ML20213F064

Summary of Operating Reactors Events Meeting 86-36 on 861020.List of Attendees,Events Discussed,Significant Events Data Sheet,Summary of Scrams W/Complications & Status of Previous & New Assignments Encl

ML20213F064
Person / Time
Site:	Monticello, Calvert Cliffs, Dresden, Peach Bottom, Oconee, Nine Mile Point, Palo Verde, Perry, Fermi, Oyster Creek, Hope Creek, Grand Gulf, Cooper, Vermont Yankee, Clinton, Maine Yankee, Quad Cities, 05000000
Issue date:	11/10/1986
From:	Holahan G Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:	Harold Denton Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
OREM-86-036, TAC-63168, NUDOCS 8611130443
Download: ML20213F064 (24)

Text

D 10 W6 MEMORANDUM FOR: Harold R. Denton, Director Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation FROM: Gary M. Holahan, Director Operating Reactors Assessment Staff

SUMMARY

OF THE OPERATING REACTORS EVENTS

, MEETING ON OCTOBER 20, 1986 - MEETING 86-36 On October 20, 1986, an Operating Reactor Events meeting (86-36) was held to brief the Office Director, the Division Directors and their representatives on events which occurred since our last meeting on October 6,1986. The list of attendees is includeo as Enclosure 1.

The events discussed and the significant elements of these events are presented in Enclosure 2. As part of our Performance Indicators program, the significant events data sheet and the summaries of scrams wich complications not fonnally presented in the Operating Reactor Events Meeting are included in Enclosure 3.

The assignment of followup review responsibility was discussed. The assignments made during this meeting and the status of previous assignments are presented in Enclosure 4. Each assignee should review Enclosure 4 with regard to their respective' responsibilities and completion dates. Please be responsive and

. advise ORAS (D. Tarnoff, X27864) if the target completion date cannot be met.

Gary M. Holahan, Director Operating Reactors Assessment Staff

Enclosures:

As Stated cc w/ Encl.:

l See Next Page DISTRIBUTION CCentralF1Je['

NRC PDR I ORAS Rdg ORAS Members l

• PREVIOUSLY CONCURRED .a/ _3 f PWR:0 RAS

• C:PWR:0 RAS

• C:BWR:0 RAS Fr 5:0R S MJVIRGILIO l

l DTARN0FF 11 / 5/86 DTONDI 11 / 5 /86 i /1 /86 GMHOLAHAN ll/p/86 /.' Pl.gj

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/ g }y-6 nV', f 8611130443 861110 9 N DR ADOCK 0500

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• -^ ; O '998 Harold R. Denton -

2- '

cc: R. Vollmer H. Pastis J. Taylor J. Stolz R. Starostecki. (

C. Heltemes A. Thadani D. Ross M. Wegner T. Murley, Reg. I L. Kintner J. Nelson Grace, Reg. II W. Butler J. Keppler, Reg. III S. McNeil R. D. Martin, Reg. IV W. Long J. B. Martin, Reg. V D. Muller W. Kane, Reg. I S. Ebneter, Reg. I R. Walker, Reg. II C. Norelius, Reg. III E. Johnson. Reg. IV D. Kirsch, Reg. V H. Thompson F. Miraglia R. Bernero T. Speis W. Russell T. Novak F. Schroeder W. Houston B. Sheron B. Boger D. Crutchfield G. Lainas E. Rossi V. Benaroya W. Regan D. Vassallo E. Jordan J. Rosenthal R. Baer E. Weiss

, R. Hernan i S. Showe S. Rubin l G. Arlotto l

s MT .. O MF ENCLOSURE 1 LIST OF ATTENDEES OPERATING REACTORS EVENTS BRIEFING (86-36)

OCTOBER 20, 1986 NAME DIVISION NAME DIVISION D. Tondi NRR/0 RAS M. Virgilio NRR/0 RAS W. Swenson NRR/0 RAS D. Tarnoff NRR/0 RAS R. Young IE/DEPER R. Jolliffe IE/DEPER F. Cox Observer / Telecommunications M. Wegner IE W. Long NRR/BWD-2 D. Basdekas RES W. Haass IE/VPB J. Stone IE/VPB V. Benaroya NRR/PAF0 W. Regan NRR/PWR-B D. Vassallo NRR/ DBL D. Allison IE/EAB D. Muller NRR/ DBL H. Pastis PWR-B C. McCracken NRR/PWR-B E. Weiss IE/DEPER M. Clausen OCM/LZ G. Murphy ORNL/NOAC F. Rosa NRR/DPLA A. Dromerick IE/DEPER H. Bailey IE/DEPER G. Klingler IE/DI S. McNeil NRR/PWR-B D. Crutchfield NRR/PWR-B C. Miller NRR/PWR-B B. Boger NRR/DHFT M. Chiramal AE0D E. Jordan IE J. Rosenthal IE/EAB L. Kintner NRR A. Thadani NRR/PWR-B E. Rossi NRR/PWR-A G. Lainas NRR/ DBL J. Stolz NRR/PWR-B T. Novak NRR/PWR-A F. Miraglia NRR/PWR-B K. Eccleston NRR/TOSB

ENCLOSURE 2 OPERATING REACTORS EVENTS BRIEFING 86-36 0CTOBER 20, 1986 CLINTON FUEL HANDLING PROBLEMS CALVERT CLIFFS 1 & 2 CARBON MON 0XIDE INLEAKAGE INTO THE SWING EDG JACKET COOLING WATER SYSTEM OTHER EVENTS OF INTEREST OCONEE 1, 2, 8 3 POTENTIAL LOSS OF ULTIMATE HEAT SINK COOPER CRACKS IN EMERGENCY DIESEL CYLINDER HEADS HOPE CREEK LOSS OF 0FFSITE POWER TEST (UPDATE)

DRESDEN 3 REACTOR SCRAM GRAND GULF 1 LOW STANDBY SERVICE WATER FLOW

o CLINTON - FUEL HANDLING PROBLEMS OCTOBER 1986 - (M. WEGNER, IE)

PROBLEM:

WRONG ENRICHMENT BUNDLES HAVE BEEN PLACED IN CORE LOCATIONS, MISSED SUB-CRITICALITY VERIFICATION AND FUEL TRANSFER CARRIAGE FAILURE HAVE OCCURRED IN THE PERIOD OF OCTOBER 4-8, 1986, CAUSE: PERSONNEL ERRORS SIGNIFICANCE:

INADEQUATE VERIFICATION OF PROCEDURAL CHANGES CIRCUMSTANCES:

OCTOBER 4 - TWO MEDIUM ENRICHMENT BUNDLES WERE PLACED IN HIGH ENRICHMENT BUNDLE LOCATIONS FUEL LOADING SPECIFICATIONS ARE BY ENRICHMENT TYPE -

(HIGH, MEDIUM, NONE) RATHER THAN BY BUNDLE NUMBER OCTOBER 7 - THE FUEL TRANSPORT CARRIAGE FAILED TO STOP AT THE REQUIRED POSITION DURING TRANSPORT OF TWO NEW FUEL BUNDLES

- CARRIAGE TRAVELED FOUR FEET BEYOND ITS UPPER STOP

- MINOR MECHANICAL DAMAGE RENDERED THE CARRIAGE INOPERABLE UNTIL OCTOBER 9 WHILE FUEL TRANSFER CARRIAGE WAS INOPERABLE, THE LICENSEE DEVIATED FROM THE SPIRAL LOADING PATTERN OCTOBER 7 - THE LICENSEE FAILED TO CONDUCT A SUBCRITICALITY TEST FOLLOWING THE LOADING 0F BUNDLE 248.

- BUNDLES 249 AND 250 WERE LOADED BEFORE DISCOVERY OF THE OMISSION

- BUNDLES 249 AND 250 0FF-LOADED AND TEST COMPLETED OCTOBER 8 - THE LICENSEE IDENTIFIED A MEDIUM ENRICHMENT BUNDLE ABOUT TO BE PLACED IN A LOCATION FOR A HIGH ENRICHMENT BUNDLE NO ADDITIONAL PROBLEMS REPORTED SINCE BUNDLE 261 FOLLOWUP: FUEL HANDLING CONCERNS DISCUSSED WITH REGION

CALVERT CLIFFS 1 AND 2 CARBON MON 0XIDE INLEAKAGE INTO THE SWING EDG JACKET COOLING WATER SYSTEM SEPTEMBER 1985 TO OCTOBER 1986 (S. McNEIL, NRR)

PROBLEM: COMBUSTION PRODUCTS WERE FOUND TO BE LEAKING INTO THE JACKET COOLING UATER (JCW) SYSTEM 0F THE SWING DIESEL GENERATOR (EDG),

CAUSE: MECHANICAL FAILURE AND MANAGEMENT BREAKDOWN IN PROCESSING MAINTENANCE WORK ORDERS SIGNIFICANCE:

GREATLY REDUCED EDG RELIABILITY DUE TO THE JCW PRESSURE DROPS POTENTIAL FOR CATASTROPHIC FAILURE OF THE EDG POTENTIAL FOR STATION BLACK 0UT INCREASED CIRCUMSTANCES:

FAIRBANKS MORSE EDGs SEPTEMBER 1985 - BG8E IDENTIFIED C0 INLEAKAGE INTO THE JCW SYSTEM OF THE SWING EDG JANUARY 1986 - DURING THE PERFORMANCE OF MONTHLY EDG SURVEILLANCES, LARGE OUT-0F-SPEC PRESSURE DROPS IN JCW IDENTIFIED JANUARY 1986 - RI IDENTIFIES IN INSPECTION REPORT THE FAILURE OF BG8E TO RESOLVE THIS EDG DEFICIENCY (ALONG WITH A MULTITUDE OF OTHER DEFICIENCIES)

MARCH 1986 - BG8E NOTIFIES EDG SYSTEM ENGINEER TO TAKE ACTION AUGUST 1, 1986 - NRC RECEIVES EXIGENT AMENDMENT REQUEST SEPTEMBER 8, 1986 - NRR ISSUES 10-DAY LC0 FOR EDG IN0PERABILITY SEPTEMBER 19, 1986 - EDG TOTALLY INOPERABLE. BG8E SUBMITS i EMERGENCY AMENDMENT REQUEST FOR AN ADDITIONAL 10-DAY LC0 EXTENSION, JUSTIFICATION WAS THAT A PORTABLE 1000 KW EDG

WAS NOW PROVIDED ONSITE, NRR ISSUES TEMPORARY WAIVER OF LCO REQUIREMENT UNTIL SEPTEMBER 23, 1986 SEPTEMBER 23, 1986 - NRR ISSUES EMERGENCY LC0 EXTENSION r SEPTEMBER 30, 1986 - EXTENSION EXPIRES AND BG8E DECLARES l EDG OPERABLE THOUGH VENTING STILL REQUIRED TO RUN EDG l

CALVERT CLIFFS, (CON'T )

OCTOBER 1, 1986 - REGION 1 DIRECTS BG8E TO SUBMIT A JUSTIFICATION FOR CONTINUED OPERATION (JCO)

OCTOBER 2, 1986 - BG8E SUBMITS JC0 OCTOBER 3, 1986 - PUBLIC MEETING IN BETHESDA WITH BG8E AND REGION I FINDS BG8E JC0 ACCEPTABLE FOLLOWUP:

LICENSEE - COMMITTED TO THE FOLLOWING:

DEDICATE OPERATOR TO VENT EDG WHILE RUNNING MAINTAIN PORTABLE EDG ONSITE UNTIL UNIT 1 IN MODE 6 ELIMINATE INLEAKAGE PROBLEM BEFORE RESTARTING UNIT 1 MAINTAIN SOUTHERN MARYLAND ELECTRICAL COOPERATIVE AC POWER LINE OPERABLE PERFORM 4-HOUR RUNS ON OTHER 2 EDGs WITHOUT VENTING NRR - MONITOR REPAIR OF SWING EDG AND DETERMINE IF IT HAS GENERIC IMPLICATIONS REGION I - ENSURE BG8E MEETS COMMITMENTS

OTHER EVENT OF INTEREST OCONEE 1, 2, AND 3 - POTENTIAL LOSS OF ULTIMATE HEAT SINK OCTOBER 1, 1986 - (H. PASTIS, NRR)

PROBLEM: LOSS OF ULTIMATE HEAT SINK CAUSE: INADEQUATE DESIGN OF WATER SUPPLY TO THE CONDENSER, LOW PRESSURE SERVICE WATER SYSTEM (LPSW) AND STANDBY SHUTDOWN FACILITY (SSF)

SIGNIFICANCE:

COMMON MODE DEGRADATION OF SAFETY SYSTEMS CIRCUMSTANCES:

LICENSEE PERFORMED AN EMERGENCY POWER SWITCHING LOGIC TEST, AS PART OF THE OCONEE 2 STARTUP-SIPHON EFFECT TO COOL THE CONDENSER AND SUPPLY WATER TO LPSW AND SSF IS LOST LICENSEE EVALUATION INDICATES SSF DOES NOT MEET ITS ORIGINAL DESIGN BASES LICENSEE REPAIRED CONDENSER COOLING WATER FLANGES (CCW)

DEMONSTRATED OPERABILITY OF LPSW AND EMERGENCY CCW PER TS.

LICENSEE PROPOSED RESOLUTION OF SSF DEFICIENCIES PRA DID NOT ADDRESS THIS EVENT FOLLOWUP:

STAFF INSPECTION OF SSF DURING UPCOMING FIRE PROTECTION INSPECTION LICENSEE MAY REDEFINE DESIGN BASIS OF CCW SYSTEM (FROM LOOP TO LOCA)

LICENSEE WILL RE-EVALUATE LAKE KE0 WEE LEVEL FOR ULTIMATE HEAT SINK AND PROPOSE TS CHANGES AS APPROPRIATE

l l

OCONEE 1-3 STANDBY SHUTDOWN FACILITY ORIGINAL DESIGN BASIS e ACHIEVE AND MAINTAIN HOT SHUTDOWN FOR 72 HOURS FOR:

- FLOOD (TURBINE BUILDING)

- FIRE (APPENDIX R)

SECURITY THREAT e DEDICATED, INDEPENDENT OF STATION, BUNKERED, SEISMIC, SELF-POWERED, SECURE, MANUAL FACILITY 4

4

_-_..___,c

OCONEE 1-3 STANDBY SHUTDOWN FACILITY PROBLEMS e INVESTIGATION OF LOWER PRGBABILITY EVENTS THAN ORIGINALLY ASSUMED INDICATES THAT THE QUANTITY OF USABLE STORED WATER UNDERGROUND WOULD BE LESS THAN THAT REQUIRED FOR FULL 72-HOUR FUNCTION.

e LONG-TERM OPERATION OF SSF, WITH RESULTANT HEAT REJECTION TO THE STORED WATER, WOULD CAUSE TEMPERATURES IN EXCESS OF DESIGN VALUES PRIOR TO FULL 72-HOUR FUNCTION.

e ADDITIONAL MEANS NEEDED TO SUPPLY DECAY HEAT COOLERS TO ACHIEVE COLD SHUTDOWN WITHIN 72 HOURS FOR APPENDIX R EVENT.

4

%e e

OTHER EVENT OF INTEREST COOPER NUCLEAR STATION CRACKS IN EMERGENCY DIESEL CYLINDER HEADS OCTOBER 20, 1986 - (W. LONG, NRR)

PROBLEM: DURING ANNUAL INSPECTION #2 EMERGENCY DIESEL ENGINE FOUND TO HAVE CRACKS IN 12 0F 16 CYLINDER HEADS CAUSE: CRACKS ARE CAUSED BY STRESSES WHICH OCCUR DURING C00LDOWN, HEADS WERE DESIGNED FOR COMBINED NATURAL GAS AND DIESEL OIL SERVICE SIGNIFICANCE:

POTENTIAL FOR FAILURE OF THE EDG DEGRADATION OF ECCS/ESF CIRCUMSTANCES:

PLANT IN REFUELING OUTAGE COOPER-BESSEMER EDG'S UNDERG0ING ANNUAL INSPECTION WITH VENDOR ASSIST ENGINE ANALYZER INDICATES VALVE LEAKAGE PROBLEMS IN THREE CLYINDERS CYLINDER HEADS REMOVED TO LAP VALVES CRACKS FOUND CYLINDER HEADS RETURNED TO VENDOR FOR INSPECTION

- VENDOR DETERMINED 12 CRACKED, 8 REUSABLE

- 4 REQUIRE REPLACEMENT (2 LEAK, 2 HAVE MAGNETIC PARTICLE INDICATIONS)

ZION REPLACED APPROXIMATELY 100 SIMILAR CRACKED HEADS ONLY COOPER AND ZION HAVE HAD THESE CYLINDER HEADS FOLLOWUP:

REPORTABILITY UNCLEAR, LICENSEE WILL SUBMIT LER LICENSEE INTENDS TO RETURN SOME CRACKED HEADS TO SERVICE TEMPORARILY, WILL REPLACE ALL HEADS ON B fH EDGs WITH STRAIGHT DIESEL HEADS WHEN AVAILABLE IE/VPB FOLLOWING UP

OTHER EVENT OF INTEREST HOPE CREEK - LOSS OF 0FFSITE POWER TEST (UPDATE)

OCTOBER 11, 1986 (ERIC WEISS, IE)

PROBLEM: LOSS OF 0FFSITE POWER (LOOP) TEST REPEATED AFTER PROBLEMS WITH FIRST LOSS OF 0FFSITE POWER TEST CAUSE: MULTIPLE EQUIPMENT MALFUNCTIONS AND PROCEDURAL PROBLEMS WITH FIRST LOOP SIGNIFICANCE:

AIT SENT TO SITE AFTER FIRST LOOP SECOND CRITICAL LOOP WAS SUCCESSFUL CIRCUMSTANCES:

PLANT AT 20% POWER WHEN TEST BEGINS TEST WITNESSED BY REGION I TEAM-PLANT SCRAMMED NORMALLY AND NO ECCS ACTUATIONS REQUIRED NO PROBLEMS DURING LOOP CAUSED BY BAILEY LOGIC MODULES 7 SIGNIFICANT TEST OBSERVATIONS REFLECT

- DESIGN CHANGES THAT WERE IN PROGRESS BUT NOT COMPLETE,

- MAINTENANCE PROBLEMS, OR

- SYSTEM RESPONSE WAS NORMAL PLANT AT ABOUT 50% POWER FOR FURTHER TESTING REGION RELEASED PLANT FROM CONFIRMATORY ACTION LETTER FAILURE RATE OF BAILEY LOGIC MODULES - APPR0XIMATELY 5 PERCENT PER YEAR, BASED ON 9 MONTHS DATA NEW BAILEY TESTER AVAILABLE MID-NOV FOR TROUBLE SHOOTING WILL NOT REQUIRE MOVING STAPLE JUMPERS BUT WILL REQUIRE REPLACING CHIP IMPROVED TESTER WILL BE AVAILABLE IN ABOUT A YEAR LICENSEE HAS DOCUMENTED PLANS FOR TESTABILITY OF BAILEY LOGIC MODULES LICENSEE COMMITTED TO ROOT CAUSE ANALYSIS AND TRENDING PROGRAM FOR BAILEY LOGIC MODULES FOLLOWUP:

REGION I FOLLOWING LICENSEE STARTUP TEST PROGRAM AIT REPORT EXPECTED IN A FEW WEEKS

HOPE CREEK LOSS OF 0FFSITE POWER TEST 10/11/86 PRINCIPAL OBSERVATIONS OBSERVATIONS RESULTING FROM DESIGN MODS IN PROGRESS A,C,D DIESEL GENERATOR HIGH CRANKCASE PRESSURE ALARM CAME IN.

CRIDS POST TRIP LOG INITIATION FAILURE.

HIGH DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE ON SERVICE WATER BACKWASH STRAINER.

OBSERVATIONS RESULTING FROM MAINTENANCE PROBLEMS NOT PREVIOUSLY FOUND C DIESEL GENERATOR JACKET WATER LOW TEMPERATURE ALARM, EVEN THOUGH ACTUAL TEMPERATURE WAS ACCEPTABLE. (CALIBRATION PROBLEM.)

CONTROL ROOM CHILLER FAILED TO AUTO LOAD. (DEMAND CONTROLLER WAS REPLACED).

OBSERVATIONS RELATED TO EQUIPMENT THAT WORKED AS DESIGNED A, B, G, AND H MAIN TURBINE BEARING OIL LIFT PUMPS FAILED TO RESET. (PUMPS OPERATED AS DESIGNED)

HPCI HIGH LEVEL TRIP OCCURRED AFTER THE SCRAM. NO ACTUAL HPCI DEMAND.WAS REQUIRED. (AUTO START WOULD HAVE RESET AT LOW LEVEL.)

OTHER EVENT OF INTEREST DRESDEN 3 - REACTOR SCRAM OCTOBER 14, 1986 - (J. STANG, NRR)

PROBLEM: REACTOR SCRAMMED FROM 100% POWER ON A MAIN STEAM HIGH FLOW SIGNAL CAUSE: CONTRACT PERSONNEL BUMPED INSTRUMENT RACK OR SENSING LINE RESULTING IN A SPURIOUS GROUP 1 ISOLATION

, SIGNIFICANCE:

RELIEF VALVE PRESSURE SENSOR OPERATED PREMATURELY DISCUSSION:

REACTOR OPERATING AT 100% POWER' REACTOR SCRAMMED ON A MAIN STEAM HIGH FLOW SIGNAL AS A RESULT OF PERSONNEL BUMPING AN INSTRUMENT RACK FOLLOWING MSIV CLOSURE OPERATORS IMMEDIATELY MANUALLY INITIATED THE ISOLATION CONDENSER TO MITIGATE PRESSURE RISE

"3B" ELECTROMAGNETIC RELIEF VALVE (ERV) LIFTED PREMATURELY AT 1080 PSIG INSTEAD OF 1101 PSIG (TECH SPEC SETPOINT)

PROCEEDED TO COLD SHUTDOWN FOLLOWUP:

LICENSEE FOUND THE 3B ERV PRESSURE SWITCH TO HAVE DRIFTED l OUT OF CALIBRATION. LICENSEE RECALIBRATED SWITCH.

LICENSEE VERIFIED CALIBRATION OF ALL OTHER ERV PRESSURE SWITCHES REGION FOLLOWING PLANT ACTION

O OTHER EVENT OF INTEREST GRAND GULF 1 - LOW STANDBY SERVICE WATER (SSW) FLOWS AUGUST 26, 1986 - (L. L. KINTNER, NRR)

PROBLEM: SSW FLOWS TO ESF ROOM COOLERS AND CONTROL ROOM AIR CONDITIONER ARE LESS THAN DESIGN FLOWS CAUSE: WHEN BALANCING SSW FLOWS AN INCORRECT COEFFICIENT FOR FLOW INSTRUMENT WAS USED; ALSO, CHEMICAL DEPOSITION IN SMALL DIAMETER PIPES.

SIGNIFICANCE: EXCESSIVE ROOM TEMPERATURES COULD CAUSE FAILURE OF SWITCHGEAR FOR ESF UNDER ACCIDENT CONDITIONS CIRCUMSTANCES:

• PLANT IN REFUELING OUTAGE (9/5 - 11/8/86)

• 8/26/86 LICENSEE FOUND FLOW INSTRUMENT ERROR AND RECOMPUTED FLOWS USING CORRECT COEFFICIENT. ROOM TEMPERATURE ANALYSES SHOWED NO FAILURE EXPECTED FOR ESF FOR AS-FOUND FLOWS.

• LOOP "B" PIPING FLUSHED AND FLOWS RE-BALANCED. FLOW STILL LESS THAN DESIGN IN ESF ROOM COOLERS BUT ACCEPTABLE BECAUSE CALCULATED ROOM TEMPERATURE WAS LESS THAN DESIGN.

• MEET THE INTENT OF LICENSE CONDITION 2.C.(20) WHICH REQUIRES

" DESIGN FLOWS" TO ALL ESSENTIAL SSW COMPONENTS,

• 10/7/86 LICENSEE FOUND SSW FLOW TO LOOP "A" CONTROL ROOM AIR CONDITIONER WAS LESS THAN DESIGN BUT ACCEPTABLE BECAUSE CALCULATED CONTROL ROOM TEMPERATURE WAS LESS THAN DESIGN.

10/15/86 LICENSEE FOUND SEISMIC LOADS ON N0ZZLES TO ROOM COOLERS UNANALYZED. ANALYSES TO DATE SHOW 14 0F 18 HAVE ACCEPTABLE N0ZZLE STRESSES. RELIEF FROM TS REQUIREMENT MAY BE NEEDED FOR FUEL MOVEMENT AND REACTOR HEAD REPLACEMENT NEXT WEEK. THESE ACTIVITIES REQUIRE SSW TRAINS TO BE OPERABLE AND DEFINITION OF OPERABLE INCLUDES " COOLING WATER" ASSOCIATED WITH THE TRAIN.

. m 4

GRAND GULF, (CON'T.)

FOLLOW UP: (BY REGION II)

• LICENSEE WILL COMPLETE ANALYSES TO DETERMINE MINIMUM REQUIRED FLOWS TO ALL ESSENTIAL SSW COMPONENTS UNDER ACCIDENT CONDITIONS IN MODES 1, 2 8 3

• LICENSEE WILL COMPLETE FLUSHING AND HYDR 0-LAZING SMALL BORE SSW PIPES AND WILL INSTALL PERMANENT FLUSHING CONNECTIONS. SYSTEM WILL BE FLOW BALANCED TO ACHIEVE MINIMUM REQUIRED FLOW IN ALL ESSENTIAL COMPONENTS IF NECESSARY, LARGER PIPES WILL BE INSTALLED.

LICENSEE WILL COMPLETE SEISMIC ANALYSES TO DETERMINE THAT N0ZZLE LOADS ARE ACCEPTABLE OR ADD PIPE SUPPORTS OR FLEXIBLE CONNECTIONS.

PERMANENT FLOW INSTRUMENTS WILL BE INSTALLED TO MONITOR SSW FLOW PERIODICALLY AND DETECT ANY FLOW BLOCKAGE.

l

. 1. _

_ . _ _ _ . _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ . . _ . . . . _ . . 4 . ..

REACTOR SCRAM

SUMMARY

WEEK ENDING 10/12/86 I. PLANT SPECIFIC DATA DATE SITE UNIT POWER RPS CAUSE COMPLI- YTD YTD YTD CATIONS ADOVE BELOW TOTAL 15% 15%

10/06/56 PALO VERDE 1 20 A EQUIP / MECH. NO 12 0 12 10/0o/96 CUAD CITIES 2 100 A FERSCNNEL YES 2 0 0 10/07/86 PEACH BOTTOM 3 76 A EQUIPMENT NO 5 2 7 10/10/96 CALVERT CLIFFS 1 100 A FERS/NEW PRO. NO 3 0 0 10/11/56 CALVERT CLIFFS 1 18 A EQUIP /R:: CORE NO 4 0 4

SUMMARY

OF COMPLICATIGNS SITE UNIT COMPLICATION 3 OUAD CITIES 2 IMADVERTANT GROUP 1 ISOLATION -MSIV CLOSUF.E RESULTED FROM INSTPUtENT VIBRATIONS e

d

g. . p , +. -m m g M - __.* 6 N'"" "

II. COMPARISON OF WEEKLY STATISTICS WITH INDUSTRY AVERAGES SCRAMS FOR WEEK ENDING 10/12/96 CCGAM CAUSE POWER NUMBER 1986 1995 CF WEEKLY WEEKLY SCRAMS (5) AVERAGE AVERAGE YTD (3) (4)

• • PO'4ER >15%

EOUIP. RELATED >15% 3 4.7 5.4 '65%)

PERS. RELATED(6) >15% 2 1.9 2.0 (25%)

OTHER(7) >15% 0 0.5 0.6 ( 7%)

• • Subtotal **

5 7.1 S.O

• • FOWER <15%

EDUIP. RELATED < 15% 0 1.5 1.3 (54%)

PERS. RELATED '.1SX 0 0. 9 0.9 (39%)

OTHER < 15% 0 0.2 0.2 ( 8%)

++ Subtotal **

O 2.6 2.4

• • • Total ***

5 9.7 10.4 MANUAL VS AUTO SCRAMS TYPE NUMEE'R 1986 1985 OF WEEKLY WEEKLY SCRAMS AVERAGE AVERAGE YTD MANUAL SCRAMS O 1.1 1.0 AUTGMATIC SCRAMS 3 S.7 9.4 e

REACTOR SCRAM

SUMMARY

WEEK ENDING 10/19/86 I. PLANT SPECIFIC DATA DATE SITE UNIT POWER RPS CAUSE COMPLI- YTD YTD YTD CATIONS ABOVE BELOW TOTAL 15% 15%

10/13/86 PEACH BOTTOM 2 70 A PERSONNEL NO 5 0 5 10/14/86 DRESDEN 3 100 A PERSONNEL NO~ 3 0 3 10/14/86 MONTICELLO 1 100 A PERSONNEL NO 2 0 2 10/14/86 PERRY 1 2A EQUIP / MECH. NO O 2 2 10/16/86 QUAD CITIES 1 90 A EQUIPMENT NO 2 1 3 10/18/86 HOPE CREEK 1 53 A PERSONNEL NO 2 8 10 10/18/86 FERMI 2 16 A EQUIPMENT NO 1 2 3 10/19/86 MAINE YANKEE 1 100 M EQUIP / MECH NO 5 0 5 3

_ _ _ ~ .

l i

I

?

. II. COMPARISON OF WEEKLY STATISTICS WITH INDUSTRY AVERAGES SCRAMS FOR WEEK ENDING 10/19/86 SCRAM CAUSE POWER NUMBER 1986 1985 OF WEEKLY WEEKLY SCRAMS (5) AVERAGE AVERAGE YTD (3)(4)

• • POWER >15%

EQUIP. RELATED >15% 3 4.7 5.4 (68%)

PERS. RELATED(6) >15% 4 2.0 2.0 (25%)

OTHER(7) >15% 0 0.5 0.6 ( 7%)

cc Subtotal **

7 7.2 8.0

• • POWER <15%

EQUIP. RELATED <15% 1 1.5 1.3 (54%)

PERS. RELATED <15% 0 0.9 0.9 (38%)

OTHER <15% 0 0.2 0.2 ( 8%)

• • Subtotal **

1 2.6 2.4 cc* Total ***

8 9.8 10.4

~ MANUAL VS AUTO SCRAMS TYPE NUMBER' ' 1986 1985 OF WEEKLY WEEKLY SCRAMS AVERAGE AVERAGE YTD MANUAL SCRAMS 1 1.1 1.0 AUTOMATIC SCRAMS 7 8.7 9.4

J..

'[

NOTES 1-PLANT SPECIFIC DATA BASED ON INITIAL REVIEW OF 50.72 REPORTS FOR THE WEEK OF INTEREST. PERIOD IS MIDNIGHT SUNDAY THROUGH MIDNIGHT SUNDAY SCRAMS ARE DEFINED AS REACTOR PROTECTIVE ACTUATIONS WHICH RESULT IN ROD MOTION, AND EXCLUDE PLANNED TESTS OR SCRAMS AS PART OF PLANNED SHUTDOWN IN ACCORDANCE WITH A PLANT PROCEDURE.

2.

~- RECOVERY COMPLICATED BY EQUIPHENT FAILURES OR PERSONNEL ERRORS

, UNRELATED TO CAUSE OF SCRAM.

3.

1985 INFORMATION DERIVED FROM RECENT ORAS PRELIMINARY STUDY OF UNPLANNED REACTOR TRIPS IN 1985. WEEKLY DATA DETERMINED BY TAKING TOTAL TRIPS IN A GIVEN CATEGORY AND DIVIDING BY

% MEEKS/ YEAR.

',. 4. IN 1985 THERE WERE AN ESTIMATED TOTAL 0F 541 AUTOMATIC AND

, 4 MANUALUNPLANNEDREACTORTRIPSAT93 REACTORS (HOLDINGFULL POWERLICENSES). THIS YIELDS AN AVERAGE RATE OF 5.8 TRIPS PER REACTOR PER YEAR AND AN AVERAGE RATE OF 10.4 TRIPS PER WEEK

[ FOR ALL REACTORS.

i

5. BASED ON 100 REACTORS HOLDING A FULL POWER LICENSE.

6. PERSONNEL RELATED PROBLEMS INCLUDE HUMAN ERROR, PROCEDURAL DEFICIENCIES, AND MANUAL STEAM GENERATOR LEVEL CONTROL PROBLEMS.

7.

I

• 0THER"' INCLUDES AUTOMATIC SCRAMS ATTRIBUTED TO ENVIRONMENTAL CAUSES(LIGHTNING),SYSTEMDESIGN,ORUNKNOWNCAUSE.

l

LIRLU3 Uttt J

. Page L. I 10/20/06 SIGNIFICANT EVENTS FREQUENCY PERr0RMANCE INDICATCR Ns. 3 PLANT NAME EVENT EVENT DESCRIPTION $16NIFICANCE GTR DATE .

CALVERT CLIFFS 1 09/18/86 SNINS EMER6ENCY DIESEL SENERATOR DE6RADED BV PDTENTIAL FOR OR ACTUAL DE6RAEATION OF 1 COMEilS!!DN PRODUCTS LEAKING INTO JACKET CDDLIN6 SAFETY-RELATED EQUIPMENT NATER. PROBLEM EIISTED FOR DVER A YEAR AND NOT PROPERLY CORRECTED.

CALVERT CLIFFS 2 09/18/86 SNIN6 EMER6ENCY DIESEL GENERATOR DEGRADED BY PDTENTIAL FOR OR ACTUAL DEGRADAT10N OF 1 COMBUST!DN PRODUCTS LEAKIN6 INTO JACKET COOLING SAFETY-RELATED EQUIPMENT NATER. PROBLEM E11STED FOR OVER A YEAR AND N3T PROFERLY CORRECTED.

CLINTON 10/04/86 PERSONNEL ERRORS RESULTED IN INCORRECT POTENTIAL FOR OR ACTUAL BREAKDCNN IN MANAGEMENT 1

. ENRICHMENT FUEL BUNDLES BEING PLACED IN OR ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS (E.6. TRAINING,.

INCORRECT CORE LOCATIONS. SUBCRITICALITY TESTS PROCEDURES, PR06 RAMS)

ALSD MISSED DUE TO PERSONNEL ERROR. --

2

)

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QUAD CITIES 2 - SCRAM WITH COMPLICATIONS OCTOBER 6, 1986 - (T. ROTELLA, NRR)

PROBLEM:

LIFTED LEAD DURING 18C MAINTENANCE CAUSED TURBINE / REACTOR TRIP FROM 100%

TURBINE STOP VALVES CLOSED CAUSING VIBRATION OF INSTRUMENTATION RACK RESULTING IN GROUP 1 ISOLATION CAUSE:

PERSONNEL ERROR DURING MAINTENANCE; INSTRUMENT RACK LOCATION ON TURBINE DECK COMBINED WITH SENSITIVE PRESSURE SWITCHES SIGNIFICANCE:

SCRAM WITH COMPLICATION SPURIOUS GROUP 1 ISOLATION ON TURBINE TRIP DISCUSSION:

DURING igg MAINTENANCE LEAD FOR REACTOR VESSEL WATER LEVEL UAS IMPROPERLY LIFTED CAUSING LOW LEVEL SIGNAL AND FEEDWATER INCREASE TURBINE / FEED PUMP TRIP ON HI REACTOR VESSEL CAUSING REACTOR TRIP TURBINE STOP VALVE CLOSURE CAUSED INSTRUMENT RACK VIBRATION SENSITIVE PRESSURE SWITCH RESULTED IN MAIN STEAM LINE LOW PRESSURE SIGNAL YIELDING GROUP 1 ISOLATION F0Lt.0WUP:

LICENSEE CONSIDERING DIFFERENT TYPE PRESSURE SWITCHES TO PREVENT RE0CCURRENCE LICENSEE CONSIDERING ADDITIONAL TRAINING IN TROUBLESHOOTING PROCEDURES

f ENCLOSURE 4

'O Page No. I 10/30/86 OPERATINS REACTORS EVENTS MEETING FOLLOWUP ITEMS AS OF MEETINS 86-36 ON OCTOBER 20 , 1986 (IN ASCENDING MEETING DATE, NSSS VENDOR, FACILITY ORDER)

MEETING FACILITY RESPONSIBLE TASK DESCRIPTION SCHEDULE CLOSED DATE COMMENTS NUMBER / NSSS VENDOR / DIVISION / COMPLET. BY DOCUMENT, MEETING EVENT DESCRIP. INDIVIDUAL DATE(S) MEETIN6,ETC.

DATE 86-10 OYSTER CREEK NRR / HOUSTON W RESOLVE THE QUESTION OF THE 11/17/86 CLOSED 10/29/86 FOLLOWUP ACTION TO 03/31/86 6E / LEVEL / ACCEPTABILITY OF BLIND SWITCHES 10/30/86 REVIEW BEING BE INCORPORATED IN SWITCH SETPOINT AND DELETION OF DAILY CHANNEL // ACCOMPLISHED REVIEW 0F JUNE DRIFT CHECK UNDER TAC Ko 1,1986 EVENT AT 61203 LASSALLE 86-21 VERMONT YANKEE NER /HOLAHAN 6. DETERMINE STATUS AND 10'/30/86 CLOSED 10/29/86 06/23/86 6! / PRDELEMS / EFFECTIVENESS OF STAFF AND 09/30/86 NO ENFORCEMENT WITHSCRAM LICENSEE ACTION ON // ACTION - IE SDLENDID VALVES POST-MAINTENANCE TESTING (SL NOTICE ISSUED 83-28). DEVELOP RECOMMENDATIDMS SEPT 2 ,1986 FOR FURTHER ACTION 86-28 GRAN') GULF IE / JORDAN E. ASSESS POTENTIAL FOR GENERIC 11/19/86 OPEN / / INFORMATION NOTICE 08/11/06 GE / CONTROL ROD / APPLICABILITY 10/30/86 IN PREPARATION WITHDRAWAL 09/30/86 PROBLEM 86-32 NINE MILE PT 1 NRR / ROSA F. DISCUSS WITH LICENSEE AND 10/24/86 CLOSED 10/29/86 09/IS/86 GE / SCRAM NRR /ZWOLINSKI J. REGION LICENSIE'S // ACTION OUTLET VALVE IMPLEMENTATION OF 6L 83-28 IN // COMPLETED ON DIAPH6 RAM REFERENCE TO 09/08/86 EVENT 10/29/86 FAILURE