey, Plant Manager
- J. T. Westermeier, Project Manager
- M. R. Wisenberg, Deputy Project Manager
- S. M.^ Dew, Deputy Project Manager
- R. J. Daly, Startup Manager
- J. E. Geiger, Nuclear Assurance Manager
T. J. Jordan, Project Quality Assurance Manager
- D. W. Bohner, Operations Quality Assurance
- A. C. McIntyre, Project Engineer
- M. A. McBurnett, Supervising Engineer, Site Licensing
- S. M. Head, Lead Engineer Site Licensing
- S. D. Phillips, Licensing
G. Ondriska, Lead Engineer, Startup
R. Penn, Startup Engineer
- C. A. Ayala, Licensing Engineer
Bechtel Power Corporation (Bechtel)
L. E. Davis, Construction Manager
- L. W. Hurst, Quality Assurance Manager
- R. H. Medina, Quality Assurance
- W. P. Murphy, Project Services Superintendent
Ebasco Services Inc. (Ebasco)
- A. W. Cutrona, Quality Assurance Manager
- R. M. Bedford, Construction Services Superintendent
In addition to the above, the NRC inspector also held discussions with
various licensee, AE, Constructor, and other contractor personnel during
this inspection.
- Denotes those individuals attending one or more of the exits interviews
conducted on February 6 and March 10, 1987.
2.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings
(Closed) Open Item 498;499/8704-01 Access Control System
This open item concerned the inordinate number of people on the fuel
handling building (FHB) access list just prior to receiving the first
shipment of new fuel. The licensee agreed that the number of people on
the access far exceeded the number of people that had routine jobs to
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perform in the FHB. The licensee revised the access system to allow for
authorization for a limited amount of time to those people that.had a
short term assignment in the FHB. The unescorted regular access list was
reduced to a minimum number of people which primarily included operations .
crews, security, some maintenance staff and management. -The NRC inspector
reviewed the new access control procedures and the list of those on the
regular access list and found it to be acceptable for the_ receipt of new
fuel.
(Closed) Open Item 498;499/8704-03 Comunication
This open item concerns the ability to communicate by radio.between the
various security patrols, FHB access control points and main security
office. The licensee was experiencing dead zones in this communication
network. The problems were resolved and the NRC inspector witnessed a
test of all the radio comunications to, from and within the FHB. This
test included a response by the shift security coordinator to the FHB
cccess control point. During this inspection, it was noted by the NRC
inspector that shift relief took place on station and that all the radio
battery chargers were located in the main security office (away from the
FHB). This could_ lead to loss of field radio communication due to dead
batteries. This item was discussed with the licensee and one battery
charger (for eight batteries) and spare batteries were relocated to the
FHB main access control point; ,The above activities were witnessed by the
NRC inspector and are satisfactory for the receipt of new fuel.
(Closed) Open Item 498;499/8633-02 Hot Functional Preoperational Test
This open item concerns the incorporat! ion or resolution of NRC review
coments to Preoperational: Test 1-RC-P-02, hot' functional test (HFT). The
licensee has revised and reissued the HFT test with the resolution of all.
NRC provided comments.
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(Closed) Deviation 498/8633-01- Preoperatio'nal Test Procedure - HFT
This deviation concerned the timely availability of'preoperational test
procedures to the NRC for review as required-by Section 14.2.11.5 of the
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Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR). The comitment was "approximately
60 days." The HFT preoperational test (1-RC-P-02) was available 56 days
before the test which is within "approximately." However, the HFT
procedure was primarily a parent document that leads the licensee through
22 other subordinate tests. Within two weeks of starting the HFT, five of
these 22 subordinate tests had not been issued. Additionally, the HFT
makes use of 86 modified plant operating procedures which were not
available in this_ modified form. The NRC inspector considered this a
deviation from their FSAR comitment.
The licensee responded by expediting the generation of the required tests
and procedures in time to allow the NRC inspectors time to complete this
review. This was_ accomplished by reviewing the tests and procedures in
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the order identified in the HFT. The NRC' inspectors did complete their
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reviews and the licensee has a clear understanding of the commitment under
Section 14.2.11.5 of the FSAR. This deviation is considered closed.
3.-
New Fuel Receipt
The first shipment of new fuel ' arrived at the STP at 2:00 a.m (CST)
January 28,1987. There were four containers, two assemblies per
container for a total of eight assemblies. Health ~ Physics (HP) and
security. preparation and inspections were meticulous. The truck was
secured in the FHB by 5:00 a.m. on January 28, 1987. The_NRC inspectors
' observed the fuel receipt activities . including a review of the material
license and shipping and inspection' records. The assemblies were removed
from the canisters and placed in the new fuel storage racks. The NRC
inspector observed various portions of this activity including HP controls
and activities, security access control and use of procedures during this
evolution. The NRC inspector performed an independent radiation survey
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and container integrity examination. The results of these examinations
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were negative.
Fuel receipt continued during this inspection period at the rate of one -
shipment per week _for the first two weeks and two shipments per week
thereafter. The NRC inspectors have witnessed selected activities of most
fuel receipts (fuel receipt being from the time arrived on site until
placement in storage racks).
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On February 18, 1987, the NRC inspector witnessed the inspection of two
fuel assemblies as performed by Nuclear Plant Operations Department -(NP0D)
personnel and Operations Quality Control (QC) inspectors. The two fuel
assemblies inspected were:
Container
Assembly
ANSI No.
l
004
C50
LM0K4L
004
C38
LM0K4X
Prior to i;he inspection, the NRC inspector reviewed PGP OPGP03-ZL-0002,
Revision 4, "New Fuel Receipt, Inspection and Storage," which defines
requirements and inspection attributes for the receipt, inspection and
storage of fuel containers and assemblies; The procedure also defines the
responsibilities of the Technical Support Division, Health and Safety
Services Division', Reactor Operations-Division, and Maintenance Division
personnel during fuel' shipment inspections.
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During the fuel -inspection, the NRC inspector noted that the latest
revision of the approved inspection procedure was in use by inspection
personnel. Radiation Work Permit 87-1-0036-A, which defines the type of
radiation work, was also in use as required by procedures. Observations
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and conversations with the inspection personnel-indicated that they were
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familiar with the procedure and its requirements.
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The NRC inspector noted discrepanciesLin documentation during review of .
fuel assembly data. sheets. For each.of the two: fuel assemblies inspected,.
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there was a discrepancy in the. recording of contamination survey results.--
' Step 8.4 of the inspection procedure requires;that a contamination survey
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. of.each fuel assembly be perfonned.
If,the removable alpha contamination-
exceeds 20 dpm, the fuel assembly must be isolated.and precautionary
measures taken. , Review of data sheets ' indicated recordings'of less than'
50 dpm, which could exceed the limit of 20 dpm, yet no precautionary;
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measures were taken as required by procedure. Conversations with licensee
personnel revealed that the alpha contamination results were inaccurately
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recorded. The contamination results were less than-20 dpm but recorded as
less than 50 dpm which exceeds.the procedural limit. (Review of the 32 '
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previous fuel assembly data sheets revealed that one other contamination.
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survey result was inaccurately recorded.
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' Further review by the-NRC inspector indicated inconsistencies-in recording
. of the drag-load forces for particular fuel assembly inserts. Some_ data'
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sheet recordings consisted of the insert weight plus. the' drag-force of the
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insert, while other consisted of the drag-force only. ;This inconsistency,
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along with inaccurate contamination recordings. indicates that personnel
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may not have been completely familiar with procedural-requirements.
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The above inaccurate alpha contamination recordings are a. result of
failing to properly follow procedures-in the recording of the correct
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alpha contamination and constitutes an apparent violation of the
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requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B Criterion V which requires
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adherence to procedures.
(Violation 498/8703-01)
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No additional violations or deviations were iduntified.
4.
IE Bulletins (IEB) and IE Circulars (IEC)'
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(Closed) IEB 77-08
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" Assurance of Safety and Safeguards During An Emergency _- Locking System."'
This bulletin deals with the locking systems and how plant ingress and
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egress is controlled during off-normal' conditions.. The. specific concerns
of the bulletin were addressed in the South Texas Project Electric
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Generating Station Physical Security Plant (STP-PSP), Amendment 6, dated
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February 1987. The STP-PSP provides information on power supplies for the
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plant security system. The STP-PSP provides details of, perfonnance and'
operability testing of the security' system.
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Approved Procedure OPG-P-03-ZS-0005, Sections 4.3 and.4.7.4 discuss
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control of and use of emergency access keys. .A review of_these sections
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indicates that-the licensee has provided a means for unimpeded access
through security controlled doors during emergencies.
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The Physical Security Plan provides for the suspension of safeguards-
measures in an emergency in accordance witn p6ragraphs 50.54(x) and (y)'of
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10 CFR Part 50. This provision will accommodate the potential _need for-
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rapid response to emergency conditions.
Emergency Plan Implementing
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. Procedures address suspension of safeguards measures during emergencies.'
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The NRC inspector has reviewed both the STP-PSP and referenced procedure
and has determined the licensee's actions acceptable.
(Closed) IEC 77-13
" Reactor Safety Signals Negated During Testing." This circular pertains
to a potential industry problem with a lack of management control of ~
equipment status and improper attention of plant personnel to plant
procedures. The concerns of this circular are adequately addressed in
licensee approved procedures. The following procedures were revi,ewed by
the NRC inspector for closure of the circular:
STPEGS Plant Procedure OPGP03-ZA-0010, Revision 2, " Plant Procedures
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Compliance, Implementation, and Review," requires that plant
procedures be strictly adhered to when performing plant activities.
STPEGS Plant Procedure OPGP03-Z0-0001, Revision 2, " Equipment
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Clearance," requires unit / shift supervisor approval of equipment
clearances for safety-related equipment.
STPEGS Plant Procedure OPGP03-ZE-0004, Revision 2, " Plant
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Surveillance Program," requires shift supervisor permission prior to
commencement of safety-related component or system surveillance
tests.
(Closed) IEB 74-07
" Personnel Overexposure - Irradiation Facility." This bulletin described
an event at an irradiation facility in which an experienced operator
received an overexposure from entering an area with a source in the
unshielded position. Action one required by the bulletin is not
applicable to STP.
In lieu of control devices and interlocking alarms,
the licensee utilizes the barricades method, permissible by
10 CFR 20.203(c)5. Action two required by this bulletin is
administratively controlled.
PGP OPGP03-ZR-001 through -009 constitutes
that control and complies with 10 CFR 20. Special training required by
action three has been verified complete. The licensee's actions
adequately address the bulletin's concerns.
(Closed) IEB 78-07
" Protection Afforded by Air-Line Respirators and Supplied-Air Hoods."
This bulletin recommends that licensees address listed items with respect
to their respiratory protection programs. The licensee has adequately
addressed the bulletin in its FSAR, Section 12.5.3.5.
(Closed) IEB 80-10
" Contamination of Nonradioactive System and Resulting Potential For
Unmonitored, Uncontrolled Release of Radioactivity to Environment." This
bulletin described an unmonitored, uncontrolled release of radioactivity
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'to the environment from a nuclear faci 11ty.1 Though no-action was required-
~ of. construction permit holders, the~ licensee. adequately reviewed the
'bulletinifor information,' reviewed their nonradioactive systems'which.
. interface with radioactive systems and revised their radioactive' sampling-
schedule to 'more'readily . identify cross contamination iffit should occur.
- The NRC ins'pector reviewed the licensee's actions and finds them-
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acceptable.'
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-(Closed)-IEB 80-12
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_" Decay Heat Removal System Operability." This bulletin was issued to.
improve plant safety by reducing'the' likelihood of losing residual-heat
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removal (RHR) system operability. .Unlike Davis.Besse, STP does_not use
their_ RHR pumps .for~ low pressure safety injection pumps. Other valve
alignment and control functions'also reduce-the likelihood of a~similar.
scenario at STP.- The following' procedures.have been_ written to include
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provisions for safeguarding against loss of redundancy and diversity of
decay heat removal:
1 POP 02-RH-0001,' Residual Heat Removal
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1 POP 03-ZG-0001, Plant Heatup - 340*F.to No Load.Tavg.
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IPOP03-ZG-0007, Plant Cooldown -'No Load Tavg to.120*F'
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Additionally,1 POP 04-RH-0001, " Loss of RHR," has been written to include
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provisions for responding to. loss of RHR' events including responses when
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maintenance or refueling activities degrade the RHR capability. _The NRC.
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inspector has reviewed the licensee's. activities _and documents dealing
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with this bulletin'and determined they are acceptable.
No violations or deviations were identified.
5.
Review of Unit 1 Proof and Review Draft of Technical Specifications =(TS).
This team inspection occurred at the STP on the proof _and review draft of-
Unit 1 Technical Specifications (TS) issued February 12, 1987. ;The;
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purpose of this review was to verify that the TS were clear:and-
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enforceable and that they reflected the installed (as-built) referenced ^
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systems. This team inspection. effort was-not completed during this-
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inspection period.
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The review consisted of one or more of the following activities being-
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performed to verify the adequacy of each TS reviewed:
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Verified that numerical values of set-points,Loperating criteria.and
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equipment operating parameters agreed with FSAR-value.
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Compared the TS to those for other recently licensed Westinghouse PWR
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Plants (Wolf Creek and Byron) and to NUREG-0452,. Revision 5,-
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" Standard Technical Specifications for. Westinghouse PWR."~
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Walked down selected system components to. verify that the as.-built ^
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system component configurations agreed with'the system components
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referenced in'the TS.
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c At the time of this inspection, the STPITS3urveillance procedures may not'
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hav'e reflected the. proof. and review versiontof theLTS, since'they had not :
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been updated during the ~ developmental stages of the'TS. ,Therefore -during '
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this inspection, the STP.TS surveillance-procedures.were.not reviewed to,
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' verify that they would adequately perfonn the surveillances as delineated
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in the PRTS. . The TS . surveillance procedures will be' reviewed at- a later-
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date. The. applicant. stated-that adstatus'of the'TS surveillance
procedures would be provided to'the NRC around March 15, 1987..
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At the time of this reviewf Nuclear Reactor'Regulatifon-(NRR)~ staff reviews
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of-a number of- applicant requested changes to the STP TS had not been
completed. Therefore. review of theselitems was deferred pending
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completion of the NRR review. Applicants. letter' numbers requesting
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changes are: ST-HL-AE-1802, dated February 24, 1987; ST-HL-AE-1862, dated-
January 27, 1987; ST-HL-AE-1882, dated January;13, .1987; ~ ST-HL-AE-18,
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dated January 13,1987; ST-HL-AE-1867 -dated January 7,1987;
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ST-HL-AE-1897,- dated ' January 28, 1987; ST-HL-AE-1901, dated February 2,
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1987;- ST-HL-AE-1930, dated February 24, 1987..
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Results of the review by Region IV were' transmitted to NRR under separate
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cover. No major items of concern were identified.
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No violations .or deviations were identified.
6.
Preoperational Test Witnessing
a.
HFT
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(1) During this inspection period, seven weeks of HFT were monitored-
by the NRC inspectors.' The HFT preoperational test (1-RC-P-02)
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is a guide that. controls the conducting of 19 other
preoperational tests:and three acceptance, tests. The-testing
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activities were inspected for compliance with Regulatory
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Guide 1.68, system specific Regulatory Guide, Chapter 14 of the
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STP' FSAR, approved plant and test. procedures' and the Startup
Manual. Testing activities were appropriately conducted .with
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minor deviations and inspector observations being addressed in a
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timely manner. Those tests that were monitored by the_NRC
' inspectors under the HFT were:
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1-RC-P-02,ReactorCoolant' System (RCS)HFT
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1-AF-P-02, Terry Turbine Test -
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1-AF-P-03, Auxiliary Feedwater Water Hammer Test
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~ 1-CV-P-02, Chemical._ Volume Control System (CVCS) Hot
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Preoperational Test
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11-CV-P-04,:CVCS Boron Thermal Regeneration Test-.
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-1-HZ-P-03, Containment Building Temperature Survey.
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1-HZ-P-04, Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) Pump Room'
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. Temperature Survey.
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1-HZ-P-OS, Miscellaneous Area Temperature Surveys
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1-MS-P.-01, Main Ste'am - HFT-
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' 1-NI-P-01, Nuclear. Instrumentation:-
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Plateaus / Alarms / Interlocks
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1-PS-P-01, Primary Process' Sampling System .
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1-RC-P-06, RCS/ Balance of Plant (B0P)/ Essential- Core
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Cooling System (ECCW) Vibration Test.
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1-RC-P-07, RCS/ BOP /ECCS Thermal Expansion Test.
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- 1-RC-P-08,TransientVibrationLTest
1-RC-P-10, Remote Shutdown:
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1-RC-P-11, Pressurizer Level and -Pressure Control . Test--
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l1-RC-P-12, Reactor Coolant Resistance Temperature
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Detector (RTD) Cross Calibration--
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1-RH-P-04,.RHR Thermal Performance
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1-RS-P-02, Rod Control'
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1-SB-P-01, Steam' Generator Blowdown and Miscellaneous Valve
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Testing
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1-SI-P-03, Safety. Injection Check Valves / Accumulator .
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Discharge Test.'
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1-SS-A-01r Secondary Plant Sampling System Acceptance Test
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1-MT-A-01, Main Turbine Roll Acceptance _ Test
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.(2) HFT Observation-
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During an. evaluation of HFT requiring steamige~nerator blowdown,.
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the inspector,noted a' condition which was confusing to reactor 1
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operators. The-flash tanks were not available and blowdown was
going to.be directed to Condenser 13. The inspector observed
. Condenser 11 vacuum pressure gage was r.ot operational.
Additionally, operators explained to the inspector that the
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analog _ readouts were _in absolute pressure in lieu of gage
pressure and are not designated as either. Both the inspector
and several operators interviewed found the situation confusing-
primarily because it is inconsistent with the rest of the
control room pressure instrumentation.
Several problems were identified with the reactor coolant
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pumps (RCPs)' during HFT. These problems are being tracked by
the licensee under the 10 CFR 50.55(e) or incident review
committee (IRC) program and will'be closed out via the normal.
NRC closure. On January 20,1987,, RCP 1C experienced a breaker -
failure caused by improper racking in-of an intermediate pump
breaker. On January 21, 1987, RGP IC experienced a seal
leak-off problem. On January 25, 1987, Cold Leg RTD, TE-461,
Was identified as having a leak around the seal weld between the
pipe boss and the RTD thennowell. This incident required
stopping the HFT, depressurizing and draining the RCS. Fifteen
other- RTDs were checked and causes of the leaks were identified
as improper installation of "6" rings in the pipe bosses and
faulty. seal welds. Repairs whm ' satisfactorily completed. On
February 6,1987, RCP ID experienced a ground due to loose wire
at the pump terminal. On February 14, 1987, RCP 1C experienced
a low seal flow problem.
The preceding problems were addressed by the licensee in a
timely-and appropriate manner with a minimum of test
interruption. They will be reviewed by the NRC when the
appropriate closure documentation is completed by the licensee.
b.
Other Preoperation Test Witnessing
(1) During this inspection period portions of other test witnessed
by the NRC inspectors include:
1-AF-P-01, Auxiliary Feedwater System - Motor Driven
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1-DG-P-01, Diesel Generator No.11
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1-DG-P-02, Diesel Generator No. 12
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1-HF-P-01, FHB HVAC System
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1-RS-P-01, Rod Control System
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1-CC-P-04, Component Cooling Water System Balance
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1-CS-P-03, Containment Spray, Train C
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(2) Test Observations
Several problems were encountered during the. diesel generator
testing. These problems are being tracked by the licensee under
the IRC programs for 10 CFR 50.55(e) reports and will be closed
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out via the normal NRC closure. On January 14, 1987, 16 hours1.851852e-4 days <br />0.00444 hours <br />2.645503e-5 weeks <br />6.088e-6 months <br />
into the 24-hour run on Diesel Generator No.12, No. 3 right-
push rod became stuck.
It was determined to be a failed roller
lifter. The No. 3 right head assembly was replaced, engine
repaired and returned to~ testing. On January 24, 1987, Diesel
Engine No.12 failed to start on attempt No. 9, series of 23.
The starting air filter on both starting air lines vibrated
loose and blew off. . Repair and temporary modification was
completed and the 23 start sequence was restarted. On February 25,
1987, the 24-hour run on Diesel Engine No. 11 was stopped.due to
high lube oil sump level. This was caused by a cracked injector
which allowed approximately 50 gallons of fuel oil to leak into
the lube oil sump. Testing was stopped, lube oil sumps, pumped
down, injector replaced,- engine checked, and testing resumed.
On March 2, 1987, the 24-hour run on Diesel. Engine No. 11 was
stopped due to high pressure fuel line leakage (spray at ferrule
points) between the fuel inspection pump and the injectors.
Repair was completed and testing restarted.
All of the above diesel problems were discussed with the vendor,
Cooper Energy System by the licensee and with.the NRC vendor
group by the NRC resident inspectors.
Closure of these
occurrences will be by the normal closure process.
No violations or deviation were identified.
7.
Training Review - GET
The NRC in'spector attended GET II, which provides radiological training
for the employees and made the foll_owing observations. The course
provides an adequate. refresher for experienced radiological workers. For
employees with no radiological work experience, the course was
superficial, especially in the practical factors or mock up section. The
program will,be further reviewed byL the flRC HP inspection staff.
'
No violations or deviations were identified.
8.
Preoperational Test Procedure Review
During the course of this inspection period, the inspectors reviewed
several preoperational test procedures. The procedures were reviewed for
compliance with the FSAR and Regulatory Guide -1.68.
The procedures
reviewed were:
1-PS-P-01, Primary Process Sampling System
.
1-MS-P-01, Main Steam.- HFT
.
1-AF-P-03, Auxiliar" Feedwater Water Hammer Test
.
1-RC-P-12, RC RTD (,ross Calibration
.
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'1-RC-P-07,RCS/B0P/ECCWThermallEx'pansion1 Test
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.1-CV-P-02, CVCS Hot Preoperational' Test '
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No violation or: deviations'werelidentified.-
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9.
Site Tours'
Thel NRC inspector conducted sit'e tours both independently and accompan'ied
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by license'e personnel.
These tours were made primarily to assess the-
condition lof inplace safety-related equipment, plant! status,;and to'
'
Lobserve ongoing preoperational; testing and work activities? The areas
-toured' included:
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,
,
. Unit-1
mechanical'and electrical. auxiliary building-(MEAB),freactori
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containment building'(RCB), FHB, emergency diesel' generator.
4
building (EDGB),.and the11 solation valve cubicle (IVC).
Unit 2:- MEAB, RCB,'FHB, EDGB,.and. IVC.
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Over the course of the inspection. period,' the NRC inspector noted a marked
'
improvement of general housekeeping as'more UnitL11 systems are. turned'over.
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from construction.
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No violations or deviations were identified.
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10.
Exit Interviews
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The NRC senior resident inspector met' frequently with seniorLlicensee..
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representatives to. discuss findings as they-were identified. ~-On March 8,-
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1987, the scope and findings of the: inspection ~were summarized with'those
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individuals den'oted in paragraph 1.
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