ML20207Q269
| ML20207Q269 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Shoreham File:Long Island Lighting Company icon.png |
| Issue date: | 01/15/1987 |
| From: | Irwin D HUNTON & WILLIAMS, LONG ISLAND LIGHTING CO. |
| To: | NRC ATOMIC SAFETY & LICENSING APPEAL PANEL (ASLAP) |
| References | |
| CON-#187-2242 OL-5, NUDOCS 8701270103 | |
| Download: ML20207Q269 (47) | |
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Reserved Januagg1},87 U 3N!tC l
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'87 JAN 21 P4 :36
~FF, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION l
I Before the Atomic Safety and LicerEing Appeal Board i
l In the Matter of )
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LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COMPANY ) Docket No. 50-322-OL-5
) (EP Exercise)
! (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, )
Unit 1) )
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LILCO'S MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF FEMA'S APPEAL AND l REQUEST FOR CERTIFICATION OF ISSUES RELATING TO l EMERGENCY PLANNING EXERCISE DESIGN IN CONTENTIONS EX 15 AND 16 l
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Hunton & Williams l 707 East Main Street P.O. Box 1535 Richmond, Virginia 23212 l
January 15,1987 2
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TABLE OF CONTENTS Page TA B LE O F C O N T E N TS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (1)
TA B LE O F A U THO RITIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (ii)
STATEMENT OF THE CASE ......................................... 1 ARGUMENT..................................................... 6
- 1. The Licensing Board's conclusion is not required by the UCS case and is contrary to the Commission's interpretation of that case in CLI-86-11. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
- 2. Admission of Contentions EX 15 and 16, without any showing or allegation that FEMA has departed from normal practice, incorrectly falls to accord FEMA due deference within the area of its expertise, disregards the presumption of regularity in the performance of its duties, and disregards FEMA's functioning under the NRC-FEMA Memorandum of Understanding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
- 3. Admission of Contentions EX 15 and 16 would be fatally in conflict with' the expert opinion of the authorized representatives of the expert agency, FEMA ............................................... 13
- 4. Contentions EX 15 and 16 involve generic policy decisions which should be made only by the Commission in a generic decision, not in a specific case application by a Licensing Board ........................ 15 CONCLUSION .................................................. 16 l
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F TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Page LILCO v. Suffolk County,628 F.Supp. 654
( E . D . N .Y . 19 8 6 ) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 LonstIsland Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Fower Station), Prehearing Conference Order (Oct. 3.1986) ..................................... 4,5,7,8 Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station), Memorandum and Order (December 1 1, 19 8 6 ) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4, 5 Long Island Lichting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station), CLI-86-11,23 NRC 577 (1986) ................... passim Union of Concerned Scientists v. NRC, 735 F.2d 1437 (D.C. Cir.1984),
cert denied,105 S.Ct. 815 (1985) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . passim Regulations 10 C F R S 2.7 3 0 (f ) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15, 16 10 C F R S 2.7 5 8 (b) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10,13 10 C F R S 2.7 85(a)( 1) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I 10 C F R S 2. 7 8 5 (d ) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I 10 CFR S 50.47(b)(14) .............................................. I 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E,1 IV.F.1., fn. 4 ........................ 1,2,7,9 i
Federal Register i
50 Fed. Reg.15,485 (Apr.18,1985) ................................ passim l 50 Fed. Reg.19,323 (May 8,1985) ..................................... 8 1
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F Page Other Authorities FEM A Draf t Guidance Memorandum EX-3 (Aug.15,1986) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 FEM A Guidance Memorandum 17 Rev.1 (Feb.1984) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 N UREG-0654/ FEM A-REP-1 (Rev.1) (1980) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2, 3 i
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F LILCO, January 1501987
. Reserved January 16,1987 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board In the Matter of )
)
LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COMPANY ) Docket No. 50-322-OL-5
) (EP Exercise)
(Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, )
Unit 1) )
LILCO'S MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF FEMA'S APPEAL AND REQUEST FOR CERTIFICATION OF ISSUES RELATING TO EMERGENCY PLANNING EXERCISE DESIGN IN CONTENTIONS EX 15 AND 16 j Long Island Lighting Company supports the December 31,1986 petition by FEMA that the Appeal Board, pursuant to its authority under 10 CFR S 2.785(a)(1) and (d), re-view and reverse the admission of Contentions EX 15 and 16 by the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board, on the grounds that in admitting those contentions the Licensing Board made a significant error of law, that its action presents major and novel ques-tions of law, and that admission of these contentions, because of their nature, threatens I to significantly prejudice the efficiency of the Shoreham proceeding by unduly length-ening it.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE Appendix E to Part 50 of the Commission's regulations requires, in paragraph IV.F.1, that an entergency planning exercise qualifying as a " full participation" exercise be satisfactorily conducted before a full power operating license can be issued. The term " full participation exercise" is defined in footnote 4 thereto. The pertinent por-tion of Appendix E is Attachment i to this memorandum.
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P Contentions EX 15 and 16 sponsored by Intervenors in this proceeding allege that the February 13, 1986 exercise of the Shoreham Offsite Radiological Emergency Re-sponse Plan supervised and graded by FEMA did not qualify as a " full participation" ex-ercise because various elements of the Shoreham Offsite Plan were not tested at all or were tested in allegedly insufficient detail. Intervenors argue that these alleged char-acteristics of the exercise, if proven, constitute " fatal flaws" in the Shoreham Offsite Plan. Contentions EX 15 and 16 are Attachment 2 hereto.
Intervenors do not allege that these aspects of the exercise occurred because LILCO failed to demonstrate any elements designed into the exercise's predetermined objectives or that LILCO failed to comply with the exercise's preagreed (but confiden-I tial) scenario: rather, their argument is that these alleged defects in the exercise were intrinsic to its design. Nor do Intervenors assert that either the substantive content of the exercise, or the process followed by FEMA in approving its design, departed in any material respect from the substance or process followed for other exercises. Rather, they simply assert that the exercise fails to meet the " full participation" provision of Appendix E to Part 50 because of the exclusion or extent of inclusion of various ele-ments.
Emergency preparedness exercises are required periodically by the NRC's basic emergency planning regulation,10 CFR S 50.47(b)(14), in order to " evaluate major por-tiens of emergency response capabilities." More detailed discussion in the basic joint NRC-FEMA technical manual, NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1 (Rev.1)(1980) requires exer-cises to test "the integrated capability and a major portion of the basic elen. ants exist-ing within emergency preparedness plans and organizations," and requires variation of the exercise scenario from year to year so that "all major portions of the plans and pre-paredness organizations are treated within a five year period." M. at 71. Exercises are to be conducted consistent with NRC and FEMA rules. I_d.
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. Corresponding FEMA authority, in FEMA Guidance Memorandum 17 Rev.1 (February 1984) (Attachment 3), sets forth 36 standard objectives for exercises, along with a matrix showing the correspondence of each such objective to observable ele-ments of emergency plans described in NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1. Id. at Attachment 1.II Like the NRC's guidance, it does not require all, or indeed any specified number, of standard exercise objectives to be fulfilled in connection with any one exercise, but merely that they all be met over a five year period.
Pursuant to this technical guidance and under the overall rubric of the FEMA-NRC Memorandum of Understanding,50 Fed. Reg.15,485 (April 18,1985), exercises are developed under FEMA's direction. Scenarios are prepared that meet desired individual exercise objectives from the list contained in Guidance Memorandum 17. The work is done under the supervision of FEMA's Regional Assistance Committees. NRC personnel are represented on those committees. It is that process, which totally precedes the conduct of an exercise, that determines its scope and intensity, by producing a list of specific objectives to be fulfilled at any given eYercise and a scenario intended to dem-onstrate the capability (or lack thereof) of responsible organizations to fulfill them. It is the output of this process which is then tested at the exercise itself.
This background is fundamental to understanding the controversy presented by the admission of Contentions EX 15 and 16. For those contentions go not at all to the actual conduct of the exercise; rather, they argue that the design of the exercise was insufficient to permit a finding of adequate preparedness, no matter what the level or nature of performance during the exercise.
1/ Guidance Memorandum 17 Rev. I was effective at the time of the Shoreham ex-ercise and remains effective at present. A subsequent document, FEMA Draf t Guld-ance Memorandum EX-3 (dated 8/15/86), is consistent with it.
r The Licensing Board admitted these contentions over LILCO's and the NRC Staff's objection in its October 3 Prchearing Conference Order, at 5-12. It affirmed its decision upon review of motions for reconsideration in a Memorandum and Order dated December 11,1986.
The Board accepted these contentions on October 3 with minor exceptions, rea-soning that the adequacy of the exercise itself as designed to be evaluated by FEMA posed potentially material questions of fact, and that Intervenors were therefore enti-tied, under the UCS case, to litigate that issue. October 3 Order at 4-9, construing Union of Concerned Scientists v. NRC, 735 F.2d 1437 (D.C. Cir.1984). In admitting these issues, the Board rejected the argument that any admissible contention concern-kg the exercise design (as contrasted with performance by exercise participants) must at least allege that the exercise departed, in objectives, scenario or other significant ways, from standard FEMA practice in offsite exercises designed and evaluated regular-ly by FEMA for the NRC at the more than 100 commercial nuclear power plants in op-eration. Id. at 7.
In its December 11 Memorandum and Order ruling on motions for reconsid-eration, the Licensing Board saluted but did not remedy any of the problems with its October 3 reasoning. The December 11 Memorandum and Order acknowledges the con-ceptual difference between exercise design and exercise results (i_d. at 11) and does not accept Intervenors' argument that Contentions EX 15 and 16 merely challenge the ex-ercise's results (i_d.). Nevertheless, it opines that the distinction between exercise de-sign and results "does not hold up when viewed in light of the regulatory scheme gov-erning emergency planning" (i_d.) and finds Contentions EX 15 and 16 admissible based on the following syllogism:
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- 1. Emergency planning exercisea are provisions of emergency plans, and the Shoreham exercise was conducted pursuant to a provision of LILCO's emergency plan;
- 2. The exercise is asserted to be a " full participation exercise" by LILCO; and
- 3. A finding that the exercise was not a full participation exercise may con-stitute a fundamental flaw in LILCO's plan.
Id. at 12-13. Nowhere does the December 11 Memorandum and Order deal with the fact that Intervenors have nowhere alleged that the exercise design process followed at Shoreham deviated from agency norms either substantively or procedurally. Nor does it show why an alleged shortcoming in exercise design (if such issues can be admissible in any event) amounts to a " fundamental flaw" in a plan, rather than merely a remediable one. Finally, while professing not to question FEMA's exercise-formation process (in which the NRC participates) (id. at 14), it throws open the result of that process to second-guessing in litigation despite the absence of any allegations that the process miscarried. Thus the December 11 Memorandum and Order, like its October 3 prede-cessor, ignores the FEMA-NRC planning construct and legitimate presumptions of agency regularity.
LILCO believes that the Licensing Board made an important error of law in ad-mitting Contentions EX 15 and 16, for the following reasons.
- 1. They are based on the premise that the output of the Shoreham exercise design process is fatally deficient, without alleging that either the process was not fol-lowed properly or that its output - exercise objectives and scenario -- failed to fulfill the relevant agency criteria. This focus on exercise formulation rather than on exer-cise results, at least in the absence of any alleged defect in the exercise development process, is irrelevant under the authority permitting litigation of exercises, Union of Concerned Scientists v. NRC, 735 F.2d 1437 (D.C. Cir.1984), cert. denied,105 S.Ct. 815
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, (1985), and with its implementation in this case by the Commission in CLI-86-11 (June 6,1986). That guidance permits litigation of exercise results, not of exercise design.
- 2. Admission of the contentions without any allegation of defects in the pro-cess for their formulation improperly ignores the interagency process set in place by the Memorandum of Understanding and implementing technical guidance from both agencies, ignores valid presumptions of agency regularity, and agency expertise, and improperly consigns litigation of a generic issue to a specific case.
The matters presented by this appeal have never been litigated before to LILCO's knowledge. They have significant implications both for the scope (and hence the remaining duration and cost) of the Shoreham proceeding and for the joint relation-l ship between NRC and FEMA. They are novel and important. Their resolution now is pivotal to avoidance of significant potentially u:c.ecessary expenditure of the parties' time and money. The Appeal Board should tako jurisdiction of them and rerarse the Li-censing Board.
ARGUMENT Intervenors' Contentions EX 15 and 16 challenge the scope of the February 13, 1986 FEMA graded exercise, rather than the quality of performance of LILCi, .
Other participant in it. Contention EX 15 alleges that the exclusion of various elements or functions of LILCO's Shoreham Offsite Radiological Emergency Response Plan from observation of the February 13, 1986 FEMA graded exercise renders the exercise insuf-ficient in scope to demonstrate that the LILCO plan could or would be implemented consistently with NRC regulations. Contention EX 16 argues that the extent of partici-pation by various elements was insufficient to demonstrate LILCO's ability to perform certain functions consistently with regulatory requirements.2/ Various aspects of other 2/ Contentions EX 15 and 16 deal with cognate topics, e.g., prompt notification
- (15A/16C,D,E; 15B/16B); hospital evacuation (15D/16H,J); schools (15E,F,G/16F,G);
(footnote continued)
,m.- .. . - - - - - - .- , , , . - - , . ,. -
m- -
. contentions N reat t the same themes as Contentions EX 15 and 16, and (to the extent admitted) were consolidated with them by the Board's October 3 Order. The same argu-ments that apply to Contentions EX 15 and 16 apply to these other contentions, and LILCO intends for them to be included within the following discussion of Contentions EX 15 and 16.
' Intervenors contend that this exercise configuration reveals a fundamental flaw in the Shoreham emergency plan. They also argue that an exercise so structured can-not qualify as the " full participation" exercise required as a prerequisite to licensing by Appendix E,1 IV.F.1. of the Commission's regulations.SI
- 1. The Licensina Board's conclusion is not required by the UCS case and is contrary to the Commission's interpretation of that case in CLI-86-11.
As the Licensing Doard correctly noted, in the UCS case the Court of Appeals, recognizing that the Atomic Energy Act requires that issues of material fact cannot be excluded from litigation in nuclear licensing proceedings, held that the issue of readi-ness measured by offsite emergency preparedness exercises raised such issues. Accord-ingly, the Court held that the subject of the exercise could not be totally foreclosed by l
j (footnote continued) evacuation of the water portion of the EPZ (15H/16B); ingestion pathway EPZ (15I/16A); special facilities (15K/16I,J); congregate care facilities (15L/16N). The dif-ference between them is that Contention EX 15 argues that elements were excluded and that that exclusion was fatal to the exercise; Contention EX 16 (and related mate-t rial from Contention EX 18) argues that the extent of demonstration of various ele-ments in the exercise was insufficient to establish the adequacy of emergency response.
- 3/ These contentions are 17,18, 26 and 30 (dealing with schcols) and 37 (dealing
, with ingestion pathway).
1 1/ The term " full participation exercise' is not found anywhere else in the NRC's regulations or regulatory guidance, nor in any FEMA regulation or guidance.
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. the Commission from the opportunity for litigation. October 3 Order, citing 735 F.2d at 1444-45.
However, the Court of Appeals then went to pains to recognize "the Commis-sion's wide discretion to structure its licensing hearings in the interest of speed and ef-
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ficiency." [d. at 1448. Noting that the Commission had argued that an " exercise is only relevant to its licensing decision to the extent that it indicates that emergency plans are fundamentally flawed," the Court stated unequivocally that: "Today, we in no way restrict the Commission's authority to adopt this as a substantive licensing standard."
[d. at 1448 (emphasis supplied).
The Commission, in promulgating a revision to its regulations pursuant to the UCS remand, specifically limited the ambit of litigation of exercises to exercise results.
The Commission stated:
The basic effect of the court's decision and of the rule change which follows is that the results of pre-licensing emergency preparedness exercises may be subject to litigation before the Licensing Board. The revision does not change the general predictive nature of the Commission's findings on emergency planning and preparedness issues.
50 Fed. Reg.19,323 (May 8,1985)(emphasis supplied).
Similarly, in shaping this very litigation, the Commission has done in CLI-86-11, 23 NRC 577 (June 6,1986), exactly what the Court of Appeals and its revised rule per-mitted. It restricted the scope of admissible contentions to those which, in addition to meeting normal tests of admissibility, also passed the additional threshold test of alleg-ing that the exercise itself demonstrated a fundamental flaw in the emergency plan Ming exercised:
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i Under our regulations and practice, staff review of exercise results is consistent with the predictive nature of emergency '
planning, and is restricted to determining if the exercise re-vealed any deficiencies which preclude a finding of reason- ,
able assurance that protective measures can and will be i taken, i.e., fundamental flaws in the plan.
23 NRC 577,581 (emphasis supplied).
There is no way that an inquiry into the adequacy of exercise design, which is the sole topic of Contentions EX 15 and 16, can be matched to the Commission's limita-tion in the UCS remand rule and in CLI-86-11 of the scope of litigation to exercise results. Nor can it be made to square with the frame of reference for the discussion:
whether the exercise itself reveals fundamental flaws in the plan. Had the Commission contemplated case-by-case inquiry into exercise design, it surely would have been un-likely to couch its discussion in the frame of reference of " exercise results" or whether an " exercise reveals" problems with an emergency plan.
However, the Commission did so limit its discussion. And such a limitation is ap-propriate in view of the context of the FEMA-NRC relationship under the Memorandum of Understanding,50 Fed. Reg.15,485 (April 18,1985). Under the relationship, which is also described at length in the FEMA October 27, 1986 Motion for Reconsideration to the Licensing Board and in argument 2 below, FEMA takes the lead in designing offsite l exercises by approving exercise scenarios and objectives, in scheduling exercises, -
providing evaluators for exercises, and issuing formal written evaluations of them. In the six years since Appendix E to Part 50 of the Commission's regulations,10 CFR Part l
l 50, has been in effect, FEMA has orchestrated and evaluated literally hundreds of offsite emergency preparedness exercises in cooperation with the NRC for the approxi-mately 100 operating nuclear power plants in this country.
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Contentions EX 15 and 16 take aim at this process, not at the results of the ex-ercise or the quality of performance of the actual participants. If admitted, they would permit case-by-case inquiry into the generic interagency policy and practice repre-sented by the FEMA-NRC modus vivendi. The Commission's discussion of the issue in CLI-86-11 does not contemplate this type of inquiry; nor is it sensible that it should, since it would permit scattered, uncoordinated inquiry into a working relationship which reflects the regulatory policies and requirements of two agencies coordinated by a formal Memorandum of Understanding.N In short, the Court of Appeals permitted the Commission to define the scope of issues which it wished to have considered in post-exercise litigation. The Commission has done so in CLI-86-11, by restricting them to bsues focused on the exercise results, not exercise design. Contentions EX 15 and 16, which have nothing to do with exercise results per se and intrude instead into an established, generic interagency procedure without alleging any defect in its execution in this case, are not within the scope of is-sues permitted by CLI-86-11. They should never have been admitted by the Licensing Board and, on review, should be rejected.
l 5/ In this sense, fully understood and illuminated by the discussion in the FEMA Motion for Reconsideration and attached affidavit, Contentions EX 15 and 16 represent a distinct challenge to an ongoing regulatory structure if not to a specific regulation.
They are thus inconsistent with the policy imbedded in the Commission's prohibition against challenges to regulations in specific licensing cases, embodied in 10 CFR l S 2.758, which absolutely prohibits attack on any rule or regulation of the Commission, subject only to a waiver on the " sole ground" that "special circumstances with respect to the subject matter of the particular proceeding are such that application of the rule or regulation (or provision thereof) would not serve the purpose for which the rule or regulation was adopted." 10 CFR S 2.758(b).
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. 2. ArtmLainn of Contentions EX 15 and 16, without any showing or allegation that FEMA has rk-ted from normal practice, incorrectly fails to accord FEMA due deference within the area of its expertise, disregards the presmnotion of regularity in the performance of its duties, and disregards FEMA's functioning under the NRC-FEMA Memorandum of Understanding.
Ever since 1980, the NRC and FEMA have cooperated on radiological emergency preparedness for nuclear power plants pursuant to a Memorandum of Understanding, most recently amended in 1985. 50 Fed. Reg.15,485 (April 18,1985). Under the Memo-randum of Understanding, FEMA takes the lead with respect to the offsite aspects of emergency preparedness exercises, as with other aspects of offsite preparedness. 50 Fed. Reg. at 15,487 (col. 3). FEMA's role includes responsibility for the offsite aspects of scenarios and objectives for joint (offsite-onsite) exercises. Under this agreement, FEMA and the NRC have for six years orchestrated annual (since 1985, biennial) exer-cises for all of the operating nuclear plants and all operating license applicants. Given that there are on the order of 100 operating nuclear power plants in the nation, this ex-perience represents several hundred cooperative exercises.
In all of these exercises FEMA has functioned as an agency acting within its scope of lawful authority and professional expertise. In all of them the exercise of that authority and expertise has been pursuant to a comprehensive compact with the NRC.
FEMA's functioning in the design and execution of the offsite aspects of the Shoreham exercise originated, as with other exercises, with a request from the NRC pursuant to the Memorandum of Understanding. As such, its methodology and proce-dures for design of the exercise - the issues raised by Contentions EX 15 and 16 - are entitled to a presumption of validity. There is no assertion by FEMA, nor any allegation by Intervenors, that FEMA's methodology or procedures for design and execution of the Shoreham exercise are any different than those it customarily uses for other
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exercises.E In the absence of a suggestion that FEMA constructed the Shoreham exercise in some fashion differently from other exercises, admission of Contentions EX .
I 15 and 16 simply disregards the legitimacy of FEMA's role under the Memorandum of l Understanding and subjects its work product to capricious case-by-case hindsight. No inquiry of the type represented by these contentions has ever been conducted in any l other licensing prueeding of which LILCO is aware.II g/ Indeed, the only substantive departure of_ the Shoreham exercise from the scope of other exercises known to LILCO involves the excision of direct physical manifesta-tions of public notification aspects of the plan - broadcasting of EBS messages, sound-ing of sirens, distribution of public information brochures. That departure is readily explained. Public notification elements, including this physical manifestation, had orig-inally been intended to be included in the exercise. However, late in December 1985 the Suffolk County Legislature enacted a local criminal ordinance which would have made it a misdemeanor punishable by up to a $1000 fine and a year in jail for any indi-vidual to participate in an emergency planning exercise which involved " simulation" of Suffolk County personnel or functions. Signed by the Suffolk County Executive in early January 1986 as Local Law 2-86, the effectiveness of this measure forced immediate reconfiguration of the exercise with respect to physical manifestation of prompt notifi-cation functions because of the potential for an assertion (well founded or not) that they involved a criminally proscribed holding-out of governmental authority. The local law was ultimately enjoined late on February 10 by a federal district court as an uncon-stitutional infringement of the federal government's prerogatives in the radiological health and safety area. LILCO v. Suffolk County, 628 F.Supp. 654 (E.D.N.Y.1986).
However, the intervening two days were insufficient to permit reinstatement of these aspects of the exercise. Even so, the exercise as actually conducted involved testing of the proficiency of LERO personnel right up to the point of mechanical activation of si-rens or radio messages, so the only element " missing" was that purely physical notifica-tion. For Suffolk County raw to claim that the modification of these aspects, which would otherwise have been fully included in the exercise, constitutes a " fundamental flaw" in LILCO's offsite emergency response plan, when those aspects were deleted only under the threat of criminal prosecution by Suffolk County, is hypocrisy. Suffolk County, and the other intervenors in league with it, should be barred by the well-established equitable doctrine of unclean hands from benefiting in this litigation from their own unconstitutional conduct.
I/ If Suffolk County and the other intervenors had been willing to do what govern-ments normally do protect their citizens rather than attempt to thwart the compensating actions of other entities to fill their default - they could and no doubt would have participated in the shaping of the exercise scenario and objectives, and their af ter-the-fact criticisms could have been attended to at a time when they could have been constructively dealt with.
- . Permitting this novel type 01 inquiry would, as indicated by FEMA's Appeal Peti-tion at 5,10-11 an? Its October 27 Motion for R0 consideration and the attached affida-vit of Mr. Wilkerson, signal aa open season for willy-nilly investigations, in the context of specific licensing cases, of a standard method of proceeding for FEMA and the NRC.
Whether or not such an inquiry would literally constitute an attack on Commission reg-ulations proscribed by 10 CFR S 2.758, it would certainly be contrary to its policy.EI Permitting this type of inquiry, as is made clear by FEMA's papers, has programmatic and generic ramifications which should not lightly be presumed to have been contem-plated by the Commission or by FEMA. It ignores the applied expertise of an indepen-dent federal agency acting within the scope of its expertise. It is not. called for and not implied by the FEMA-NRC Memorandum of Understanding. It has never been under-taken before in any other licensing case. It is the type of inquiry which should be au-thorized only by the Commission itself, not by a Licensing Board applying eFisting Com-mission rules and policy. The Licensing Board should not have admitted the contentions in the first instance in light of these considerations. The Appeal Board, in light of them, should reverse the Licensing Board and reject Contentions EX 15 and 16.
- 3. Admission of Contentions EX 15 and 16 would be fatally in conflict with the expert opinion of the authorized representatives of the expert agency. FEMA.
I Admission of Contentions EX 15 and 16 would be, as shown immediately below,in 1/ Without agreeing that any particular allegation of a departure by FEMA from its normal practice in developing exercise scenarios and objectives would be sufficient to frame a contention challenging FEMAb exercise design, it is possible that some types of allegations of this nature mignt ineet the test of inconsistency with a rule's purpose set i out for waiver requests by 5 2.758(b). Without any such allegation, however, permitting
! inquiry into exercise design in specific cases merely destroys any benefit to the FEMA-NRC program.
conflict with the basic structure under which FEMA has organized the business of offsite radiological preparedness evaluation. It would also be in conflict with the spe-cific expert opinions proffered in the affidavit of Robert S. Wilkerson (attached to FEMA's October 27 Motion for Reconsideration), who is responsible for the branch within FEMA which conducts offsite preparedness evaluations for nuclear power plants.
It also would be in conflict with the explanation of FEMA policy outlined in FEMA's Ap-peal Petition and Motion for Reconsideration. Those documents stand on their own and are worthy of serious attention by this Board.
Three observations from Mr. Wilkerson's affidavit are worth special attention, however. First, Mr. Wilkerson avers unequivocally that the kind of intrusion repre-sented by Contentions EX 15 and 16 "would fundamentally change the ongoing exercise planning and exercise process for off site safety considerations at commercial nuclear power generating sites throughout the cou. '
(Para. 2). Second and vitally impor-tant, in Mr. Wilkerson's expert judgment the only valid indicator of preparedness is "the designed event, the exercise and its results"; and inquiries into exercise design, scenario development or scope do not illuminate the process of evaluation of preparedness.
(Para. 3). And finally, the NRC has concurred and consistently cooperated in this pro-cess, which involves opportunity for adversarial scrutiny of exercise performance but
, not of exercise des 12n. (Para. 4).
In light of the description of the structure and functioning of FEMA's program contained in FEMA's Appeal Petition and its October 27 Motion for Reconsideration and i Mr. Wilkerson's affidavit, the Appeal Board should exclude Contentions EX 15 and 16.
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. 4. Contentions EX 15 and 16 involve generic policy decisions which should be made only by the Commission in a generic decision, not in a specifle case application by a Licensing Board.
Contentions EX 15 and 16 permit challenges to FEMA's design of the Shoreham exercise without any assertion that FEMA departed from its customary practices in that design process. They are thus improper under the Commission's implementation of the UCS decision in the remanded rulemaking and in this specific docket. Such inquiry is irreconcilable with the entire framework of the FEMA-NRC radiological prepared-ness evaluation compact. Both of these reasons commend reconsideration of the Li-censing Board's determination and exclusion of Contentions EX 15 and 16.
It is clear, in any event, that admission of these contentions implicitly involves a major policy decision respecting the scope of exercise litigation. In FEMA's expert judgment, it would drastically affect such reviews nationwide.
It is LILCO's view that these considerations powerfully commend the Appeal Board's reversal of the Licensing Board on these contentions and rejection of them at this point. Falling that, the Appeal Board should irnmediately certify the issue to the Commission for interlocutory review. If the Appeal Board reaches any decision on the merits of the issue, other than exclusion of Contentions EX 15 and 16, it should immedi-ately refer that ruling to the Commission.
Such certification or referral would be appropriate under the pertinent regula-tion,10 CFR S 2.730(f), which permits expedited interlocutory review "to prevent det-riment to the public interest or unusual delay or expense." The inclusion or exclusion of Contentions EX 15 and 16 will substantially affect the scope, cost and pace of this pro-ceeding. They involve basic concepts underlying the NRC-FEMA emergency prepared-ness program - a matter involving strong public policy elements. They are exactly the
9
.. type of issue for which expedited interlocutory Commission review is appropriate.E CONCLUSION For the reasons stated above, LILCO respectfully urges the Appeal Board to re-view the Licensing Board's October 3 and December 11 decisions on Contentions EX 15 and 16, and to revcrse those decisions and exclude Contentions EX 15 and 16 and all other derivative contentions whose intention is to question the design of the February 13 exercise, as contrasted with its results. In the event the Appeal Board takes any ac-tion other than such exclusion, LILCO requests that the Board certify, or as appropri-ate refer, the issue and any ruling by it to the Commission pursuant to 10 CFR S 2.730(f) for expedited interlocutory review, i
Respectfully submitted, Do'tfald P. Irwin Counsel for Long Island
, Lighting Company Hunton & Williams 707 East Main Street P.O. Box 1535 Richmond, Virginia 23212
- DATED
- January 15, 1987 i
2/ LILCO does not ask that discovery be stayed on those issues: in the event they are ultimately admitted for litigation, any delay in discovery may delay their readiness for trial. In any event, substantial discovery on them is already underway.
9 LILCO, January 15, 1987 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 00HERT IMNRr In the Matter of
- LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COMPANY ~87 JAN 21 P4 :37 (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1)
Docket No. 50-322-OL-5 Off tu ;i _. . = t .
80C M gr g g ryjt,r:r I hereby certify that copies of LILCO'S MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF FEMA'S APPEAL AND' REQUEST FOR CERTIFICATION OF ISSUES RELATING TO EMERGEN-t CY PLANNING EXERCISE DESIGN IN CONTENTIONS EX 15 AND 16 were served this date upon the following by first-class mail, postage prepaid, and on those parties marked by an asterisk (*) by telecopter on January 16,1987.
Alan S. Rosenthal, Chairman
- Mr. Frederick J. Shon Atomic Safety and Licensing Atomic Safety and Licensing i Appeal Board Board Fif th Floor (North Tower) U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission East-West Towers East-West Towers, Rm. 430 4350 East-West Highway 4350 East-West Hwy.
Bethesda, MD 20814 Bethesda, MD 20814 Gary J. Edles
- Secretary of the Commission Atomic Safety and Licensing Attention Docketing and Service Appeal Board Section i Fif th Floor (North Tower) U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission East-West Towers 1717 H Street, N.W.
4350 East-West Highway Washington, D.C. 20555 Bethesda, MD 20814 Atomic Safety and Licensing
- Howard A. Wilber
- Appeal Board Panel Atomic Safety and Licensing U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
! Appeal Board Washington, D.C. 20555
- Fif th Floor (North Tower)
East-West Towers Atomic Safety and Licensing 4350 East-West Highway Board Panel Bethesda, MD 20814 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555
! John H. Frye, III, Chairman Atomic Safety and Licensing Bernard M. Bordenick, Esq.
- Board Oreste Russ Pirfo, Esq.
! U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Edwin J. Reis, Esq.
4 East-West Towers U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
! 4350 East-West Hwy. 7735 Old Georgetown Road Bethesda, MD 20814 (to mailroom)
Bethesda, MD 20814 l
i Dr. Oscar H. Paris Atomic Safety and Licensing Herbert H. Brown, Esq.
- Board Lawrence Coe Lanpher, Esq.
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Karla J. Letsche, Esq.
. East-West Towers Kirkpatrick & Lockhart 4350 East-West Hwy. South Lobby - 9th Floor
. Bethesda, MD 20814 1800 M Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036-5891
.- - - . _ - - . , , - , - , ~ , - . - _ , _ , - , _ , - . . . - _ , - - - - - _ - , _ - , - , , . , , . - . . . - . - - _ . - - , _ _ , . _ _ . . - . , - . . . , _ , , , - -
e
- Fabian G. Palomino, Esq.
- Mr. Philip McIntire Richard J. Zahnleuter, Esq. Federal Emergency Management Special Counsel to the Governor Agency Executive Chamber 26 Federal Plaza Room 229 New York, New York 10278 State Capitol Albany, New York 12224 Jonathan D. Feinberg, Esq.
New York State Department of Mary Gundrum, Esq. Public Service, Staff Counsel Assistant Attorney General Three Rockefeller Plaza 120 Broadway Albany, New York 12223 Third Floor, Room 3-116 New York, New York 10271 Ms. Nora Bredes Executive Coordinator Spence W. Perry, Esq.
- Shoreham Opponents' Coalition William R. Cumming, Esq. 195 East Main Street Federal Emergency Management Smithtown, New York 11787 Agency 500 C Street, S.W., Room 840 Gerald C. Crotty, Esq.
Washington, D.C. 20472 Counsel to the Governor Executive Chamber Mr. Jay Dunkleberger State Capitol New York State Energy Office Albany, New York 12224 Agency Building 2 Empire State Plaza Martin Bradley Ashare, Esq.
Albany, New York 12223 Eugene R. Kelly, Esq.
Suffolk County Attorney Stephen B. Latham, Esq. H. Lee Dennison Building Twomey, Latham & Shea Veterans Memorial Highway 33 West Second Street Hauppauge, New York 11787 P.O. Box 298 Riverhead, New York 11901 Dr. Monroe Schneider North Shore Committee P.O. Box 231 Wading River, NY 11792 r ,
"Y Do'nald P. Irwin Hunton & Williams 707 East Main Street P.O. Box 1535 Richmond, Virginia 23212 DATED: January 15, 1987
! t l-ATTACHMENT 1 Port M, App.E 10 CPR Ch. I (1 1-86 Edities) near site emergency operations facility; and local emergency plans as is reasonably among the nuclear facility. the principal achievable without mandatory public par.
State and local emergency operations cen- ticipation shall be conducted for each site at ters. and the field assessment teams. Such which a power reactor is located for which communications systems shall be tested an. the first operating license for that site is nually.
lasued after July 13, 1983. This esercise
- d. Provisions for communications by the shall be conducted within 1 year before the '
licensee with NRC Headquarters and the issuanes of the first operating almene for I appropriate NRC Regional Office Oper- full power and prior to operation above Sg
! atsone Center froen the nuclear power reae- of rated power of the first reester. and sher tar control room. the onsite teehattal sup- include participation by seek State and port conter, and the near eite emergency op-erstions factiety. Such comununications shall local government within the pluses esse.
i be tested monthly, sure pathway EFE and seek State within the lagostion espesure pathway EFE.
F. 7YstninS 3. Each licensee at each site shall ensuelly esereise its eenergeoey plan.
The programa to provide for (1) the train. 3. Each 18*===== at seek site shall escredes ing of employees and eseressing, by periodic
, drtile, of radiation emersoney olans to with oftuite authertales suok thes the mate ensure that employees of the licensee are and local severnment emergammy pense ser i familiar with their spesefte essersumsy re- each operating reester este are essented h6-spense duties, and (3) the partielsesion in enninEy. with fem er partial pestistettens a the training and drills by other porosas by states and loses sever ===mmam withha the wheee asalutasse emmy be needed in the plusse espessme pathuey M h and event of a radiation emergency shaR be de* Iceal goversma that bees W psomus, acribed. This shall include a deteripeten of pated b a Jett esseehe shop Osake 3.
"y"'an=d initial training and perteer re- 1303. are eIIWho to feer smettegate ha
. treintag pregness le be provided to seek of essergumsy prepassessas smeentennen e tem the following categories of emnerguesy po nial fregesmay. The level of parateattom E*
shall be se feDeust
"""."*Directore n and/or coordinatme of pate the(a) A State aba5 at least partinny pestial, 2 each othese escrete et seek h i
i or assedsat as- (b) A State shall fully partistete ha at I
' an=== ant. imeludi.ng control rossa shift per. least one offuite esereise every 2 yeese. '
sonnel. (c) At least ones every 'l years au Steese
- c. Paanwaps useoitering tenenst within the plume espesare patheep WW
- d. Fire control teams (fire brigadas); for a gima alte must fully pestiegese in sus
- e. Repair and dessage control teams; offaite escretas for that site Me esenise
- f. First aid and recrue teames must adeo involve full participetten by local
- g. Medical support personnel. govermmanae within the pluene esposure
- h. IJeonese's headquartere support per. pathway EFE.
sonnek (d) Partial partielsation by a local govern-
- 1. Security personnel ment during an offbite esercles for a site is In addition, a radiological orientation acceptable only when the local government ,
training program shsil be made available to local services personnek e.g., local emergen.
- I cy services / Civil Defense. local law enforce, censee personnel physically and actively ment personnel, local news media persons. take part in testine their integrated capabil.
' The plan shall describe provtsions for the ity to adequately access and respond to an conduct of emergency preparedness exer, accident at a commercial nuclear power cises as follows: Esercises shall test the ade, plant. " Full participation" includes testing quacy of timing and content of implement. the major observable portions of the onsite Ing procedures and methods, test emergency and offsite emergency plans and mobilisa.
equipment and communications networks. tion of State. local and licensee personnel test the public notification system, and and other resources in sufficient mumbers ensure that emergency organization person. to verify the capability to respond to the ac.
net are familiar with their duties. cident scenario.
i I. A full participation
- exercise which * " Partial participation" when used in con.
tests as much of the licensee. State and junction with emergency preparedness exer.
cises for a particular site means appropriate offsite authorities shall actively take part in a Use of site specific simulators or comput. the exercise sufficient to test direction and era is SCCeptable for any exercise. control functions; i.e (a) protective action
- " Full participation" when used in con. decision making related to emergency action Junction with emergency preparedness exer. levels, and (b) communication capabilities cises for a particular site means appropriate among affected State and local authorttles offsite local and State authorttles and 11 and the licensee.
i 512 I
i I
t
~
ATTACHMENT 2 6
l Auaust 1, 1986, revised as of November 24, 1986 and, further revised in accordance with Licensine Board instructions of December 4, 1986 EMERGENCY PLANNING CONTENTIONS RELATING TO THE FEBRUARY 13, 1986 EYERCISE I.- CONTENTIONS EX l-7: LILCO'S LACK OF LEGAL AUTHORITY' IS A FUNDAMENTAL FLAW contentions EX l-7. Not admitted.
3 ..-
II. CONTENTIONS EX 8-14: LACK.0F ACTIVE QOVERNMENTAL PARTICIPATION IS A FUNDAMENTAL FLAW Contentions EX 8-14. Not admitted.
III. CONTENTIONS EX 15-19: LIMITED SCOPE OF THE EXERCISE PRECLUDES REASONABLE ASSURANCE FINDING Contentions EX 15 and EX 16: (The matters set forth in suboart C of EX 18 are admitted as additional alleced defici-encies in the exercise; and the matters alleced in EX 20 are deemed covered by EX 15 and 16]. The scope of the February 13 exercise of the LILCO Plan was so limited that it could not and did not yield valid or meaningful results on implementation capability as required by 10 CFR S 50.47(a)(2), in that it did not include demonstrations or evaluations of major portions of
t the LILCO Plan and the emergency response capabilities of many persons a i entities relied upon to implement the LILCO Plan.
The data set forth in subparts A-I, K, and M of Contention E7 15 and A-L and N of Contention EX 16 individually and collectively establish that the exercise demonstrated a fundamental flaw in the LILCO Plan. The exercise results do not demonstrate that the LILCO Plan could or would be implemented, and the exercise results preclude a finding that there is reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a radiological emergency at Shoreham, as required by 10 CFR S 50.47(a)(1). Thus, the exercise demonstrated a fundamental flaw in the LILCO Plan. m . . . , . . u_ .
Specifically, several critical aspects of offsite emergency preparedness, and major substantive portions of the LILCO Plan, were excluded from the exercise. Neither the exercise scenario (which LILCO prepared), nor responses by players during the j exercise, nor any FEMA evaluation or observation, addressed the elements identified in EX 26 A-I, K and M of emergency prepared-ness required by the referenced sections of the NRC's regulations and NUREG 0654.
The failure of each of the persons and entities identified in EX 16 A-L and N below to participate in the exerci'se both individually and collectively means that the exercise did not comply with 10 CFR S 50.47(b)(14) and did not demonstrate that the LILCO Plan can or will be implemented, as required by 10 CFR SS 50.47(a)(1) and (a)(2). Rather, the exercise results were'so limited that they demonstrated a fundamental flaw in the scope of
the exercise and in the implementability of the Plan and preclude a finding that there is reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of n Shoreham accident, as required by 10 CFR $ 50.47(a)(1).
Other than LILCO and its personnel, the majority of tne or-ganizations, entities, and individuals relied upon in the LILCO Plan for implementation of that Plan did not participate in the exercise. Thus, the exercise did not address the willingness, availability, training, equipment, capability, or adequacy of performance of the entities and ind.ividuals identified in EX 16
, A-L and:N below, each of which is necessary to implement the portions of the LILCO Plan referenced in each subpart. The fact.
that each of these entities and individuals did not participate in the exercise precludes a finding that the LILCO. Plan.is capable"of implementation or a finding of reasonable-assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a Shoreham emergency, as required by 10 CFR S 50.47(a)(1). Accordingly, the LILCO Plan is fundamentally flawed.
f EX 15.A. (Submarts C and D of EX 16 subsumed in this l
submart; and the failure to test sirens as alleced in EX 24 will be considred as an examole of an additional emission).
Procedures for actual notification of the public and actual issuance of emergency information and protective action recommendations to the public, as set forth in OPIPs 3.3.4, 3.8.1 and 3.8.2, and at pages 2.2-2 thru 2.2-2a, 3.3-4 thru 3.3-6, 3.4-6, 3.8-4, 3.8-6 and Appendix A, pagas IV-2 and IV-3 of the 3-
LILCO Plan, were excluded from the exercise, in that sirens, the LILCo Ess system, and WALK Radio were not tested, used, demonstrated, or involved in the exercise. Thus, neither the notification capabilities of LILCO or WALK Radio personnel, nor the notification capabilities of LILCO's EBS system, were evaluated during the exercise. Such capabilities are required by 10 CFR 5 50.47(b)(5), 10 CFR Part 50, App. E.5 IV.D; NUREG 0654 55 II.E and F, and Appendix 3, and were required to be demon-
. _ m.g s . . ;_ . . _. 2 a strated in the exercise. Objectives Eoc 14 and 15. Their exclusion from the exercise precludes a finding of reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a Shoreham emergency, as required by 10 CFR 5 50.47(a)(1). Accordingly, the LILCO Plan is fundamentally flawed. '
. . . ~ w .. - u . . . . .t. w - - _ ,A_ s .1 LILCO's suggestion that the conduct of a " prompt notification test" would correct this deficiency (131 letter dated June 20, 1986, from John Leonard to Harold Denton (SNRC-1269), Enclosure 1 at 4) is incorrect. Such a test, assuming one were conducted in the future, would deal with siren operability; it would not test or demonstrate the ability of LILCO's offsite response organization to integrate that single portion of an emergency response with the remaining actions necessary in an emergency, nor would it test or demonstrate that the LILCO Plan could be implemented.
EX 16.C. (This submart subsumed in basis A of EX 15]. WALK Radio did not participate in the exercise. It is relied upon*for initial notification of the public of an emergency as well as for
_4_
issuance to the public of protective action recommendations and other emergency information. Ett LILCO Plan at 2.2-2 thru 2.2-2a, 3.3-4 thru 3.3-6, 3.4-6, and 3.8-6; OPIP 3.3.4; OPIP 3.8.1; I OPIP 3.8.2.
1 EX 16.D. (This subnart subsumed in basis A of EX 15]. No other radio stations participated in the exercise. Under the LILCO Plan, stations WBLI, WCTO, WGLI, WGSM, WLIM,. WLIX, WLNG, WRCN, WRED, and WRIV are relied upon to ccnstitute LILCO's EBS system; therefore they are relied upon for initial notification of, and communication of protective action recommendations and other emergency information to, the public. Egg.LILCO Plan at 2.2-2 thru 2.2-2a; App. B.
EX 24. (Not senarately admitted but failure to test sirens will be dealt with as an additional examnle of an omission under submart A of EX 15]. EOC ARCA 7 refers to the fact that_there was no activation of the siren system during the exercise. FEMA Report at 41. The siren system is the central feature of the prompt notification system in the LILCO Plan. Egg Plan at 3.3-4 thru 3.3-6 and 3.4-6; OPIP 3.3.4. Its exclusion from the exercise precludes a finding that LILCO can and will provide early notification of an emergency to the public as required by 10 CFR S 50.47(b)(5), and 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E S D.3, and thus precludes a finding of reasonable assurance enat adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a Shoreham accident.
5-
EX 15.B. (subnart B of EX 16 subsumed in this submart].
Procedures for nctification of, and issuance of protective action recommendations to, the members of the public in the water portion of the plume exposure EPZ, as set forth in OPIP 3.3.4, and at pages 2.2-2a and 3.3-5 and Appendix A at IV-4 and IV-6 of the LILCO Plan, were excluded from the exercise, in that the U.S.
Coast Guard did not participate in'theaexercise (other than perhaps'the receipt of one or more telephone calls) and FEMA never evaluated Coast Guard performance (assuming arauendo there was any). -Such capabilities are required by 10 CFR 5 50.47(b)(5), 10 CFR Part 50, App. E, 5..IV D,.eandLMUREG.0654 55 II.E and F, Appendix 3, and the exercise was supposed to (but did not) test the alleged Coast Guard commitment under the LILCO Plan to notify water-borne traffic in the EPZ. Egg, gagt, FEMA Report at 9; objective EOC 16. The water portion of the EPZ-constitutes nearly 50 percent of the physical area of the plume EPZ. The exclusion of such procedures.from the exercise pre-cludes a finding of reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a Shoreham emer-gency, as required by 10 CFR S 50.47(a)(1). Accordingly, the LILCO Plan is fundamentally flawed.
EX 15.B. (Subeart 9 of Ex 16 subsumed in this subeart].
Demonstration of the capability of implementing protective action recommendations for the public on the waters of the plume exposure EPZ, or for transients on beaches or in parks or similar areas in the EPZ, as set forth in OPIP 3.3.4, and at pages 2.2-2a, 3.3-4 thru 3.3-6, 3.8-1 thru 3.8-3, and Appendix A at IV-4
and IV-6 of the LILCO Plan, was excluded from the exercise. Such capabilities are required by 10 CFF. 5 10.47(b)(10), and NUREG 0654 SS II.J, and objectives FIELD 9 and EOC 16 required a demonstration of the ability to evacuate all er part of the 10-mile EPZ including the water portion. There in fact was no demonstration of any ability to effect an evacuation of the water portion of the EPZ. This exclusion from the exercise precludes a finding of reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a Shoreham accident as required by 10 CFR S 50.47(a)(1). Accordingly, the LILCO Plan is fundamentally flawed. , .
EX 16.B. (This subeart subsumed in bases B and H of EX 15].
j The U.S. Coast Guard did not participate in the exercise beyond perhaps receiving phone calls. It is relied upon for initial i
notification of, and communication and implementation of protective action recommendations to, members of the public in the water portion of the plume exposure EPZ, and for private and l commercial vessel traffic control and access restriction on the l water portion of the EPZ. Egg LILCO Plan at 2.2-2a, 3.3-5; OPIP 3.3.4. The water portion of the EPZ constitutes approximately 50 percent of the entire EPZ. FEMA did not observe or evaluate the Coast Guard's performance of any of these activities,' including, if it occurred in fact, One dispatching of any Coast Guard vessels into the EPZ.
EX 15.C. Procedures for public education and the dissemi-nation of information to the public on a periodic basis, as set forth in OPIP 3.8.1, and at pages 3.8-1 thru 3.8-4 and Appendix A
D at IV-3 thru 4, IV-70 of the LILCO Plan, and a demonstration of the adequacy of public education materials, were excluded from the exercise. Such programs and materials are required by 10 CFR S 50.47(b)(7), 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, S IV.D, and NUREG 0654 S II.G. Their exclusion from the exercise precludes a finding of reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a Shoreham accident,' as required by 10 CFR S 50.47(a)(1). Accordingly, the LILCO Plan is fundamentally flawed.
EX-15.D. (Submarts H, I, and J of EX 16 subsumed'-in7this suboartl. Procedures relating to evacuation of EP2^ hospital patients and patients in the Suffolk Infirmary, and a demon-stration of the capability of implementing such an evaeuation, were excluded from the exercise. There are approximately 850 patients in the Central Suffolk, St. Charles, and John T. Mather Hospitals and the Suffolk Infirmary (OPIP 3.6.5, Att. 2), of which approximately 155 are designated maternity, newborn, or pediatric. Procedures to evacuate these persons and the capability and resources to implement them are required by 10 CFR 55 50.47(b)8) and (b)(10), and NUREG 0654 S II.J.9 and 10. Their exclusion from the exercise precludes a finding of reasonable as-surance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a Shoreham accident, as required by 10 CTR S 50.47(a)(1). Accordingly, the LILCO Plan is fundamentally flawed.
O EX 16.H. (This suboart subsumed in basis D of EX 15).
Officials from hospitals located in the EPZ -- Central Suffolk Hospital, St. Charles Hospital, John T. Mather Hospital -- and the Suffolk Infirmary did not participate in the exercise. Such officials are relied upon for determination and implementation of protective action recommendations-for hospital patients.- Egg App. A at IV-172;.OPIP 3.6.5 5 2.0 (Note); OPIP 3.6.1 5 5.3.2.
EX 16.I. (This subcart subsumed'in basis D of EX 15].
Officials and personnel from the nine nursing and adult homes located in the EPZ did not participate'in the exercis's. Such personnel are relied upon for implementation of protective action recommendations for the residents and patients in such homes.
Egg App. A at II-28 thru -29, IV-173 thru -176; OPIP 3.6.5.
EX 16.J. (This subcart subsumedin-basis D of'EfW15}.
Officials from hospitals, nursing homes, and .Mimilar fadfl[ ties outside the EPZ relied upon'for relocation services ~a'nd necessary health care for special facility evacuees did not participate in j the exercise. The LILCO Plan fails to include agreements for such facilities which indicate an ability to provide necessary reception services, in violation of NUREG 0654 S II.J.10; instead, the Plan merely includes a list of such facilities and indicates LILCO's reliance upon them for relocation services and necessary health care for evacuees from hospitals, nursing and adult homes in the EPZ. Egg App. A at IV-166a thru -168, !V-172 thru -178; OPIP 3.6.5.
EX 15.E. (Submart F of EX 16 subsumed in this submart].
Procedures relating to the sheltering of school children (agg OPIP 3.6.5; OPIP 3.6.1; App. A at II-19 thru -21) were excluded from the exercise. Such procedures, and the resources and capa-bilities necessary to implement them, are required by 10 CFR 55 50.47(b)(8) and (b)(10), and NUREG 0654 55 II.J.9 and 10.
Officials of most of the school districts relied upon in the LILCO Plan for the implementation of the protective action of.
sheltering have stated that they do not have the resources and are not capable of implementing such an action during a Shoreham emergency. The exclusion of LILCO's proposed.schogi g eltering procedu,res from the exercise precludes a finding of reasonable-assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be;taken in the event of.a Shoreham emergency as required bys.10,CFR 5 50.47(a)(1). Accordingly, the LILCO Plan is fundamentally.
flawed.
EX 15.F. (Submarts F and G of EX 16 and EX 26 subsumed in
, this subcart). FEMA did not observe any demonstration of the i
organizational ability necessary to effect an early dismissal of schools, even though such a demonstration was One of the exercise j objectives. Egg objective EOC 18; FIELD 15; FEMA Report at 38.
, Under the LILCO Plan, early dismissal is one of the primary pro-tective actions for sc"mol children. LILCO Plan at 3.6-7: App. A at II-19 thru -21; OPIP 3.6.5. Thus, procedures relating to the early dismissal of schools and the ability to implement them are required by 10 CFR S 50.47(b)(10) and NUREG 0654 S II.J. .Offici-l als of most of the school districts relied upon in the LILCO Plan
, 10 -
i
F.
for the implementation of early dismissals have stated that they do not have the resources and are not capable of safely or effec-tively implementing an early dismissal during a Shoreham acci-dent. FEMA's failure to observe any demonstration of the ability to implement LILCO's proposed protective action of early dismis-sal during the exercise precludes a finding of reasonable
~
assurance that adequate protegcive measures'can and will be .
4 implemented in the event of a Shoreham accident, as required by 10 CFR S 50.47(a)(1). Accordingly,- the LILCO Plan is funda-
~
mentally flawed.
, EX 15.G. (Suboarts F and G of EY 16. EX 26, _and EX 30 subsumed in this submart). Procedures relating to the evacuation of school dhildren, as set forth~.in OPIP 3.6'.5 and'in" Appendix A I
at II-19 thru -21 of the LILCO Plan, which refer to non-existent school plan's and rely upon school officials to locate and mobi-lize necessary personnel and equipment to implement an evacua-
! tion, were excluded from the exercisei Such procedures and the capability of implementing them are required by 10 CFR SS 50.47(b)(8) and (b)(10), and NUREG 0654 SS II.J.9 and 10.
Officials of most of the school districts relied upon in the LILCO Plan for the implementation of school evacuations have stated that they do not have the resources and are not capable of safely or effectively implementing an evacuation of schcol children during a Shoreham accident. And, the one free play message in the exercise purportedly involving simulated evacuation assistance for the Ridge Elementary School did not-even purport to demonstrate the resources or capabilities of
_ _ . _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ ..____2____
officials of that school or of the Longwood School District to implement an evacuation, and thus failed to demonstrate the resources or capabilities necessary to implement the proposed
'[ procedure for evacuation of school children set forth in the f
LILCO Plan. The exclusion of such procedures from the exercise precludes a finding of reasonable assurance that adequate pro-i tactive measures can and will be taken in the event of a Shoreham accident, as required by 10 CFR S 50.47(a)(1), and precludes any
, finding that objectives EOC 20 and FIELD 16 were met. According-ly, the LILCO Plan is fundamentally flawed.
EX 16.F. (This submart subsumed in bases E, F, and G of I
EY 15]. Other than one or two persons fr.cm the Shoreham-Wading River School District, school officials and personnel, including teachers, from the two parochial schools, 13 nursery schools, and 33 public schools located in the EPZ, as well as those from the i
seven school districts outside the EPZ but with children who reside within the EPZ, did not participate in the exercise.
Personnel from such schools are relied upon for implementation of l
l protective action recommendations for school children under the LILCO Plan. Egg App. A at II-19 thru -21, IV-169 thru -171; OPIP l
l 3.6.5.
l
! EX 26. (Not secarately admitted but will be dea'lt with under subcarts F and G of EX 15]. EOC ARCA 9 refers to the fact that only Shoreham-Wading River Central School District partici-pated in the exercise. FEMA Report at 41. According to the LILCO Plan, all protective actions for school children are to be implemented by school district and school personnel, not by
LILCO. OPIP 3.6.5; App. A at II-19 thru -21. There are 33 I public schools, 15 private and nursery school.s, and one BOCES supervisory district within the EPZ; in addit.on, there are seven school districts outside the EPZ with children who reside within the EPZ, plus three private schools and one BOCES supervisory district with buildings located just beyond the EPZ. App. A at II-19 thru -21 and IV-169 thru -171. The LILCO Plan relies upon these school officials and personnel, and their failure to participate in the exercise constitutes a deficiency which precludes a finding of reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken for schoolmchildren in the event of a Shoreham accident.
EX 30. (Not secarately admitted but will be dealt with un-I der suboart G of EX 15]. Patchogue SA ARCA 5 refers <to the fact that it took 40 minutes to dispatch a LILCO bus driver.to pick up a bus to use to simulate the evacuation of 40 children from the Ridge Elementary School. FEMA Report at 67. Under the LILCO Plan, such procedures, involving the use of LILCO bus drivers for evacuation, are relied upon for evacuation of special facilities and nursery schools (OPIP 3.6.5), although with respect to all other schools including Ridge, LILCO assumes that regular school bus drivers would perform necessary driving duties. This defi-ciency demonstrates LILCO's inability to promptly communicate transportation needs of members of the public and to effectively implement procedures to effect evacuation of special facilities.
Thus, it precludes a finding that LILCO has adequate provisio'ns for prompt communication among response personnel as required by 13 -
l 10 CFR S 50.47 (b)(6), or that the protective action of evacua-tion can and will be implemented as required by 10 CFR S 50.47(b)(10). It also precludes a finding of reasonable assir-ance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a Shoreham accident.
EX 16.G. (This suboart subsumed in bases F and G of EX 15].
Other than two drivers from the Shoreham-Wading River School-District, school bus drivers did not participate in.she exercise.
School bus drivers from 10 school districts, as well as from numerous private and nursery schools, are relied upon for imple-mentation of the protective actions for school children of early dismissal and evacuation. Egg LILCO Plan, App. A at II-19 thru
-20; OPIP 3.6.5. -
EX 15.I. [Suboart A of EX 16 and EX 37 subsumed in this subpart]. Procedures for determining, issuing, and implementing protective action recommendations for:the ingestion pathway EPZ (aside from the single recommendation that dairy animals be placed on stored feed), as set forth in OPIP 3.6.6 and at pages 3.6-1 thru 3.6-4 and 3.6-7a thru 3.6-8a of the LILCO Plan, were excluded from the exercise in that the State of Connecticut did not participate in the exercise and LILCO did not implement suen procedures even for the portion of the ingestion pathway EPZ j
located in the State of New York. Such capabilities are required i
by 10 CFR S 50.47(b)(10), 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, 5 IV.F, and l
NUREG 0654 S II.J, and by objectives EOC 9, 12. Their exclusion f rom the exercise precludes a finding of reasonable assurance-that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the i
l
event of a Shoreham accident, as required by 10 CFR S 50.47(a)(1). Accordingly, the LILCO Plan is fundamentally flawed.
EX 16.A. (This subcart subsumed in basis I of EX 15]. The State of Connecticut did not participate in the exercise beyond perhaps receiving a phone call from a LILCO-" player" at approxi-mately 10:30. Connecticut is relied upon for issuance and imple-mentation of protective actions for the portion of the ingestion pathway EPZ located within its borders. Egg LILCO Plan at 3.6-8; OPIP 3.6.6.
EX 37. (Not smearatelv admitted but incarnorated into submart I of EX 15]. The exercise revealed a fundamental flaw in the LILCO Plan in that the LERO players didenot' determine, recommend or -implement the protective actions-ne'cestaYphte mitigate the consequences of the radiological release In the in-
~
gestion pathway, as required by OPIP 3.6.6, 10 CFR S 50.47(b)(10) and NUREG 0654 $ II.J.ll. For the reasons set forth below, LILCO failed to satisfy objectives EOC 8 and 12 and the exercise
- results preclude a finding of reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a Shoreham accident, as required by 10 CFR S 50.47(a)(1).
- Specifically, during the exercise the LERO personnel at the EOC failed to perform any of the following actions:
4 EX 37.A. LERO personnel failed to extend protective action recommendations for the ingestion pathway beyond the 10-mile EPZ and thus failed to mitigate the radiolcgical consequences.of the accident, as required by OPIP 3.6.6., SS 1, 2 and 5. According
Mk ,
ATTACHfENT 3
[ *
\ f Guidance Memorandus 17. Revision 1 Technological Nasards 2073S9 CONDUCTING FRE-EXERCISE AND POST-EXERCISE ACTIVITIES i
Pursese This Guidance Mesorandue provides guidelines for conducting pre-emercise and post-emercise estivitiss.' ' * ,,,
tscharound ,
i Under 44 CFR 350, it is the responsibility of a State and its local governments to conduct-joint euereises as a condities of initial and continued Federal Energency Management Agency (FEMA) approval. The i
original @uidance Memorandus (t3H+1TS, dettid Jtfinnstr8,1941, provided precedural guidance latended"tWiMMrove stie aba~ duct. of esartises and to establishi' greater uniferaity among the FEBtk Mose-in this activity.
While progrees has been made, there is still auch diversity assag Regions in the quality of exercises esadmeted. This hvielen is a further effort l
st achieving uniferelty ia propering for and"ciendesting emeraises. It l
espercedes the January 8, 1981? 5W 17. ItJis te"be' esed ta conjuosties with the August 5, 1983, senerandum free Dave McLoughita entitled
" Procedural Policy en Radielegical Energency Preparednese Flas Revieve, Raereise Observattens and Evaluatione, and Interie Findinge" la all joise esercises required by the Nuclear Regulatory;, ommissies C (NRC) and FEMA regulattene.
l
~
Guidance 1
- 1. Pre-enercise Activity l Past experience has siews that joint caercises must be planned I
considerably la advance and each step scheduled. le order to essere optimum reewits, the following silesteses should be est, at a stateue.
More frequent contacts are at the discrettes of the Regies.
(
WOTE: These silestones are predicated en adheresse to the biensial esercise
(
frequency. If, for any reason, esercises will be more freguest, the silestone dates shows in parentheses should be used.
l l
M11.ESTmge pgg unnagg ptEFARATION 5e Later Than the I ter Prior to Esercise 120 daye State end 11eeeeee jointly esvelop and
! embait emeratee objectives to TEMA and j (75) RC Regional Offices.
I I
105 days FEMA and NRC Regional Offices semplete f
reviews of objectives and entent of play (60) af ter meettag with lisenese/ State, if
- . seesseary.
1 .
- - - - - - - - . _ _ _ . . , - , _ - - - - _ ~ ~ ~ - - - - - - , -
e
-z- 507300 90 days State and licensee submit exercise
- scenario to FEMA and NRC Regions 1 (45) for review.
60 dayo FEMA and NRC Regions contact or meet
. (33) with State and licensee to discuss modifications and complete the scenario.
40 days Controller's meeting to develop
! coordination of esercise.
(30) 30 days FEMA and NRC Regions develop specific (23) post-enercise activity schedule with the State and advise FEMA and NRC Neadquarters.
15 daye Optional - The RAC Chairmen and NRC tese leader meet to develop observer (IS) action plaa (where statiemed, how
- v. , t e c ,
n .m, , o easy., free each organisation, what
. , e I y e o n, to look for)~.
1 day All Federal ebeervers, both onette (1) and offeite, meet in the esercise area to,finalise eseignmente and
,, receive instructions.
i Whenever an euereise is scheduled, the Regies should insediately i assure construction of a time line based on the above and make it available to the State, NRC Region, and FEMA Meadquarters. Where s' plant is located on a Regional boundary, the Region in which the plant is actually located l is considered the lead Region for perpeces of scheduling sad coordiastion.
r Istablishing the ties line is the reopensibility of the lead Region.
l Adhering to the time line should permit ample time to review and negotiate any changes to the esercise objectives and the esercise scenario. Newever,
[ should delays occur which may offeet the scheduled esercise date, the Regional Director must so advise the State, the utility, the NRC Region, and FEMA Readquarters. The FEMA Regional Office should seks every ef fort to rectify slips in the timetable to avoid rescheduling the esercise date.
The basic objectives for the exercise should be taken from the list of 36 in Attachment I. The objectives have been developed to generally correspond to the observable elements of NURIG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1, as well as the modules contained in the "Medular Fermat for Uniformity of Radiological toergency Freparedness tsarcise Observatione and Evaluations."
Objectives should be cheeen to test a enjer porties of emergemey reopense espebilities. Objectives related te deficionates of record seheduled for serrection f ree the previsua esercise should be included. Ze addities, each of the 34 ebjectives should be tested at least esee withis a five-year period. ,
i I
' 20739L The objectives for each exercise must be reviewed by both theOnce FDtA
- and NRC Regional Offices before specific scenarios are written.
reviewed, the State and licensee will develop a scenario for submission i
which will include, at a sintaus: l l
- a full schedule of all events.
- all dosimetry and monitored values to be supplied to the monitoring teams,
- all. release data freo.She, plant. . ,
..,~m
- calculations of offsite dese, and 7
- applicable seteorologieal data.
4 : s u ,,
FEMA and NRC Regions will.eemsd6aste review of:the scenarie and notify If messesary, a the State and'11eensee of any necessary modifications.
meeting to discuss modificatione should be held. If agreeneat saamet be reachedrFEMA.and NRC Headquarters. assistampe,.should be sought.
m.,.a.:.. .
J n.,
- 11. Post-emercise Meetings- .,3 %
A. Three audience groups are to be involved in pes,t-ezercise asettages v-
- a e.. .
- observers, - -
.i ~ . c
- esereise participants, and
- public/sedia.
l The approach to each audience's meeting will usually vary. In addition, the timing and intent of the meettags say very depending upon whether the esercise is conducted in advance of FDIA '350" approval
(" qualifying exercise") or for conciaued *350" approval.
- 3. The following chart illustrates post-enarcise aseting requirements for qualifying exercises and exercises for continued FEMA approval.
Guidance se each type of meeting fo11ews.
L 00WTTNUED=4F?t0 VAL EXERCTSE On EIFYtpG IIERCISE-Oteerwer Bebriefing Steerwer Debriefing Emsreise 7seticipeate Eseecise 7artic1 pants Srieftag Brieftag .
Meettag Public Meeting
, l
i .' 207392 !
l
. 1. Observer Debriefing (for qualifying and continued-approval esereises), i i
- s. Immediately following the esercise. the RAC Chairnos I sheeld convene the FEMA and RAC evaluators to debrief thee and to consolidate their aboarvations and coemente. The separate eboerver debrieflag is met specified under 44 CFR 350 bit should be incorporated as standard precedure. During this same period, the NRC tese leader should parallel this process with the NRC observers.
- b. As seen se possible af ter their independent debrieflage, the RAc.eatrusa and the NRC tese leader sheeld meet to coordinate and arrangei Fedoest
, u, participation .;in the joint emeraise participant's briefing.
3
- 2. Esereise Participants' Briefing (for ges11fying eswl contiamed-a.: t - . approval emeraises).' = . ^ '
b a. Within og heure"ef the esopletten of as emeralse, a briefing involving the esercise participeats and Federal observers should be he1&ss discuse the preliennery resulte of thd'dWHefse. This brieflag should be-held la accordance W th 44 CFR 350.9(a) and (d).
a.n , . . , , , ,
- b. A receemanded agenda to be seed is as follows: )
. v , p . ., . ,- , a . . a. .o
. u ..s~
Review efronette actions by NEC,
.. ... w ,- - 1.icensee presents their vieve (slarifying questione
'^
er teaments),
- - Review of offeite seriesd:by RAC Chatrues, l
- State and leasts present their views (clarifying questions er sessents).
- Review of Federal roepense (if applicable) by RAC C'nairman, and
- opportunity for clarifying questions or esaments by licensee, State, and locals.
- c. The presentations should each be a brief, integrated i overview severlag the highlights of the esereise. The most important
- deficionates observed suet be tecluded sad appropriate semendation for j good performance can be included. Eamover, the RAC Chairess met j tadisate whether the State er local properednese is adequate er i quote.
- 3. Meeting For Caettened FW A Approval Emeralses.
l a. Followtag an emerstee for eestissed FEMA approval, e soottag
- Levolving emeratee partialpeats, representatives from the M C and other appropriate
! Federal agenstee and the public and the media should be held is aseeWWesse
! with 44 CPR 350.9(e) la the vicinity of the noelear peuer fee 111ty. At the i discreties of the Regional Director, this meeting any be combined with the l ,
emeralse participants' br?.efing.
i l .
i
, 207393
- b. The public and media may attend the meeting as ebeervers.
Eoweveg, at the discretion of the Regions 1 Director, writtes questions
- f. .
free the public and media may be submitted at or after the meeting for
- coesideration la the esercise evaluation. Also, the Regional Director may further use his/her discretion to solicit sad reopend to oral questions and cessents during this meeting. Under to circumstances should it be indicated whether State or local preparedness is adequate or inadequate.
- c. During the meeting, the RAC Chairosa should offer an
- oveifview of the exercise and should provide his/her observations. Coseents i from the RAC members and FINA observers may be solicited at the discretica ,
! of the RAC.,Chairees.
. t a e' ,
- 4. Public Noetinge l s. Frier to che submission by the Regieaal Director of the evaluation of the pien vai exercise to FEMA Reedquartere, a publie emeting ta sesordamse with 44 CJA 350.10 should be hald is she. vicinity of the nuclear. power. facility. Emersise participeasei representatives free the NBC, and other.. appropriate: Federal, Staterand.4eesi asemales should i o%ec :f **r m = -
{ satead. . , _
._ v e er Lt.M . .; '. h o
,u .,.,,,,, s. .% %.. a k i.
. , b. The. nesting should sequoias.eenbeve"of 'thedpublid with appropriate. State and least emerseeay plass, the.seemise of theronessise and indicate actions en corrective sessures, ameuer eeF queetteus abeus FINA's review and evolvation, and receive suggestices,freerthe' pub 4 W .
a for improvement or chassee. . . - . ' .. s . . 7. . v , - . ,
. e ., . . . . .
l g c. For situatises la uhish a publia enestag has been held i l
during the 350 approval process and prier to both star qualifytag' ese'ruise '
and the effective date (October 28, 1983) of the final rule, 44 CFR 350, the requirement for conducting a public emettag under 350.10 will be I considered by FEMA to have been est if a "briating" use held for the j initial, qualifying emeraise. <
i S. *Meetinas" for exercises conducted duries 350 scorevel erecess.
Requirements in 44 CFR 350 do not address the eenduct of *seetings" for esercisee held af ter the initial, qualifying esercise and before the sceplettes of the
! 350 approval process. For such esereises, a meeting as described in 350.9(e)
- should be held even though the content of this meeting ta the rule is for l
emeralsee seeducted for costinued FEMA approval. FINA's evaluaties of such
- 1sterte" esercises is an integral part of eer everall 350 approval process;
! therefore, as opportunity should be provided to the emersies participeats, the publia, media, and other Federal agensias to discuse the performasse j of the emeraise and our preliminary evaluaties. (
i l i
i
~ . , ,
i I
= - - . - _. _ - _ _ . _ ._ - _
ATTACHMENT I 2Q7}g4
. Gt 17 CORRESp0NDING I NUREG-065
- PART(S) of 90RM olutmv.
g.1, g.g ,
Deusestrate ability te nobilise g sec. I
- 1. sec. I J stff and activate facilities M Sec. I promptly. Sec. I
_ Sec. I sea. I A.2.a.
- 2. bnetrateabilitytofully see. I A.4 staff fas111 ties and maintain Sect T "
statfing areend the clock. g , ,; g s - ,
=.v a. .
...m ,, .,
g see. II A.1. d .
- 3. Deeenstrate ability to make i A. 2. a decisieme and to coordinate , sa85f 4 TI U !
emergency sativities. ,m .
- 3. s .r . .n o % . . r 4 C.3.a.
4 Domenstrate adequacy of facilities Sed.1y* ' '" 8 " *- 1 + M.2, and displays to support energency Sirf. If N.3 operatione.
See. II
.. .n a . u .m . n r . x. .
+ *' * ' ' ' -
F
- 5. Deeenstrate ability to communicate 3 ' sed.dtf
)' with all appropriate locations, J' sec. III'*'"h" See;'III ergenisations, and field personnel. ,M, l
See. III
. ww %. ,, . g g ..g g . .. . . u i
2 -1 y e .~
l ;1 g,,,
l j
a --A w.c 2, r o . . , ,
, g. I. I. '
I 4. Deeenstrate ability to seb111:e' 3'Se'c2 I j and deploy field eenitoring '
tease in a timely fashion.~
- 7. Demonstrate appropriate equipeent 'N Sec. II, III !.4, I.
and procedures for determining l
) ambient radiation levels.
pM Sec. II, III !. 9 .
S. Demonstract appropriate equipment and procedures for esseurement of Q M g,Sec. I, II '
airborne redigtedine concentrations
(
as low as 10" uC1/CC in the j
presence of noble gases.
Demonstrate appropriate equipment .31 see. II, III t.4 9.
4 end precedures for cettection and M See. I, II l'
treaeport of semples of sett, vegetation, snow, e ater, and milk.
M see. I, II C.3 i
- 10. Demonstrate appropriate lab j operation functions for seasuring .
and analysing all types of .
samples.
I i
]
s
-~w w,s -, eww_ ,we .mme
n . .p . ,,
' . 207395
. C . 23PONDING OBJECT!vg 'i' "f 3) of FORM NUREC-06 5
.- ad#c.k 11. Demonstrate ability to project t0C Sec. V t.to, y,g dosage to that public via plume Ecr sec. x1
-(
es pesure, head on plant and field data, and to determine appropriate protective seasures, based on PAC's, available shelter, evacuation time escinctes, and all other appropriate factors.
- 12. Demonstrate ability to project toc Sec. V !.10, J.:
desage to the public'via ingestion EOF Sec. VI pathway exposure, based on plant ,
and field data, and to determine
appropriate protective esasures, based on FAC's and other "1* aa' 'a52". . . .
- m. u
- m v
w.,
- 13. Deeenstrate abilify to imp 1,en,en,.... t, . d dec.,a n ,,.,VII.C;,,. - ., J.9, J.1 protective acti'ons for ingestion , g ., y , , , ,,, i g ., , .,w ,
pathway hasards. ,
I 14. Demonstrate ability to alert the ~
tej[ sec. VI E.6 public within the 10-sife EPZ, and j], Sec. III disseminate an initial instructional , , ..
, r-e.a. - ,
message, within 15 minutes.
- 13. Demonstrate ability to formulats f.nc Se,c. VI E.5 and distribute appropriate
.. instructione to the public, in a ,
timely fashion.
I
- 16. Demonstrate the organisational toc Sec. VII.A J.9, J.
ability and resources necessary fji Sec. I to manage an orderly evacuacion of all ce part of the plume EPZ.
- 17. Demonscrite the organizational EOC Sec. VII. A J.10.t ability and resources necessary j]t $4c. I to deal with impediments to evacuation, as incionent weather or traffic obstructions.
- 18. Deeenstrate the organizationst 10C sec. VII. A J.10.:
ability and resources necessary fA,Sec. I to control access to an evacuated area.
e S
I
", b.#
mAQWM I 207396 GM 17 J WRRESPONDIM OS.;Emvi FART (S) of 70 2 NUREG-0654
- 19. Deeenstrate the organisational g Sec. VII, 8 J.10.4 !
ability and resources necessary 3 Sec. 11.5 to offeet an orderly evacuation of eebility-tapetred individuale within the plume 17Z.
- 20. Demonstrate the organisational- g See..VII.3 a r. J.9. J.10 '
ability'end ressuroes nesseeery' ' JF See.' II.h r e c hut * . : e t oi - .
to offeet se orderly eveeustion
-m of seheels within the plume Ept. -
- 21. Desenstrate ability to continueuely See. VIII K.3. a. b eenitor med centrol emergenay a ..., See.r IV, . <3 ... 4.., .
worker espeewree - .rr me onidre See. V. n. eras .iaeervere i .....m s.$. .. .r m mi.e.,v .,.u. 4 ut inn veres... *+*a
- 22. Demonstrate the -abitaty to enke that 'See. V + t)*.
. J.10.f desisten, based on predetermined Sec. VI criteria, whether te (sees KI sewe n - a" .s ;e N11"ves emergency workers and/or the general ** 's d.
population. -
- 23. Demonstrate the ability se supply See. VIII .[a r ma . .e . J.10.e and adesmister KI, enee stes deciates See. IV has been ende to de' se. Sec. V
.u. .n
24. Deeenstrate ability to offeet am g Sec. VII.B J.2 erderly evacuatten of ensite pereennel.
- 25. Demonstrate ability to brief the Sec. IX C.3.s media in a clear, accurate and Sec. IV G.4.a timely meaner. ec. IV ;
- 26. Deeenstrate ability to provide Sec. IX C.4.h advance coordination of information Sec. IV released.
- 27. Demeestrate ability to establish Sec. 11 C.4.c and operate rueer control in a Sec. VI i eseediasted fashion.
- 28. Demeestrate edequesy of procedores g See. II J.12 ,
t for registraties and radiological
! esattering of eveeuses. j
- 29. Desenstrate adequesy of facilities RttoC See. !!! . J.10.h '
for sees care of evaevees. .
,..j l
l
\ -
MTAMM I et 17 207397 I i
1 ComSPONCING',.
(, ,
O&iisaavi FART (S) of FOIDI NURIC-0654 I
- 30. Deeenstrate adequate equipeent M all K.S.a. b and precedures for decontamination of emergency merkere, equipment ,
, and vehicles.
- 31. Demonstrate adequacy ef ambulance M See. III L.4 facilities and precedures for headling eestamiested ledividuals.
3::. Demonstrate adequacy of hospital S t.See. 11 . ... m . . , , , - L.1 fastlittes and precedures ier . .o .+ u.:. n 4 , , , , , .. . ,
handling sentaminated individuals. w ,, . . . , o. .._. c.ua cy , .
d . . . . e. : n., .rcini.u.co, .eviseentativee . . r. -
- 33. re. ist. rate abilityceeridaatifyaru . (tethe deceleged):veneise e.bouia C.1.a. b need ter, request, and ebesta Federal seatatance.
..3 .....+ ,q3.... .u. .. .. . . .
- 34. Dew.aer-' stet sbility to releeste+tecndte be, developed)h. .- c.,5.2, M.3 and operate the alternese'SOF/ SOC.* .. .e a e . ,s. ,.y .w f.. e , .c
..4- , y eni v, : i x, e . ..iin r you . '. ..,6v.
- 35. Deseistrate ability to easieste see. Y M.4 tes 1 petulation espesure. See. VI
.~ .. u a. .... . -
- 34. Demonerrate ability te determine g see. X < ;en . m ..N.1
- and implenest appropriate measures for aestrelled recovery and reentry.
8
\ . '. ,
_