ML20202B863
| ML20202B863 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Brunswick  |
| Issue date: | 06/26/1986 |
| From: | Fredrickson P, Garner L, Ruland W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20202B836 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-324-86-15, 50-325-86-14, NUDOCS 8607100440 | |
| Download: ML20202B863 (7) | |
See also: IR 05000324/1986015
Text
F
l
i
'
.
2Kfoo
UNITED STATES
/
'o
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
"
[
REGION il
o
g*
, j
101 MARIETTA STREET, N.W.
t
ATL ANTA, GEORGI A 30323
\\...../
Report Nos. 50-325/86-14 and 50 324/86-15
Licensee: Carolina Power and Light Company
P. O. Box 1551
Raleigh, NC 27602
Docket Nos. 50-325 and 50-324
License Nos. DPR-71 and DPR-62
Facility Name: Brunswick 1 and 2
Inspection Conducted: May 1 - 31, 1986
' M / /'8
Inspectors:
s
W7
ulan
Dite Si'gned
.
b/M/J4
w
~
,
er
Date Sfgned
p L. W /Ga
.,
7
Approved By:
/
. Axe /'
0/M /fs
~
P. E. Fredrickson, Section Chief
Date Sfgn'ed
Division of Reactor Projects
SUMMARY
Scope:
Routine safety inspection conducted by the resident inspectors on site
in the areas of maintenance observation, surveillance observation, operational
safety verification, onsite Licensee Event Reports (LER) review, onsite followup
of events, ESF System walkdown, plant startup from refueling and followup on
unresolved item.
Results:
One violation - failure to maintain a service water valve motor
operator breaker in the correct position.
,
'
i
8607100440 860626
ADOCK 05000324
g
_ _ _ - _ , _ _ _ _ - _ _ . - - . -
= .
_- -
_
r-
)
-
.
DETAILS
1.
Licensee Employees Contacted
-
P. Howe, Vice President - Brunswick Nuclear Project
C. Dietz, General Manager - Brunswick Nuclear Project
T. Wyllie, Manager - Engineering and Construction
G. Oliver, Manager - Site Planning and Control
J. Holder, Manager - Outages
E. Bishop, Manager - Operations
L. Jones, Director - Quality Assurance (QA)/ Quality Control (QC)
R. Helme, Director - Onsite Nuclear Safety - BSEP
J. Chase, Assistant to General Manager
J. O'Sullivan, Manager - Maintenance
G. Cheatham, Manager - Environmental & Radiation Control
K. Enzor, Director - Regulatory Compliance
B. Hinkley, Manager - Technical Support
R. Groover, Manager - Project Construction
A. Hegler, Superintendent - Operations
W. Hogle, Engineering Supervisor
B. Wilson, Engineering Supervisor
R. Kitchen, Mechanical Maintenance Supervisor (Unit 2)
C. Treubel, Mechanical Maintenance Supervisor (Unit 1)
R. Poulk, Senior NRC Regulatory Specialist
D. Novotny, Senior Regulatory Specialist
W. Murray, Senior Engineer - Nuclear Licensing Unit
Other licensee employees contacted included construction craftsmen,
engineers, technicians, operators, office personnel, and security force
members.
2.
Exit Interview (30703)
The inspection scope and findings were summarized on July 5,1986 with the
general manager. The violation - Failure to Maintain a Diesel Generator
Service Water Valve Breaker in the Correct Position, paragraph 11, was
discussed in detail.
The licensee acknowledged the findings without
exception.
The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the
materials provided to or reviewed by the inspectors during the inspection.
3.
Followup on Previous Enforcement Matters (92702)
Not inspected.
4.
Maintenance Observation (62703)
The inspectors observed maintenance activities and reviewed records to
verify that work was conducted in accordance with approved procedures,
Technical Specifications, and applicable industry codes and standards. The
--
)
-
.
2
inspectors also verified that:
redundant components were operable;
administrative controls were followed; tagouts were adequate; personnel were
qualified; correct replacement parts were used; radiological controls were
proper; fire protection was adequate; quality control hold points were
adequate and observed; adequate post-maintenance testing was performed; and
independent verification requirements were implemented.
The inspectors
independently verified that selected equipment was properly returned to
service.
Outstanding work requests were reviewed to ensure that the licensee gave
priority to safety-related maintenance.
The inspectors observed / reviewed portions of the following maintenance
activities:
86-ASMll
Inspection / Repair of MCC-2XB After Salt Water Spray
86-AWQD1
RHR Suction Valve E11-F004B Remote Shutdown Switch
Repair / Replacement
Re-install Unit 2 Drywell Access Concrete
86-AKLJ1
LPRM 36-13B IV Curve (Time Domain Reflectometry per
MI-16-5, Rev. 6)
No violations or deviations were identified.
5.
Surveillance Observation (61726)
The inspectors observed surveillance testing required by Technical
Specifications.
Through observation and record review, the inspectors
verified that:
tests conformed to Technical Specification requirements;
administrative controls were followed; personnel were qualified; instru-
mentation was calibrated; and data was accurate and complete.
The
inspectors independently verified selected test results and proper return to
service of equipment.
The inspectors witnessed / reviewed portions of the following test activities:
MST-RHR22M
RHR-LPCI ADS CS LL3, HPCI RCIC LL2 Div 1 TR Unit
Channel Calibration
PT-72
Main Steam Line Monitor Channel Calibration
PT-91.0.37
Residual Heat Removal (Ell), Class 2, Loop B,
VT-3/VT-4 Examination of Cc.aponent Supports
2-MST-ADS 23R
ADS Safety Relief Valve Prinary Position Channel
Calibration, Rev. O
r-
)
-
.
3
,.
1-MST-HPCI15M
HPCI Steam Leak Detection Channel Functional Test,
Rev. 1.
No violations or deviations were identified.
6.
Operational Safety Verification (71707)
The inspectors verified conformance with regulatory requirements by direct
observations of activities, facility tours, discussions with personnel,
reviewing of records and independent verification of safety system status.
The inspectors verified that control room manning requirements of 10 CFR 50.54 and the Technical Specifications were met.
Control room, shift
supervisor, clearance and jumper / bypass logs were reviewed to obtain
information concerning operating trends and out of service safety systems to
ensure that there were no conflicts with Technical Specifications Limiting
Conditions for Operations.
Direct observations were conducted of control
room panels, instrumentation and recorder traces important to safety to
verify operability and that parameters were within Technical Specification
limits. The inspectors observed shift turnovers to verify that continuity
of system status was maintained.
The inspectors verified the status of
selected control room annunciators.
Operability of selected Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) trains specifically
Units 1 and 2 Core Spray, Unit 1 HPCI, and partial Unit 1 RHR, were verified
by insuring that: each accessible valve in the flow path was in its correct
,
position; each power supply and breaker were aligned for components that
must activate upon initiation signal; removal of power from those ESF
motor-operated valves, so identified by Technical Specifications, was
completed; there was no leakage of major components; there was proper
'
lubrication and cooling water available; and a condition did not exist
which might prevent fulfillment of the system's functional requirements.
!
Instrumentation essential to system actuation or performance was verified
operable by observing on-scale indication and proper instrument valve
'
lineup, if accessible.
I
The inspectors verified that the licensee's health physics policies /
l
procedures were followed. This included a review of area surveys, radiation
work permits, posting, and instrument calibration.
l
The inspectors verified that: the security organization was properly manned
and security personnel were capable of performing their assigned functions;
persons and packages were checked prior to entry into the protected area
(PA); vehicles were properly authorized, searched and escorted within the
i
PA; persons within the PA displayed photo identification badges; personnel
l
in vital areas were authorized; and effective compensatory measures were
!
employed when required.
.
The inspectors also observed plant housekeeping controls, verified position
l
of certain containment isolation valves, reviewed the clearance log and
l
selected clearances, and verified the operability of onsite and offsite
'
emergency power sources.
i
l
"
-
.
4
The inspectors performed a walkdown of the Unit 2 drywell prior to closecut
to verify that systems were ready for unit operation.
Items inspected
included fixed supports, snubbers, position of Emergency Core Cooling System
(ECCS) manual injection valves, re-assemb-ly of components, and housekeeping.
The inspector found that the Safety Relief Valve (SRV) bolt lockwire was
broken on valves F013A and D and was not wired strictly in accordance with
the figure in maintenance instruction MI-16-626, Rev. 5, Target-Rock Safety
Relief Valves Two Stage, Model 7567F. On two valves the mounting bolts were
wired together but the procedure showed only two bolts together.
The
licensee corrected the lockwire on all the SRVs and will examine the need
for any further corrective action.
The inspector also found the Unit 2 drywell entranceway replete with
graffiti.
The inspector informed plant management that the graffiti was
unprofessional and did not reflect the desire of the NRC or CP&L for quality
work to be done in the drywell.
The plant manager acknowledged the
inspector's concern.
No violations or deviations were identified.
7.
Onsite Review of Licensee Event Reports (92700)
The listed Licensee Event Report (LER) was reviewed to verify that the
information provided met NRC reporting requirements.
The verification
included adequacy of event description and corrective action taken or
planned, existence of potential generic problems and the relative safety
significance of the event. Onsite inspections were performed and concluded
that necessary corrective actions have been taken in accordance with
existing requirements, licensee conditions and commitments.
(OPEN) LER 1-86-01, Isolation of Reactor Building Fire Hose Stations. The
licensee took 17.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> to install a length of 2 1/2" diameter fire hose (a
mechanical jumper) because procedures were not in place to aid installation.
The licensee committed to develop and implement procedures to aid installa-
tion of required alternate fire suppression.
However, the LER did not
specify a date when the procedures would be in place.
Internally, the
licensee plans to implement the procedures for the entire plant by January
22, 1987. The LER will remain open pending procedure implementation.
No violations or deviations were identified.
8.
Engineered Safety Features System Walkdown (71710)
The inspectors performed a partial walkdown of the Unit 2 core spray system,
including a complete walkdown of all accessible piping, supports and valves
in the drywell . The inspectors verified that valve positions were correct
and that hangers and snubbers appeared operable.
System and support
drawings were compared to the as-built conditions.
No violations or deviations were identified.
m
)
-
.
5
9.
Plant Startup from Refueling (71711)
System walkdowns were performed on the RHR, HPCI and DC power systems to
verify system operability prior to Unit 2 startup.
On May 28, 1986, while
performing system walkdowns of portions of the Residual Heat Removal (RHR),
High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) and Reactor Coolant Isolation Cooling
(RCIC) systems on Unit 2, the inspector observed the following items:
a.
Fixed hanger 2E11-21FH62 on the low pressure coolant injection piping
portion of the RHR system was missing a one-and-seven-eighths inch nut
from the stud which attaches the hanger to the pipe clamp. Review of
the In-service Inspection (ISI) results conducted during the present
outage revealed that the condition was reported on February 17, 1986
"
and a work request (number AIGM1) to correct the deficiency was issued
on February 22. Review of the items identified as pre-startup items by
the licensee did not include this work request.
Startup from the 196
day scheduled outage is anticipated within two weeks of this inspec-
tion.
The ISI procedure, PT-91.0.37, which was utilized by the
licensee, requires that a missing item that could impair proper
functioning of the support shall result in a support being declared
The licensee is reviewing whether or not the support
1
should have been declared inoperable and a limiting condition of
operation entered per Technical Specifications. This is an Unresolved
Item:
Discrepancies Found After ISI (324/86-15-02).
b.
The base plate associated with the HPCI steam line snubber 2E41-61SS99
was found with two of its four anchor bolts in close proximity to
unfilled holes in the concrete wall. One of the holes appeared to
partially overlap with that containing the anchor bolt. This is a
concern because the similar locations adjacent to the other two bolts
are covered by the base plate and the force transmitted to the wall is
almost all shear. The acceptance criteria for the ISI procedures which
inspect supports do not address identification of such conditions.
This is considered an additional portion of the above unresolved item.
No violations or deviations were identified.
10. Onsite Followup of Events (93702)
Followup of Unit 2 Service Water Gasket Leak of April 30, 1986.
The
inspector reviewed Operating Experience Report No. 2-86-19.
The subject
report describes the cause of and correctise measures taken by the licensee
in response to a service water gasket blowout which caused shorting / tripping
safety related MCC 2XF and 2XB. The licensee determined that the failure
was due to use of an ethylene propylene (EPDM) material in a high pressure
application (400 psi) between a raised faced flange and an epoxy painted
flat flange.
The licensee believes that failures of this type will occur
within 14 days of being placed into service. The majority of the creep
\\
"
}
.-
.
6
resulting from compressive loading will occur within 14 days. The licensee
has identified 6 locations in each unit with some or all of the above
characteristics. However, due to length of service, these joints are not
anticipated to fail. The licensee plans to replace the gasket material in
those joints or modify the joints appropriately at the next convenient time.
The report also identified items which need to be inspected as a result of
being wetted during this event. The list appears to be adequate and the
inspection schedule appropriate.
The report identified that unplanned
flow paths were found and made recommendations for correcting them.
The
inspectors will review the licensee's implementation of the OER findings as,
Inspector Followup Item:
Inspection Schedule Implementation and Correcting
Unplanned Flow Paths (324/86-15-03).
No violations or deviations were identified.
11.
Followup of Unresolved Item (92701)
(CLOSED) Unit 2 Diesel Generator Service Water Supply Valve Breaker Open
(324/86-12-05).
The inspectors reviewed the licensee's Operational
Experience Report (0ER) 2-86-13. The report identifies that the breaker for
2-SW-V255 was probably opened during performance of MI-W-2K2, GE breaker
compartment checkout, of compartment DGD. The licensee plans to revise the
MI to include independent verification of breaker alignment for breaker
positions prior to the MI performance.
OP-39, Diesel Generator Operating Procedure, Rev. 27, Attachment 8, page 3,
the electrical lineup pre-startup checklist, requires valve 2-SW-V255
breaker to be closed.
Contrary to OP-39, the 2-SW-V255 breaker was open.
This is a violation (324/86-15-01).
One violation and no deviations were identified.