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Proposed Tech Specs Table 3.3-3 Re ESF Actuation Sys Instrumentation
	ML20207L276
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Site:	Catawba
Issue date:	10/06/1988
From:	; DUKE POWER CO.
To:	;
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ML20207L269	List: ML20207L266; ML20207L276;
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I n TABLE 3.3-3 (Continued) f -7 3 N -

E ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION d #

N +

l h MIN 190M

$ TOTAL NO. CHANNELS CHANNELS APPLICABLE A A i j d FUNCTIONAL UNIT OF CHANNELS TO TRIP OPERABLE ,

MODES ACTION w g ;

r- t 14 Nuclear Service Water Operation C.I .;;-[

j ,,, (Continued) F

c. Loss-of-Offsite Power 3 2 2 1,2,3 15 h i d. Containment Spray See Item 2. above for all Containment Spray initiating functions and ,

requirements. g l l

4

e. Phase "B" Isolation See Item 3.b. above for all Phase "B" and requirements.

Isolation initiating functions Y-+- j 1

1 $ -

f. Safety Injection See Item 1. above for all Safety Injection initiating functions i

and requirements.

I TJ l 3 g. Sur. tion Transfer-Low %

! Pit Level (Units 1 and 2) 2/ pit 1(either 1/ it 1,2,3,4 28 O 1 M y h v

9 i

15. Emergency Diesel Generator p Or .ation (Diesel Building "

7 Ventilation Operation, Nuclear 1u

yy Service Water Operation) gy a. Manual Initiation 2 1 2 1,2,3,4 18 9 j

.. o ga b. Automatic Actuation Logic y

q J 22 and Actuation Relays 2 1 2 1,2,3,4 21 1 OO l

c. Loss-of-Offsite Power 3 2 2 1,2,3,4 15 .

d. Safety Injection See Item 1. above for all Safety Injection initiating functions 1 gg and requirements. y oa

--C 1 ;; 16. Auxiliary Building Filtered

) _ Exhaust Operation

~

! a. Manual Initiation 2 1 2 1,2,3,4 18 g

b. Automatic Actuation Logic 4 and Actuation Relays 2 1 2 1.2,3,4 21 BB10170266 381006 PDR ADOCK 03000413 P P9R3 -

h t kM s TABLE 3.3-3 (Continued)

TABLE NOTATIONS Q ,

I Ny 3N f # Trip function may be blocked in this M00E below the P-11 (Pressurizer Pressure Interlock) setpoint.

}j h g 4 .u ## Trip function automatically blocked above P 11 and may be blocked below P 11 when Safety Injection on low steam line pressure is not blocked.

l 4p p g m "The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable.

l e0%4 ACTION STATEMENTS

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b N ACTION 14 - With the number of OPERA 8LE channels one less than the Minimum i gM

Channels OPERA 8LE requirement, be in at least HOT STAN08Y within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in COLD SHUTOOWN within the following l

l 14 4x however* one channel may be bypassed for up to 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months t 30 hours;illance for surve testing per Specification 4.3.2.1, provided l T % -

l Q j the other channel is OPERABLE.

h ACTION 15 - With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Total 4 Number of Channels, operation may proceed until performance of

! -@ the next rer.uired ANALOG CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST provided the a y ,

4 inoperable channel is placed in the tripped condition within l

i hour.

g

v ACTION 16 With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Tctal Number of Channels operation may proceed provided the inoperable

, {N p i channelisplacedInthebypassedconditionandtheMinimum V

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Channels OPERABLE requirement is set. One additional channel may be bypassed for up to 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months for surveillance testing per y

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9 Specification 4.3.2.1.

W3 ACTION 17 - With less than the Minimum Channels OPERA 8LE requirement, l e operation may continue provided the containment purge supply j g q and exhaust valves are maintained closed.

, s M.5 q I ACTION 18 - With the number of OPERABLE channs!? one less than the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, restore c.? inoperable channel

! $ dA to OPERA 8LE status within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months or be in at least HOT STANOBY l 5i .I within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in COLD Shut 00kN within the following

%%* 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

, s j . ACTION 19 - With the number of OPERA 8LE channels one less than the Total t4 Number of Channels, STARTUP and/or POWER OPERATION may proceed i

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' l! 34 6*d 33 provided the following conditions are satisfied:

The inoperable channel is placed in the tripped condition f'.fyp a.

within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months , and The Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement is met; however, one

b.

D additional channel may be bypassed for up to 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months for sur-j

$ veillance testing of other channels per Specification 4.3.2.1.

CATAWSA UNITS 1 & 2 3/4 3 25

TABLE 3.3-3 (Continued)

ACTION STATEMENTS (Continued)

ACTION 20 - With less than the Minimum Channels OPERABLE, within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months determine by observation of the associated permissive status light (s) that the interlock is in its required state for the existing plant condition, or apply Specification 3.0.3.

ACTION 21 - With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, be in at least HOT STANDBY ;

within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months ; however, one channel may be bypassad for up to 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months for surveillance testin0 per Specification 4.3.2.1 provided the other channel is OPERABLE.

ACTION 22 - With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Total Number of Channels, restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months or be in at least HOT STANDBY within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in at least HOT SHUTOOWN within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months .

! ACTION 23 - With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Total Number of Channels, restore the inoperable channel tc OPERABLE status within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months or declare the associated valve inoperable and take the ACTION required by Specification 3.7.1.4.

ACTION 24 - With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Minimum Channels OPERABLE, restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months , or initiate and maintain operation of the Control Room Area Ventilation System with flow through the HEPA filters and activated carbon adsorbers.

ACTION 25 - With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, be in at least HOT STANDBY

! within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months .

ACTION 26 - With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, be in at least HOT STANDBY within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in at least HOT SHUT 00WN within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months .

ACTION 27 - With the number of OPFRABLE channels one less than the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, be in at least HOT STANDBY within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months ; however, one channel may be bypassed for up to 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months ;

for surveillance testing per Specification 4.3.2.1 provided the other channel is OPERABLE.

i ACTION 28 - a. With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the [' ,

Total Number of Channels, restore the inoperable channel i

to OPERABLE status within 7 days or align the Nuclear Service Water System for Standby Nuclear Service Water .

Pond recirculation, or be in HOT STANDBY within the next '

6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in at least COLO SHUTOOWN within the following [

30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months . 'r 4 I[p [/ b. With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the ( f d c\ y Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months align 6 f e @T bp the Nuclear Service Water System for Standby Nuclear Service Water Pond recirculation, or be in HOT STANOBY ,

! within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in at least COLD SHUTOOWN [ !

within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months . '

t C

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CATAWBA UNITS 1 & 2 3/4 3-26 Amendment No. p5'(Unit 1) I

! AmendmentNo,y(Unit 2)

ACTION 29 - Hith the number of OPERABLE channels less than the Total Number of Channels, STARTUP and/or POWER OPERATION may proceed provided one of the following applicable conditions is satisfied r

a. With one channel inoperable, place the inoperable channel in the tripped condition within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months and ensure the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement is set. One additional channel may le J

bypassed for up to 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months for surveillance testing of other channels per Specification 4.3.2.1 or l With less than the Minimum Number of Channels OPERABLE align the b.

Nuclear Service Water System for Standby Nuclear Service Water Pon/, recirculation within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months , or be in at least 901 STANDBY wi'.hin the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months , at least IKTF SUVfDOWN within the fcilowing 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months , and at least COLD SHVfDOWN within the subsequent 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months .

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Attachment 2 ,

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DISCUSSION AND NO SIGNIFIC NT HAZARDS ANALYSIS The proposed change to Technical Specification Table 3.3-3, item 14.g. is necessary to reflect a change to the Nuclear Service Water (RN) System swapover logic.

This modification affects the RN System Pumphouse pit level instrumentation. The RN System provides essential auxiliary support functions to Engineered Safety ,

Features of the station. The system is designed to supply cooling water to l various heat loads in both the safety and non-safety portions of each unit.

1 There are currently four level transmitters per pump pit at the RN Pumphouse.

Two pits exist that provide suction to two separate redundant trains of RN pumps.

Each pit can be suppli(d from the normal and assured source of water. Two of the four level transmitters are safety related and powered from separate sources of battery backed vital AC power. These transmitters alarm in the control room on low level and on emergency low level in either pit and re-aligt. suction from Lake ,

Wylie to the Standby Nuclear Service Water Pond (SNSWP) upon emergency low level. l The other two level transmitters are currently noa-safety related and provido the

! control room with an alarm when the fluid level across the strainer has a t l differential height of more than 6". This indicates blockage of flow across the strainer which wou;d dictate the need to clean the strainer.

The modification will upgrado 1 out of the 2 non-safety dirferential icvel i transmitters per pit to safety grade. This W 11 provido a third low l transmitter por pit to accommodate a 2 out of 3 logic instead of the present 1 ;

} out of 2 logic. Past experience has shown that a single spurious failure to the l 1 "low" posit h can initiato a swapover when there is an adequato water level in '

the RN pits. Inadvertently challenging the system with numerous valves changing position and starting all RN pumps is unnecessary and reduces the reliability of l the system. The 2 out of 3 logic will eliminate system re-alignment due to postulated single failures except power supply failures. Loss of a particular I

120 VAC power supply in each pit would cause 2 out of 3 Lovel Transmitters to road low and initiate swapover. In this scenario the particular power supply is the same one that powers the transfer logic for that pit and swapover is

! initiated anyway. There'oro, no new failuros that initiate swapover have been introduced. l i

, The existing level transmitters havo 120 VAC vital power backed by batteries. The l battery back-up ensures that swapover does not occur upon loss of normal offsite AC power before the dies.ils start. Also pit level indications (for existing j safety grado level transmitters only) will be maintained in the control room i independent of normal offsito AC power. i l

The two upgraded level transmitters will also havo battery backed vital AC power Thu new lovel transmitters will have a low level alarn on the computer and an j emergency low Invol computer alarm and annunciator. The two existing level l i transmitters hr.vo a computer alarm and an annunciator for low icvel and emergency i

low lovel. The failuro mode of all the safety grado levol transmitters is the same. They fall low on loss of power. This is desirablo because the SNSWP is tho qualified source for the ultimate heat sink. The new arrangement has bcon l reviewed for rollability concerns and judged to have no adverso impact on plant i safety.

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DISC 1'SSION AND NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS ANAINSIS (CONTINUED) >

The new proposed Action Statement 29 is intended to reflect the addition of the new level transmitters (i.e., 2 out of 3 logic). (Please note that several separate Technical Specification change requests involve the addition of Action Statements to page 3/4 3-26 and the numbering of the Action Statements should be sequential as the amendments are issued).

Proposed Action 29 would allow continued operation with one less than the l required Total Number of Channels provided the inoperable channel is placed in the tripped condition. This will essentially place the RN Swapover logic into a 1 out of 2 scheme which is a conservative condition. If this condition cannot be met the Action Statement we Id call for either shutting down the station or realigning the RN System m c , Nn f rom the Lake to the SNSWP. Realigning the RN suction would place the RN dj., tem suction in its safety position, which is a conservative condition.

l It is also requested that the raquirements of the Action Statement for Item 14.g on Tabin 3.3-3 be waived temporarily (48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months per pit) on c one time basis in l order to allow orderly implementation of this modification. During installation ,

j of this modification, the RN swapover circuitry will need to be rendered I inoperable for a short period of time (less than 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months por pit). During this time at least one RN pit will be available. The 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months is needed for implementation of the modification on each pit separately.

The pit will be inoperable during implementation of the modification only from I the standpoint of automatic realignment to the Standby Nuclear Service Water Pond l l

from its normal supply if low level is sensed in the affected pit. All necessary automatic functions would still occur, however, if a low level is sensed (1/2 logic pre modification, 2/3 logic post-modification) in the opposite pit. The I only automatic valve actuation which is activ.ted by train specific pit level instrumentation is the loop cross-over isolation valves. Closure of these valves is only required in the event of design basis accident accompanied by a failure l of a pit supply valve to open when an emergency diesel generator or nuclear service water pump is out-of-service for extended maintenance. All four ilesel

, generators and nuclear service water pumps will be maintained in an operable I status for the duration of the requested 48 hour5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months periods. It is therefore concluded that the RN System will be capable of performing its design function during any design basis event, including any concurrent postulated single i failure, throughout the requested 48 hour5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months periods.

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The changes to Table 3.3 3 have been proposed to allow for issuance of this amendment prior to implementation of the modification. The first line entry for Item 14.g. would be in effect prior to the modification. The second line entry would be applicable after the installation and functional testing of the nodification, j

The proposed Action Statement is appropriate for the 2 out of 3 logic scheme and will ensure that the station is operated in a safo manner if any of the trip 4 channels become inoperable. l i

j in a lettur dated September 30, 1987 f rom Mr. Steven Varga, NRC/NRR to Mr.11. B. l l Tucker Duke Power Co.3pany, the NRC Staff noted that this proposed modification i I

was acceptable and would improve the overall reitability of the RN System. l I

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l DfSCUSSION AND NO SIGNIFICANT RAZARDS ANALYSIS (CONTINUED) 1 10 CFR 50.92 states that a proposed amendment involves no significant hazards I considerations if operation in accordance with the proposco amendment would nott j (1) Involve a significant increase in the probability or l consequences or an accident previously evaluated; or '

l (2) Create the possibility of a new or different kind of ;

accident from any accident previously evaluated or !

l (3) Involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. l The proposed amendment does not involve an itcrease in the probability or consequences of any previously evaluated accident. The proposed modification would increase the reliability of the RN Sya+.em by clininatink unnecessary i actuations of the swapover instrumentation a d components. No now modes of l operation will be allowed, therefore the probability of an accident is not !

increased. During implementation of the modificatien the RN System will be capable of performing its intended function duting any design basta event. The I new logic will help avoid inadvertant RN swapover and be more reliable therefore, the consequences of an accident will not be affected. ,

The propoaod amendment does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated. The RN System design basis i will not be changed as a result of this modification. No new nodes of plant l

( operation will be allowed. During implementation of the modification the RN l System will be capable of performing its intended function during any design )

basis event. l i

The proposed amendment does not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. The modification would enhance the reliability of the RN System by decreasing the liklihood of inadvertent actuations and during implementation of l the modification the RN System will be capabic of performing its intended l function during any design basis event, consequently the reliability and safety I margin of the station will be enhanced.

l For the above reascas, Duke Power concludes that this proposed amendment does not involve any Significant liazards Considerations.

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ML20207L276

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