ML20204J260

From kanterella
Jump to navigation Jump to search
Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 51 to License DPR-45
ML20204J260
Person / Time
Site: La Crosse File:Dairyland Power Cooperative icon.png
Issue date: 07/30/1986
From:
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:
Shared Package
ML20204J239 List:
References
NUDOCS 8608110037
Download: ML20204J260 (5)


Text

h*

  • a inuiTFD RTATFR

~

[

}.

NUCLEAR R GULATORY COMMISSION g

E WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

%...../

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION SUPPORTING AMENDMENT NO. 51 TO PROVISIONAL OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-45 DAIRYLAND POWER COOPERATIVE LA CROSSE BOILING WATER REACTOR (LACPWR)

DOCKET NO. 50-409

1.0 INTRODUCTION

By application dated September 29, 1982, as revised October 29, 198?,

September 16, 1985, and April 1, 1986, Dairyland Power Cooperative (DPC)

(the licensee) requested a change to Appendix A technical specifications (TS) of Provisional Operating License No. DPR-45 for the La Crosse Boiling Water Reactor (LACRWR). The change involves the consolidation and clarification of operability and surveillance requirements for the Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS). This safety evaluation is a review of the requested changes submitted in the September 29, 1982 letter as amended by the October 29, 1982, September 16, 1985 and April 1,1986 letters, and their impact on the operation and administration of plant activities.

2.0 DISCUSSION The TS changes proposed by the licensee consolidate requirements for operability and surveillance testing of the ECCS components into a new section, 4/5.2.24. Limitina Conditions for Operation (LCO) and bases for system operability are established, and TS Sections 2.4.6, 2.4.7, 4.2.2.14, 4.2.2.15, 4.2.2.16, 4.2.2.18, 5.2.7 and 5.2.8 are deleted. Proposed changes were evaluated against criteria specified in both the BWR Standard Technical Specifications (STS) and the Standard Review Plan (NUREG-0800), Chapter 6.3.

Review of the proposed changes revealed that system surveillance acceptance criteria are incorporated into system bases. Discussions with the licensee indicate that the acceptance criteria delineated in the bases section of the proposed amendment are identical to the criteria specified in the LACRWR Inservice Testing (IST) program. Since IST periodically verifies the operational readiness of components against specific Derformance criteria per the requirements of 10 CFR 50.55a(c), the staff finds the changes acceptable as discussed below.

8608110037 860730 PDR ADOCK 05000409 P

PDR j

i 3.0 EVALUATION A.

Addition of TS Section 4/5.2.24, " Emergency Core Cooling Systems" (ECCS) and 5.2.24.4, " Overhead Storage Tank Surveillance Requirements"

1) ECCS The proposed TS Section 4/5.2.24 discusses the general purpose and capability of the ECCS and incorporates the content of current TS Sections 2.4.6, 2.4.7, 4.2.2.14, 4.2.2.16, 4.2.2.18, 5.2.7 and 5.2.8, into Standard Technical Specification format. ECCS subsystems are discussed in new TS Section 4/5.2.24 as follows: the High Pressure Core Spray (HPCS) System is addressed in Subsection 4/5.2.24.1, the Manual Depressurization System (MDS) is addressed in Subsection 4/5.2.24.2, the Alternate Core Spray (ACS) System, is addressed in Subsection 4/5.2.24.3, and the Overhead Storage Tank (0HST) is addressed in Subsection 4/5.2.24.4 Each subsection is discussed individually below.

a) High Pressure Core Spray (HPCS)

The TS is revised to consolidate current TS sections 2.4.6, 4.2.2.14, and 5.2.7 in STS format. Applicable modes are stated.

In addition, more restrictive LCO are imposed and associated surveillance requirements are revised to be more closely aligned with those of STS. Bases for the HPCS system are added to the TS as Section 4/5.2.24.1 and include most of the current require-ments of current TS 2.4.6 and 4.2.2.14.

Bases for the Low Pressure Core Spray (LPCS) mode of the HPCS system are included in the TS. Surveillance requirements incorporate the test requirements delineated in current TS Section 5.2.7 and include both manual and automatic system injection verification, lack of full scram signal system block, valve lineup verification and confirmation of sufficient air pressure for the air-operated control and isolation valves. The licensee discusses system performance and testing criteria in the bases and has committed to continue the inservice testing (IST) of pertinent components under the auspices of the IST program using the criteria addressed in the proposed system bases. Discharge pressure requirements for the positive displacement HPCS pumps are modified to be "in excess of reactor operating pressure" in lieu of the 1450 psig currently required; however, IST surveillance acceptance criteria used to periodically verify both component and system operability remain the same.

i l

, LACBWR has separated the TS for the HPCS system into two sections; i.e., HPCS mode and LPCS mode. Specific operability, LCO and surveillance criteria are delineated for each.

Requirements for reactor shutdown based on the status of both modes of the HPCS system, previously omitted, are specified.

I Since the proposed TS consists of clarification and consolidation of current system surveillance requirements including revision of sur-veillance test frequency and acceptance criteria to more closely align with those of the Standard Technical Specifications, the staff finds the proposed enJnges to be acceptable.

b) Manual Depressurization System (MDS)

The MDS rapidly reduces reactor coolant system pressure to a level where the ACS can provide water to the reactor core. LCO, surveillance requirements, system bases, applicable modes and requirements for reactor shutdown based on MDS status are placed into STS format in proposed Technical Specification 4/5.2.24.2.

Since the proposed TS consists of clarification and consolidation of current system surveillance requirements including revision of sur-veillance test frequency and acceptance criteria to more closely align with those of the Standard Technical Specifications, the staff finds the proposed changes to be acceptable.

c) Alternate Core Spray (ACS)

Proposed Section 4/5.2.24.3 is added to address LC0 and surveillance requirements for the ACS system and incorporates current requirements as stated in current TS 2.4.7, 4.2.2.18 and 5.2.8.

Although not explicitly stated, the ACS is also identified as the Low Pressure Core Injection (LPCI) by the licensee. The ACS/LPCI system serves as a backup to the LPCS mode of the HPCS system but does not provide normal reactor coolant system (RCS) makeup; therefore, STS addressing LPCI requirements and functions but excluding those associated with shutdown cooling and makeup functions, were used to evaluate the adequacy of the proposed TS requirements.

Bases and surveillance requirements are stated which indicate that the licensee has incorporated, where appropriate, the require-ments of the STS. The ACS is not required to be operable in Mode 4 since the ACS system supply is not used for primary coolant makeuo purposes. The requirements for appropriate pump discharge pressures and flows, submission of a Special Report should actua-tion of the ACS result in injection into the RCS, and for reactor shutdown based on the status of the ACS system are added. The proposed TS do not include the requirement of current TS 5.2.8 to demonstrate that the check valves in the system are not stuck i

L

. in a closed position; however, the licensee has previously com-mitted to continue verification of the operability of the check valves at every refueling under the auspices of the IST program.

Since the proposed TS consists of clarification and consolidation of current system surveillance requirements including revision of sur-t veillance test frequency and acceptance criteria to more closely align with those of the Standard Technical Specifications, the staff finds the proposed changes to be acceptable.

i d) Overhead Storage Tank (OHST)

Proposed Section 4/5.2.24.4 defining LCO and operability requirements i

previously omitted and incorporating current TS 4.2.2.16 is added.

Surveillance requirements associated with the OHST are defined in new TS Section 5.2.24.4.

The inoperability of the OHST does not cause both HPCS and LPCS modes of the HPCS system to be inoperable simultaneously; however, required action statements are consistent with the specifications of both the current LACBWR TS 3.0.3 and proposed TS Section 4.2.24.1.

Comparison of the proposed TS with the STS indicates that the licensee has imposed operability and surveillance requirements aligned with those of the STS. Requirements for reactor shutdown based on OHST status are defined.

Since the proposed TS consists of clarification and consolidation of current system surveillance requirements including revision of sur-veillance test freauency and acceptance criteria to more closely align with those of the Standard Technical Specifications, the staff finds the proposed changes to be acceptable.

B.

Deletion of Sections 2.4.6, 2.4.7, 4.2.2.14, 4.2.2.15, 4.2.2.16, 4.?.2.18, 5.2.7 and 5.2.8.

The operability requirements of 2.4.6, 2.4.7, 4.2.2.14, 4.2.2.16 and 4.2.2.18 and the surveillance requirements delineated for the HPCS and ACS/LPCI systems stated in current TS 5.2.7 and 5.2.8 are incorporated into proposed Section 4/5.2.24 as discussed above. An additional provision, delineated in current TS Section 4.2.2.15, for removal of the HPCS pumps from service for maintenance given certain prerequisites is no longer necessary as it expired on May 22, 1981 and, therefore, is deleted.

The staff finds these proposed changes to be acceptable.

4.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

This amendment involves changes to requirements with respect to the installation or use of facility components located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20 and changes to the surveillance requirements. The staff has determined that the amendment involves no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure.

The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that this amendment s

involves no significant hazards consideration and there has been no public comment on such finding. Accordingly, this amendment meets the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9).

Pursuant l

to 10 CFR 51.22(b) no environmental impact statement nor environmental assess-ment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of this amendment.

5.0 CONCLUSION

The staff has further concluded, based on the considerations discussed j

above, that:

(1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety e

of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, j

and (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commis-sion's regulations and the issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the i.

public.

Principal Contributor: Region III, Pat Eng j

Dated:

July 30, 1986 i

i l

l l

L

. -..-