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AEOD/E605 Lightning Events at Nuclear Power Plants, Engineering Evaluation Rept
	ML20205N819
Person / Time
Site:	Davis Besse
Issue date:	04/30/1986
From:	Chiramal M; NRC OFFICE FOR ANALYSIS & EVALUATION OF OPERATIONAL DATA (AEOD)
To:	;
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	TASK-AE, TASK-E605 AEOD-E605, NUDOCS 8605060074
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ENGINEERING EVALUATION REPORT Lightning Events at Nuclear Power Plants by the Office for Analysis and Evaluation of Operational Data

April 1986 i

4 Prepared by: M. Chiramal l

Note: This report supports ongoing AE00 and NRC activities, and does not represent the position or requirements of the responsible NRC program offices.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS o

Page

SUMMARY

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I

1.0 INTRODUCTION

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 2.0 DISCUSSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 2.1 Geographic Distribution of Lightning Events ..................... 2 2.2 Seasonal Distribution of the Events . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 2.3 Systems Affected by Lightning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 2.3.1 Offsite Power Systen .................. 6 2.3.2 Safety-Related Instrumentation and Control Systems ........................ 8 2.3.3 Meteorological, Weather and Environmental Systems ........................ 9 2.3.4 Radiation, Gas and Effluent Flow Monitors . . . . . . . . 10 2.3.5 Air Intake Tunnel Halon System ............. 10 3.0 FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 1

4.0 REFERENCES

.......................... 12 TABLE 1 - Events by Year and Month . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 FIGURE 1 - Geographical Distribution of Lightning Events at US Nuclear Plants . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 FIGURE 2 - Contour Map of Mean Annual Lightning Strike Density ................... 5 APPENDIX A - Events Involving Lightning ............ 13

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SUMMARY

During the summer of 1985, several nuclear plants in the United States were affected by lightning strikes. To alert licensees of the problems that were experienced by nuclear units, the Office of Inspection and Enforcement issued Information Notice 85-86, " Lightning Strikes at Nuclear Power Generating Stations" on November 5, 1985. To assess the impact that lightning strikes have had on operating nuclear plants, and to determine the safety implications of the effects of lightning, AE00 conducted a search of the licensee event report (LER) data base and a review of the events thus obtained.

The search identified 62 events involving lightning for the period 1981 to 1985. The 62 events occurred at 30 plant sites and involved 32 reactor units.

In comparing the the number of lightning events, the geographic location of the affected units and the annual lightning strike density at the location, a direct correlation between the annual lightning strike density and the number of events is noted.

The data show that the systems affected are: (1) the offsite power system, (2) the_ safety-related instrumentation and control systems, (3) the meteorological and weather systems, (4) the radiation, gas and effluent flow monitoring systems, and (5) the air intake tunnel halon system.

This report documents the review of the events with regard to how lightning strikes affected these systems. The report includes the findings of the review and concludes that although lightning strikes have adversely affected the operation of some nuclear plants, in most cases, there has been no signi-ficant degradation of safety and minimal equipment damage. In particular cases where damage has been extensive or where failures caused by lightning strikes have been repetitive, the licensees have taken corrective actions to reduce the consequences of future strikes. Since the Office of Inspection and Enforce-ment has recently issued an information notice on lightning strikes at nuclear plants to alert licensees of some of the problems experienced, the report suggests that no further actions be taken at this time.

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1.0 INTRODUCTION

GenerK1 % sign Criterion 2 (10 CFR 50, Appendix A) requires that structures, systems and components important to safety be designed to withstand the effects of natural phenomena. Although GDC 2 does not specifically cite lightning as an example of a natural phenomenon, nuclear plants, in general, are designed to be protected from lightning strikes prevalent at the sites where the plants are located. During the summer of 1985, several nuclear plants in the United States were affected by lightning. In many cases the lightning caused the affected plant to trip; and in some cases, only an isolated system, like the meteorological system, was affected. To alert licensees of operating plants of the potential problems due to lightning, the Office of Inspection and Enforcement issued Information Notice 85-86, " Lightning Strikes at Nuclear Power Generating Stations" on November 5,1985.

As a result of these events and to assess the adequacy of the protection provided, a search for and review of lightning events at nuclear plants was initiated to determine the effects that lightning strikes have had on safety-related systems at operating nuclear plants. Searches of the data bases of operational events from 1981 to the end of 1985 were performed.

Sixty-two events involving lightning were identified. These 62 events are contained in the 61 licensee event reports (LERs) listed in Appendix A of this report. The appendix also includes the abstracts of the events involved.

It should be noted that only those lightning-induced events that affected systems important to safety, and/or are required by regulations to be reported, are included. That is, all incidents of lightning strikes at, or near, a nuclear plant are not included because they are not reportable.

2.0 DISCUSSION 2.1 Geographic Distribution of Lightning Events The 62 events occurred at 30 plant sites and involved 32 reactor units. The units affected and the number of events involved are summarized as follows:

Plant Name Number of Events / Plant Big Rock Point, Brunswick 1, Byron 1, Catawba I, Connecticut Yankee, Cooper, Davis-Besse, D.C. Cook 1, Duane Arnold, Fitzpatrick, Hatch 1, McGuire 2, Shoreham, Summer 1, Turkey Point 3, Vennont Yankee, Waterford 3 1 Arkansas Nuclear One 2, Farley 2, Grand Gulf 1, Maine Yankee, Peach Bottom 3, Pilgrim, Susquehanna I, Susquehanna 2, St. Lucie 2. Wolf Creek 2 Yankee Rowe 3 Browns Ferry 1, Crystal River 3 5 McGuire 1, IMI 2 6

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l The above. data, displayed on a map of the United States with all the operating nuclear plants located on it, is shown in Figure 1. As seen on the map, all !

the reactor units which suffered lightning-involved events are located in the l mid-western and eastern regions of the U.S. The majority (55 events) involved units east of the Mississippi River. Since the total number of lightning strikes at the plant site are not reportable or reported, an indirect measure of susceptibility of plants to lightning strikes was developed based on the lightning strike density for the region in which the plant is located. Figure 2 l (obtained from Reference 1) is a contour map of mean lightning strike density

. for the contiguous U.S. When Figure 1 is compared to Figure 2, a direct correlation between lightning strike (i.e., ground flash) density and the number of lightning-caused events at nuclear units is seen. That is, the plants with the higher number of lightning events are located in geographic regions of high lightning strike density. ' For example, certain sections of Florida and Alabama have a mean annual ground flash density of 10 to 12 flashes / square-km, and plants such as Crystal River 3, St. Lucie 2, Farley 2 and Browns Ferry 1, which have suffered multiple lightning events, are located in those sections. There are exceptions to this correlation, such as some of the nuclear plants located in the New England region (Yankee Rowe, pilgrim and Vennont Yankee). These plants have experienced multiple lightning-induced events, but are located in regions with a mean annual lightning flash density of only 2 to 3 flashes / square-km. This situation could be due to the design and installation of lightning protection equipment at the plants located in regions of low lightning strike density. (See Reference 2 for details of a study that assessed the effectiveness of lightning protection at nuclear power plants.)

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2.2 Seasonal Distribution of Lightning Events The 62 events were tabulated by the month and the year of occurrence. The results are presented in the following table.

Table 1--Events by Year and Month Year Jan. Feb. Mar. Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Totals 1981 1 - - - 2 2 1 -

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1 15 Totals 2 3 2 1 8 15 13 6 6 3 2 1 62 One conclusion evident in Table 1 is that lightning-induced events are clustered during the sumer months when thunderstorms prevail. Table 1 also shows that the total number of lightning events experienced annually by the nations' nuclear plants are more or less constant.

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2.3 Systems Affected by Lightning The 62 events were reviewed to determine the systems that were primarily affected by the lightning strike. The systems affected fall into five broad -

categories, as follows :

o Offsite Power system o Safety-related Instrumentation and Control systems o Weather and Meteorological systems o Radiation, Gas and Effluent Flow Monitoring systems o Air Intake Tunnel Halon system A discussion of each of these systems, the nuclear units involved and how they were affected by the lightning strike follows.

2.3.1 Offsite Power System Of the 62 events, 29 were categorized as lightning-induced events affecting the of.fsite power system. The following is the list of plants that fall into this category, with the number of events involved.

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Plant Name Number of Events /Plent Connecticut Yankee, Pilgrim, Cook 1, Crystal River 3, Fitzpatrick, Summer 1, Grand Gulf 1, McGuire 2, Davis Besse, Catawba 1, Wolf Creek, Waterford, Shoreham 1 Maine Yankee, Susquehanna. 1, Susquehanna 2, Peach Bottom 3 2 Yankee Rowe 3 I

McGuire 1 5 Total 29 Of these 29 events, seven led to a reactor trip due to lightning affecting -

the offsite power system. Yankee Rowe, Susquehanna 1 and Peach Bottom 3 each experienced two reactor trips, and Susquehanna 2, one reactor trip. (For more {

information on these events refer to Appendix A for LERs 50-029/82-019 &

83-022, 50-387/84-028 8 029, 50-278/85-018 and 50-388/85-025). The effects on the offsite power systen (e.g., partial loss, breakers tripping and reclosing, voltage surges) often caused problems in the onsite power systems leading to loss of some operating equipment (e.g., generator trip, reactor coolant pump trip, loss of transformers). The loss of operating equipment, in turn, would cause a reactor trip. The plants that experienced reactor trips (due to the effects of lightning on the offsite power system) are all located in Pennsylvania or Massachusetts. Since these states are in regions of medium to low lightning flash density, the data would suggest that the level of lightning protection provided at these plants (or for the offsite power system supplying these plants) may be inadequate. The plant and equipment involved, however, did not sustain serious damage and, except for the reactor trip system actuation, no safety-related system was affected.

Four events at McGuire 1 (84-010 & 017, and 85-017, & 020), one at McGuire 2 (85-005) and one at Catawba 1 (85-034) had the same result - inadvertent start of the emergency diesel generators. This was caused by the lightning inducing voltage transients in the offsite power system which in turn actuated the instantaneous undervoltage relays of the safety-related buses associated with the diesel generators. The licensee for Catawba 1 has made design modifications to the undervoltage circuitry to correct the problem, and the licensees for the McGuire units have initiated similar plans.

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Voltage surges or spikes in the implant electrical distribution systems, induced by lightning strikes on offsite transmission lines, were the cause of all the events at Sumer 1, Wolf Creek and Shoreham and one of the events at McGuire 1 (LER 50-395/83-074; 50-482/85-055 & 071; 50-322/85-040; and 50-369/82-046).

Except for the event at Waterford 3 (85-054), all of the events involved a partial loss of offsite power (e.g., loss of a transmission line, trip of sections of the switchyard, transfonner trip). In some cases the event occurred while the unit was at power and the partial loss did not affect plant operation.

In other cases the event occurred while the plant was shutdown, and the partial loss had no significant effect on the unit.

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At Waterford 3, while the unit was shutdown, a lightning strike caused the loss of all offsite power for one half-hour duration. The lightning caused the complete loss of the grid. (Two fossil units connected to the ring grid also tripped.) The emergency diesel generators started and energized the vital buses as designed.

In all 29 events, except for an occasional lightning arrestor or insulator )

failure, very little equipment damage occurred. No safety-related systems or equipment were damaged.

2.3.2 Safety-Related Instrumentation and Control Systems Nine of the 62 events involved lightning-induced problems on implant safety-related instrumentation system and equipment. Examples of such problems are: blown fuses of inverters and control rod power supplies, inadvertent actuation of multiple channels of the main steam line radiation

) monitors and pressurizer pressure, and damaged electronic components. The following is a list of the nine events and the units involved:

plant Name Number of Events / Plant Big Rock Point, Brunswick 1, Grand Gulf 1, Byron 1, Turkey Point 3 1 Farley 2, AN0 2 2 Total 9 Six of these nine events resulted in a reactor trip. The trip at Turkey Point 3 (85-019) involved the spurious actuation of multiple reactor protection system channels of pressurizer pressure. Brunswick I tripped because the main steam line radiation monitors actuated (84-025). ANO 2 tripped from 100 percent power due to voltage spikes on Core Protection Calculator channels 2 and 4 (85-016).

The two events at Farley 2 (84-004 and 85-010), and the one at Byron 1(85-068),

involved reactor trips due to power range neutron flux high negativa rate, which were caused by control rods dropping into the core. Lightning apparently caused surges in the distribution system ard tripped multiple power supplies

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in the control rod drive system. These events raise some concern regarding the adequacy of the protection provided at these plants for mitigating the effects of lightning. In all cases where multiple channels of safety-related instruments were affected, the failures were to the " fail-safe" state and the plant was able to be safely shut down. Of these events the one that occurred at Byron I was the most significant.

The Ifghtning event at Byron 1 also involved failures of several channels of safety-related instruments and equipment. Byron I was operating at about 11 percent power on July 13, 1985 when a severe thunderstonn occurred in the vicinity of the plant. A lightning bolt apparently struck the Unit I containment building and induced voltage surges in instrumentation and control cables in one of the four containment penetration areas. The voltage surges failed four i power supplies in the control rod drive system which resulted in several control rods dropping into the reactor core. .A power range negative flux rate reactor trip occurred insnediately. In addition to the reactor trip, damage to plant instrumentation and equipment also occurred. Instrumentation and equipment affected included: protection system channel II instruments, train B solid state protection system components, meteorological tower instruments, rod drive power supplies and loose part monitoring instruments. Some security equipment was also damaged. (See 85-068 for details of the event)

As seen on Figures I and 2, Byron is located in a region of medium lightning activity (6 flashes / square-km.). As such, is not expected to be subjected to many lightning strikes. However, because of the damage sustained during this strike, the licensee modified the lightning protection system of the containment str*:cture to minimize the effect of any future strikes. To ensure that lightning strike currents are carried directly to ground, the containment

) lightning protection grid has been isolated from structural steel and new conductors have been routed from the grid to the station ground mat. These corrective actions should improve the protection provided to the safety-related instrumentation systems and equipment at Byron 1.

2.3.3 Meteorological, Weather and Environmental Systems Twelve of the 62 lightning events caused failures in systems isolated from the nuclear plant, such as meteorological, weather or environmental towers and stations. Lightning strikes in the vicinity of these systems have failed instruments in the system by causing electronic component damage and blown fuses. The plants involved and the number of events experienced are as follows:

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Plant Name Number of Events / Plant Browns Ferry 1 5

Crystal River 3 4 i

i Vermont Yankee, Cooper,

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Browns Ferry 1 and Crystal River 3 are located in areas of high mean annual lightning strike density. Yet all of the events that occurred at Browns Ferry 1 (the meteorological station is comon to all three Browns Ferry units) and four of the five experienced by Crystal River 3, affected systems physically isolated from the stations themselves. This suggests that the lightning protection provided at these plants has been effective. It should also be noted that the five events at Browns Ferry occurred in 1981 and 1982, and the four events at Crystal River 3 occurred in 1981, 1982 and 1983. In the last 2 years, there have been no events reported at these sites. Apparently the i

. corrective actions taken at thes'e units have been effective in reducing lightning-induced damage to these systems.

2.3.4 Radiation, Gas and Effluent Flow Monitors .

Seven of the lightning-induced events involved problems with radiation, effluent flow or stack gas /offgas monitors. The majority of the problems were due to voltage surges induced by the lightning strikes. In all cases, the failures were associated with instruments confined to a particular location and involved no serious consequence. The number of events and the plants involved are as follows: ,

Plant Name Number of Events / Plant (-

Pilgrim, Hatch 1, Arnold, McGuire 1, Wolf Creek 1 St. Lucie 2 2 Total 7 St. Lucie 2 is located in a zone of high lightning strike density but has experienced only two events (both occurred on October 24, 1983, and were apparently caused by the same lightning strike). This suggests that the lightning protection provided at St. Lucie has been adequate.

2.3.5 Air Intake Tunnel Halon System Five events involved a spurious actuation or inoperability of the air intake tunnel halon system (and auxiliary and fuel handling building supply and exhaust fans) due to lightning flashes actuating certain ultraviolet detectors located in the air intake structure. All of these events occurred at TMI 2 in 1982 and 1983. Since then no additioaal events have been reported, suggesting that the corrective actions taken have been appropriate.

3.0 FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS Based on a review of the sixty-two lightning-induced events that occurred at operating U.S. nuclear plants during the period from 1981 to 1985, the following i findings and conclusions are presented:

1. The plants that experienced the lightning events are located in the mid-western and eastern regions of the United States. The majority (55 of the events) involved units located east of the Mississippi River.

2. There appears to be a direct correlation between the lightning strike density in a region and the number of lightning events experienced by a nuclear unit in that region. Exceptions to this correlation (e.g., the number of events experienced by certain plants located in the New England region) are probably due to inadequacies in the design and/or installation of the lightning protection systems.

3. The data suggests that the total number of lightning-induced events experienced each year by the operating nuclear plants in the U.S. is approximately the same and is likely to remain so, without additional improvements in protection.

4. Systems affected by lightning strikes have been: (1) the offsite power systems; (2) onsite safety-related instrumentation and control systems; (3) radiation monitoring systems; (4) weather and meteorological systems; and (5) air intake halon system (at TMI 2).

5. Of the 62 events studied, 29 were categorized as lightning-induced events affecting the offsite power system. Seven of the 29 events led to a reactor trip. The plants that experienced reactor trips (i.e.,

Susquehanna 1 & 2, Peach Bottom 3 and Yankee Rowe), are located in regions of low to medium lightning strike density, suggesting that the level of lightning protection provided at these plants (or for the offsite power system) may be inadequate.

6. Four events at McGuire 1 and one at Catawba 1 were due to the sensitivity of inplant undervoltage relays on the offsite power system.

The design modifications to the undervoltage circuitry at both the McGuire and Catawba plants are intended to correct the problem.

7. In the 29 events affecting the offsite power system, no significant equipment damage was sustained. The effects of the lightning strike have included partial to full loss of offsite transmission lines, damage to lightning arrestors, trip of switchyard breakers, and voltage surges in offsite and onsite electrical systems. No safety-related systems or equipments were damaged.

8. Nine of the 62 events resulted in problems to inplant safety-related instrumentation and control systems. Problems such as spurious actuations of protection channels, blown fuses of power supplies and damage to electronic components were caused by voltage spikes and surges induced by the lightning strike. Six of the nine events led to a reactor trip. In events where multiple channels of safety-related instrumentation or control systems were affected, the failures have been to a safe state (i.e., the channels failed in such a manner that the protection or safety function wasaccomplished). Of these events, the one at Byron 1 involved both instrumentation system and equipment failures. The licensee at the Byron plant modified the plant lightning protection system to minimize the effects of any future strikes.

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9. Eleven lightning events involved failures in systems which are located in isolated locations such as the meteorological, weather or environmental stations. Five of the events occurred at the Browns Ferry site and four at the Crystal River plant. Since 1983 no further events have been reported by these plants. This suggests that the corrective actions taken at these sites have been adequate.

10. Seven events at six plants involved problems with radiation, effluent flow or gas monitors. The problems were primarily caused by voltage surges induced by lightning strikes in the vicinity of the plants.

11. Five events which occurred at TMI 2 involved ultraviolet detectors used in the air intake halon system. Since 1983 no events have been reported, hence the problem has apparently been corrected.

Based on the above findings it has been concluded that lightning strikes have affected the operation of a significant number U.S. nuclear plants. However, in almost all cases, the safety of the plant was not significantly degraded and the equipment damage caused by the event was not serious. That is, in general, the safety-related systems and components in operating nuclear plants are adequately protected from the effects of lightning. In particular cases where damage was extensive or where repeated problems occurred, the licensee took adequate corrective actions. Finally, the Office of Inspection and Enforce-ment has recently issued Information Notice 85-86, " Lightning Strikes at Nuclear Power Generating Stations," to alert licensees of some of the more significant problems experienced by nuclear plants.

Accordingly, no further action regarding lightning events is recommended at

> the present time beyond continued routine review of LERs and other operational data reports submitted for such events.

REFERENCES

1. D.R. MacGorman, M.W. Maier, W.D. Rust, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, " Lightning Strike Density for the Contiguous United States from Thunderstorm Duration Records ", NUREG/CR-3759.

2. ENTCOR Corporation, " Lightning Problems and Protection at Nuclear Power Plants ", NSAC-41, December 1981.

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APPENDIX A EVENTS INVOLVING LIGHTNING 1

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Docket No. 50-278; LER NO.85-018 Plant Name: Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station- Unit 3.

Date of Event: July 11, 1984 ABSTRACT On July 11,1984,at 1920 with Unit 3 at 95 pecent power and Unit 2 shutdown fora refueling and pipe replacement outage, a fault occurred in the cross-tie between the north and south substations during a lightning stom. Substation breakers #45, #55, #225 and. #245 opened to clear the faul t. Coincidentally, the Unit 3 startup bus breaker 50-35 opened and deprived the plant of one of two offsite power sources. The affected 4160 volt emergency safeguard buses fast-transferred to the Unit 2 startup bus. Following the fast transfer, a scram on high neutron flux and ractor low level Group II and III isolations occurred. The high neutron flux was caused by spurious closure of the "800" main steam isolation valve due to a failed dc solenoid valve. The reactor feedwater pumps automatically recovered level to +45 inches and tripped on high level. The Unit 313.2 kV auxiliary bus #4 was manually transfered to the Unit 2 starup bus A and the RCIC system was started to control reactor water level. The operator manually closed the 5U-35 breaker to restore offsite power to the Unit 3 startup bus.

) A task force was assembled in August 1984 to address corrective actions for this event.

Docket No. 50-298 Plant Name; Cooper Nuclear Station l Date of Event: July 19, 1985 1

At approximately 0453, July 19,1985, with the reactor in cold shutdown and refueling in progress, a meteorological system trouble alarm was received by the control room. The apparent cause of the alarm was failure of the meteorological system due to a lightning strike on the meteorological data tower, northwest of the station. Repair actions were promptly initiated on the system and were completed at approximately 1045 when the system was restored to service.

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W Docket No. 50-382 LER No.85-054 Plant Name: Waterford 3 Date of Event: December 12, 1985.

ABSTRACT

.. At 1926 on December 12, 1985, while the reactor was in Mode 5 ( cold shutdown ), all offsite power was lost. As a result both emergency diesel generators started in the emergency mode and restored power to essential loads. The initiating event, which led to the loss of offsite power, was a lightning fault resulting in 'several breaker operations, additional faults and misoperation of some relaying. Various relay setpoints have been changed to prevent some of. the events recurring.

Docket No. 50-482 LER No.85-071 Plant Name: Wolf Creek Date of Event: October 9, 1985.

ABSTRACT On October 9,1985 at approximately 1015 CDT a control room ventilation J isolation signal ( CRIVS ) was initiated due to a radiation monitor in the control building HVAC system sensing a momentary low voltage condition.

All required ESF equipment responded properly. During this event the plant was in Mode 3, hot standby.

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.1. t . fi Lihil . n E t h i L aii Of f. 6 8.+ E NC E Wr:. I F Pud i 6 o A i fii i irF t- .

a r-c f . lHE i.INE Wri. FE;i Okt i e il ell N# H f - r i f t.: i nt TRIP. i Hi- F i e-rn WAi (-LACED ifJ MODE _ ~ . fHE CAUSE WWi s L i vi t a hif10 Sifi f t 'E Oli f ttE ItoiV Tite UC1* 15 A I YF t: nM - :; B . J ib i V- 1 S00 000 LINE DUi< l fl0 i t-tE DIORM. t rt t iFL e u. Iihl T MA$i Oi: AC TUhEi:e by I ht: NE ' i i entv>f .E Et.Ei_ i H 1 t COti, bin: ht . Oi.E b 1 0 ii:RV 1 & .

vsOy : u..

t Oiv-t : LLh si_d. DniA a o . e c. . < , e e + <. c . < ,: 4 . e <- + < . + + e + 3 e s- + s- e e < ,; + + e + c a ,a e + + . . . + c . se e e < o + e

& # # ,, < .. 4 fcLV151OP f ". . NONDLo . . J s. t '. t Hi i wi !

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i t.OC t Ci : 02

REOlON: 1 N'i_::WL Aiii. t il T Et: iOPAL ENOlhELR: 6WA>

} F AC I LI TY OPERATOR: YAN: LE AioNit Ltili_ i k l C t e e.

5YhDOL: 't A t .

obi.THAC1 J, A LlOttiNINu 5 TRIT.L e.HUSLD itft 1% INO NORNAL OPERATION . i IN ONNODE L i Nii O. C , b. ni linuuiMAN HvDbu :.Yoit0N

! ~ 1 s. . 115 IV IRAN 5M I'. of t uo. i i i .o. h i y Or th ii( m Af.D 10 Ot-EN ANll LOct e sul , bt. ..UL ~l i NO J H LOi

.1.1>. i t iL L i hi: HLiMn i Nt u t-l et: t v i K b .

i e t Ai CIECUIi s#ECH iFEE .

i

l l ': 1 S iniL F i F vi 1.tt'ORtAbLt

T AT 1 ON I OWER FEDi.K T ] ON WAi 14111 A it.b.

O C Ci m n E N Ct- OF THIS NA' loin.. THEaROOi tAv1.E

' t 6:rl FLt

~

ULT iOF ho i4tHEi e eiL'vENi ta n .i A LiO

it<tt L ON l t il 115 i V 1RAhSM) ...line i i r ii.

L I Nei i. e ifi t iiiv i i i bin .

Ur LH t NO 6N13 LOCt th6 OOi t ir iHE i -- 1 J. o L1Nt 2 U.'..D.

No UEC.lORED IN ONE HOUR. lHE PLANI WAY htiilektet b 10 100). t s ii"L P .

t i er EL 'i l VE nC ilOli 15 DLEML:D I4 tic ii . :.nR v .

v e v .. .

F Utu't J L t. R 'i.f. '. Doin .... .. .+.

.< , , ,.#. .. ,.. . ,c ..< ...+. .<.+. #<.<

,< . + .. c .< . 4.... ....<.4 i Vf.N i D4e t-

' dot t E 1 'vEAR tEk NUMBEH ht V)SION in . NilMbLtc N i. s a:

no / 22vcsS ly4 A ve.f 19 /:

022 0

- - - - ....e****,e*************,**********,........**..,

029 t oO le *,,*.....

YANiEE ROWE TYPE: PWR DOCLET:024 fu i . . : WE hEOluN: I nt o.H f I Es.. int;st t.NO t hfin : .. +.> a i

FACILITY OPERATO3*

SYMBO. YANKEE 1AE ATOMIC ELECTRIC CC[

1 WATCH-LIST L' ODES FOR iHIS LER ARE:

, 990 COMPLEY. EVENT

' 975 POSSIBLE SIGNIFICANT EVEN1 REFERENCE LERG:

' 1 029/83-019 2 029/82-019 3 029/80-021 AD5 TRACT DURING NOhr4AL OPERAllON J N H Ol'E I A L l 6ti f N s r40 J uht i. L D t. t Li. l u s s. AL DISTURDANCE UN THE l-126 115 L V 1RAN5MI55 TON t. iNL RE5ULIED 14 A PLANT TRIP AND THE TEMPORAR'y DEENi kO12 4T ION Ot' SONE t i. ANT EOult Ni'NI REOuiki!D iW TECH SPt C . THE F t.oh f I-ee 14 Y INTU THE en 1 iof . 4 e, ff MEhii t-OM sHE F OL i OWINO i t_s. H SPI C;.: : . 4 . al : 3.b.I: 3.O.1.1 ....c.J: ...:...?? TABLE 3.3-4. THIS EVENi LaA5 C4050D 0v' n LIOHINiNO sit <iKE GH tied YRAN5N156)Ori LiNE IN C LU5L F Rup leill y TO iHL i Wssi. H) A P D. L'EENEtiO l t.t'Is DU5SES AND INOPERABLE EuutPhENi WEHE PROMPlLi F E i URhll.' (U 5ERViCE BY OPERATIONS AND MAiNILNANCE PiiRSONNEL. 1Hf it ANT war. FETUi<NE D 10 POWEk UPERATION.

FORM 4 LER 5t55 l'ATA 03-v3-06

- - - - .,++.** *u..,+........+. u +++...+..++r...... ..,+ .,+..,*

DOCKET YEAR LER NUNi4Ett REVlslON DOS NOfibt h 1% ) '. Lvt- N e DATE 1 155 1903 012: O 031v2/O M is m e O'e21/03

- ,.+.***************,+++++*.****.,**,..++++.+++...++++..++.-..,***,

.* DOCKET:155 610 ROCt' POthf 1YPE:bWR REG 1ON: 3 N555:6E ARCHi TECTURAL tiNGif tEER: UECri FACIL1Tv OFLhniOR: (ON50NERS f'OwER (O.

5)MbOL: CPC I COMMENTS STEP 5 5 THRU 7: CUMP. 1Z2 = UNrKNOWN EQUIFriLn'i. tt td t- el f 1 e ELELiH)CALLY DAMAGED.

I REFERENCE LER5:

1 165/78-040 .: 165/79-v15

)

ABSTRACT FOLLOWIt46 A LIGHTNING STRit.L ni lHE Fi. ANT 51iE. OPERniUh5 obrCi<VED A DLOWN FU5E ON TtlE Sin fl0 INVERitih LOulFhdh e t'0K vh6 ve: iko tvHIAINMENI VACUUM RELIEF Loup 6. lhU5 letE VENilLA110H SufPLv LUut- und f r#UPLhAbt.h AND THE FUSE WAS I MMED t s f EL y' REPLACED. itit t*EDOlivnN Low wAS NUT i AFFECTED AND RErlalNED OPERABLE. PRIOR FUSE blOwlNo htFORTED IN LER 78-40 AND LER 79-15 DUT NOT RELATED TO Li6hiNINO. t'OL LOW i NO lhE LIGHTNING 51RiiE. INVE5116AllON REVEALED l'ANAOE 10 PLoni l tit t" PHONE 8

SYSTEMS. SECURIIV SYSIEH EOUIPMENr. DOHESTit WA1EH i.Ohituts. i AS WELL AS THE DLOWN FUSE DE6CRlDED ADOVE. SAFE T V REL AYED bis s Erlb kN 1hE PLANT HAVE NOT DEEN PRONE 10 FRIOR LIGHTNiNo DAMAOti. Rt POR e nB L il i 8

BASED ON TEC H SPEC /_. 9. 2. D( 2 8

) FORN 5 LER SL55 DATA "3-03-66

- - - - ..***....4.*******.....***.....***..,***+++...........,**...

DOCKET YEAR LER NUNDER REVISION DCS NUNDER NSIC EVEN) DATE

) 213 1983 014 0 6308250101 185176 O//30/03

- - - - e....*******..*****..******************,+...**.......,*****

I DOCLET:213 CONNECTICUT YANtEE TrPE PWR

.s .

NSSS:WE f

. . REGION:( '

ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER aWXX

. FACILITY OPER4 TOR: CONN. YANEEE ATONIC POeER CO.

5'vMBOL: COY ABSTRACT Wr11LE IN NODE ONE, ONE OF 1HE TWO INCOrilNO STATION SERVICE SUPPLIES WAS DISABLED BY A THUNDERSTORM. THE DISADLED '500RCE WAS THE 1206 LINE i (l15 iV). ADNINISIRATIVE TECH SPECS STATE THAT WiTHTWO ONE INCOrl!NG POWER SOURCE DisADLED, SOURCES DE AVAILABLE FOR POWER OPEPAllON.

IT NOST BE RESTORED WITH1N 72 HOURS, OP Pt. ANT SHUTDOWN 15 REOOIRED.W..,

FuttOWiNO THE LOSS OF lHE 1.;O6 L i Nt , soiO TRAN56ER Ot: HOUSE LUADS ~

HADL TO THE RENAINING 115 L V LlNE. THE AFF EC TED LINE HAD bt e_t*

i H:- s-FFliCTED LiNE W43 RESTOREO iv DISHELED AT AN UrF5iiE SWITCHv ARD.

$LhviCE ON ~/ / .:1/tG. i Hti Pl AN I RE Ns e Nt.ie Ai 19e 6 POWEk THkvOn"OUT 1 H .' '-

Tihd PERfoD.

v ;- v ;t- 8 6 i ORN 6 I ti k St 5' . DA't A

....o.4 +4...o...+.***on*...,o...

++...**44..,+,.,to o.n o4+.4o ht V LJ ON liC t. f auNi En N>10 EVLue Dart.

DUC)El YEAR LEH NUMbkN

v59 0.:5 v 0 31 11%:94 v // J1/05 250 1085 vi> is

- +.... n...u..... 4#.o. u....u o+e..........+.u.++..

..***o e+

t Uni E y FOIN t v Vt;

fyn DOCtEFt250 .

N ie.b : wE REOlON! J ARCHIiLC1 URAL ENGINEEur bi C r t FACIL1Tv OPERATORt FLURiDA iOhlei b L1uHf L v.

SiMOOL* t; PL

.0< '

EOMMENis STEP 1: COMr NE1 - F RE550R1 iEh F Rth50t L r RO~t tit i iUM L UMP Ah A'l W :..

) REPORTADILITv CODES FOR THIS LLR AHEt 13 10 CFR SO.73(a)(2)(iv): tiSF act ua t i vtit .

)

Ab51RALT POWER LEVEL - 100%. ON .lULY 21, 1985 AT 11141 i.N.. UNIT 4 LXPERitINtLD

) A REACTOR TRIP FROM 100% POWER DUE TO A SFURIOU5 LOW PRESSUHi2ER tRP5). 1 Hei PRESSURE SI6NAL DENERATED IN THE REAL10H t ROTECTiUN 5'tSTEN HEACTOR TRIP LOO!C IN THE RPS INITIATED A SUBSCOUENT TURDINE TRIP.

1 THE REACTOR TRIP RESULTED IN STEAM OENERATOR LEVELb DECREAE.lNo bELOW THE LOW-LOW SETPOIN15, 15% OF THE HARnOW rah 0E SPAN. DUE TO STEAM OENERATOR EURINi:. THIS I N111 ATED AN AUTUMAT is. 51Anl OF AU.siLinks FEEDWATER I' UMPS. PLANI PROC tiDORE :s WI.Rei USLD TO SfsbiL12L ("E UNil tH A HOT ST ANDb t' CONDITION. A HEAVt i.LECThlC AL AND RAIN SiOhN WAb IN Ph00RE55 HT THE TIMC OF THE EVENT. THE FINDiNOS FROM H PUST-TRIP REVIEW INDIC AlEle liini THE NOST PRObaf:LE L6USL WAS H LIOHlNiNu STRJrL.

WHICH AFFEE1ED l'REMUnl ZER PRE %URE PteO(ECT ION COMPARATOR3 OETilHO o sfURIOUS IRE 5GURIZER LOW PRESSURE REALTOR TRIP. lHE FOLL(WING CORRECTIVE MEASURES WERE TAKEN: (1) 10 tin 50Ht. THAT (HE vhhi>UHiiEM i Hti PRES 5URE AND LEVEL PROTECl lON LHANNEL5 WERE NOT DAMAOED hv' LIGH1NING SIRIEE, A PERIUDIC OPERAblLIIv' IEsi WA5 PERFURMED 051NO

) OFERAYINO FROCEDURE 14004.4. THESE PROiECliON f if4NNELS l'Ebf 0RNED SAT 15FAC10RILY. (2) A REVIEW WA5 CONDUCitID Or iHL FRINTOHfd OF lHd UNIT 3 480 VAC LOhli CENTER VOLTAGE ANALy/ERS 6ND 1HE UNDEbVOL1 AGE

' NO AbHOhMAL INDIC AfivHS WEiW CIRCUITS SEOUENCE OF EVEN15 HECORDER.

EVIDENf ON lHESE PRIN10VTS.

f LER SCb5 DATA 0 3-0 3- @..

FORM 7 ne**esen*ewoeeesseeeeeee*<eones***+<.* nee.*<***es+e***<+***.. NLsC Evi tu s l it i f t-LER NONbEN l E Vible:#N l ei. PintH t.

bO( t- tit YEAR

+ =

259 1981 026 0 8106300193 If'703 05/27/G1 oooooooooooooooooooood ooooooooooooooooooooooooot soooooooooooooooo I '

DOCKET 259 BROWNS FERRY 1 1 YPE BWit

REGION 2 NSSSIOE ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: TVAX FACILITY OPERATOR TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY SYMBOL: TVA COMMENTS STEP 2 COMPONENT XR - WIND DIRECTION RECORDER.

FWFERENCE LERS:

1 259/C:2-015 2 259/G2-058 Abi RACT WIND DIRECT ION s HANNEL XR-90-102-2 (ELEVA110N 3N FEEL e FAILED. THL WIND DIRECTION CHANNEL IS COMMON 10 UNiis 1, 2. AND J. iHEr;E WERE NO PREVIOUS SIMILAR EVENTS. IN LINE FUSE IN THE LoiERLIfi ANGUS hELORDER BLEW DURlNO AN ELEC1RICAL GTORM. T HE FUSE WAS hEf-L A'.UU AND iHE t.YSTEM WAS RE TURNED TO SERVICE WITHIN 24 HOUkb.

FORM 8 LER SCSS DATA 03-03-u6 a... **** ****....******..************..... .........+.... .........

DOCLET YEAR LER NUMDER REVISION DCS NUMDER N5IC EVENT DATE 259 1902 001 0 G2021602bo l ~/ 2 0 0 v1/03/OJ j ................... ... ....<* .... ............ ... ...............

... DOR ET*259 BROWNL FERRY 1 TYPE:DWR REOION: 2 NSSS*OE ARCHITECTURAL ENOlNEER: TVAX FACILITi OPERAiOR 1ENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHOklii SYMBOL: TVA ADS 1RACT

.i METEOROLOOICAL INSTRUMENTATION 0-TDR-90-103 AIR 'iEMPERATbhE DELTA 1 Al i

ELEVATION 620-737 MSL AND O-XR-90-102-1 (30 FOOT AIR sFEED) Af

ELEVATION 620 MSL FAILED. (TECH. SPEC. TABLE 3.2.I.) 1HIS i , INSTRUMENTATION IS COMMON TO UNITS 1, 2 AND 3. LIGHTHING DAMAGE YO

! TRANSISTORS G3 AND 04 CAUSED THE O-TDR-90-103 OUTAGE. 2 ELOWN FU5Eb IN PANEL 9-34 AND 2 DLOWN FUSES AT THE METEORULOGIC AL STATION RENDERED O-XR-90-102-1 INOPERADLE. FUSES AT THE ACROMAO 312D WERE REPLACED AND THE UNIT RETURNED TO SERVICE WITHIN 24 HOURS.

FOhM 9 LER SL6S DATA 03-03-Oo

.....*.** ........**,.*********.****.....**.........e**........... .

DOC l 'ET YEAR LER NUNDER REVISION DCS NUNDER NS)C EVENT DALE 259 1902 v15 0 02031GO259 1'/2499 02/09/02

- ...,******....*******...*****.**,******+****........ .............

DORET 259 DROWNS FERRY 1 DPE:DWR 8

REGION: 2 NSSS OE ARCHITECTunAL ENGINEER: TVAX FACILITY OPERATOR: TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY I SiMDOL TVA COMMENTS l STEP 2 COMPONENT XR - WIND SPEED AND DIRECTION RECORDER, MODEL NO. 312D.

REFERENCE LER58 1 259/82-ovl 2 259/60-002 3 <S4/02-05u o :.5 % I-026

1 .

- ( (

AB51'tiAC f D(nT A T O O-XR-90-lO2-1. O-)R-90-lO2-2 4620 MSL VWlND5 PEED AND WIND DIRECTION), AND 0-Xh-90-lO3 (737 MSL WIND bit EC TION) FALLED (IECH.

.: , nNti SPE s.. . 1ABLE 5.2.1). THis INSTRUMENTA1}ON 15 s.ONNON 10 UNild 1,

' 3. PREVIOUS EVENT 52 BFRO-50-259/82001. 269/60002. LIGHTNING STRUCL IN PROXIMITY OF THE ENVikONMENTAL DATA STATION CAUSING FAILURL.

REPLACED INSTRUhENTATION-T'rPE FU5ES IN THE 620 MSL W/G. W/D AND 737 M5L W/D CHANNELS REPLACED ACRONAG MV/l . NODEL -812D ON THE 737 M5L W/D. CHANNELS WERE RETURNED IV SERVICC IN 1-1/4 HOUR $.

v;-v8-oo 10 Lt:R SCbb DAi A FORN

.* ....-...<4+ .***. ............ ..*...++.**++.......*............**

16.5 NUMbth N51C LVEN DAit DOct EV NEAR LLR fiUNDER bEVlblON 043 O G2Ouv 3017 :.:. 1754ev 0.se sG/ s.-

2 y, 1902

.......****..........+....,+**...+....>.++..............+.......

DOCt ET:259 6h0WN5 FEhRY t irt'E DWR REGION: .. rd 58GL ARCriiTECTURAL ENGlHEER ivAA -

FACILITr OhiRATOR: 1ENNE5SEE VAL.LLi AUTHUhlTy

$vMBOLt IVA ABSTRACT DELT A AIR TErif ERATURE RECOhiER o20-7 9, Ji 19.i..$

N5L iibh-90-lv.D WA5 ObiikVfD

. THIS li rsTi.OhlihTAi ( 0h I E.

TO FEAD DOWNiCALE ON .JUNL 39 AND . July CONMON TO UNIT 6 1, 2. AND 3. YLC H Lhi T AULE ' 4. 2.1 bEOUARES A MINIMUM GPERABLE OF ONE DELTA AIR TEhPEHATuriE hECORDEtt bETWEEft i ELEVATION 6.~.0-737 M5L. 1.lOHTHING 51RUCt; ]N iMai VIC INil Y OI iME ENVIRONMENTHL DATA STATION C AU5IliG F AILURE OF THE DEt.TH Ain TEPPERATURE RECORDER 620-7 37 HEL. ELOWN FUtE: PthE Flit.6Chie. i t tL

' 620-737 MSL AIR 1EMPERH1Unti. RECORDtik WAs OUT OF %Rv u.E Fox t o Hudh 5 i ON . JUNE 30 AND 16-1/2 HOUh5 ON vuLi 4. 1962. 1H15FLANNED. lb CUNdlbEnCis A RANDOM EVENT AND NO FURTHER RECURRENCE CONTROL l' e

LEh SESb DATA vi~03-06 FORM 11

)

NblC LVLNT DAi'l DOC)El YEAR LER NUNDER REVISION DCS NUMbEh 250 1982 059 0 82001o0115 1/o903 w/ lv/ G2 i **....,**********...........*....********+..................*.+..

DOQ ET 259 DROWNS FERR'r i fii'E BWei REDION: .- NS55:GE ARCH 11EC1 URAL ENGINEER: fVAk FACILITY OPERAlOR: 1ENNE55EL VALLhi AUinOR Tv SiMD0Lt TVA C0hMENTS

$TEP 2 COMPONLNT AR - Nabb DlhEtilvN HECohDt'H. Nupt L (*>. 1-11015.

ADSTRACT I LLCV. 620 MSL WIN!* DIREC110N bECORDEN (1-)H-wo-lO2-2) WAt Ubw 2. RvlD ANitTV 3.

READ DOWNSC ALE. 1His INdTRUMENTATION 13 COMMON 10 uni l'a 1 TECH SPEC 1 ADLE 3.2.1 HCOUlhES 1 HAT ( HANNEL 10 bL siPERAblL.

) LIGHTNING STRUCU IN THE VICIN11Y OF THE ENVinetiMENIAL Dnin STAT ivH CAUSING FAILURE OF 1HL ESTEhLINE ANGUS RECOHDLh (HUDLL L -i lu t 5 s .

DLOWN FUSES WERE REPLACED IN THE WIND DIREETiON CHANNEL AND iI WAS I RETURNED TO SERVICE. THE RECORDER WAS OUT OF SERVICE FOR APPROX 1MATELY SEVEN HOURS.

i

. . FORN 12 LER SCSS DATA 03-03-86 ooooooooooooooooooooo(. eooooo..ooooooooooooo ***J oooo.oo..ono ooo. l

' DOCKET YEAR LER NUMBER REVISION DCS NUNbER N510 CVEN1 DATL

. . 271 19G4 014 9 G49G30047o 191143 v7/23/G4

.... *******.....****....**. *****.+ ....****.......................

DOCLETt271 VERMONT YANhEE TYPEtBWR REGION: 1 N555tGE ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER EDAS FACILITY OPERATOR VERMONI YANKEL NUCLEAh POWER CORP.

SYMDOL: VVC REPORTABILITY CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:

10 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)tt): Shutdowns or t e C rin i ca l F PP C i i i Ca t i Ors Vi016IIOnl.

REFERENCE LERSt 1 271/80-020 nBSTRACT FOWER LEVEL - 000%. DURING WEELLY LNV . AIR SANFLE COLLECliONL ON 7/22/G4, IT WAS DISCOVERED lHAT A CONTINUOUS SAMPLE WAS NOT BEING DRAWN AT SAMPLE STAT 10N AT 1. 2. ~liXH SPECS 1 AblE 3.9.1 REOUIRES THAI CONTINUOUS AIR SAMPL NO DE PERFORMED. LOW PLANT RELEASE LEVEL 5 WERE MONITOREle DUi< LNG THIS PERIOD AND PA51 EXPERIEM.E HA5 INDIC ATED THA1 g THESE LEVEL 5 ARE DETECIADLE BY ENV AIR SAMPLINO. THE hAIN FUSE FOR i

THE SAMil.ING $1AfJON HAb btOWN OUI APPROA O HRS INTO SAMPLir>6 C vtLE.

A SEVERE ELECIRICAL SlORM WAS REPORTED IN THE AhEA AT IHis ilhE. a NEW FUSE WA5 IN51 ALLEb IN THE SANPLE $1nl]ON AND A SUb5EOVENT FUNCTIONAL CHECK OF THE STnTION WAS PERFORMED. NO FORTHER DAMA6E Ws45 NOTED. A PHEVIOUS SINILAR UCCURRLNCE WA5 REP 0RTED AS LER 00-20/ 3L.

UNADLE TO LOCATE HliCORD FOR LER: 27G/GS-018

) FORM 14 LER 5C55 DATA 03-03-86 DOCEET YEAR LER NUNDER REVis10N DCS NUNDER N5IC EVENT DATE 293 19G1 01G 1 G106240033 166550 05/12/01 i ..*****.**********............***.+**********..........++.**.....

DOCLETt293 PILGRIM i TiPE BWR 1

REOION: 1 N555:GE ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER DECH FACILITY OPERATOR

bO510N ED)$ON CO.

SYMDULt DEC ADSTRACT FOLLOWING A LIGHINING HIT IN 1HL AhLA UF MAIN STACE, 1HE SIACl. 645 RADIATION HONilOR 1705-16A ALARMED OH PANEL C '<03 IN T Ht' CONTROL ROOM.

DUTH THE PRE ANFLIFIER AND IULSE ilEIGHT lil5CRININATOR CIRCUlTS HAD FAILED #4PPARENTLi DUE iO A VOLTAOE SUROE GENERATED b/ ThE Lf0HINING STRIKE. THESE SUD COMPONENis WERE REPLACED IN-EIND. THE SYSTEN RECALIDRATED AND RETURNED D3 SERV (CE.

fORN 1b LER SC55 !!AfA 03-03 06

)

D00 ET YEAR LER NUNDER REVISION DCS NUNDER NLIC EVLNi DHIL

! 293 1983 045 0 G309120477 1G5366 0G/02/ 83

, )

- - - - .e*****a.*********....***********.******

i DOCLE1:293 PILORIN 1 TYPE DWR REGION: 1 NLL5tGE "

ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEERag 'ECH I FACILITY OPERATOR' cOSTON EDISON CO.

SYMDOLt DEC REFERENCE LERS:

1 293/82-051 2 293/83-007 ADSTRACT ON 6/2/83, DURING A COLD SHUTDOWN CONDITION, A LOL5 OF 345KV OFF-SITE POWER OCCURRED. THE EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATORS IMMEDIATELY STARTED A5 DESIGNED. STATION SAFETV RELATED EQUIPMENT FUNCllOrdED A5 INTENDED [

DURihG 1HE SWi KHOVER IO EMERGENCY POWER. THE SECONDAR( OFF-5I1E POWER SOURCE t 236N), VIA 1HE SHUTDOWN TRANSFORMEh, CONilNUED TO BE AVAIL 9DLE DOttlNG THIS EVENT. LERS 82-51 AND G3-7 REPORTED SIMILAR RE50 tis, l.E. LOSS OF 3451:V OFF-SilE POWER WHILE SHUTDOWNi h0 WEVER.

CAviE WAS DIifERENI FOR THOSE EVENTS. LIGHTNING S1R at.iNG IN fHE AREA 1RIFFLD LINE 342 AND LOCFED OUT T HE START-UP TRANSFORMER VI AAFlEn t-HA5LA "v DIFt'ERENTIAL stEL Ai . LINE 355 WAS UNAFFECIED by This (NENT.

VISUAL INSPECllON SHOWED Nu APPARENT DAMAGE, FvwER WA5 HEST 0 RCD 10 l t tL TRANiFURMEP. THE EMERGENCY DIESEL OENERATOR$ WERE THEh REMOVED Fi<OM SERVICE.

16 LER SC55 DATA Os-03-6o FORet

.o..u.......n*o.+,u....u.....****a...++...u.....+o*........

YEAL LER NUNDER REVISION DCS NUMBER N51C EVENT DAiL DOCiET Oo/16/G1 302 1981 033 0 8107280588 167624

n..n*n.......ne***u*.ne**n..****...***+.**.***....**..*.o s

DOCIErt302 CRYSTAL RIVER 3 TYPEtPWR REGION 8 2 NS$$rDW ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: GLDT FACILily OfERATOkt FLORIDA POWER CORFORATION t SYMBOL: FPC I AD$TFACT 4 LIGHTNING STRlLE TO THE CR-3 STARTUP TRANSFORMER CAUSED LOSS OF ALL AC POWER. Tt1E LO55 OF POWER TRIPPED AH FANS CAUSING kB TEMPERATURE TO I DE > 130F FOR 15 NINUTES, REACHING A NAXIMUM TEMPERATURE OF 135F.

AC EDG-A b THE F0551L PLANT STARTUP TRANSFORMER PROVIDED REDUNDANCY.

POWER LOS$ WAi DUC TO FAILURE OF THE LIGHTNING ARRESTOR SYbiEM TO 1

PREVENT Loss OF THE CR-3 STARTUP TRANSFORMER. EDG-4 ENERGIZED A 4160 V ES LUS AND b 4160 V ES DOS WA5 ENERGI7ED FROM THE FO5SiL FLHNT STARTUP TRohirukMER. AN ENGINEERING INVESTIGATivN OF THE LIGHTNING (496EsiOR SidTEM FAILUhC WILL DE CONCLUDED by 1/31/02. HIGH RD TEMPERAlUhE W b REDUCED TO <130F WHEN AHF-1 A 6 IC WERE RE51 AkiED.

LER 5L55 L'Al A v .4-O ct-oc I'06M 17

- - uessee**.nns**.s****eeno****enn*******so.eene**.s***n***** EVtNT D4iE i liOct ET NEAR LER NUNDER REV1510N DC5 NUNDEh Ni.i t 302 1901 034 O G107200376 167659 ve /17/ 01 i

e s s e e e e n o s e * *

e e ss e e e e s s *

see s n e s e sn e s e e s s e n e.s.* *

s s s e.e s..s I

DOCrETt302 CRYSTAL RIVER 3 TYPEtPWR REGION 8 2 N555:DW

' ARCHilECTURAL ENGINEER: GLDT FACILITV OPERATOR: FLORIDA POWER CORPORATION SYMDOL FPC j l l COMMENTS THIRTEENIH LUCNT REFORTED UNDER THIS SPECIFIC ATION.

(iBSTRACT

I A LIGHTNING STRIKE Rl. .ERED ALL METEOROLOGIC AL I. TRUNENTATION I

' INOPERABLE. THIS WAS THE FIRST LIGHTNING INDUCED LO5i. OF ALL NETEROLOGICAL INSTRUNENTATION.

ALL AFFECTED INSTRUNENTAllON WAS 8

REPAIRED OR REPLACED AND THE FUNCTIONAL TEST WAS SATISFACTORY. AN ENGINEERING INVESTIGATION WILL BE CONDUCTED TO LVALUATE 1HE INSTALLELs LIGHTNING ELIMINATOR SYSTEM.

i FORN 18 LER SCS$ DATA 03-03-86 IiOCLET YEAR LER NUNDER REVISION LeC S NUME{R N5IC EVENT DATE 302 1982 048 0 8200200229 175067 O~7/15/82

...+.*********,***********n**+...**********++...#+,.........***....

DOCFET 302 CrWSTAL RIVER 3 T r PE t P9t<

REGION: 2 N559:DW ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER 8 GLE4T FACILITY OPERATOR: FLORIDA POWER COhf ORATION SYMBOL FPC COMMENTS NANY PREVIOUS EVENTS WERE NOT lleLNIIFIED Dr LER NO.

ABSTRACT DURING A THUNDER $ TORN, J T WAS DISCOVERED THAT THE WIND 5PElle AND TEMPERATURE CHANNELS FOR DOTH 33 6ND 175 Fl. hEYEOROLOOICAL TOWER ELEVATIONS WERE NOT FUNCllONINO PROFERLi. iHIL 15 CONTRARV TO TECH SPECS 3.3.3.4. THESE ARE THE SECOND AND SI ATH OCCURRENCES FOR THE 33

.; AND 175 FT. WIND CHANNELS, RESPECTIVELV. IT 15 ALSO THE FOURTH AND l FIF1H OCCURRENCE FOR THE 33 AND 175 FT. TEMPERATURE CHANNEL, RESPECTIVELY. THIS 15 1HE 22N!i REPORT UNDER THIS SILCJFICAllON.

THESE INSTRUMENTS WERE AFFECTED DY A LIOHTNIh6 STRILE. DAMAOED LOUIPNENT WAS RENOVED, REPAlRED, AND C ALID6ATED. THL INSTRONEN15 WERE RETURNED TO SERVICE. AN EVALUATION IS IN PROGRESS TO DETERMINE J

NE1 HODS TO PREVENT RECURRENCE OF THIS 1YPE OF EVEN1.

) FORM 19 LER SCSS DATA 03-03-86 e.*****************************************+***************,.*******

DOCLET YEAR LER NUMDER REVISlON DCS NUMBER NSIC EVENT DATE 302 1963 032 O E:309130200 105437 08/05/83 DOCIETt302 CRYSTAL RIVER 3 lite *fWR REGION: J N555 DW ARCHITEC1 URAL ENGINEER: GLDT FACILITY OPERATORt FLORitta POWER C OkFokATlvN SiMOOL* FPC LUhMLN)S STEP 38 COMPONENT ZZT = ALL NElEOROLOOl( At. I NSTRUMENT Al l a sN i ADSTRAC1 AT 1000 ON HUGUST S, 1983. DUklNO SEVLRL WEAlHER CONDI)lONS. THE

' METEOROLOGICAL MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION WAS FOUND TO DE INOPERADLE (TECH SPEC 3.3.3.4). THE INSTRUNEN1 AT ION WAS RETURNED 10 OPERAblLIT V DV 1130 ON AUG 11, 1983. THIS Wns 1HE 1HIRD 11ME THAT LIGH1NING HAS STRUCN THE NETEOROLOGICAL TOWER AND THE TWENTY-NINTH REPORT UNDER I SPECIFICATION 3.3.3.4. THE METEOROLOGICAL INSTRUMENTATION FAILURE WAS C AUSED DY A LIGHTNING STRIKE. COMPONENTS WERE REPLACED AND RECALIDRATED, AS NECESSARY.

8 .

- { ( 03-03-86 FORM 20 LER SC55 DATA -

o **.oooooooooooooneee **ooooooooooooooooooooe**eo+o ooooooooooooooo EVENT DATE YEAR LER NUMBER REVISION DCS NUMDER N510 DOC EET 045 8312130142 1G7846 10/16/03 302 1993 1 6 ************** ,*******************************++ ******************

DOCLET:302 CRYSTAL RIVER 3 T'vPE PWR 1 REGION: 2 N55StDW ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: GLDT FACILITY OPERATOR: FLORIDA POWEh CORFOhATION SYMDOL: FPC COMMENf5 STEP la CONP XE - WIND is1RECTION INDIC ATUR 50YM REPUNi - SEVLRAL OCCURRENCES IN 23 DAY 5 bEFERENtE LLh5:

1 302/82-005 .- 302/82-069 3 302/02-031 4 302/63-00S

ABSTRACT ON OCTOBER 16, 1963, DURING ROUTINE PLANT OPERATION, IT W45 DISCOVERLil ON THAT THE 17F WIND DIRECTION INSTRUMENTATION WAS INOPERABLE.

OCTOBER 28, 1983, lHE 33' WIND DIRECTION INSTRUNLNTATION WAS DISCOVERED INOPERABLE. ON NOVEMBER 2, 1903. THE 3 3' WINO DIRECTION UN NOvlMDER 44, 1903, iHL INSTRUNENTATION WA5 DISCOVERED INOPERABLE. ON NOVEMDER

' 175- WIND L'IRECTIUN IN51RUMENTATION WA5 UUr OF TOLERANCE.

8, 1983, THE 175' WIND SPEED INSTRUNENTAT)ON WAS INOPERnDLE. D AC t .UP DATA W/45 AVAILADLE THROUGH A PRE-ESTADLISHED CHANNEL FROM THE NATIONAL

WEATHER SERVICE. 1HE APPARENT C(4USES FOR THE IN51HUNENTAT ION FAILUt;ES ARE SEVERE WEATHER DAMAGE AND COMPONENT FAILURE. y,ALL IN5 f RUMENTAl lON WAS REPAIRED AND RETURNED TO SERVICE Di NOVENOER 1963. THIS REVISION LiOCUMEN1s ADDITIONAL FAILURES DURING THE SAME TIME PERIOD.

21 LER SCSS DATA 03-03-86 8

FORM NSIC EVENT DATE DOCLET YEAR LER NUNDER REVISION DCS NUMBER I 309 1983 614 O G306030341 183245 04/25/83

+********************.*******************************.*************

DOCLET:309 MAINE YANFEE TYPE:PWR REGION: 1 N555 CE ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: SWXX FACILITi OPERATOR: MAINE YANEEE ATONIL POWER CO.

SYMBOL MYA AD5 TRACT WHILE AT STEADY-5 TATE FULL POWER OPERATION ON APRIL 25, 1903, SECTION 207 OF THE 115UV hEdLRVE STATION SERVICE LINE [<EC AME UNnVAILAULE WHEN ONE PHASE WAS DAMAGED DY LIC41TNING. THE AL1ERNATE SECTION 69 11SKV INCOMING SERVICE LINE HAS DEEN OUT OF SERVICE FOR UP6RADING SINCE APRIL 19, 1983. lHE LOSS OF THE REMAINING 11Sr,V INCONING LINE FORCED I OFERATION IN A DEGRADED MODE PERMITTED DY TECH SPEC 3.12.D. SECTION 207 WAS hESTORED 10 SERVICE WITHIN FOUR HOUR $. DOTH ENERGENCY DIESEL POWER SUPPLIES WERE CONTINUOUSLY OPERADLE WHILE THE LINE WAS OUT OF i SERVICE. SECTION 207 WOULD bE TAKEN OUT OF SERVICE FOR H PERIOD OF LEss THAN ONE HOUR TO INSTALL NEW LIGHTNING mRRE510RS AND THIS ACriON WAS EXPECTED;TO DE COMPLETED PRIOR TO THE TIME SECTION 69 WAS i RESTORED TO SERVICE.

' FORM 22 LER SC55 DATA UFv346

6 o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o ,. o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o ooooooooooooooooo DOCFET YEAR LER NUN. A REVISION DCS NUMBER . 1C EVENT DATE f -

309 1983 025 0 8300110104 185192 07/02/03 DOCAET*309 MnINE YANKEE TYPE PWR REGION: 1 NSSStCE 1 ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER SWXX FACILITY OPERATORt MAINE YANIEC ATONIC POWER CO.

SYMDOL MYA i ADSTRAC T I DURING NORMAL STEADY STATE FULL POWER OPERATIONS, SECTION r4 e OF l'HE

!!5 V.V RESERVE STAT ION SERVICE LINE DEC AME INOFERHDLC WHEN BREALERS F4T J THE SUROWIEC SUBSTATION OPENED. THE AllERNATE IIS LV INCONING LINE, ;

SECTION 207. WAS 0U1 OF SERVICE FOR GENERAL UFORADE. THE LO55 OF THE REMAINING 115 IN INCOMING LINE FORCED OPERATION IN A DEGRADED MODE l PERMITED Dr TECH SPECS 3.12.b. EMER0 ENC ( DIESEL FOLER SUPPLIE5

, REMAINED OFERADLE WHILE THE 115 IN ' LINES WERE OUT OF SERVICE. SECTION 69 WAS RESTORED AND RETURNED TO SERVICE WITHIN 4 MINUTES. LIGHINIHb STORM ACTIVITY THROUGHOUT THE POWER DISTRIbuilON AREA RLSULIED IN IHL TEMFORARY LO55 UF St:VEkAL OfHER SERVICE LINES DukING THE FEAIOD WHEN THE SECTION 69 DREAF.ERS WERE OPEN. SINCE THE POWER SYSTEM DISPATCHER

' WAS ADLE 10 RECLOSE THE BREAKERS AND RE fURH SERVICE WITHOUT 4

DIFFICULTY, 1HE LOSS OF SECTION 69 WAS PRODADLY DUE TO A LIGHINING

, STRILE. THE LIGHTNING MOST LIFELY ACTIVATED OROUND FnULT liutAllON FROTECTION FOR THE LINE, vi ENING lHE SUFFLY EfiEAl erb AT SUROWIEC.

}, 1 FORM 23 LER SCSS DA'lA 03-03-G6

..............*...**................m....+......................

DOO ET TEAR LER NUMBER REVISION DCS HUMDER N5IC EVtNT DALE j 515 1901 049 0 8111vbO703 170051 ON30/UI i ......**............................................................

DOCLET*315 C 001: 1 1VPE PWR REGION: J 115551WE

. ARCHilECTURAL ENGINEERt AEPS ;

I FACILITY OPCRATOR: INDI ANa b NICHIDAN ELECTRIC CO.

S'rMbOLt iME i REFERENCE LERit

. 1 315/79-026 l

l AD.slRACl

! THE 69/4tN ALTEfiNATE bESEhVE SOURCE WAS DECL AhED INOPERAOLE AFTER LP

! VOLl AGE FAILONE- ALARMS WERE RECEIVED IN THE CONTROL ROOMS. lHIS FAILURE AFFEC1ED DOTH UNil ONE AND UN1T TWu. A SIMILAR EVCNT ltlAl OLCURRED FREVIOUSLY WAS REFORlED Van t..E.R. 31S/'/9-026. THE htAHH I INDIC AT ION fiESULT ED WHEN A JUMFE.< ON ONE i HASE OF T HE 691.V F A I L E D.

THIS FAILURE PRUDADLY UCCUkkED DUE TO A LIGHINING STRILE AS H StiVLRt::

THUNDERSTORM WAS NOVING THROU6H THE ARCA. THE PLANTSIDE DELAIERS WLRC OPENED AND REMAINING FOWLR SUPPLIES DEMONS 1 HATED TO DE UPERAbtE. THt.

8 JUMPER WAS REPLACED AND bHEAlER CLOSED WITHIN 10 HOORS AND 6 MINUTi %

I,

} l FORM 24 LER SCSS DATA 03-03-u6 DOCFET YEAR LER NUMBER REVISION DCS NUMDER NSIC EVENT DATE

] i 320 1962 018 O O207090160 174127 06/01/02

.....****e ........................................**...............

leOCtET Sie 1HHt:E MlLE ISt.ANu 2 1 vie:PWR i'

3 -

0 .

REGIONtf 1 N35S BW I

ARCrilTECTURAL ENGINEER: .sNRO l .

r -

FACILITY OPERATOR NETi4OI OLITAN EDISON CO.

SYMBOLt MU COMMENTS STEP 1: COMPONENT XE - ULTRAV10LET LIGHT DETECTOR. STEP 28 liv $ HS - Alk INTAKE TUNNEL. GTEP St T-COL X - LONG TERM COLD SHUIDOWN.

Ab5 TRACT THE AIR INT 6LE TUNNEL (AIT) HnLON LisTEM ACTUATED. 11115 TR160E6ED TriC ACTUATIOli OF lHE AIR DELUGE SYS'IEM AND 1 RIFFED Tite AVA ILink y AND FUEL HANDLING BUILDINGS ( AD .'.. FHin SUPFL V AND LXHnOST F ANS. TH15 EVENf l '!

CONLIDERED REFOklADLE PER TECH SPEC 6.9.1.W D) DOE TO LNTRY INiG AND LONPLI ANCE WITH THE AC'llON ST ATENENi5 Of 'iECH &l'EC 3. 9.12 APD L. 7.10. .'

A5 A RESULi OF LOW VEN f tLAl lON FLOWholE AND INOt t'hnulL ili tuvE IU bliCHARGE) OF THE tlALOt> ' .Vd1 LN. REstLC'ilVELv. 1HF ihl'i l Al lNO L AUSE Uf

~iHE EVENI IS AliRIDUILD 10 LIOtiihlNn $6 t T tilG Oi'F AN UL i RAVIOLt; # Lions l'E T ECTOR IN THE Alk 1NTAt L IUPNEL. LY51EH l'O Lhtuti:L OPEf. AiED As IHC DL iiGNED IH F ERFORMitk. THE '30D'iEOUEN i oi GTEN .N. t VAT i ull>/ TR a i":..

HALON t< DELUGE SiGlENb WE6E ':.E(URLie nNb T HC Vt. 'T IL A f ION Gv51LNb i RESTORED DY 1745 HuURd. i s tC HnLOH S v 5T FM Wo j. t.Lt. hat <vtu ANO HE (Ut<NCH TO 5ERVICE AT 1750 HOUhd Or4 . JUNE 1,/ . 1 %.2.

FORM 25 LLR :4.25 DANA v 3-0 3 m.6 i ** ...,*.....** ...*e...........-..............>+..........#... +e..

DOCtET 'vEAR LER NUMBER REVISIOli DCS NUNDEH NLIC EVEhf DnIC 320 198g Ulo O O2070901o1 l '/ 41 ;,, 06/01/02

4.........**....#.....r.......................................a*...+

1sOtt ETt 320 THREE MILL ISLAND .. T YPE I N6 REOluNt i lii s c.: liW AkCHiIECTUhAL ENGihELR DHno FACILITY OPERA 10Rt NET 60POLITod EDISON CO.

' 5'f MbOL t MEC s

C OhnEN f'2 l STEP 1: CONFONENi NM - ANPL11IER i. HIP.

, REFERENCE LEhL 1 1 320/01-03S 2 D20/01-036 3 320/Ol-Uh.

ADSf6ACT THE WIND REED. W1ND D)hECTluN. ANi' AlR l LNI'LfinTUkE I ND i f. Al l ON IN THL UNIT 2 COHTROL ROOM WAS LOSI. 1 H l'.. LVt:N1 1 > C Oh5 l Dt.hL'H hh EUH I HDL L t LH GECTION 6.9.1.4(D) l'UE TO ENiHV INiO AND CONI LI ANCI. Wl'lh f Ht. ACTION STATEMENT OF TECH wtX 3.3.s.4 THid LER 15 GIMILnR TO LEh S G1-39.

81-36. AND 01-30. TH15 LVENT nab AFPAREN)Ly CAUSED Dy LlOH1NING STRILING THE NCTLOROLnoiCAL TOWER HLSULTlho IN IWO DLUWN HMfLIFICR I (HIPS IN THE FUFI'ER ANPLIFIER AND A ELOWN f~USE IN lHL 12 VOLT F OWER SUPfLY. 1HE COMe'ONCNT, WERE REPL ACf D AND lHE hE1LUHOLOIC AL INSTRUMENT 5 f(ETU6NLD TO SEl<VICE AT 194S HOUlis ON UUNE 1. 1902.

I FOHM 26 lek SCSS DAIA 0 3-O J4 ra I ...........................****e.....e**.e..........** ...... ......

DoctEl YEAR LER NUMBER REVislON DCG NUMDEH N11C EVENT DAIC 320 1902 022 1 0311210400 107467 06/29/62 i ....................***.............,*******...******..e***.*

DOClETs320 1Hkt:C NILE ISIANis i 1(PE PWR ht3.lON: 1 HMGt DW s

AFtCHITECTLOAL ENGINEElf BNRO FACILITY OPERATOf'. METROPOLITAN EDISON CO. I

! SYMBOLt MEC

, t.0MMENTS STEPS 1,2 43 ISYS SW - AIR INTAhE TUNNEL.

HEFERENCE LERS 1 320/02-018 ARSTRACT THF AIR INTAlE TUNNEL (AIT) HALON SYSTEN fiL10ATED. THIS CAUSED 1HE ACTUAi1ON OF Tt16 AIT DELUGE SYSTEM AND 1hIPPCD THE AUA1Li ARY AND FUEL HANDLINO DUILDINGS SUFPLY AND EXHAUST FANS. THl$ EVEN1 IS CONSIDERED REPOATADLE PER TECH SPEC 6.9.1.9(D) DUE TO ENiRr INTO AHD COMPLl ANCE Wilti THE ACTION STATEMENTS UF l EC H dPLC Ts. 9.12 AND 3. 7.10. 3 AS A hESULT OF LOW VENTILATION FLOWRATE AND INOPEFADILITv iDUE TO DISC HARGE ) OF 1HL HALON SYSTEN. RESPECTIVELY. SINILAR fvENil LE6 G2-Ulu. 1HE INITIATING CAUSE OF TH'E EVENT (5 ATTRIDUTEli 10 L IC4i f N t ho ACTUATINO 1HE ULTRAVIOLET LIGH1 DETEC lOttL IN lefE AIR ifJTAI E IUNNt:L .

IHt; Svb1EM UPEHATED AS DEdIGNeiD PLRFOhM(NG 1HE SUBdLvUENI Fi siLM !

ACTUATING / TRIPS. THE HALON AN! DELU6C SYS' lend WERL SE( URED HN(e fHF !

VEHTlLATION 5'tS1 EMS RE50TRED Al 1710 HuVtt ON ,JohE 29. 1902. l Ht: t Ms.UN SYSTEN WAS HECHARGED AND RETURNED 10 SERVICE AT 1627 HOURS ON JULY 9, 1982.

1 FORN 27 LER SCSS DATA v r O3-06 t

, le0Cr ET YEAR LER NUNDCR REVISION DCS NUNDER NSIC EVENT DATE !

320 1983 025 1 0410230116 i M412 06/ 21/ O J !

.... .............. ****.. ..*....+,..........+ ...#........+ .... !

DOCt ElI 329 ittREE MILE ISLAND 2 T'rPEIPWR REGION: 1 NLS$1DW AhCHITECTUkAL ENGINEERI DNRG FACILIT OPERATOR: METROPOLI TAN I:DISON LO.

SYMbGLI MEC e I [

COMMEllTS UV DETEC10R$ SUCEPTADLE TO DE TRIG 0ERED bY L10tl1NlrJG FLASHES. STEPS 1-248 -

ISh SW - AIR IH1/AE IUNNELt STEP 258 1-COLUMN A - LONO TEhN COLD SHUTDOWN. i hEFEF LNC E LERS I 1 320r00-010 2 320/02-023 3 320/GF 014 4 RO/03-93) 5 320163-043 nDbTRALT [

UN o-21-bb. 1HE iOLLOWING WAS DE1ERNINED YO l.t: fLFORTADLL lUhW ANI IU l SLC T ION o.'< 1. 9( D ) OF THE 1ECil SPECG. DElWLCH 926-03, ANie 1-20 03.

1HE Alh IN1 At C 'lVNNCL ( All ) HALUN bv 51LN WAS 6 At<l l ALL ) DISAhNCD UN 11 GCC AslONL. 1HC DISARMING WAS INTENI'lONAL 10 FROTEC'l HIE S'v ilE M FRvM LIGHTNING INDUCED SPUhlOUS HALON DISCHAROED. AF1ER IALSAGE OF THE 8

1HUNDERSTOhM. THE AIT HALON GYSTEM WAG HEslORLD 10 n iOLL FUNCl(ONOL [

i 51 A10%. )Hi:SE EVENTb CONCERN TEC H SPEC 3.7.19. J. ON 3 Ot.CHSIONu ;

(REFERENCE LER S 02-16, 02-23. AND 03-14) 1HE Ali HALON SYSiEM WAS SEI l 1 OFF DY Ll6HINING FLASHES. THE HALON St'b7EN UllLIZES ULTRAVIOLE1 !

i LIGHT AND HATE OF PnESSURE RISE DElEC TORS l'U lhl00ER liiti HALON !

DISCHAh6E. 1HE UV DETEC10R$ OF 2 ZONES AkE 061ENTEle SUCH THAT 1HEv' !

( ) MAY ' DE TRIPPED DY FLASHEG OUISIDE THE AIR INI At,E STRUCTURE. AS AN l INTERIN l'ROTECTIVE ACTION. THE SUSEEPTIDLE Ali HALON Sv'STLN ZGNE G) l l

WERE DIS /4MED DURING THUNDERGTORMS 10 PRLVENT U UH100:. DISCHAkOLS. [

l 3 Pf: hMANLtdi C URi<EC T IVE AL11ON, A1T S1RUr TU6E LOWLb$ l#E 1.Lf.D l

.I .

INSTALLED. LOUVERS SH,' .D PREVENT OCCURRENCES OF g

'E AB0VE EVENIS.

FORM 20 LER $CS$ DATA v3-v3-06

' DOG ET YEAR LER NUMBER REVISION DCS NUMBER NSIC EVENT DATE 320 1993 031 1 G410230123 19S413 07/21/03

- ........***............................................+........,

i DOO E1t320 IHREE MILE ISLAND 4 TvPE:PWR REGION: 1 N5t$t DW ARs.H1TECTURAL ENothELHt bNk0 FACILITY OPERATOkt METROPOLITAN LDitJ>N CO.

SYMBOL: MEC COMMENIS UV DETEC TORS SUC EPT Al LE 10 lie 1 RIG 6E RELI lip L l o*1Trs)No i t. AtHLv. 51 Lt S 1-108 IS'v3 SW - AIR INT At E IUhlit.L1 GTEP 11* Y - C ULUht s a - LOhv l e.nN C ULD ihv ilu.4f l.

REFCiiCNCE LER$t 1 320/02-010 2 320/02-v23 3 32veu'.-vl4 4 2. 0/ O.-i-020 5 320/G3-043 ABSTRACT ON 6-J1-03,1HC FOLL6 WING WAi. DETEhNirvLl' 10 l-E t ali OrtT AbLt. FViiSUAN1 10 SECTION 6.v.1.9tD) i. 'l HE LECH iPEC3. viiiWi Eh /-21 nhD G >-e3. TliE

~

' AIR INTAL.E TUNNEL (AIT) HALON 6(51 Lfl l*,b i Al i i ALL Y D i t Ah M Eli O N 4 GCCA310NG. 'l HE D i $HkM I NG WA'_. I N1 EN T i uNoL 1 0 i R o ltic f iHE :.rsiEM t:RvH LIGHTNING INDUCCD SPURIOUb HALON D150%h0EL. AFTER FALSAGE OF THE M THUNDERSTORM, THE S'v5 TEM WnS RESTORtID TO A FULL FUNCTIGHAL STATUS.

'lHESE EVENTb CONCEMN 1C(tt 0PEC 3.7.10.3. (bffEhENCE LER 03~.$s. ON 3 OCCASIONS. thEFERENCE LER 2 02-10, G2~.: .s AHu O.,- 14 ) Yttu nin tmLUN THE HALOrv Syt.1CM OTlLilEt SYSTEM WA5 SET Off liv Ll6HifliNO FLASHEi.

) ULTRAVIOLET LIGHT AND Rost vt- PRESGURE niiC DE FEC TORT To 1Riv0EH TriE HALON DISCHARGE. 1HE UV l'ETECTORS OF 2 ZONES ARE ORIENTED SUCH THAT AS

' THEY MAY DE TRIPPED BY FLASHES UUTSIDE iHC Alh thT A6.ti i f HUCiURE.

AN INTERIM PROTECTIVE ACTION. T HE 6.USCCP1101.E n11 HALON S(STEM IONEtts WERE DISARMED DURING THUNDERSTORMS TO PREVENT 3FURIOU5 DISCHARGES.

1 PERNANCNT CORRECTIVE INCLUDED 1NLTALLING A1T $ThUCTUhE LOUVERS.

LOUVERS SHOULD PREVENT HECUHkEilCE OF lHE EVENT.

FORM 20 LER SCSS DA1A 03-03-00

ee e.een,e**..*.e e* e***** nee...ee ........ee.eno.eeeeeese..... e DOClCT YEAR LER h9NDEh hEVl$1GN MG NUMbEH td. l C EVENI D4lE 1903 0o3 0419230199 14541 e vG / 27 / 0 3 320 1

............................e........................................

DUG ETt 320 IHREE MlLE l'iLANb .' l v Pt. t PWh hEO l of4 1 N :.SS i liN art *HI TEC11#<AL LN0lilEf.Rt DNk0 FACILIT y 6F EF ATnkt MFTh0FUL I T AN EDitOrd C O.

S'tMbOL MCC i

LOMMEN15 IIV lirTEC10RS LUC EPT Altl.f 16 FF 1 R16r.f bfle 14 f LibHINIHO f L. ASHCt. Sil:PG l-Of i ISYS SW - AIR INint li 1HNNELt S1EP 91 T -C ULUMil A - Luh6 ILhM CULD SHUIDOWN.

REFERENCE LEld.t 8 1 320/02-010 2 320/02'023 3 320/03-014 4 320/03-025 5 320/03-031 AbtTHnc1 l _

I ON 6-21-03. THE FOLLC

'iEC T ION 6.c.1.o( B s ci-[ '.HE TECH GF ECS.NG WAS DETERMINED BETWEENtim / AND 9-12-83.TO LE THERij~ % TABL l

Alfi INTAL'E TUNNEL (Alii HALON 5) STEN WAt FARilALLY DitAAP'ED ON 3

. *OCCA5IONG. THE DISAkMINO WAS INTENTION TO I hvTtC Y reid dv> TLM Fh0M

, 1.10t1TNING INDUCED SeLURIOUS HALON DISCHARGES. AFTER FASSAOL OF 1HE STORM. 1HE SYSTEM WAS RIISTORED TO A FULL FUNCTIONAL STA105. THESE EVENTS CONCERN TE(H SFEC 3.7.10.3. REFEl<EN( E L f'R 't f-t3-25 ANI) 83-31.

ON 3 GCC A510NS (LER'S O2-18. G2-23. AND 83-614#, 1HE AIR HALON SYSTEM WAS SET OFF DY LIGHTNING FLASHES. A5 AN IN1E RIM Fh0TECTIVE AC110N.

iHE SUSCEPTIBLE All HALUN SYSIEM ZONE ($) WERE DISARMED DURING STORMS ,

TH PREVI:N1 iPURIOUS DIStHARGES. 1HE HALON $YSTEN UilL121.5 OLTRAVIOLET I t.10HT ANb F.4i E OF FnESSUnd hiSE DE ID. TORS IU iR 100i R IHE liALOfI *

[

D15C HARoli . 1HE UI.YhAVIOLL1 l'E1Li.lOH5 OF 4 s'uhtS AHL URIENTED SUiH l VHAT THtiv 11 A f bis 1kitPED IM flAtilE5 OUISIDE Ue* I t tt' Alh IN Dd t !

STh0C1Uht. PF PelnNEN I 8. OliF L C I ) Vi: HClION ) NL LUDL D #NL1At.tenION OF Al'1

> Vnue. Y UHt. L ouvi- ia , utsAhMING IHE nlR HALUN Vr iua H M htitN D)p.UNIIN0tD.

i r

I 06rl :o lLR SC55 l'AiA 0 3-O *:t - O(. L i ......................... ........................................... I DO'. t El %nk LER NUNiLh hEV1510N K S NUNbli. N:.lC L VE N'l 18A FE 3.: t 1%) v'/ 4 0 61001J0172 li.44 G4 v)/20/01

........................++.... ............++ ......................

DUC t ET: 321 Ho1C H 1 f yf it s bW...

hilbiONI ..

NSSSIOE I H he.M i I L C T U H A'. f N v i h L E M t BES$

7 l

FAC1L11* UF t'hniuR OLOROIA FOW1.k (U. l 8

S v hDOt. t OFC l

I LOMMEN12 :

.T riF f r (Odr ONENi NM -

) R ANi.15 i OL .

I hEFERENCE LLn5:

1 3.'l/7'- 004 .

nos mACT I 1HE MAIN SMCI. Off-uAb FLOW HECOkl+Eh WAS FUUND )NOFERATIVE. E.1.5. l ht'OUIRES (vNT INUOU MUNilvHINO Ut> SIACl. Geb FLOW. 1H14 l$ H I hEFET1TIVC 1VENTt L.Ek SG '421/1979-084. . 1HL CAULE HAS DLEN ATTRIDUTED i IQ CGMP 0NENT FnlLU6E. 1HE FAILUhE WAS DUE iO SEVChnL IHANdi$ TOR l FAILUREL IN L ACH I t.OW NEASURINO UNI 1 THL CONF 0NtiNib WLhl hLl LACED, t, l HE FLOW I Hi s l'.'. HEC nL il*R ATED nNie hE IUriNED 10 '.ERV IC t:. l l

t f GhN 31 LLk St.S'. DAIA 03-U3-Oc. !

.................................. ........ ........................ l l'O(i E f YLob Li h NUcil.1 h bl.V I S l oN I n ': NUNiit b tb 1( lVLN1 DAl C. [

3.?; 108', o.19 O US16100194 l 'er.i 4 s .S O'</09/05 ;

.................................................. ................. l, l

Dvd C T 32.> i.i t0nte loM i y Pti [*We-l 8

h rr.18 'N i i Ni.' .d f OE '

ontHiILCIUhot. t.Nu l NI .li k a st1:t )t i ACll 11 4 LHAiOR: LONO ISLAND LibHIJN0 8.O.

I S v H t+06.1 Lil I l

f hEPOHTAblLilt ColeLL i Oh *lHis lek Ahl8 t i 13 10 (FH 'io.73t4)(2)(iv) ESF Mtuationa. !

l Alt % T H At'.1 I Poidh i LVLt -

oOlk. e st . % . '-4' i A'l 1 v9. Ao b e ..t e vi i t.iu.e '..f m <i'tti i i

l

VENTILATION SYSTEM (R( 'S ) / C CHTROt ROON AIR CCWDI 9N I NG K R*+C )

1N111ATIONOCCURREDDUnTOANUNDERVOLTAGCCONDIT[4N. THE FLANT Witt

,IN OFERATIONAL CONDITIOft 2. THC UNiiEHVULTA0t' LOrlDITION woi DUE TO A i 10HTNING STORM WHICH C AUSEli THE 13e i V OFFS 11E FOWER V0 DE(hCatt be 6t .V . ALL ELECTRIC AL DUMES fiCING FED FROM THE t h AV e-vWEH WERE

' REfu.*CED PROPORT]DNALLY. THis UNDEhVOLTAGE TRIP 15 A NOhNnL DESIGN I

CONDITION FOR EQUIPMENT DEING UTILI2EI) FOR NORMAL PLANT OPERATIONS.

DV INITIATING RDSVS/CRAC. THE REAC10R DLD6 NORNAL VENTILATION SYdTEN [

(RDNVS) TRIFFED DY DESIGN. ONCE THE C AUSE WA5 DE1El<MihED. fnd hDNVd !

WAS RETURNED 10 NORNAL ANI) THC bitLV5/CRA( WAS iEthhED. IttEhi' WAS NO LofETv SiONtr U.ANCE 14 THE EVEH1.

i ohm 52 LER SCtb DniA v 3 -v > u. j

................. .... .<...u..... . . ...+e**...<.o.... .a ......a l'Os.e i T YEAR LCR NUNOCA hEV)5)On in. 5 NUNDLR r $1C L vt on UAiC :

3 .~5 1004 v2S O S410 t G u% / 1'*1014 . m I w .c o

(

......................u..............................o....n... I i

DO. t ET 32S DHUNSWif.l: 1 I vf Et liWP DF:G1ONI .! Ni.tLt Oi {

i tW<C H I T EC 1 Unnt. ENGINERI UECA FACILITi OPI.6410Hf L OROL I Nn POWi k b L IGH f L O.

sV Mtuit. : CPL j f

C UhME N i '

t T t' F 5 1 AND .':I l f T L( T Is= C t. i t ( R 1 C Al . D A ST ukDor.o. L I ':. I ( F on ( wii orn.t H i1e f I

AL OUGT is.4L 110N110R.

J,

"* FCPORTAblL1Tv' CODES FOh (Hid LOR ARL 1; 10 C FR 50. 7 3 4 a ) ( 2 s t i v ) IISF .u t u.s t t ein t .

iuaThnC1

}

I'OWER I.LVCL - 00%. ON 9-10-U4, Al viO9, n UNIi i nuiUNniit hLot'lvh GCHAM AND A PRIMAR) COtti AINMEH1 GROUP 1 ISQL ATIOll OCCUkhtte in>L 10 AN I i

1NDTRUNENT UPSC ALE AC TUAllON OF UNI I 1 DEHCTOR MAIN STLAN L INL RADIATION HIGH MONITORG t -b l 2-hM-l:603C AND D. AT 1H2 liMC. Uhli ! W* i c. J AT 9'% l'OWER. AT 0915, ON 9-10-04. THE UNIT 2 bf"o AUTONAllCAll.Y i i

INITIATED DUE TO A NCUTkOh FLUX HIGH $10llAL TO THE REAC TOR nVEfiAOL f>OWER RANGC MONITORING SYS1CN. AT THC TIME UNIT 2 WAL IN n ;

REFUEL / MAINTENANCE OUTAGE. THE EVENIG ftESULTED FROM L10*llHlho i STRICING THC UNITS' CONNON TUhlilNC l' LUG STRUCTURC HEATER l.Ai I

TEMIGANTRY CRANE AND COMMON ELECTRICAL SWIICHYARD AREA. WHI C H lill'UC C h CLLI.TRIC AL INFULTES IN10 i: ACH UNIT 'S LUD.JLC T I N i.'l R U NI N T h f le W . AflEh !

IHE Ull!T 2 EVENT. 11lE Ft':. T4IP GIOHAL HA; HCSCT. DUklHO 1H4: UNti 1 l

$ CHAM HCCOVCfiy. bEHC IOR LEVEL DRIEFLY DECREASED TO LON l.LUt L hU. 1. I 1HL UNI 1 H10H FHLG%URE COOLANI INJECTION AND HEACTOH C 01{ 1996.4IIUll COOLING SYSTCMS AU f 0NAl lC ALLY $16A1018 t>U 1 lilD NOT 1NJLtl. H AC 1 vk (

SAFETV Hl.Lilf VALVI D.is v ) 10130 AUI'OM6 f H.nLL) LIFTLD ni IHL HlUHC'st l l

DE AC TOk f riC%URC Of 1199 ISIO. AND OhVS f ul 34 HND f. Hi.bl. HANUnt i. ,

Of ENED 10 CON 1h0L hiiAC lust FRE%URL. Nu GONIC INDIC6ilvN Of SAv l PUsillONS W45 AV411.HDLI . al lHOUAH Till: thV 1 AILPlf't; 1LMc LkAIUtt. l INDIC AinHL WEHC F UNCllONING FROPCHL). FULLOWING Ph% nut: Of HunRitoht i j i lil ANA. OHD5000CNT blAfInk (R111rAl11V 09 leNil I WAb IAlnbis'.HID t.N .

2 9-15-G4. l I

! ' (

) i OhN 33 Lt.h ttt0 l'AIA oeum i j ....................................................................

) DOCIET YCAR LCR NUNDER RfNislON liCS NUNDCh NSIC CVI N T l' ATE ;

i 33t tog 4 020 0 040/2*.0$d6 Iv0/30 Ow I7/04 f

................e........... ..(....................... ... <.**e...

i L -

I

'DOCPETt331 ARNOLD T'vPEtf*WR I

REGIONk 3 NSC.t.: GE

l. ARCHI TEC 1 UHAl. ::NI.INEEk t OFa H

. FACILIT) (41hhIDHs 10WA L LI.fTih l t ( I bH~l i t i me t< f. O .

> Vf MLiOl . t i ti t.

C6MMENTS STl?PS 1 5 4 AND 138 NOBEL 64-PTO REPOR1 A131LI TY rnDFS I s)k TH E S L EH ARF:

13 to CFR So. 734 4 )( 2)( s v): L t.V a c t uri t i ntes.

hEFEkENCE LEIU.

1 3:: l /04-e sN. J 'O l /04 00 ?: 1 : 41 e r al . . ia .4 . < l /.e 4 -O l i 5 %1/77-o'# e. . 4 it t / H 4 o e /

abs 1 RAf. T l'OWER t i. vel. - v". 7 'i. . 'l l u 'A S1 ANDin i si 16 6 lui.e i we'l e e is. . . . * . ii.u ii f e Adle) MAT IC Al l y 4 T i he: Ate t 'fLFAkoll' on~v . He *

..m un.. the infinN SibNALS FFWI THE t. Of fl h ol lil.Dn Alle I N i hi l' n ecol'i m i l o w N' *N ile 'H. IN EntH :ASE. ilH- RAlei Al st ati lil 1HE nke o t.en h teelir inet U les hd of NORMAL b A C 6 6 R O U Nie L.l: V Lt. $ . 1hE bl6NALt. Lihi- 116 Ne it i , h n :. I A: :.l- ANie i14. 14 0 WA1 HESCT. AM ER INVE%)lOATION. Ie I ; tit'.L i t m o eHos o e As i .,L e)F 'e Ht: t

'A INIT I AllON MAY Il HlbH NOl5TINI ok ^l Hurd d A Oh M3.. hf_t L. AC EMtINT OF r THESE MONilOHS ANI) HELOC AT ION IO n LL'.c. L Xh e ;i.O Aktin imvd bi.CN INITIATED. RADI Al lVN 1 tai. A f NORMol. I A'. t >:.hu' .rai e i.l N I.L S A N D i n C Sl'U i.

8 (UNC TIONCD Ah Dtbl6ht: D.

FORM 34 t.Lh 58. % l'A1A

.....~...........'e U .4 - 0 .< - O . .

1

......................................... .c. 4 1800 CT vi: AR LER NUNith htIVI SI ON I n. . NUNblo o l o. 1vlNf DAit l 33.4 1402 033 0 :4 9J2:.U.m a i 4a / t 07 /00i v.'

............................................ .+,,.+....i.6... .ee....

DOCLEf t 333 FITlPA1RICl; T itN:l l4.lu hC610NI i N1.% 861 ARCHITl:CTURAL LiiOINt:1.Rt SWO

) F A C I L I T i' O r>E R A T O R I F OWLk AU1HUR11 v s el 1tif sea H. in to sy ML*0L t PNv i Ab3 TRACT RESERVE IOWER lihCA6Ek 10022 WAt. OPf4 00k Al-tw alNnitty 4 MINOTES 1Hvi C AUSINA # 3 L I66t f HOUGL HILL LlhL 10 lif. Nu r m o ti obt.L. h's SIUNIF D: ANT HA/Ahle I:A l tlED lit t. Altit 1 HL Olbl h l i'.4 V l.104. Lan :

d lLL "VAILhl4LL AN!' IS . I CROSS TICle SUCH 1 HAT IH 1hG EVCHI OF n Villi e h ts- We d el HIMUt.ilNG l.OiG OF HOuti: St.RVICC LOWER. ALL LOAbb WUULie HAvi i s.rton NLie i.Nt'60lll:te VI A ;

THE HVAILAbtE !!M.V LlHC. SEL TL Lil dit bl. # 6 Ht.hC L I t'nunUnAf H 3.4.A.l.A. LibHININ6 SThUCL ONC Of list 1W0 1 I M v ht:M hvi; I Uht 6 Llt'LL C AUSINie GUI l'LY Dhtne Ln Tu Ol'EN. l HL UPI:lin e Uh ( 4.n'. t l e # Ht: Uht 96 EH l CONTh0L SW11CH I N " AU f 0 AFI Ch b iet "* l'U r.1 l i o n i 4.U n i l N U I Ht. 9010 hCCLitil !

FLATUht? UF 1 Hl. DhEnlLH WHILE HC 8.HLLLle POWLh LUlHHUL L t.h ll.H HNil 1:NiUhED 1HC l.INL WAL CLCAR FOR hllLO'djNO leht ne 1.6 I

F06H SS LLH SCG5 UnlA 9)-04-U0 I .............................................e........ .............

DOC F C T YLHR LLH NUMiit lt blVISION Ovo NUMH:h Nila iMN I DAlt.

346 1961 000 O OlO303OU34 !?4312 01/27/01

) ....................................................................

t isOCl CT I 346 l'AV I S-lil:%l: 1 1)i l' Iw.

e ht.o i nN I J l e i.' . .. t t M

.l e s

AFCHITECTURAL ENGINEERg ECH

{

FACIt.!TV OPERATOR: iOLEDO l.DISON CO.

' GYM 80t. sEC COf1MENTS WEATHER WAS WET AND SNOWY AD51AACT ON JANUARY 27 SW11CHv6hliIn.lS i iklFPEle AND LOCiCD OUT. l>E-ENEhOlZING ST ARTUP TRANSFORMER v2 AND CHUS. LNG THE GInT ION 1:$.G IN DUS DEING l'OWEhED 18Y ST ARTUr> 1hnNiFOhMCH v2 10 F ASI TRANLFER 10 ST Ah f Uf' 1PANSFORMEk 01. ON FLbhUhRY 1. J DU L 1kIFPI D AND LOO Ele Hul .

DE-ENEROlllNG ST AR10P 166Ni4 OhMEH ist AND I.AUi.ING THE STAllON 12. 0 I N hv5 A TO FAST TRAN'.Iih in '.'I AH l UP IR6HGFORMEA "2. T HE t. DUi IRIP OC C U6 heli l>UE 10 AC 1 D iN i-BON A l'l hE( 11 uni 4L Uh0VND (Uhhl:No f(E LH V HND 1 HAT THE C f HASE LloHlh tfl0 nhki slER on .nI Ak f 0P TRAN3FvFMth OJ APILA% Ele (HokOEls. THIS COULD HAVC i<f.EN f AU..l le by AN I N i f.UNAt. F AILURE . A dot 1 OF L l6HTHING Oli ELI.e. T h it ot '9 'h0i . . IE.llN6 DE f thMihEle 6 0H I Ht. .I UU; .

THAT T HE "le" PHASL L 106 0 N I Nn eibbf '..Tr h ilAle f (911. I t'. D . IN bOlH I Ni.i nNo. la .

1 ht. WL AT HEh HA':. SiluWV of i4 IM i .

I OhN 96 l.i.R SC .J . DA'l A 0 ;:- 0 3 4u.

................................... .. ........e................e...

TiOC 6 El YEAf( LER N8 NI4 i- blN f ' . l ON liC S NUN!;f.R N :. l C EVLNT 13A11.

?iA 1o04 von o if 4 0 4. 4 9 .. .'3.

1.b .:<., g

. 03/2//G4 I ......o............o.. 4. .. ...... ............e.+e.. ..........ie...

DOC t Eit 364 FARLEY .' iltCIPWh .

htelotu N9 5:WE AhCHI TEC IURAL EHAlf ai Eht HC VACILITv OfFfin Uni i-l Al'ONo i Ol'l H t O.

5 4 fitu it .1 e .I ':

)

hEFORTAltiLITY CODES FOti 1 H 1 '.. l . l: b' Aht:s 13 to (Fh Sie. 7 )(a ) ( c e t t v i t l '.A netoitturie.

AlisikAC T I POWER I1:Vi~L - 100'<. . AT 1247 ON 04. iht; hEnC ich 1klFf'ED FROM 100*4 POWEk DUE TO A POWCh I.oNUE hidlibnN HIGli i LH A NCOATIVC HATE. ftilS WAS C AUSED DY ALL C ONih0L hold. l'hliFl'INA IN10 lHE t.06E l'UE 10 A VOLl AOE I SUNOE, CAUSED DY TEV(h6 L10hlHINO. WtilC H ik II i CD litL I H IMAR v ANI>

i<AC LUP 3 VDC I'OWLf< 'iUl f L IE : 10 Att. I i'UP hOli (ONihot i OWI.h C AtilNL10.

THE Al:Ac10R ikiP bfdolEP" nFt.lli h DUt in 'lHL HIOH liEOAI IVI: hAFL.

f OhN *i 7 IIk 5 . l'AI A O 't ~ 0 > O 6

...................................... 4........ee.... ........,,...

l'OCl 1 T ) C Al< l.1 h NUNiit t, til VI' l e sti ( n. '.. NUHitli' it. i t LVI.NI 19611

?,A 14 0 '.. 010 .. . i ;.. . i;. l . eO4 /.

. 19' .c o u o//l*i/US s ....eeeeeeeeeeeeeeee..e...e.e.es.eeees..e..e.s..e.e......o...e......

DUC ) [ T I '4/A F Ahl EV g f il't 1I'WH i hlOloNr . rF ' '.i Hl:

AhCHliECIUkAL EN0lNlths dew .

F Al'. Ill T V Of 1.kA T UNI nt AliANA f uki h (Ie.

I % ,Mi'ist i ni C COMMENTG

) STED 01 CONP MEl - fAi.1 l>E AD l'U . T h ANM l R lel Vlt i .

hElOklADILIT) C ulit: I on lill* l.4 P 6hl i i 13 to 0 6 '..o.7:nai..'esives I.i te. t o ti t t e ri' .

o I

ABSTRACT

! POWEh LEVEL - 09% AT 1949 ON 7-15-65 DURANO STEADC SFATE OPERATION

. AT 99 PERCEN) POWEH 6Nu WITH SEVERE THUNDinsiunMi IN (eti AHEn, A HEAC10h TRIF OCCUhhED bOE TO A HIOH NC04 TIVI: I t.U t HATE. HS DETECTED Dr THE POWEH HANOE NUCLEHH DETEC TORd. LIGHTNihu Al>PAHENTLY CAUSED A VOLTAGE SUROE WHICH ThlPPED bOTH THE NORNAL AND REDUNDANT POWER SUPPLIES IN ROD CON 1ROL SYSTEM POWER C ADINC1d 2nC HND 20D. THE CONTROL RUDS POWERED DV THESE C ADINETS DROf FED IN10 lHE COhE C AUt..lNO THE HIGH NtiOATIVti FLUA RAll. SHORTLY AF(C6 HE 1 RIP. DOTit OEhEk+VIUR '

OU1FUT f 4RE(d fin. OFliNi:le i RENATUREL Y RESUI.1 INO IN l'L'-ENCfo3121NO ALL THREE nFnCinH L Out. ANT FUMI >5 DEFORE THE F A'; I DEHD pus ) MNSFQtf-EAfUhE COULD 1RANiFEk THF.lR I OwEh SIFPLY rh(el 1HF. oth ILI APv 'iu 1HL STARTUP T RANSFUDMEic. . 1Hi! HESUL11HO l.Crs:. OF FORCI:li Cvot.A'sT e (htVLAT ION

~

CONSIITUltD o "NOT IF !( AIION Of UNUS.UHL LVLN1' ( Odbl i i 09 NATURAL C lkC ULnT ivil (nOi.INO WA., VERiF IED. AienCulMent.Lv .n. M i ho iE :. (# (En i Ht.

h E AC 10R 1 h l t ' . Ft ht 10R C OOL ANT FUNP ; D WAb S i e,R e ll.' nhD i nt' t"Oi ll'IC iil l ON OF UllU':.Unt, lWLNi s.UNDI e ION 8 ser. lLRMINHTED. I t . .. I l h a VLMsFiED IHE F R O P E R O F L b n i ) n N Ot' I nt OUIPUT 1:RI: At Lin. nND i90 f nii l'E A0 14U :

1RANSFEH. I Ot.LnWlhu IESi iNO AND lHE CUMPLE l lON OF hEnUlkED UEPHIte '. -

8 1HE UN)I hLlUbbt.it 10 l'OWilh UPL kA i l ON ON */ l'i- W.

l FOnM :p lek SCSS DAIA 03-03-Ot

.......................................+................ .. .........

DOCI C I 'v lnk LLH hl*h0En REVl 510N DLS NUMDEH NilC LVEh1 DATE e

MO l ' .itl nov ei 01011404.u ! ? ! 's .ra 1 i / 22 / O.;

.........# .................................#.......+... 4..........

... f icul t E l 3/.:s Ohl nN..HS l'UC L LAR l' Ivf'Elith

~

hEOlONI 4 N5SSiti; e 6C HI TLC IUto.L t Neililt.L H I Ot:Cil LoCJL11, of L66)Oni Ahl AN;M l Owl 4 AND L16ni to. ;

s r ht"! L t of L l MLFERENCE LinSi

! M u/02-iniv v 3/.0/01-010 3 Mur t, U-OSir 4 XO s (.0-OH !

t'. 3(.0 / u 2 - 02 / r. 360/02-005 7 M.0/te.O-v.16 x 360 / N-07 ct I <> MO/ /0-v13 iO 360/74-004 11 M6 / '/ O- U21 12 MO/ 70-U/O nbsThnCY I ON 11/22/02 WHILL IN Mul'E 2. CON 1h0L LLC NEN f hi:.i!Ni'L y LALCULATOk 0:EAC) H .' f A I l L D . CLA POS11 ION hEADINOS WLhl I nt l'il E VI:Hr 4 HOURS. HilD THE i.06.E I hOli (1 )Uf' C Al C UL ATf'46 (CN J WLid I i tu. L l IN C Lnc H2 INOP in.

h t O U l b f te lov A'. I i vH "s OF llXH Of LE Inl4LE 3. e l . C L n'. HI WAs of thADLE.

CFC <t Attu 6 Alt Els Al 1His 1 INE l'VI IHL Ulhth .i HnNNt;t.S hl NAINLl' OPI:hohtL. Ohte ; CI C C HnNNLL':. ARE hEUU t hEle IU DL Oll;h6btE (CH ILCH

' 'sf I'C 3. 3. l .1.

. 1H1> OL t UhhCNC E 1G hlT OR fAl4Li l 'l h I Ls. H f f L t 6. 6. A . ?' . D .

SlHILnk Od8lhl l NCl?.. WLhl kl.POkll'll IN LLH 4 U."69 *. Ul mlu, ten -o'3v .

6 N D f lo - v'.G . OIHLH UCCUhkl.NCI:d I DLN i l F V I Nu 8. l. ne i hil.Uhl u Wi t L hLl ukill8 I IN LLH d U4-ed/. 04-00 % 00-0J0, 79-U/3, N Ol s.79-094. /u-vv% AND 70-020. Nu uiC 11 IL L AUGL f OULte l'E DC flihNj NLle. O HC C 6Uli i U.E L iliLY C UULit DL hl.Lhllli 10 h LllAtININO GIUhM I N l h v 6 hl:Ss of lHE liht UI IHE

' OCCUhhl:NCL. (LAC H2 AN! C i 'C 'C ' HEC C IVE PUHt h i kud 1 HL $ANI SOUld: I. .

..nF TWohC nNie HonliWAht: l..elnONOG i l C 6 hEVL AL L D Hi s thblCnisuh vi lHE f olMl; UF 1ht i AILUhl. C C AC Nd AND all ( ( WEhl: ht-l Nil int.1ll D ANls lHE I ICHlUDit '!OhVI Il lnhC LS WLht l'LHFukHCil f u VLHlf , PhorEH UithAllON.

AFICh I'hMVINO Of(:hnDltIiY, r; C AL 692 AND fIL L WI.hl hLIUhNLD 10 SEhVICE.

I f OhN M l.1 h M% leAT A O p .U ? %s.

l .............e4............ .................. ..... ................

dCVET re YEAR LER NUMW 94EVISION DCS NUNBER 'C EVENT DATE '

36G 1985 016 0 8509200061 1 . . , 1 88 09/05/85

. oooooooooooooseeeeeeeeee.*eeeeeeeeeeesososooeeeeeeeeeees . eeeeeeeos t

. DOCVETt368 ARFANSAS NUCLEAR 2 TYPEtPWR I HEGION: 4 NSSS CE !

ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: DECH I FACILITY OPERATOR ARI AN5AS POWER AND LI6HT CO.

SYMDOL APL :

REPORTADILITY COICS FOR THIS LER ARE 13 lu CFR 50.7 3(a )(2) t ivil ESe actintions. {

REFERENCE LERdt 1 360/05-0l? c N 9/O'3-ol S AfriTRACT i F OWER L EVEL - I t a/4. ON f rb-Ub A l 00p6 HRM A l'E A'. T uh l en t' Ln. i. Uhhf.D .

CORE PROTEC TION CnLCULA f0it CHAhNCLS 2 AhD 4 OENElinTi:0 t.u.e DNbk iHIP>

AS A RESUL1 OF Lh60NEOUb RCS PARANETER INPUTS CAOLED by AN ell:C1RICAL 1RANSIENI INDUCED DY A LlOH1NINO SIRIlL. F05 UtIP HE0h>HSC WAS ;

! NORNAL. EFW ACTUATED ON LOW SO LEVEL. Ef-N s.uN1ROL VALvl :.i.v-103v I FAILED OPEN DUE TO A SHORTED CLOSING 0:ul IN 1HE VnLVI. vei~hAluR. YHi.

C AUSE WAS FOUND TO DE A WIhlNG ERROk. THE COLL WAb ht:f t.e#[ D. AND A I WiklNO ERROR WAS CORREC TED. 'IEdIINO FROVt-D S AllSf ACloth Oi-EHA'llON ANil !

2CV-1039 WAS hE10RNED TO SERVICE.

I l

FOf.M 49 LEn ':.CSL DATA v eO3-vo

~ eseeeeeeeeeeeesse***s.**.s.o.e..s.**. seesseeesese.**.s.es o..s.eese DOCtET YEAR LER HUMbEU hEVislON DCS fluMbER f rit t CVENT DnTE ,

364 1902 046 o 02:0709021 ~/ 1 'l41 M v.oO1/O2

......e...e........ ee.................n .e... 4..+......... .......

DOCLLT8369 NCOUIRL 1 TYPCIPWR ;

REGIONI 2 Hisst Wii (

l ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: DUtE FACILIT Y Of CRATOR: DUr.C l'OWER CO. ,

SyM1)OLt DPC l COMMENTS ,

I j STEP 1 i:FFCC1 IA -

INTLbFEhENCE.

l HbS1RACT THC CONVENTIONot WAS11' (WC) SY11LM lelSulAROL FLOW l Ng i e,UNL N I ny 1 UN ' d FLOW RECORDER WAi. FOUND TO I+L hl:CukblNO LE$d IHAN IHE Gil AUt olCA t> LOW.

THE FLOW INSTRUMENI ATION HnS f*CCt.ARED INOf LRAOLE f th 16:let REC [

l

, ).,3. 3.O WHICH Id hl:PvHI AOLC PUk;.UANI I O ~1 LCH SiEC o. 9. l .1 A lo . fu:s i l

RESULTED I RON 14:VI AYlON UF 1HC 1NbTh0NENY' S INTLhNAL Lt.D.1h0NIC ZERU !

POSITION (IE2P) t INSTHOMdH r GPCC I AlllES COMPolhf HUDCt. IO/u i'_vW METLk.

WI TH A CNOS CENTRAL LHOCLS$1NG UNIT). A SEVLht LLD.lblC AL S10hN THC i PREVIOUS EVENING IS IHnUOHf 10 HAVE CAdiHD FOWEH SUPPLY I N i t.t4 C HE ti'. t:. f WHICH HESULTED IN 01THLH 1HL CPU LOSINO 1HL ICZP OH IHL 7LbO IOSillON f

' DRIFilNA. THE It'lP Un3 RFSET AND IHC tilSTHUNCNT Allott titator.CD l t

OrEisADLE.

l FORN di LER SCSS l'ATA @o 3- u/. !

' !)OC VC1 YCAR LER NUNi{k 60 VISION leCS NUNbCh NSIC LVLN1 l'ATC 7

I 369 1982 076 o 02:2140176 179709 11/64/02 l eseeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeees ......,**ee......e*,es ................se.s. t

.I . .

DO.CKETt369 HCOUIRE 1 ( TYPEtPWR (

REGION: 2 NS$58WE niyCHI TECTURAL ENOINEERt DUt E FACILITY OPERATOR: DUt:E POWER LO.

iyHDOLt DPE ADSTRAC T THE POWER SUFF LY TO THE C MAIN FIRE PUNP WAS LOS1 FOR APPROAINAIELY 2 HOUR $ AND 25 MINUTES. GINCE THE A MAIN FIRE PUMP WAS sLHEADY OUT OF SERVICE, 2 OF THE 3 MAIN FIRE PUNP5 UEHE INOPERABLE WHICH VIOLA 1ES TECH SPEC 3.7.10.1 AND 15 REPORTABLE PUR$UANs 10 TECH Si-EC i.. 9. J .13 ( b ) . lHE JOCEEY PUNPS MAlNTAINED NORMAL FHE55UbE IN 's ht FIRL PROTEC TION 5NSTEM AND ONE MAIN FIRE PUMP WAS ALwAYS AVHlL4lH.E ' FAD IHF SYSTEN f(EEN CHALLENGED. THE C NAIN FlkE fUMP 15 5UPPLIED WITH fONE6 FROM a SOURCE 1hAI 15 10 T ALLY INDEPENDENT OF hCvUIRC. YhE PowEH LOS'.

RESUl. Tele FROM A bROIEN INSULATOR (APPARENTLY DAMA9F.D b y LIGHININO) ON THF 44 6V LOUE TRANSM15sinN LINE (ALTERNATE POWER SUPPLi TO COWANS Fnkle F RAN f(IVC RI END ) . THE TRON 5 MISSION LINE INSUL ATOG WAS EEh. AC ED-POWER RLSTORED. AND THE PUMP l>ECLARED UPERAbLC.

FORN 42 LER SC55 l'ATA 03-03-86

.................. #......****, s,.......*........... ...**.........

DOC)El NEAR LER NUNDER REV15 ION DCS NUNDER NSIC EVEN1 DATE 360 1904 010 0 040SO704G4 189636 03/28/G4

=>.......................*****....*****++.+i..........*********+.

DOCi E r: 360 MiOUIRE 1 TYPE PWR FFOION: L NLSSINE OPC HI TI C lilPAL E NO I Nt'E R t DUI'E F Ai: ILIf4 M f li A T OR s I.sUtE PUNER CO.

S , MitOL t DPC

) C OMME N i t STEP 3 EFFECT CODE IX - VOL1 AGE FLUCTUATIONE HFPO9fnblL11Y CnDES FOR THIS LER ARE:

!? In (FR Sn.73(a)(2)(tv): ESF nc t uo t t orit..

REFERENCE LERSt j ::/,o / D4 -i n g AM.T 6 Ar T iOWFh I EUFt -

e int O. . I'lESEL 6ENERATOR (D/Oi 11'l.sPERIENCFD AN INVAllD AtilnMalir . . hme nN MAprH ;>O , lon4 AT 1 7 *.. . T Hi: Is/A SinR1Fle ON A UNil i 14L At t nUI c. j hNnt OENEDA10D BY A MONENTARY l NEk 16ANiNI% ION 5 Sv5 TEM lelsih6tiaNCl? IH 6E fu A SEVERE STOhM. (D/O in WAS INOFEhADLE DOE TO NAltsifMANCI.) UNil 1 WA$ IN A REFUELING OUT A0E WI IH ALL i UEL REMOVED thoM IHt: ht At iOr< al 1HE TIME OF 1HIS UCCOHnLilCC. l H l ':. INCIDENi !$

ni si. llcul f le la ON UNULUAL SERVlf. E C ONiil l lON liUL IU lHE iUWER istilRlbullhN SYS1EH DISTUHbANCE C AUSED b( lHL SEVEHC WEnlHER. lHIS i:VEtH l': limit. Ah TO I'hl:VIOUL l.f:R 369/64-06. '# HE IrLHCLOUI SJONAL CLEAhEle IN lt. o IPAN 1 SI:C ONie. THEREFORE THE l'/O WAS 1801 LUADED. lHE is/ n W A S 'i H u l leuWN AFTi k UPERAllNO EOR Al l ROR INATELY bl( MINUIES. 1Hl:

le/h IthfUkMEle n'.. DESIONi.D DUHINo IHIG INC ll#LN i .

s l' OhN +4 3 LEli SC 55 l'AT A 03-03-05

. ........ ..............e*** ee........................*eeee***.*se 8 l'Or lT i YrAR l E6 NIINfiEls REVISION DCS NUNf*ER NSIC EVENT DATE ava 1084 017 0 040703O n1 19ust1 05/23/84 i e* ........ ...............e**,............................. ..... .

'DCIC KET t 369 MCGUIRE 1 g TYPE PWR

(

. RECoION8 2 NSSS8WE t ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: DUKE

. FACILITY OPERATOR: IW E POWER CO.

2 SYMDOL* DPC COMMENTS STEP 1: EFFECT CODE IA - VOLTAGE FLUCTUATIONS REPORTADILITY CODES FOR 1HfS LER ARE:

13 10 CFR SO.73(as(2)(av)* ESF actuatioree.

HEFERENCE LERS J 369/04-O10 2 369/84-006 AbSTRACi POWER LEVEL - 050%. DlkSEL OENERATORS ( D/Ce s s J A AND J B L AP6Mit*8CED AN INVALID AUiOMATIC STAR 1 ON MAY 23, 1984 AT 16% . ThE DO"5 sTERiED ON A UNIT 1 bLACLOUT SlONAL OENERATEb 'f A b NOME >TARY POWL A 10 SThi bul ) Or3 SYSTEM DISTURDANCE C AUSED BY AN ELECTRICAL STORM iN THE :ERVtCli AREH. I UNIT 1 WAS IN MODE 1 AT SO% POWER AT THE TINE OF THE OC(.URRENCE. >

THIS INCIDENT IS ATTRIBUTED 10 AN UNUSUAL SE6VICE CONbiTION. DUE lu THE POWER DISTRIDUTION SYSTEM 13ISTORb4NCE C AU5ED bY THE ELECTRIC AL STORM. THIS EVENT IS SIMILAR TO PREVIOUS LER'S 369/84-10 sND 369/04-06. THE DLACILOUT SIONAL CLEARED IN LESS lHAN 1 SEC OND, lHE D/G'S DID NOT LOAD. fHE D/O'S WERE' SHUT DOWN AFiER OPERATiNO FOR f' APPROXIMATELY 22 MINUlES. THE D/O'S PERFOPMED AS DESIONED buii1NO 1HIS INCIDENT. DUKE POWER IS PUR$UING INSTALLING A TIME DELHY ON THE UV {

RELAY TO AID IN PREVENTION OF SPURIOUS STARTS.

e FORM 44 LER SCSS DATA 03-03-06

s s e n s n e s s e n * * *

s + n u s n + m s e n e + s n n n e n n s e re s + s u s m n + < < n DOCEET YEAR LER NUMBER REVISION DCS NUMBER NSIC EVENI DATE

=

l 369 1985 017 0 8506240051 194635 05/15/GS p ***

s e n e s,e n e s e s * * * * *

e n e n s * * * * *

n s *

s e e n e < < mn e n * *, n e u n <

DOCVET 369 MCGUIRE 1 TYPEtPWR I REGION: 2 NS$$tWE ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEERt DULE I FACILITV OPERATOR: DUKE POWER CO. !

$4MBOLt DPC COMMENTS STEP 2: EFFECT 1X - VOLTAGE FLUCTUATIONS.

REPORTADILily CODES FUM THis LER ARE:

13 10 C FR 50. 7 3(e n t 2)( iv il ESF actuatters.m.

ADSTHACI POWER LEVEL - 000%. ON 5-15-65. DO 1A EiPEHIENCED AN INVALib AU10NAllC START DOE 10 A UNIT DLHCLOU1 SIGNAL OENERATEb DY n NOhENYHRY POWER 1RANSHISSIONS SYSTEM ELECTRICAt. DISTURBANCE DURING A SEVERE SiORM.

(DG ID WAS INOPERADLE AT THE TIME DUE TO MAINTENANCE REPAIRS). THE UNIT WAS IN MODE 6 WITH ALL FUEL REMOVED FFON THE REACTON COhE AT THE TlHE OF THE OCCURRENCE. THIS INCIDENT IG ATTRIDUTED TO AN UNUSUAL i SERVICE CONDI T ION. DUE 10 1HE POWER DISTRID01 ION SYSTEN [G STURDANCE CAUSED DV THE SEVERC WEATHER, AND A DESIGN DEFICIENCY bECAUSE THE

' START CIRCUITRY OF THE DG'S CAUSE THEN TO START ON AN INSTANTANEOUS

UNDERVOLTAGE CONDITION.

i FOfkN 4D (.Eb S(55 I'N'l b 8 'M O . "'I!8b

.) . .

e. ooooooooooooo oooooooooooooooooooooog YEAR LER NUMBEn REVISION DCS NUMBER s*oooooooooooooooooo+o***s( Nw C EVENT DATE DCCKET

. 369 1985 020 9 8507180641 145215 06/07/G5

- ********************+++..+.*,..************++..........+.,*........+

r DOCKETt369 MCGUIRE 1 TYPE:PWR REGION: 2 N555:WE ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: DUKE FACILITY OPERATOR: DUKE POWER CO.

SYMBOL: DPC REPORTABILITY CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:

, 13 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv): ESF actutions.

REFERENCE LERS:

1 360/05-017 AB5 TRACT POWER LEVEL - 000%. DG ID EXPERIENCED 2 INVALib AU10MATIC STARTS ON 6-7-85 AT 1644 AND AGAIN AT 190G. IN LACH CASE. OG lb SiARTED ON A UNIT 1 BLACLOUT SIGNAL GENERATED DY A NONENTARY POWER TRAN5 MISSIONS SYSTEM DISTURBANCE DURING A SEVERE STORM. (DG 1A WAS OPERABLE, BUl DID NOT START EECAUSE THE 4EV ESSENTIAL SWITCHOEAR,- lETA, WAS AL10NED l TO THE 500 KV SWITCHYARD VI A UNIT 2 AND DID NOI ext ERIENCE THE VOLTAGE

DIP.) THE UNIT WAS IN MODE,5 (COLD SHUTDONN) AT lHE TIME OF THIS OCCURRENCE. THIS INCIDENT IS ATTRIEiUTED TO AN UNUSUAL SERVICE

CONDITION, L'UE TO THE POWER DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM DISTURBANCES CAUSED DV

, THE SEVERE WEATHER. A DE61GN DEFICIENCY WAS IbENTIFIED SINCE THE l START CIRCUITRY OF THE 180 '5' C AUSE THEM TO 51 ART ON AN INSTANTANEOUS

UNDERVOLTAGE CONDITION. THE DG STARTED A5 DESIGNED AND WOULD HAVE 1

LOADED IF IT WAS NECESSARY. PLANT SAFETY WA$ NOi AFFECTED. THE START SYSTEM WILL bE MODIFIED TO PREVENT DG STARTS Oh WURIOU5 VOLTAGE DROPS.

FORM 46 LER SCSS DATA 03-03-66 f ...*......................**....*. .........................,.......

DOCKET YEAR LER NUMBER REV1510N DCS NUrtBER NSIC EVENT DATE l 370 1985 005 0 8503250315 1936G3 02/2G/G5

- - - - .+***********.*********************+*+++++*******++.+******

i DOCKET:370 MCGUIRE 2 TYPE:PWR

REGION: 2 N554 : WE ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: DUKE FACIL)TY OPERATOR: DUEE FOWER CO.

l SYMDOLt DPC

! PEPORTABILITY CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:

l 13 10 CFR 50.7 3 t a ) ( 2) ( iv): ESF actuat:ons.

AUSTRACT POWER LEVEL - NGX. DG 2D EXPERIENCED AN INVALID AUTOMATIC STAR 1 WHEN

! AN ELECTRICAL STORM APPARENTLY CAUSED A VOLTAGE DIP ON THE TRAIN 'D' i i f.55ENTIAL SWITCHGEAR. UNIT 2 WAS SHUTDOWN FOR hEFUELING AT THE TINE.

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS WILL CONSIST OF INSTALLATION OF A MODIFICATION TO i THE UNDERVOLTAGE RELAYS TO PROVIDE A TIME DELAY 10 AID IN SCREENING i OUT SPURIOUS START SIGNALS.

UNADLE TO LOCATE RECORD FOR LER: 382/85-054

)

FORM 48 LER SCSS DfiTA 03-03-86

.. *******+,***,*****,+.*************+,***+,*,++...+**+,*******+.***

l'OC F ET VEAR LER NUMbEn REVISION DCS NUMDER Hsic EVENi DATE

'387 1984 028 g O 8407200288 1j ~09 06/13/84 wopooooooo**ooo**oo*+os ..oooooooooooooooooooo,*oon.. ****..,n *om+

. DOCKET 397 SU500EHANNA 1 TYPE:BWR 3 REGION: 1 N555:GE ARLWITECTURAL ENGINEER: BECH FACILITY OPERATOR: PENNSYLVANIA POWER h LIGHT CO.

SYMBOL: PPL REPORTABILITY CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:

13 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv): ESF actuations.

ABSTRACT POWER LEVEL - 100%. As A RESULT OF A LIGHTNING STRlLE ON A .;30tV TRAN5 MISSION LINE, THE UNIT 1 STARTUP TRANSFORMER T-1v ISOLATED, ONE OF TWO SOURCES 0F OFFSITE POWER. THE LOS5 OF iHE 'l-10 TRAN5F ORNER CAUSED A TRIP TO THE UNIT 1 AND UNIT 2 'A' REACTOR PROitiC TION Sv5 TEM

' (RPS). REAttuk BLb6 ZONE 1, II AND III HVAC SYSTEMS TRIPPED Af"D STANDBY OAS TREATMENT SYSTEM INITIATED DUE TO THE LOSS OF RP3. ThE EFFECT ON FEEDWATER AND REACTOR RECIRCULATION CONTROL 5 CAUSED A

' REACTOR VE5SEL LEVEL INCREASE WHICH RESULTED IN A REACTOR SCRAM.

PLANT SYSTEMS RESPONDED A5 DESIGNED AND RESULTED IN THE SAFE 5HUTDOWN OF THE NUCLEAR POWER PLANT. THIS EVENT 15 REPORTABLE PER i '

10CFR50.73(A)(2)(IV) SINCE AN UNPLANNED ENGINEERED 5AFETY FEATURE 5 (E5F) ACTUATION OCCURRED AND THE RP5 TRIPPED.

I FORN 49 LER 5 CSS DATA 03-03-86 m m + m m n u m m + m s-m e n m n e n , + ,m m u m m m m m

1 J DOCKET YEAR LER NUMBER REVISION DC5 NUMBER N5IC EVENT DATE 387 1984 029 0 8408090421 191267 U//vse84 e s * *ess emesemmsun,esom m s mm emmnme mu an m DOCKET:387 5U500EHANNA 1 TYPE:BWR d

i REGION: 1 N555:GE

) ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: BECH FACILITY OPERATOR: PENNSYLVANIA POWER h LIGHT CO.

5YMBOL: PFL

)

COMMENTS STEP 7: IX = VOLTAGE TRANSIENT; STEP 9: I5YS H5 = COMNON REFUELING FLOOR.

) STEP 12: EFFECT HX = CONSTANT SPEED AND FLOW.

REPORTABILITY CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:

13 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv): E5F actuations.

ABSTRACT POWER LEVEL - 100%. A5 A RESULT OF A LIGHTNING STRIKE UN A 23OKV TRAN5 MISSION LINE, THE UNIT 1 START-UP TRANSFORMER f-10 ISOLATED 1 OF 2 SOURCES OF OFF5ITE POWER. THE LO55 OF THE T-10 TRANSFORMER CAUSED A 3; 1 TRIP TO THE UNIT 1 AND 2 'A- RPS. REACTOR BLDG ZONE 1, II, 6ND III HVAC SYSTEMS TRIPPED AND STANDBY GAS TREATMENT SYSTEM INITIATED DUE TO THE LOSS OF RPS. THE EFFECT ON FEEDWATER'AND REACTOR RECIRCULATION

+ 1 CONTROL 5 CAUSED A REACTOR VE5SEL LEVEL INCREASE. MANUAL FEEDWATER

.. CONTROL WA5 TAKEN TO DECREASE REACTOR VESSEL LEVEL. THE 'A' REACTUR 1 FEEDWATER TURBINE TRIPPED 3 SECS AFTER BEING RESET. THE 'C- REACTOR

,j i FEEDWATER TURBINE FLOW DECREASED DUE TO THE STEAM 5UPPLY ISOLATING.

THE 'B' REACTOR FEEDWATER PUMP DID NOT PROVIDE SUFFICIENT FLOW TO MAINTAIN REACTOR VE55EL LEVEL. THE REACTOR SCRAMMED ON LGW LEVEL.

1 REACTOR VESSEL LEVEL DECREASED AND INITIATED THE HPCI AND RCIC 1 SYSTEMS, AND CLOSED THE . MSIV's. REACTOR. VESSEL LEVEL INCREASED TO THE TRIP POINT FOR HPCI, RCIC, AND REACTOR FEEDWATER TURDINES. ALL l SAFETY SYSTEMS WHICH WERE REOUIRED OPERATED SAT 15FAL IUen. T n l *_ EVENT

.I - .

15 REPORTABLE PER 1OCfi O.*/3(A)(2)(IV) SINCE AN U .ANNED ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE (ESF) AL(UATION OCCURRED AND 1HE R[P. TRIPPED.

FORM SO LER SC55 DATA 05-O' c-86

- - - o ***** m m *** m ****** m m ** m ****************** EVENT m *******

DATE DOCKET YEAR LER NUMBER REVISION DCS NUMBER NSIC 388 1985 020 0 8507110122 195383 05/:e1/85

m m

m m ** m .o ,+ m + m m . m *****************,** m > m .

00C VE T : 38r< SU50UEHANNA 2 TYPE:BWR RE61ON: 1 N555:GE ARCHITECTilRAL ENGINEER: DECH FACILITY OPERATOR: PENtiSYLVANI A POWER h LIGH't LO.

$vMi)nt : PPL i OMMENTS WATCH 975: LO55 OF OFF SITE POWER.

WATCH-LIST CODES FOi< THIS Lt-R ARE:

C75 POSSIBLE SIGNIFICANT EVENT REPORTABILITY CODES FOR fHis LER mRE:

13 10 CFR 50.73(a )(2)(i vi: E5F actuati.nr..

ro- t- t- R E NC E t.'E R5 :

' 1 388/85-017 2 38:;/8".-011 ABSTRACT POWER LEVEL - 000%. ON 5-31-85, 'A LIGHTNING STRIKE TO OR NEAR THE TlE LINE BETL!EEN THE 500iN ANO 230EV 5HITCHYARD5 CAUSED A VOLTAGE TRAN5IENT WITHIN UNIT z. ALL TRIP 5 WERE PER DE510N AND C AU5ED BY A 8

LOSS OF MOTIVE POWER OR LO55 OF CONTROL POWER. lHE AUTOMATIC START OF

) THE CONTROL ROOM EMERGENCY OUTSIDE AIR SUPPL) SYSTEM WA5 PER SYSTEM DESIGN. THE TRIP OF THE SGT5 AFTER ITS AUTO-RESTART WA5 NO f PER

) DESIGN. A MALFUNCTIONING SGT5 DAMPER ACTUATOR WAS REPLACED AND PROPER OPERATION WA5 VERIFIED. A REVIEW OF THE POSSIBILITY OF ADDITIONAL LIGHTNING PROTECTION FOR OFF5ITE POWER 500RCE5 HA5 DEEN REQUESTED.

' FORM 51 LER SC55 DATA 03-03-86

- - m ** m m m ****** m **o *** m ***o*** o**** oo m >.*** m ****

DOCEET YEAR LER NUMBER REVISION DC5 NUMBER N5IC EVENT DATE 388 1985 OJS O 8511120242 106749 10/05/85 m e* m ne m u n m m ,>*1+ m m o o+ m ** m o** m m m

m *

' 1OCr.ET:388 SU500EHANNA 2 TYPE:BWR REGION: 1 N555: 0E l ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: 8ECH l FACILITY OPERATOR: PENNSYLVAN)A POWER h L 1 '_ ti t LO.

l 5YMBOL: PPL COMMENTS

STEP 3: CAUCE IX-GROUND FAULT CLEARED: STEP e: TVPE AR.

EEPORTABILITY CODES FOR THIS LER ARE:

' 13 10 CFR 50. 7 3(a )(2)(iv): ESF actuations.

ABSTRACT I POWER LEVEL - 100%. ON 10-5-85 AT 0837 A PHASE TO GROUND F AULT OCCURRED ON THE SU500EHANNA-ALBURTIS-WESC05VCILLE 500FN TRAN5 MISSION LINES DUE TO A LIGHTNING STRIKE. THIS CAU5ED THE GENERATOR ai8 ESC 05VILLE !tE C t ia.Oi f BAFArki< t2T) In nPEM. THE 21 t<REA6.ER J . _ - __

I

.RECLOSED 2 SEC5 LATER[ 1T TRIPPED IMMEDI ATELY WHf A FAILURE OF THE 2T DREAKER WAS SEN5ED BY .HE BREAKER FAILURE LOGIC.( (HE BREAhER FAI LOGIC IN TURN TRIPPED THE SUNBURV 2 NORTH C IRCUIT BREALER (4T)

ISOLATING THE UNIT 2 GENERATOR. THIS C AUSED A TURBINE TRIP AND v

REACTOR SCRAM ON TURBINE CONTROL VALVE FAST CLOSURE. THE PLANT RESPONDED As DESIGNED. TWO SAFETY RELIEF VALVES ACTUATED TO LIMIT REACTOR PRES 5URE TO 1085 PSIO AND RESEATED 5ATI5FACTORILY. THE HIGHEST REHCTOR WATER LEVEL DURING THE SCRAM WAS +41 INCHE5 AND THE LOWEST WATER LEVEL WAS +2 INCHES. THE SENSED BREAKER FAILURE CONDITION WAS CAUSED BY NORMALLY OPEN CONTAC15 ON A RELAY IN THE BREAKER FAILURE LOGIC BEING STUCK CLO5ED. THE RELAY FAILURE WAS UHRELATED TO THE LIGHINING STRitxE. THE 2T BREALER WA5 ISOLATED, AND UNIT 2 WA5 RESTARTED AND SYNCHRONIZED TO THE GRID AT APPROA 1850 ON 10-6-85. THE FAILED RELAY HA5 SINCE BEEN REPAIRED AND THE 2T BREAKER RETURNED TO SERVICF.

FOhM 52 LEh iC55 DATA 0 3-03-t:6 e n u n u n n u n e n . o + , n n # + + n u n e u

s e s- u n n u e n u e u e e n * ,

DOCLET YEAR LER NUNDER REVISION DC5 NUMBER NSIC EVENI DATL 389 1983 OS9 0 831102O272 187024 09/25/83

* * * * * * *

n e * + + + o n * * * * * + p e + + n *

n * * *- + o * * * * + + + + * * * * * * + *

u & p e n DOCKET:3Oy 61. LUCiE 2 TYPE:PWR REG)ON: 2 N555:CE ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: EBAd FACILITY OPERATOR: FLORIDA POWER b LlGHi COMPANY SYMBOL: FPL ABSTRACT WHILE OPERATING AT 94% POWER, CHANNEL CHECK 50RVEILLANCES REQUIRED BV

' TECH SPECS 3/4.3.3.1 AND 3/4. 5. 3.9 FOR MAIN STEAM REL IEF VALVE RADIATION MONITOR 5 AND 5/O BLOWDOWN EFFLUENT MONITORS WERE NOT g PERFORMED. A LIGHININO STRILE HAD RENDERED CONTROL ROOM MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION INOPERABLE, HOWEVER PORTABLE INSTRUMENTATION WAS AVAILABLE FOR LOCAL MONITORING. SURVEILLANCE WAS RESUMED IMMEDIATELY UPON DISCOVERY. THE CAUSE Oi~ THIS EVENT WAS A LOSS OF CONTROL ROOM INDICATION FOR THE SUBJECT CHANNELS AND THE OPERATOR ON 5HIFT BEING I

UNAWARE THAT LOCAL READOUT HAD BEEN PROVIDED BY THE ISC DEPARTMENT.

OPERATIONS DEPARTMENT PERSONNEL ARE NOW AWARE THAT LOCAL READOUT 15 AVAILABLE, AND THE IbC DEPT. HA5 ORDERED ADDITION (4L READOUT 5 THAT CAN BE INSTALLED.

FORM 5? LER SC55 DATA 03-03-86 e n

n + + + n n + n u n n e e n u n u s- . *

n + . n e u n

n c e n

n u e + n s u *

DOCVET YEAR LER NUMBER REVISION DC5 NUMBER N51C EVENT DATE 389 1983 OF3 0 8311010384 187210 09/24/83

n

w o u n +

n e n * * * *

n o . .o . 4 +

n u

o . . + o n

o n *

n . n * *

DOCKET:389 ST. lucid 2 TYPE:PWR REGION: .

N555:CE ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: EBAS FACILITY OPERATOR: FLORIDA POWER b LIGHT COMPANY SYMBOL: FPL AB5 TRACT WHILE OPERATING AT 94% POWER, A LIGHTNING STRILE RESULTED IN lHE CONTAINMENT OASEOUS MONITOR FAILING. CONTAINMENT GASEOU5 MONITOR 15 1 OF 3 SYSTEMS REOUIRED TO DETECT RC5 LEAKAGE PER TECH SPEC 3/4.4.6.

THE GASEOUS MONITOR WAS RESTORED TO SERVICE WITI:'N THE TIME LIMITS SPECIFIED. THIS WA5 THE FIRST OCCURRENCE OF THIS TYPE. THE CONTAINMENT OA5EOUS MONI Un t-s t Lt- u UUE IU H VUL i H'A *:e LE Ih -OLID

8 . .

TTATE CIRCUITRY (C AUSE BY THE LIGHTNING STRIKE) ICH SCRAMBLED THE LUC iC C IRCUl is AND DA t s BASE. THESY51EMWASREST(ONEDBVRESETTING i

8.f h 1 C .

FORN 54 LER SCSS DATA 03-O % 86

- <-* m ****** m m *, m .** m ******* m

m ******** m ** ****+** m DOCKET YEAR LER NUMBER REVISION DCS NUMBER N51C EVENT DATE 995 1983 074 0 8308000001 185102 06/03/83 m m m m m m

m m e m m m *

m * * * * * * + e e + + *

m + m * * <- *

m DORET:395 $UMMER 1 TYPE:PWR REGION: 2 N555:WE ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: GLBT FACILITY OPERATOR: 50U e rs tnROLINA ELECTRIC h 6As CO.

5YMDOL: LC C ADSTRACT WITh THE PLANI 1N NODE 1, THE "A" EMERGENCY DIE 5EL GENERATOR WAt.

CONNECTED TO VITAL BU5 IDA AND LOADED TO 4250fW DURING IT5 OPERADILITV SURVEILLANCE 1EST. THE NORMAL 115KV POWER SUPPLY 10 THE VITAL BU5 WAS LOST AND THE DIE 5EL GENERATOR OUTPUT BREALER TRIPPED OPEN. THE DIESEL WAS 5 HUT DOWN AND LOChED OUT BY A PHASE DIFFERENTIAL FELAY, THEREBY LOSING ALL n.C. POWER INPUT TO THE VITAL DU5. NO ADVERSE CON 5EOUENCE5 RESULTED A5 THE REDUNDANT VITAL BUS REMAINED OPERABLE FOR PLANT SAFEGUARD 5. rHE EVENT WAS CAUSED BY AN ELECTRICAL SUR0E FROM A I LIGHTNING STORN. THE SURGE TRIPPED: (1) THE NORMAL iOWER FEED ;

BREAKER FOR VITAL BUS 1DA OPEN ON OVERCURRENi. (2) THE DIESEL GENERATOR OUTFUT DREARER OPEN ON OVERCURRENT AND PHASE DIFFERENTIAL.

THE LICENSEE WILL EVALUATE ADDITIONAL SURGE SUPFRESSION CIRCUITRY TO PROTECT THE D1ESEL GENERATOR CIRCUITRY.

FORM 55 LER SC55 L'ATA 03-03-86

}

m + m m

m . m *+* m ********+**************++,************+ o* o

' DOCKET YEAR LER NUMBER REVISION DCS NUMBER NSIC EVENT DATE 413 1985 034 0 8506250256 195253 05/15/85 e mmmm mmemm**m mm***o*****+meno m +m+ e n*

)

DOC):ET: 413 CATAWDA 1 TYPE:PWR REGION: 2 N555:WE i ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: DUKE FACILITY OPERATOR: DUFE POWER CO.

SYMBOL: DPC COMMENTS STEP 1 AND 2: EFFECT IX- ELECTRICAL FAULT; OTHER REPORTABItiTY -

10CFR50.72tB)(2)(II).

REPORI AblLITV CODES FOR THis LER ARE:

I 13 10 CFR SG.73(ar(2)(iv): ESF actuatiors.

i 21 OTHER: Voluntar, reeort, special r-e e o r t , Par t 21 reeort,

,I etc.

l

ADSTRACT POWER LEVEL - 000%. DIESEL GENERATOR'S (D/0) 1A AND ID EXPERIENCED AN I INVALID AUTOMATIC START ON MAY 15, 1985, AT 2348 HOURS. THE D/G's STARTED FOLLOWING THE DETECTION OF AN UNDERVOLTAGE CONDITION ON lHE ESSENTIAL SWITCHGEAR. THIS CONDITION WAS DUE TO A MOMENTARY l TRAN5 MISSION SYSTEM DISTURBANCE WHICH OCCURRED WHEN A BREAKER FAILED AT THE HARRISBURG TIE STATION DURING A LIGHTNING STORM. UNIT 1 WA5 IN MODE 5 (COLD SHUTDOWMJ AT T HE T I ME OF 1HE INC 11'Erq . lH]5 INCIDENT 15

' CLASSIFIED Av. AN UNU5UAL SERVICE CONDITION, DM YO ihE DiSIRfDUYlON L:

SYSTEM DISTURBANCE. ( (

f'ORM 56 LER SC55 DATA 03-03-86

, ******e,****me*****,a************e,eme**+<-****m+.<++,**<-,w+,

DOCLET YEAR LER NUMBER REVISION DC5 NUMBER N51C EVENT DATE 416 1982 003 0 8207200226 175365 06/16/82

- - - - m ** m *** m ***** m

m m ..+* m **** ++. m .* m .

DOCKET:416 GRAND GULF 1 TYPE:BWR REGION: 2 N555:GE eRCHI(ECTURAL ENGINEER: BECH FAC]LITY OPERATOR: MI551551PPI POWER .% LlOHT C O.

5(MBOL: MPL COMMENTS STEP 2: MODEL NO. FDA-5.

REFERENCE LERS:

1 416/82-143 ABSThots l'URING TESTING, THE OUTPUT AMPLIFIER 5 FOR i rst FREE FIELD FBA s t' ORC LD BALANCED ACCELEROMETERi WERE FOUND INOPERABLE WHiCH cum 5TIiUTEG A LIMITING CONDITION FOh OPERATION (TECH SPEC :.?.7..?). ihE INCIDENT 15 DEING REPORTED IN ACCORDANCE WITel IECH SPEC 6.9.1.13.6. r-m LURE OF lHE FREE FIELD FDA REdOL. LED IN LOSS OF SEISMIC MONITUna NG IN AN AREA OUf5[DE THE POWER DLOCK. THE PROBADLE CAUSE FOR FAILUHt- ur- eHE AM.LIFIERS FOR THE KINEMETRIC5 FDA-3 15 ATTRIBUYED TO NATURA._ C AUSE$.

l (I.E.. LI6HTNING DAMAGE). OUTPUT AMPLIFIER 5 HAVE BEEN REPLACEO AND l

THE 50RVE]LL ANC E iEST COMPLElE D.

FORM 57 LER SC55 DATA 03-03-86

- - - - m*****m**m****m*m***mmm*+++++,m*m*um****

DOCKET YEAR LER NUMBER REVISION DCS NUMBER N51C EVENT DATE 416 1984 027 0 8406070256 190269 05/03/84

m m * * * * * *

m e m s- m * < * + m m * + + m m e , m m * * , + , m + + + + * , , +

I DOCKET:416 GRAND GULF 1 TYPE:BWR REGION: 2 N555:GE i

ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: BECH FACILITY OPERATOR: MISSISSIPPI POWER b LIGHT CO.

SVMBOL: HPL REPORTABILIIV CODE _' FOM TH)5 LER ARE:

13 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv>: ESF actuatiorie.

REFEhENCE LERS:

1 416/84-024 A051RACT FOWER LEVEL - 000%. DURIN6 ADVER5E WEATHER ON NAi 3, 1984, A LIOHiN1Nb STRit:E CAUSED A LOS5 OF POWER FROM THE 115tN OFFSITE POWER dOPPLY.

THIS RESULTED IN DEENLRO12ATION OF THE DIV1510N 1 AND DIVislON 3 E5F BUSES. BOTH DIVISIONS- DIESEL GENERATOR:. disMTED AND ENERGIZED THEIR i

RESPECTIVE BudES. THERE WA5 ALSO A DIVISION 1 AUXILIARY DUILDING ISOLATION. THE BU5Es WERE PARALLELED TO THE 500hV OFFSIiG FOWER SUPPLY TO RESTORE NORMAL POWER.

1 -

l l FORN 58 LER SC55 DATA v3-03-Oc-

! .o.*n.m**+.....on+.n-+m....<-++++,,,,..++<.++.~<u->+>+++++.

riCKET O YEAR LER NUNDEf REVISION L4C5 NUMBER N( EVENT DATE 454 1985 068 0 8508190453 19c.135 07/13/85 we.***m**************.**********e*******+,u****+++++>m.***u DOCKET:454 BYRON 1 TYPE:PWR REG)ON: 3 NSSS:WE ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: SLXX FACILITY OPERATOR: COMMONWEALTH EDISON CO.

SYM90L: CWE COMMENTS STEP 1: P$is EP - btHeJON 6ROUND; STEP 17: C OrlP )I - STATUS LANN STEP 20:

COMP XI - WIND SPEED AND DIRECTION INDICATOR

ST:iP 26: COMP MEi -

SURVEILLANCE CAMERA 5; STEPS 23, 24: ISYS SW - Ge+iE ttOO5E; STEPS 23, 26, 20, 29: SYS SW - UttNOWN AREA 5; STtiP 7: EFF I X - CONI >UCi ED l'O GROUND. WATCH 975 - LIGHTNING DAMAGES tAF EGUARD5 INSTRUMENi AT ION.

NATCH-LIST CODES FUP fHIC LER ARE:

975 POSS)blE 51GNIFXCANT EVENT i REi'ORTABILITy CODES FOR TtlI5 LER ARE:

13 10 CFP 50.73(a)(2)(1v): ESF a c t ua t i o re s .

AB5 TRACT POWER LEVEL - 011%. ON JULY 13, 1975 AT 04 39 CDT, A LIGHTNING STRIKE IN THE VICINITY OF DYRON STATION RESULTED IN A REACTOR 'IRIP 4ND DAMAGE t TO PLANT INSTRUMENTAIION. IF 15 DELIEVED THAT LIGHTNING INDUCED A VOLTAGE TRAN5IENT ON THE STATION GROUND, CAUSING ROD DRIVE POWER SUPPLIES 1BD PS-1 AND IDD P5-2 'f0 FAIL. 1HESE POWER SUPPLIES FEED CONTROL AND ALARM CIFCUfTRY ASSOCIATED WITH CONTROL ROD BANK 5 B (+ND D SHUTDOWN BANK D. T HU5, t AiLURE OF THE POWER SUFFLIES RE5ULTED IN IN5ERTION OF THESE ROD BANKS, AND A NEGATIVE FLUX RATE 1 RIP.

INVESTIGATION INTO THE INSTRUMENT FAILURE INDIC ATES THAT MOST LIEELY A LIGHTNING STRIKE TO THE REACTOR CONTAINMENT BUILDING OCCURRED. THE LIGHTNING WAS CONDUCTED su OROUND THROUGH THE CONTAINMENT BUILDING

) STEEL. A5 THE LIGHTNING STRIKE PASSED DY CONTAINMENT PENETRATIONS, VOLTAGE WAS INDUCED INTO C ABLES PASSING THROUGHT THE PENETRATIONS.

THE INDUCED VOLTAGE POTENTIAL WA5 ENOUGH TO DAMAGE PLANT I INSTRUMENTATION. A5 A RESULT, PORTIONS OF TRAIN B SAFEGUARDS INSTRUMENTATION WERE UNAVAILABLE. TO PREVENT EOUIPMENT DAMAGE DUE TO SIMILAR LIGHTNING STRIKES, THE CONTAINMENT LIGHTNING PROTECTION SYSTEM i WAS MODIFIED. THIS MODIFICATION WAS INSTALLED PRIOR TO START-UP AFTER 'IHE lIGHTNIN6 STRIVE. THE PRlMARY OBJECTIVE OF THE MODIFICATION WAG TO MlNiM12E THE EFFECl OF LIGHiNING STRitE5 ON PLANT EOU1PMENT.

Il FORM S9 LER SC55 DATA 0 3-03-E:6

].

o

m *

m o o <w , c te . n o m e o m

o m o u n o m * + o o m o

l DOCKET YEAR LER NUNDEh REVISION DC5 NUNDEh NE.lc EVENT DATE 482 1485 r.3 0 u509110090 lyS439 09/06/8S j I n*m*****mo*me************m*****m***m**m,**mm****

DOCKET:482 WOLF CREEE 1 TYPE:PWR I REGION: 4 N555:WE ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEER: DECH FACILITY OPERATOR: FANSAS GAS h ELECTRIC CO.

5VMBOL: EGE COMMENTS

! ' STEP 2: EFFECT IX - VOLTAGE FLUCTUATION.

I REPORTABILITV CODE 5 FOR THI5 LER ARE:

' 10 CFR So.73(e r i; f iiv): E5F actuatiorrs.

13 L

s

~ s e *

'AD5 TRAC i

(

, POWER LEVEL - 092%. ON 6-6-85. AT 214I C DT A CONTROL ROON VENTILATION ISOLATION WA5 INITI ATED DUE TO A RADI ATION MONITOrt MOMENTARILY v

SIGNALING HIGH RADIATION LEVEL 5 IN THE OUTSIDE AIR MAKEUP TO iHE CONTROL DLDG VENTILATION SYSTEM. ALL REOUIRED ESF's EOUIPMENT FUNCTIONED PROPERLY. DURING THIS EVENT THE PLANT WA5 IN MODE I, POWER OPERATION, AT 92% REACTOR POWER. THE ISOLATION SIGNAL OCCURRED DUE TO )

A NE ARDY LIGHiN)NG STRIt'E C AU5ING A VOLTAGE FLUCTUATION TO THE RADIATION MONITOii POWER SUPPLY, WHICH IN TURN CAUSED THE MONITOR TO ALARN. AFiER lHE VOLTAGE FLUCTUATION PASSED, THE NONITOR INNEDIATELY RETURNED TO NOrtMAL READINGS AND CLEv' IRED THE ALARM. THE REASON THAT Tril5 NONllOR At.ARNED WHILE OTHER RADIATION MONITORS POWERED FRON THE SAME SOUi<CE Di D NOT ALARM 15 STILL DEING INVESTiOATED. NO RADIATION WAs iRiiSENT ed C ONi"IRNED HV A REDUNDANT CON 7i:UL ELD 6 VENTILATION R Ali e Ai t'oh Moh i ii eR.

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_ - - - _ _ - _ - - - - . _ . .__ _ _ _ .

ML20205N819

Contents

Text

SUMMARY

1.0 INTRODUCTION

4.0 REFERENCES

SUMMARY

1.0 INTRODUCTION

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