ML20212C534
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,'g UNITED STATES
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o NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION -
E WASHINGTON, D. C. 20$55 3
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CHAIRMAN February 18, 1987 The Honorable Morris K. Udall, Chairman Subcommittee on Energy and the Environment Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs United States House of Representatives Washington, D. C. 20515
Dear Mr. Chairman:
I an enclosing the report of the nondisclosure of Safeguards Information by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission for the quarter ending December 31, 1986. This is in accordance with the orovisions of Section 207(a) of Public Law 96-?o5 of . lune 30, 1980.
Sincerely, N. %
Lando W. 7. h , 1 {,
Enclosure:
As Stated cc: Rep. Manuel L u.ia n
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G703030007 870226 PDR COMMS NRCC CORRESPONDENCE PDR
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION QUARTERLY REPORT ON NONDISCLOSURE OF' SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION Section 147 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, prohibits the unauthorized disclosure of specific types of Safeguards Information. This.
section also directs the Nuclear Regulatory Commiasion (NRC) to prescribe such regulations as necessary to prohibit the unauthorizeo disclosure of Safeguards Information. NRC's regulations implementing Section 147 were published in the Federal Register on October 22, 1981 (46 FR 51718). The attachment to this report identifies the specific types of information,, documents, and recorts that are protected from unauthorized disclosure.
Section 147 also requires thatsthe NRC report on a quarterly basis the Commission's application during that period of every regulation or order prescribed or issued under this section. As required by Section 147, the following items indicate the Safeguards Information withheld from public disclosure under the provisions of the implementing regulations during the period October 1, 1986 through December 31, 1986.
During the reporting period .the following identifies information withheld from three separate Freedom of Information Act requests.
I. Type of Information Withheld On one occasion, information was withheld from public disclosure which identified the size and armament of responding #orces, locations of intrusion detection devices, and details of communications system at a facility. '
Unauthorized Disclosure Could Have Adverse Impact The public disclosure of this type of information could significantly increase the probability of unauthorized entry into the facilities, and the information could be of considerable value to a potential saboteur in considering or planning a sabatoge attempt.
Assurance That Only the Minimum Amount of Information was Withheld The withholding of this type of Safeguards Information does not deny the public basic information concerning the level of protection afforded material at facilities but does leave information gaps.
A line-by-line review of the documents was conducted to ensure that only the miniumum amount of information was withheld.
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.II. Type of Information Withheld ,
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On one occasion, information was withheld from public disclosure 1 which identified the size, response time and amament of responding forces at a facility.
Unauthorized Disclosure Could Have Adverse Impact The public disclosure of this type of information could significantly l
increase the probability of unauthorized entry into the facility, and l the information could be of considerable value to a potential saboteur in considering or planning a sabotage attempt.
l Assurance That Only The Minimum Amount Of Infomation Was Withheld
! The withholding of this type of Safeguards Infomation does not deny the public basic information concerning the level of protection afforded material at facilities but does leave infomation gaps.
- A line-by-line review of the document was conducted to ensure that i only the minimum amount of information was withheld.
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j III. Type of Information Withheld On one occasion, information was withheld from public disclosure which identified details of the alarm system layout, procedures for members of the security organization, on-site connunication system, lock combinations, locations of certain safety-related equipment identified as vital, and the size, response time and armament of responding forces at a research reactor.
l Unauthorized Disclosure Could Have Adverse Impact The public disclosure of this type of information could significantly i increase the probability of unauthorized entry into the facility, and
! the information could be of considerable value to a potential saboteur I
in considering or planning a sabotage attempt.
Assurance That Only The Minimum Amount of Information Was Withheld The withholding of this type of Safeguards Information does not deny the public basic information concerning the level of protection afforded material at facilities but does leave infomation gaps.
A line-by-line review of the documents was conducted to ensure that only the minimum amount of infomation was withheld.
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.s ATTACHMENT IDENTIFYING SPECIFIC TYPES OF INFORMATION PROTECTED FROM UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURE 9
- 1. Physical Protection at Fixed Sites Information not otherwise classified as Restricted Data or National Security Inforcation relatir.g7to the' protection of facilities that process form.ula quantities of strategic special nuclear material and power reactors.
Specifically:
4 (i) The composite physical security plan for the nuclear ;
facility or site. '
(ii) Site specific drawings, diagrams, sketches, or maps that substantially represent the final design features of the physical protection system.
(iii) Details of alarm system layouts showing location of intrusion detection devices, alarm assessment equipment, alarm system wiring, emergency power sources, and duress alarms. ,
(iv) Written physical security orders and procedures for members of the security organization, duress codes, and patrol schedules. '
(v) Details of the on-site and off-site communications systems that are used for security purposes.
(vi) Lock combinations and mechanical k'ey design.
(vii) Documents and other matter that contain lists or locations of certain safety-related equipment explicitly identified in the document as vital for purposes of physical protection, as contained in physical security plans, safeguards contingency plans, or plant specific safeguards analyses for production or utilization facilities.
(viii) The composite safeguards contingency plan for the facility or site.
b (fx) Those portions of the facility guard qualification.and training plan which disclose features of the physical security system or response procedures.
(x) Response plans to specific threats detailing size, disposition, response time, and armament of responding forces.
(xi) Size, armament, and disposition of on-site reserve forces.
(xii) Size, identity, armament, and arrival times of off-site forces comitted to respond to safeguards emergencies.
- 2. Physicel Protection in Transit Information not otherwise classifiec as Restricted Data or National Security Information relative to the protection of shipments of formula quantities of strategic special nuclear material and spent fuel.
Specifically:
(1) The composite transportation physical security plan.
(ii) Schedules and itineraries for specific shipments.
(Routes and quantities for shipments of spent fuel are not withheld from public disclosure. Schedules for spent fuel shipments may be released 10 days after the last shipment of a current series.)
(iii)
Details of vehicle immobilization features, intrusion alam devices, and communication systems.
(iv) Arrangements with and capabilities of local police response forces, and locations of safe havens.
(v) Details regarding limitations of radio-telephone communications.
(vi) Procedures for response to safeguards emergencies.
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- 3. Inspections, Audits, and Evalutions Information not otherwise classified as Restricted Data or National Security Information relating to safeguards inspections and reports.
Specifically:
Portions of safeguards inspection reports, evaluations, audits, or investigations that contain details of a licensee's or applicant's physical security system or that disclose uncorrected defects weaknesses, or vulnerabilities in the system. Information regarding defects, weaknesses, or vulnerabilities may be released after corrections have been made. Reports of investigations may be released after the investigation has been completed, unless withheld pursuant to other authorities, e.g., the Freedom of Information Act (5 U.S.C. 552).
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