ML20210M613
| ML20210M613 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Comanche Peak  |
| Issue date: | 08/18/1997 |
| From: | Polich T NRC (Affiliation Not Assigned) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20210M619 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9708220073 | |
| Download: ML20210M613 (13) | |
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NUCLEAR REGdLATORY COMM18810N WASHINGTON. D.C. asseMeet TEXAS UTILITIES ELECTRIC COMPANY COMANCHE PEAK STEAM ELECTRIC STATION. UNIT 1 DOCKET NO. 50-445 AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE Amendment No. 54 License No. NPF-87 1.
The Nuclear Regulatory Comission (the Comission) has found that:
A.
The application for amendment by Texas Utilities Electric Company (TV Electric, the licensee) dated December 7, 1994 (TXX-94326), as sup>1emented by letter dated June 21, 1996 (TXX-96384), complies wit) the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Comission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; B.
The facility will operate in conformity with the application, as amended, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Comission; C.
There is reasonable assurance:
(i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Comission's regulations; D.
The issuance of this license amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and E.
The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with Ib CtR Part 51 of the Commission's rqalations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.
2.
Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Yachnical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment and Paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. NPF-87 is hereby amended to read as follows:
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9708220073 970018 PDR ADOCK 05000445 P
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2-2.
Itchnical Soecifications and Environmental Protection Plan The Technical Specifications colitained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No. 54, and the Environmental Protection Plan contained in Appendix B, both of which are attached hereto, are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the Environmental Protection Plan.
3.
The license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance to be implemented within 60 days.
FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Timothy J.
olich, Project Manager Project Directorate IV-1 Division of Reactor Projects III/IV Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Attachment:
Changes to the Technical Specifications Date of Issuance: August 18, 1997 T.
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UNITED STATES j}
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION g
WASHINGTON, D.C. 30eeM001 TEXAS UTILITIES ELECTRIC COMPANY COMANCHE PEAK STEAM ELECTRIC STATION. UNIT 2 DOCKET NO. 50-446 AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE Amendment No. 40 License No. NPF-89 1.
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
A.
The application for amendment by Texas Utilities Electric Company (TU Electric, the licensee) dated December 7, 1994 (TXX-94326), as sup)1emented by letter dated June 21, 1996 (TXX-96384), complies witi the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; B.
The facility will operate in conformity with the application, as amended, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Comission; C.
There is reasonable assurance:
(1) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (11) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations; D.
The issuance of this license amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and E.
The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.
2.
Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment and Paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. NPF-89 is hereby amended to read as follows:
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. (2) It.chnical Soecifications and Environmental Protection Plan The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revisev through Amendment No. 40, and the Environmental Protection Plan contained in Appendix 8, are hereby incorporated into this license.
TU Electric shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the Fnvironmental Protection Plan.
3.
This license amendment is effective as of its date.f issuance to be implemented within 60 days.
FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION A
Timothy J.
lich,ProjectManager Project Directorate IV-1 Division of Reactor Projects III/ly Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Attachment:
Changes to the Technical Specifications Date of Issuance:
August 18, 1997 4
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I ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NOS. 54 AND 40 FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NOS. NPF-87 AND NPF-89 DOCKET NOS. 50-445 AND 50-446 Replace the following pages of the Appendix A Technical Specifications with the attached pages. 11e revised pages are identified by Amendment number and contain marginal lines indicating the areas of change. The corresponding overleaf pages art also provided to maintain document completeness.
REMOVE INSERT 3/4 7-8 3/4 7-8 8 3/4 7-3 B 3/4 7-3 B 3/4 7-3a B 3/4 7-3b B 3/4 7-3c B 3/4 7-3d f
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l TABLE 4.7-1 l
l SfCONDARY COOLANT SYSTEM SPECIFIC ACT1Y111 SAMPLE AND ANALYSIS PROGRAM TYPE OF MEASUREMENT SAMPLE AND ANALYSIS AND ANALYSIS FREQUENCY 1.
Gross Radioactivity At least once per 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.
Determination
- 2.
Isotopic Analysis for DOSE a)
Once per 31 days, when-EQUIVALENT I-131 Concentration ever the gross radio-activity determination indicates concentra-tions greater than 10%
of the allowable limit for radiciodines.
b)
Once per C months, when-ever the gross radio-activity determination indicates con-centrations less than or equal to 10% of the~
allowable limit for radiciodines.
- A gross radioactivity analysis shall consist of the quantitative measurerent of the total specific activity of. the secondary coolant except for radio-nuclides with half-lives less than 10 minutes. Determination of-the contributors to the gross specific activity shall be based upon those energy peaks identifiable with a 95% confidance level.
COMANCHE PEAK - UNITS 1 AND 2 3/4 7-7
PLANT SYSTEMS l
MAIN STEAM LINE ISOLATION VALVES LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.7.1.5 Four MS!Vs shall be OPERABLE.
l APfLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3.
ACTION:
MODE 1:
With one MSIV inoperable but open, POWER OPERATION may continue provided the inoperable valve is restored to OPERABLE status within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />; otherwise be in STARTUP within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.
MODES 2* and 3*:
l With one or more MSIVs inoperable, subsequent operation in MODE 2 or 3 may proceed provided the MSIV is closed within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> and verified closed once per 7 days. Otherwise, be in HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.
SURVEILLANCE RE0VIREMENTS 4.7.1.5 Each MSIV shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by verifying full closure within 5 seconds when tested pursuant to Specification 4.0.5.
The provisions of Specification 4.0.4 are not applicable for entry into MODE 3.
I
- Separate entry times into Action Statement is allowed for each MSIV.
l COMANCHE PEAK - UNITS 1 AND 2 3/4 7-8 Unit 1 - Amendment No. 54 Unit 2 - Amendment No. 40 m__
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PLANT SYSTEMS BASES
$/4.7.1.4 SPECIFIC ACTIVITY TI,e limitations on Secondary Coolant System specific activity ensure that tha resultant offsite radiation dose will be limited to a small fraction of 10 CFR 100 dose guideline values in the ev at of a steam line rupture. This dose also includes the effects of a coinc. dent 1 gpm primar" to-secondary tube leak in the steam generator of the affected steam line. These values are consistent with the assumptions used in the safety analyses.
3/4.7.1.5 MAIN STEAM LINE ISOLATION VALVES 5
BACKGROUND The MSIVs isolate steam flow from the secondary side of the steam generators following a high energy line break (HELB). MSIV closure terminates flow trom the unaffected (intact) steam generators.
One MSIV is located in each main steam line outside, but close to, cmtainment.
The MSIVs are downstream from the main steam safety valves (MSSVs), the steam generator atmospheric relief valves (ARVs), and auxiliary feedwater (AFW) pump turbine steam supply, to prNent MSSV, ARV, and AFW isolation from the steam generators by MSIV closure. Clocing the MSIVs isolates each steam generator from the others, and isolates Ge turbine, steam dump system, and other auxiliary steam supplies from the steam generators.
The MSIVs close on a main steam isolation signal generated by either low steam generater pressure, high containment pressure, or steam line pressure nt;,ative rate-high.
Each MSIV is provided with a three-position control switch mounted on the main control beard. The switch has three positions which are close, auto and open, with a spring return to auto position.
Both Train A and Train B contacts are contained in each hand switch to ensure that the valves can be closed even if one train fails. The valves also fail closed on a loss of hydraulic fluid signal.
Each MSIV has an MSIV bypass valve which is locked closed during power operation. During startup, hot standby, and hot shutdown, one MSIV bypass valve may be opened provided the other three bypass valves are locked closed and their associated MSIVs are closed. The MSIVs may also be actuated manually.
APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES The basis for the MSIV operability is derived from their assumed cperation in the accident analyses of the breaks in the secondary system (principally, steamline break). The design of the secondary system precludes the uncontrolled blowdawn of more than o~ne steam generator, assuming a single active component failure (e.g., the failure of one MSIV to close on demandL In addit nn, the MSIVs are credited in the analyses of the steam generator tube rupture :ccidents.
In the safety analyses, several differen' SLB events are compa ed against different event
.ceptance limits. A doodle-ended guillotine SLB at hot zero power is the liming case with respect to the core response. The double-ended COMANCHE PEAK - UNITS 1 AND 2 B h e,7-3 Unit 1 - Amendment No. 54 Unit 2 - Amendment No. 40 i
PLANT SYSTEMS BASES 3/4.7.1.5 MAIN STEAM LINE ISOLATION VALVES APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES (Continued) guillotine SLB outside containment upstream of the MSIV is limiting for offsite dose consequences, althougg a break in this short section of piping has a very low probability. A 1.0 ft non-mechanistic break upstream of the MSIVs in the steam tunnels from at-power conditions is limiting with respect to environmental qualification in the steam tunnels. A large SLB at higher power levels is limiting with respect to maximum containment temperature used for equipment qualification.
In the analyses of the feedwater line break and steam generator i
tube rupture accidents, the MSIVs are credited for steam generator isolation. A significant failure considered for all cases is the failure of a MSIV to close.
The MSIVs remain open during power operation and their safety function is to close on demand. These valves are assumed to operate under the following situations:
a.
A HELB (SLB or FLB) inside containment.
In order to maximize the mass and energy release into containment, the analyses assumes that the MSIV :n the affected steam generator fails to close.
For this scenariu, steam 1s discharged into containment from all steam generators until the remaining MSIVs cluse. After MSIV closure, steam is discharged into containment only from the affected steam generator and from the residual steam in the main steam piping downstream of the closed MSIVs in the unaffected loops.
Closure of the MSIVs isolates the break from the unaffected steam generators, b.
A break or postulated crack outside of containment does not affect the containment environment, but may affect the environment in the steam tunnels. With respect to the core response to a SLB event, the uncontrolled blowdown of more than one steam generator must be prevented to limit the potential for uncontrolled RCS cooldown ana positive reactivity addition. Assuming that the MSIV on the affected steam generator fails to close, the closure of the other MI !s isolates tha break and limits the blowdown to a single steam generator.
c.
A break donnstream cf the MSIVs will be isolated by the closure of the MSIVs.
d.
Following a steam generator tube rupture event, closure of the MSIVs isolates the affected steam generator from the intact steam generators.
In addition to minimizing radiolocical releases, this enables the operator to maintain the pressure of the steam generator with the ruptured tube below the MSSV setpoints, a necessary step toward isolating the flow through the
- rupture, e.
The MSIVs are also utilized during other events such as a feedwater line break. These events are less limiting so far as MSIV OPERABILITY is concerned.
COMANCHE PEAK - UNITS 1 AND 2 B 3/4 7-24 Unit 1 - Amendment No.54 Unit 2 - Amendment No.40
PLANT SYSTEMS BASES l
3/4.7.1.5 MAIN STEAM LINE ISOLATION VALVES APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES (Continued)
The MSf!s satisfy Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement on Technical Speci-fication leprovement for Nuclear Power Reactors (58 FR 39132 of July 22,1993).
,LC0-This LC0 requires that four MSIVs in the steam lines be OPERABLE. The MSIVs are considered OPERABLE when.the isolation times are within limits, and they close on an isolation actuation signal (per Surveillance Requirement 4.3.2.1).
This LC0 provides assurance that the MSIVs will perform their design safety function to mitigate the consequences of accidents that could result in offsite exposures comparable to the 10 CFR 100 (Ref.1) limits or the :GC staff approved licensing basis.
APPLICABILITY The MSIVs must be OPERABLE in MODE 1, 2, and 3 when there is significant mass and energy in the RCS and steam generators. When the MSIVs are closed, they are already performing the safety function.
In MODE 4, normally most of the MSIVs are closed, and the stcas generator energy s
is low.
In MODE 5 or 6, the steam generators do not contain much energy because their temperat;re is below the boiling point of water; therefore, the MSIVs are not required for isolation of potential high energy secondary system pipe breaks in these MODES.
ACTION MODE 1 With one MSIV inoperable in MODE 1, action must be taken to restore OPERABLE status within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />. Some repairs to the MSIV can be made with the unit hot. The 8 hour9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> completion time is reasonable, considering the low probability of an accident occurring during this time period that would require a closure of the MSIVs.
The 8 hour9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> completion time is greater than that normally allowed for containment isolation valves because the MSIVs are valves that isolate a closed system penetrating containment. These valves differ from other containment isolation valves in that the closed system provides an additional means for containment isolation.
If the MSIV cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />, the unit must be placed in a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the unit must be placed in MODE 2 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and Modes 2 and 3 COMANCHE PEAK - UNITS 1 AND 2 B 3/4 7-3b Unit 1 - Amendment No.54 Unit 2 - Amendment No.40
PLANT SYSTEMS BASES 3/4.7.1.5 MAIN STEAM LINE ISOLATION VALVES ACTIONS (Continued)
ACTION would be entered. The completion times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach MODE 2 and to close the MSIVs in an orderly m:nner and without challenging unit systems.
!!QQES 2 AND 3 This Action is modified by Note
- indicating that separate action statement entry is allowed for each MSIV. The Note
- allows this Action to be entered separately for each inoperable valve, and completion times (the times allotted in the Action Statement to complete the designated actions) to be tracked on a per velve basis. When a valve is declared inoperable, this Action is entered and its completion time starts.
If subsequent valves are declared inoperable, this Action is entered for each valve and separate completion times start and are tracked for each valve.
Since the MSIVs are required to be OPERABLE in MODES 2 and 3, the inoperable MSIVs may either be restored to OPERABLE status or closed. When closed, the MSIVs are already in the position required by the assumptions in the safety analysis.
The 8 hour9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> completion time is consistent with that allowed in Mode 1 f.CTION.
For inoperable MSIVs that cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the specified completion time, but ue closed, the inoperable MSIVs must be verified on a periodic basis to be closed. This is necessary to ensure the.t the assumptions in the safety analysis remain valid. The 7 day completion time is reasonable, based on engineering judgment, in view of MSIV status indications available in the control room, and other administrative contrcis, to ensuro that these valves are in the closed position.
If the MSIVs cannot be restored to OPERABLE status or are not closed within the associated completion time, the unit must be placed in a MODE in wh.ch the LCO dces not apply, 70 achieve this status, the unit must be placed at least in MODE 3 within i hoors, and in MODE 4 within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />. The allowed completion times are r m.4ble, based on operating experience, to reach the required unit conditions from H0DE 2 conditions in an orderly manner j
and without challenging unit systems.
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (SR) j SR 4.7.1.5 This SR verifies that MSIV closure time is s 5 seconds on an actual or simulated actuation signal. The MSIV closure time is assumed in the 1
COMANCHE PEAK - UNITS 1 AND 2 B 3/4 7-3c Unit 1 - Amendment No.54 l
Unit 2 - Amendment No.40
PLANT SYSTEMS BASES -
3/4.7.1.5 MAIN STEAN LINE ISOLATION VALVES SR 4.7.1.5 (Continued) accident and containment analyses. This Surveillance is norsally performed upon returning the unit to operation following a refueling outage. The MSIVs should not be tested at power, since even a part stroke exercise increases the risk of a valve closure when the unit is generating aower.
As the MSIVs are not tested at power, they are exempt from the ASMi Code,Section XI, requirements.during operation in MODE 1 or 2.
The Frecuency is in acconlance with the Inservice Testing Program pursuant to Specification 4.0.5.
This test is conducted in MODE 3 with the unit at operating temperature and This SR is modified by a Note that provides exemption from tressure.pecification 4.0.4 for entry into MODE 3.This allows a delay of testing until MODE 3,iterion was generated.
to establish condibons consistent with those under which the acceptance cr REFERENCES 1.
3/4.7.1.6 MAIN FEEDWATER ISOLATION VALVES The feedwater isolation valves the feedwater isolation bypass valves, and the feedwater preheater by> ass v,alves are designed to close on a Feedwater Isolation Si trip, and 2)gnal to 1) limit t a cooldown following a safety injection / reactor limit the mass addition to the containment on a steamline break inside containment, and 3 result in over feeding of)a sterm generator. limit the severity of feedwater malfunctions which The allowed outege times and required actions are consistent with normal plant operating requirements and the
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safety functions of the valves.
3/4.7.1.7 STEAM GENERATOR ATMOSPHERIC RELIEF VALVES The OPERABILITY of the steas, generator atmospheric relief valves ensures that reactor decay heat can be dissipated to the atmosphere in(ARVs) the event oT a steam generator tube rupture and loss-of offsite power and that the Reactor Coolant System can be cooled down for Residual Heat Removal System operation.
Two ARVs are required to cool the Reactor Coolant System in a time frame compatible with prevention of overfill of the faulted steam generator. All four v
ARVs are required to be OPERABLE to allow for not Leing able to use the ARV on the faulted steam generator and an active failure of one of the remaining three
_ARVs.
3/4.7.2 STEA RENERATOR PRESSURE / TEMPERATURE LIMITATION Thelimitation on steam senerator pressure and temperature ensures that the pressure-induced stresses in the steam oenerators do not exceed the maximum allowable fracture toughness stress 11mItg. The limitations of 70*F and 200 psig are based on a steam generator RT,n of 60 F and are sufficient to prevent brittle fracture.
COMANCHE PEAK - UNITS 1 AND 2 B 3/4 7-3d Unit 1 - Amendment No.54 Unit 2 - Amendment No.40
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1 PLANLSYSIEM BASES 3 /4.7.3 COMP 0NENT COOLING WATER SYSTEM The OPERABILITY of the Component Cooling Water Systen ensures that suf-ficient cooling capacity is available for continued operation of safety-related equiment during normal and accident conditions. The redundant cooling capacity of tsis system, assuming a single failure, is consistent with the assumptions used in the safety analyses.
3 /4.7.4 STATION SERVICE WATER SYSTEM The OPERABILITY of the Station Service Water System ensures that sufficient cooling capacity is available for continued operation of safety-related equip-ment during normal and accident conditions. The redundant cooling capacity of this system, assming a single failure, is consistent with the assumptions used in the safety analyses. A unit in H0DE 1, 2, 3 or 4 will be designated as operating and a unit in MODE 5, 6 or Defueled will be designated as shutdown with respect to the Station Service Water Systen.
Train isolation by two normally closed valves in series or one locked closed ~
valve is provided to satisfy GDC-44. Unit isolation by one locked closed valve is provided to satisfy GDC-5. A pump for an operating unit is inoperable when its associated cross-connect is open.
In the event of a total loss of Station Service Water in one unit at Comanche Peak, backup cooling capacity is available via a cross-connect between the two units. An OPERABLE pump is manually realigned and flow balanced to provide cooling to essential heat loads. The OPERABILITY of the unit cross-connect along with a Station Service Water pump in the shutdown unit ensures the availability of sufficient redundt.nt cooling capacity for the operating unit.
The Limiting Condition of Operation will ensure a significant risk reduction as indicated by the analyses of a loss of Station Service Water System event. The surveillance requirements ensure the short and long-tern OPERABILITY of the Station Service Water System and cross-connect between the two units.
The Station Service Water System cross-connect between the two units consists of appropriate piping, and cross-connect valves connecting the discharge of the Station Service Water pumps of the two units. By aligning the cross-connect flow paths, additional redundant cooling capacity from one unit is available to the Station Service Water System of the other unit.
A cross-connect valve is 0FiRABLE if it can be cycled 'or is locked open. A valve that i:annot be demonstrated OPERABLE by cycling is considered taoperable until the valve.is survallied in the locked open position. However, at least one cross-connect valve between units is required to be maintained closed in accordance with GDC-5 imless required for flushing or due to total loss of Station Service Water pumps for either unit.
COMANCHE PEAK - UNITS 1 AND 2 B 3/4 7-4 Unit 1 - Amendment No.14 e
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