Text

Proposed Tech Specs Table 3.3-3,reflecting Change in Actuation Logic for Nuclear Svc Water Sys
	ML20207E344
Person / Time
Site:	Catawba
Issue date:	08/09/1988
From:	; DUKE POWER CO.
To:	;
Shared Package
ML20207E340	List: ML20207E336; ML20207E344;
References
	NUDOCS 8808180017
	Download: ML20207E344 (9)
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s Attachment i Proposed Technical Specification Changes 8800100017 880809 PDR P ADOCK 05000413 PDC

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TABLE 3.3-3 (Continued) o +p h-Q o g k C ENGIt!EERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION W N h

' MININUM g TOTAL NO. CHANT!ELS CHANNELS APPLICABLE C{e. o{

OF CHANNELS TO T!!IP OPERABLE MODES ACTION P g FUNCTIONAL UNIT

~ Nuclear Service Water Operation T 14.

" (Continued) m 1,2,3 IS*

c. Loss-of-Of fsite Power 3 2 2 g N

d. Containment Spray See Item 2. above for all Containment Spray initiating functions and requirements.

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e. Phase "B" Isolation See Item 3.b. above for all Phase "8 Isolation initiating functions and requirements.

Safety Injection See Item 1. above for all Safety Injection initiating functions *^'

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and requirements. El 2 b.

';' g. Suction Transfer-Low '

O Pit Level (hifs had L) X X Y -1,2,3,4 k R W ~?. h 3'a %

15. Emergency Diesel Generator Operation (Diesel Building v 4

Ventilation Operation, Nuclear Service Water Operation) -

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a. Manual Initiation 2 1 2 1,2,3,4 18 g$+ -+-

b. Automatic Actuation Logic and Actuation Relays 2 1 2 1,2,3,4 21 3 2 2 1,2,3,4 IS*

c. Loss-of-Of fsite Power _,

See Item 1. above for all Safety Injection initiating functions f> _"

d. Safety Injection y' -

and requirements. -c -c.

16. Auxiliary Building Filtered Exhaust Operat~sn 2 1,2,3,4 18 fu gy

a. Manual Initiation 2 1

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b. Automatic Actuation Logic and Actuation Relays 2 1 2 1,2,3,4 21 [_

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k9N. TABLE 3.3-3 (Continued]

TABLE NOTATIONS k] 3N N o'

Trip fur.ction may ba biccLed in this MODE below the P-11 (Pressurizer Pressure Interlock) setpoint, j p

1. Trip function automatically blocked above 0-11 and may be blocked below s4 .o P-11 when Safsty Injection on low steam line pressure is not blocked.

pp m "The provisions of Specification 3.0 4 are not applicable.

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& ACTION STATEMENTS gy N ACTION 14 - With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Minimur Channels 0FERA3LE requirement, be in at least HOT STANOBY V within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in COLD SHUT 00WN within the following

$ I 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months ; however,' one channel may be bypassed for up to 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months

{ for surveillance testing per Specification 4.3.2.1, provided k{* % ~

y4 y the other channel is OPERABLE.

b ACTION 15Number - With oftheChannels, numberoperation of OPERABLE cnannels cae less than the Tota may proceed until performance of 4 f the next required ANALOG CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST provided the y I inoperable channel is placed in the tripped condition within N

e o 1 v 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months .

A v ACTION 16Number - With ofthe number of OPERABLE channels one less than the To Channels, operation may proceed provided the inoperable

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channel is placed in the bypassed condition and the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement is set. One additional channel y may be bypassed for up to 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months for surveillanet testing per 4 Specification 4.3.2.1.

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ACTION 17 - With lass than the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, e operation may continue provided the containment purge supply p5 **

and exhaust valves are maintained closed.

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I ACTION 18 - With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than t Channels OPERABLE requirement, restore the inoperable channel l D dA to OPERABLE status within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months or be in at least HOT STAN 3i

%% .I within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in COLD SHUT 00WN within the following s 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

I ACTION 19 - With the number of OPERABLE channels one less tha Number of Channels, STARTUP and/or POWER OPERATION may proceer

4. provided the following conditions are satisfied:

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The inoperable channel is placed in the tripped condition within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months , and t., 't yp The Minimum Channels OPERA 8tE requirement is met; however, one

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additional channel may be bypassed for up to 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months for sur- l veillance testing of other channels per Specification 4.3.2.1.

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s CATAWSA - UNITS 1 & 2 3/4 3-25

TABLE 3.3-3 (Continued)

ACTION STATEMENTS (Continued)

ACTION 20 - With less than the Minimum Channels OPERABLE, within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months determine by observation of the associated permissive status

' light (s) that the interlock is in its required state for the existing plant condition, or apply Specification 3.0.3.

ACTION 21 - With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, be in at least HOT STANOBY within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months ; however, one channel may be bypassed for up to 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months for surveillance testing per Specification 4.3.2.1 provided the other channel is OPERABLE. ,

I ACTION 22 - With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Total Number of Channels, restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE !

status within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months or be in at least HOT STANDBY within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months . .

ACTION 23 - With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Total Number of Channels, restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months or declare the associated valve inoperable and take the ACTION required by Specification 3.7.1.4.

ACTION 24 - With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Minimum Channels OPERABLE, restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months , or initiate and maintain operation of the Control Room Area Ventilation System with flow through the HEPA filters and activated carbon adsorbers. f <

ACTION 25 - With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, be in at least HOT STANDBY l within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months .

ACTION 26 - With the numtar of OPERABLE channels one less than the Minimum Cha,nnels OPERABLE requirement, be in at least HOT STANDBY within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months .

i ACTION 27 - With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Minimum Channels ODERABLE requirement, be in at least HOT STANDBY within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months ; however, oqe channal may be bypassed for up to 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months for survaillance testing per Specification 4.3.2.1 provided the other channel is OPERABLE.

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. g. sfg_ i- A C T10 45 a 3fY 3' l CATAWBA - UNITS

2 3/4 3-26 Amendment No. (Unit 1)

Amendment No. (Unit 2)

ACTION 28 - a. With the number of OPERABLE chanaels one less than the Total Number of Channels, restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE '

status within 7 days or align the Nucicar Service Water System for Standby Nuclear Service Water Pond recirculation, or be in HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in at least COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

b. With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months align the Nuclear Service Water System for Standby Nuclear Service Water Pond recirculation, or be in HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in at least COLD SHWDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

ACTION 29 - W Lth the nun.ber of OPERABLE char.nels less than the Total Number of Channels, STARTUP and/or POWER OPERATION may proceed provided one of the following applicable conditions is sr.tisfied

a. With one channel inoperable, place the inopetable channel in the tripped condition within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months and ensure the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement is met. One additional channel may be bypassed for up to 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months for surveillance testing of other channels per Specification 4.3.2.1: or

b. With less than the Minimum Number of Channels OPERABLE align the Nuclear Service Water System for Standby Nuclear Service Water Pond recirculation within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months , or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months , at least HW SHWDOWN within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months , and at least COLD SHWDOWN within the subsequent 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months .

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Attachment 2 Discussion and No Significant flazards Analysis l

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6 DISCUSSION AND NO SIGNIFICANT IIAZARDS ANAINSIS The proposed change to Technical Specification Table 3.3-3, item 14.g. is necessary to reflect a change to the Nuclear Service Water (RN) System swapover logic.

This modification affects the RN System Pumphouse pit level instrumentation. The RN System provides essential auxiliary support functions to Engineered Safety Features of the station. The system is designed to supply cooling water to various heat loads in both the safety and non-safety portions of each unit.

There are currently four level transmitters per pump pit at the RN Pumphouse, Two pits exist that provide suction to two separate redundant trains of RN pumps.

Each pit can be supplied from the normal and assured source of water. Two of the four level transmitters are safety related and powered from separate sources of battery backed vital AC power. These transmitters alarm in the control room on low level and on emergency low level in either pit and re-align suction from Lake Wylie to the Standby Nuclear Service Water Pond (SNOWP) upon emergency low level The other two level transmitters are currently non-safety related and provide the control room with an alarm when the fluid level across the strainer has a differential height of more than 6". This indicates blockage of flow across the strainer which would dictate the need to clean the strainer.

The modification will upgrade 1 out of the 2 non-safety differential level transmitters per pit to safety grade. This will provide a third level transmitter per pit to accommodate a 2 out of 3 logic instead of the present 1 out of 2 logic. Past experience has shown that a single spurious failure to the "low" position can initiate a swapover when there is an adequate water level in the RH pits. Inadvertently challenging the system with numerous valves changing position and starting all RN pumps is unnecessary and reduces the reliability of the system. The 2 out of 3 logic will eliminate system re-alignment due to postulated single failures except power supply failures. Loss of a particular 120 VAC power supply in each pit would cause 2 out of 3 level Transmitters to read low and initiate swapover. In this scenario the particular power supply is the same one that powers the transfer logic for that pit and swapover is initiated anyway. Therefore, no new failures that initiate swapover have been introduced.

The existing level transmitters have 120 VAC vital power backed by batteries.

The battery back-up ensures that swapover does not occur upon loss of normal I offsite AC power before the diesels start. Also pit level indications (for existing safety grade level transmitters only) will be maintained in the control room independent of normal offsite AC power.

The two upgraded level transmitters will also have battery backed vital AC power The new level transmitters will have a low level alarm on the computer and an emergency low level computer alarm and annunciator. The two existing level transmitters have a computer alarm and an annunciator for low level and emergency low level. The failure mode of all the safety grade level transmitters is the same. They fail low on loss of power. This is desirable because the SNSWP is the qualified source for the ultimate heat sink. The new arrangement has been reviewed for reliability concerns and judged to have no adverse impact on plant safety.

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. DISCUSSION AND NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS ANALYSIS (Continued)

By letter dated October 16, 1987 numerous Technical Specification changes were 4 requested which would affect the RN System Specifications. This proposed

amendment is independent of those previously requested changes and supercedes the changes requested in that letter for Table 3.3-3, item 14.g. The new proposed Action Statement 29 is Intended to reflect the addition of the new level transmitters (i.e., 2 out of 3 logic). The new proposed Action Statement 28 is essentially that Action Statement contained in the October 16, 1987 letter.

(Please note that several separate Technical Specification change requests involve the addition of Action Statements to page 3/4 3-26 and the numbering of the Action Statements should be sequential as the amendments are issued).

Proposed Action 29 would allow continued operation with one less than the required Total Number of Channels provided the inoperable channel is placed in the tripped condition. This will essentially place the RN Swapover logic into a 1 out of 2 scheme which is a conservative condition. If this condition cannot be met the Action Statement would call for either shutting down the station or realigning the RN System suction from the Lake to the SNSWP. Realigning the RN l suction would place the RN System suction in its safety position, which is a conservative condition.

It is also requested that the requirements of the Action Stateacnt fcr Item 14.g on Table 3.3-3 be waived temporarily (48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months per pit) on a one time basis in order to allow orderly implementation of this modification. During installation ,

I of this modification, the RN s*vapover circuitry will need to be rendered inoperable for a short period of time (less than 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months per pit). During this time at least one RN pit will be available. The 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months is needed for t implementation of the modification on each pit separately The changes to Table 3.3-3 have been proposed to allow for issuance of this j amendment prior to implementation of the modification. The first line entry for l Item 14.g. would be in effect prior to the modification and is the same change as ,

i was proposed in the October 16, 1987 letter. The second line entry would be !

i applicable after the installation and functional testing of the modification.

I The proposed Action Statement is appropriate for the 2 out of 3 logic scheme and will ensure that the station is operated in a safe manner if any of the trip ,

channels become inoperable.

In a letter dated September 30, 1987 from Mr. Steven Varga, NRC/NRR to Mr. H. B. l Tucker, Duke Power Ccupany, the NRC Staff noted that this proposed modification l was acceptable and would improve the overall reliability of the RN System.

10 CFR 50.92 states that a proposed amendment involves no significant hazards considerations if operation in accordance with the proposed amendment would not (1) Involve a significant increase in the probability or .

consequences of an accident previously evaluated; or 1

i (2) C eate the possibility of a new or different kind of l accidsnt from any accident previously evaluatedt or l

l (3) Involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

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DISCUSSION AND NO SIGNIFICANT llA7ARDS ANALYSIS (Continued)

The proposed amendment does not involve an increase in the probability or consequences of any previously evaluated accident. The proposed modification would increase the reliability of the RN System by eliminating unnecessary actuations of the swapover instrumentation and components. No new modes of operation will be allowed, therefore the probability of an accident is not increased. The new logic will help avoid inadvertant RN swapover and be more reliable therefore, the consequences of an accident will not be affected.

The proposed amendment does not create the possibility of a new or different kJnd of accident from any accident previously evaluated. The RN System design basis will not be changed as a result of this modification. No new modes of plant operation will be allowed.

The proposed amendment does not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. The modification would enhance the reliability of the RN System by decreasing the liklihood of inadvertent actrations and consequently enhance the reliability and safety margin of the station.

For the above reasons, Duke Power concludeJ that this proposed amendment does not involve any Significant Hazards Considerations.

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ML20207E344

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