ML20202B863

Safety Insp Repts 50-324/86-15 & 50-325/86-14 on 860501-31. Violation Noted:Failure to Maintain Svc Water Valve Motor Operator Breaker in Correct Position

ML20202B863
Person / Time
Site:	Brunswick
Issue date:	06/26/1986
From:	Fredrickson P, Garner L, Ruland W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20202B836	List: ML20202B829 ML20202B845 ML20202B863
References
50-324-86-15, 50-325-86-14, NUDOCS 8607100440
Download: ML20202B863 (7)

See also: IR 05000324/1986015

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2Kfoo UNITED STATES

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Report Nos. 50-325/86-14 and 50 324/86-15

Licensee: Carolina Power and Light Company

P. O. Box 1551

Raleigh, NC 27602

Docket Nos. 50-325 and 50-324 License Nos. DPR-71 and DPR-62

Facility Name: Brunswick 1 and 2

Inspection Conducted: May 1 - 31, 1986

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Approved By:

P. E. Fredrickson, Section Chief

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Division of Reactor Projects

SUMMARY

Scope: Routine safety inspection conducted by the resident inspectors on site

in the areas of maintenance observation, surveillance observation, operational

safety verification, onsite Licensee Event Reports (LER) review, onsite followup

of events, ESF System walkdown, plant startup from refueling and followup on

unresolved item.

Results: One violation - failure to maintain a service water valve motor

operator breaker in the correct position.

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DETAILS

1. Licensee Employees Contacted -

P. Howe, Vice President - Brunswick Nuclear Project

C. Dietz, General Manager - Brunswick Nuclear Project

T. Wyllie, Manager - Engineering and Construction

G. Oliver, Manager - Site Planning and Control

J. Holder, Manager - Outages

E. Bishop, Manager - Operations

L. Jones, Director - Quality Assurance (QA)/ Quality Control (QC)

R. Helme, Director - Onsite Nuclear Safety - BSEP

J. Chase, Assistant to General Manager

J. O'Sullivan, Manager - Maintenance

G. Cheatham, Manager - Environmental & Radiation Control

K. Enzor, Director - Regulatory Compliance

B. Hinkley, Manager - Technical Support

R. Groover, Manager - Project Construction

A. Hegler, Superintendent - Operations

W. Hogle, Engineering Supervisor

B. Wilson, Engineering Supervisor

R. Kitchen, Mechanical Maintenance Supervisor (Unit 2)

C. Treubel, Mechanical Maintenance Supervisor (Unit 1)

R. Poulk, Senior NRC Regulatory Specialist

D. Novotny, Senior Regulatory Specialist

W. Murray, Senior Engineer - Nuclear Licensing Unit

Other licensee employees contacted included construction craftsmen,

engineers, technicians, operators, office personnel, and security force

members.

2. Exit Interview (30703)

The inspection scope and findings were summarized on July 5,1986 with the

general manager. The violation - Failure to Maintain a Diesel Generator

Service Water Valve Breaker in the Correct Position, paragraph 11, was

discussed in detail. The licensee acknowledged the findings without

exception. The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the

materials provided to or reviewed by the inspectors during the inspection.

3. Followup on Previous Enforcement Matters (92702)

Not inspected.

4. Maintenance Observation (62703)

The inspectors observed maintenance activities and reviewed records to

verify that work was conducted in accordance with approved procedures,

Technical Specifications, and applicable industry codes and standards. The

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inspectors also verified that: redundant components were operable;

administrative controls were followed; tagouts were adequate; personnel were

qualified; correct replacement parts were used; radiological controls were

proper; fire protection was adequate; quality control hold points were

adequate and observed; adequate post-maintenance testing was performed; and

independent verification requirements were implemented. The inspectors

independently verified that selected equipment was properly returned to

service.

Outstanding work requests were reviewed to ensure that the licensee gave

priority to safety-related maintenance.

The inspectors observed / reviewed portions of the following maintenance

activities:

86-ASMll Inspection / Repair of MCC-2XB After Salt Water Spray

86-AWQD1 RHR Suction Valve E11-F004B Remote Shutdown Switch

Repair / Replacement

PM-85-107 Re-install Unit 2 Drywell Access Concrete

86-AKLJ1 LPRM 36-13B IV Curve (Time Domain Reflectometry per

MI-16-5, Rev. 6)

No violations or deviations were identified.

5. Surveillance Observation (61726)

The inspectors observed surveillance testing required by Technical

Specifications. Through observation and record review, the inspectors

verified that: tests conformed to Technical Specification requirements;

administrative controls were followed; personnel were qualified; instru-

mentation was calibrated; and data was accurate and complete. The

inspectors independently verified selected test results and proper return to

service of equipment.

The inspectors witnessed / reviewed portions of the following test activities:

MST-RHR22M RHR-LPCI ADS CS LL3, HPCI RCIC LL2 Div 1 TR Unit

Channel Calibration

PT-72 Main Steam Line Monitor Channel Calibration

PT-91.0.37 Residual Heat Removal (Ell), Class 2, Loop B,

VT-3/VT-4 Examination of Cc.aponent Supports

2-MST-ADS 23R ADS Safety Relief Valve Prinary Position Channel

Calibration, Rev. O

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1-MST-HPCI15M HPCI Steam Leak Detection Channel Functional Test,

Rev. 1.

No violations or deviations were identified.

6. Operational Safety Verification (71707)

The inspectors verified conformance with regulatory requirements by direct

observations of activities, facility tours, discussions with personnel,

reviewing of records and independent verification of safety system status.

The inspectors verified that control room manning requirements of 10 CFR

50.54 and the Technical Specifications were met. Control room, shift

supervisor, clearance and jumper / bypass logs were reviewed to obtain

information concerning operating trends and out of service safety systems to

ensure that there were no conflicts with Technical Specifications Limiting

Conditions for Operations. Direct observations were conducted of control

room panels, instrumentation and recorder traces important to safety to

verify operability and that parameters were within Technical Specification

limits. The inspectors observed shift turnovers to verify that continuity

of system status was maintained. The inspectors verified the status of

selected control room annunciators.

Operability of selected Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) trains specifically

Units 1 and 2 Core Spray, Unit 1 HPCI, and partial Unit 1 RHR, were verified

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by insuring that: each accessible valve in the flow path was in its correct

position; each power supply and breaker were aligned for components that

must activate upon initiation signal; removal of power from those ESF

motor-operated valves, so identified by Technical Specifications, was

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completed; there was no leakage of major components; there was proper

lubrication and cooling water available; and a condition did not exist

which might prevent fulfillment of the system's functional requirements.

! Instrumentation essential to system actuation or performance was verified

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operable by observing on-scale indication and proper instrument valve

lineup, if accessible.

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The inspectors verified that the licensee's health physics policies /

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procedures were followed. This included a review of area surveys, radiation

work permits, posting, and instrument calibration.

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The inspectors verified that

the security organization was properly manned

and security personnel were capable of performing their assigned functions;

persons and packages were checked prior to entry into the protected area

(PA); vehicles were properly authorized, searched and escorted within the

i PA; persons within the PA displayed photo identification badges; personnel

l in vital areas were authorized; and effective compensatory measures were

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employed when required.

. The inspectors also observed plant housekeeping controls, verified position

l of certain containment isolation valves, reviewed the clearance log and

l selected clearances, and verified the operability of onsite and offsite

emergency power sources.

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The inspectors performed a walkdown of the Unit 2 drywell prior to closecut

to verify that systems were ready for unit operation. Items inspected

included fixed supports, snubbers, position of Emergency Core Cooling System

(ECCS) manual injection valves, re-assemb-ly of components, and housekeeping.

The inspector found that the Safety Relief Valve (SRV) bolt lockwire was

broken on valves F013A and D and was not wired strictly in accordance with

the figure in maintenance instruction MI-16-626, Rev. 5, Target-Rock Safety

Relief Valves Two Stage, Model 7567F. On two valves the mounting bolts were

wired together but the procedure showed only two bolts together. The

licensee corrected the lockwire on all the SRVs and will examine the need

for any further corrective action.

The inspector also found the Unit 2 drywell entranceway replete with

graffiti. The inspector informed plant management that the graffiti was

unprofessional and did not reflect the desire of the NRC or CP&L for quality

work to be done in the drywell. The plant manager acknowledged the

inspector's concern.

No violations or deviations were identified.

7. Onsite Review of Licensee Event Reports (92700)

The listed Licensee Event Report (LER) was reviewed to verify that the

information provided met NRC reporting requirements. The verification

included adequacy of event description and corrective action taken or

planned, existence of potential generic problems and the relative safety

significance of the event. Onsite inspections were performed and concluded

that necessary corrective actions have been taken in accordance with

existing requirements, licensee conditions and commitments.

(OPEN) LER 1-86-01, Isolation of Reactor Building Fire Hose Stations. The

licensee took 17.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> to install a length of 2 1/2" diameter fire hose (a

mechanical jumper) because procedures were not in place to aid installation.

The licensee committed to develop and implement procedures to aid installa-

tion of required alternate fire suppression. However, the LER did not

specify a date when the procedures would be in place. Internally, the

licensee plans to implement the procedures for the entire plant by January

22, 1987. The LER will remain open pending procedure implementation.

No violations or deviations were identified.

8. Engineered Safety Features System Walkdown (71710)

The inspectors performed a partial walkdown of the Unit 2 core spray system,

including a complete walkdown of all accessible piping, supports and valves

in the drywell . The inspectors verified that valve positions were correct

and that hangers and snubbers appeared operable. System and support

drawings were compared to the as-built conditions.

No violations or deviations were identified.

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9. Plant Startup from Refueling (71711)

System walkdowns were performed on the RHR, HPCI and DC power systems to

verify system operability prior to Unit 2 startup. On May 28, 1986, while

performing system walkdowns of portions of the Residual Heat Removal (RHR),

High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) and Reactor Coolant Isolation Cooling

(RCIC) systems on Unit 2, the inspector observed the following items:

a. Fixed hanger 2E11-21FH62 on the low pressure coolant injection piping

portion of the RHR system was missing a one-and-seven-eighths inch nut

from the stud which attaches the hanger to the pipe clamp. Review of

the In-service Inspection (ISI) results conducted during the present

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outage revealed that the condition was reported on February 17, 1986

and a work request (number AIGM1) to correct the deficiency was issued

on February 22. Review of the items identified as pre-startup items by

the licensee did not include this work request. Startup from the 196

day scheduled outage is anticipated within two weeks of this inspec-

tion. The ISI procedure, PT-91.0.37, which was utilized by the

licensee, requires that a missing item that could impair proper

functioning of the support shall result in a support being declared

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inoperable. The licensee is reviewing whether or not the support

should have been declared inoperable and a limiting condition of

operation entered per Technical Specifications. This is an Unresolved

Item: Discrepancies Found After ISI (324/86-15-02).

b. The base plate associated with the HPCI steam line snubber 2E41-61SS99

was found with two of its four anchor bolts in close proximity to

unfilled holes in the concrete wall. One of the holes appeared to

partially overlap with that containing the anchor bolt. This is a

concern because the similar locations adjacent to the other two bolts

are covered by the base plate and the force transmitted to the wall is

almost all shear. The acceptance criteria for the ISI procedures which

inspect supports do not address identification of such conditions.

This is considered an additional portion of the above unresolved item.

No violations or deviations were identified.

10. Onsite Followup of Events (93702)

Followup of Unit 2 Service Water Gasket Leak of April 30, 1986. The

inspector reviewed Operating Experience Report No. 2-86-19. The subject

report describes the cause of and correctise measures taken by the licensee

in response to a service water gasket blowout which caused shorting / tripping

safety related MCC 2XF and 2XB. The licensee determined that the failure

was due to use of an ethylene propylene (EPDM) material in a high pressure

application (400 psi) between a raised faced flange and an epoxy painted

flat flange. The licensee believes that failures of this type will occur

within 14 days of being placed into service. The majority of the creep

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resulting from compressive loading will occur within 14 days. The licensee

has identified 6 locations in each unit with some or all of the above

characteristics. However, due to length of service, these joints are not

anticipated to fail. The licensee plans to replace the gasket material in

those joints or modify the joints appropriately at the next convenient time.

The report also identified items which need to be inspected as a result of

being wetted during this event. The list appears to be adequate and the

inspection schedule appropriate. The report identified that unplanned

flow paths were found and made recommendations for correcting them. The

inspectors will review the licensee's implementation of the OER findings as,

Inspector Followup Item: Inspection Schedule Implementation and Correcting

Unplanned Flow Paths (324/86-15-03).

No violations or deviations were identified.

11. Followup of Unresolved Item (92701)

(CLOSED) Unit 2 Diesel Generator Service Water Supply Valve Breaker Open

(324/86-12-05). The inspectors reviewed the licensee's Operational

Experience Report (0ER) 2-86-13. The report identifies that the breaker for

2-SW-V255 was probably opened during performance of MI-W-2K2, GE breaker

compartment checkout, of compartment DGD. The licensee plans to revise the

MI to include independent verification of breaker alignment for breaker

positions prior to the MI performance.

OP-39, Diesel Generator Operating Procedure, Rev. 27, Attachment 8, page 3,

the electrical lineup pre-startup checklist, requires valve 2-SW-V255

breaker to be closed. Contrary to OP-39, the 2-SW-V255 breaker was open.

This is a violation (324/86-15-01).

One violation and no deviations were identified.