ML20203N361

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Physical Protection of Plants & Matls,Requirements for Physical Protection of Nuclear Power Reactors, 10CFR73 Statements of Consideration
ML20203N361
Person / Time
Issue date: 02/24/1977
From:
NRC
To:
Shared Package
ML20203N357 List:
References
FOIA-86-661, FRN-42FR10836, RULE-PR-73 NUDOCS 8609230344
Download: ML20203N361 (3)


Text

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1, UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION t RULES and REGULATIONS TITLE 10, CHAPTER 1. CODE OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS-ENERGY

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PART PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF PLANTS AND MATERIALS 73 i

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g STATEMENTS OF CONSIDERATION L

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38 FR 35430 requirement for advance shipping notice Pubbshed 12/28/73 type. In order to make notification re.

? is not applicable to spent fuel shipments, quirements upon arrtval of a shipment

" and would also not be applicable to ship- consistent, paragraph 73.36(c)(3) has PART 73-MtYS4 CAL PROTECTION QF ments or transfers of SNM by road with

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PLANTS AND MATERIALS one way transit times of one hour or less been revised to require that the c'onsignee

? Pursuant to the Atomic Energy Act of inform the shipper by teleptjbne-end 1

in duration between instaBations of a telegraph or teletype. -

1954. as amended, and sections 583 and licensee; (4) telephone and telegraph 553 of 'I1tle 5 of the United States Code, or teletype notifications are required (5) In order to be more definitive as b the Atomic Itnergy Comrsiad='s regula- thipment arrives at its des. to the " appropriate" NRC Inspection and 5= . Enforcement Regional Omce to be in-k tion 10 CPR Part 73 is hereby repub .

hshed as a document subject to aanen,..

~tination i

'h'D %"n all cases! (5) and a deonition of the - appropriate NRC Regional In-formed of shipments a new definition has been added in paragraph

  • 73.2(r). Por tion for the purpose of incorporaunt spection and Enforcenpent Omce to be domestic shipments the appropriate Re-Into one document aM amaadmaats to notified of shipments has been added. stopal Of!!ce is the omee within whose the regulauon to date taauding the De following discussion pertains to region the licensee who is responsible for amendments 3 nhMahad in the FassaaL ltems (1) through (5) respectively: the physical protection arrangementa of

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RaszsTra on November 8,1973. In r,. (1) De proposed rule specified that the shipment is located. For. export and/

? ~em, Part 73 a number of editortal the advance notice of shipment contain i or import shipments the appropriate Re-chansee ~have been made, including information as specified in 9 73.70(g). gional 02ce is the omce within whose clartAcation of the efr*ctive date of a Comments on this requirement indicated region the licenseelrho is responsible for

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number of sections ~ that some of the information in proposci the physical protection arrangementa of

- l 73.70(g) is not ava!!able seven days in the shipment is located and also the Re-I advance of a shipment. Accordingly this glonal Omce for the meton in which the  !

E 40 FR 52840 provision has been revised to require last or first point of exit or entry from m only the following information in the or into the UA is located, as appropriate. ,

Pubhshed 11/13/75 advance shipping notice: shipper, re. Pursuant to the Atomic Energy-Act of

-5 Effective 12/15/75 ceiver, carrier (s), estimated date and 1954, as amended. the Energy Reorgan!-

A time of departure and arrival, transfer sation Act of 1974, and sections 552 and 7 PART 73-PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF potts, and modes'of shipment. 553 of title 5 of the United States Code, PLANTS AND MATERIALS (2) A telephone call to the Director of the foDowing amendments of 'I1tle 10, 1 *"** ** the appropriate NRC Inspection and Chapter I Code of Federal Regulations, E uc Mat Enforcement Regional Of!!ce t.ssures that 3 11shed as a document sub-lei On Aprt! 4,1975, the Nuclear Regula* the Regional Office would be alerted to 3 r-tory Commtaatan (NRC) puo!!shed in the the fact that advance shipping informa-5 Pastsat Escistan (40 FR 15098) pro- tion details were being sent by mail.

E_ posed amendments to its regulations in Appropriate accon could be taken if the 10 CFR Part 73 to require that advance information did not arrive as expected.

42 FR 10836 y- notice of shipments involving certain (3) Several commenters reqyested quanttues of special nuclear material clarification on whether the advance Published 2/24/77 E (6NM) be provided to the NRC, and that shipping notice was required for spent Effective 3/28/77 g the NRC be notified upon arrival of such fuel shipments. It was not intended that g ahlpmenta. Interested persons were in* the advance shipping notice apply to PART 50-LICENSING OF PRODUCTION

= spent fuel shipments. Accordingly, t 73.6 AND UTILIZATION FACILITIES wited to submit commenta and sugges- has been revised to except spent fuel s- tions for consideration in connection shipments from the requirement for an PART 73-PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF

, witn the proposed amendments within 30 PLANTS AND MATERIALS r days after publication in the PapstAL advance shipping notice. Addluonally-one commenter requested that inter-site Requirements for the Physical Protection Raotsyra. Upon consideration of the shipments between closely spaced in- of Nuclear Power Reactors iE -

E comments received and other factors in- stallataons also be excluded from the re. On November 13, 1974, the Atomic volved, the NRC bas adopted the pro- quirement of an advance shipping nouce.

g posed amendments with certain modif1- Energy Commission published in the g

g cations set forth below, Significant differences from the Section 73.73 has been accordingly re-vised to exclude the requirement of an FrorsAL Rrcisita (39 FR 400381 pro-posed amendments to its regulations in m- advance shipping notice for " road ship.

amendmenta published for comment ments or transfers with one way transit 10 CPR Part 73," Physical Protection of

, are: (1) the amount ofinformation to be times of one hour or less in duration Plants and Materials," which, in the in-supplied in the advance shipping notice between installations of a licensee." terest of the common defense and secu-b has been reduced; (3) in addition to (4) Paragraph 73.36(c)(3) of the pro- rity and the public health and safety t

notifytng the NRC Inspection and En- posed rule required the consignee to would identify measures to be taken for forcement Regional Omce by mall. the ep n y licensee is nquired to notify the Director noufy the shipper upon arrival of a ship- Mc ear pom reacWs g ment by telephone telegraph or teletype. against bdustrial sabotage.

of the appropriate Regional Omce by Paragraph 73.36(e) of the proposed rule Interested parties were invited to sub-telephone seven days in advance of the ahipping date that an advance shippin4 required that the consignee inform the mit comments and suggestions in con-notice had been sent by ma!!: (35 the shipper and the appropriate Regional nection with the proposed amendments OfBee by telephone ssui telegraph or tele- within 60 days after publication in the Elk 73.SC-1 September 1,1982 8609230344 860918 PDR FOIA k KORKALA86-661 PDR m_

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, t PART 73 o STATEMENTS OF CONSIDERATION i Psosaat Racasysm. Upon consideration of actor. In addition, studies have indicated functional requirements will not vary.

the comments received, and other factors that the generic characteristics (i.e., the However, to clarify the requirements on involved, the Nuclear Regulatory Com- " defense-in-depth" concept of reactor these and other special cases of physical {

mission has adopted the proposed plant design) of commercial power re* security interfaces of operating power amendments, with certain modifications actors make the releasing of radioactiv- reactors. a specific mention is made of as set forth below. ity by acts of sabotage difficult. Further- the case of adjacent reactor facilities.

Significant differences from the pro- more, the potential consequences of a (3) Guard force duties have been the

, posed amendments published for com- reactor sabotage are judged to be less subject of review by the Commission in ments are: (1) Addition of a general than the extreme consequences which connection with fuel cycle facilities. A I I

performance requirement; (2) clarifica- could be associated with the successful specification of those duties, appropriate tion of the requirements for multtunit detonation of an illicit nuclear explosive to licensed power reactors. has been in-sites; (3) clarifying the number and re- device. Having considered these factors, cluded in i 73.55th)(3) .'

sponse requirements of on(te security the Commission has concluded that the In addition, minimum and nominal

, personnel: (4) rewording of tne require- level of protection specified in i 73.55 is numbers of armed response personnel

' ment to have a security supervisor on adequate and prudent at this time. The have been specified in i 73.55(h)(2). The

' shift at all times; (5) specification of kind and degree of threat and the vul- number of such armed response person-the level of illumination to be provided nerabilities to such threats will continue nel required at a given facility could be

. for monitoring and observation require- to be reviewed by the Commission. more or less than the nominal number ments; (6) replacement of the term Should such reviews show changes that depending on factors such as the follow - *

" bullet penetration resistance" with a would dictate different levels of protec- ing to be considered during evaluation of j new term

  • bullet-resisting"; (7) changes tion, the Commission would consider a I censee's physical security plan, not t to permit off loading of cargo inside of changes to meet the changed conditions. necessarily in order of importance:

the protected area; (8) a change to re- Compliance with the detailed require- (a) Selection, training and motiva-quire escort for all vehicles in the pro- ments should essentially satisfy the gen- tionof response force.

tected area, except designated licensee eral performance requirements stated (b) Availability._and construction of vehicles, instead of requiring cleared in the rule in I 73.55(a). However, there defensive positions.

drivers or um- employee drivers; (9) may be instances for some plants where ' (c) Availability and kno* ledge a _. of a change to permit certain Camm(maton additional requirements will have to be weapons and other equipment.

+ approved delivery. and inspection activi- imposed so that the general performance (d) Individual site considerations, in-

. ties to be carried out in protected or vital requirements can be met. In these cases, cluding size, topography, configuration, 4 areas; (10) deletion' of the requirement such requirements will be spectiled by the ' geography,-weather, and number of nua-

"for additional barriers to obstruct ready Commission's staff. In any event all 11- clear power plant units.

access to vital areas;. (11) changes to censees subject to the rule must comply (e) Location and reliability of initial permit additional licensee vehicles nec- with the general performance require- detection devices.

essary to the conduct of the ofBcial plant ments. Nothing herein should be con- (f) Consideration of Local I4w En-

> functions into the protected area; (12) strued as precluding licensees from pro- forcement Agencies response.

I su addition to require upon termination viding the Commission's staff with (g) Vital area hardening, including of employment of any employee that cer. suggested other equivalent detailed plant design, location of and access con.

tain keys, locks, combinations, and other measures that the licensee determines to trol to vital areas.

related equipment be changed; (13) be necessary to meet the general per-changes to require the implementation formance requirements.

(h) Design and construction of pro-tected area barriers. f of the new rules on a graded basis; and It also should be noted that to reduce (D Redundancy of security systems.

(14) changes in the protected area access the vulnerability of operating facilities (j) Initial clearance and continuing 1 control provision to delete the require. from the threat of an insider, the Com- reliability assessment of personnel. .

ment for progression of search functions mission is considering a program to re- (k) Security and contingen# proce-and to define physical protection in quire personnel security clearances for dures.

, terms of a bullet-resisting structure. Individuals employed in sensitive work It also should be noted that, to increase

. Editorial changes aho were made, as ap, activities who have access to or control the effectiveness of security organisa-propriate. This includes eliminating an over special nuclear material. However, tions, the Commission is considering a

obsolete provision in 150.54. In addition, applicants and licensees should continue regulation concerning guards and other I 73.55 (b)(2),(b)(3),and (b)(4) (phys, to use the employee screening guidance security personnel qualifications and leal barriers) and i 73.55 (c)(3) and from the American National Standard, training. The regulation could take the l (c) (8) (access requirements) have been ANSI N18.17, ** Industrial Security for for of an amendment to 10 CFR Part 73 clarifled and reorganized into I 73.55 Nuclear Power Plants." Should the con- and include performance cdteria for use (c)(2). (c)(3). (c)(4). (c)(5) and (d) tinuing review of such internal threats by licensees in developing and applying

. (3). (d)(4), respectively. by the Commission show changes that detailed personnel qualifications, basic

! The following discussion pertains to would dictate different levels of protec- training, and tactical training plans to

^, items (1) through (14) above: tion, future changes to meet these new be used in conjunction with security (1) Although performance objectives conditions would be forthcoming. plans.

were considend in the development of (2) In adopting these amendments (4) The proposed rule would have re-4 the proposed rule, the rule itself did not the Commission considered the special quired that a supervisor of the security specify the level of performance that the case of the physical security interfaces organization be onsite at all times. Com-physical protection system and security of an operating reactor on a site at ments indicated that the responsibility organization are to achieve.Many of the which another reactor is under construc- of the security supervisor had been con-comments indicated that inclusion of a tion. Specifically, consideration was fused with that of the shift supervisor.

I general performance requirement would given to the need for special access pro- To clarify its intent, the rule set forth aid in the implementation of the rule cedures, barriers, or guards at the se- below was reworded to require that one and more explicitly indicate the level of curity boundaries common to the two protection required. A paragraph has units. It was determined that these erbe commission has published for com-amendments require a level of protec- ment. proposed amendments to to cra 73.50 been added to the amendment which ad- tion along a protected area boundary, (g) that correspond to the response require-dresses these general performance re- m n i the Ie mon red phy e la. I 73 ( ) )

quirements for the physical protection gg system and the security organization.On

  • the basis of intelligence and other rele- independent of the activity outside or aratesons rulemaking with an interest from this in the proceeding, per-response require-vant information available to the NRC inside the protected area. While the ments in 173.shh)(3) may comment on there are no known groups in this coun- specMc protecWe measures will vary the proposed amendment to 5 73.so(g) before try having the combination of motiva- according to what is adjacent to a pro. April 11,1977. Any changes resulting from tion, skill, and resources to attack either tected area boundary, e.g., a river, a commentswith on Irespect 73.so(s) wm also be con-to the present rule.

a fuel facility or a nuclear power re- parking lot, or a reactor under construc. Isigr (h)(3).

tion, the level of protection and its Member 1,1982 73.SC.2

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. .. a j PART 73 e STATEMENTS OF CONSIDERATION 4

full time member of the security organi. within the protected area to only those nization Act of 1974, and Section 552 '

( sation who is authorized to direct the ac. designated as emergency or security ve- and 553 of title 5 of the United States tivities of all other members of the secu. hicles except under emergency condi- Code, the following amendments to Title rity organizatnn be onsite at all times. tions. Based on comments received the 10 Chapter I, Code of Federal Regula.

(5) The prowsed rule did not specify Commission has concluded that addi- tions. Part 73 are published as a docu.

f a level of illummation. Comments indi. tional transportation, other than for ment subject to codification.

cated that a levet of illumination should emergency and security purposes, is re-i be specified. The rule set forth below quired to perform necessary plant func-specifies a level of illumination which is Lions 'nierefore, the rule set forth below sufDefent for the monitoring and observa. has been modified to permit designated tion requirements. licensee vehicles necessary to perform (6) The proposed rule used the term official plant functions within the pro- 42 m W O3

" bullet penet, ration resistance." Co:n. tected area but with certain necessary MM 12n2/77 ments indicated a need for a clear mean. controls. Effective 1/23/78 ing. Since the meaning of " bullet pene. (12) He proposed amendments speci-

  1. tration resistance" was covered in the fled that locks, keys, combinations, and PART 73-MfYSICAR. PIIOTECTION OF j term " bullet-resisting" de0ned and used other related equipment used to control PtMTS AM MAMAM i by the Underwriters' Laboraories (UL) access to protected and vital areas be Guard Force fleepense to en Alarm l Standard UL-752, the rule set forth below controlled to reduce the probability of AGENCY: US. Nuclear Regulatory was changed to use the term " bullet. compromise and be changed whenever 'wnmwon.

resisting" and a new definition has been there is evidence that they may have been added in f 73.2 to correspond to the deft. compromised. An additional requ'rement ACTION: Final rule.

l nition of

  • bullet-resisting" used by the to change upon terminataon of employ-

SUMMARY

he Nuclear Regulatory Standard UL-752. ment of any employee, keys, locks, com- rwn=*=atan is ==anding its agulations (7) he proposed rule would have re, binations, and related equipment to to clarify the alarm require-quired that cargo be off loaded outside which that employee has access, has anents for casite guards to spe-i the protected area. On the basis of pub- been included. etal nuclear material from M and i lic comments, it was determined that off (13) The proposed amendments speci. Manaad plants from tidustrist sabotage.

loading outside the protected area ar.sy fled that the new rules be implemented EFFECTIVE I) ATE: He ==andmania not be cost effective. The rule set forth , by licensees by 180 days from the date haaama effective January 23, 1978.

' 1;elow provides for off loading inalde the of Commission approval of the physical protected area under appropriate secu. security plan. Comments received showed ,POR g.* FUR *I'HER INFORMA'M CON.

rity conditions and, to tne extent prac. a need for addiuonal time for implemen-4 ticable, at a specifically designated mate, tation of certain features. It appears that George W. McCorkle, Chief Phyelcal i rials receiving area that is not adjaceng additional time could be provided for Security v.saaneeng Branch, UA. Nu-to a vital area. compilance with some features of the clear Regulatory Commission. Wash-(8) he proposed rule would have re. rule without prejudice to the public ington. D.C. 30888, 301-427-4181.

quired that either the driver of a vehl. hes!th and safety and common defense SUFFr.swamfTARY INFORMA110N:

( cle permitted access into the protected and suurity, Other features can be raore On February 10,1977, the Nuclear Regu-ares possess an AEC personnel security promptly implemented. The Commission 1 story tw==*=8an puhMahad k the clearance, or the vehicle be driven by an has therefore concluded that a graded Fuosaar. Raomesa (43 FR 8383) proposed employee of the licensee while in the pro. psegram for tenplamentation is desirable. a=nd= ants to its Ngulations in le CPR tected area. Based upon the cammanta Re rule has been changed to permit Part 13, "Phyelcal Protection of Plants received and the attendant increase in additional time for construcuon and in. and Materials," whleh wohid'clartty the i trafBc that would result from item (7; stallation requirements and to require responsibilities of the ensite guards fee" above, regarding off loading, the rule has the procedural aspects in the organisa- the protection of speelai nnataar matertal i been revised to require that all vehicles, tion, access, communications, and re. from theft and licensed plants frem In-i except designated licensee vehicles, re. sponse provisions to be implemented by dustrial sabotage, an formity in the anpm daesan wouldofassum uni-neulatorF 8

quiring entry into the protected area May 25,1977,

shall be escorted by a member of the (14) The proposed amendments would requimments in this important ama.

security organization while within the have required that access control to the Intensted partses wee invited to e protected area. protected area proceed progressively *"","g and "88*'" '

  • g , proposed mandman

, (9) he proposed rule would have re. from the detection of Arearms and ex- withh 60 days after puhua=* tan m to j quired that all packages be searched prior plosives to identificauon and admission. Passaar. Raouram. Upon consideration of i to entry into the protected area.De rule that the function for the detection of the aa== ants received and other emetoes

{ set forth below has been changed to per. firearms and explosives be physicallF hvolved, to Nuclear Regulatory com-

mit certain Commission approved deliv. separate from the function of identifica- mamanan has adopted the proposed

+ ery and inspecuon activiues to be con. tion, and that individuals performing the ampnAmants, with certain =adiaam*8ana j ducted within protected or vital areas for identificauon and controlling admittance as set forth below angneecan* dHrenness l reasons of safety, security or operational be housed in a structure capable of pro- from the proposed amendmant published necessity, viding physical protection to the occu- for comment are: (1) Restructuring and 1 l (10) The proposed rule would have pants to assure their ability to respond rewording of the ma===es 30 he taken l l required appropriate barriers to obstruct and summon assistance. On further con- to neutralise a thmet, and (3) moording ready access to vital areas by ground sideration, these provisions appear to be of oceditions for the use of deadly fores.

Vehicles. The Commission has decided unduly restrictive. He important factor Some of the comments received fadi.  !

on the basis of studies in progress that in preventing a compromise of such an ested a belief that the guard force ac. )

4 this proposed provision as it applies to access control function is to protect the 18cas listed in the pnposed rule were j i vehicles should not be included in the ability of the guards to respond and to sequential, that is, Gv) was not to begin regulauons at this time. This proposed senman assistance Accordingly, the antil Gli) was eengisted. W etarity 20s ,

amendment has been deleted from the progression and physical separation pro. tatent, the nde was seuerded to sesidue )

rule set forth below, although physical visions discussed above have been deleted that actions toaculeulles to emot h barriere are required for protection from the amendments and a requirement torposing guards between speelmi nnelear against attempts at unauthorised access added for isolation of the individual (s) matesh! and any pomon attempMag l of the character described in the general responsible for the last access control entry for tan purpose of industrial sabo-performance requirements, funcuon within a bullet-resisting struc- tage or heft, ele, and hfonning local (11) he proposed rule would have ture to assure his ability to respond and enforcement jg m enesung amama.

{ limited the admission of vehicles de **'"'nunicate. aAd "tf j signed primarily for carrying passengers Fursuant to the Atomic Energy Act *,, m M regard to

of 1954, as amended, the Energy Reorga-l i 73 SC-3 *n _1, leg 2 i l

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