ML20206T402
| ML20206T402 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Shoreham File:Long Island Lighting Company icon.png |
| Issue date: | 04/18/1987 |
| From: | Christman J HUNTON & WILLIAMS, LONG ISLAND LIGHTING CO. |
| To: | Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20206T406 | List: |
| References | |
| CON-#287-3195 OL-3, NUDOCS 8704230173 | |
| Download: ML20206T402 (76) | |
Text
e-3/ 5 titCO, xpri1 13,13,7 .
t DOCMETED USNRC UNITED STATES OF AMERICA .. . ..
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION '87 APR 21 Pl228 CFFirE F E FG' '
Before the Atomic Safety a'nd Licensing Board . c.
In the Matter of )
)
LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COMPANY ) Docket No. 50-322-OL-3
) (Emergency Planning)
(Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, )
Unit 1)- )
LILCO hereby moves to strike the following portions of the written " Testimony of Stephen Cole, Susan C. Saegert, James H. Johnson, Jr., David Harris, Martin Mayer, Gregory C. Minor and Steven C. Sholly," dated April 13,1987 (hereinaf ter "CSJHMMS").
The basis for striking most of this testimony is that it is outside the admitted is-sues in this proceeding. It is outside the admitted issues because it addresses issues that have already been litigated before, in the original emergency planning hearings in 1983-
- 84. Moreover, it is duplicative of testimony filed in the exercise proceeding (50-322-OL-5) that is now in progress.
Most of the Suffolk County testimony that LILCO seeks to strike is related to the so-called " shadow phenomenon." What we are calling the " shadow phenomenon" issue here is basically the hypothesis that people will not follow emergency advisories (EBS messages, principally). The two reasons why people will not follow advisories, Interve-nors claim, are pre-existing fear of radiation and low " credibility" of the message giver.
A related behavioral issue is that people will allegedly experience anxiety and exhibit aggressive behavior.
The " shadow phenomenon" is a generic issue (indeed it is an issue at all only be-cause of what happened at Three Mile Island, not at Shoreham), and it has been litigated many times, both in other proceedings and in this one.
8704230173 870418 gDR ADOCK 05000322 FMsID _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __. -_ _ _-
- I. THE " SHADOW PHENOMENON" IS A GENERIC ISSUE
. In the first place, the so-called " shadow phenomenon" (overreaction) is not something that is peculiar to nuclear emergencies, as the record in this proceeding shows. Cordaro et al., ff. Tr.1470, at 17-18. In any kind of emergency (for example, floods or hurricanes) some people may evacuate without being told to (and some people may stay put when told to leave).
In the second place, this so-called " phenomenon," treated as a " phenomenon," is in a sense a fabrication. See Tr.1996-99 (Dynes). The " phenomenon" is people evacuating outside the area in which they were instructed to evacuate. For the Three Mile Island accident, the " shadow" has been defined to exist outside a five- or ten-mile zone, the zones in which protective actions were recommended by the governor. But at the time of the Three Mile Island accident, public officials were publicly discussing a number of such " zones." Some people were discussing five miles, some ten miles, and some twenty miles.II In the third place, this so-called " phenomenon" has been litigated in several pro-ceedings, including the Three Mile Island proceeding, which is, if anything, e most ap-propriate place. See Louisiana Power & Light Co. (Waterford Steam Elec. Station, Unit 3), LBP-82-100,16 NRC 1550,1562 (1982); Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. (Diablo Canyon Nu-clear Power Plant, Units 1 & 2), LBP-82-70,16 NRC 756,778-80 (1982)2/; Metropolitan 1/ At 12:30 p.m. on March 30,1979, the governor of Pennsylvania advised pregnant women and preschool children within a five-mile radius to leave the area. At 2:45 p.m.
on March 31 NRC Chairman Hendrie held a press conference in Bethesda in which he disclosed the possibility of evacuation up to 20 miles out. Staff Report to the Presi-dent's Commission on the Accident at Three Mile Island (Kemeny Commission), Report of the Public's Right to Information Task Force 26,27 (Oct.1979).
2/ Af ter hearing Suffolk County's witnesses Johnson and Erikson, the Diablo Canyon Board was "not convinced that a social survey would offer useful improvement in public information planning . . . ." LBP-82-70,16 NRC at 778,823-24.
l 1
c
- Edison Co. (Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit No.1), LBP-81-59,14 NRC 1211, 1568-69 (1981).W II. PREVIOUS LITIGATION IN THE SHOREHAM PROCEEDING More important for present purposes, the shadow phenomenon has been ex-haustedly litigated in the Shoreham proceeding already.
Suffolk County's first opportunity to litigate it was during the " Phase 1" onsite portion of this proceeding. Both LILCO and Suffolk County submitted Phase I written testimony on the " shadow phenomenon." See Direct Testimony of Dr. James H.
Johnson, Jr. on Behalf of Suffolk County Regarding Contentions EP 2B and EP 5B (Oct.
12, 1982); Direct Testimony of Dr. Stephen Cole, on Behalf of Suffolk County Regarding Contentions EP 2B and EP 5B (Oct.12,1982); Direct Testimony of Dr. Kai T. Erikson on Behalf of Suffolk County Regarding Contentions EP 2B and EP 5B (Oct.12,1982). The County's written testimony relied on opinion polls to predict that the shadow phenome-non in a Shoreham emergency would be large. However, this testimony was never heard because Suffolk County defaulted on the Phase Iissues.
Suffolk County's second opportunity to litigate the " shadow phenomenon" came l in late 1983 and 1984, when the subject was litigated at great length in the original l
emergency planning hearings.M See Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power 3/ Citing Dr. Johnson, the Intervenors in the Vogtle case alleged that the applicants should be prepared for the displacement of a significant number of people outside the EPZ. The Board, having reviewed the Nuclear Safety article by Dr. Johnson, found in it no support for a consideration that any spontaneous evacuation of residents of the Augusta area (about 26 miles from the plant) might be expected to impede the evacua-tion of the Vogtle 10-mile EPZ. The Board denied admission of the contention. Georgia Power Company (Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, Units 1 and 2), August 12,1985, slip op, at 35-36.
In the Seabrook case the Board rejected a contention that " behavioral variations" among members of the public should be analyzed. (Apparently this referred to the pos-sibility of panic.) Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 182),
slip op, at 87-90 (Apr. 29,1986) (unpublished).
4/ In addition to litigating it under EP Contentions 23 (Evacuation Shadow Phenom-enon) and 65 (Evacuation Time Estimates), another opportunity to litigate essentially (footnote continued)
g a
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Station, Unit 1), LBP-85-12, 21 NRC 644, 655-71, 972-74 (1985) (hereinaf ter "PID"). The Licensing Board heard testimony from eleven witnesses on several aspects of this issue, including public reaction to non-nuclear emergencies and to the accidents at TMI and Ginna, PID,21 NRC at 657-60; the ability to predict future response from opinion polls, 21 NRC at 663-67; the effect of pre-emergency fears of radiation on response during an emergency,21 NRC at 658-59,667-68,670; the effect of emergency information on re-
! sponse,21 NRC at 660-63; and the credibility of various information sources during an emergency,21 NRC at 687-91. The Board concluded that:
On the basis of the preponderance of evidence on Con-tentioa 23 [the "shadori phenomenon" contention, set out at 21 NRC 972-74], the Board finds that LILCO has sustained its burden of proof. . . .[T]he Board agrees with Suffolk County (as does LILCO) that some evacuation shadown phenomenon would likely occur in the event of a serious radiological emer-gency at Shoreham. The conclusion of the County that the overresponse would be so great as to preclude adequate pro-tection of public health and safety in a radiological emergen-cy is, however, based on flawed interpretation of research ev-idence. LILCO has adequately demonstrated that a rational public will behave predominantly in accordance with public information that is disseminated at the time an emergency happens. It will not react by following some predetermined tendency that urges a shadow evacuation. The Board finds further that, contrary to the contention and based on the en-tire record, LILCO has given adequate consideration to the evacuation shadow phenomenon in its emergency planning process.
PID,21 NRC at 670. This decision was affirmed. Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), ALAB-832, 23 NRC 135 (1986), petition for review granted on other grounds, Order, Docket No. 50-332-OL-3 (Sept.19,1986) (unpublished).
Insofar as this agency is concerned, it is final. And it is binding on the parties under the doctrine of r_es judicata.
(footnote continued) the same issue came under the " Credibility" issue, Contention 15. Here again the Inter-venors contended people would not follow emergency advisories, but here the Interve-nors focused on " credibility" as the cause, in addition to fear of radiation.
o A third opportunity to litigate the " shadow phenomenon" may occur if the Ap-peal Board's decision on EPZ boundaries in ALAB-832 is affirmed by the Commission. In ALAB-832 the Appeal Board ordered that Suffolk County should have another opportu-nity to litigate the " shadow phenomenon," but under a different contention as to wheth-er minor adjustments to the ten-mile EPZ should be ordered. 23 NRC at 148-49. This decision is under review by the Commission.
The fourth opportunity for Suffolk County to litigate the " shadow phenomenon" may come in the -05 proceeding on the emergency planning exercise, in which the County is again presenting testimony on the " shadow phenomenon." Some of this -05 testimony was stricken by the -05 Board on April 16,1987.E In fact, a large amount of the testimony in CSJHMMS is word-for-word the same as that stricken in Suffolk Coun-ty's testimony on Contention EX 38 and 39 in the -05 proceeding. See " Testimony of Philip Evans, Ford Rowan, Stephen Cole, Susan C. Saegert, Elizabeth F. Lof tus, David Harris and Martin Mayer," dated March 13, 1987. Attached to this motion as Attach-ment 1 is a comparison of the CSJHMMS testimony in this -03 proceeding with the pas-sages from the County's -05 testimony on Contentions EX 38 and 39.0 The fif th opportunity will come in this reception center remand proceeding, un-less the County's testimony is stricken. As we shall show, the issue is the same, the witnesses are the same, and the evidence is the same as in 1983-84.
IH. THE ISSUE ADMITTED IN THIS RECEPTION CENTER PROCEEDING lt is true that the Appeal Board has ordered a " shadow phenomenon" issue admit-ted into this reception center proceeding. But the admitted issue is limited. In the Appeal Board's words, the remand was for the following issue:
1/ The written Memorandum and Order to this effect was issued April 17, 1987.
s/ Approximately 24 of the 57 pages in the -03 CSJHMMS testimony are copied word-for-word or with only minor variations from the -05 testimony.
D.
.e Dr. Johnson's testimony deals with the evacuation shadow phenomenon. See supra p.146. While that matter has already been extensively litigated, it was not done in the context of the Coliseum and any problems its location vis-a-vis the Shoreham facility might create.
ALAB-832,23 NRC 135,162 (1986). The Appeal Board's statement of the admitted issue refers back to the " Direct Testimony of James H. Johnson, Jr. on Behalf of Suffolk County Regarding LILCO's Proffered Evidence of January 11, 1985," which was served on February 19, 1985. The crux of Dr. Johnson's 1985 testimony about the location of the reception center is the following:
[T]here will be a perception among many people in the area between the plant and the refuge (i.e., the 0-40 mile region) that that area (or much of it) is unsafe, because the safe ref-uge center (the Nassau Coliseum) is still further from the source of the emergency.
Id. at 4. This issue was admitted for litigation in this proceeding.
Also, on page five of the 1985 Johnson testimony, in response to a question as to whether he had "other concerns about LILCO's proposal to use the Nassau Coliseum,"
Dr. Johnson testified that LILCO's proposalis likely to cause "a great deal of congestion around the Nassau Coliseum." Id. at 5. Dr. Johnson's concern was this:
With the Nassau Coliseum now designated to host people who
. may be contaminated by radioactive materials, and with de-contamination taking place both inside and outside the struc-ture, the number of people in the surrounding communities
- perceiving a threat to their health (and that of their families) is likely to increase, thus increasing the number who will at-tempt to evacuate. Likewise, the area immediately sur-rounding the Coliseum is characterized by substantial com-l mercial development, including a number of private and government office buildings. Workers in these buildings are also 11kely to sense that the area is not safe and will attempt to leave the area -- in many cases using ruds and crossing in-tersections over which evacuees attempting to reach the Col-iseum will travel.
The outflow of Nassau County residents and workers and the influx of evacuees from Suffolk County, processes which. could very well occur simultaneously, could create major traffic problems within the vicinity of the Coliseum.
o
_7_
Id. at 5-6 (footnote omitted). Thus the issues raised by Dr. Johnson's testimony, and ac-cepted derivatively by the Appeal Board, are limited to (1) the notion that the location of the reception centers will affect people's perception of the risk and (2) the notion that people who live in the immediate vicinity of the reception centers will run away when the centers are used for monitoring and decontamination. LILCO is not moving to strike the portions of the Intervenors' April 13,1986 testimony that address these is-sues. But no other " shadow phenomenon" issues are admitted.
Also admitted in this proceeding are issues about " transportation and traffic problems,""whether the distance of the (centers) from the plume EPZ would increase exposure to radiation," and the " adequacy of the evacuation routes." The Intervenors attempt to bring in the " shadow phenomenon" under these issues, claiming that huge numbers of " shadow evacuees" will clog the highways. But, as LILCO discusses in its accompanying Motion to Strike Testimony of David T. Hartgen and Robert C.
Millspaugh, this argument is in effect an attempt to expand the EPZ to 40 miles, rather than the 10 miles called for by the regulations, and is therefore an improper challenge to the regulations.
IV. SPECIFIC TESTIMONY THAT SIIOULD BE STRICKEN What the County's written testimony attempts is nothing less than a reprise of the theories that the County litigated in 1983-84. As noted above, the Intervenors' ar-gument is that people will not follow emergency advisories and will be anxious and ag-gressive. This argument breaks down into six propositions:
- 1. Polls predict generally how many people will overreact in an emergency.
- 2. People on Long Island fear radiation.
- 3. Fear of radiation makes people overreact.
- 4. People at TMI overreacted.
.- _g_
- 5. Anxiety during a radiological emergency causes (a) hostility and (b) Im-paired ability to process information.
6.. People will also overreact because of LILCO's low credibility.
h These issues are the same now as they were earlier in this proceeding. For example,
- Issue 5, about stress making it hard to " process new information" or " perform unfamil-lar tasks" has not changed. In 1984 Intervenors argued that stress would make people unable to drive their cars along evacuation routes. See Saegert, ff. Tr. 2259, at 3,4,6.
Now they argue that stress will make people unable to drive to reception centers.
In some cases the Intervenors have made the same old arguments but cited a
, newer document. For example, some years having passed since his previous testimony, Dr. Johnson now cites a 1986 article by himself as well as a 1981 one (CSJHMMS p. 27 n.16). But if the Intervenors think they have new evidence on an old issue, they must 4
move to reopen the record and meet the stringent standards for doing that. See 10 C.F.R. S 2.734,51 Fed. Reg. 19,535,19,539 (May 30,1986).
i In some cases LILCO is moving to strike Intervenor testimony because it relitigates old issues even though the Intervenor testimony attempts to rebut portions of LILCO's written testimony filed March 30,1987. There is nothing incongruous about this. As indicated in the cover letter to the March 30 LILCO testimony, LILCO believes that some portions of its own written testimony go beyond the scope of the admitted is-sues. From depositions of the Intervenors' witnesses it appeared that those witnesses intended to testify once again about already-litigated matters like shadow phenomenon, hostile behavior by drivers, fear of radiation, and so forth. LILCO therefore addressed these subjects to some extent as a precaution against the possibility (however remote) that the Board might reopen the record on some of the already-litigated matters. The i fact that a topic is addressed in LILCO's written testimony, therefore, cannot be taken i
as LILCO's view on what the proper scope of the admitted issues is.
i
a r ,
A. CSJHMMS op.' 1 LILCO does not object to these pages.
~
B. CSJHMMS p.11 (all) and first three lines of p.12 - LILCO moves to strike these lines because they merely recite the witnesses' conclusions based on their views about fear of radiation, the usefulness of opinion polls, and overreaction. Since those views should be stricken as redundant of earlier testimony (see below), the conclusions on pp.11-12 should be stricken on the same ground.
4 C. CSJHMMS p.12 (from subhead III on) through p.19 (10th line, right above
- subhead 2) - LILCO moves to strike these pages because they simply repeat Suffolk County's of t-repeated claim that Dr. Cole's opinion polls show that there would be a large overreaction in a radiological emergency. These excerpts give the flavor
1 April 13,1987 CSJHMMS (Planning Basis) Testimony i
At 12:
d
, A. (Cole) Yes. I recently conducted a survey which, among other things, was aimed at determining how Long Is-land residents both inside and outside of the EPZ would re-spond to a LILCO advisory to seek monitoring at reception centers.
At 16-17:
The data obtained from the responses to this question are set forth at p. 26 of Exhibit 8. Fif ty percent of all Long Island households said that they would go to the specific center,32%
said that they.would have their radiation level checked some-where else,13% said that they would not bother to have their
, level checked, and 5% were unable to answer this question.
Fif ty percent of the population of Long Island represents more than 1.3 million people.
At 17-18 n.12:
In a real accident, depending upon the seriousness of the accident and other variables, the number of people seeking monitoring might be somewhat larger or smaller than
! that found in the survey; but I am sure that in any serious ac-1 cident, such as that postulated in the February 13,1986 Exer-cise, there would be an extremely large number of people seeking monitoring at the reception centers - many times
- more than LILCO assumes - in response to an advisory to do -
so.
Compare the above passages with earlier Suffolk County testimony:
Cole (Oct.12, 1982, at 3 (never heard)
Social Data Analysts, under my direction, conducted in May and June,1982, a large random sample survey of Long Is-land residents. Its purpose was to find out how Long Island residents would respond to a nuclear accident at the Shoreham Nuclear Power Plant, and to determine if their re-sponse would evidence the evacuation shadow phenomenon.
Johnson (Oct. 12,1982), at 7 (never heard) l In light of the actual human response to the TMI acci-dent,' my colleagues and I conducted a survey of the residents of Long Island for the purpose of eliciting from these resi-dents an expression of how they intended to respond to an ac-cident at Shoreham.
At 13:
In the survey results for all three scenarios, the evacuation shadow phenomenon is evident and is highly significant in planning for a radiological emergency at Shoreham.
[
l Cole, f f. Tr. 2792 f
At 3:
The surveys I have conducted reveal that in the event of an accident at Shoreham, many thousands of people from both inside and outside the EPZ will seek to evacuate, even though they will not have been advised to do so. Indeed, they may seek to evacuate even though they have been advised not to evacuate. Thase findings confirm the existence of the
' evacuation shadow phenomenon, and raise questions about whether LILCO's plan will be effective in protecting the health and safety of Suffolk County residents in case of a ra-diological emergency at Shoreham.
At 4:
In April 1982, I was retained by Suffolk County to con-duct a social survey that would evaluate how people would react to a possible radiological emergency at the Shoreham Nuclear Power Plant.
- _= ..- . -.- - .
e
_11 At 10:
The purpose of this survey, I might point out, was not to measure precisely whether 30 percent, 31 percent or 32 percent of the people would evacuate if there were a Shoreham emergency. Rather, the purpose of this survey was to obtain some general estimates of the size of the group that would evacuate.
At 14:
Based upon the survey, I would expect that in the event of a Shoreham emergency, a large amount of voluntary evacuation must be expected. The precise amount of volun-tary evacuation varies depending upon the perceived severity of the event, except that in all cases (i.e., even the least se-vere event) a significant number of departures is predicted.
In particular, passages at CSJHMMS p.17 attempt to repeat or supplement the County's earlier testimony that polls are a good way to predict actual emergency be-havior. For example:
April 13,1987 CSJHMMS (Planning Basis)
Testimony At 17:
Surveys are useful, however, to estimate the approximate magnitude of the public's response to a monitoring advisory.
Here, the data show that many times more people will arrive
, at LILCO's reception centers than LILCO assumes. (Footnote omitted.)
At 17 n.12:
The point made in this testimony is not that a particular num-ber of individuals, or individuals from a particular location, would seek monitoring or that they would do so at a particular time, but rather that LILCO's 30% planning basis is a gross underestimation of the number of people who could be ex-4 pected to arrive at the reception centers. Thus, as noted above, no one suggests that the survey is a precise instrument which accurately predicts precisely how many, or which, peo-ple would actually seek monitoring. But, the survey is the best tool that we have; it gives us a rough idea of the magni-i tude of monitoring-seeking behavior. LILCO's witness, Dr.
Lindell, has used his previous surveys to draw conclusions about future behavior, just as we have.
Compare the earlier testimony:
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- 1 l Johnson (Oct. 12,1982), at 15 (never heard).
For planning purposes, and given the actual experience at TMI, I believe it is reasonable to take people's expressed in-tended behavior as their actual anticipated behavior. In the event of an actual evacuation notification to people within ten miles of the plant, therefore,~ at least 432,000 families will be on the roads in Long Island.
Cole (Oct. 12,1982), at 14 (never heard)
In general, however, surveys are highly reliable predic-tors. The fact that millions of dollars are spent every week in the United States on survey research shows that business, the government, the media, and academia all have faith in this method.
Erikson (Oct. 12,1982), at 3 (never heard)
Yes, I believe that the survey responses are a reliable indicator of what Long Island residents are likely to do in the
,. event of .a radiological emergency at Shoreham. On the i whole, surveys do a good job of predicting behavior.
Cole, ff. Tr.
2792, at 25 In my opinion, surveys provide important data that should be used by emergency planners in developing and evaluating the workability of an emergency plan. -
See also Cole, ff. Tr. 2792, at 30-32, 64.
CSJHMMS pages 18-19 (dcwn to subhead 2) simply' give the conclusions drawn 4
from the premise that there will be a huge number of people overreacting: many peo-i i pie will come to the reception centers and many people will clog (unspecified) roads.
This passage should be stricken as an attempt to relitigate the shadow phenomenon.
! CSJHMMS p.19 (starting with subhead 2) through p. 25 responds to LILCO's criti-cisms of the County's opinion polls and of the hypothesis that emergency behavior can
- be predicted by polls. Once again, this is a relltigation of the shadow phenomenon issue.II It is no answer to say that LILCO itself submitted testimony on these subjects; I/ LILCO is aware that the Appeal Board remanded one small portion of the " role
- conflict" issue (bus driver availability) in ALAB-832,23 NRC 135,152-54. The remand
.' (footnote continued)
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l C as noted above, LILCO admittedly filed testimony on already-litigated issues in some in-stances. ,;[
Five public opinion polls were considered by the Licensing Board in ruling on
~ shadow phenomenon. PID,21 NRC at 663. Suffolk County argued that polls taken be-fore an emergency have value in predicting actual response during an emergency. PID, 21 NRC at 657. The Board rejected this notion:
The Board lists the numerical findings of the County survey to I illustrate the general magnitude of the responses and not be-
[ .cause we believe that they accurately reflect future evacua-l tion behavior of large populations. . . .
~
{ .
-l The polls did not and could not supply respondents with urgent a tone and situation-specific information that would be publicly available in a real emergency . . . .
The poll results have no literal predictive validity because the residents of Suffolk and Nassau Counties do not now have that additional information that respondents would need to deter-mine their actions in an emergency. We give little weight to the predictive findings of the public opinion polls.
PID, 21 NRC at 664, 666, 667.E The County should not be allowed to reopen this issue now; its testimony should be stricken.
(footnote continued) was for admission, at minimum, of a particular survey of volunteer firemen. The inter-venors argue that this means that all their surveys are admissible. The truth is. howev-er, that, at least with respect to polls of members of the public, the Appeal Board did not disturb the Licensing Board's finding that " poll results have no literal predictive va-lidity," 21 NRC at 667. That finding has now passed the time for Commission review and is final.
8/ The Board found that opinion poll results confirm what it concluded from other evidence about the fear of radiation harbored by the population. PID,21 NRC at 666.
Indeed, the Board noted that LILCO and Suffolk County agreed that many people fear radiation. I_d. In light of these findings, there is no justification for taking additional survey evidence to further confirm something about which there is no real issue.
9 s' Most of this testimony is duplicative of the prefiled . testimony submitted by Suffolk County on Contentions EX 38 and 39 in the -05 proceeding. Sm Attachment 1.
The testimony was not stricken by the -05 Board. Thus, it should be stricken here as
- duplicative of testimony being litigated elsewhere.
D. CSJHMMS p. 26 - LILCO moves to strike this page because it relitigates the issue of whether pre-existing fear of radiation determines overresponse. Here is the testimony:
April 13,1987 SJHMMS (Planning U Basis) Testimony, at 26 Q. What factors will cause the response you antici-pate to a monitoring advisory, which is many times greater than what LILCO assumes?
A. (Saegert, Johnson) The most important factor is the pre-existing concern about radiation which exists in the public and in particular among residents of Long Island. Re-search has shown that they are very concerned about being exposed to dangerous levels of radiation in the event of an ac-cident at Shoreham and that they are likely to act on those concerns. In particular, they are likely to take measures to determine whether they have been exposed to radiation.
Unlike most other hazards, they cannot make this determina-tion for themselves. Thus, they will seek out facilities which will enable them to make that determination. It is simply un-realistic to assume that this response will be restricted to 30% of the EPZ population.
The public's strong concerns about radiation are well-chronicled in the literature. For instance, much research by Slovic and his colleagues has demonstrated that the public perceives radiatlo short of warfare.lg to be one of the most dreaded hazards
-I N See, g, P. Slovic, B. Fischoff, and S. Lichtenstein,
" Rating the Risks," Environment Vol. 21,14-39 (April,1979).
Compare earlier versions:
Saegert, ff. Tr. 2259, at 6 The public's fear of radiation has beer. amply demonstrated by studies conducted by Slovic, Lichtenstein and Fischoff which found that people fear a nuclear power plant accident more than any other disaster agent except warfare and terrorism.
i
O o (Footnote omitted.)
Zeigler & Johnson ff.Tr.2789,at 23 Slovic, Fischhoff, and Lichtenstein (1979)2/h ave found that radiation is the disaster agent most dreaded by the public ex-cept for terrorism and warfare. Radiation is imperceptible to the human senses. One is therefore unable to determine when one is in its presence.
2/ P. Slovic, B. Fischoff, and S. Lichtenstein, " Rating the Risks," Environment 21,14-39 (April,1979).
See also, for example, Tr.1740 (Sorensen).
Thus, the new testimony either repeats or attempts to supplement earlier testi-many. Moreover, it directly contradicts the PID. The Board has already accepted that people fear radiation. PID,21 NRC at 666. (Indeed, it would not be rational for them n_ot to fear it.) But the Board also found that pre-accident fear is not a direct cause of evacuation in an emergency:
Instead, this fear helps shape how people use informa-tion and perceive the threat during an accident.
We adopt this finding from LILCO's testimony because of its reasonableness and because we do not accept the notion that people caught in an emergency situation simply abandon reason and respond blindly to pre-existing fear. The Board can hardly imagine that any-one would evacuate in a radiological emergency unless fear of radiation pre-existed as part of the common knowledge. However, we conclude that reasonable people need and will seek information on which to base their actions, particularly in the urgent conditions of an emergency. If the information is inadequate or con-flicting, they may act inappropriately. If it is com-plete and consistent, they will accept it and use it as intended.
PID, 21 NRC at 662; see also id. at 658-59. In light of this holding, further testimony discussing the effect of pre-existing fear on the shadow phenomenon is barred.
8 .
The -05 Board struck duplicative testimony in Suffolk County's prefiled testimo-ny on Contentions EX 38 and 39 on April 16,1987. See Attachment 1.
E. CSJHMMS p. 27 (1st 5 lines) - LILCO moves to strike this answer (spon-sored by Dr. Johnson) on the ground that it relitigates the " shadow phenomenon / fear of radiation" issue.
April 13,1987 CSJHMMS (Planning Basis) Testimony, at 27 (Johnson) Likewise, my studies of evacuation behavior at TMI demonstrated that fear of radiation was one of the prime causes for the overresponce which led over 140,000 people to evacuate, although only a small fraction of that number (about 3,500) were advised to do so.
(Footnote omitted.) The Board will recall litigating the effect of fear on TMI residents at extraordinary length in early 1984. Compare earlier testimony:
Zeigler & Johnson, ff. Tr.
2789, at 35 However, there is no basis on which to conclude that such (EBS] messages will be t]Le determining factor in human re-sponse to a radiological emergency. Our TMI study found that fear of impending harm, not conflicting information, was the overriding factor in triggering evacuation.
Cole & Tyree, ff. Tr. 3907, at 9 In fact, the Sorensen and Richardson analysis supports the op-posite conclusion that pre-accident fear is an important cause in evacuation behavior.
At 14:
These data lead us to conclude that actual distance from the plant and two Questions measuring the respondent's concern with radiation from nuclear plants, EMITB and CONCERN, are the primary influences on what the LILCO witnesses have called the situationally perceived threat.
(Emphasis in original.)
)
At 15:
However, the data presented in the Sorensen and Richardson model show that fear of emissions from nuclear plants and concern with the nuclear plant are more important influences on a situationally perceived threat than are the respondents' perceptions of information available to them.
l Fear of radiation from nuclear plants is widespread l among the residents of Long Island. This is shown by both the County's survey and the survey conducted for LILCO by Yankelovich, Skelly and White.
See also the lengthy cross-examination at Tr. 1836-70.
F. CSJHMMS p. 27 (Saegert and Johnson answer)- LILCO moves to strike this as a relitigation of the shadow phenomenon issue, for the same reasons given in section E immediately above. For example:
April 13,1987 CSJHMMS (Planning Basis) Testimony, at 27 Thus, they concluded, it is pre-existing attitudes toward a hazard - in this case, radiation released during an accident -
that is the most important cause of overresponse or evacua-tion shadow.
The -05 Board struck duplicative testimony in Suffolk County's prefiled testimo-ny on Contentions EX 38 and 39 on April 16, 1987. See Attachment 1.
G. CSJHMMS p. 28 (all) - p. 29 (1st 6 lines)-- LILCO moves to strike this testi-mony. It seeks to relitigate the issue of the colorless, odorless nature of radiationN making it special. Much testimony on this subject has already been heard, for example:
9/ See also Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 &
2), LBP-82-70,16 NRC 756, 824 (1982) (summary of Dr. Erikson's views that people do not know what radioactive substances look like or feel like or how far they can reach into the countryside).
.i '
Cole, ff. Tr. 2792, at 26-27 Radiological emergencies are very different. Virtually
, nobody who would be exposed to a radiological emergency, were an accident to occur at Shoreham, has ever experienced one before. The fear that people have of a radiological emer-gency is substantially greater than fear of a natural disaster such as a hurricane. Radiation cannot be seen, felt, or heard and is therefore considerably more frightening to most people than natural disasters.
See also some of the testimony quoted in section D above; Tr. 2017-19 (Mileti).
The second paragraph, about AIDS, is simply an attempt to supplement earlier testimony about the colorless, odorless nature of radiation with an alleged analogy. It
- should be stricken (1) because it is an attempt to relitigate old issues and (2) because AIDS has such tenuous relevance, if any, to reception centers that testimony about AIDS is not " relevant, material, and reliable." 10 C.F.R. S 2.743(c) (1986).
! The -05 Board struck duplicative testimony in Suffolk County's prefiled testimo-ny on Contentions EX 38 and 39 on April 16,1987. See Attachment 1.
H. CSJHMMS p. 29 (starting a: line 7) - p. 30 (1st paragraph) - LILCO moves
- to strike this passage because it seeks to reopen the issue of fear of radiation and its re-a lation to overreaction. For example:
April 13,1987 CSJHMMS (Planning Basis) Testimony at 29 (Cole) The recent survey I conducted, as well as many I have conducted in the past, measured the public's fear of radiation as opposed to other hazards. All of the surveys I have conducted on the issue demonstrate a fear of radiation among the general public and a strong correlation between that fear and response to protective action recommendations.
The -05 Board struck duplicative testimony in Suffolk County's prefiled testimo-ny on Contentions EX 38 and 39 on April 16,1987. See Attachment 1.
i
_ . _ _ . _ . - . ,. - _ . , _ . . - _ . . _ . . _ . - . . _ . . . . - . _ . - _ _ _ . _ _ - . , . . _ _ . . , _ - , . - _ . _ . _ . . , . . . _ _ . , _ _ ~ _ _ . , _ .,
- - L CSJHMMS p. 30 (2d paragraph, starting line 16) to D. 36 (1st 3 lines) -
LILCO moves to strike this testimony because it attempts to reopen the issue of fear of
. radiation and its effect on overreaction. For example:
April 13,1987 CSJHMMS (Planning Basis) Testimony at 31 Perhaps one of the most important conclusions to be drawn from an analysis of the transcripts of the focus groups is that Long Island residents have a deep-seated fear of being ex-posed to radiation released during an accident at Shoreham. 1 This fear is held by a significant segment of the Long Island population.
Here the County has created new evidence (focus group interviews) of fear of radiation.
However, the point the County is trying to make is the same: people fear radiation, and this fear will tend to make them overreact. Just as surveys cannot be used to pre-dict future emergency response, neither can lengthy statements of opinion by individu-als conjecturing on their likely future behavior in response to an emergency at Shoreham. Moreover, focus group evidence could have been created for the earlier shadow phenomenon litigation but was not. If the County wants to present it now it should move to reopen the record.
The -05 Board struck duplicative testimony in Suffolk County's prefiled testimo-ny on Contentions EX 38 and 39 on April 16,1987. See Attachment 1.
J. CSJHMMS Section III.4 (pp. 36-41) - LILCO moves to strike this testimony on three grounds. First, the testimony seeks to reopen the " shadow phenomenon" issue that was litigated in 1983-84. The testimony says that the accident at Chernobyl has increased pre-existing fear of radiation:
.* April 13,1987 CSJHMMS (Planning Basis) Testimony, at 41 In summary, the pre-existing fears which Long Is-landers have of radiation, which the above excerpts demon-strate have been exacerbated by Chernobyl, will result in a massive number of people converging on LILCO's reception centers for the purpose of being monitored in the event of an accident at Shoreham.
Chernobyl is new evidence that the County wants to present on an old issue (pre-existing fear of radiation). It is required to reopen the record first. Recently the -05 Board declined to admit a similar contention about the effect of Chernobyl on people's response to a Shoreham accident. Memorandum and Order (Ruling on Intervenors' Mo-tion to Admit Contentions), Oct 28, 1986, slip op. at 5. One of the reasons for the ruling was that the contention was redundant of the " shadow phenomenon" contentions, the Board's decision as to which had become final. Id.
The -05 Board struck testimony in Suffolk County's prefiled testimony on Con-tentions EX 38 and 39 on April 16, 1987, which is almost identical, word-for-word, with Suffolk Cou'ity's testimony on Chernobyl discussed here. See Attachment 1.
K. CSJHMMS Section III.5 (pp. 41-47)- LILCO moves to strike this entire sec-tion. It is an attempt to reopen the shadow phenomenon issue and particularly to rebut LILCO's 1983-84 testimony that emergency response is primarily determined by situa-tional perception of risk, which in turn is shaped by emergency information.
Also, the second paragraph, starting on page 42 (beginning with "Second") and running through the first four lines on page 43, attempts to reopen the record on whether the stress of a radiological accident would make people have trouble "compre-hending and processing spatial information":
l
a April 13,1987 CSJHMMS (Planning Basis) Testimony, at 43 This is v ause some people under stress, as Long Island resi-dents si vly would be during an accident, of ten have trouble comprenending and processing spatial information.
Compare earlier testimony:
Saegert, ff. Tr. 2259, at 4 People, unable to escape congested situations, will feel in-creased stress, reduced ability to comprehend the environ-ment and make rational decisions, and aggression.
If LILCO's traffic guides attempt to enforce or overtly encourage conformance with the prescribed routes, the re-sulting confrontation could lead to conflict and aggression be-tween drivers and traffic guides.
At 6:
People experiencing high levels of stress have reduced ability to process new information, particularly if it does not relate to their preconceived goals and intentions. This may have a particularly important effect on traffic flow. For instance drivers, may have trouble noticing and interpreting important information such as signs, road cues, and the behavior of other drivers.
At 12:
Further, the stress generated by the emergency will reduce their ability to recall the routes. Even mild stress, such as that people experience when shopping in a crowded su-permarket, leads people to forget where things are located.
The problem can be expected to be anore serious in a more complex topography and under conditions of greater stress.
(Footnote omitted.)
At 17:
As stated earlier, high levels of stress reduce information pro-cessing capacity. Such capacity is necessary to make the nu-merous decisions that influence rate of speed and safety (for
- ' example, the gauging of distance between cars, determining proper speed, choosing routes, etc.) Drivers will be responsi-ble for making moment-to-moment decisions in a situation that will tax their mental capacities and go against psycho-l logically likely ways of perceiving, remembering and behav-ing. In addition, the driver will have to respond to the
O unexpected enforcement of traffic controls and the unex-pected behavior of other drivers.
(Footnote omitted.) For further comparison, see the Intervenors' 1984 proposed find-ings on "The Effect of Stress"(Attachment 2 to this motion).
Also, tne paragraph beginning " Third" (lines 5-9) on page 43 reopens the issue of whether people will follow emergency advisories:
April 13,1987 CSJHMMS (Planning Basis) Testimony, at 43 Third, even people who understand correctly the con-tents of the message but were not residents of the named zones, may nonetheless seek monitoring because, assuming people know their own zone, they may not know which zones they have gone through, or travelled near, during their trips out of the EPZ.
Likewise, the last paragraph on page 43 (lines 10-20) reopens the matter of radi-ation not stopping at geographic boundaries, fear of radiation, people's lack of under-standing of the effects of radiation, and people's not following emergency advisories, all of which were litigated already:
April 13,1987 CSJHMMS (Planning Basis)
Testimony, at 43 Fourth, large numbers of people are likely to discount LILCO's zone concept in its EBS messages altogether. People know that radiation in the air does not stop at precise geo-graphic boundaries. Thus, some people would consider the idea of zones - some safe, some not - as counterfactual, and would, accordingly, ignore any implication or statement in the message that only residents of certain zones had been en-dangered. Individuals' fear of radiation, combined with their lack of understanding of its effects (a lack of understanding which LILCO's EBS messages do nothing to alleviate) would make it likely that they would seek monitoring.
Compare earlier testimony:
O o
Saegert, ff. Tr. 2259, at 3
However, because of concern for personal safety and the safety of families, drivers will seek the " safest" route out of the EPZ. It can be expected that in many cases a driver's perception of the safest route will not coincide with the routes that LILCO has assigned to him or her. . . . Under stress, the ability to process information may be reduced sig-nificantly.
Zeigler & Johnson, if.
Tr. 2789, at 31 In short, people are not likely to believe that harmful radia-tion will stop at the dividing line for a LILCO subzone.
(Footnote omitted.)
CSJHMMS pp. 44-47 (down to subsection 6) should be stricken because they seek to reopen the " credibility" issue (EP Contention 15). For example:
April 13,1987 SJHMMS (Planning Basis) Testimony, at 44 Finally, LILCO's messages that people outside a partic-ular zone would be safe are likely to be discounted by the pub-lic due to LILCO's low credibility.
Compare earlier testimony:
Zeigler and Johnson, ff. Tr. 2789, at 36-37 Survey data reveal that LILCO is held in very low re-gard by the population of Long Island. As will be discussed in the Suffolk County testimony on Contention 15 (Credibility),
it is therefore likely that many people will not heed LILCO's messages because they deem LILCO to be untrustworthy.
Thus, even if LILCO's messages are assumed to be perfect, they may be ineffective.
Cole, ff. Tr.10,727 At 5:
Surveys conducted by Suffolk County and LILCO show that Long Island residents have a high level of concern and fear about the dangers associated with nuclear power. Given this high level of fear, if there were an accident at Shoreham many citizens, including people whom LILCO expects to play various roles implementing the LILCO Plan, would experience high levels of anxiety. Under these conditions, it is unlikely
13 that these people would believe messages telling them they were safe from harm, or that particular actions would protect them from harm, no matter who the messages came from.
A substantial majority of Long Island residents do not trust LILCO to tell the truth. In the case of an actual nuclear acci-dent, an event which LILCO has continually told the public is almost impossible, LILCO's credibility would most likely be even lower.
At 6:
If residents do not trust LILCO to tell the truth about a ra-diological emergency at Shoreham, then many of them are likely to disregard the information and advice that they are given, resulting in LILCO being unable to implement its Plan.
Saegert, ff. Tr. 2259, at 3 The health-threatening conditions that will exist or may be l perceived to exist during a radiological emergency will pro-l duce stress and anxiety among the population which will, among other things, affect the behavior and performance of drivers seeking to leave the EPZ. I believe that the level of stress and anxiety.will be particularly great for a Shoreham emergency because of the public's extreme fear of radiation and LILCO's perceived lack of credibility as an organization able to command and control the emergency response.
Purcell, et al., ff. Tr.10,727, at 45 In summary, the public distrusts information provided by nuclear utilities. Beyond this, LILCO's credibility on Long Island is low and is exacerbated by the public perception of both potential conflicts of interest involved in the LILCO Plan and LILCO management incompetence. For all these reasons, we believe that the public will not view LILCO as a credible source of information or direction during a Shoreham emergency.
At 46:
LILCO's lack of credibility will cause the public to question the accuracy and adequacy of notice that an emer-gency exists, to doubt that the full dimensions of the emer-gency are being coveyed to them in a manner that accurately discloses the true nature of the emergency, and to question the propriety, accuracy and adequacy of the protective ac-tions recommended by LILCO.
-o C
At 47:
The public similarly is likely to disbelieve statements made by officers and employees of the company that is re-sponsible for the emergency, and will not believe that those employees are acting in the best interests of the public's health and safety rather than LILCO's own corporate welf are.
Thus, information provided by LILCO employees prior to or during an emergency would be ignored by many people, and in any event, is likely to be interpreted in a variety of ways not anticipated or intended by LILCO. Thus, reassurances that no real danger exists, that danger is minimal, or that particular actions will protect, would be viewed skeptically and could in-crease some people's fears that the situation was serious and that LILCO was covering it up.
At 65:
The public will not obey the LILCO employees designated to act as traffic guides and security personnel assigned to per-form security functions at various locations such as the EPZ perimeter and relocation centers, for several reasons related to LILCO's lack of credibility.
The same CSJHMMS testimony on page 45 and in footnote 26 on pp. 45-46 relles once again on the focus group interviews. In addition to the reasons given ebove,E!
this focus group testimony should be stricken because selec'cd quotes from individuals are not " relevant, material, and reliable" evidence.E 10 C.F.R. S 2.743(c).
Pages 46-47 (down to subhead 6) should be stricken because, once again, they at-tempt to reopen the issue, already litigated, of credibility and people's compliance with emergency advisories.
M/ The same witness, Dr. Cole, testified in 1984 about other focus group interviews he had conducted and what they told him about LILCO's credibility. Cole, ff. Tr.
10,727, at 16; Tr.10,823-27 (Cole). The reception center testimony is just an attempt to reopen and supplement the earlier record.
M/ At some point the Intervenors will argue that LILCO offered evidence of group interviews in 1984 in the form of testimony by anthropologist Steve Barnett. See Barnett et al., f f. Tr. 9689, at 45-46. Dr. Barnett's interviews and Dr. Cole's are not comparable. See, e.g., Tr. 9733-34, 9741 (Barnett). And LILCO has never claimed for Dr. Barnett's interviews the type of predictive validity claimed by the Intervenors fr.-
Dr. Cole's. See, eg., Tr. 9756 (Barnett).
-o-The -05 Board struck duplicative testimony in Suffolk County's prefiled testimo-ny on Contentions EX 38 and 39 on April 16, 1987. See Attachment 1.
L. CSJHMMS Section III.6 (pp. 47-51) -- LILCO does not move to strike this section, except as follows:
The citation to caselaw in footnote 28 is inadmissible.
The sentence in lines 6-8 on page 50 ("of course, as stated earlier . . . actually arrive") should be stricken for the same reasons as the earlier testimony on which it relles.
The paragraph on pages 50-51 (beginning " Finally" and e.1 ding "a Shoreham 11-cense") should be stricken as not " relevant, material, and reliable." 10 C.F.R.
S 2.743(c). It is speculation about FEMA's motives and irrelevant to the substantive merits of the Krimm guidance memorandum.
M. CSJHMMS Section III.7 p. 54 LILCO moves to strike the passage at the bottom of page 54 beginning "LILCO's Environmental Report" on line 15 and ending with "during an accident" at the very end of the page. This testimony discusses the likelihood of wind shif ts. The likelihood of wind shif ts was litigated in 1984 under Contention EP 64, which alleged that wind con-ditions on Long Island required LILCO to evacuate the population within at least a radi-j us of five to seven miles from the plant if any evacuation was called for. See Cordaro et al., ff. Tr. 8760, at 42-43; Tr. 8957 (Cordaro). The record on wind variability has al-ready been made.
Note that LILCO does not move to strike the conclusions the County witnesses draw (top of page 55) from their impression of site meteorology. But as to the meteo-rology itself (that is, the likelihood of wind shif t), the Intervenors had a full opportunity to present evidence under Contention 64; their interest there was the same as here,
C.
namely to show a high likelihood of wind shif t. Hence the fact that a different issue about the implications of wind shif t is now being litigated does not mean that the Inter-venors are entitled to a second chance to litigate the likelihood of wind shif t itself.
N. CSJHMMS Section IV (" Conclusions")
LILCO moves to strike page 56 through line 6 on page 57, which seeks to reopen the " shadow phenomenon" issue, as discussed above.
O. Exhibit 8 LILCO moves to strike Exhibit 8, the report of the opinion poll on which much of the inadmissible testimony depends.
Respectfully submitted, if'- in ? T_ ^ :J James N. Chlistman Mary Jo Leugers Stephen W. Miller Hunton & Williams 707 East Main Street P.O. Box 1535 Richmond, Virginia 23212 DATED: April 18,1987
/
ATTACllMENT 1 D Testimony Stricken By -05 Board That Is Duplicated In ~03 Testimony of Suffolk County I. Survey of Public's Response To LILCO Instruction to Seek Monitoring (pages 12-19)
A. Description of Survey (pages 12-16)
April 13, 1987 March 13, 1987 CSJIIMMS (Planning Suffolk County Testimony Basis) Testimony (-03)
On Contentions EX 38 and 39 (-05)
[In both the -03 and the -05 proceedings, Suffolk County relies on the same surveys con-a ducted by Dr. Cole to predict how people will react in the event of an actual radiological emergency at Shoreham. The testimony in the two proceedings describe the methods used to conduct the surveys in nearly identical language, though not always in the some order. The following are samples of the duplicative language. ]
at page 13:
at page 153, [duplicative but not stricken]:
The purpose of this survey was not to mea- The purpose of this survey, I might point sure precisely what percent of Long Island house- out, was not to measure precisely whether 50 per-holds would seek monitoring. Rather, the purpose cent or 55 percent of Long Island households would was to obtain some general estimates of the size evacuate af ter hearing the f trst EBS message.
, of the group that would attempt to travel to Rather, the purpose of this survey was to obtain LILCO's reception centers for monitoring. some general estimates of the size of the group
o
.o April 13, 1987 March 13, 1987 CSJHPMS (Planning Suffolk County Testimony l Basis) Testimony (-03)
! On Contentions EX 38 and 39 (-05) that would evacuate, in response to the actual messages -- including their tone anxi situation-specific information -- which LILCO showed during the Exercise it would use to respond to a real Shoreham accident.
A. (Cole) This was a telephone survey in A. (Cole) This was a telephone survey in which we interviewed 1,500 Long Island residents. which we interviewed 1,500 Long Island residents.
at pages 14-15: at pages 155-57 [duplicative but not stricken]:
Upon completion of the questionnaire, the A. (Cole) The survey was administered to survey was administered to a stratified random a stratifial random sample of households residing sample of households residing in Nassau and in Nassau and Suf folk Counties. The sample was Suffolk Counties. The sample was stratified based stratified based upon three geographical areas.
upon three geographical areas; we interviewed a We interviewed a random sample of 379 residents random sample of 379 residents living in the EPZ, living in.the EPZ, a random sample of 629 resi-a random sample of 629 residents living in Suffolk dents living in Suffolk County but outside of the
o s
April 13, 1987 March 13, 1987 CSJif)915 (Planning Suffolk County Testimony Basis) Testimony (-03)
On Contentions EX 38 and 39 (-05) i County but outside of the EPZ, and a random sample EPZ, and a random sample of 492 residents of l
of 492 residents of Nassau County. Telephone num- Nassau County.
bers were randomly generated by computer according * *
- to the method set forth in the Technical Appendix. (Cole) Telephone numbers were randomly gen-l See Exhibit B, at 37-39.
eratal by computer according to the method set forth in the Technical Appendix. See Attachment I
14, p. 37-30.
l l * *
- l l
Q. Can the results of such a random sam- Q. Can the results of this survey be used l ple survey be used to generalize to all individu- to generalize to all individuals on Long Island?
als on Long Island?
A. (Cole) The survey was designed to be A. (Cole) The survey was designed to be a random sample of all Long Island households with a random sample of all Long Island households with j telephones (more than 97% of households on Long telephones. (More than 97% of households on Long i
Island have telephones). Within households, we Island have telephones.) Within households, we utilized either the male or female head of utilized either the male or female head of
7; i
0 '
l April 13, 1987 March 13, 1987 CSJHM S (Planning Basis) Testimony (-03)
Suffolk County Testimony On Contentions EX 38 and 39 (-05) household as an informant on what the household household as an informant on what the household 1
l would do. Thus, the results can be used to gener- would do. Thus, the results can be used to gener-alize to all Long Island households. alize to all Long Island households.
. . . l l
For this survey, the sampling-error for the For this survey, the sampling error for the entire sample is plus or minus three percentage entire sample is plus or minus three percentage points.10/ This means that in theory if this sur- points; the sampling error for Nassau County and vey were to be repeated 100 times using the same Suffolk County outside the EPZ is plus or minus techniques, in 95 out of the 100 times the results four percentage points. The sampling error for obtained for a particular question would be within the EPZ is plus or minus five percentage point. 1 3 percentage points of the results which would This means that in theory if this survey were to have been obtained by interviewing members of be repeated 100 times using the same techniques, every Long Island household, in 95 out of the 100 time the results obtained for I
a particular question would be within 3 percentage
)
10/ The sampling error for the EPZ is plus or points of the results which would have been ob- I
}
l Cinus five percentage points. The sampling error tained by interviewing members of every Long Is-for Nassau County and Suffolk County outside the land household.
EPZ is plus or minus four percentage points.
April 13, 1987 March 13, 1987 CSJHM S (Planning Suffolk County Testimony Basis) Testimony (-03) On Contentions EX 38 and 39 (-05)
B. Surveys Indicate That a " Shadow" Will Occur (pages 16-19) at pages 16-17: at page 276:
Q. Please describe the results of the Q. In your opinion, why is there no basis survey regarding the demands likely to be placed for that assumption?
l on LILCO's reception centers.
A. (Cole) In the survey, we asked the A. (Cole) My opinion is based upon my 1,500 respondents how they would respond to a se- knowledge of the great fear that Long Island resi-ries of EBS messages actually used by LILCO during dent have of being exposed to radiation (see the its February 1986 Exercise to " inform" the public portion of this testimony relating to Contention I
of the escalating nature of an accident at Ex 22 subpart F) and on a question in the recent Shoreham and the protective actions which they survey I conducted for Suffolk County. In that should take. One of the questions asked was the survey we asked the 1,500 respondents the follow-following: ing question:
If at 1: 45 p.m. you heard on the radio a If at 1:45 p.m. you heard on the radio a LILCO representative say that certain people LILCO representative say that certain people living within ten miles of Shoreham may have living within ten miles of Shoreham may have been exposexl to radiation during their trip been exposed to radiation during their trip out of the evacuation zone and should go to out of the evacuation zone anni should go to a specific location in Nassau County to be a specific location in Nassau County to be monitoried for possible radioactive monitoried for possible radioactive
O April 13, 1987 March 13, 1987 CSJHPetS (Planning Basis) Testimony (-03)
Suffolk County Testimony On Contentions EX 38 and 39 (-05) 4 contamination, would you: (1) go to the I
specific location in Nassau to see if you contamination, would you: go to the specif-ic location in Nassau to see if you have have been contaminated with radiation; or been contaminated with radiation, or go (2) go somewhere else to have your radiation somewhere else to have your radiation level level checked; or (3) would not bother to have your radiation level checked?
checked, or would not bother to have your radiation level checked?
I Exhibit 8, at 56. The data obtaintal from the re- The resulting data enable us to estimate that 1
sponses to this question are set forth at p. 26 of about 50 percent of all Lon<r Island households i
! Exhibit 8. Fifty percent of all Long Island would attempt to go to the location in Nassau households said that they would go to the specific County to be checked for radiation. Fifty percent center, 32% said that they would have their radia- said that they would go to the specific center, 32 tion level checked somewhere else, 13% said that percent said that they would have their radiation they would not bother to have their level checked, level checked somewhere else, 13 percent said that and 51L were unable to answer this question. Fifty they would not bother to have their level checked, percent of the population of Long Island repre- and 5 percent were unable to answer this question.
I sents more than 1.3 million people. Fifty percent of the population of Long Island represents more than 1.3 million people.
i l
I .
April 13, 1987 March 13, 1987 CSJHMMS (Planning Suffolk County Testimony Basis) Testimony (-03)
On Contentions EX 38 and 39 (-05) i i
C. Surveys are Valid Predictors of Future Behavior (pages 17-18) l l
l at pages 17-18, footnote 12: at pages 166-67 [duplicative bat not stricken):
Q. LILCO witnesses argue (LILCO testimony Q. In the past, LILCO witnesses have ar-at 13-17) that your survey is not a reliable means qued that surveys are not a reliable means to pre-to predict what people would do during a real ra- dict what people would do during a real ra-diological emergency. Why should the Board accept diological emergency. Why should the Board accept as valid the survey results you have described as valid the ' survey results yoo have described which support your allegation that many times more which support the allegations in Contention than the numbers of people LILCO presumes will ac- Ex 22.F?
tually arrive at LILCO's reception centers?
A. (Cole) While it is true that surveys A. (Cole) While it is certainly true are not perf ect tools for predicting exactly how that surveys are not perfect tools for predicting individual people will respond to a future event, exactly how individual people will respond to a they do provide very usef ul evidence. The point future event, they do provide very useful evi-made in this testimony is not that a particular dence, ... Thus, the point made in Contention number of individuals, or individuals from a Ex. 22.F and the related contentions, is not that
e April 13, 1987 March 13, 1987 CSJHM S (Planning Suffolk County Testimony Ba si s ) Testimony (-03) On Contentions EX 38 and 39 (-05) particular location, would seek monitoring or that a particular number of individuals, or individuals they would do so at a particular time, but rather from a particular location, would voluntarily that LILCO's 301 planning basis is a gross evacuate, or that they would do so at a particular underestimation of the number of people whould time, but rather that LILCO's assumption during could be expected to arrive at the reception cen- the Exercise that there would be no voluntary ters. Thus, as noted above, no one suggests that evacuation, and the FEMA evaluator 's identical as-the survey is a precise instrument which accurate- sumption. . . . Thus, no one suggests that the
{
ly predicts precisely how many, or which, people survey is a precise instrument which accurately l l would actually seek monitoring. But, the survey predicts precisely how many, or which people would is the best tool that we have; it gives us a rough actually attempt to evacuate, or more precisely idea of the magnitude of monitoring-seeking behav- when, were a real accident such as that depicted ior. LILCO's witness, Dr. Lindell, has used his in the Exercise to occur at Shoreham and LILCO previous surveys to draw conclusions about future were to disseminate the instructions it used dur-behavior, just as we have. ing the Exercise. But, the survey is the best tool that we have; it gives us a rough idea of the size of the evacuation shadow in response to the specific information contair.ed in LILCO's Exercise EBS messages.
. . _ s _. . _ . - - _ - _ - _ _ - _ . _ . ... .._.
April 13, 1987 March 13, 1987 CSJHM4S (Planning Suffolk County Testimony Basis) Testimony (-03) On Contentions EX 38 and 39 (-05)
In a real accident, depending upon the seri- In a real accident, depending upon the seriousness
- ousness of the accident and other variables, the of the accident and other variables, the evacua-number of people seeking monitoring might be some- tion shadow might be somewhat larger or smaller
]
- what larger or smaller than that found in the sur- than that found in the survey; but I am sure that 1
i vey; but am sure that in any serious accident, in.any serious accident such as that postulated in
- such as that postulated in the February 13, 1986 the Exercise scenario, there would be a large vol-Exercise, there would be an extremely large number untary evacuation in response to LILCO's demon-f of people seeking monitoring at the reception strated advisories to the public.
i i
centers -- many times more than LILCO assumes --
1 l in response to an advisory to do so.
1 l
I II. Perceptions of Risk and Pre-Existing Fears (pages 26-41)
I j A. Pre-Existing Fears Measured by Surveys and Focus Groups (pages 26-36) a at page 26: at pages 168-69:
Q. What factors will cause the response you Q. In your opinion, why would so many ,
+
[
I e
i
April 13, 1987 March 13, 1987 CSJHMS (Planning Suffolk County Testimony Basis) Testimony (-03) On Contentions EX 38 and 39 (-05) anticipate to a monitoring advisory, which is many people attempt to leave immediately in response to times greater than what LILCO assumes? LILCO's EBS No. 1, rather than waiting to see how the accident developed or waiting for an instruc-j tion to evacuate?
A. (Saegert, Johnson) The most important A. (Cole, Saegert, Loftus) We discuss sev-factor is the pre-existing concern about radiation eral reasons related to the specific tone and con-which exists in the public and in particular among tent of EBS No. 1 in Section 4 below. But, the residents of Long Island. Research has shown that most basic reason, as stated in subpart F of Con-1 they are very concerned about being exposed to tention Ex 22, is the pre-existing fears and per-dangerous levels of radiation in the event of an ceptions of Long Island residents. Research has accident at Shoreham and that they are likely to shown that they are very afraid of being exposed i
act on those concerns. to dangerous levels of radiation in the event of i
an accident at Shoreham.
I j at page 27: at pages 183-85:
4
[ Question same as on page 26 listed above] Q. Do any other data support the allegation
) in Contention Ex 22.F we have been discussing i
-i i
April 13, 1987 March 13, 1987 CSJHletS (Planning Suffolk County Testimony Basis) Testimony (-03)
On Contentions EX 38 and 39 (-05)
(that voluntary evacuation would result from LILCO's Exercise EBS messages due to pre-existing fears)?
(Saegert, Johnson) The public's fear of ra- A. (Cole, Saegert, Loftus) Yes. One sur-diation, and the behavioral consequences vf that vey is describal in a paper co-authored by LILCO fear, are also describal in Dr. Lindell's Nuclear witness, Michael K. Li ndel l . The paper, entitled Safety article. While the behavior he and his " Protective Response to Technological Emergency:
colleague were investigating was evacuation, rath- Risk Perception and Behavioral Intention," by M.
er than monitoring-seeking, the two behaviors have K. Lindell and V. E. Barnes, was published in the some similar roots. October-December 1986 issue of the journal Nuclear Safety.
The authors found that the results of their study The authors conclude that the results of are consistent with those conducted by Slovic et their study are consistent with those of risk per-al. "in determining how negatively radiation haz- ception studies such as those of Slovic et al. "in ard is viewed." M., at 464. Thus, they conclud- demonstrating how negatively radiation hazard is ed, it is pre-existing attitudes toward a hazard viewed."
. _ . ~ _ _ _ . ._. _ - _- .
April 13, 1987 March 13, 1987 CSJHMS (Planning Suffolk County Testimony Basis) Testimony (-03) On Contentions EX 38 and 39 (-05)
-- in this case, radiation released during an ac-cident -- that is the most important cause of * *
- overresponse or evacuation shadow. The same fear Rather, their data lead thern to believe that of radiation will also be the primary factor caus- it is attitudes toward the hazard -- radiation re-ing hundreds of thousanals of people to attempt to leased during an accident -- that is the most in-be monitored in the event of a Shoreham accident. portant cause of overresponse or evacuation shad-ow.
at page 28-29: at pages 281-82:
(Harris, Mayer) Our experience in the pub- (Harris, Mayer) Our experience in the pub-lic health field also demonstrates that in a lic health field demonstrates that, given the Shoreham accident a substantial portion of the events during the LILCO Exercise, a substantial population would voluntarily report for testing, portion of the population would voluntarily report even it such persons had no scientific or objec- for testing, even if such persons had no scientif-tive basis for assuming they had been exposed to ic or objective basis for assuming they had been radiological particulates. Radiation is colorless exposed to radiological particulates. Radiation and odorless. Therefore, it is impossible for is colorless and odorless. Therefore, it is
1 l April 13, 1987 March 13, 1987 CSJilMMS (Planning Suffolk County Testimony Basi s t Testimony (-03)
On Contentions EX 38 and 39 (-05) people to determine on their own whether they have inpossible for people to determine on their own been exposed to radiation. We also know that the whether they have been exposed to radiation. We public has a greater f ear of radiation than of al- also know that the public has a greater fear of most any other hazard. This f ear, coupled with radiation than of almost any other hazard. This the fact that one cannot determine without moni- fear, coupled with the fact that one cannot deter-toring whether one has comd ih contact with radia- mine without monitoring whether one has come in tion, would result in people reporting to the re- contact with radiation, would result in people re-ception center to seek testing even if they were porting to the reception center to seek testing instructed not to da so. even if they were instructed not to do so.50/
l We are aware of many instances where people, 50/ We are aware of many instances where who reasonably could not have believed they were people, who reasonably could not have believed exposed . . .. they were exposed . . . .
[Next 16 lines are duplicative] [Next 16 lines are duplicative]
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l l
l April 13, 1987 March 13, 1987 -
CSJHM S (Planning Suffolk County Testimony Basis) Testimony (-03)
On Contentions EX 38 and 39 (-05) l l
at pages 29-31: at pages 171-72:
Q. Have you conducted research into the Q. Please explain (why there "would be i perceptions of local residents about radiation voluntary evacuatiore in light of ' pre-existing hazard s? preceptions and fears of Long Island residents concerning nuclear accidents. '"}
[(Cole)) . . . As a social scientist, I A. (Cole) As a social scientist, I have have long believed in the importance of long believed in the importance of integrating integrating quantitative and quali..ative research quantitative and qualitative research methods. In methods. In order to prove a particular proposi- order to prove a particular proposition, it is I tion, it is necessary to have quantitative data. necessary to have quantitative data. Qualitz.tive j
{
Qualitative data-adds a richness to quantitative data adds a richness to quantitative data that can data than can help us understand better what peo- help us understand better what people will do. It ple will do. It can, therefore, provide important can, therefore, provide important insight into the insight into the reasons behind some of our find- reasons behind some of our findings from systemat-ings from systematic quantitative research. ic quantitative research.
In order to understand better the essential- So, in order to understand better the essen-ly quantitative answers given by the sample of tially quantitative answers given by the sample of
April 13, 1987 March 13, 1987 CSJHPets (Planning Suffolk County Testimony Basis) Testimony (-03) On Contentions EX 38 and 39 (-05)
Long Island residents who responded to the survey, Long Island residents who responded to the survey, I conducted some qualitative group interviews, I conducted some qualitative group interviews,
- sometimes callal " focus groups." Perhaps one of sometimes calla! " focus groups." Perhaps one of the most important conclusions to be drawn f rom an the most important conclusions to be drawn f rom an analysis of the transcripts of the focus groups is analysis of the transcripts of the focus groups is that Long Island residents have a deep-seated fear that the EBS messages preparat by LILCO and used i of being exposal to radiation releasal during an during the Exercise bring out deep-seated fear of accident at Shoreham. This fear is held by a sig- being exposed to radiation released during an ac-nificant segment of the Long Island population. cident at Shoreham, a fear which is held by a sig-Although it may be alleged that this fear rray be nificant segment of the Long island population.
based on misinformation, it is real nonetheless. Although it may be allegal that this f ear may be based on misinformation, it is real nonetheless. . . .
The transcripts of the focus groups suggest The transcripts of the focus groups suggest that strongly that fear of radiation is the primary fear of radiation may be the primary reason why so reason why so many people told us in our systemat- many people told us in our systematic survey that ic survey that they would attempt to seek they would attempt to evacuate af the accident
.__ _ m April 13, 1987 Mhrch 13, 1987 CSJ1119tS (Planning Basis) Testimony (-03) Suffolk County Testimony On Contentions EX 38 and 39 (-05) monitoring if there was a LILCO advisory that mon- postulated in the Exercise were real and LILCO re-itoring was necessary, even if such pecple were sponded with the EBS messages it prepared for use not within the scope of LILCO's advisory, during the Exercise.
at pages 31-32:
, at pages 72-74 [duplicative but not stricken):
Q. Could you please describe the procedures Q. Could you please describe the proce-which were followed in conducting the focus dures which were following in conducting the focus groups? groups?
A. (Cole) I conducted three focus groups A. (Cole) I conducted three focus groups with participants living both inside the EPZ and with participants living both inside the EPZ and
- those living in Suffolk County but outside the those living in Suffolk County but outside the EPZ.l_7/ EPZ. . . .
When the participants arrived, they were escorted When the participants arrived, they were es-into a conference room where I greeted them. The corted into a conference room where I greeted respondents were first given a one page question- them. The respondents wue first given a one-page naire in which they were asked to give their opin- questionnaire in which they were asked to give ion on Shoreham and a few demographic their opinion on Shoreham and a few demographic l
1 i
April 13, 1987 March 13, 1987 CSJHMS (Planning Suffolk County Testimony Ba si s ) Testimony (-03)
On Contentions EX 38 and 39 (-05) characteristics. I told the respondents that we characteristics. A tabulation of these results is were interested in how they would react if the presented in Attachment 16 hereto. I told the re-Shoreham nuclear plant was put on line and sane- spondents that we were interested in how they thing was to happen at the plant. I explained would react if the Shoreham nuclear plant was put that I would be playing a series of tape recorded on line and something was to happen at the plant.
messages and we would then be discussing them. I I told them I would be playing a series of tape then played for them the full text of some of the recorded messages and we would then be discussing EBS messages issued by LILCO during LILCO's them. I asked ther to imagine that they were at February 13, 1986 exercise. Between each message, home on a weekday morning and af ter getting up at there were discussions regarding the participants' 7:00 a.m. they turned on the radio and heard the perceptions and attitudes about a Shoreham acci- following message. They were asked to assume that dent, and how they would react to the messages. this was not a test but a real event . We then played a recording of the full test of the first EBS message prepared by LILCO, and simulated to be broadcast at 6:52 during the Exercise. After a discussion of that message, other EBS messages prepared during the Exercise (Nos. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6,
April 13, 1987 March 13, 198/
CSJHM4S (Planning Suffolk County Testimony Basis) Testimony (-03)
On Contentions EX 38 and 39 (-05)
- 7) were also played and discussed. The discussion of the three focus groups were tape recorded aad then transcribed, at pages 31-32, footnote 17: at pages 172-173 [duplicative but not stricken]:
17/ The first group had a mixture of these peo- The first group had a mixture of these people; the ple; the second had primarily pers,ons living out- second had primarily persons living outside but side but not far from the EPZ; and the third had a not far from the EPZ; and the third had a majority majority who lived inside the EPZ, with some liv- who lived inside the EPZ, with some living outside ing outside but on the border. In order to re- but on the border. In order to recruit the mem-cruit the members of the focus groups, we draw a bers of the focus groups, we drew a random sample random sample of telephone numbers from the ex- of telephone numbers from the exchanges in the EPZ 1
- changes in the EPZ and in Suffolk County bordering and in Suf folk County bordering the EPZ. These 4
the EPZ. These telephone numbers were drawn in telephone numbers were drawn in the same manner as the same manner as were those utilized in the sys- were those utilitzed in the systematic survey.
tematic survey. Experiencert telephone Experienced telephone interviewers were used to
April 13, 1987 March 13, 1987 CSJHMMS (Planning Ba si s ) Testimony (-03)
Suffolk County Testimony On Contentions EX 38 and 39 (-05) interviewers were used to recruit the partici- recruit the participants. The interviewers fol-pants.
Iowed a protocol which is Attachment 15.32/
f at page 32, footnote 17 cont.:
at page 173, footnote 32 [duplicative but not stricken]:
Since the analysis of the survey data showed 32/ Since the analysis of the survey data showed that attitudes toward Shoreham were a very signif- that attitudes toward Shoreham were a very signif-icant determinant of how one would respond to a icant determinate of how one would respond to a radiological emergency, we tried to have the com- radiological emergency, we tried to have the com-position of the focus groups represent the compo- position of the focus groups represent the compo-sition of the population of the areas from which sition of the population ot the areas from which they were drawn on this crucial question. Because they were drawn on this crucial question. Because in the area from which were drawing the group par- in the area from which we were drawing the group ticipants more than 70% of the population is op- participants more than 70% of the population is posed to the opening of the Shoreham plant, we opposed to the opening of the Shoreham plant, we made a special effort to recruit pro-Shoreham par- made a special effort to recruit pro-Shoreham par-ticipants, turning down potential participants who ticipants, turning down potential participants who
e April 13, 1987 March 13, 1987 CSJHMMS (Planning Suffolk County Testimony Basis) Testimony (-03) On Contentions EX 38 and 39 (-05) were anti-Shoreham in order to find pro-Shoreham were anti-Shoreham in order to find pro-Shoreham participants, participants.
at pages 33-34: at pages 174-75 [duplicative but not stricken]:
Q. Have you analyzed the focus group Q. llave you analyzed the focus group transcripts? transcripts?
A. (Cole, Saegert, Johnson) Yes, we A. (Cole, Saegert, Loftus) Yes, we have.
have. They support our testimony that there is a They provide additional support for the allega-deep-seated fear of radiation -- and the conse- tions in Contention Ex 22 subpart F, that there quences of a Shoreham accident -- on Long Island would be a substantial voluntary evacuation, in which would result in a large number of people the event of a real Shoreham accident, in response seeking monitoring even though not advised to do to the EBS messages used by LILCO during that Ex-so. ercise, as a result of the public's pre-existing perceptions and fears, the contents of the EBS messages, and LILCO's lack of credibility.
April 13, 1987 March 13, 1987 CSJHPets (Planning Suffolk County Testimony Basis) Testimony (-03) On Contentions EX 38 and 39 (-05)
Q. Please explain how the focus group Q. Please explain, first, how the focus data demonstrate that pre-existing perceptions and group data support the Contention Ex 22.F allega-fears of Long Island residents oncerning nuclear tion that " pre-existing perceptions and fears of accidents would cause far more people to seek mon- Long Island residents concerning nuclear acci-itoring that LILCO a::,sumes. dents" would cause voluntary evacuation if LILCO's response demonstrated during the Exercise were to occur with respect to a real Shoreham accident.
A. (Cole, Saegert, Johnson) The focus A. (Cole, Saegert, Loftus) The focus groups showed that some Long Islanders believe groups showed that some Long Islanders believe that if there is any accident at Shoreham, they that if there is any accident at Shoreham, they 2
will be exposed to radiation. In general, and will be exposed to radiation. In general as consistent with the findings of LILCO's witness, LILCO's former witness Barnett also found in his Dr . Lindell, most Long Island residents would not research, Long Island residents frequently do not base their assessment of risk on such objective base their assessment of risk on either the amount factors as the amount of radiation they have been of radiation they have been exposed to or the du-exposed to or the duration of that exposure. In ration of that exposure. In their view, exposure their view, exposure from an accident at a nuclear from an accident at a nuclear power plant to any
April 13, 1987 March 13, 1987 CSJil>945 (Planning Suffolk County Testimony Basis) Testimony (-03) On Contentions EX 38 and 39 (-05) power plant to any amount of radiation for an
_ amount of radiation for any length of time is dan-length of time is dangerous and potentially even gerous and potentially even lethal. One woman who lethal. Indeed, for many, the fact that there has lives in the shadow of the Shoreham plant, when been an accident means to them that they have al- asked what she would do after hearing the first ready been exposal. EBS message used by LILCO during the Exercise, replied:
I live a half a mile east of the plant and I think I would make a nice gin and tonic. I figure I have been exposed anxi I would just
, sit it out. Focus Group # 1, held on January 20, 1987.
at page 34: at page 177 [duplicative but not stricken):
Bele' are some of the comments elicited from After hearing EBS No. 2, a participant stat-the focus group participants ed:
I l
4
April 13, 1987 March 13, 1987 CSJHMMS (Planning Ba si s ) Testimony (-03)
Suffolk County Testimony On Contentions EX 38 and 39 (-05)
I think today that we don't live in any area I think today that we don't live in any area that is isolated from others, and we don't that is isolated from others, and we don't have buffer zones. We may be injured by a have buffer zones. We may be injured by a nuclear power plant in. Wisconsin or Ohio, nuclear power plant in Wisconsin or Ohio, and to just base a decision on whether we and to just base a decision on whether we live near LILCO or not may not be the wisest live near LILCO or not may not be the wisest thing to do. I have to agree with this gen- thing to do. I have to agree with this gen-tieman that when ! heard the second report tieman that when I heard the second report
[EBS message # 2 ] I would already believe [EBS # 2] I aould already believe that I was 1
that I was affected by it and I am never af fect ed by it and I am never going to out-going to outrun the winds that will take this radiation away.
run the winds that will take this radiation away. (# 2)
In another focus group af ter hearing the i
second EBS message, a tespondent said:
I feel that if I didn't die in the next six months, I would definitely die of it in the I feel that if I didn't die in the next six months, I would definitely die of it in the next five years. next five years. (# 2)
Another said:
One of my worries would be that perhaps I One of my worries would be that perhaps I 4 had already lost my life and just didn't had already lost my life and just didn't know it. There is a certain time delay be- know it. There is a certain time delay be-tween this release of radiation by the time tween this release of radiation by the time all consultations were made and got out to all consultations were made and got out to all the radio stations, I may have already all the radio stations, I may have already been exposed to radioactivity. We may in been exposed to radioactivity. We may in fact be walking dead already. I just don't fact be walking dead already. I just don't know. know. (# 2)
April 13, 1987 March 13, 1987 CSJHPetS (Planning Suffolk County Testimony Basis) Testimony (-03)
On Contentions EX 38 and 39 (-05) at pages 35-36: at page 177 [duplicative but not stricken):
These statements and many others in the These statements illustrate well the atti-transcripts illustrate well the attitudes of many tudes of many Long Island residents who partici-Long Island resident s who participatal in the pated in the focus groups and, we imagine, who an-focus groups and, we believe, who answered the swered the-larger survey. Once an accident has larger survey. Once an accident has occurred at occurred at Shoreham and some (any) radiation has 3
Shoreham, and especially if any radiation has been been released, they believe that their lives are releasal, they will believe that their lives are in grave danger.
in grave danger.2_0/ Acting in accordance with I
their fears and beliefs, they will seek monitoring to determine whether they have been exposed to radiation.
at page 35, footnote 20: at pages 178-180:
20/ Q. Did all the participants in the focus Q. Did all the participants in the focus groups have a deep f ear of exposure to radiation groups have a fear of exposure to radiation from from an accident at Shoreham? an accident at Shoreham?
April 13, 1987 March 13, 1987 CSJHP94S (Planning Basis) Testimony (-03) Suffolk County Testimony On Contentions EX 38 and 39 (-05)
A. (Cole, Saegert, Johnson) No. Some of A. (Cole, Saegert, Loftus) No. Some of 4
the participants expresscd the opinion that the the participants expressed the opinion that the amount of radiation being released from Shoreham amount of radiation being released from Shoreham 1
during the hypothetical accident might not be so during the hypothetical accident might not be so great as to kill and that indeed they might be great as to kill and that indeed they might be able to protect themselves by sheltering. So, not able to protect themselves by sheltering. So, not all of the respondents had a strong fear of radia- all of the respondents had a strong fear of radia-tion; but a majority did. And insofar as we can tion; but a majority did. And insofar as we can tell f rom studies such as that conducted by tell from studies such as that conducted by Slovic, et al., this is true in the general popu- Slovic, et al., this is true in the general popu- '
s lation. lation.
at pages 34-35: at page 283:
Below are some of the comments elicited from Here are some additional examples of state-I the focus group participants af ter hearing various ments from focus groups respondents, expressing of the LILCO EBS messages which ranged from simply their fears over the long term effects of a advising the public of an accident at the Shoreham Shoreham accident, which would in our opinion, plant, to advising evacuation and monitoring for lead them to seek monitoring:
people in specific EPZ subzones.
j
April 13, 1987 March 13, 1987 CSJH1945 (Planning Suffolk County Testimony Ba si s ) Testimony (-03)
On Contentions EX 38 and 39 (-05)
With nuclear power, we are dealing with an With nuclear power, we are dealing with an
, entity that we don ' t know that much about. entity that we don't know that inuch about.
As f ar as the danuges f rom radiation, and so As f ar as the damages f rom radiation, and so on. My cousin when she was little was ex- on. My cousin when she was little was ex-posed to radiation and twenty years later posed to radiation and twenty years later she had cancer f the thyroid. she had cancer of the thyroid. (# 3)
You don't have u worry about shopping be- You don't have to worry about shopping be-cause they wouldn' t let you out with any cause they wouldn't let you out with any food. No matter what it was. If it is food. No matter what it was. If it is within the evacuation area, it is within the evacuation area, it is contaminat al . Where is this reception cen- contaminated. Where is this reception cen-ter? Who is going to welcome you with open ter? Who is going to welcome you with open arms? arms? (# 1)
I always think about the long term effects. I always think about the long term effects.
The water supply, the animals, t he g ra ss , The water supply, the animals, the grass, the potatoes, all of it. I do not know if the potatoes, all of it. I do not know if
s e
_ April 13, 1987 March 13, 1987 CSJHDMS (Planning Suffolk County Testimony Basis) Testimony (-03) On Contentions EX 38 and 39 (-05) 1 it happened if I would ever come back. it happened if I would ever come back. (#
1)
Even if you were able to would you be happy Even if you were able to would you be happy coming back? I wouldn't. Look at Three coming back? I wouldn't. Look at Three Mile Island and that was a minor situation. Mile Island and that was a minor situation.
Chernobyl is going to be closed for 1500 Chernobyl is going to be closed for 1500.
years. Something on that style. years. Something on that style. (# 1) 4 I
B. Effects of Chernobyl on Pre-Existing Fears (pages 36-41)
I at page 36: at pages 283-84:
A. (Saegert, Johnson) Without a doubt. In In the event of a real emergency, people now the event of a real emergency, people now have the would also have the example of Chernobyl to inten-
]
4 example of Chernobyl to intensify their fears. sify their f ears. As we discussed in the section The Chernobyl incident -- and its after etfects -- of our testimony relating to matters raised in
, were widely publicized.21/ People know that far Contention Ex 22.F, the Chernobyl incident -- and I more than the area 10 miles from the Chernobyl its after-effects -- were widely publicized.
i i
1
April 13, 1987 March 13, 1987 CSJHMMS (Planning Suffolk County Testimony Ba si s ) Testimony (-03)
On Contentions EX 38 and 39 (-05) plant was contaminata1. In fact, the incident was People know that far more than the area 10 miles made public by the Soviet Union only after in- from the Chernobyl plant was contaminated. In j creased radiation levels were detected by scien- fact, the incident was made public by the Soviet
)
tists in Sweden. Radiat ion f rom Chernobyl af f ect- Union only after increased radiation levels were l
ed crops and anirrals as far away as Scotland, detect ed by scientists in Sweden. Radiation from Lapland and Turkey. The example of Chernobyl Chernobyl af fect ed crops and animals as far away would give people far outside the EPZ -- as well as Scotland, Lapland and Turkey. The example of as people in the EPZ who had not been advised to Chernobyl would give people far outside the EPZ --
so do -- a basis for determining that they should as well as people in the EPZ who had not been ad-seek monitoring. vised to so do -- a rational basis for determining to seek monitoring, at pages 36-37, footnote 21: at page 284, footnote 52:
21/ Headlines such as "Chernobyl Doses Across 52 Headlines such as "Chernobyl Doses Across Con-Continent" and maps have appeared in magazines and tinent" and maps have appeared in magazines and newspapers showing half of Europe as contaminated. newspapers showing half of Europe as contaminated.
Subsequent to the Chernobyl accident, newspapers Subsequent to the Chernobyl accident, newspapers have carried predictions and vivid descriptions of have carried predictions and gruesome descriptions potential cancers resulting from exposure. A year of potential cancers resulting f rom exposure. A af ter the Chernobyl accident, one headline read year af ter the Chernobyl accident, one headline
April 13, 1987 March 13, 1987 CSJilt945 (Planning Suffolk County Testimony Basis) Testimony (-03)
On Contentions EX 38 and 39 (-05)
"After Chernobyl, Birth Defects Low but Retarda- read "After Chernobyl, Birth Defects Low but Re-tion High." Pictures in Life magazine of the vic- tardation High." Pictures in Life magazine of the tims create terrifying and vivid images. victims create terrifying and vivid images.
Hohenemser, C., Deicher, M., Ernst, A., llofsass, flohenemser, C. , Deicher, M., Ernst, A., Hofsass, H., Linder, G., Recknagel, R. (1986) Chernobyl: H., Linder, G. , Recknagel, R. (1986). Chernobyl:
An early report, Environment 28(5), Washington, An early report. Envi ronn en t . 28(5), Washington, D.C.: Heldref Publications, 6-30. D.C.: lleldref Publications, 6-30.
at pages 37-39: at pages 265-67:
Q. Does the public believe that an acci- Q. Does the public believe that an acci-dent such as that which occurred at Chernobyl dent such as that which occurred at Chernobyl could happen at Shoreham? could happen at Shoreham?
A. (Cole) Yes. The first evidence comes A. (Cole) The answer is an unequivocal from a survey conducted for Newsday in September yes. The first evidence comes from the survey of 1986. The Newsday survey asked the following conducted for Newsday in September of 1986. The question: Newsday survey asked the following question:
Several months ago there was a serious acci- Several months ago there was a serious acci-dent at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant in dent at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant in the Soviet Union. Do you think that a seri- the Soviet Union. Do you think that a seri-ous accident like this could happen in the ous accident like this could happen in the United States? United States?
a l
April 13, 1987 March 13, 1987 CSJitMMS (Planning Suffolk County Testimony Basis) Testimony (-03) i On Contentions EX 38 and 39 (-05)
Eighty-two percent of the sample of Long Is- Fully 82 percent of the sample of Long Is-land residents said. . . .
land residents said. . . .
[next 42 lines are duplicative] [next 41 lines are duplicative]
. . . as a result of f ear generated by the . . . as a result of f ear generated by the accident at the Chernobyl nuclear plant in the So- accident at the Chernobyl nuclear plant in the So-viet Union.22/ Likewise, this greater concern is viet Union.12/
likely to cause an increase in the number of peo-ple who would seek monitoring in the event of a Shoreham emergency.
at page 39, footnote 22: at page 267, f ootnote 47:
22/ When I cross-tabulated the responses to the 47 When I cross tabulated the responses to the l question on whether they thought an accident like question on whether they thought an accident like Chernobyl could happen here with behavioral inten- Chernobyl could happen here with behavioral inten-tions, I found that. . . . tions, I found that. . . .
[ rest of footnote is duplicative] [ rest of f ootnote is duplicative)
April 13, 1987 March 13, 1987 CSJHP9tS (Planning Suffolk County Testimony Ba si s ) Testirmny (-03)
On Corstentions EX 38 and 39 (-05) at pages 39-41: at pages 267-70:
The most recent survey I conducted for The most recent survey I conducted for Suffolk County also contained questions concerning Suffolk County also contained a few questions con-the Chernobyl accident. The great majority of cerning the Chernobyl accident. The great majori-Long Island residents were f amiliar with that ac- ty of Long Island residents were familiar with cident at Chernobyl. All respondents were asked that accident at Chernobyl . . . . All respondents the following question: were asked the following question:
[next 47 lines are duplicative}' [next 47 lines are duplicative) at page 41: at page 270:
In summary, the pre-existing fears which The pre-existing fears which Long Islanders Long Islanders have of radiation, which the above have of radiation, which fears have been exacer-J .
excerpts demonstrate have been exacerbatal by bated by Chernobyl, would further increase the Chernobyl, will result in a massive number of peo- tendency for Long islanders to evacuate in re-i ple converging on LILCO's reception centers for sponse to LILCo's demonstratal EBS messages.48/
the purpose of being monitored in the event of an accident at Shoreham.
l
April 13, 1987 March 13, 1987 CSJHbMS (Planning Suffolk County Testimony Basis) Testimony (-03) On Contentions EX 38 and 39 (-05)
III. The Effects of Emergency Information (pages 41-47)
A. EBS Messages (pages 41-44) at page 42: at page 277:
[Concerning the "Effect of Emergency (Concerning Contention EX 49.C on the number 4
Information") of people who would seek monitoring although not so advised]
(Saegart, Johnson) No. First, as we have First, as we have discussed in the section discussed above, people have a strong fear of ra- of our testimony on Contention Ex 22.F (above),
diation. We have examined the EBS messages in people have a tremendous fear of radiation. The LILCO's Plan and those " broadcast" by LILCO during EBS messages " broadcast" by LILCO during the Exer-the February 13 exercise. They do nothing to calm cise do nothing to calm this f ear, or to explain t
this fear, or to explain why only some people why only some people might have been contaminated, might have been contaminated. In fact, the con- In fact, the contents of the EBS messages them-tents of the EBS messages themselves would proba- selves would probably lead people to seek moni-bly lead people to seek monitoring.23/ toring.
at page 42, footnote 23: at pages 277-78:
April 13, 1987 March 13, 1987 CSJHMMS (Planning Suffolk County Testimony Basis) Testimony (-03)
On Contentions EX 38 and 39 (-05) 23/ For instance, in one such message used dur- As we pointed out above, Exercise EBS Mes-ing the Exercise it is stated that a " major re- sage No. 7, which purports to give information lease of radiation into the air" occurred at about dose rates, is unclear, full of unintelligi-12:00, and then gives thyroid does rates as "per- ble jargon, and fear inducing. The message states centages" -- 400%, 100% and 40% -- of EPA "evacua- that a " major release of radiation into the air" tion guidelines." There is no attempt. . . . occurred at 12:00, and then gives thyroid does rates as " percentages" -- 400%, 100% and 40% -- of
[next 19 lines are duplicative] EPA " evacuation guidelines." There is no at-tempt. ...
[next 19 lines are duplicative]
at pages 42-43: at page 279 [duplicative but not stricken]:
Second, some people will focus only on the Second, some people might focus just on the parts of EBS messages stating that the public will parts of EBS 8 and 8.1 stating that "the public" be monitored for possible radioactive will be monitored for possible radioactive decontamination, or may have been exposed to decontamination, or on the part of EBS 8.1
April 13, 1987 March 13, 1987 CSJH19tS (Planning Suffolk County Testimony
_Ba_ si s ) Testimony (-03) On Contentions EX 38 and 39 (-05) radiation during their trip out of the EPZ, with- mentioning that "they may have been exposed to ra-out focusing on the portion of the message intend- diation during their trip out of the EPZ," without ed to limit the size or location of the public focusing on the portion of the message intended to which may have been exposed. This is because some limit the size or location of "the public" which people under stress, as Long Island residents may have been exposed.
surely would be during an accident, often have trouble comprehending and processing spatial in-formation.
Third, even people who understand. . . . Third, even people who understood. . ..
i (next 15 lines are duplicative] [next 15 lines are duplicative]
B. Credibility 1
at page 44: at pages 249-50:
Finally, LILCO's messages that people out- LILCO's own witness Michael LindelI has con-side a particular zone would be safe are li' cly to cluded that the allegation in Contention Ex 22.F 4
be discounted by the public due to LILCO's low which we are now discussing, is true. Thus, credibility. As LILCO's witness Dr. Lindell has Lindell and Darnes conclude:
i i stated:
i
4 April 13, 1987 March 13, 1987 CSJHMS (Planning Suffolk County Testimony Basis) Testimony (-03)
On Contentions EX 38 and 39 (-05)
The gap between accurate information and the . . . The gap between accurate information achievement of compliance with recommended and the achievement of compliance with rec-actions should be recognized as a large one. ommended actions should be recognized as a l Persont must attend to, comprehend, yield large one. Persons must attend to, compre-to, and retain information before they can hend, yield to, and retain information be-act on it. The yielding is likely to occur fore they can act on it. The yielding is only if the source of the information is likely to occur only if the source of the considered credible. information is considered credible.
Lindell and Barnes, at 466.
at page 44: at page 224:
It is well known, and admitted by LILCO, A. (Cole) First, it is well known, and that LILCO has a low degree of credibility in the granted by LILCO, that LILCO does have low credi-Long Island community. We will not repeat at bility in the Long Island community. We will not length here the evidence on that subject discussed repeat at length here the evidence on that subject in the prior litigation.2_4/ In addition, however, discussed in the prior litigation.39 In addition, more recent surveys and other data have confirmed however, more recent surveys and other data, ref-that fact. Between 1982 and December 1986, there erenced in Contention Ex 22.F, have confirmed that has been little change in the credibility afforded fact. Thus, between 1982 and December 1986, there by Long Island residents to LILCO.25/ has been little change in the credibility afforded by Long Island residents to LILCO.
r April 13, 1987 March 13, 1987 CSJHPMS (Planning Suffolk County Testimony Basis) Testimony (-03)
On Contentions EX 38 and 39 (-05) at page 44, footnote 24: at page 224, footnote 39:
24/ In the 1982 survey conducted for Suffolk 3_9/ In the 1982 survey conducted for Suffolk County, we found only 4 percent of the population County, we found only 4 percent of the population of Long Island said that they would trust a LILCO of Long Island said that they would trust a LILCO official to tell the truth about an accident at official to tell the truth about an accident at Shoreham, 36 percent said that they would trust a Shoreham, 36 percent said that they would trust a LILCO official "somewhat," and 58 percent said LILCO of ficial "somewhat," and 58 percent said that they would not trust a LILCO official at all that they would not trust a LILCO official at all (2 percent had no opinion). (2 percent had no opinion),
at pages 44-45, footnote 25: at pages 224-25:
25/ (Cole) In my most recent survey, only eight In my most recent survey, eight p rcent of percent of the respondents said that they would the respondents said they wc.uld trust a LILCO of-trust a LILCO official "a great deal" to tell the ficial "a great deal" to tell the truth about an truth about an accident at Shoreham. Thirty-nine accident at Shoreham. Thirty-nine percent said percent said "somewhat," and 50 percent said not "somewhat," and 50 percent said not at all. Two at all. Two percent had no opinion. percent had no opinion.
When asked whether they would believe LILCO * *
- if its [ sic] stated during an accident that all This survey question is based on LILCO's repeated people more than 10 miles from the Shoreham plant statement in the EBS message prepared and used
April 13, 1987 March 13, 1987 CSJHMMS (Planning Suffolk County Testimony Ba si s) Testimony (-03) On Contentions EX 38 and 39 (-05) were saf e, only 18 percent of the respondents said during the Exercise, that there was no need for that they would believe LILCO on this crucial people outside the 10 mile zone to take any ac-point; 77 percent said that they would not believe tion. Only 18 percent of the respondents said LILCO, and 6 percent said that they did not know that they would believe LILCO on this crucial whether they would believe LILCO. point; 77 percent said that they would not believe LILCO, and 6 percent said that they did not now
[ sic] whether they would believe LILCO.
at pages 45-46: at pages 280-81:
(Cole, Saegert, Johnson) The focus group (Cole, Saegert, Loftus) Indeed, the focus
- data also support our testimony that people would group data support this analysis that people would i
not accept instructions f rom LILCO that only por- not accept as valid instructions from LILCO that
. tions of the population had been endangered or ex- only portions of the population has been endan-1 posed.26/ gered or exposed:
26/ "Did you believe [the] LILCO [EBS mes- "Did you believe [the] LILCO [EBS message]
sage] that if you were outside that zone that you that if you were outside that zone that you weren't in any danger?" weren't in any danger?"
e April 13, 1987 March 13, 1987 CSJHMMS (Planning Basis) Testimony (-03)
Suffolk County Testimony On Contentions EX 38 and 39 (-05)
[next 28 lines are duplicative] [next 28 lines are duplicative]
at page 46: at pages 284-85:
j Q. If LILCO has such low credibility, why Q. If LILCO has such low credibility as you i
would people -- indeed more than advised to do so have discussed, why would people ignore LILCO's
- go to reception centers run by LILCO to be mon- instructions concerning evacuation but listen to itored?
its instructions concerning monitoring for possi-ble radioactive contamination?
A. (Cole, Saegert, Johnson) If LILCO were A. (Cole, Saegert) If LILCO were to tell to tell Long Island residents during an accident Long Island residents during an accident at at Shoreham that they are in no danger, LILCO Shoreham that they are in no danger, LILCO would would be saying something that, as the data show, be saying something that the public would ini-the public would initially disbelieve. However, tially disbelieve and which the public would be-I if LILCO were to tell members of the public that lieve is in LILCO's self-interest. If LILCO were they should be monitored for radioactive contami- to tell members of the public that they should be i
nation, it would be telling them something that monitored for radioactive contamination, it would
April 13, 1987 March 13, 1987 CSJHP94S (Planning Suffolk County Testimony Basis) Testimony (-03)
On Contentions EX 38 and 39 (-05) they would be likely to believe, because it would be telling them something that they would be like-1 be consistent with their own beliefs. During a ly to believe, because it would be consistent with l real Shoreham accident many members of the public their own beliefs. During a real Shoreham acci-would be frightened that they had been exposed to dent many members of the public would be desper-potentially harmful doses. Thus, they will at- ately frightened that they had been exposed to po-tempt to be monitored -- in much higher numbers tentially harmful doses. If LILCO offered them a than LILCO assumes. place to have that level checked, those who could 1 get to that place would attempt to do so.
I 1
1
Attactunint 2 e
available roadway capacity has not been accurately portrayed. The buses will also be making frequent stops, in some cases on designated evacuation routes, blocking the lane for at least some time. Finally, in many cases buses and ambulances will be moving in directions contrary to the evacuating traffic, creating conflicting flow. Id.; Herr, ff. Tr. 2909, at 45-46.
558.
Mr. Lieberman and Dr. Urbanik took the position that the pres-ence of special vehicles would have an insignificant effect on evacuation times since their numbers are small relative to the numbers of private ve-hicles. Cordaro et al. (Contention 65), ff. Tr. 2337, at 91; Crbanik, ff.
Tr. 3430, at 14. But this meets only part of the concern addressed by Con-tention 65.E. The special vehicles on the evacuation network will often be ,
traveling in directions contrary to evacuation flows, thus causing delays and interruptions in those flows that have not been, but should be, re-flected in LILCO's time estimates.
12.
The Effect of Stress (Contention 65.F) 559.
Contention 65.F asserts that LILCO's time estimates de not take into account the presence of stress in drivers that can impede their abili-ty to operate, thus leading to increased evacuation times. Professor Saegert testified that during a radiological emergency, the health-threatening conditions that the public may perceive to exist will produce stress and anxiety that will, among other things, affect the behavior and performance of drivers seeking '.) esacuate. Stress levels are likely to be I
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r f
significantly higher during a radiological emergency than in other types of emergencies because of the public's heightened fear of radiation.311/ Con-ditions on Long Island, where the EPZ cover:s much of the width of the is-land, where there cannot be a 360 degree dispersal of traffic, and where the roadway capacity is limited, are like'ly to increase stress and anxiety.
Tr. 2328-29 (McGuire). Stress on the part of evacuees is also likely to be
\ <
aggravated by mistrust of the warning mess' ages and information disseminated by LILCO. Evacuees are likely not to believe LILCO's emergency information because of LILCO's low credibility with tha public. Saegert, ff. Tr. 2259, at 8-9; see also findings on Contentions 15 (Section II.B) atd 23 (Section I.A).
560.
Drs. Mileti and Sorensen testified for LILCO that a radiological emergency will indeed increase stress and anxiety. But in their opinion, this may increase rather than decrease vigilance and therefore result in better driving skills.389/ Dr. Mileti acknowledged, however, that if driv-ing skills and driver awareness decreased under stress, the consequence would be an increase in traffic accidents. Cordaro et al., ff. Tr. 1470, at 135.
t.
311/ This has been amply demonstrated by studies conducted by Slovic, Lichtenstein and Fischoff and confirmed by the actual behavior at TMI and surveys taken on Long Island. Saegert, ff. Tr. 2259, at 3, 6-7; Tr. 2287-91 (Saegert); see also findings on Contention 23 (Section I.A).
319/ Dr. Mileti conducted a study of the TMI accident that failed to sug-gest an increased incidence of automobile > accidents following the accident. Cordaro et al., ff. Tr. 1470, at 130-32. Professor Saegert testified, however, that Dr. Mileti's data were very weak. Tr. 2300 (Saegert). I r
,i
-381-4 y - - - - - - - - _ _ - . _ _ ._ , , - , .n.. _ - - . -,-_-,,,y -r v -
--,s -- m--- -r-ww--- - -
Y 561. We are unable to accept the opinions of LILCO's witnesses. Good driving on congested roads clearly requires concentration and attention to other drivers' speed, direction, and behavior. Drivers who are stressed and anxious will tend to focus on getting to their destinations and may ig-nore what other people are doing. Misjudgments may lead to wrong turns and accidents, thus causing delay. As Professors Herr and Saegert testified, studies of driver stress present clear empirical findings that stress, such as will result from a Shoreham emergency, reduces a driver's information pecesssing capacity, which translates into reduced ability to operate an hatt unt i.le ef ficiently. Herr, ff. Tr. 2909, at 47-48: Saegert, ff.
Tr , L ?.i i. at 17-18.
We conclude that the delaying effects of the stress factor u.va 1 have been included in LILCO's time estimates.390/
390/ Mr. Lieberman testified that he attempted to account for driver "un-certainty" Cordaro et by reducing roadway capacities in his model by 13*..
al. (Contention 63), ff. Tr. 2337, at 63. It is clear, however, that the 15*. capacity reduction does not reflect the effects of stress but rather the normal loss of capacity that accompanies con-gested conditions.
It is apparent that LILCO has retroactively and inappropriately attempted to stretch the purpose of the 15*. capacity l reductica f actor to cover the stressful conditions of evacuation. We agree with Professor Herr that Mr. Lieberman's 13*. reduction factor is
(
too heavily taxeo since LILCO claims that it reflects reduced capacity from congestion, reduced capacity from driver uncertainty and anxiety, and reduced capacity from the confusion caused by directing traffic contrary to traffic signals. Tr. 3003-04 (Herr); seg Plan, App. A, at III-14 through 15.
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