ML20205A029
| ML20205A029 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Catawba  |
| Issue date: | 08/01/1986 |
| From: | Lesser M, Peebles T, Skinner P, Van Doorn P NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20205A014 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-413-86-27, 50-414-86-30, CAL, NUDOCS 8608110289 | |
| Download: ML20205A029 (8) | |
See also: IR 05000413/1986027
Text
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UNITE 3 STATES
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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101 MARIETTA STREET, N.W.
ATI.ANTA, GEORGI A 30323
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Report Nos.
50-413/86-27 and 50-414/86-30
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Licensee: Duke Power Company
422 South Church Street
Charlotte, N.C.
28242
Docket Nos.:
50-413 and 50-414
License Nos.: NPF-35 and NPF-52
Facility Name: Catawba 1 and 2
Inspection Conducted: June 26 - July 251986
Inspector: b, f
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Approved by:
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T. Peeb~les, 5ection Chief
Dat.e Signed
Projects Branch 3
Division of Reactor Projects
SUMMARY
Scope: This routine, unannounced inspection was conducted on site inspecting in
the areas of, review of plant operations (Units 1 & 2); surveillance observation
(Units 1 & 2); maintenance observation (Units 1 & 2); review of licensee
nonroutine event reports (Unit 2); and followup of confirmation of Action Letter
commitments (Units 1 & 2).
Results:
Of the five (5) areas inspected, two (2) apparent violations were
identified, (Failure to follow procedure for corrective maintenance, paragraph
7.b. and Failure to provide adequate procedure for valve operator maintenance,
paragraph 7.c.)
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r608110289 860804
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REPORT DETAIiS
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1.
Licensee Employees Contacted
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J. W. Hampton, Station Manager
H. B. Barron, Operations Superintendent
A. S. Bhatnager, Performance Engineer
- W. H. Bradley, Quality Assurance
M. J. Brady, Asst. Operating Engineer
S. Brown, Reactor Engineer
~*B.
F. Caldwell, Station Services Superintendent
- J. W. Cox, Superintendent, Technical Services
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T. E. Crawford, Operations Engineer
L. R. Davison, QA Manager Technical Services
B. East, I. & E. Engineer
C. S. Gregory, I. & E. Support Engineer
- C. L. Hartzell, Compliance Engineer
J. A. Kammer, Performance Test Engineer
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J. Knuti, Operating Engineer
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- P. G. LeRoy, Licensing Engineer
W. W. McCollough, Mechanical Maintenance Supervisor
.W. R. McCullum, Superintendent, Integrated Scheduling
C. E. Muse, Operating Engineer
F. P. Schiffley, II, Licensino Engineer
- G. T. Smith, Maintenance Superintendent
- J. Stackley, I. & E. Engineer
D. Tower, Operating Engineer
Other licensee employees contacted included technicians, operators,
mechanics, security force members, and office personnel.
- Attended exit interview.
2.
Exit Interview
The inspection scope and findings were summarized on July 25, 1986, with
those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above. The inspector described the
areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection findings. 4 No
dissenting comments were received from the licensee. The licensee did not
identify as proprietary any of the materials provided to or reviewed by the
inspectors during this inspection.
3.
Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters
(Units 1 & 2) (92701)
(92702)
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This area was not inspected.
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4.
Unresolved Items *
A new unresolved item is identified in paragraph 5.c.
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5.a Plant Operations Review (Units 1 & 2) (71707 and 71710)
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a.
The inspectors ieviewed plant operations throughout the reporting
period to verify conformance with regulatory requirements. Technical
Specifications (TS), and administrative controls. Control room logs,
danger tag logs, Technical Specification Action Item Log, and the
removal and restoration log were routinely reviewed.
Shift turnovers
were observed to verify that they were conducted in accordance with
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approved procedures.
The , inspectors verified by observation and interviews, the measures
taken to assure physical protection of the facility met current
requirements.- Areas inspected included the security organization, the
estab1fshment and maintenances of gates, doors, and isolation zones in
the proper condition, that access control and badging were proper and
procedures followed.
In addition to the areas discussed above, the areas toured were observed
for fire prevention and protection activities.
These included such
things as combustible material control, fire protection systems and
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materials, and fire protection associated with maintenance activities.
Detailed inspections were accomplished for reactor trips occurring on
July 8, 1986 (Unit 2) and July 17, 1986 (Unit 1). The inspectors also
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witnessed startup testing activities associated with Unit 2 including
observation of Loss of Control Room test (TP/2/A/2650/03) on June 27,
1986 and July 11, 1986 and Turbine Trip Test (TP/2/A/2650/07) on
July 23, 1986. The inspectors participated in a special inspection of
the safety injection incident which resulted from the Loss of Control
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test conducted on June 27, 1986.
This inspection is documented in
NRC/RII Report No. 50-413/86-25, 414/86-27. Documentation of followup
of corrective actions related to this incident is contained in
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paragraph 9 below,
b.
On July 9,
1986, the licensee requested a temporary waiver of
compliance with Technical Specifications (TS) which involved an
extension until 8:00 a.m. on July 12, 1986 for the time allowed by TS
Action statement 3/4.6.3 " Containment Isolation Valves".
This waiver
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was made in order to preclude an unnecessary thermal cycle on the
reactor and associated systems.
Following discussions between NRR,
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Region II, the Resident Inspector and the licensee, the waiver was
granted. The licensee subsequently went into the ACTION statement on
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July 12, repaired the valve and returned the valve to operable status
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within the ACTION statement time requirements.
The licensee has
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addressed this issue in a letter to Region II dated July 10, 1986.
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- An -Unresolved Item is a matter about which more information is required to
determine whether it is acceptabale or may involve a violation.
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c.
On June 22, 1986, an Engineering Safeguards Features (ESF) actuation
occurred.
This ESF actuation was the automatic startup of the
Auxiliary Feedwater (CA) pumps caused by a loss of ' normal feedwater.
During this actuation, CA Train A (CA pump) failed to start, several
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Nuclear Sampling (NM) and Steam Generator Blowdown (BB) valves failed
to close, and valve ICA-46 B in CA Train B failed to close completely.
The licensee identified that the failure of CA Pump to start and the NM
and BB valves to not operate was due to a failure of a Bussman type FNA
fuse. This type of fuse had been identified at McGuire Nuclear Station
(MNS) as a potential problem. A review of this area by the inspector
identified that several failures also had occurred at Catawba. As of
June 26, 1986 a total of twenty (20) fuses were identified as having
failed, e'aven (11) of which were found in the warehouse stock.
These
failures were di gussed with Region II, NRR and the MNS Senior Resident
Inspector in detail. As a result, Region II requested that Duke Power
Company (DPC) perform a more detailed investigation of the reliability
of Bussman FNA type fuses at all their nuclear generating plants. The
Cunfirmation of Action Letter dated July 3,
1986, for Catawba as
discussed in paragraph 9, addresses this issue.
DPC has initiated
discussions with the manufacturer and has commenced a test program to
determine reliability.
In addition, Catawba has commenced performing
weekly visual surveillances to obtain data on failure rates. Pending
the completion of data collection and analysis and review of the
conclusions reached by the licensee and review by the inspector, this
item
is
identified
as
an
Unresolved
Item
413-50/86-27-01,
414-50/86-30-01, Followup of analysis of Bussman type FNA fuses for
reliability.
No violations or deviations were identified.
6.
Surveillance Observation (Units 1 & 2) (61726)
During the inspection period, the inspector verified plant operations were
in compliance with various TS requirements.
Typical of these requirements
were confirmation of compliance with the TS for reactor coolant chemistry,
refueling water tank, emergency power systems, safety injection, emergency
safeguards systems, control room ventilation, and direct current electrical
power sources.
The inspector verified that surveillance testing was
performed in accordance with the approved written procedures, test instru-
mentation was calibrated, limiting conditions for operation were met,
appropriate removal and restoration of the affected equipment was
accomplished, test results met requirements and were reviewed by personrel
other than the individual directing the test, and that any deficiencies
4dentified during the testing were properly reviewed and resolved by
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appropriate management personnel.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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7.
Maintenance Observations (Units 1& 2) (62703)
a.
Station maintenance activities of selected systems and components were
observed / reviewed to ascertain that they were conducted in accordance
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with requirements. The inspector verified licensee conformance to the
requirements in the following areas of inspection: the activities were
accomplished using approved procedures, and functional testing and/or
calibrations were performed prior to returning components or systems to
service; quality control records were maintained; activities performed
were accomplished by qualified personnel; and materials used were
properly certified. Work requests were reviewed to determine status of
outstanding jobs and to assure that priority is assigned to
safety-related equipment maintenance which may effect
system
performance.
b.
During review of Work Requests (WR) the inspector noted that WR No.
21552-OPS was signed off as complete on June 23, 1986.
This WR was
initiated to perform corrective maintenance on Auxiliary Feedwater
Systems (CA) valve ICA46B which had not closed fully as required to
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provide CA pump runout protection on June 22, 1986 during an ESF
actuation (see paragraph 5.c.).
The WR documented that a blown fuse
had been replaced correcting the condition which prevented the valve
from closing. A review of the electrical schematic by the inspector
disclosed that the electrical design of the valve included a lock-in
circuit which should have allowed the valve to go full closed once the
close signal had been received. The licensee was requested to review
this problem further and discovered that the valve operator did not
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have the torque setting required by design.
Licensee Maintenance
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Management Procedure
1.0,
Work Request Preparation Section 4.10
requires the job supervisor to sign approval of a WR if the problem
identified has been resolved and expected results are produced.
Therefore, this item is a violation of TS 6.8.1 which requires licensee
procedures to be followed. This is Violation 413/86-27-02: Failure to
follow procedure for corrective maintenance.
e.
Further review of the problem identified in paragraph 7.b. above was
conducted by the licensee at the request of the inspector. This review
disclosed that the licensee procedure for maintenance of Rotork valve
actuators, Ip/0/A/3820/11, Certification of Rotork Valve Actuators, was
inadequate in that it referenced rated torque valves for valve
actuators rather than required torque valves for the individual
applications. This resulted in certain actuators which were required
to have torque settings greater than the rated value being replaced
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without proper recertification of torque settings.
This further
resulted in Valve Nos. ICA46B, CA pump runout protection valve and
INV158, Chemical
and Volume Control System letdown containment
isolation valve being undertorqued and not being able to close under
all postulated conditions.
Licensee evaluation of these conditions
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indicated that these problems did not represent a serious safety
concern.
These evaluations are documented in licensee memoranda
H. E. Edwards to A. P. Cobb dated July 18, 1986 and July 16, 1986.
This item violates 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V which requires
procedures to include appropriate quantitative acceptance criteria.
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This 1, violation 413/86-27-03: Failure t.o provide adequate procedure
for valve operator maintenance.
Two violations were identified as described in paragraphs 7.b. and 7.c.
No
deviations were identified.
8.
Review of Licensee Nonroutine Event Reports (Unit 2) (92700)
The below listed Licensee Event Reports (LER) were reviewed to determine if
the information provided met NRC requirements. The determination included:
adequacy of description, verification of compliance with Technical
Specifications and regulatory requirements, corrective action taken,
existence of potential generic problems, reporting requirements satisfied,
and the relative safety significance of each event.
Additional inplant
reviews and discussion with plant personnel, as appropriate, were conducted
for those reports indicated by an (*).
The following LERs are closed:
- LER 414/86-13, Rev.1
Rx Trip due to Failure of Reverse
Purge Flow Valve
- LER 414/86-14
Manual Rx Trip due to Turbine
Trip on Hi-Hi S/G Level
- LER 414/86-15
R Trip due to S/G Level Control
Instability
- LER 414/86-16
Main Feedwater Isolation due to
Overfeed of Steam Generator
- LER 414/86-18
Main Feedwater Isolation due to
Steam
Generator
Level
Control
Instability
Main Feedwater Isolation due to
Overfeeding of a Steam Generator
No violations or deviations were identified.
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9.
Confirmation of Action Letter Followup (Units 1 & 2) (92703)
A Confirmation of Action Letter (CAL) was issued July 3,1986 concerning the
transient which occurred at Catawba Unit 2 on June 27, 1986 (see Inspection
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Report 50-413/86-25, 50-414/86-27). All actions associated with item 1 of
this CAL were to be completed prior to proceeding above Mode 3 for Units 1
and 2, as applicable.
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Action 1.a. required the licensee to review and understand the root cause
and sequence of events associated with the transient.
The licensee
completed an in depth review of this event.
This was documented in a
" transient cycle" report written on July 6, 1986.
The inspectors reviewed
this report in detail and also discussed the event with licensee management.
The inspectors concluded that the licensee has completed this action item.
Action item 1.b. required the licensee to review functional controllers on
the main control panels (MCP), Auxiliary Shutdown Panels (ASP), and the
Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Control Panel (TDAFWPCP) with
respect to valve position, nomenclature, units of measure and correct
labeling and that changes made would be incorporated into procedures and
training.
This review was conducted for Units 1 and 2 and various changes
made to the panels. The inspectors reviewed these changes, the procedures
affected and training.
The inspectors concluded that the licensee has
completed this action item.
Action 1.c. required the licensee to conduct a review of all safety-related
circuits where Bussman FNA type fuses are used and where the failure of the
fuse would result in an undetected component malfunction such that the
components safety-related function would not be performed. The licensee was
allowed to perform a weekly visual surveillance on these fuses until
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sufficient data could be obtained and analyzed. The inspector reviewed the
licensees program to accomplish this data collection and participated in the
surveillance process.
Also the results of the initial inspection was
reviewed by the inspectors. This action was taken for both units 1 and 2.
The inspectors concluded that the licensee has conducted the initial review
and is performing weekly surveillances as specified by this action item.
Action item 1.d. was a requirement to train all licensed operators and Shirt
Technical Advisors on this event and the changes to procedures and panels as
a result of this CAL.
The inspectors reviewed the training plan and
witnessed several sessions of the training presentations.
Based on this
review, the inspectors concluded that the licensce has satisfied this action
item.
Action item 1.c.
specified that the licensee would correct all hardware
malfunctions that occurred during this event.
The hardware malfunctions
were corrected and appropriate retesting performed. The inspectors reviewed
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the documentation associated with this work and considered this item to be
complete.
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Action item 1.f. required changes to procedures for initiation of a safety
Jnjection during operation from the ASP.
The inspectors reviewed these
procedures for Units 1 and 2 and consider this action to De complete.
Action item 1.g. required the licensee to provide additional controls over
startup activities, to include additional prior review of test procedures
and additional personnel training.
The licensee implemented additienal
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controls and training.
These controls and the associated training were
reviewed by the inspectors and discussed v.ith Region II management. The
action taken by the licensee .is considered acceptable and this item is
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Action item 2 was to satisfactorily complete the Loss of Control Room Test
prior to Unit 2 exceeding 30% power. This test was performed on July 11,
1986 with no abnormal problems.
Prior to proceeding above Mode 3, the actions taken by the licensee in
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response to the CAL and the reviews conducted by the inspectors were
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discussed in detail with Regien II management.
No violations or deviations were identified.
10.
Previously Identified Inspector Findings (Unit 2) (92701)
(CLOSED) Inspector Followup Item 414/84-08-02: Evaluate Feedback from TSC to
Control Room and OSC.
This item is closed based on previous inspections
documented in Report No. 50-414/86-10.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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