ML20212B550

Environ Qualification of Safety- Related Electrical Equipment

ML20212B550
Person / Time
Site:	South Texas
Issue date:	12/23/1986
From:	HOUSTON LIGHTING & POWER CO.
To:
Shared Package
ML20212B489	List: ML20212B550 ST-HL-AE-1863, Forwards South Texas Project Unit 1 Environ Qualification of Safety-Related Electrical Equipment, Providing Addl Program Description.Encl Should Be Used W/Fsar & Ref Submittal to Understand Complete Plant Program & Commitment
References
NUDOCS 8612290271
Download: ML20212B550 (48)

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W HOUSTON LIGHTING & POWER COMPANY SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT UNIT 1 l

ENVIRONMENTAL QUALIFICATION OF SAFETY-RELATED ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT i

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HOUSTON LIGHTING & POWER COMPANY SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT ENVIRONMENTAL QUALIFICATION OF SAFETY-RELATED ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT Table of Centents SEeTION TITLE PAGE

1.0 INTRODUCTION

1-1 1.1 Purpose..................

1-1 1.2 Scope...................

1-1 1.3 Associated Programs............

1-1 1.4 Program Responsibilities.........

1-2 1.4.1 Bechtel Energy Corp. (BEC)........

1-2 1.4.2 Westinghouse...............

1-2 1.4.3 Houston Lighting & Power Co. (HL&P)....

1-2 1.5 STP Position...............

1-3 2.0 IDENTIFICATION OF SAFETY-RELATED ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT...........

2-1 2.1 Criteria for Selection of Equipment....

2-1 2.2 Identification of Safety-Related Equipmer.t 2-1 2.3 Identification of Nonsafety-Related Equipment 2-1 2.4 Identification of Post Accident Monitoring l

Equipment.................

2-2 2.5 Equipment Qualification Masterfile (EQM).

2-2 3.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONDITIONS.........

3-1 3.1 Normal Service Conditions.........

3-1 3.2 Abnormal Service Conditions........

3-1 3.3 Accident Service Conditions........

3-1 3.3.1 DBE Conditions Inside Containment.....

3-1 3.3.1.1 Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA)......

3-1 3.3.1.2 Main Steam Line Break (MSLB).......

3-2 3.3.1.3 High Energy Line Break (HELB).......

3-2 3.3.1.4 Radiation Levels Inside Containment....

3-3 3.3.1.5 Chemical Spray..............

3-5 3.3.1.6 Submergence................

3-5 3.3.2 DBE Conditions Outside Containment....

3-5 3.3.2.1 Isolation Valve Cubicles.........

3-6 3.3.2.2 Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Room.......

3-6 3.3.2.3 Mechanical Auxiliary Building.......

3-7 3.3.2.4 Radiation levels Outside Containment...

3-7 3.3.2.4.1 Direct Radiation Doses from Containment..

3-7 3.3.2.4.2 Direct Radiation Doses from Emergency Core Cooling Systems (ECCS) Piping....

3-8 3.3.2.5 Safety Injection System..........

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HOUSTON LIGHTING & POWER COMPANY SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT ENVIRONMENTAL QUALIFICATION OF SAFETY-RELATED ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT Table of Contents (Continued)

SECTION TITLE-PAGE 3.3.2.6 Containment Spray System.........

3-8 3.3.2.7 Post-Accident Sampling System.......

3-8 3.3.2.8 Direct Doses from Normal Radioactive Process System..............

3-9 3.3.2.9 Residual Heat Removal System.......

3-9 4.0 ENVIRONMENTAL QUALIFICATION METHODOLOGY..

4-1 4.1 Codes and Standards Used for Qualification 4-1 4.2 Test Sequence...............

4-1 4.3 Test Specimen...............

4-2 4.4 Margin..................

4-2 4.5 Interface.................

4-2 4.6 Aging and Synergistic Effects.......

4-2 4.7 Analysis.................

4-2 4.8 Inspection and Enforcement - Information Notice..................

4-3 4.9 Operability................

4-3 4.10 Accuracy.................

4-4 4.11 Equipment Qualification Checklist Package (EQCP) and Equipment Qualification Data Package..................

4-4 4.12 System Component Evaluation Worksheets..

4-5 4.13 Mechanical Equipment Qualification....

4-6 4.14 Environmental Qualification Review and Evaluation................

4-6 4.15 Corrective Action Plans..........

4-6 4.16 Flow Diagram of Environmental Qualifica-tion of Mechanical Equipment.......

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5.0 SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT EQUIPMENT i

QUALIFICATION MAINTENANCE AND SURVEILLANCE l

PROGRAM..................

5-1

6.0 REFERENCES

6-1 l

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HOUSTON LIGHTING & POWER COMPANY SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT ENVIRONMENTAL QUALIFICATION OF SAFETY-RELATED ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT TABLES Table 2-1 List of Systems Needed to Perform Safety Functions Pages 2-3 to 2-8 Table 3-1 Environmental Conditions Pages 3-10 to 3-24 i

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N HOUSTON LIGHTING & POWER COMPANY SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT u

ENVIRONMENTAL QUALIFICATION OF SAFETY-RELATED ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT w,

1.0 INTRODUCTION

l.1 Purpose

't The purpose of the Environmental Qualification (E0) Program fpr

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the South Texas Project (STP) is to provide assurance that q'

electrical equipment important to safety as defined in 10CFR i

t 50.49(c), will perform its intended function.

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.'~_,,a This document is prepared in response to the NRC request for N

additional program descriptive information to supplement the Environmental Submittal of August 1986 and the FSAR. These three documents must be considered together in order to establish an understanding of the complete STP program and commitment.

1.2 Scope 3

The equipment within the scope of this program includes those components of the following classes which are located in harsh environments due to the STP postulated accidents, including loss of coolant, high energy line breaks and fuel handling accidents.

a.

Class 1E (safety-related) electrical equipment.

b.

Non-Safety-Related electric equipment whose failure ti jr postulated environmental conditions could prevent the ~

accomplishment of safety functions.

b i

c.

Accident monitoring instrumentation as described in Regulatory Guide 1.97 (Design Categories 1 and 2).

1.3 Associated Programs I

The environmental cualification of electrical equipment in 3 harsh environment is one segment of an integrated program for STP which also includes the following:

a.

Evaluation of electrical equipment in a mild en'ironment.

v b.

Environmental cualification of mecha'nical equipment (soft parts analysis).

c.

Seismic qualification of electrical equipment.

d.

Development of special qualification maintenance requirments.

e.

Plant maintenance and surveillance.

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HOUSTON LIGHTING & POWER COMPANY SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT ENVIRONMENTAL QUALIFICATION OF SAFETY-RELATED ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT 1.4 Program Responsibilities The main participants in the STP qualification program are Bechtel, Westinghouse and HL&P.

1.4.1 Bechtel Energy Corp. (BEC)

Bechtel is responsible for deriving the STP environmental parameters, developing acceptable qualification criteria, developing the Equipment Qualification Masterfile, issuing suitable qualification specifications to equipment vendors, ensuring that vendor qualification programs are acceptable and that their delivered hardware is in conformance with the specifications.

In the case of NSSS equipment, BEC is responsible for ensuring the plant specific applicability of the Westinghouse qualification packages.

In addition, under the direction of HL&P, a participant in the Westinghouse EQ User's Group, BEC reviews the Westinghouse generic qualification documents.

BEC is riso responsible for installation of the equipment in conformance to the qualification program.

1.4.2 Westinghouse As the NSSS supplier, Westinghouse has the responsibility of qualifying the equipment to generic conditions representative of all their plants. The Westinghouse qualification program described in WCAP 8587 has been reviewed and approved by the NRC.

In addition certain NSSS items have been upgraded, and Westinghouse is supplying STP specific qualification f

programs.

l 1.4.3 Houston Lighting & Power Co. (HL&P)

As the Licensee, HL&P has the responsibility for performing an Owner's Review to ensure that licensing and contractual commitments are met.

In addition, HL&P must establish familiarity with the program and its implementation so that licensing commitments will be retained after turnover from BEC.

HL&P is also required to transfer special qualification maintenance requirements from the vendor qualification reports into equipment maintenance programs.

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HOUSTON LIGHTING & POWER COMPANY SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT ENVIRONMENTAL QUALIFICATION OF SAFETY-RELATED ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT 4

1.5 STP Position Th'e EQ Program for the South Texas Project meets the requirements of 10 CFR 50.49. All equipment within the scope of this progran.has been evaluated for compliance with IEEE 323-1974 and NUREG-0588, Category I.

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HOUSTON LIGHTING & POWER COMPANY SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT ENVIRONMENTAL QUALIFICATION OF SAFETY-RELATED ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT 2.0 IDENTIFICATION OF SAFETY-RELATED ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT 2.1 CRITERIA FOR SELECTION OF EQUIPMENT The STP Environmental Qualification Program qualifies all safety-related equipment which is located in a potentially harsh environment.

South Texas Project defines a harsh environment as where normal or accident environmental temperatures exceed 125 F and/or the total integrated dose exceeds lx104 rads (103 for solid state equipment).

Equipment which was considered for inclusion within the scope of the STP program includes the following:

A.

Safety-related (Class 1E) electrical equipment.

B.

Nonsafety-Related electric equipment whose failure under postulated environmental conditions would prevent satisfactory accomplishment of safety functions.

C.

Accident monitoring instrumentation as described in Regulatory Guide 1.97 (Design Categories 1 and 2).

The systems containing electric equipment in the above categories are listed in the previous submittal.

2.2 Identification of Safety-Related Equipment The safety-related equipment required to be qualified has been identified within the normal design engineering process wherein each component is evaluated to determine if it is required to perform a safety function as described in 10CFR50.49. This evaluation utilizes P&ID's together with the plant safety analysis. Results of this evaluation are documented in the design engineering lists by designating each component's safety classification.

2.3 Identification of Nonsafety-Related Equipment During the ongoing design process it was determined that there were some components which do not perform a safety-related functions but whose failure could under postulated design bases events prevent a satisfactory accomplishment of safety I

functions.

This nonsafety-related equipment [10CFR 50.49 l

paragraph (b)(2)] was added to the list for qualification and identified as " Qualified Non-Safety Instrumentation".

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HOUSTON LIGHTING & POWER COMPANY SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT ENVIRONMENTAL QUALIFICATION OF SAFETY-RELATED ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT 2.4 Identification of Post Accident Monitoring Equipment An STP specific review of post accident monitoring equipment (PAM) was performed utilizing the guidance presented in Regulatory Guide 1.97, Rev. 3.

This review determined a list of instruments necessary for monitoring plant conditions and equipment after a design bases accident. As stated in Reg.

Guide 1.97, the instrumentation in Categories 1 and 2 require environmental qualification.

This PAM's equipment [10CFR 50.49 paragraph (b)(3)] was added to the list for qualification.

2.5 Equipment Qualification Masterfile (E0M)

The Equipment Qualification Masterfile is also a controlled data base residing in the same computer system as the design engineering lists discussed above. The design engineering lists consist of the Instrument Index, Valve List and Equipment List.

The EQM is created and updated periodically by electronic transfer of all components designated for qualification as described in preceding paragraphs. The EQM sort of equipment in harsh environments consist of nine (9) nuclear safety-related data fields and two (2) information fields. The nuclear safety-related data fields are as follows:

a.

Safety System Designation b.

Equipment Tag Number 9

c.

Equipment Description d.

Electrical or Mechanical Classification e.

Location (Building and Room) f.

Elevation g.

Purchase Order Number h.

Manufacturer i.

Model Number j.

Qualification Status k.

Installation Status 2-2 8566c/0330c 5

e TABLE 2-1 LIST OF SYSTEMS NEEDED TO PERFORM SAFETY FUNCTIONS EE RGENCY REACTOR CONTAINENT REACTOR OTHERS SYSTEM REACTOR CONTAINENT CORE HEAT HEAT RADI0 ACTIVITY (SeeNotes SYSTEM NAE DESIGNATOR SHUTDLW ISOLATION COOLING REMOVAL REMOVAL CONTROL On Page 6)

Auxiliary Feedwater AF X

X X

X i

Post Accident Monitoring AM Post Accident Sampling AP X

X(b),(c)

Auxiliary / Steam System &

AS X(a)

Boiler Breathing Air System BA X

Baron Recycle BR XI'}

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Process Control System BS X

X X

X X

X X

I Component Cooling Water CC X

X X

X X(a)

Containment Combustible CG X(a)

Gas Control Chilled Water CH X(a)

Containment (Hydrogen)

CM X

X(a)

Monitoring Containment Spray CS X

X X

Condensate Storage CT X( a)

(Auxiliary Feedwater) 1 2-3 8567c/0330c

TABLE 2-1 LIST OF SYSTEMS NEEDED TO PERFC?.M SAFETY FUNCTIONS EERGENCY REACTOR CONTAINENT REACTOR OTHERS SYSTEM REACTOR CONTAINENT CORE HEAT HEAT RADI0 ACTIVITY (SeeNotes SYSTEM NAE DESIGNATOR SHUTDOWN ISOLATION COOLING REM) VAL REMOVAL CONTROL On Page 6)

Chemical and Volume Control CV X

X Standby Olesel Generator DG X(a)

DO JW*

LU*

SD*

125V de Power (11 X(a)

Non Radioactive Plumbing DR X(*)

Drains and Sumps (Maintain Pressure Boundary)

Make-Up Demineralizer DW X

Radioactive Vents and Drain ED X

Electro-Hydraulic Systems EH X

(Generate Reactor Trip (Antici-Signals) patory)

Essential Cooling Water EW X(a)

Spent Fuel Pool Cooling FC X

and Cleanup Fuel Handling FH X(a)

Fire Protection System FP X

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TABLE 2-1 LIST OF SYSTEMS NEEDED TO PERFORM SAFETY FUNCTIONS EERGENCY REACTOR CONTAINENT REACTOR OTHERS SYSTEM REACTOR CONTAINENT CORE HEAT HEAT RADI0 ACTIVITY (SeeNotes SYSTEM NAE DESIGNATOR SHUTDOWN ISOLATION COOLING REMOVAL REMOVAL CONTROL On Page 6)

Feedwater FW X

Control Room HVAC HB X

X(a)

Containment Building HVAC HC X

X Electric Auxiliary Building HE X(a)

HVAC Fuel Handling Building HVAC HF X

X(a)

Standby Diesel Generator HG X(a)

Building HVAC Mechanical Auxiliary Building HM X(a)

HVAC Miscellaneous HWAC HZ X(a)

Instrument Air IA X

Incore Instrumentation II X(a)

Containment Leak Rate Testing IL X

Emergency ac Lighting LA XIf)

Main Steam MS X

X X

X Main Steam Drains MT X

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TABLE 2-1 LIST OF SYSTEMS NEEDED TO PERFORM SAFETY FUNCTIONS EERGENCY REACTOR CONTAINENT REACTOR OTERS SYSTEM REACTOR CONTAINENT - CORE HEAT HEAT RADI0 ACTIVITY (SeeNotes SYSTEM NAE DESIGNATOR SHUTDOWN ISOLATION COOLING REMOYAL REMOVAL CONTROL On Page 6)

Nuclear instrumentation NI X

Nitrogen Storage System NL X

4KV ac Power PK X(a) 480V Load Centers PL X(a) 480V MCCS PM X(a)

Reactor Coolant Pump 011 PO X

Primary Samplir.g System PS X

Radiation Monitoring RA X

X Reactor Coolant RC X

X X

X Reactor Coolant Vacuum RD X

Degassing Residual Heat Removal RH X

X X

X Reactor Makeup Water RM X

Rod Control RS X

Station Air (Maintain SA X

Pressure Boundary)

Steam Generator Blowdown SB X

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TABLE 2-1 LIST OF SYSTEMS NEEDED TO PERFORM SAFETY FUNCTIONS EERGENCY REACTOR CONTAINENT REACT (R OTERS SYSTEM REACTOR CONTAINENT CORE HEAT HEAT RADI0 ACTIVITY (See Notes SYSTEM NAE DESIGNATOR SHUTDOWN ISOLATION COOLING REMOVAL REMDVAL CONTROL On Page 6)

Engineering Safety Feature SF X

X X

X X(a)

Actuation Safety Injection SI X

X S. G. Sludge Lancing and SL X

Chemical Cleaning System Solid State Protection SP X

X X

X X

120V ac Class 1E Uninter-VA X(a) rupted Power Supply Radwaste Liquid WL X

Containment Building Airlock XC X

Various Systems ZE XI'}

Instrument Bridle Valving ZH Z3 ZK ZP ZT ZQ Zu ZY l

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TABLE 2-1 LIST OF SYSTEMS NEEDED TO PERFORM SAFETY FUNCTIONS EERGENCY REACTOR CONTAINENT REACTOR OTERS SYSTEM REACTOR CONTAINENT CORE HEAT HEAT RADI0 ACTIVITY (See Notes SYSTEM NAE DESIGNATOR SHUTDOWN ISOLATION COOLING REMOYAL REMOVN.

CONTROL On Page 6)

NOTES:

i;ap Provides support for other safety systems.

I b l Indication of selected parameters only.

(c[

Safety grade control of Class lE valves.

I d,I RHR/ Safe Shutdown implication.

l e,I Pressure boundary only.

l f, 1 Maintain Class lE power supply integrity.

I t g,I Isolation devices safety and non-safety circuit, i

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HOUSTON LIGHTING & POWER COMPANY SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT ENVIRONMENTAL QUALIFICATION OF SAFETY-RELATED ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT 3.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONDITIONS For the purpose of establishing environmental conditions for qualification, the plant is divided into buildings and rooms, the environmental parameters for each of these rooms were determined for normal, abnormal and accident service conditions as applicable. This information is provided in Design Criteria 4E019NQ1009 and Table 3.11-1 of the Final Safety Analysis Report, Section 3.11.

However, the latest revision, FSAR change request 929 (HL&P Change Notice 980) is included in Table 3-1.

3.1 NORMAL SERVICE CONDITIONS Normal conditions include the normal operating ranges which the heating, ventilating, and air conditioning (HVAC) equipment will maintain during routine plant operation, maintenance, or testing.

This includes shutdown and hot standby.

3.2 ABNORMAL SERVICE CONDITIONS Abnormal conditions are those environmental conditions resulting from a loss of non-safety HVAC. This loss of non-safety HVAC may be caused by an equipment failure or loss of off-site power. The duration of a loss of normal HVAC is taken as 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, with a frequency of occurrence of once per year.

3.3 ACCIDENT SERVICE CONDITIONS Accident ccnditions are those plant conditions resulting from the most limiting pipe failure for that location.

In the case where pipe breaks are not limiting, temperatures are based on the HVAC Design Criteria for the corresponding area.

The specific analyses performed and their results are discussed in greater detail below.

3.3.1 Design Basis Event (DBE) Conditions Inside Containment 3.3.1.1 Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA)

The environmental qualification and design condition envelope is based on an analysis of the containment response to a spectrum of hot and cold leg LOCAs. The analyses were performed using Bechtel's COPATTA containment response analysis program. The C0PATTA program predicts pressures and temperatures within the containment building atmosphere and sump regions and the temperature profiles in various modeled 3-1 8568c/0330c

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HOUSTON LIGHTING & POWER COMPANY SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT ENVIRONMENTAL QUALIFICATION OF SAFETY-RELATED ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT structures. A complete description can be found in Bechtel Topical Report BN-TOP-3.

The methodology used in the COPATTA program is consistent with that provided in NUREG-0588 as applied to LOCA analyses. The analyses used to define the qualification envelope were developed from break mass / energy flow data provided by Westinghouse and are presented in FSAR Section 6.2.

The worst case LOCA is a double-ended pump suction break at full power with loss of off-site power and loss of one train of Containment Heat Pemoval System. The post-accident qualification envelope for safety-related equipment is shown in Dwg. No. 2C-01-9N-90030.

3.3.1.2 Main Steam Line Break (MSLB)

The environmental qualification and design condition envelope is based on an analysis of the containment response to a spectrum of secondary system pipe ruptures. This evaluation was performed utilizing the Bechtel COPATTA code incorporated with the methodology presented in NUREG-0588, Appendix B.

On the basis of peak containment pressure, the full double-ended rupture at hot shutdown is the most severe case. On the basis of peak containment temperature, the 1.40 ft2 double-ended rupture at 102 percent power is the most severe case, (see FSAR section 6.2.1.4).

The post-accident design envelope for safety-related equipment inside containment conservatively covered by Dwg.

1. 2C-01-9N-90030 and 2C-01-9N-90031.

3.3.1.3 High Energy Line Break (HELB)

The evaluation of environmental conditions associated with the high energy line break (HELB) are presented in FSAR Section 3.6.

A listing of the lines that are considered capable of failure is given in FSAR Tables 3.6.1-1 and 3.6.2-3 (LOCA only).

Design features such as physical separation, pipe supports, pipe restraints, and conduit supports are provided where proven that pipe l

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HOUSTCN LIGHTING & POWER COMPANY SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT ENVIRONMENTAL QUALIFICATION OF SAFETY-RELATED ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT whip or jet impingement effects could damage essential systems to an extent which would impair their design function or affect necessary component operability. Physical barriers are provided to protect essential components where analysis shows that adverse effects could still result.

For the in-containment environmental analysis, the bulk containment temperature, pressure, and humidity conditions resulting from the HELB are enveloped by the environmental conditions resulting from the MSLB and LOCA Design Basis Accidents.

3.3.1.4 Radiation Levels Inside Containment i

Safety-related equipment in areas which may be exposed to significant radiation during post-accident operation has been assessed using the guidance provided by NUREG-0588 and NUREG-0737.

As a result of a loss-of-coolant accident a complete depressurization of the primary system and a large release of radioactive material to the containment atmosphere could occur.

The sources of radiation are discussed in FSAR Chapters 12 and 15.

Gamma and beta doses are determined for I

three types of radioactive source distributions:

a, containment airborne, b.

plate out on containment surfaces, and c.

mixed in the containment sump water. A given piece of equipment may receive a dose contribution from any or all of these sources. The amount of dose contributed by each of these sources is determined by the location of the equipment and the effects of shielding.

a.

Containment Airborne The finite cloud model is used to calculate the gamma dose to equipment from airborne sources. This model uses a sphere with the same volume as that of the containment.

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HOUSTON LIGHTING & POWER COMPANY SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT l

ENVIRONMENTAL QUALIFICATION OF SAFETY-RELATED ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT The beta doses to equipment from airborne sources following a postulated accident are calculated using a semi-infinite cloud model. All the beta energy is assumed to be absorbed by the equipment.

b.

Plateout The area available for Plateout is based on the calculated LOCA heat sink areas.

The contribution to the gamma dose from iodine plateout is calculated using a cylindrical shell source of the same height and volume as that of the containment. No internal structures are modeled. Air attenuation is not considered.

Beta doses to equipment due to plateout assume that the iodine plates out uniformly on all the plateout surfaces. An infinite plane source model is used to calculate the equipment dose.

c.

Sump The gamma dose from the sump is calculated by modeling the sump as a cylinder of the same radius as the secondary shield wall. The dose is then calculated at the center of this cylinder.

In addition to gamma and beta radiation from accident sources, doses due to normal operation over a 40-year plant life are also considered.

The total integrated dose from gamma and beta sources are added together to establish equipment qualification requirements.

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HOUSTON LIGHTING & POWER COMPANY SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT l

ENVIRONMENTAL QUALIFICATION OF SAFETY-RELATED ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT 3.3.1.5 Chemical Spray The LOCA chemistry conditions are 2000-4000 parts per million of boric acid (H 80 )

3 3 and Sodium Hydroxide (NA0H) to maintain the pH value of 7.5/10.5 for a total duration spray of 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />. STP E0 program include the effects on the qualification equipment.

The SCEW sheets indicate the requirements and~ qualification results.

3.3.1.6 Submergence STP has located equipment that will be required to perform safety functions above the flood level. Equipment is evaluated and protected if necessary against wetting effects and flooding effects.

3.3.2 DBE Conditions Outside Containment Plant areas containing high energy lines were systematically identified in a review of piping layout and plant arrangement. This systematic review verifies that the effects of postulated auxiliary system piping breaks (HELB) are isolated, physically remote or restrained by plant design features from safety-related systems or components. Where jet impingement due to HELB breaks on safety-related equipment could occur, it has been demonstrated that insufficient impingement load was generated to damage the equipment or barriers have been erected to protect the equipment.

For each area previously identified, an environmental analysis is performed to verify that those safety-related systems and components which are required to function during the postulated event and I

are exposed to the harsh environment are qualified to j

operate in the maximum temperature, pressure, and l.

humidity envelope generated by the piping break. The plant areas affected by HELB are addressed in the l

following subsections.

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L HOUSTON LIGHTING & POWER COMPANY SOUTH TEXAS ~ PROJECT ENVIRONMENTAL QUALIFICATION OF-SAFETY-RELATED ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT 3.3.2.1 Isolation Valve Cubicles The isolation valve cubicles located between the Turbine building and Containment building have been analyzed for environmental effects on single-area steam and feedwater line breaks. The results of the analysis are contained in FSAR Appendix 3.6.A.

The objective of the analysis was to define short-term peak pressure-temperature conditions in the valve-rooms in response to single area pipe breaks. The analysis was performed using the Bechtel computer program, FLUD, a multi-node, thermal-hydraulic code.

It is described in detail in FSAR section 3.6.A.

The analysis showed the single area rupture of a main steam line in the main steam isolation structure to be limiting.

The post-accident qualification envelope for safety-related equipment in this area is shown on FSAR Table 3.11-1.

The STP has evaluated the effect of superheated steam for a Main Steam Line Break (MSLB) on systems and components outside of containment. The evaluatian indicates that the only location for potential deleterious effects at STP would be the Isolation Valve Cubicle (IVC). At STP, the IVC consists of four separate cubicles (one per steam line) separated by i

concrete structural walls. No credit is taken for equipment in a cubicle where a rupture occurs in the event analysis.

The evaluation is documented in letter ST-HL-AE-1124 dated September 28, 1984. The conclusion is that the effects of a release i

of superheated steam in the IVC do not pose a threat to the ability to bring the plant to a safe shutdown.

3.3.2.2 Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Room Since the isolation velve cubicles are

^ hysically separated between trains, the p

postulated pipe breaks in the steam supply i

line to the turbine driven pump would impact l

safety-related equipment associated with i

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HOUSTON LIGHTING & POWER COMPANY SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT ENVIRONMENTAL QUALIFICATION OF SAFETY-RELATED ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT this pump and other safety-related equipment associated with the steam and feedwater lines from the applicable steam generator.

These postulated breaks would disable the pump, therefore this equipment would not be required to function and qualification of this equipment to the pipe break environment is not required. Other equipment and pumps associated with other steam generators are located in rooms that are isolated from pipe break events other than in their own pump room. They are not required to be qualified for the pipe break environment.

3.3.2.3 Mechanical Auxiliary Building There are some high energy lines located in the mechanical auxiliary building. Analysis of the environmental response of each area to rupture of these high energy lines is consistent with the requirements of NUREG-0588. These analysis were completed using the Bechtel canputer code "FLUD".

"FLUD" is a multi-node, thermal-hydraulic code.

It is described in detail in the Bechtel user's manual. The FLUD code takes credit for heat transfer to surrounding structures and provides a realistic calculation of long-term subcompartment pressures and temperatures as a function of time following pipe breaks.

3.3.2.4 Radiation Levels Outside Containment The sources of radiation to the outside containment can be identified as:

a.

direct radiation doses from containment, b.

direct doses from emergency core cooling system (ECCS) piping, and c.

direct doses from normal radioactive process systems.

3.3.2.4.1 Direct Radiation Doses from Containment In order to calculate the direct dose from containment, the gamma dose is determined by using the OAD, point-kernel, shielding code.

The concrete containment shell and interior concrete structures are modeled.

The beta dose is attenuated by the containment structure.

3-7 8568c/0330c

HOUSTON LIGHTING & POWER COMPANY SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT ENVIRONMENTAL QUALIFICATION OF SAFETY-RELATED ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT The direct dose from containment is due to airborne radioactivity within containment.

Major radiation streaming paths considered are containment penetrations such as the equipment hatch, personnel air lock, and purge penetrations.

3.3.2.4.2 Direct Radiation Doses from Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) Piping 4

Piping containing radioactive fluid is modeled as a cylindrical source. Credit is taken for concrete shielding as appropriate. Beta radiation from piping is negligible due to the steel thickness.

3.3.2.5 Safety Injection System The safety injection pumps are assumed to be operating in the recirculation mode.

Prior to start of recirculation, the high-pressure safety injection system will contain non-radioactive water from the refueling water storage tank. At the = tart of recirculation (approximately 30 minutes after the start of the accident), the source terms are those given for the containment sump in FSAR section 3.11.5.2.

3.3.2.6 Containment Spray System The containment spray system is assumed to i

be operating in the recirculation mode.

Prior to start of recirculation, the containment spray system will contain non-radioactive water from the refueling water storage tank. At the start of recirculation (approximately 30 minutes after the start of the accident), the source i

terms are those given for the containment sump in FSAR section 3.11.5.2.

3.3.2.7 Post-Accident Sampling System The piping for the post-accident sampling system contain sources from outside containment. The sources ir.cluded in FSAR section 3.11.5.2 may be present in those i

samples.

l 3-8 8568c/0330c

HOUSTON LIGHTING & POWER COMPANY SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT ENVIRONMENTAL QUALIFICATION OF SAFETY-RELATED ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT 3.3.2.8 Direct Doses from Normal Radioactive Process Systems

~

Doses due to normal operation over a 40-year plant life are considered. Contributions from piping containing radioactive material are included.

3.3.2.9 Residual Heat Removal System The residual heat removal pumps are assumed to be operating in the shutdown cooling mode. The source terms for this operation are those given for the reactor coolant system described in FSAR section 3.11.5.2.

1 3-9 8568c/0330c

k TARE 3-1,

1 ENVIRONDENTAL CONDITI(IIS l

Relative Cumulative Radiation 4 i

location Temperature Pressure Humidity Dosage (rads)

(Environmentalp Normal Range Abnormal HVAC Accident 3 3 Normal Range Accident Normal

3 Radiation EQ.

l (DesignatorJ (max / min.*F)

Type

(*F)

Normal Accident (maxAnin, 5)

(5)

Range Accident Type Environ.6 1

1. R:ac*or Containment, 2, 5, 7 l

(8xilding Designator - C)

I Reactor c150/6511 131/ 99 QC 323'

+0.3/psig 48.4 psigf 70/0a 100a 3.5 109 1.4x108 H

j Cavity max max (Ra. 001, 002)

-0.1 psig

-3.1 psig9 2.5x1010 neutron 3

min min

}

l Tendon Access 95/50" NA NS M

ate.

M 80/20 M

100 100 gamma M

I Gal 1Iry 1

(Rs. 011. 013) 70/0a" 100a 7x105 1.2x108 left Pug and Heath 120/6511 167/-

QC 323'

+0.3/psig 48.4 psigf gamma N

1 Enchanger Rooms; max max and i

Valve Rooms

-0.1 psig

-3.1 psig9 beta (Re. 104 j

109, lib,105lil,108, min min e

i i

202, 207, 209) j 303, 304, 306 i

NOTES

i 1.

LIEA chemistry conditions are:

j pH,minyax: 7.5/10.5 boric acid (H 80 ): 2000-4000 ppe; depending on the location of equipment, the spray flourate ranges from 2

3 3 0 ps/ft to 0.5 ft, while the a le of ray is vertical. Total duration of spray is 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> which is in accordance with erence kk. N is added to mainta n the noted above.

2.

For the contalmeent structural design, a temperature of 286*F, corresponding to the saturation conditions at the containment structural design pressure, shall be used.

I 3.

Peak values for those accident scenarios without the margins. Margins as defined in IEEE 323-1974 shall be added by the supplier during

{

testing.

1 4 Radiation exposure values represent the 40-year integrated exposures for normal operation and 180 days post-accident for accident values.

i 5.

A one-time structural integrity test at 65 psig is performed on the NC8 prior to operation.

6.

M: Mild Environment; H: Harsh Environment as defined in 3.1.0.

7.

IIside containment normal radiation parameters are gauna only, while accident parameters are gamma and beta.

8.

Definition of Abbreviations / Symbols:

AQ: Safety ~related heating and cooling NA: Not applicable for safe shutdown of the plant.

NS: Non safety grade HVAC heating and cooling.

i QC: Safety grade cooling n

The effect of superheated steam on IVC accident temperatures was raised by NRCIE Bulletin #84-90 and resolved by IRC item #208 and HL&P letter to NNC #5T-HL-AE-1124 dated September 28, 1984.

Tegerature Profile in Appendix A Maximum temperature from temperature profile (Appendix 8)

=

B(P Diesel W111 be provided later for specific locations as needed.

l 8569t/0330c l

I

TAR.E 3-1 EIAf!RON8 ENTAL CONDITIGIS Relative Cumulative Radiattoa4 Location Temperature pressure Numidity Dosage (rads)

(Environmental [

Normal Range Abnormal HVAC Accident 3 3 Nomal Range Accident Normal 3 Radiation EQ.

(Designator)

(maxAnin. *F)

Type

(*F)

Normal Accident (maxAin,5)

(5)

Range Accidad Type Environ.5 St:an Generator a120/65II 159/ " QC 323'

+0.3/psig 48.4 psig 70/0a 100m 2x107 1.2x108 f

ganas M

Cospartments max max and (Rs. 201)

-0.1 psig

-3.1 psig9 bets sin min Pressurizer bl50/65II 197/ " QC 3238

+0.3/psig 48.4 psig 70/0a 100a 2x107 1.2x108 f

gasma M

Enc 1:sure max max and (Rs. 206)

-0.1 psig

-3.1 psig9 beta min ein InsideJROM d200/65U 226/ " NS 323'

+0.3/psig 48.4 psigf 70/0a 100s y,105 1.2x108 g,,,,

y Shroud" max max and

-0.1 psig

-3.1 psig9 beta min min Other Areas a120/65II 165/ " QC 323'

+0.3 psig 48.4 psigf 70/0a 100a 2x107 1.2x108 gamma H

Inside Secondary max max and Shf21d CAbove

-0.1 psig

-3.1 psig9 beta E 1. 19')

ein min I

Other Areas a120/65II 167/ " QC 323'

+0.3/psig 48.4 psigf 70/0a 100a 3.5x105 1.4x108 gamma H

I2 side Secondary max max and Sh121d (Below

-0.1 psig

-3.1 psig9 beta E 1. 19', Rs.004) ein min Other Areas Outside 120/65II 168 %

QC 3238

+0.3/psig 48.4 psig 70/0 100 3.5x104 1.4x108 gamma H

Secondary Shield max max and

-0.1 psig

-3.1 psig beta min ein 2.

Isolation Valve Cubicles (8v11 ding Designator-I)

Watertight Rooms 129/408" 129/ M NS NA ate.

NA 80/20 100 100 100 gamma M

(Res. 001. 002,

=

003,004)

Aux. Feedwater 104/50' 104/36"QC 335*""

slightly 5.8 psigo 80/20 100 100 1.3x104 gamma H

pump Cubicles positive

=

(R; s. 005. 006, 007,008) and i

platforms, E1. 21'2*

(Ras. 101. 102, 103,104) 3-11 8569c/0330c

~

TARE 3-1 Elef!RWNENTAL CONDITIONS Relative Cumulative Radiation 4 Location Tesserature Pressure Numidity Gosage (rads)

(Environmenta1{

floresi Range e normal NVAC Accident 3 3 Ilonmal Range Accident Normal 3' Radiatten EQ. -

(Designator, (maxAsia, 'F)

Type

(*F)

Normal Accident (mezAsia, 5)

(5)

Range Accident Type Environ,6 Feedwater Cubicles 104/5F 104/36"QC 3358""

slightly 5.8 psig 80/20 100 100 1.5m105 o

gamma N

(Ras. 201, 202,.

=

positive 203,204) and Feedwater Line Area (Res. 301, 302, 303. 304)

Stras Line 104/5F 104/35"QC 3350*"

slightly 5.8 psigo 80/20 100 100 3.5m105 gamma H

Area positive

=

(Res. 401. 402, 403,404) 104/508 104/36"QC 3350""

si htly 2.8 psigo 80/20 100 100 3.5ml05 (Ras. 501} 502, gamma N

503, 504 pos tive

=

3.

Electrical Auxiliary Building (Building Designator-M)

Electrical Pene-104/50r 104/50"QC 104r ate.

ata.

80/20 80 100

8. 5x105 trction Room gamma H

(R2. 001)

Power Cable Vault 104/50r 104/50"QC 104r ate.

ate.

80/20 80 100 1.kl03 (Rs. 002) gamma M

Entrance at 104/50r 104/50" QC NA ate.

18 4 80/20 NA 100 8.5m105 Electrical gamma H

Penetration (Re. 003)

Corridor 104/50r 104/50 QC 104" ate.

ate.

80/20 80 100 1.kl03 (Re. 004) gamma M

Fire Extinguish-104/50r 104/50"QC 104F ate.

ate.

80/20 80 100 1.kl03 gemaa M

ing System Room (Rs. 005) 8:ttery Room 77/65r 77/65 AQ 77F

ate, ate.

75/45 80 100 1.kl03 gamma M

(Rm. 006, 008) i 1

l l

3-12

' 856gt/0330c

TAR.E 3-1 EMIRONENTAL CONDITIONS Relative Cumulative Radiation 4 Location Temperature Pressure theidity Dosage (rads)

(Environmental)l Normal Range Abnormal HVAC Accident 3 3 Nomal R Accident Normal 3 Radiation EQ.

(Designatcr (sax / min *F)

Type

(*F)

Normal Accident (eax/ min (5)

Range Accident Type Environ.6 Distribution 104/50r 104/50" QC 104" ate.

ate.

80/20 80 100 100 gassa M

Panel (Res. 007. -

009)

Electrical 104/5GP 104/50" QC NA ate.

NA 80/20 M

100 100 gamma M

Equipment Room (Re. 008A)

Switchgear Roco 86'*/50" 86/50" QC 104r ate.

ate.

80/20 80 100 100 gaara M

(Re. 010) 9 WAC Room 104/509 104/50 QC 1044 slightly

+0.125 wg4 80/20 80 100 500 gamma M

(Re. 013) positive Cable Spreading Later Later N4 120I slightly 0.3 psigY 80/20 100 100 130 gassa M

Room negative (Ps.14B)

Aux. Shutdown 80/50r 80/50" QC 80r ate.

ate.

80/20 80 100 100 gassa M

Panel (Re. 015,B,C D)

Electrical Cable 104/50r 104/50" QC 104r ato.

ate.

80/20 80 100 1.3x103 Room (Re.101) ganea M

Cable Spreadin 104/50r 104/50" QC 104r ate.

ate.

80/20 80 100 1.3x103 Roan (Re.102)g ganea M

9 HVAC Roos 104/509 104/50 QC 104P ate.

ato.

80/20 80 100 500 gamma M

(Re.1048)

Electrical Pene-104/50r 104/50" QC 104r ato.

ate.

80/20 80 100 5x105 gassa H

tration Area (Re. 201)

R21ay Roos 80/729 80/72 "QC 809 slightly

+0.125 wg4 80/20 80 100 100 gassa M

(Re. 202) positive Control Room 78/729 78/72 "QC 781 slightly

+0.125 wg4 80/20 80 100 100 -

gausa M

(Re. 203) positive 9

R;sults Eng. Office 78/729 78/72 QC 120I ate.

0.3 psigY 80/20 80 100 100 gausa M

(C:. 2038)

Kitchen 78/729 78/72 QC MA ate.

NA 80/20 NA 100 500 ganea M

(Re.205C) 9 HVAC Room 104/509 104/50 QC 1049 slightly

+0.125"wg4 80/20 80 100 500 genua M

(Re. 206) positive 3-13 8569c/0330c

TAR.E 3-1 ENVIRONENTAL CONDITIONS Relative Cumulative Radiation 4 Location Temperature Pressure Humidity Dosage (rads)

(Environmenta15 Normal Range Abnormal HVAC Accident 3 3 Normal Range Accident Normal 3 Radiation EQ. '

(Designator)

(max /ntn,*F)

Type

(*F)

Normal Accident (maxAnin, 5)

(1)

Range Accidenk Type Environ.'

S=1te ear Room 86"/50r 8U50"QC 104r ats.

ata.

80/20 80 100 130 gamma M

(Re. 2 2)

Distribution 104/50P 104/50" QC 104r ats.

ata.

80/20 80 100 130 gamma M

Room (Rs. 213, 2158)

Battery) Room 77/65" 77/65 AQ 77r ata.

ata.

75/45 80 100 130 gamma M

(Rm 214 Computer Room 77/739 NA NS 779 sli htly

+0.125"wg4 40 40 100 130 gamma M

(Rs. 215) pos tive Electrfeal 104/50r 104/50' QC 104r

ata, ata.

80/20 80 100 7x105 Penetration Area gamma H

(Rs. 301)

Cab 12 Spreadin 104/50r 104/50" QC 104r ata.

ata.

80/20 80 100 4x103 Room (Rs. 302)g gamma M

HVAC Room 104/509 104/50' QC 1049 slightly

+0.125'wg4 80/20 80 100 500 ganna M

(Rs. 307) positive Corridor 78/72r 78/72" QC 1201 ate.

0.3 psig4 80/20 80 100 130 gamma M

(Rs. 308)

Corridor 104/50r 104/50 'QC 120I ats.

ata.

80/20 80 100 5.1x105 genna H

(Rs. 308A)

I Elec. Eq. Area 104/50" Later QC 120

ate, ate.

80/20 80 100 130 gasuna M

(Rs. 3080)

Switchgear Room 86"/50r 86/50 QC 104r

ata, ate.

80/20 80 100 100 gamma M

(Re. 318)

Distribution Room 104/50r 104/50" QC 104r ata.

ata.

80/20 80 100 1.3 103 gamma M

l (Rs. 319) l Motor Generator 104/50r 104/50 QC 104r ata.

ata.

80/20 80 100 1.kl03 Set Room (Rs. 320) gamma M

8.ttcry Room 77/65r 77/65 AQ 77r

ata, ata.

75/45 80 100 1.3x103 (Rs. 321) gamma M

I l

Power Cabinets 104/50r 104/50' QC 104r ats.

ate.

80/20 80 100 4x103 (Ra. 323) gamma M

3-14 8569t/0330c

TAR.E 3-1 EleflRONENTAL CONDITIONS Relative Cumulative Radiation 4 Location

- Temperature Pressure Humidity Dosage (rads)

(Environmenta15 Normal Range Abnormal HVAC Accident 3 3 Normal Ran Accident Normal 3 Radiation EQ. -

(Designator!)

(maxhin, 'F)

Type

(*F)

Normal Accident (maxAmin, (5)

Range Accidedt Type Environ 6 Power Cable Vault 104/50P 104/50" QC 104r ata.

ate.

80/20 80 100 4x103 (Ra401) gamma M

Cagater Room

'77/7300 117 NA 1201 slightly at least 80 40 40 100 100 gamma M

(Rm 402) positive 1/8" positive StorabRoom 104/50r 96/50 'kS M

ata.

M 80R0 M

IM IM gamma H

(Rs.

)

HVAC Room 104/50P 104/50" QC 104r ata.

ata.

80/20 80 100 500 gamma M

(Ra,410)

Cab 12 Vault Room 104/50r 104/50" QC 104r ate.

ate.

80/20 80 100 h103 gamma M

(Rs. 412)

Outside Air Intake 104/29P 104/29" QC NA ata.

NA 80/20 NA 100 1.h104 Structure (Rs. 501) gamma H

HVAC Room 104/50P 104/50" QC NA ata.

NA 80/20 NA 100 1.h104 (Rs.5028) gamp*

H HVAC Room 104/50r 104/50" QC NA ate.

NA 80/20 NA 100 1.kl04 (Rs. 504) gamma H

+

HVAC Roam 104/50r 104/50" QC 104r ate.

ats.

80/20 80 100 1.h104 (Rs. 507) gamma H

HVAC Room 104/50r 104/50"QC 104r ata.

ata.

80/20 80 100 1.kl04 gamma N

(Rs.508,509)

Rad. Monitor 104/50r 104/50" QC 104P ats.

ata.

80/20 80 100 1.h104 (Rs.510) gaan:

H 4

Fuel Handling Building (s againg Designator-t}

HVAC Room 104/655 104/49"QC 120V slightly slightly 80/20 80 103 100 gamma M

(Rs. 003) negative negative ECCS Cubicles 104/65t 104/49"QC 120V slightly slightly 80/20 80 103 7.2x106 gamma H

(Rus. 004, 005, 006) negative negative Recirculation Valve 104/657 104/49"QC 120V slightly slightly 80/20 80 103 Ikl06 gamma H

Rooms (Rus. 007, negative negative 008, 009) 3-15 8569t/0330c

TA~ 3 3-1 EWIRONENTAL CONDITIONS Relative Cumulative Radiation 4 Location Temperature Pressure Itamidity Dosage (rads)

(Environmental)

Normal Range Abnormal HVAC Accident 3 3 Normal Range Accident Normal 3 Radiation EQ. '

(Designator)

(max / min, 'F)

Type

(*F)

Normal Accident (max / min,5)

(5)

Range Accident Type Environ.6 Soray Addit 104/655 104/59"QC 120V slightly slightly 80/20 100 103 2.1x104 Tank Rooms (ive007A..

negative negative gauna H

00BA,009A)

HVAC Room 104/655 Later QC 120' slightly slightly 80/20 80 1000 7.2x106 (Rs. 010) negative negative gamma H

Storace Room 104/65s 104/49 %

120V slightly slightly 80/20 100 103 100 gasuna M

(Rs. 104) negative negative Spent Fuel Pool 104/65s 104/49"QC 120V slightly slightly 80/20 80 2x103 100 gasuna M

Puses negative negative (Res.106,107)

Stora Room

~104/655 119/4h'" NS 120V slightly slightly 80/20 100 103 100 gasuna M

(Rs. 08) negative negative New Fuel Storage 104/65PP Later M

Later slightly slightly 80/20 100 6000 100 gauna M

(Rs. 203) negative negative HVAC Room 104/65s 112/4h'"QC120V slightly slightly 80/20 100 103 100 gasuna M

(Rs. 204) negative negative Pictform 104/655 112/4h*"QC120' slightly slightly 80/20 100 100 100 gasuna M

(Re. 205) negative negative Spent Fuel Pool 104/65s 119/4h'"NS120V slightly slightly 80/20 100 6x103 100 gamma M

Hx Room 206 negative negative Spent Fuel Pool 104/65s 124/4h'" NS 120' slightly slightly 80/20 100 6x103 100 9,,,,,

g Hx Room 207 negative negative Post Accident 75/655 NA NS M

slightly M

80/20 M

1x10 1.3:103 3

9,,,

y 5

1 (Rooms negative 5

Cask Handling Area 104/65 M

NS NA slightly slightly ~

80/20 NA 103 1.3x103 9,,,,

y Room 303 negative negative Systems $m. Sub-104/65s ji7f4[*"NSM slightly NA 80/20 NA 1000 1.2x104 HVAC Su ly gamma H

F002 negative Spent Fuel Pit 104/65f NA NA M

slightly M

80/20 NA 1x107 7.5x104 gauna H

Rs. F111 negative 1

3-16

'856gc/0330c

TAR E 3-I EurIRGHENTAL CON 0!TIONS Relative Cumulative Radiation 4 Location Temperature Pressure theidity Dosage (rads)

(Environmental)

Normal Range Abnormal HVAC Accident 3 3 Nonnel Range Accident Normal 3 Radiation EQ. -

(Designator)

(mexAnin, *F)

Type

(*F)

Normal Accident (maxAnin, 5)

(5)

Range Accident Type Environ.6 5.

Mechanical Auxiliary Bu11elne tsun eine Designator-M) 104/50P 10g/44"NS J25x slightly 0.3 psigx 80/20 100 103 130 ECW Sune)

_ aans M

(Ra.017 negative g

104/44"QC 13_5F slightly 0.4 psigy 80/20 100 2x103 100 gamme N

Roric Acid Transfer 104/50P F w Cabicles negative (Re. Oi8a, 018)

Roron Recycle 104/50P 133/44"NS 2g slightly 0.3 psigx 80/20 100 107 100 gamme H

Room (Rs. 019) negative Recycle Holdigt Tank.104/50P 120/44 NS J20_I slightly 0.3 psigy 80/20 100 1x107 100 gamma N

Room 20 & 24 negative 145/44"NS 150I P

Recycle Heat Malve 104/50 slightly 0.3 psig 80/20 100 1x107 100 gamma N

x Room 22 & 23 negative Stoir No. 4 104/50P M

M 175x slightly 1.6 psigX 80/20 100 103 100 gamme N

(Rs. 05) negative 111/44"NS JM slightly 0.3 psigK 80/20 100 1x107 100 gamma M

Seal Water Hz 104/50P I

(Re. 26) negative valve Room 104/50P M

M 240F slightly 1.6 psigy 80/20 100 107 100 gamme N

(Re.031) negative 104/44"QC g slightly 0.6 psigy 80/20 100 107 100 gamma N

CUCS Valve 104/50P Cm61cle negative (Rs. 033)

Letdeun Reheat 104/50P 128/44 NS 240F slightly 1.5 psigy 80/20 100 107 100 games N

Room negative P6sitive Displace-135/50P 126/44"NS' 1557 slightly 0.6 psigy 80/20 100 107 100 gasma N

ment Charging Pump negative

~

(Rs. 037)

Centrifugal 135/50P 135/44"QC g slig ly 0.6 psigy 80/20 100 107 100 gaans N

ggrue i

nega ve 135/44"QC 155F slightly 0.,psigy 80/20 100 107 P

Centrifugal 135/50 100 gamme u

Pump negat we i

3-17 l8569t/0330c i

i

~

TAE.E 3-1 I

~

EWIRMENTAL CONDITIONS i

Relative Cumulative Radiation 4 i

Location Temperature Pressure Humidity 6-- (rads)

L I

(Environmental?

Normal Range Abnormal HVAC Accident 3 3 Nomal R Accident Nomal 3 Radiation EQ. ~

j (Designator)

(mashin, 'F)

Type

(*F)

Normal Accident (max 4fn (5)

Range Accidedt Type Environ.6

{

j CVCS Valve 104/50P 104/44 QC g

slightly 0.gpsip 80/20 100 107 100 gamma N

j Cubicles negat we (Rs. 044) j

)

Moderating HX 104/50P 115/44"NS 140 slightly 0.8 psigy 80/20 100 1x107 100 gamma H

1 g

(Rs. 45) negative Valve Room 104/50P Later M

gl slightly 0.3 psigy 80/20 100 107 100 gamma N

(Rs. 46) negative Valve Room 104/50P jjgf44 %

negative 245I slightly 2.1 psigy 80/20 100 1x107 100 gamma N

(Rs.48)

Pug Room 104/50P 115/44"NS ate.

1.7 psigF 80/20 100 1.x107 100 gauna M

245l (Re.04g)

Letdoun HI Room 104/50P 122/44 M 240 slightly 1.6 psigy 80/20 100 1x107 100 gamma N

(Re.50) negative 130/44"NS 350_I ate.

1.0 psig 80/20 100 1.x107 100 ganna N

P L.W.P.S. Waste 104/50 x

Evaporator (Rs. 0538)

High Activity 104/50P M

NS 125x slightly 0.3 psig 80/20 100 2x108 100 gamma H

x Spent Resin Stor-negative age Tank (Rs. 054)

{

R: actor Make-up 104/50P 104/44"QC i

Water Pump Cubicles

-125X slightly 0.7 psigK 80/20 100 2X103 100 ganan H

]

(Rs. 062) negative 4

P Refueline Water 104/5C 111/44 NS

-120X slightly 1.6 psigx 80/20 100 6 103 1.kl03 Storage Tank Room negative genna H

t (Re. 063) 104/50P 133 NS 125X slightly 0.3 psigx N

PhradioactiveChase (Rs. 064) negative 80/20 100 103 3.4x105 y

Electrical Equis-P ment Room (Rs. 065) 104/50 M

NS 135F slightly 1.0 psigF 80/20 100 100 1.kl03 negative gamma H

120/44"QC i

Essential Otiller 120/50P 120I slightly 0.9 psig*

80/20 100 103 130 gamma H

& CCW Puay Room negative (R2s. 067, 67E, t

67F) i i

t 3-18 l856sc/0330c

}

.. ~ _ -.

~

TAEE b1 1,

ENIRONENTAL CONDETIONS Relative Cumulative Radiation 4 i

location Temperature Pressure Humidity Dosage (rads)

(Environmental)

Normal Range Abnormal HVAC Accident 3 3 Norwal Range Accident Normal 3 Radiation EQ. -

(Designator)

(maxhtn, *F)

Type

(*F)

Normal Accident (maxAm n, 5)

(5)

Range Accident Type Environ.6 l

4 t

l h'ridor 104/50P 126/44 NS 170Y slightly 1.0 psigY 80/20 100 103 100 gamma N

. 067A, 0678).

negative l

3 125/44"NS M*

slightly 1.6 psig 80/20 100 103 100 gamma H

Corridor

'104/50P x

(Re.06?C) r.egative 126/44"NS LOY slightly 1.0 psigY 80/20 100 103 1.h103 Corridor 104/50P gamma H

{

(Rs. 0670) negative P

Valve Woom 104/50 M

NS 125" slightly 0.3 psig" 80/20 100 6x103 100 gamma M

l (Rs. 068E) negative P

Chart al Absorber 85/50 M

NS 125x slightly 0.3 psig 80/20 100 107 Room fRs. 068F) 1.h103 x

gamma H

~

negative Guard Bed Cub N e 85/50P M

NS 1255 7

slightly 0.3 psig" 80/20 100 10 100 gamma H

(Re. 068H) negative

~

l HA Removal 104/50P M

NS 125x slightly 0.3 psig 80/20 100 107 2

x 100 gamma M

SRid Room negative (R. 068K)

P I

i Pump Rcom 104/50 Later M

120 slightly 0.3 psigY 80/20 100 6000 100 gamma M

l (Rs. 72) negative Boric Acid Tank 104/50P M

NS 140Y slightly 0.3 psigY 80/20 100 2x103 100 gamma N

j Room (Rs. 076) negative l

105/44"N5 140I P

Valve Room 104/50 slightly 0.3 psig 80/20 100 6000 100 gauna M

x (Rs. 079) negative

~

VLV Rm 104/50P H

j34f44 NS 1401 slightly 0.3 psigY 80/20 100 1x107 100 genna H

l (Ra.79A) negative

~

i VLV R#

104/50P H

144/44 gs g1 slightly 0.3 psigY 80/20 100 1x107 100 gamma N

j (Rs.118) negative 128/44"NS 140I VlV Rs 104/50P slightly 0.3 psigY 80/20 100 1x107 100 gamma N

l (Rs. 79C) negative

)

Cooling Water 104/50 MS 1258 slightly 0.3 psig 80/20 100 103 100 gamma M

P x

Heat Exchanger negative 3

~

j (Ra.106) 1 l

3-19

!, 8569c/0330c I

TA KE 3-1 j

ENVIRONENTAL CONDITIONS Relative Cumulative Radiation 4 Location Temperature Pressure Husidity Oosage (rads)

(Environmental [

Norwal Range Abnormal HVAC Accident 3 3 Normal Range Accident Normal 3 R adiation EQ.

(Designators (max / min *r)

Type

(*F)

Norwal Accident (saxAu f n,1)

(I)

Range Accident Type Environ.6 P

H Non-Radioactive 104/50 jjgj44 NS 1201 slightly 0.3 psig" 80/20 100 1000 130 gamma M

Piping (Re. 106A) negative 112/44"NS 195x slightly 2.2 psigx 80/20 100 103 100 gamma H

104/50P Non-Radioactive)

Piping (Re. 107 negative P

Radioactive Pi 104/50 NA NS 21 5Y 7

4 slightly 1.6 psigY 80/20 100 10 1.3x10 gamma H

Pen. k ea<{Re.pe108) negative P

Corridor 104/50 NA NS 160Y slightly 1.8 psigY 80/2C 100 103

'1.3x104 gassa H

(Re.108A) negative P

Nonradioactive Pipe 104/50 NA NS

-130Y slightly 1.5 psigY 80/20 100 103 100 gamma H

Chase (Re.1088) --

negative 124/44"NS Radioactiv's 104/50P Pipe Chases

-230Y slightly 2.1 psigY 80/20 100 107 2.6x105 gassa H

negative (Re.108C)

P Radioactive Pipe 104/50 NA NS 155Y slightly 1.8 psigY 80/20 100 107 2.6x105 gamma H

Chases (Re.10BD) negative P

Electrical Chase 104/50 NA NS negative 130Y slightly 1.5 psigY 80/20 100 103 100 gamma H

(Re.108E)

Dry Waste Compactoc 104/50P U

jjjf44 NS 1551 slightly ate.

80/20 100 6000 100 gaena H

(Rs.109) negative 121/44"NS

,160x slightly 1.6 psig 80/20 100 107 100 gassa H

P Radioactive Pipe 104/50 X

g Chase negative (Rms 110,110A) 105/44"NS 1201 LASR Stora Tank 104/50P slightly 0.7 psigY 80/20 100 6000 100 gausa M

& Pump (Re 112) negative HVAC Room 104/50P 104/50"NS 1201 slightly 0.3 psigY 80/20 100 1000 130 gamma M

(Re. 2068) negative Nonradioactive ID4/50P 125/44"NS 125x slightly 0.3 psig 80/20 100 103

9. 7x105 X

Pipe Penetration ganna H

negative (Re. 216) 113/44"NS 125x slightly 0.3 psig 80/20 100 103 100 csuma M

Radwaste Control 78/50P x

Room (Re. 217) negative 3-20 8569c/0330c

TAE.E 3-1 ENVIRO 4fENTAL CONDITIONS Relative Qamlative Radiation 4 location Temperature Pressure theidity Dosage (rads)

(Environmental)

Normal Range Abnormal HVAC Accident 3 3 Normal Range Accident Normal 3 Radiation EQ. -

(Designator)

(maxAmin, *F)

Type

(*F)

Normal Accident (maxAsin. S)

(1)

Range Accidelat Type Environ.6 P

Stairway 78/50 M

NS MX slightly 0.3 psig" 80/20 100 103 100 gamma M

j (Re. 217A) negative i

Radweste Control' 78/50I M

NS

-125" slightly 0.3 psig" 80/20 100 103 100 gamma M

i Room (Rs. 2178) negative 78/50P Hallway )

NA NS gx slightly 0.3 psig 80/20 100 103 130 gamma M

x (Rs. 218 negative P

Corridor 104/50 NA NS 125*

slightly 0.3 psig 80/20 100 103 d

100 gamma M

(Rs.21E) negative i

Corridor 104/50P NA NS

-1408 slightly 0.3 psigx 80/20 100 103 100 gamma N

(Ra 218K) negative 84/44 "NS negative B Pa s Transf

?104/50P 1201 A ea fRs. 219Af slightly 0.3 psigY 80/20 100 100 100 gamma M

104/44"QC CVCS Valve Cubicle 104/50P j

(Rs.226)

-125x slightly 0.3 psigx 80/20 100 107 100 gamma N

negative l

Counting Room 7g/68 NA NS 125*

slightly 0.3 psig" 80/20 100 103 hh 100 gamma M

i (R2231) positive i.

116/44"NS 1201 P

Volume Control 104/50 sligh ly 0.3 psigY 80/20 100 1x107 100 gamma M

Tank (Rs. 233) negat we i

Rad Chem. Lab.

75/7233 NA NS

-1258 slightly.

0.3 psigx 80/20 100 6a103 100 gamma M

j

& Sample Room negative j

(Re. 234) l Sample Room 75/72JJ 115/44"NS gx slightly 0.3 psig 80/20 100 6xl03 100 gamma M

x

{

(Re.235) negative Baron Analyzer 104/50P U

97f44 NS 12'0,1 slightly 0.3 psig*

80/20 100 1x107 0

100 gamma N

Room 235A negative j

Valve Area 104/50P Later NA negative l

120I slightly 0.3 psigY 80/20 100 6000 100 gamma M

(Ra. 238) 109/44"NS 1201 P

Valve Room 104/50 slightly 0.3 psigY 80/20 100 1x107 100 gamme N

(R2.238k) negative P

Valve Area 104/50 Later NA 1201 slightly 0.3 psigY 80/20 100 107 100 gamma M

}

(Re. 238R) negative 3-21

{ 8569c/0330c 1

I

TAR.E 3-1 ENVIRONENTAL CONDITIONS Relative Cumulative Radiation 4 location Temperature Pressure Humidity Dosage (rads)

(Environmental)

Normal Range Abnormal HVAC Accident 3 3 Norwal Range Accident Norwal 3 Radiation EU.

(Designator)

(sax /ein,'F)

Type

(*F)

Normal Accide nt (max /ein,1)

(1)

Range Accident Type Environ.6 Filter kea 104/50P H

jj3f44 MS 1201 slightly 0.3 psigY 80/20 100 6000 100 gassa M

(Re.M243) negative ilter kea 112/44"NS negative F(Re.M2a3A,L) 104/50P i

1401 slightly 0.3 psigY 80/20 100 6000 100 gassa M

a 108/44"NS 125x slightly 0.3 psig 80/20 100 2x109 100 gamma H

Mixed Bed 104/50P x

Demineralizer n?gattve Cubicles (Res. 244A-T) 1 koonh.i5')

104/50P H

1201 AC ij4f44 MS negative slightly 0.7 psig 80/20 100 1000 100 gamma M

x P

rrid r

. $24A, 3248)

-125*

slightly 1.6 psig 80/20 100 103 130 games M

104/50 MS x

negative E

Decontastnation 85/50 MS

-125*

slightly 0.3 psig*

80/20 100 2x103 130 gasta H

]

k ea (Re. 325, 325A) negative 112/44"NS Personnel Hatch 104/50P j

Area (Re. 326)

-125x slightly 0.3 psig" 80/20 100 103

1. 7x106 genua H

negative 118/44"NS 120I Valve Operatin 104/50P slightly 0.3 psigY 80/20 100 1x107 100 gamma H

Area (Re. 327)g negative HVAC Control 104/50.

104/44"QC P

1_25x slightly 1.6 psigx 80/20 100 103 1.3x103 2

gan,,

y Panels negative (Re.327A) 104/44"QC 125" slightly 0.3 psig 80/20 100 103 2.3x103 P

Hydrogen & Radia-104/50 x

gaWPa M

tion Monitors negative (Re. 328)*

P Concentrate Stor-104/50 NA NS

-140x slightly 0.3 psig" 80/20 100 10 100 gamma H

7 age Tank (Re. 331) negative P

Corridor 104/50 NA HS

-140*

slightly 0.3 psig" 80/20 100 6x103 100 gassa H

(Re. 331A) negative Radwaste Mixing 104f50P NA NS 125" slightly 0.3 p'sig*

80/20 100 10 100 gasca H

7 Tank (Re. 334) negative 3-22 8569c/0330c

~

TAILE 3-1 EWIRON8 ENTAL CONDITI(plS Relative Cumulative Radiation 4 Location Temperature Pressure Humidity Dosage (rads)

(Environmental; Normal Range Abnormal HVAC Accident 3 3 Normal Range Accident Normal 3 Radiation EQ. *

(Designators (max / min,'F)

Type

(*F)

Normal Accident (max /Isin,5)

(1)

Range Acciddnt Type Environ.6 107/44"NS J25_x slightly 0.3 psig 80/20 100 6000 130 ganna M

Volume Control Tank 104/50P Z

Operating Room negative (R2. 335) 6.

Oftsel-Generator Us11 ding touuoing Designator-0)

Engine Room, oper-104/50Z 120/422QC 120z slightly slightly 80/20 80 100 100 gauna M

003)g (Ras. 001, 002, ctin positive positive 104/50" Later NA 120" slightly slightly 80/20 100 100 100 genna M

Stairwell (R:. 004, 005, 006) positive positive Intike Filter Rooms 104/50z 104/422QC 120Z slightly slightly 80/20 100 100 100 gamma M

j Room 101,102,103 positive positive Bldg.

Diesel Oil Stora 104/50z 113/42"NS 1202 j

Room (Rus,107, N8, posktive posktive sli htly sli htly 80/20 80 100 100 ganna M

109)

Stairwell 104/50Z 104/42"QC 120Z slightly slightly 80/20 100 100 100 ganna M

Room 110,111,112 positive positive Inttke Air 104/50Z 104/42"QC 120Z sit htly sli htly 80/20 100 100 100 gamma M

Room 207, 208, 209 posktive posktive 7.

Turbine-Generator Building tautiaing Designator-G)

General Areas 110/50aa NA NS NA slightly NA 80/20 NA 100 100 gammaa M

positive I

'

• Hydrogen & Radiation Monitors are shielded; listed data is conservative (use data for 327A),

• • Adjacent Areas 3-23

! 8569c/0330c

TAR.E 3-1 EMIRONENTAL CONDITIONS Relative Cumulative Radiation 4 Location Temperature Pressure Humidity Dosage (rads)

(Environmental)

Normal Range Abnormal HVAC Accident 3 (Designator)

(max / min, *F)

Type

(*F)

Normal Accident (maxAnin, 5)

(5)

Range Accidt3 Radiation EQ. '

3 Normal Range Accident Normal Type Environ.6 8.

Miscellaneous sus iaings tuuiscing Designator-P)

N EC tog /34cc 104/43 QC 104/34CC sis 9 1Y S119 ly 80/20 80 100 100 M

g negat we nega ve starting at 50'F)

General Areas 104/50bb NA NA ate.

NA 80/20 NA 100 100 gasma M

i l

l i

1 1

i

~

8569c/0330c

HOUSTON LIGHTING & POWER COMPANY SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT ENVIRONMENTAL QUALIFICATION OF SAFETY-RELATED ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT I

4.0 ENVIRONMENTAL QUALIFICATION METHODOLOGY General Design Criteria 4 of Appendix A to 10CFR 50 requires that plant equipment be designed to accommodate the effects of and be compatible with the environmental conditions associated with normal operation, maintenance, testing, and where applicable, postulated accidents.

In accordance with 10CFR 50.49, the electrical equipment located in a harsh environment for STP is environmentally qualified consistent with the positions specified in Category I of NUREG-0588,

" Interim Staff Position and Environmental Qualification of Safety-Related Electrical Equipment". Conformance to NUREG-0588 requirements is discussed in FSAR Section 3.11.2.

For equipment within the scope of the NSSS Supplier (Westinghouse) qualification is done in accordance with WCAP 8587. This WCAP describes the methodology employed by Westinghouse for qualification of safety-related electrical equipment. This WCAP was reviewed and accepted by the NRC through the issuance of a Safety-Evaluation Report (SER) on November 10, 1983. Each EQDP (Supplement 1, WCAP 8587) contains a description of the qualification plan / procedure, qualification program and results for its associated safety-related equipment. The EQDPs are then compared to the STP environmental service conditions for the location in which the equipment is installed in order to establish that the equipment is qualified for its operating service conditions. FSAR Table 3.10N-1 identifies the applicable EQDPs contained in Supplement 1 of WCAP 8587.

4.1 CODES AND STANDARD USED FOR QUALIFICATION The project requirement for environmental qualification of safety-related equipment is to meet guidelines of NUREG-0588, Rev. 1.

In addition, IEEE 323-1974 and R.G.1.89 is used in the qualification effort along with the other ancilliary standards and regulatcry guides. To ensure compliance with these requirements, evaluation and review was performed as described in sections 4.2 to 4.6.

4.2 TEST SEQUENCE The test sequence specified in IEEE 323-1974 is carefully observed in the evaluation and review of qualification documents. When this preferred sequence was not followed, justification for deviation was provided that the test sequence is more severe for the item being tested.

4-1 8570c/0330c

HOUSTON LIGHTING & POWER COMPANY SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT ENVIRONMENTAL QUALIFICATION OF SAFETY-RELATED ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT 4.3 TEST SPECIMEN The review of the qualification documents ensure that the same

~

piece of equipment was used throughout the test sequence.

Documentation is provided that when similarity is used, equipment furnished to STP is similar or identical to the tested equipment or adequate justification is provided for differences from the tested specimen..

4.4 MARGIN Margin is the difference between the most severe specified service conditions of the plant and the conditions used in the testing to account for normal variations in commercial production and reasonable errors in defining satisfactory performance. The suggested factors specified in IEEE 323-1974, Section 6.3.1.5 were used in the review of STP qualification documents.

4.5 INTERFACE The installation interface of the tested equipment is addressed in order to ensure that the tested equipment represents the interfaces of the actually installed equipment. Sealing devices to prevent moisture intrusion into the electrical termination cf the equipment tested are considered in the qualification report, as appropriate.

4.6 AGING AND SYNERGISTIC EFFECTS Considerations made for materials that are susceptible to thermal, radiation and/or vibration are addressed in the evaluation. Known synergism or those found during test, if any, were investigated.

4.7 ANALYSIS Analysis in combination with test or partial tests have been l

used for qualification of STP safety-related equipment.

Analysis done by itself was not employed in the qualification program for harsh environment equipment. Partial test is a test of only a portion of the component, or a portion of its function where size, application or other test limitations preclude the use of full type test. Extrapolation or analysis of partial type test data and type test supplemented with test of components and analysis are examples of the use of combined analysis and test.

l l

4-2 8570c/0330c

HOUSTON LIGHTING & POWER COMPANY SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT ENVIRONMENTAL QUALIFICATION OF SAFETY-RELATED ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT 4.8 INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT - INFORMATION NOTICE IE Bulletin and Notices are included in the review of the

~

qualification documents. The use of such equipment to STP is permissible only when the corrective action is performed by the original equipment manufacturer and/or the modified equipment is requalified or justification has been provided.

4.9 OPERABILITY TIME The post accident operability requirement for equipment is 30 days from the initiation of the accident. When qualification of equipment cannot meet the 30 days requirement, the actual time the equipment is required to operate plus 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> margin was used in accordance with NUREG 0588, Rev. 1.

The 30-day qualification period is a conservative estimate for the time required for the harsh environments to return to pre-accident conditions with the exception of radiation. STP qualifies equipment for 180 days of post accident radiation.

At 30 days, various cooling pumps provide redundant functions since the required amount of cooling is decreased significantly. Thus, within each of the three trains of accident mitigation systems there are redundant pumps, any of which is adequate to provide flow for that train.

Therefore, a 30-day qualification period is conservative because of the following factors:

A.

The amount of system redundancy (3 trains versus the normal 2 train design).

B.

The functional redundancy (multiple pumps to perform the same function).

C.

Spatial diversity (redundant equipment is either in separate buildings or adequate physical separation exits).

D.

Radiation qualification is based on a 180 day integrated dose.

E.

Significant margin exists in the environmental curves in either the peak values or the time to return the ambient conditions.

F.

Maintenance can be performed.

4-3 8570c/0330c

HOUSTON LIGHTING & POWER COMPANY SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT ENVIRONMENTAL QUALIFICATION OF SAFETY-RELATED ELECTRICAL EQUIPPENT 4.10 ACCURACY The demonstrated accuracy is evaluated on a case by case basis for acceptability.

In addition the demonstrated accuracy is included in a total instrument loop uncertainty is performed when required by Regulatory Guide 1.105 or the Plant Emergency Operating Procedure.

4.11 EQUIPMENT QUALIFICATION CHECKLIST PACKAGE (EQCP) and EQUIPMENT l

QUALIFICATION DATA PACKAGE (EQDP)

As an aid to the res aw of each vendor qualification package, Bechtel has used environmental and seismic checklists. The environmental checklist is based on NUREG-0588 while the seismic checklist is an extension of the SQRT form. These checklists provide permanent documentation of the review and are filed in a separate EQCP for each purchase order. The responses in the checklists reference the source document from which they are taken. These source documents are filed in an accompanying volume termed the Equipment Qualification Data Package (EQDP).

The EQCP lists each tag number which is validated against the EQ Masterfile. Also included in the EQCP are related items of correspondence and a listing of any related IE Notices, Bulletins, non-conformance reports, filed change notices, walkdown results, etc. A copy of the associated SCEW sheets is also included.

The EQCPs and EQDPs are kept in Bechtel engineering as working copies. This is merely for convenience, because all constituent vendor documents, Bechtel documents and the EQCP itself are filed in the Records Management System (RMS) from which they will be retrievable for the life of the plant.

l 4.12 SYSTEM COMP 0NENT EVALUATION WORKSHEET (SCEW)

The results of completed qualification documentation efforts are summarized on the System Component Evaluation Worksheets.

l Each SCEW contains the following information:

a.

The EQCP and Purchase Order Number; b.

Equipment Description - including the equipment Identification (Tag) No(s)., type, manufacturer, and model number, specified and demonstrated accuracy; c.

The plant location (s) and en>ironmental conditions in which the equipment is located and the basis upon which qualification is evaluated; 4-4 8570c/0330c

5 0

!iOUSTON LIGHTING & POWER COMPANY SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT ENVIRONMENTAL QUALIFICATION OF SAFETY-RELATED ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT d.

The peak postulated normal and accident environmental conditions based upon the limiting plant areas described in (c) above (i.e., temperature, pressure, humidity, chemical spray, radi tion and thermal aging temperature and time),

and the specific references from which the data was obtained; e.

The equipment's required post-accident operating time; f.

The peak qualified environmental conditions and demonstrated operating time, and the specific qualification documentation references from which this data was obtained; and g.

A statement concerning the applicability of qualification for submergence.

4.13 MECHANICAL EQUIPMENT QUALIFICATION The non-metallic parts of the safety-related mechanical equipment are identified in Appendix A of the Mechanical Equipment Qualification Report (MEQ-1). Also in this Appendix the Mechanical Equipment Qualification Sunnary status for each part is provided. A determination is made during qualification analysis in Appendices A and D of the MEQ-1 as to whether the non-metallic part is required for the equipment to perform its safety function.

If a part is not required, no further analysis is performed and the rationale is provided.

If the part is required, it must be constructed of materials with the capabilities to withstand the environment and process condition imposed on it. The non-metallic part's degradation must not prevent the equipment from performing its safety functions during its exposure to these environmental conditions.

Material capabilities are compared against the environmental and process effects of radiation, temperature, and aging, to determine part susceptibility. The Arrhenius equation is used where applicable to calculate the life of materials. The effects of pressure and humidity were not analyzed since these are enveloped by the process conditions given in the design specification. The effect of external beta radiation is considered to be insignificant as the non-metallic parts are shielded.

The non-metallic material qualification in Appendix D of MEQ-1 shows the results of the material capability analysis, and the qualified life of each non-metallic material. The life calculation is based on the radiation and temperature only and must be used in conjunction with the specified maintenance / surveillance program identified in equipment manual provided by respective vendor / manufacturer.

~

4-5 8570c/0330c

l HOUSTON LIGHTING & POWER COMPANY SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT ENVIRONMENTAL QUA.IFICATION OF SAFETY-RELATED ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT A flow diagram of the overall approach for mechanical equipment-qualification is shown on the Flow Diagram of Environmental Qualification of Mechanical Equipment.

4.14 ENVIRONMENTAL QUALIFICATION REVIEW AND EVALUATION Environmental qualification evaluation is performed by comparing the non-metallic part material capabilities, including aging analysis results, to the environmental conditions to which it is exposed. The material. capabilities include the ability to withstand temperature, radiation, and aging effects imposed by the environmental conditions. The environmental conditions include both ambient and process conditions. For the process condition, the internal radiation and process temperature have been considered. The applicable internal radiation was determined for the total integrated dose at the pipe centerline and the process temperature was obtained from the design temperature specified in Masterfile P1 ping Line List. For the operating life of a part, the evaluation includes exposure to the normal environment followed by an accident and/or HELB environmental condition.

Material capabilities for temperature and radiation as summarized in Appendix B of the MEQ-1 are obtained from various handbooks and manufacturers' publications. The material degradation as a result of thermal aging is calculated using the Arrhenius Model.

A qualification analysis is performed for each non-metallic material identified in Appendix A of MEQ-1. The acceptability of non-metallic parts is determined by comparing the material capabilities to the process conditions and the enveloping environmental condition of all the associated material requisitions.

If the part can sustain the postulated process and ambient environmental effects, it is considered acceptable.

Otherwise a replacement schedule or substitute is recommended.

4.15 CORRECTIVE ACTION PLANS Non-metallic parts, which cannot sustain the required normal and accident environmental conditions, are corrected by either replacing the part with a qualified material or adjusting the replacement schedule.

4-6 8570c/0330c

HOUSTON LIGHTING & POWER COMPANY

]

SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT ENVIRONMENTAL QUALIFICATION OF SAFETY-RELATED ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT 4.16 FLOW DIAGRAM 0F ENVIRONMENTAL QUALIFICATION OF MECHANICAL EQUIPMENT SENTFY PECHANCAL E0urrtNT COVERED BY PtCH. E.O. PROGR AM SY P.O.

• 4 REVEV E0. MASTER FLE & OTER DOCLPENTS TO PREPARE A LET OF ALL TE PECHANCAL EOUrtfMT SY TEft REVEV SPECFCATIDN I

I REVEV APPLCABLE E

A SERVCE AW MNTFY YARIOUS COWRENIS PARTS CONTAMMO I

(SECTION 4.0)

ACE - SENSITIVE /

I DEORADABLE MATERIAL 00 ARE IT PETALLE TE C AL S

PARTS ItEQUstED FOR YES CAPABMY OF NtfT ALLC REC 0%e REPL ACEPENT N)4

^"

PART(S)

PARTS MADE OUT OF E EQUPPENT TO PEftF0ftM PEET OR EMCEED TE ENVft0N-OUALFED MATERIALS OR E A A LE S SAFETY FtseCTDN PENTAL COPOITION TO

(

F POSSIBLE REVst TE MATERIAL VHCH IT S EMPOSED REPL ACEMENT SCEDULE 7

(APptm etg)

(APPEPCM D)

?

eso YES QUALTTICATION H

I 4-7 8570c/0330c

HOUSTON LIGHTING & POWER COMPANY SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT ENVIRONMENTAL QUALIFICATION OF SAFETY-RELATED ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT l

5.0 SOUTH-TEXAS PROJECT EQUIPMENT QUALIFICATION MAINTENANCE AND SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM The programs for preventive maintenance, surveillance and periodic testing has been developed in accordance with R.G. 1.33, Rev. 2.

The programs are based on manufacturer's recommendations, experience and the results of STP equipment qualification programs. They are governed by applicable sections of 10CFR50 Appendix B.

Special EQ maintenance requirements identified in the vendor qualification reports have been documented and transmitted under a controlled program to the Nuclear Plant Operations Department for integration with the standard maintenance programs. The program also provides for the review of operating experience reports, I&E Notices and Bulletins, etc., and the incorporation of pertinent requirements from these sources.

l l

l 5-1 l

8665c/0330c i

1:

, e HOUSTON LIGHTING & POWER COMPANY SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT ENVIRONMENTAL QUALIFICATION OF SAFETY-RELATED ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT

6.0 REFERENCES

1.

Code of Federal Regulations - Title 10, Part 50, Paragraph 49 (10 CFR 50,49), " Environmental Qualification Electric Equipment Important to Safety for Nuclear Power Plants."

2.

NUREG-0737, " Clarification of Three Mile Island Action Plan Requirements," 1980.

3.

NUREG-0588, Revision 1, " Interim Staff Position on Environmental Qualification of Safety-Related Electrical Equipment", 1981.

4.

IBM System 38 - Access to E0 Masterfile Listing for Safety-Related Equipment and SCEW Sheets for Electrical Equipment in Harsh Environments".

5.

IBM System 38 - Access to Seismic Dynamic Sheets for Safety-Related Equipment.

6.

Final Safety Analysis Report, South Texas Project Units 1 and 2, Amendment 56.

7.

Bechtel Power Corporation Computer Code: COPATTA User's Guide, Volume I, " Practical User's Guide", Volume II, " Theoretical User's Guide", 1974.

8.

FLUD, A Compartment Differential Pressure Analysis Code I

9.

Carfagno, S.P. and R.J. Gibson, "A Review of Equipment Aging Theory and Technology," EPRI NP0-1558, September, 1980.

10. WCAP 8587, Revision 6-A (NP), " Methodology for Qualifying Westinghouse WRD Supplies NSSS Safety-Related Electrical Equipment," March 1983.

11.

IBM System 38 for EQ Masterfile Listing.

l 12.

14926-MEQ-1, Mechanical Equipment Qualification for South Texas Project.

13. 4E019NQ1009, Interdiscipline/ Generic Design Criteria, Equipment Qualification.

6-1 8575c/0330c

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