ML20212M596

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Proposed Tech Specs Incorporating Editorial & Typo Changes for 3/4.8.4.3 Re MOV Thermal Overload protection,3/4.5.1 Re ECCS Operating & Bases 3/4.6.1.2 Re Primary Containment Leakage
ML20212M596
Person / Time
Site: Fermi DTE Energy icon.png
Issue date: 03/09/1987
From:
DETROIT EDISON CO.
To:
Shared Package
ML20212M581 List:
References
NUDOCS 8703120091
Download: ML20212M596 (4)


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8703120091 870309 PDH ADOCK 05000341 PDR P

F TABLE 3.8.4.3-1 (Continued)

MOTOR-0PERATED VALVES THERMAL OVERLOAD PROTECTION

- e SYSTEM (5)

VALVE NUMBER AFFECTED

12. . . . . . . . "...."...-^.."...-.,-_-......'..-.
13. P44-F601A Emergency Equipment Cooling Water (EECW)

P44-F601B EECW P44-F602A EECW P44-F602B EECW P44-F603A EECW P44-F6038 EECW P44-F604 EECW P44-F605A EECW P44-F6058 EECW P44-F606A EECW P44-F606B EECW P44-F607A EECW P44-F6078 EECW P44-F608 EECW P44-F613 EECW ,

, F44-F614 EECW P44-F615 EECW P44-F616 EECW

14. P50-F603 Compressed Air Systems P50-F604 Compressed Air Systems
15. T48-F601A Containment Atmosphere Control System T48-F601B Containment Atmosphere Control System T48-F602A Containment Atmosphere Control System

. T48-F6028 Containment Atmosphera Control System T48-F603A Containment Atmosphere Control System T48-F603B Containment Atmosphere Control System T48-F604A Containment Atmosphere Control System T48-F604B Containment Atmosphere Control System T48-F605A Containment Atmosphere Control System T48-F605B Containment Atmosphere Control System T48-F606A Containment Atmosphere Control System T48-F606B Containment Atmosphere Control System T4803-F601 Containment Atmosphere Purging System T4803-F602 Containment Atmosphere Purging System

16. T49-F601 Primary Containment Pneumatic Supply System T49-F602 Primary Containment Pneumatic Supply System s

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EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS i

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPFRATION (Continued)

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ACTION:

a. For the core spray system:
1. With one CSS subsystem inoperable, provided that at least one LPCI pump in each LPCI subsystem is OPERABLE, restore the inoperable CSS subsystem to OPERABLE status within 7 days or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
2. With both CSS subsystems inoperable, be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the next 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
b. For the LPCI system:
1. With one LPCI pump in either or both LPCI subsystems inoperable, provided that at least one CSS subsystem is OPERABLE, restore the inoperable LPCI pump (s) to OPERABLE status within 7 days or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
32. With a 'LPCI system cross-tie valve closed, be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the next o g g,24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.

15.khithoneLPCIsubsystemotherwiseinoperable,providedthat '

4 both CSS subsystems are OPERABLE, restore the inoperable LPCI t sut, system to OPERABLE status within 7 days or be in at least l HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN

,within the following 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.

l 4. With both LPCI subsystems otherwise inoperable, be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the next 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.*

5. The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable for up to 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> for the purpose of establishing the RHR system in the LPCI mode once the reactor vessel pressure is greater

~

than the RHR cut-in permissive setpoint.

c. For the HPCI system, provided the CSS, the LPCI system, the ADS and the RCIC system are OPERABLE:
1. With the HPCI system inoperable, restore the HPCI system to OPERABLE status within 14 days or be in at least HOT SHUT 00WN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> and reduce reactor steam dome pressure to < 150 psig within the following 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.

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  • Whenever two or more RHR subsystems are inoperable, if unable to attain COLD SHUTDOWN as required by this ACTION, maintain reactor coolant temperature as low as practical by use of alternate heat removal methods.

FERMI - UNIT 2 3/4 5-2

, 2 .

. 3/4.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS BASES -

'3/4.6.1 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT 3/4.6.1.1 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY PRIMARY CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY ensures that the release of radioactive mate-rials from the containment atmosphere will be restricted to those leakage paths and associated leak rates assumed in the safety analyses. This restriction, in conjunction with the leakage rate limitation, will limit the SITE BOUNDARY radiation doses to within the limits of 10 CFR Part 100 during accident conditions.

3/4.6.1.2 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT LEAKAGE The limitations on primary containment leakage rates ensure that the total containment leakage volume will not exceed the value assumed in the safety analyses at the peak accfdent pressure of 56.5 psig, P,. As an added conserva-tism, the measured overall integrated leakage t-ate is further limited to less than or equal to 0.75 L, during performance of the periodic tests to account for possible degradation of the containment leakage barriers between leakage tests.

Operating experience with the main steam line isolation valves has g-Indicated that degradation has occasionally occurred in the leak tightness of the valves; therefore the special requirement for testing these valves.

The surveillance testing for measuring leakage rates is consistent with the requirements of Appendix J of 10 CFR Part 50 with the exception of i

exemptions granted for main steam isolation valve leak testing and testing the airlocks after each opening and analyzing the Type A test data.

N45.4 - M1

, Appendix J to 10 CFR Part-50, Paragraph III.A.3, requires that A l- tests be conducted in accordance with the provisions of 4E6-49M, " Leak e-l~ Rate Testing of Containment Structures for Nuclear Reactors." M9+49M requires that Type A test data be analyzed using point-to point or total time analytical techniques. Specification 4.6.1.2a. requires use of the mass plot analytical technique. The mass plot method is considered the better analytical technique, since it yields a confidence interval which is a small fraction of the calculated leak rate; and the interval decreases as more data sets are added l to the calculation. The total time and point-to point techniques may give con-l fidence intervals, which are large fractions of the calculated leak rate, and the intervals may increase as more data sets are added.

The mass plot method is endorsed by ANSI /ANS 56.8-1981 (Containment System Leakage Requirements) which superseded N45.4-1972.

3/4.6.1.3 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT AIR LOCKS The limitations on closure and leak rate for the primary containment air locks are required to meet the restrictions on PRIMARY CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY l

and the primary containment leakage rate given in Specifications 3.6.1.1 and FERMI - UNIT 2 B 3/4 6-1

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