Text

Proposed Tech Specs,Incorporating Reactor Trip Bypass Breaker Surveillance
	ML20205T224
Person / Time
Site:	McGuire, Mcguire
Issue date:	03/16/1987
From:	; DUKE POWER CO.
To:	;
Shared Package
ML20205T211	List: ML20205T206; ML20205T224;
References
	NUDOCS 8704070243
	Download: ML20205T224 (8)
	v • d • e

!

TABLE 3.3-1 (Continued)

REACIOR TRIP SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION 5

MINIMUM A

TOTAL NO.

CHANNELS CHANNELS APPLICABLE FUNCTIONAL UNIT OF CHANNELS TO TRIP OPERABLE MODES ACTION c-2 1

2 I

2 9; 12.

l 5

g j.

19.

Reactor Trip Breakers 2

1 2

3, 4*,

5*

10

~

R 20.

Automatic Trip and Interlock 2

1 2

1 2 9

I 2

1 2

3, 4*, 5^

10 Logic m

>d A

2 5

C' l

w t.1 8704070243 870316 PDR ADOCK 05000369 P

PDR

ATTAdHM&aT T (00WWU(th)

TABLE 3.3-1 (Continued)

ACTION STATEMENTS (Continued)

ACTION 9 - With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, be in at least HOT STANDBY within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months ; however, one channel may be bypassed for up to 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months for surveillance testing per Specification 4.3.1.1, provided the other channel is OPERABLE.

ACTION 10 - With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months or open the Reactor trip breakers within the next hour.

ACTION 11 - With the number of OPERABLE channels less than the Total Number of Channels, operation may continue provided the inoperable channels are placed in the tripped condition within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months .

ACTION / 2. With one of the diverse trip features (Undervoltage or shunt trip attachment) inoperable, restore it to OPERABLE status within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months or declare the breaker inonerable and apply ACTION

The breaker shall not be bypassed while one of the diverse )f.]

trip features is inoperable except for the time required for perfoming maintenance to restore the breaker to OPERABLE status.

McGUIRE - UNITS 1 and 2 3/4 3-8

h O

O TABLE 4.3-1 REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIRENENTS o

E TRIP ANALOG ACTUATING MODES FOR e

l CHANNEL DEVICE WHICH 5

CllANNEL CilANNEL OPERATIONAL OPERATIONAL ACTUATION SURVEILLANCE c

d FUNCTIONAL UNIT CHECK CALIBRATION TEST TEST LOGIC TEST IS REQUIRED RDJ)

N.A.

1, 2, 3*, 4*, 5v

~

1.

Manual Reactor Trip H.A.

N.A.

g o.

I 2.

Power Range, Neutron Flux High Setpoint S

D(2,4),

M N.A.

N.A.

1, 2 m

M(3, 4),

Q(4,6),

R(4,5)

Low Setpoint S

R(4)

M N.A.

N.A.

1,,,,

2 w

3..

Power Range, Neutron Flux, N.A.

R(4)

M N.A.

N.A.

1, 2 i

High Positive Rate "O

4.

Power Range, Neutron Flux, N.A.

R(4)

M N.A.

N.A.

1, 2 High Negative Rate 5.

Intermediate Range, S

R(4,5)

S/U(1),M N.A.

N.A.

1

,2 Neutron Flux 6.

Source Range, Neutron Flux 5

R(4,5)

S/U(1),M(9)

N.A.

N. A.'

2

, 3, 4, 5 7.

Overtemperature AT S

R M

N.A.

1, 2 8.

Overpower AT S

R M

N.A.

1, 2 N 1 9.

Pressurizer Pressure--Low S

R H

N.A.

I 10.

Pressurizer Pressure--High 5

R H

N.A.

1, 2 11.

Pressurizer Water Level--High S

R H

N.A.

1 dR L

12.

Low Reactor Coolant flow 5

R H

N.A.

I c.

N v

i

i 2

S TABLE 4.3-1 (Continued) 5 A

REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS TRIP c5 ANALOG ACTUATING MODES FOR d

CHANNEL DEVICE WHICH CHANNEL CHANNEL OPERATIONAL OPERATIONAL ACTUATION SURVEILLANCE r

FUNCT10NAL UNIT CHECK CALIBRATION TEST TEST LOGIC TEST IS' REQUIRED ro d.

Low Setpoint Power Range Neutron Flux, P-10 N.A.

R(4)

M (8)

H.A.

N.A.

1, 2 e.

Turbine Impulse Chamber' Pressure, P-13 N.A.

R H (8)

N.A.

I l'l.

19.

Reactor Trip Breaker N.A.

N.A.

M (7, J1)

N.A.

1, 2, 3*,

4*,

54 20.

Automatic Trip and N.A.

N.A.

M (7) 1, 2, 3*, 4*,

54 Interlock Logic N.A.

H.A.

l w

"w N R.

NA N.A.

N.R.

Mbd/Gn)1,z,9ff i

b.b b ggg pm M

ene h-kA Cj t

,m_-

C, b

NW/iQ$&[

(cmez)

\\

TABLE 4.3-1 (Continued)

TABLE NOTATION With the Reactor Trip System breakers closed and the Control Rod j

Drive System capable of rod withdrawal.

t Below P-6 (Intermediate Range Neutron Flux Interlock) Setpoint.

M

M Below P-10 (Low Setpoint Power Range Neutron Flux Interlock) Setpoint.

(1) -

If not performed in previous 7 days.

Comparison of calorimetric to excore power indication above 15% of (2)

RATED THERMAL POWER.

Adjust excore channel gains consistent with calorimetric power if absolute difference is greater than 2%.

The provisions of Specification 4.0.4 are not applicable for entry into MODE 2 or 1.

(3)

Single point comparison of incore to excore axial flux difference above 15% of RATED THERMAL POWER.

Recalibrate if the absolute difference is greater than or equal to 3%.

The provisions of Specification 4.0.4 are not applicable for entry into MODE 2 or 1.

(4)

Neutron detectors may be excluded from CHANNEL

CALIBRATION.

i (5)

Detector plateau curves shall be obtained, evaluated, and compared 7

to manufacturer's data.

For the Intermediate Range and Power Range

)

Neutron Flux channels the provisions of Specification 4.0.4 are not applicable for entry into MODE 2 or 1.

(6)

Incore - Excore Calibration, above 75% of RATED THERMAL POWER.

The provisions of Specification 4.0.4 are not applicable for entry into MODE 2 or 1.

(7)

Each train shall be tested at least every 62 days on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS.

i With power greater than or equal to the interlock Setpoint the (8) required operational test shall consist of verifying that the interlock is in the required state by observing the permissive annunciator window.

(9)

Monthly surveillance in MODES 3*, 4* and 5* shall also include verification that permissives P-6 and P-10 are in their required state for existing plant conditions by observation of the permissive annunciator window. Monthly surveillance shall include verification j

of the Boron Oilution Alarm Setpoint of less than or equal to five times background.

(10) -

Setpoint verification is not required.

McGUIRE - UNITS 1 and 2 3/4 3-14

6' (SAG 62)

TABLE 4.3-1 (CONTINUED)

TABLE NOTATION i

i (11) -

The TRIP ACTUATING DEVICE OPERATIONAL TEST shall independently verify the OPERABILITY of the undervoltage and shunt trip circuits for the Manual Reactor Trip Function.

t (12) -

The TRIP ACTUATING DEVICE OPERATIONAL TEST shall independently verify the OPERABILITY of the undervoltage and shunt trip attachments of the Reactor Trip Breakers.

(13) -

Prior to placing breaker in service, a local manual shunt trip shall be performed.

(14) -

The automatic undervoltage trip capability shall be verified operable.

i i

McGUIRE UNITS I and 2 3/4.3-14a e

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INSTRUMENTATION I

(

BASES 3/4.3.1 and 3/4.3.2 REACTOR TRIP AND ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION (Continued) following actions may be initiated by the Engineered Safety Features Actuation System to mitigate the consequences of a steam line break or loss-of-coolant accident:

(1) Safety Injection pumps start and a,utomatic valves position, (2) Reactor trip, (3) feedwater isolation, (4) startup of the emergency diesel generators, (5) containment spray pumps start and automatic valves oosition, (6) containment isolation, (7) steam line isolation, (8) Turbine trip, (9) auxiliary feedwater pumps start and automatic valves position, and (10) nuclear service water pumps start and automatic valves position.

Technical Specifications for Reactor Trip Bypass Breakers (BTB's) are included in response to GL 85-09 and NRC letters to Duke dated June 10, 1986 and Novem-

?

ber 7, 1986. The staff states that BTB's meet Criterion 3 of the proposed (now interim) Commission Policy Statement on Technical Specifications. The amendment to issue the technical specification is dated [ staff insert appropriate date].

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i McGUIRE - UNITS 1 and 2 8 3/4 3-la Amendment No.5(Unit 1)

Amendment No.3f Unit 2) l i

l s.

k i

= -

1 ATTACHMENT II 4

I SAFETY ANALYSIS AND DETERMINATION OF NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS e

j The proposed changes were initiated by the NRC Staff in Generic Letter 85-09.

The

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changes are expected to provide added assurance that the Reactor Trip Bypass Breakers (BTBs) will operate as expected, by assuring that maintenance and testing -

j are performed regularly.

In a practical sense, no effect will be created by this amendment because the testing and maintenance are currently being performed. No safety concerns are raised by this amendment, because the amendment formalizes additional test requirements with the goal of improving safety.

This amendment does not involve a Significant Hazards Consideration (SHC) as i

}

determined using the criteria of 10CFR50.92. The proposed amendment will not l

increase the probability or consequences of any accident previously evaluated in the FSAR, or create the possibility of any new accident not previously evaluated.

No hardware or procedures changes are being made, so no accident or margin will be affected.

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