ML20206Q418

Safety Insp Rept 70-0025/87-01 on 870309-12 & 26.No Violations or Deviations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Mgt Organization,Operator Training & Retraining,Criticality Safety Review,Maint & Surveillance & Radiation Protection

ML20206Q418
Person / Time
Site:	07000025
Issue date:	04/10/1987
From:	Brock B, Thomas R, Zurakowski P NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V)
To:
Shared Package
ML20206Q355	List: ML20206Q350 ML20206Q418
References
70-0025-87-01, 70-25-87-1, NUDOCS 8704210399
Download: ML20206Q418 (12)

Text

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s L U. S.-NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION.

REGION V Report No. 70-25/87-01 Docket No. 70-25 License No. SNM-21

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Safeguards Group: I

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Licensee: Rockwell InternationalLCorporation Rocketdyne Division Atomics International 6633 Canoga Avenue ,

Canoga Park, California -91304 Facility Name: Headquarters Sit!e and Santa Susana Field Laboratory Inspection at: Hea'dquarters.SiteandSantaSusana'FieldLaboradory Inspection Conducted: March 9-12,.and 26, 1987 .

Inspectors: Ab./ '

< M//d /

B. L. Brock, Fuel Facilities Inspector Date Signed (AA Y Y//O/27

• P. _ Zurjakowski, Radiation Specialist 'Date igned Approved by: M 8 R. D. Thomas, Chief .

04te4igned Nuclear Materials Safety Section Summary:

Inspection on March 9-12, and 26, 1987 (Report No. 70-25/87-01)

Areas Inspected: A routine unannounced safety inspection was conducted of management organization; operator training and retraining; criticality safety; operations review; maintenance and surveillance; radiation _ protection;

-transportation / radioactive waste management /10 CFR Part 61; environmental protection; and emergency preparedness.

During this inspection, Inspection Procedures 88005, 88010,:88015, 88020, 88025, 83822, 86740/88035/84850, 88045 and 88050 were~ covered.

Results: No violations or deviations were identified in the' areas inspected.

8704210399 87o433

{DR ADOCK 07000025 PDR

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DETAILS

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1. Persons Contacted

• J. S. Mcdonald, Director, Atomics International _ 4 M. E. Remley, Director, Nuclear Safety.and Licensing

• C. J. Rozas, Director, Health, Safety and Environment ..

R.:P. Warren, Technical Skills and Development Human Resources and -

Communications

• R.'J. Tuttle, Manager, Radiation'and Nuclear Safety W.-- R. McCurnin, Manager, Nuclear Operations F. H. Badger, Health and Safety Engineer J.~.W. Rowles, Health and Safety Specialist J. D. Moore, Health and Safety Engineer. ~

3 L. E. Rodman, Senior Fire Protection Engineer (Emergency Coordinator)

E. Martini, Senior Instructor B. Daies, Training Specialist-

! D. Harrison, Staff Chemical Engineer E. L. Babcock, Assistant Manager,' Rockwell International-Hot Laboratory C. Nealy, Member Technical Staff D. Parker, Shift Leader . .

F. E. Begley, Health and Safety Specialist Respiratory Protection

J. A. Chapman, Health and Environmental Safety Specialist D. C. Campbell,' Member, Technical Staff D. J. Elliott, Assistant Manager, Hot Cell Operations

• Denotes those attending the exit meeting.

2. Management Organization and Controls Section 9 of NRC License SNM-21 incorporates Part 1 of the licensee's application and supplements dated October.29 and December. 17, 1982, March 2,-7, May 29 and June 12, 1984 as license conditions.

A. Organizational Structure

^

Se~ction 11.3 of the license. application requires >certain organizational divisions of responsibility to provide a check and balance system in the important areas of plant safety.

The licensee's organizational structure remains unchanged since the revisions implemented just prior-to ,the. previous. inspection. The instrument calibration group has;been added to the Health Safety and Environment Department.

B. Procedure Controls -

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Section 11.3.4 of the license application requires that, changes in established procedures must be authorized in advance by appropriate management. l N,

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2 The Fermi decladding procedure was revised as the result of the investigation.of-the ignition of chips from sawing'through zirconium fuel assemblies in Cell 4 of the'Rockwell International Hot Laboratory (RIHL). The revisions were reviewed by the NRC inspector-and were found incomplete (see_Section 5B(1)(b)).

The review of the. procedure for packaging solidified grinder coolant 4 and fines:in a package using steel shielding instead of lead was completed. The reduction in the scope of work eliminated decladding the-fuel therefore no grinding fines will be generated. The project now involves only. disassembly of the fuel assemblies.. The waste

packaging problem is now somewhat different (see details-in Section 4

8.A).

No violations were identified.

3. Operator Training and Retraining Condition 14 of the current license requires that prior to unsupervised wark with special nuclear material appropriate formal training shall be given-in criticality *and/or radiation safety.

i A. A review of the licensee's master. training records and discussions with Training, Radiation and Nuclear, Safety, and Building 020 Operations personnel disclosed that all persons had received the required training prior to working with licensed material. It was found by the inspector that discrepancies' discovered during the last several inspections in the master training records had been corrected.

It was also found that the computer print out;of the records'has increased in volume by at least a factor of three due to the addition of many hundreds of new entries caused by'the merger of several divisions in the'new Rockwell International organizational structure. This substantial increase in record volume, the death of i the former Training Director and the retirement of a key Training l Specialist has been detrimental in making the Master Training Record '

a completely accurate and viable' document. During this current inspection at least ten discrepancies related to; respiratory protection training were found. This record disclosed that these persons had not received the required training. Whereas, a careful .

check of secondary records maintained by the Health and Safety I Specialist in charge of respiratory protection training disclosed- I that the persons had indeed received the required training. Several -l good ideas on how to further improve the master training record  !

emerged from a discussion with the two training specialists charged j with the responsibility of maintaining this important record. Item (85-01-02) will remain open for further review.

B. The program for consolidation of the responsibility for the i respiratory protection program under one person in the Radiation and l Nuclear Safety Group was reviewed. It was found that the consolidation has been completed and is working smoothly. However, because of anticipated annual leave and possible-sick ~ leave, a

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!second'personwithexpertisSinINdustrialHygiene'is'6eingtra'ined. l i 'as backup to the Senior eHealth and Safety. Specialist-now in charge; F

4 of the program. This closes item ~(86-03-03).: :s w : : ; s, .

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The NikC inspectors identified ai need for 5dditional,tMaining of the-L - ' '

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< operators. The safety:sigriificance of the need to vacuum the .

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zirconium chips' generated during-the;c'utting operation while they;

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were still' wet was discussed (seeJSection 5;B.(1)(b)),- '

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! 4. . Criticality Safety -

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Section 2.7'of-the license application requires that prior to initiating .

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, a project involving potential . hazards,1 authorization must' be obtairied j- from the appropriate Department Director and from designated Safety '

i and/or Criticality Safeguards personnel iii the Health, SafetyLand. -

Radiation Services Department. A ~

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. A. Nuclear Criticality Safety Analysis Section 4.1.3 of the license application requires the completion of a Nuclear Safety Analysis for the Fermi fuel decladding operation.

L i The required Chiticality-Safety Study (CSS) and Nuclear Safety:

! Analysis (NSA) we're completed, reviewed,'and approv'ed before startup= .

4 of the Fermi decladding operation. ;The scope'of the project has

=been reduced significantly since the previous inspection. The. scope currently-involves only removal of the fuel. pins from the fuel' ,

assembly and packaging them in groups of'35 as previou' sly planned.

Decladding the fuel pins is not-included in the reduced scope of  ;

work.

!- The Fuels Committee Chairman recently retired. He was a signatory

. approving both the Criticality ~ Safety; Study and the Nuclear Safety

c Analysis. The background of the new chairman will be reviewed in'an .

. inspection following the appointment (87-01-01). '

B. Fermi Fuel Declad Project.

The licensee is limited to "5 kilograms U-235' or enriched uranium and plutonium in combination not to exceed 5.0 effective _kg -

calculated by kg U-235:+-(2.5)(kg-Pu)."' '

+

F j -(1) The' licensee identified that.on. February 10,11987 a transfer 3of 3 4 - two fuel assemblies ~ to the RIHL exceeded the NRCJ1icense limit.

F Security and the Criticality Safeguards Advisor were notified-after the.two fuel assemblies joined end to end were separated.

2 Operations-were stopped at the_ request ~of the CriticalityJ >

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Safeguards Advisor. _. Security at the RIHL~was reinforced.' The-Criticality Safeguards Advisor's review reconfirmed that' the  ;

contained'U-235-(9.5 kg)' constituted less thanthalf of.the '

criticality control ' limit of 22.1 kg U-235 '(moderator-controlled); therefore,"this occurrence constituted a violation 3 }_, e f

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.ofthe'licenselimit'of5lkgU-235. On.obtainin~g the concurrence of the Chairman Nuclear. Safeguards . Review Panel corrective action-was completed. .-The extra fuel assembly was

' returned to the RMDF .The~ occurrence was reported to the.NRC' Region V . Safeguards Section Chief tiy ' telephone' on February'10, 1987, the afternoon of the; incident,1with.a follow up-letter to the Region V Administrator.on-February.11; 1987. . The-licensee undertook an investigation as to the cause of.the occurrence' and prepared a procedure to preclude recurrence. It appeared that the cause was'of a' nature (one assembly possibly dropped onto another~intas 'torage' pit) that' corrective action taken for a previous' license limit violation (in-c' ell packaging'-

inspection report 70-25/84-05) would not have been expected.to-preclude this occurrence.,

(2) The Cell 4. posted Work Station Criticality Control' Limit of 4800 gm U-235, 25.7% enriched,'as 1 assembly or 4 batches...had been exceeded in the. occurrence described in the preceding-paragraph (4.B.(1)).- ,The Nuclear Safety Analysis distinguishes between the NRC: license' limit of.5ckg U-235 and the Criticality.

Safety Study derived Criticality Control Limit' of 22.1 kg U-235'

. (45 percent of a minimum critical mass).

The Nuclear Safety Analysis includes in 'section 9.f, under General Safety Considerations, the requirement that, "If any. condition develops which 4 requires the use'of procedures not previously approved, operations will.

be halted, and radiation and nuclear safety will be informed. A safe procedure will be devised to overcome the nonstandard condition.

Approval of the interim procedure by. Radiation and Nuclear Safety will be accomplished as expeditiously as'is possible."

The incident documentation indicated that the operai! ors-(a) did not stop operations when the problem was identified, (b) did not notify Radiation and Nuclear Safety before separating the fuel assemblies, and (c) did not use a separations procedure that had been reviewed and approved by Radiation and Nuclear Safety. The problem did not have the potential to - 1 jeopardize the public health and safety because it involved only 20 percent of a minimum critical mass. However, the licensee's performance raises the question of-adequacy regarding the retraining.in the General Safety Considerations quoted above. The licensee's followup of this' item will be reviewed during the next inspection (87-01-02). l One violation was identified by the licensee' and was expeditiously; corrected. Due to the action taken by.the licensee,'a' citation was not considered in this case.

5. Operations Review Section 2.1 of the-license application requires the licensee to comply with all the requirements of the regulations, to operate the facilities in a safe and efficient manner and within the requirements of all license conditions under which the activities are authorized.

A. Decontamination / Decommissioning (D/D) l l

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License Condition 25,requi~res that1the licensee follow the general decommissioning plan submitted in"the enclosures.to the; letter: dated.

..- March 15, 1978. 1

'(1); Building 055 Nuclear Materials' Development Facility (NMDF)- ,

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v (a) ;'The' inspectors tour.oTheOak. inc[uded BuildingISS_ during('the faci Ridge _..AssociatedUniversity.ORAU)teamhad completed. itst independent overcheck of the building.a'nd-grounds ;for the NRC. Some additional soilfsamples-were taken'from the drain line trench during the overcheck.

The 0RAU report is being prepared

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m .(b) The HEPA filter ba'nk in th'e Building 055 high volume J v'entilation system (breathing air) was removed and" J-

' disposed of as radioactive. waste.-

I B. Operations ~

,' (1) Bdilding 020 Rockwell International Hot Laboratory (RIHL).

(a) The Fermi decladding project has undergone a significant J

reduction in scope'. The decladding of.the fuel pins by grinding.was eliminated.; The. operation, now much simpler, ~

also generates much:less waste. .The dose'from waste packages is expected to be more easily controlled'(see Section 8.A.). The licensee disassembled the higher dose, rate assemblies.first. This' facilitated shipping this-higher level waste'in the NLI:1/2 cask'while it'was still available. At the. time of the: inspection approximately< 54 percent of the 214 fuel assemblies had undergone .

disassembly. Disassembly is expected to be completed-in May 1987. If no additional work develops"the D/D offthe .

RIHL may start- as early; as October 1987. ~ .,

%/. . _ . ndr (b) The licensee experienced burn.ing of some zirconium chips generated in Cell l4~duringitheisawingiphase of?the disassembly _ operation on'0ctober 28,:1987 U 0perations were stopped and the cell was purged with nitrogenito

, extinguish the chipsf .The' Incident Review Committee that

_ . convened the next day. concluded that the)saw blade 4 crept.

toward the uranium' metal ~and by; friction igni_ted:the . -

"i uranium chips which we're being_ generated and<these'in turn- ~

ignited the zirconium chips that hadLaccumulated in the' stainless , steel wrapper . tube.. Process changes- to preclude. j recurrence were initiated by the committee.NThe inspector  !

noted that the change . involving vacuuming the chips (now l

generated duringiwet cutting)..before they dried was~not-appropriately incorporated in the' applicable; procedure.

The safety significance of theiwet. vacuuming appeared not to be understood by the operators. The~licenseelreviewed-the process changeslinitiated by the committee and agreed -

i the procedure (1530P000005)'needed further rev_ision to -i assure that the' zirconium chips.would be.. vacuumed while I j

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they.were still wet.' LTh'e procedure: revision will be: ,

reviewed'during the.next inspection-(open. item 86-01-01 + . .

, .wil1 therefore remain open).;. Additionally ythe_licens6e.L ,

,. - will include _the;safetyEsignificance-of 4 the procedure-s - - revisions in an. operator training session." The licensee'fs-4- action on this, item"willfbe rev.iewed during-the next o f' "

inspection-(87-01-03).

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.~. . s l~ (c) The inspect. ors observed the,licens'ee'[s-weight b' asis ~ >

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verification that the-140 fuel: pins were being subdivided ,

.into fourl35. pin groups. .-The weighing operation observed gave a measured 35 pin batch' weight.(clad present) versus .

-a 35 pin batch weight-: projected from'a measured: single; pin ,

weight.. The measured; weight'was within 0.3. percent of the,

projected weight and would:readily) indicate-a, pin count- -x discrepancy. i *

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] No violations were. identified. .

Maintenance a'nd Surveillance Testing

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[ Section 9 of NRC License SNM-21 incorporates Part 1 Eof the licensee's 1 i application and supplements dat'ed October.29'and. December 17, 1982,~and i

-March 2,_7, May 29 and June 12, 1984 asElicens'e conditions; , i

" l l A. Breathing Air Supply System ,

_ i a l The, licensee has upgraded the. Breathing Air Supply Syst'em in th'e

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j Additio'n ally, all regulatorsLare' j_ RIHL by adding a backup air _ pump. 4 1

i to be replaced with new regulators that will be locked after= ,

j adjustment. A metrology' number for calibration will be'assignedJa, l 4

control calibration frequency. The licensee planstto complete the planned upgrading in recognitio'n of the fact that the system would be needed for cell entries for new contracts or for D/D of the:RIHL.

The status of this project will be reviewed.during the next-

.l ,

j inspection (87-01-04). _

} 8. Sewage Treatment Plant -

1 The' tour of the onsite sewage treatment. plant disclosed:no

! discrepancies. The valve controlling release of-effluent, diverted-l -to the temporary diversion pit was still locked.in the closed ~

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' position and the key is controlled by the~ RIHL health' physicist.

No violations were-identifi_ed.- ,

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7.- Radiation Protection ,

i Protection against radiation hazards associated with' licensed' activities 'i  ;

is required by 10 CFR Part 20.

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A. Tour of Facilities'-

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-(1) TheNM0Fhuil' ding-055),'RIHL'(Building.020)",i. Sewage Treatmerit Plant and.the associated diversion: basin,'and the Respiratory

~ Protection Maintena'nce and-Train.ing Laboratory were visited by; , -

a .the inspector. .No violation of good, health physics or other NRC' requirements were noted during the tour. '

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! , B. External Exposurei x

The review of 2nd quarter 1986 through 4th quarter 1986 radiation

exposure records disclosed-no exposures .in excess'of regulatory .

' limits. The highest quarterly whole body exposure noted was.1180:

.arem; JNo significant readings were noted on finger ring or visitor

. . film badges.

C. Internal Exposures -

ThE licensee utilizes a' bioassay program from U.S. Testing Company of Richland, Washington.- A review of the available records for the- '

2nd through 4th quarters 1986 disclosed no. internal exposures:

exceeding licensee administrative limits or regulatory limits.

During the 1st quarter'of 1986'the licensee-submitted sixt6en samples for plutonium analyses and fifty-three samples <for. fission  ;

product analyses. Of the samples submitted forty-five'.results had= .i not yet been received prior to the last inspection. These records.. I and all 2nd, 3rd and 4th quarter records were reviewed ~during this

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inspection. No exposure exceeded licensee administrative or ~

regulatory. limits. This closes-open: item (86-03-08).

D. Non-Reportable Incident Review 4

One non-reportable incident which occurred during-the 3rd quarter- >

1986 was reviewed. This involved an entry into the large SEFOR' glove box by a Health and Safety Specialist for the purpose of?

decontaminating the glove box'sufficiently so that-it could beLsent; to another organization. Initial measurements,' prior.to entry, - '

l indicated that if one wore a supplied air hood with(associated '

suitable protective garments, the operation could be performed safely. .A lapel air: sampler was worn ~by the: person making the; .

entry. The Health and Safety.. Specialist remained;in-the glove box 1 for approximately twenty-five minutes. Analysisofthegir. sampler- .l filter disclosed'an air concentration of 7.8X10t8 uCi/cm . .This value was much higher than had been expected-from the+ initial i measurements. The radioactive m'aterialsnin the glove; box were 5-

=primarily mixe'd fission products," uranium'and plutonium. The ,

' incident was handled by_the licens6e'in#an~ appropriate ~and: -

expeditious manner. -Two bioa'ssaystwere t'aken.C Both were-foundLto:

'be at the minimum, level of-detection. Proper health. physics -

H practices were followed throughout the proc'edure.. No signific' ant internal or external,e~xposurelhad been= received during the; entry;

?Because of high potentialifor' internal exposure;ifjthe air hood stops functioning properly,1 this procedureiwill! continue' to be '

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followed as an~open item (86-03-01) for the ne'xt?se.verall .

, inspections. If the licensee decides not o're-enter.the gluve box,-

this open item will be closed. ,

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• Transportation / Radioactive 1WasteManadmenU/i0CFR"Part6h

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Annex 1"B"o ofthecurrentslicenseincorporates)guidelinesforreleaseiof, ,.

equipment and_ facilities for unrestricted use; '10.CFR-Part 20.301:to ,

j: Part-20.401 regulates the disposal.of waste. 10 CFR Part 61 requires that all radioactive' waste prepared for dispo's al lis classified :in' j

accordance with Section 61.55 and meets the waste. characteristics j

requirements' in Section 61.56. >

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10 CFR.20.311(d)(3) require's that -licensees who. t'ransfer.l radioactive' ',

' waste to a land disposal facility or: licensed waste collector.shall; ,

conduct a quality. control program ~to' assure. compliance with'10 CFR 61;55~

and 61.56.

7 10 CFR.Part 71 regulates the packaging and; transportation of; radioactive material.

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A. Waste Management '

, The disposal of waste generated by the decladding operations in the:

1 RIHL was again discussed with the Staff Chemical Engineer in charge ~

l of writing and executing the detailed written procedures necessary  ;

j' to carry out the disposalloperation-in assafe and efficient manner.

+

Details of the operation are' discus'sedgin. Reports 70-25/86-02:and-70-25/86-03. The original' plans called for a concrete.and lead- -

' shield around a twelve gallon; inner container which held the , .

l grinding fines from the Fermi fuel decladding operation.. Because.of-

+ _ a recent. ruling by the Environmental Protection Agen'cy'(EPA),.which * '

in.effect prohibits-the use of-lead asishielding'in.such cases, the licensee has experimented with steel ~as1 shielding material. -The:

j Staff Chemical Engineer stated that this did not work very wellt , ' ,

because so much steel was nee'ded to giveTadequate shielding.' ?The j resulting package was too'. heavy to meet normal transportation ~

requirements. It then.became necessary to fractionatelthe grinding ^ -

fines so that the amount ofisteel-in the' shielding could be reduced. i o The-limited quantity'of grinding': fines on hand were; disposed of.in'a j safe manner by fractionating the qua'ntity placed in the twelver '

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gallon containers when necessary. This closeshitem 86-01-03. s

. The centerless grinding operation' has since' s been replaced.by sawing - ,

the fuel' assemblies into sections'and removing t the enclosed fuel '

i pi ns'. This' operation is~-performed remotely inside the' hot cell. ;l Although.the cutting chips and other scrap from.this operation- l

[ contains far less activity than'the centerless-grinding operationL l . produced, a safe and: efficient packaging method'aust still be j  :

designed and put into practice. 'The Staff Chemical ~ Engineer stated'  !

the packaging will'be si_mila' r_ to that: designed forf the centerless 9 grinding fines. However, the packaging will.be significantly-

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different; therefore, the. package will'have/to be proven i

experimentally and-a detailed procedure written. ,The' experimental .

packages 'are expected to be~ tested!inlthe 'next1few weeks. , The Staff I Chemical Engineer stated:that.no packiges will_ beidispose'd of until -

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-the written' procedure has been completed and'. approved. The 2i licensee's, progress'in this; area willLbe: reviewed during the next. . -

inspection-(87-01-05). ,

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,B. Transportation and'Part 61 I ' ' '

J l Because tioth the Manager, Nuclear Safety' and Licensing ~ and the.

iTransportation Manager were on travel, it was.not possible to

complete this.section.' The Manager, Radiation:and Nuclear Safety _

stated that in his Lopinion no shipment'of radioactive material.-under NRC jursidiction'.had occurred since the last inspection. However, he'could not be sure because he.did not;have access to the records.

.Therefore these. items will be reviewed during the next. inspection '

.(87-01-06). - ^

'No violations were'id'$ntified. .

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9. '

. Environmental-Protection (

e Title 10oftheCode'ofFe'deralRegulations,'Part20.'106;"Radioactivit'y

, in Effluents to Unrestricted Areas requires that licensees control?their:

i operations to preclude releasingiradioactive' material'.in concentrations exceeding the limits specified in Appendix:B', Table II~of Part 20.

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, The licensee's semi-annual effluent repor'tsifor January 1, 1986 through' June 30,'1986 and July-1,fl986-through December 31,v1986 continue to reflect effluent streams contamination levels less than NRC r'elease

j. limits (10 CFR Part 20, Appendix B).

i The results from the analyses of'the two~ samples taken from the temporary.

diversion pit, and reported in Table I of the-previous report,- ,

(70-25/86-03) were below NRC release limits. Item (86-01-04) is.

( therefore closed.

No violations were identified.

~

10. Emergency Preparedness

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I~_ License-Condition:24 requires the' licensee to maintain and execute.the ~ t response measures in accordance with the Radiological Contingency Plan

submitted.to the Commission on' August 28, 1981,-as-revised on March 3, .:

1982. Additionally, Appendix,A~to the Radiological Contingency Plan. l l states:that the Master Emergency Plan has;.been approved as part ofLthe license.

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.The fire extinguishers. checked'on a tour of the facilities had all

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I ' received their monthly inspections'. The hous'ekeeping'in all of the '

l= areas. visited was' good. ,

n L B. The licensee conducted the' annual evacuation and' training exercise for Building 020'on June 26, 1986. 'The: drill was observed by.

. representatives of.Ventura County Emergency. Planning and the i California State Department of Public Health.- The. licensee's: .

critique held immediately after the' drill was' attended by ten offthe .R a

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t-licensee's employees and'the California'l State,' Department. of Health and Safety representative. 1Nine items needing attention were identified and responsibility for each was' assigned. Eight of.the-items were followed'up'by October. 30, 1987. The' final item,-

. installation ~of~a RADIAX cable in Building.020,,was completed and tested-since the-onsite inspection. The' anticipated improvement in communications with emergency. team members was' achieved. This-

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closes item 86-03-07.

No violations were identified.

'11. Exit Meeting- -

The results of the inspection were discussed with the licensee's. staff-identified in Section 1.

The topics discussed included:

The violation identified, reported (though not required), and expeditiously corrected by the licensee;-

The: status of the previous open items:

Closed (86-01-03) Review Fermi container dose control; (86-01-04) Sampling unlined diversion pit; (86-03-03) Review planned consolidation'of the respiratory protection program; (86-03-07) Review status of' corrective actions for problems identified during the June 26, 1986 drill at Building 020; and (86-03-08) Review second quarter.(1986) bioassay results.

Open

'(85-01-02) Training records accuracy;

(86-01-01) Review approval of Fermi procedures;.

-(86-03-01) Review airborne concentration: levels during alpha glove box entries; .

l(86-03-02) Review program of replacement of RIHL_ ventilation system fans; (86-03-04) Review status of the plans to color code dosimeters (86-03-05) Review licensee's plans regarding use of TLDs or shortening the use period of film badges (86-03-06) Review licensee's plans for training ancillary workers; New l

(87-01-01) Review background of new Fuels Committee Chairman when

" appointed; (87-01-02) Review the retraining relative to actions to be taken when nonstandard operation conditions are' encountered; l (87-01-03) Review the retraining provided relative to the safety 1

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. . significance of vacuuming.the. zirconium chips-while wet;-

(87-01-04) Review the status of the upgrading of the Breathing Air

-Supply System; .

~(87-01-05) Review the licensee's new packaging for the coarse

', zirconium sawing chips; (87-01-06) Review records ~of shipments made under NRC jurisdiction. ,

The changing status of the training records and the staff responsible for,them; Assuring that procedures in use~are current; and Independent audits of the Master Emergency. Plan.and.the Radiological Contingency Plan by. persons not.having emergency responsibilities.

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