ML20213E332

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Forwards Comments on Idcor Degraded Issues Per 821213 Request.Tables 1A & 1B Provide Priority Ratings for Both in-vessel & ex-vessel Phenomenological Issues W/Potential Importance & Also for SECY-82-1B
ML20213E332
Person / Time
Issue date: 02/18/1983
From: Mattson R
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To: Rosztoczy Z
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Shared Package
ML20213E209 List:
References
FOIA-87-113, FOIA-87-60 NUDOCS 8303090089
Download: ML20213E332 (48)
v • d • e


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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

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MEMORANDUM FOR:

Zoltan R. Rosztoczy, Chief Research and Standards Coordination Branch, DST FROM:

Roger J. Mattson, Director, Jivision of Systems Integration

SUBJECT:

COMMENTS ON IDCOR DEGRADED CORE ISSUES As requested in your memorandum of December 13,1982, enclosed are our coments on the IDCOR degraded core issues for which the Division of Systems Integration

. has significant areas of responsibility.

Tables 1A and 18 provide priority ratings (L. M and H) for in-vessel and ex-vessel phenomenological issues with potential importance for the IDCOR pmgram and also for SECY-82-1B, " Proposed Comission Policy Statement on Severe Accidents and Related Views on Nuclear Reactor Regulation." Likewise, Table 2 provides priority ratings for containment issues.

If you like this approach and decide that other' elements of NRR ( Ap., RRAB) should use it, we would be willing to ask our BNL contractor to review these priority ratings and provide a more detailed basis for addressing the issues in our cognizance.

If such a course is taken, it needs to be coordinated with Jim Malaro's work on element 5.13 of the SARP.

I have asked Miller Spangler to provide additional input, especially those degraded core issues relating to the issues involving policy decisions treated in SECY-82-1B, following Comission action on he proposed policy statement, Y\\

Roger J. Ma on, Dire: tor Division of Systems Integration

Enclosure:

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TABLE A. - IWORTANT FIEIDENGL0GICAL ISSUES;IN-VESSEL IWORTANCE TO b

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CHARACTERIZIlls 4

IMORTANCE TO DIAR-FRACTIONS (ASStMINS IW ORTANCE'.78 CSISIDERIS p FIEN00EN0 LOGICAL ISSUES (THATAREUNRESOLVED).

ACTERIZING CONTAIN -

REALISTIC TREA1 MENT 0F-I MITIG4TI0ll FIXES p$

MENT FAILURE SOURCE TEIDtS)

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BW PWR PWR Bl4 PlR PWR BWit 3

P f

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CORE-lEATLP & UNC0VERY INCLUDING PRIMARY

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IN-VESSEL L

SP LD IC SP LD

' IC SP j.

SYSTEM THERMAL HYDRAULIC & " GAP" RADIO-

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L M

M-M M

M M.

PJ NUCLIDE RELEASE Yi

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4 k

2 (ENERATION & RELEASED TO CONTAlletENT ~

M N

L L

L

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N L

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4. H G

4 5

RATE. AMOUNT & STEAM MIXING)

. s. CORE DEGRADATION / COOLING RECOVERY INCLUDINE 4

' MELT" RADIONUCLIDE REl. EASE L

L L-M M

M N

N N

3d, CORE DEGRADATION / CORE MELT. INITIAL SLUW-h+

i ING INCLUDING "DELT" RADIONUCLIDE RELEASE L

M M.

H H

H M

M N

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MOLTEN CORE IN LOWER HEAD. INCL. FUEL /

d COOLANTINTERACTIONS(E.G.,STEAMEXPLOSI0lls L

'M M

M M

M M

M M

& CONTRIB. TD RADIONUCLIDE RELEhSE)

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f. VESSEL FAILURE CHARACTERISTICS LMODE.

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f.9 TEW. & Cor. OF CORitM & AMT., COMP..

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& CHARACT. OF RADIONUCLIDES RETAINED _ &

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M M

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M H

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RFI FAvn TO CONTAINMENT)

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g. PRIMARY SYSTEM FAILURE CHARACTERISTICS

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( )1 Pump Seal Failune Steam Generator Tube Ruptures L

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((,,lPipingFailures(Thers.& Mech.)

t J Direct. Cont. Bypass (Event V)'

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[1. LD = LARGE DRY H = If9EDIATE ATTENTI0lls MAJOR RESEARCH RESOURCES REQUIRED

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IC = ICE CONDENSER M = DESERVING OF ATTENTI0lli MODERATE RESEARCH RESOURCES REQUIRED F-3.

SP = SUPPRESSION POOL L = LOW PRIORITVs Olt.Y LIMITED RES0UllCES WOULD BE COST-EFFECTIVE I

4.

HIGH IF BWR IS NOT INERTED M

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EXCEPT AS IT IWACTS CORE-NEATIP v

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~ ACTERIZING RADIONUCLIDE I W ORTANCE 10 e

(THATAREUNRESOLVED)

MENT FAILURE' RELEASE F?. ACTIONS (ASStMING CONSIDERING I) l'

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REALISTIC TR[ATENT OF MITIGATION F

SOURCE TEIMS7 FIXES 1

S PWp PWg By PWR PWR BWR-PWR PWR.

BUR I' EX-VESSEL LD IC SP LD IC SP LD IC SP a.

INITIAL INTERACTION WITH MTER (0XID41'10N f

l; RELEASE)

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M*

M N

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bk INITIAL INTERACTION WITH CONCRETE y

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& STRUCTURES. (VAPORIZATION RELEASE)

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INITIAL DISPERSION M

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LONG-TERM INTERACTION WITH WATERS'

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L (INCL. COOLABILITY OF DEBRIS & SCRU881NG)

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L L

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LONG-TERM INTERACTION WITH CONCRETE

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FINAL DISPOSITION OF CORitM M

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HYDROGEN GENERATION BURNING M

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TABLE 2. - IWORTANT PHEN 0 FEN 0 LOGICAL ISSUES: CONTAIMEIIT L

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ACTERIZING CONTAIN-RADIONUCLIDE RELEASE FRACTIONS ING MITIGATION FIXE 5 y

i MENT. FAILURE (ASSUMING REALISTIC TREATMENT

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PHENOMEN0 LOGICAL SENERIC ISSUES-PWR PWR BWR PWR PWR BWR PWR PWR SUN f

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3 LD IC SP LD IC SP LD IC 3p a_

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H t

M M

M tl CAPABILITY H

H H

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l URE. COMPLETENESS) (DEFINITION OF FAIL-FAILURE HECHANISMS

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EqulPfENT SURVIVABILITY IN CONTAINENT L

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PRELIMINARY LIST OF ISSUES The Comission must answer four basic questions:

1.

How safe are nuclear powdr plants?

2.

How can the level of safety be improved and at what cost?

3.

To what extent should such improvements be required?

4.

How should such requirements be imposed?

Severe accident research is (or should be designed to answer the first two questions. This requires resolution of the following:

1.

Use of PRA To what extent do we rely on PRA?

i How complete a PRA is needed?

How do we handle external events, human error, sabotage, etc?

2.

Use of Surrogates The Commission proposes (SECY 82-1B) to make generic decisions on existing plants using existing PRAs (rebaselined).

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o m m w m x m w z u m,;,..mrua.x v To what~ extent can surrogates be used for classes of plants, containments, accident sequences, consequences, external events, costs-(e.g..'ATWS)?

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What is our fallback position (e.g., NREP, SEP Phase III)?

3.

Uncertainties What uncertainties are importan', to the decisionmaking process?

What are the sources of these uncertainties?

Can the uncertainties be reduced to a tractable level? How long will it take? What will it; cost?

Is there a practical way to compensate for the uncertainty (e.g., by adding margin,anothersystem)?

If the answer to the la'st two questions is negative, what do we do?

4.

Phenomenology 1

What unresolved phenomenological issues (in-vessel and ex-vessel) are i

important to the decisionmaking process?

Is there NRC/ Industry consensus on this?

I How are these issues being addressed?

When will they be resolved?

5. -Human Factors (Same as for Phenomenology) l 6.

Benefit / Cost Analysis What are the benefits / costs of each corrective action?

o What benefits / costs do we consider?

l o How are benefits / costs quantified?

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'm o Do we use discounting?

How are benefits and costs summed and balanced?

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o Are weighting factors used?

o How are results displayed?

In order to answer questions 3 and 4 we need to resolve the following:

1.

How safe is safe enoughi What benchmark (s) (e.g., safety goal) will be used to assess the adequacy of existing' plant designs?

Should a defense-in-depth safe, guard be superimposed on any benchmark?

How will. plants be assessed against the benchmark?

i Should we be satisfied with simply eliminating risk outliers?

2.

Regulatory Options l

How do we balance, prevention, management and mitigation requirements?

Should regulatory changes be made on an ad hoc basis or as part of a coordinated rulemaking effort?

What form should regulatory changes take?

l. -

Should new requirements specify acceptable performance or should they be prescriptive (e.g.,GDC)?

'Do we change the Design Basis to add class 9 accidents?

If so, how do we handle class 10 accidents?

Do we change the DBA source term?

Do we change the failure criteria (e.g., go to double failure criteria)?

What are the advantages and disvantages of each regulatory option?

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ENCLOSURE II Proposed Alterations te Itc0R Degraded Core Issues

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  • Attachment 1

..-Degraded Core issues 1

Sequences and Plant types.

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t-surrogate (How gene'ric are findings 4.

-initiating events P~

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-component reliability data (NPRDS)

-risk assessment methodology

-plant specific features and affect on risk

-safety goal (need for and use)

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2.

Phenomenological Generic Issues uggg

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. -hydrogen release from. primary system (rate and amount)

-release of radionuclides and core materials frem primary system,e s -Ilus av, in veuel "r

-consequences of direct containment bypass ? wh3 in-venel Genciiny op n,,t.A.n &

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- pa+en4fo.I Car-v essel Ca, lum:.Cr-a,

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-recovery potential prior to vessel' failure

-potential for containment f ailure frca in-vessel steam explosion's

-primary system failure from steam overpressure /*)

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causes and effects +s(Mf f4 sy.HE'm

-vessel f ilure:

re lenhton oS C,ssion produc in pr-tvnsr~j l

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Er.-vessel Issues

-ilydrogen generation, distribution, and combustion gfg

-debfih/ coolability limits g

-corium-concrete interactions, 4 g

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-steam and noncondensible gas ' overpressure

-fi sion product transport, depositien$eaw n.etention and r ex p los son..co n s etyk ncq= r wees.k en 9 o S,wse//en cas-t d m

9. ln rfted7nalysisys"sves' ~~ 'J"'

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-modeling of key phenomena and how these influence course' of accident

-MAAP./ MARCH and RETAIN / TRAP-MELT comparisons of dominant saquences.

in reference plants m.n d c oww'usso h )

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-effects of operator actions (bo44s ow w.e ssion

-effects of uncertainites and sensitiyjties i

2;plicc5ility t: :th:r phr.t:

de/e/e,' t ec/undaw.+

fo /irae Ale. I

-validation and verification requirements for MAAP and RETAIN l

4. ~ Containment

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-capabilit'v

-fatiure mechanisms inclu.clon9 com p/cde ners con s ide.rael-ron r

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.f-Equipment Survivability -

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-ih containmen*

-ex containment

- pra les.l.,,'t,'s M can s a ders.4*an 6.

Accident Manage 6ent Issues 5

- Cu.n e4 von I a.Iloca.4

.n e r,4e rle. ( J.e., =4o %4,. n vs. opers.4e< a.che

-operator diagnostic instrumentation

-credible operator actions

-off-site procedures

-use of MAAP/P.ETAlH in operator action mode

-management training

-strategies:

guidance vs. procedures

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-diaonostic training b,

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-configuration planning / control

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%,7.. Cost-beneilt Issuesu l..la4-<n $

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-e ersenes

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-met.odology

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-cost / benefit criteria

-safety goal

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Credit to be Given for Preventive Measures

-Hardware reliability. improvement 1

-Human reliability assessment

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- wa h a

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Need for Mitigative Features

-c'ontainment spray systems

-containment cooler systems

-filtered-vented containment

-core retention devices

-passive decay heat removal' systems

-hydrogen control measure

-ex-vessel flooding

-enhanced equipment survivabi.lity

10. Treathent of other Issues

.ATWS

-External events

-Sabotage

-Pressurized thermal shock

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k AGENDA IDCOR/NRC MANAGERS MEETING March 2, 1983, 10:30 A.M.

AIF Bethesda Offices I.

Description of the industry proposed process for closure of degraded core issues - IDCOR II A.

Objectives Cordell Reed B.

Overview John Raulston C.

Description of types of meetings John Raulston D.

Scope of proposed meetings John Raulston E.

Technical areas for closure discussions John Raulston F.

NRC Reaction Denny Ross G.

Agenda / objectives of next IDCOR/NRC Management meeting John Raulston H.

Scope / objectives of next NRC staff and contractor technical meeting John Raulston II.

Status of IDCOR Mario Fontana III.

Status on NUREG-0900, RES Programs, and SECY 82-1B NRC IV.

Relationship of Bernero's new office to NRC's resolution of degraded core issues NRC r

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TECHNOLOGY for ENERGY CORPORATION l

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OBJECTIVE TO DEVELOP COMPREHENSIVE, INTEGRATED, WELL-i DOCUMENTED, TECHNICALLY SOUND POSITIONS ON THE ISSUES RELATED TO DEGRADED CORE ACCIDENTS.

THESE POSITIONS WILL BE THE BASIS OF INDUSTRY PARTICIPATION IN ANY NRC SEVERE ACCIDENT DECISION i

PROCESS

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TECHNOLOGY for ENER3Y CSRPERATION i

)

POLICY l

USE EXISTING INFORMATION ENHANCE TECHNICAL UNDERSTANDING AND i

COMMUNICATIONS i

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i S 82 523512 6I

TECHNOLOGY ler ENERGY CORPORATION

,f PCLICY GCOUP l

J. SELBY, CHAIRMAN j

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i IDCOR STEERING ATOMIC i

GROUP INDUSTRIAL

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C. REED, CHAIRMAN FORUM l

I J. SIEGEL IDCOR I

LEGAL j

i TEC RESPONSIBLE ADVISOR j

OFFICER G. EDGAR Q

A.R. BUHL, VICE PRESIDENT l

l lDCCg IDCOR PROGRAM OFFICE I

TECHN! CAL M.H. FONTANA, PROGRA.M DIRCIOR i

ADVISORY GROUP P. STANDIFER, PROJECT MANAGER 3

i M. LEVERETT, CHAIRMAN l

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SENIOR CONSULTANTS I

j H.K. FAUSKE i

S. LEVINE j

N. RASMUSSEN j

j R.SEALE W. STRATTON i

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REACTOR & MANT U

ON CONTRACTS RISK ANALYSIS PHENOMENA I

SYSTEMS

& UCENSING ADMINISTRAMON

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S.V. ASSELIN ED FULLER l

E.P. STROUPE R.M. SATIERFIELD C.R. NAULT i

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TECHN3LCOY for ENEROY CORPSRATISN l

DEVELOPED PLAN AND PROCESS FOR IDCOR DOCUMENTATION REPORT FUNCTION CONCLUSIONS &

IDENTIFIES ISSUES AND RECOMMENDATIONS IDCOR POSillONS i

- /

~

TECilNICAL SUPPORTS IDCOR POSillONS ON

SUMMARY

ISSUES AND INDEXES SUPPORTING TECHNICAL INFORMATION REPORTS

-- /

TECHNICAL PROVIDES DETAll TECHNICAL REPORTS INFORMATION IN SUPPORT OF IDCOR POSITIONS ON ISSUES i

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TECHNCLCGY for ENECOY CORPORAT13N 0

IMPLEMENTED NRC INTERACTIONS PROGRAM HELD FIRST MANAGEMENT MEETING IN MAY 1982

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REVIEWED NRC FUEL DAMAGE PROGRAM IN JUNE,1982 REVIEWED RISK CODES & VALUE IM' ACT PROGRAMS IN JULY 1982 P

(

REVIEWED SASA/lREP/NREP/ASEP IN AUGUST 1982 HELD SECOND MANAGEMENT MEETING IN SEPTEMBER 1982 l

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ucunotoeysorsusreycc:PoRATIEN l

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I-TECHNICAL APPROACH DEVELOP GENERIC EVALUATION CRITERIA l

j SELECT REPRESENTATIVE REFERENCE PLANTS IDENTIFY DOMINANT ACCIDENT SEQUENCES WHICH CAN l

RESULT IN DEGRADED CORES IF UNCHECKED l

REALISTICALLY CHARACTERIZE REACTOR BEHAVIOR i

i IDENTIFY & ASSESS OPPORTUNITIES FOR REDUCING RISKS THROUGHOUT THESE SEQUENCES 1

i RELATE RESULTS TO EVALUATIVE CRITERIA k

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SEVEN PRA's WERE EXAMINED IN THE IDCOR PRESENT RISK WORK AREA SURRY

  • OCONEE SEQUOYAH i

ZION PEACH BOTTOM i

GRAND GULF LIMERICK i

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TECHNOLO3Y for ENER3Y CCRPORATION i

i DEVELOPED INTEGRATED CODE (MAAP) FOR i

ANALYSIS OF SEVERE ACCIDENT BEHAVIOR OF PWR's & BWR's WHICH INCLU. DES:

1 BEST ESTIMATE PHENOMENOLOGY' l

DETAILED PLANT DESIGN INFORMATION i

SYSTEMS INTERACTIONS OPERATOR ACTIONS BATCH OR INTERACTIVE MODE CAPABill1Y FOR OPERATOR TRAINING AS WELL AS SEVERE ACCIDENT ANALYSES i

I 4

l l

1

l TECHNOLOGY for ENERGY CORPORATION l

REFERENCE PLANTS ZION:

PWR, LARGE DRY CONTAINMENT i

(COMED, WEST., FAl, TEC)

SEQUOYAH:

PWR, ICE ~ CONDENSER i

(TVA, WEST, FAl, TEC)

PEACH BOTTOM:

BWR, MARK I (PECO, GE, BECHTEL, FAl, TEC)

I GRAND GULF:

BWR, MARK lli

=

(MISS. P & L, GE, BECHTEL, FAl, TEC) l t

TECHNCLOGY for ENER3Y CCCPORATION l

DEVELOPED APPROACH TO NON-REFERENCE i

PLANTS & GENERIC APPLICABILITY i

I!'-

PREPARED LIST OF KEY ISSUES li#

PREPARED LIST OF PARAMETERS OF ALL PLANTS I se..?'

!O' IDENTIFIED PLANTS AS MODELS FOR NON-REFERENCE PLANTS' i

- SUSQUEHANAH (BWR MK ll)

- CALVERT CLIFFS (CE) j

- OCONEE (B&W)

HELD KICK-OFF MEETINGS WITH B&W, CE, PP&L, BG&E i

l

/

n._.

TECHNOLO3Y for ENECOY CO2PERATION

~

l DEVELOPED APPROACH TO i

l NON-REFERENCE PLANTS & GENERIC APPLICABILITY (CONT.)

)T INSPECTED SUSQUEHANAH, CLAVERT CLIFFS, OCONEE t

- STEERING GROUP APPROVED APPROACH OF MODIFYING MAAP CODE TO DO ANALYSES FOR i

THE ABOVE PLANTS

)

- ACTUAL MAAP ANALYSES OF NON-REFERENCE i

PLANTS WOULD BE DONE AFTER JULY 1983 j

1 l

i 4

f.%7 9 %

1 3

'O

i TECHNOLOGY f:r ENEROY CCRPORATION l

l SET UP MAAP/ MARCH-2 BENCHMARK ANALYSES WITH NRC ANALYSES TO.BE PERFORMED ON KEY SEQUENCES FOR REFERENCE i

l PLANTS (SAME SEQUENCES AS IDCOR TASK 23) i l

ANALYSES TO BE PERFORMED USING COMMON (CORRECT) PLANT i

INFORMATION i

ANALYSES TO BE PERFORMED " BLIND" j.

COMPARISON TO OCCUR IN JUNE 1983 l

i

,1 l-

~,

TECHNOLGOY for ENE20Y CCCPODATION FINALIZED EXPERT REVIEW PROCESS AND EXPERT REVIEW GROUP MEMBERSHIP

~

HYDROGEN CONTROL, DISTRIBUTION, AND COMBUSTION PREVENTION SYSTEMS MITIGATIVE SYSTEMS EQUIPMENT SURVIVABILITY CONTAINMENT STRUCTURAL CAPABILITY j

l l

SAFETY GOAL ADAPTATION GROUND RULES

=

SEQUENCES AND RISK ASSESSMENT l

s l

HUMAN FACTORS AND OPERATIONAL PROCEDURES i

=

CONTAINMENT ANALYSES l

{

DEGRADATION PHENOMENA i

SOURCE TERMS i

i

l TECHN3 LOGY for ENE20Y CSCPO2ATION MAINTAINED COGNIZANCE OF RELATED PROGRAMS 1

=

ISSUED FINAL REPORT ON RELATED

~

i PROGRAMS WHICH COVERS WORK BEING DONE BY

-- EPRI

- DOE i

- siRC

- GERMANS

- FRENCH

- SWEDES

- UTILITIES i

1

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INDUSTRY'S PLAN FOR 4

i ACCEPTABLE CLOSURE OF SEVERE ACCIDENT ISSUES 4

CORDELL REED i

CHAIRMAN, IDCOR STEERING GROUP l-JOHN RAULSTON CHAIRMAN, IDCOR CLOSdRE SUBCOMMITTEE d

t I

i I

i j

1 t

0 s.

1 4

IDCOR/NRC 3/2/83 MANAGEMENT MEETING OBJECTIVE:

l REACH UNDERSTANDING OF AND AGREEMENT IN PRINCIPLE ON THE INDUSTRY'S PROPOSED l

PROCESS TO SUPPORT THE REGULATORY l

CLOSURE OF SEVERE ACCIDENT ISSUES - IDCOR ll i

i l

1 i-1 l

i 611A65 i

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I IDCOR ll OBJECTIVE I

j OBTAIN TECHNICAL CLOSURE ON j

SEVERE ACCIDENT ISSUES 1

  • OBTAIN PERMANENT REGULATORY CLOSURE i

4 I

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{

611AS4 I

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THE SUCCESSFUL IDCOR PROGRAM HAS ESTABLISHED THE TECHNICAL FOUNDATION I

FOR PERMANENT RESOLUTION OF THE SEVERE

~

ACCIDENT ISSUES i

i DEVELOPED A COHERENT, COORDINATED PLAN FOR ASSESSING l

SEVERE ACCIDENT ISSUES

~

l FOCUSED THE BEST TECHNICAL AND MANAGEMENT TALENT.ON i

PROBLEM ASSESSED WORLD-WIDE EXPERIMENTAL DATA AND METHODS

?

t IDENTIFIED AND ADDRESSED DEFICIENCIES IN EXISTING ANAL METHODS i

1 l

l I

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)

THE SUCCESSFUL IDCOR PROGRAM HAS ESTABLISHED THE TECHNICAL FOUNDATION FOR PERMANENT RESOLUTION OF THE

(

SEVERE ACCIDENT ISSUES

~

l DEVELOPED STATE-OF-THE-ART METHODS FOR REAllSTICALLY ANALYZING PLANT BEHAVIOR i

i PROVIDED A BROAD PERSPECTIVE ON RESOLVING DEGRADED CORE ISSUES THROUGH COMPREHENSIVE INDUSTRY REPRESENTATION PARTICIPATION PROVIDED THE TECHNICAL BASES FOR PROCEEDING TO CLOSURE I

l i

l

~

THE SUCCESSFUL IDCOR PROGRAM HAS ESTABLISHED THE MANAGEMENT FOUNDATION FOR RESOLUTION OF THE SEVERE ACCIDENT ISSUES I

MANAGED THE PROGRAM ON SCHEDULE AND WITHIN BUDGET FOCUSED THE BEST MANAGEMENT AND LEGAL TALENT ON THE PROBLEM l

p l

i

l i

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IDCOR ll WILL ASSURE ACCEPT BLE PERMANENT REGULATORY DECISIONS ON THE SEVERE i

ACCIDENT ISSUES AFTER FILING-IDCOR's l

TECHNICAL CASE i

t

  • OBTAIN AGREEMENT ON OBJECTIVES, SCOPE, DECISION PROCESS, i

PROCEDURES, AND TIMING.

]

. IDENTIFY KEY ISSUES FOR TECHNICAL RESOLUTION i

RANK ISSUES BY PRIORITY AND DEVELOP OPTIMUM ORDER OF i

. RESOLUTION

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l i

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I r

IDCOR II WILL ASSURE ACCEPTABLE PERMANENT REGULATORY DECISIONS ON THE SEVERE ACCIDENT ISSUES AFTER FILING-IDCOR's TECHNICAL CASE j

OBTAIN AGREEMENT ON KEY TECHNICAL AND REGULATORY i

-ISSUES SUGGEST RULES AS APPROPRIATE AND SEEK ISSUANCE BY INFORMAL PROCEDURES O

l 9

9 I

l.

I

IDCOR CLOSURE PROCESS MANAGEMENT

~

MEETINGS PROPOSED DEFINITION CLOSdRE-PHASE RULES TECHNICAL MEETINGS I

011A62

j l

l l

l IDCOR 11 WILL MINIMIZE SCHEDULE AND l

FINANCIAL RISK TO EACH UTILITY LICENSEES NOT REQUIRED TO RESPOND TO SEVERE ACCIDENT i r

QUESTIONS INDIVIDUALLY PREVENTS UNCOORDINATED RESPONSES CLOSURE COSTS LESS THAN A SINGLE LICENSEE WOULD INCUR i

'I i

4

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i UNIFIED INDUSTRY APPROACH CARRIES MORE WEIGHT WITH NRC i

l PROVIDES A FOCAL POINT FOR NRC i

i

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l 1

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3 I

sl l

IDCOR ll TEPES OF

~

l MEETINGS / BRIEFINGS BEFORE 7/1/83 2/1/84 7/'1/83 2/1/84 7/1/84 SENIOR NRC MANAGERS

/

V V

MRC LICENSING STAFF o

V V

MRC RESEARCH STAFF, o

V o

kCONTRACTORS 4RC COMMISSIONERS

/

o V

BRIEFING ACRS/CRGR BRIEFING

/

o

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$ATIONAL LABS o

/

o BRIEFING ADMINISTRATION /

/

V

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BOORDINATION l

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j SCOPE OF SENIOR NRC/IDCOR MANAGEMENT MEETINGS

  • IDENTIFY SCOPE & TIMING OF EACH TECHNICAL MEETING
  • CONFIRM AGREEMENT ON.lSSUES FOR NEXT TECHNICAL MEETING
  • REVIEW AGREEMENTS FROM PREVIOUS TECHNICAL MEETINGS
  • REVIEW REGULATORY IMPLICATIONS
  • REVIEW PROGRESS OF DECISION PROCESS
  • DOCUMENT RESOLUTION i

611A66

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PROPOSED PROCESS FOR NRC RESEARCH STAFF & TECHNICAL CONTRACTOR MEETINGS i

  • AGREE ON ISSUE SCOPE

-

  • IDCOR/NRC EXCHANGE SUMMARIES

{

OF ISSUE PRIOR TO MEETING

  • CONDUCT MEETING; DISCUSS SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES AND IDENTIFY AREAS OF:

I

- AGREEMENT

- DIS AGREEMENT

- CONFIRMATORY RESEARCH

  • DOCUMENT RESULTS OF MEETING 4

l 3

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0: 1A57 f

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~~.

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i TECHNICAL AREAS OF MEETINGS WITH i

NRC STAFF & CONTRACTORS i

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  • KEY SEQUENCES AND PHENOMENA i

l

  • ANALYSIS METHODOLOGY
  • SOURCE TERMS
  • CONTAINMENT ANALYSIS

\\

  • MITIGATION FEATURES, OPERATIONAL FACTORS AND COST BENEFITS
  • OTHER ISSUES (SEISMIC, SABOTAGE, ETC)

ACCEPTABILITY OF RISK LEVEL i

l 011A58 l

i-

i

1 i,

j SCOPE OF NEXT IDCOR/NRC I

MANAGEMENT MEETINGS i

)

  • EXECUTIVE

SUMMARY

OF IDCOR RESULTS 4

  • AGREE ON KEY ISSUES TO BE COVERED IN FUTURE NRC/lDCOR ~ STAFF & CONTRACTOR TECHNICAL MEETINGS
  • AGREE ON OVERALL SCHEDULE FOR FUTURE l

NRC/IDCOR MANAGEMENT MEETINGS & NRC i

STAFF & CONTRACTOR TECHNICAL MEETINGS

~

  • ITEMS NORMALLY COVERED BY IDCOR/NRC SEN' LOR MANAGEMENT MEETINGS s

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F SCOPE OF NEXT NRC STAFF & CONTRACTOR I

TECHNICAL MEETING ON KEY SEQUENCES i

& PHENOMENA

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i i

4 j

  • REPRESENTATIVE SEQUENCES FOR SEVERE j

ACCIDENT ANALYSES

  • PLA-NT SPECIFICITY
  • KEY PHENOMENA

-STEAM EXPLOSION i

- STEAM SPIKE I

-HYDROGEN GENERATION & BURN

-CORE CONCRETE REACTION

- DEBRIS COOLABILITY i

i l

G I1 A56 j

1

P E45g g g jy7 ATTENDANCE comuTTzz IDCOR-NRC Closure Meeting DATE.

3/2/83 TIME 10:.30

~m PI K E AIF Bethesda NAME ORGANIZATION

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