Text

Advises That Bh Faulkenberry Notified on 840208 of Ofc of Investigations Inability to Send Investigator on 840209 to Conduct Investigation Into Cheating on Exam for Licensed Control Room Operators.Supporting Documentation Encl
	ML20199H258
Person / Time
Site:	Trojan File:Portland General Electric icon.png
Issue date:	02/15/1984
From:	Shackleton O; NRC OFFICE OF INVESTIGATIONS (OI)
To:	Martin J; NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V)
Shared Package
ML20151H981	List: IA-84-656, Advises That Util Identified Individual Who Had Notes Available to Him During Recent Requalification Exam.Requests Ofc of Investigation Participation in Review of Situation; ML20151H979; ML20151H993; ML20151J018; ML20151K296; ML20151K372; ML20199G847; ML20199G870; ML20199G895; ML20199G911; ML20199G939; ML20199H011; ML20199H028; ML20199H058; ML20199H089; ML20199H096; ML20199H119; ML20199H132; ML20199H235; ML20199H249; ML20199H258; ML20199K451;
References
	FOIA-84-656 NUDOCS 8604090323
	Download: ML20199H258 (76)
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Fehrita ry 15, 1984 MEMORANDUM FOR: John b. Martin, Regional Administrator, Region Y FROM:

. .i Owen.C.ShackletonJr.,Directos.01ficeof{j,.*

Investigations FicId Office, Region V

SUBJECT:

TROJAN - CHEATING ON F.XAMINATION FOR LICliNSED CONTROL ROOM OPERAToks (QS-84-n09)

REFERENCE:

Martin's memo to Shackleton on captioned rubject dated February 7, 1984 I advised B. H. FAUI.KENBERRY, Deputy Regional Administ rator, Region V, on February 8, 1984, that of would not be ab]c to send an inventinator on February 9, 1984 to esmduct an invest ipat ion into the c..ptioned ebe.oing incident, as both of my investigators .tre working on the high priosity Bost rom-lierr.cn case. The llemt rnm-hes nen mar i ce li.in been idensil'ied as belon of the highest priserit y a a il l ict. In the critiralley patie not liiablo Canyon's licensing.

I have opened an inquiry (QS-84-009) on this matter. As sonn as 1 have manpower, OI will conduct an investigation into the cheating of the required annual requalification examination for licensed Control Rnom Operat ors at Trojan.

8604090323 860213 PDR FOIA BELL 84-656 PDR A

TP[OJAN NUCLFAR PLANT NUCLEAR DATA SHEET

. Revision 11 November'15, 1983 NUCLEAR DESIGN - CYCLE 6 POWER BOL, HFP Power Defect E0L (O PPM B), HFP

-1100 pcm ,

~1800 pcm Pcwer Coefficient -11 pcm/% power

-18 pcm/% power Doppler Defect

-1010 pcm

-1020 pcm '

Doppler Coefficient

-10.0 pcm/% power

=-10.0 pcm/% power Moderator Defect (No Load to Full Load) -150 pcm

-780 pcm Moderator Coefficient BOL, HFP - 9 pcm/*F BOL, HZP - 1.6 pcm/*F EOL, HFP - 34 pcm/*F EOL, HZP - 21 pcm/*F SHUTDOWN MARGIN.'

Technical Specifications >--1600 pcm Modes 1, 2, 3. 4, 5 K,ff .95 or Baron 2000 ppm Mode 6 Cycle 6 Minimum Nuclear Design values

-2580 pcm (BOL, HZP)

-1920 pcm (EOL, HZP)

Typical Calculations

_BOL (No Xe)

_ EOL (Eq. Xe)

Total Rod Worth (EZP) -6375 pcm

-6896 pcm Most Reactive Rod + 880 pcm

+ 950 pcm Power Defect l

+1100 pcm : '

+1800 pcm Redistribution + 500 pcm l

+ 950 pcm Rod Insertion (BKD 190 Steps) + 160 pcm

+ 120 pcm -

-3735 pcm

-2915 pcm S

Revision 11

. Page 1 of 14 g.

h.

+. .

, M19T11 ANEOUS NIELEAR PAR #GRS Foint of adding heat 1 I 10 amps 1 97 .

,Bggg .00560 (BOL), .0050'6 (EOL)

EXCESS REACTIVITY

~'

K gg 31.144 Racetivity 312,600 pcm ROD WORTHS (HZP) BOL (No XE) E0L (Eo, XE)

Totals 6375 pcm 6896 pcm Shutdown Banks 2030 pcm 2710 pcm C:ntrol Banks 4345 pcm 4186 pcm

Cantrol Bank D 1273 pcm

-1267 pcm Diff. Rod Worth.(W/ overlap)

13.0 pcm/ step peak 8 40 steps

<1 pcm/ step near bottom and top of core Most Reactive Rod (K-6) 880 pcm 950 pcm .

BORON Worth

-9.0 pcm/ ppm H2P, BOL

-13 pcm/ ppm cold Accumulators (Modes 1, 2 & 3)

C3 11900 ppm; 870 - 930 ft8; 600 - 673 psig RWST (Modes *5, & *6) 102,000 gallons; 2000 < C3 < 2500 ppm .

(Modes 1, 2, 3, & 4) 1428,000 gallons 137'F BAST's (Modes 1, 2, 3. & 4)

System = 14.418 gallons; 7000 < C3 < 7700 ppe; 1 65*F !

(Modes *5 & *6)

One tank = 12,600 gallons; 7000 < C, < 7700 ppm; 165*F BIT (Modes 1, 2, & 3) 6 ,;

20,000 < CB <22,500; >900 gallons; 1145*F Dilut3

=100 gallons / ppm Borct3

-10 gallons / ppa .

The RWST criteria or the BAST criteria Revision 11 munt be met in Modes 5 and 6. Page 2 of 14

p=r:.. ,

XENON. ,

(1. Di act frco ficcien' 0.3%; 2. Ta-135 39,- I-135 6.6 hs - Xe-135, 5.9%)

100% pcver equi. -2740 pcm =48 hours .

100% power peak 5000 pcm =8 hours Trip to Pretrip from 100% 25 hours2.893519e-4 days 0.00694 hours 4.133598e-5 weeks 9.5125e-6 months Trip to Pretrip from 25% 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months Trip to Zero 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months SAMARIUM (1.4% Nd-149 ~

1.7 hr ' 53 hrs - Sm-149 (Stable))

Equilibrium ~500 pcm =40 days Paak After SD 878 pcm =12 days SOURCES -

Steendary (2) 4 rodlets per assembly (88" long)

Antimony-123. Beryllium-9 Located H3 and H13 _

8D *"~~~~~~~~~~' 124

51 o Sb +Y 51 Sb *------~ Te * + 8 + l W M.4Be' 52 4 Be'+ Y+o 4

4 Revision 11 Page 3 of 14 t

l l

FUEL A$SEMBLIES Region Enrichment Number 1

0.8 12 4

1. 6' 1 5

1.2 60 6

1.9 44 7A 2.8 48 78 3.2 12 -

8 3.3 16 Lattice 17 X 17: 264 Fuel Rods, 25 Thimbles Dimensions Width 8.466" '

Height =153" NOTE: 1.

3 fuel rods / assembly replaced with SS rods in B03, B04, B12, C14, D02,

.C08, D14 M02, NO2, M14, N08. PO4, P12. P13, 2.

5 fuel LIS, rodsR11.

ROS, / assembly replaced.with SS rods in A05, All, E01', EIS, LO1, These assemblies also have 7-2 X 8 minigrids located midway between normal grids.

FUEL RODS Material Fuel: UO - 88.6 Metric Tons of Uranium Pellets: 0.3225 in, diameter - 95% density Fuel Clad: 0.0225 in. thickness, 0.374 in. OD, Zire -4 Thimbles: 0.0345 in. thickness. 0.482 in. OD, Zirc -4 Crids: 8 Inconel - 718 grids per assembly Cap: Prepressurized with 350# Helium (Regions 6, 7, & 8)

. Revision 11 Page 4 of 14 l

CD'NTROL RODS -

Numbsr ~53 Arrangement S = '

A Cf=4 ,

S ~

B B" S =4 C =8 C C

~

S D b~'

Material Ag - 80%, In - 15%, Cd - 5%

Clad Stainless Steel - 304 CORE MWD /MTU 9800 (255 EFPD)

MWth 3411 Teve 557 - 584.7'F (0 - 100% power) ,'

'AT. 60*F 0 100% power Pressure 2235 psig (Normal Operating) 2735 psig (Safety Limit) _

R2ight 144" Diemeter 132" t

i I

. Revision 11 Page 5 of 14

POWER DISTRIBUTION .

Flux Fast 27.3 X 1013 (BOL) 31.96 1013 (EOL)

Thermal 4.65 X 10 18 (BOL)

, 5.4 X 1018 (EOL)

KW/ft

Westinghouse Maximum Design 22.8 Maximum Postulated 18 Steady State Peak 13.6 Steady Average 5.44 Fq (Z) - Heat Flux Hot Channel Factor 1[4.64]{K(Z)]. Power l 50:

1 2.32 [K(Z)], Power > $0%

,_P_

RCS Flovrate and F - Combination of RCS flowrate and F shall be above and to the lef t of curve shown in STS.

F = FNH(Entha1pvrisehotchannelfactor) r 1.49 [ 1.0 + . 3(1.0-P) )

Quadrant Power Tilt Ratio ~

QTPTR 1 1.02 for P > 50%

DNBR - >1.71 thimble coldwall cells *

(Three fuel rods and a thimble tube) l i

>1.73 for typical cells (Four fuel rods)

Revision 11 .

Page 6 of 14

/

I

INHOUR APPR0X

o=U+8 T

'If 1 + IT (Generally 'the E Neglected) .

~

1* - 2 X 104s ,,,, I = 0.1 sec-1

~

T= (Where prompt term is insignificant)

_Ao 1

l POWER P = P,e (t = time in seconds)

P = P,10 (

} (E} (t = time in minutes) sn = 2 .

K. -

EFF I

=

Number n in generation K = efpn (L L ) =K=

eff 1-p ft (nonleakage) = Number n in previous gen.

eff - I eff eff eff Revision 11 !

Page 7 of 14 I

s-

~

. SU.BCRITICAL MULTIPLICA' TION (M)

Definition: A stable' or increasing neutron population in the subcritical core,

. due to the presence of a source (So).

a

t = MSo t t = # final neutrons' ..

E=g = multiplication factor, where So = source strengt b*-

l but *t = So(1 + k + k2 + k + . . .) ; if K < 1, then 3

"t = S 1 f -.k

- - l M=g, & =

1 - k,ff , but Mt

= h & M2

= , where C = count rate 1-k

.'. = = r C (1 - k,gg ) = Cz(1-k,gg )

t l 1-k efft ECCS DATA 1

Shutoff Design Run-Out )

Press. Press. Flow Press. Flov Centrifugal Charging Pumps . 2670 2510 150 610 550 Safety Injection Pumps 1520 1080 425 650 -

650 l

Accumulators 600 - 673 600 - 673 - - - - variable - - - - - - l Rasidual Heat Removal Pumps 200 160 3000 140 4500 m.

Revision 11 Page 8 of 14 l

l l

DELTA TEMPERATURE -

OTAT 1 ATO sp . Kt -K (rate)(Tave - 584.8*) + K 3 (Press - 2235)-ft(aI)

Kt = 1.32 K2 = .02109/*F .

, .. . .. K = .001/ psi .

AI = qT - qB ft = 2.2% per % AI < -45% AI 2.66% per % AI > +3% AI OPAT sp 1 AT0 _Ku - Ks (rate)(Tave) - Ks (Tave - 584.8) - f2 (AII' K. - 1.08 Ks = .02/*F Ks = .00137*F for Tave > 584.8*

= 0 for Tave < 584.8*

-f-=0 6TO = 60*F R0D BLOCKS OT8T 3% < Trip 2/4 OP8T 3: < Trip 2/4 Int. Range 20% 1/2 Pwr. Range 103% 1/4 Imp. Press <15%

(Auto 1/1 BK D 223 Steps l 1/1 Revision 11 Page 9 of 14 i l

o

_s_u eo t Nt MUldBAud secter Cooling Watar Lov'Fl v 600 gpm

. 1/1' S.ttter C:oling Watcr Low Praccura 57 poig 1/1 hic;ccn;5se: of:

Stator Cooling Water High Temp. 81*C i et 133%/ Min.

1/1j OT!.T = 3% < Trip Setpoint 2/

CPAT - 3% < Trip Setpoint 2.3 see on; 27.7 see Loss of 1 MFP > 70% 2b Off *t 133%/MI"-

131%/secondto70%

REACTOR TRIP SETP0 INT LOGIC PERMISSIVES

-Source Range 5 10 cps 1/2 P-6. P-10 Int. Range 25%

1/2 P-10 Pur. Range Lo 25%

2/4 P-10 Pvr. Range Hi 109%

2/4 Pur. Range Rate 25% in < 2 sec. 2/4 OTaT Variable 2/4 l OP6T Variable i 2/4 l Pzr. Press. Hi 2385 psig 2/4 I Pzr. Press. Lo 1865 psig (rate sensitive) 2/4 l P-7 Pzr. Level Hi 92%

2/3 P-7 il i

Flow Lo 90%

2/3 in 1 loop >P-8 i I

2/3 in 2 loops >P-7 Fraq. Lo' 57.5 Hz 1/2/ bus both buses P-7 Volt to 68%

1/2/ bus both buses P-7 RCP Breakers Open l 2 > P-7 S/G Lo-Lo Level 20% (Note 3) l 2/3 any S/G Facd Plow Low Fd 1.5 X 10' lbs/hr < Stm. 1/2 any S/G Coincident to S/G Level 252 1/2 same S/G Safety Injection Any )

1/2 Turbine Trip Stops Closed 4/4 P-7 Low Emergency Trip Oil i Pressure (800f) 2/3 Gen 2ral Warning ;

Protective Train Trouble 2/2 A. Loss of either 48V DC B. Loss of either ISV DC )l C. Any PC Card out (except Isolator)

D. Input Error Inhibit Switch in " Inhibit" E. Multiplexer Test Switch in " Inhibit" :

F. Logic Function Switch "A" out of " Normal" G.

H. Permissives Function Switch out of " Normal" Memories Function Switch out of " Normal" f

I. Output Relay Test Panel in " Test" '

J. Closing Reactor Trip Bypass Breaker l

l K. Cround Return Fuse Open Manual f 1/2 i

Revision 11 Page 10 of 14 i

. SAFETY INJECTION -

SIGNAL SETPOINT LOGIC PERMISSIVE 5

'anual M

1/2 Centainment Hi Pressure 4 peig (Note 2) 2/3 Pressurizer Lo Pressure _. 1835 psig (Note 3) 2/3

~

Steam Flow ~P-11 (Pzr Press'. l Hi Steam Flow 40% flow e o to 20% load P-12 (Lo-Lo Tave',

Variable between 20 - 100%

110% flow 6 100% load 1/2 per loop, 2/4 loops W/Lo Steam Press 600 psig (rate sensitive) 2/4 loops or Lo-Lo Tave 553*F 2/4 loops Steam Differential One loop 100 psig less than 2/3 other loops .

CONTAINMENT ISOLATION SIGNAL SETPOINT LOGIC Manual .

1/2 Safety Injection any SPRAY ACTUATION -

SIGNAL SETPOINT LOGIC Manual 2/2 Containment Pressure Hi-Hi 30 psig 2/4 STEAM LINE ISOLATION SIGNAL SETPOlh"I LOGIC Containment Hi-H1 30 psig 2/4 Steam Flow .

El Steam Flow 40% flow e o to 20% load

!l Variable between 20 ~ 100% 'l 110% flow 0 100% load 1/2 per loop, 2/4 loops l W/Lo-Steam Press 600 psig (rate sensitive) or Lo-Lo Tave 2/4 loops 553*F 2/4 loops 1

Revision 11 Page 11 of 14 r_

1 --

. FEEDWATER' ISOLATION SIGNAL SETPOINT LOGIC S/G Level Hi-Hi 75% 2/3 any I gen.

. Safety Injection Any Reactor Trip W/Lo Tave 564*F 2/4 AUXILIARY FEED PUMP STARTS START SETPOINT LOGIC Undervoltage on A-1 (A-2)(Note 4) <2.56 KV > 1 see 1/2 taken twice Lo-Lo S/G Level (May be manually blocked)(Note 3) 20% 2/3/ gen Main Feed Pu=p Trip (may be manually blocked) 2/2 Snfety Injection Any PERMISSIVES LOGIC C I.R. Hi rod stop (Current =20%) 1/2 C - 2 = P.R. Hi rod stop (103%) 1/4 C - 3 = OTaT rod stop and turbine runback (OTAT Trip - 3%) 2/4 C - 4 = OPAT rod stop and turbine runback (OPAT Trip - 3%) 2/4

_ C - 5 = Auto rod vithdrawal block (Impulse Press. >15%)(PT-505)

C Load rejection arm steam dumps (10% step or 5%/ min)(PT-506)

C Condenser available for du=p (vacuum and cire. water)

C - 11 = Bank D Auto Rod withdrawal limit (223 steps)

~

P - 6 = Allow Hi Volts OFF and Block of S. R. Trip (10 " amps) 1/2 P - 7 = Block "at power" trips (10% - P-10 or P-13) P-10 2/4 P-13 --

1/2-P Allows loss of one loop flow (39%) 2/4 P ; 10 = Allows block of P.R. Lo trip (25%) allows block of I.R. 2/4 Hi rod block (20%) and trip (25%); block S. R. Hi volts. ,

Input P-7 P - 11 = Allows block of pzr press (1835 psig) lov S.I. 01915 psig 2/3 P - 12 = (Lo-Lo- Tave 553*F) allows block of Hi steam flow SI. 2/4 blocks steam dump (except cooldown valves can be reset) l P - 13 = (Impulse Press 10%) One of the P-7 signals 1/2 P - 14 = (Hi-Hi S/G 1evel - 75%) Trip turbine, trip feedpumps, close FRV's & Whittakers, open Cond. Pump recires. 2/3 any S/G '

Revision 11 l Page 12 of 14

" '~ #

CONTROLS. i J' TAvE 557?F - 584.7'F ,

(0 - 100% pow 2r)

P'ZR LEVEL 30% - 61.5% span (557*F - 584.7'F Tave)

PZR PRESS

See Page 14 ROD CONTROL Auto: 8 s/m; 1.5*F - 3*F error 8 s/m .72 s/m; 3*F ++ 5'F error Manual: 48 s/m Control Rods 64 s/m Shutdown Rods S/G LEVEL 33 - 44% span (0 - 20% turbine load)

A4% (20 - 100% turbine load)

FIRST STAGE IMPULSE PRESSURE 66-570 psig 15 - 100% power

-STEAM DUMPS

~

Permissives:

1/2 cire pumps 2/2 vacuum (<5" Hg Ab.)

Arming :-

Loss of Load 5%/ min or 10% step (PT-506) ;

_. Turbine Trip 4/4 stop valves closed or 2/3 low emergency trip oil pressure Mode Selector Switch Positioned to STEAM PRESSURE Opening:

Loss of Load: Tave - Tref (5'F - 16.4*F = 0 - 100% open)

Tave Mode < Trip Open - 0 10.7*F; G 16.4*F Turbine Trip: Tave - 557'F (0 - 27.7'F = 0 - 100% open)

Trip open - 0 13.8'F; h 0 27.7*F l

Pressure Mode : Auto = steam pressure - setpoint Manual = Operator Controlled Interlocks:

Lo-Lo Steam Generator level after time delay of 5 minutes, locks out all dump valves except PCV-507A, B, and C.

Lo-Lo Tave locks out all steam dumps; interlock can be bypassed using the two bypass interlock switches on CO2, for PCV-507A, B, and C.

Revision 11

. Page~ 13 of 14 1

,, ,,, . PRESSURIZER PRESSURE

~

Hy'droctotic Tact 3107 Hydrectatic Test m

Safety Limit '

2735 .h' No RCS Breach Expected E

Safety valves Lift 2485 g Ri Press. Reactor Trip 2385

,k Power Operated Reliefs Armed and Open 2335 l_

g s.

2315 Power Operated Reliefs Shu't cSpray Valves Fully Open/

Hi Press. Alarm 2310 CSpray Valves Start Open 2260 2250

Proportional Heaters Fully Off Normal Operating Pressure 2235 (psig) 2220

Proportional Heaters Fully On

Backup Heaters Off y 2218 e

=

2210

Backup Heaters On & Lo Press.

g S

Alarm

.3 Auto Unblock SI 1915 1915 Permissive to Block SI h 1865

Reactor Trip E ,

1835 Safety Injection

The signals to these components are rate sensitive and as a result, the action may take place at a different system pressure than the listed setpoint. l NOTE 1:

Setpoints provided in this data sheet are Standard Technical Specifications values. Actual setpoint will be slightly more conservative in most cases.

NOTE 2: Set at =3.5 psig due to an administrative commitment.

NOTE 3:

Prz. Press, increased from 1765 psig and S/G Lo-Lo Level increased from 15%

due to temperature calibration problems with Barton transmitters. These values may change or revert depending upon the permanent fix - to be announced.

NOTE 4:

Also actuates if <3.85 KV >4 secs (1/2 taken twice) with an SIS and normal fdr brk shut, or if<3.85 KV >55 secs (1/2 caken twice) without an SIS.

Revision 11 Page 14 of 14

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F**/ .h .

Y & DfIEEOFF1CE COMMUNICATION g~- '

- m - co--

- = arch 26, 1984 CONFIDENTIAL M 8-64

v. m h 6

.g.hp Fossible ERC Licensed Personnel Retrainint Exam Compromise (Cycle 4B)

A possible exam compromise was discovered while students were completing their annual relicense examination on February 3, 1984. At approximately 11:30 AM, a student W found a Cycle 6 design data sheet (Attachment A) in the paper towel holder of the restroom used by the students during the exam.

This examination is the final avamination following the annual relicense i

training program. This program consists of eight days of lectures followed by a study day and an exam. The class (Group A) was started on January 23 with 14 people attending. Attachment B lists the names, titles, and type i of license of the personnel in the group. Groups B and C started on February 6 and 21, respectively.

The final armeinations are similar in content and for.aat to the NRC license armeinations. There are two different arm =1 nations (senior reactor operator and reactor operator) which are administered to the appropriate students (Attachment B). The ownminations were given in the license classroom of the Training complex. This trailer consists of the classroom, kitchen area, office area, and two restrooms (men and women). The men's restroom is located directly outside the classroom and was used by all students during the **==4 nations.

The avamination started at about 8:00 AM with a required completion time of 2:00 PM. Prior to the start of the ====ination, the students were informed i

of the exam time limit, requirement that only one person could leave the room at a time, and to ask the proctor any questions they might have con-carning exam questions. The exam was proctored full time by Training j Specialist IV's;6 6 - andemumummummassa.

Proctoring was alternated every 14 - 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months on a random schedule.

M ompleted his ====ination at about 11:45 AM and left the exam area. Be returned about 5-10 minutes later to obtain some paper towels to protect his hands while he carriad a dirty, sharp-edged engine " manifold to the meintenance weld shop. Be opened the towel holder in the men's rest-roce to obtain a large number of towels and found the data sheet.

< ~,

2 mv 4-

. ' <hdreh 26, 1984 s N F048-84 Fame Two Minformed N , Training Supervisor, of the item discovered and the associated facts at about 12:40 PM. N reviewed the facts, investigated the area where it was discovered..and decided to discuss the event with the esas proctors.

At about 2:30 PM after exam completion, 6 pM reviewed the facts with asas proctors 6 , m . m ad 6 sad questioned them concerning their observations during the exams and their ideas concerning available options.

decided the arm == should be reviewed against the data sheet to possibly find any indications of cheating and to write new ===== for possible use in i ratesting the group. 6 'en met wit h seting i General Manager, to discuss the event and to gain concurrence regarding the initial course of action being takan. m requested 6 Manager Technical Services, and W. Operations Supervisor, to join and in the discussion. It was decided to review the exam, write new arman, to further investigate the event. It was decided the investigation should be '

conducted by N and 6 . We then discussed whether m 6 involvement would compromise the results of the investigation and decided it would not based on the interview results. M involvement was deemed necessary because most of the students involved worked for him.

We also discussed reporting the event 1smediately. We decided it was not

~

addressed under the reporting requirements but it would be reported following substantiation of our suspicion after further invesciation.

The Training Department wrote new exana Sunday, February 5. They also reviewed each student's exam and reported no initial indications of cheating were found. Review of the resetor operators' =w=== indicated that at most, 14.5% of the questions could have been affected if the material had been used.

This corresponds to about 13% of the total point value of the test. Attach-ment C indicates the questions possibly affected. The review of the senior operator exams indicated that about 11.25% of the questions could have been affected. Attachment D indicates the questions possibly affected. This l

corresponds to about 8.5% of the total point value of the test. These results are based upon whether any information from the data sheet was applicable to the question; not whether the question could have been answered completely from the material. Therefore, these results are very conservative.

The investigating team completed a set of prepared questions (Attachment y) l on Sunday. M was the first person interviewed Sunday afternoon on his day off in an attempt to maintain his identity confidential. He walked through his actions up to and following his discovery of the data sheet with b

us. The interview consisted of the prepared qeustions and totaled A out Ih hours. Two abnormalities were identified in the intervisv. They *re

~ discussed in the following paragraph.

It was determined that was the pri:aary suspect f6r the following reasons:

l

^e ,

'. ,

d reh 26, 1984 h 048-84 Fame Thr'ee .

i

1. During the two-week retraining period, 6 came to work early in the mornings. Be observed N coming in before 6:00 AM the day of the exam. He also noted that h had not come in early any of the previous. days. 6 suspected that 6 was possibly the guilty person for these reasons. I

2. M noted an abnormality as he was waiting to leave the exam

~

room to go to the restroom, a person approached the classroom door apparently returning from the restroom but stopped and went back for something. The person then approached the door again abcut 30 seconds later and entered the classroom. The person was 6

3. W informed 6 that M vould be required to take an overdue monthly retraining quiz after the completion of his annual exam. When 6 entered the Training Department office trailer to take the monthly quiz, his face and neck were flushed.

6 thought M flushed features were abnomal.

The other students did not exhibit this condition.

The investigating team then discussed.the other students involved and out-lined our strategy (Attachment E) for the investigation. We decided to start the student interviews on swing shift Sunday. This shift consisted of five of the involved students including the STA who was also one of the exam-taking students. This was the last swing shift for these people, and the Monday, February 6, swing shift was composed of six of the remaining seven involved students. The one remaining student was the Assistant Planner Scheduler whom we scheduled to interview Monday on day shift.

Consequently, we called the Sunday swing shift together about 4:00 PM. We briefed them regarding the incident and the purpose of the investigation.

Individual interviews were then conducted for each involved student.

Following each interview the investigation team reviewed the results with the preliminary analysis being they were not involved. The Assistant Planner Scheduler was then interviewed Monday about 9:00 Ah, February 6, 1984. He volunteered for a lie detector test which several other people had also 1 i

previously done.

At this time, 6 and M were apprised of the first-half l results. The possibility of getting a polygraph machine was discussed as l well as finger printing the data sheet. It was decided to complete the 1

l initial investigation and proceed from there.

l l

Monday, the investigating team briefed the oncoming swing shift of the event 1 l

and the purpose of the investigation. We interviewed three individuals with )

results similar to the previous interviews. The fourth interview was con- l ducted with6. We briefed M on the interview process, j the possible consequences to the individual, and the possible consequences i to the personnel who took the exam, the company, and to the industry.

6 started the interview vith the statement he was leaving the

- _ _ . __ _ _a

r l .

jarch26,1984 4 m -048-84

~ Page Four ,

company. He had accepted a job with another company and had been going to submit his resignation Friday, February 10, 1984. Be stated be had no reason to cheat due to this circumstance. We then asked when he had heard about the incidenti and if he had any other knowledge. Be then confessed saying he. did not know why he had done it, but that he had not used the data sheet'for the exam. Be than stated he could have easily left without saying a word but decided that would be unfair to the people he worked with and to the company. We asked if he had put the material there, and again he said he had. He said he put it there about 15-20 minutes prior to the exam. He again stated he did not know why and he also stated he did not know why he finally decided to confess. He became very emotional at this point. We asked him to think about what the appropriate disciplinary action should be and give us a recommendation prior to his shift the next day.

A summary of each interview of people in the class is included in Attachment G. An interview with 6 and M at 1:30 PM the following day was established. We then conducted the remaining interviews with no additional results. On Tuesday at 7:45 AM, we briefed you and 6 of the confession.

6 met with 6 , as scheduled, the following day. The discussion started with asking him exactly what he placed in the towel holder. He stated, " general information .... a Cycle 6 design data sheet".

He declined to have his shop steward present. He was then asked what he was reconnending for his discipline. He stated that retaking the exam, giving notice of termination at the end of swing shift, and leaving the company for his new job was his recommendation. He was then informed that the recommended company discipline was to be suspension of license and licensed activities, and loss of license bonus for six months. In addition, a week's vacation starting immediately to consider the incident and let things settle down was recommended as well as a letter of apology to the other students. He was also informed he would have to retake the exam. N stated he j did not want his license formally suspended for six months as he went to his

! new job. He asked what else could be done. He was informed his license could be placed inactive issmediately if he were no longer with the company.

He was also informed that FGE would retain the information within the company as much as possible. Bowever, M was informed the NRC would be notified and normal ERC procedures would prevail. 6 rejected the recommendation to issue a 1c ter of apology to the students.

The discussion was concluded with 6 issuing his letter of resignation (Attachment B), and taking seven days of vacation from February 7 - 15, 1984. Eis security badge was pulled denying his access

'to the plant immediately after the meeting.

o The NRC Resident Inspector, h was informed of the facident i immediately following the discussion at 3:00 PM on February 7,1984.

Subsequently, the ODOE was informed the morning of February 8, 1984 The i L ;l

. lJ

e. .

.. *Mrch 26,1984 g 9 048-84 Fame'Five ,

incident, company position, and final courpany results were communicated to licensed personnel, and operating crews directly afterward. 6 was issued. a letter of gratitude (Attachment I) from the company for his trust-worthiness and ethical integrity for reporting this incident.

(s 6 was leaving the plant Tuesday, February 7, 1984, 6 asked to talk to him. Be stated that Sunday night, February 5, he was talking to 6 6 told his he was leaving Trojan anyway so he could just admit he did it to get everybody off the hook.

6 told M that if he did compromise the exam, he should confess; but if he did not, he would be stupid to confess. M related his concern at this time that M aight be taking a fall f or evetyone else.' N told 6 that it was confirmed that M was the person by having him explictly identify what was found. 6 said he remembered that nobody else was told exactly what was found. He said he felt better knowing N was confirmed to be the responsible person.

The investigating team would like to conclude this investigation by saying that if the person had not wanted to be found out, it would have been difficult to prove otherwise. The success of this investigation rests with the high integrity and trustworthiness of the people at Trojan. It obviously rubbed off on a person of weaker character and pressed him forth to confess. Upon leaving the company stated he owes every-thing he has to the people at Trojan. He respects then too much to leave a black cloud lingering overhead.

It is believed that this case of possible compromise is an isolated incident.

Preliminary eram hmtion results are included as Attachment J.

M j

. ATTACHMENT A nDJAN NUCLER MMI s W CLEAR R&TA SEIET Revision 11 Novwher 15, 1983 NUC1 FAR DESIGN - CYCLE 6 POWER BOL, HFP EOL (O PPM B), HFP Power Defect -1100 pcm -1800 pcm Power Coefficiant -11 pcm/I power -18 pcm/: power Doppler Defect -1010 pen -1020 pcm Doppler Coefficient ,

-10.0 pcm/% power .-10.0 pcm/: power Moderator Defect .

(No Load to Tull Load) -150 pcm -780 pcm Moderator Coefficia t SQL, RTP - 9 pcm/'T EOL, EFP - 34 pcm/*T BOL, EZP - 1.6 pcm/*T EOL, EZP - 21 pcm/'T SHbTD0'4N MARGINJ T:c h< cal Specifications 3-1600 pcm Modas 1, 2, 3, 4. 5 K,g, .95 or Baron 2000 ppa Mode 6 Cyclo 6 Minimum Nuclear Design values -2580 pcm (BOL, EZP) -1920 pcm (EOL, EZ?)

Typical Calculations BOL (No Ze) EOL (Ea. Ia) l l Total Rod Worth (EZP) -6375 pcm -6896 pcm l Most Rasetive Rod + 880 pcm + 950 pcm i

Power Defect +1100 pcm +1800 pc=

l Redistribution + 500 pcm + 950 pcm Red Insertion (RED 190 Steps) + 160 pcm + 120 pcm

-3735 pcm -2MS pcm

Revision 11 Fase 1 of 14

ce .

t- -

l Point of adding heat 1 X 10.esups -

l T .97 .

T,,, .00560 (a0L) 00506 (sm.)

EXCESS REACTIVITY

~

Ec ,, =1. lu Esactivity .12.600 pcm l l

ROD WORTHS (HZP) BOL (No XE) EOL (Ec. XE) l l

] Tstals 6375 pcm 6896 pcm .

1 i

Shutdown Banks 2030 pcm 2710 pcm

, Control Banks 4345 pcm 4186 pcm i

! Control Bank D 1273 pcm 1267 pcm i -

Diff. Bad Worth (w/ overlap) 13.0 pcm/ step peak 9 40 steps

<1 pcm/ step amar boccom and top of core 1

i Most Esactive Rod (E-6) 880 pcm 950 pcm BORON

, Ucrth *-9.0 pcm/ ppa EZF BOL

~13 pcm/ ppa cold -

Acci-tators (Modos 1, 2 & 3) C, 11900 ppm; 870 - 930 ft3; 600 - 673 psig i INST (Modas *5. & *6) 102.000 gallone; 2000 < C3 < 2500 ppa

{ Onodes 1, 2. 3 & 4) 142s 000 gallons 137'r R&ST'o (Medas 1, 2, 3. & 4)

System = 14.418 gallons; 7000 < C, < 7700 ppa; 1 65'T OIndes *5 & *6) Can tank = 12.600 gallons; 7000 <.C, < 7700 ppe; 165'T i

BIT Deodas 1, 2, 6 3) 20.000 < C, <22.500; , e,, sallena; 1145'r .

i D11uta *100 gallons /ppe Sortta =10 gallons / ppa-

The INST criteria er the B&ST.criteris Revision 11 anst be met in Modes 5 sad 4. Page 2 of la 7

l_...(1.

Direct free fissima 0.3%;. 2. Te-135 y 1-135 ,,, g , Za-135, 5.9%)

100% power equi.. 2740 pcm =48 hours 1002 power peak S000 pcm =8 hours -

Trip to Protripr from 1001 15 hours1.736111e-4 days 0.00417 hours 2.480159e-5 weeks 5.7075e-6 months Trip to Protrip fram 25Z 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months Trip to,Earo 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months ,

SAMARIUM (1.4% Nd-149 g,7 g Pm-149 Se-149 (Stable))

53 hrs Equilibrium =500 pcm =40 days Peak Afcar SD =878 pez =12 days SOURCES Secondary (2) 4 rodlets per assembly (88" long)

Antimony-123. Bery111um-9 Located E3 sad E13 l l

Sb *,n----------- Sb l

ey l

sb T l ' 8 '!Y! l " I!*I - '"'

51 *------52* '

y

- ' Y

Revision 11 Page 3 of 14

FUEL ASSEMBLIES ,

nazion Enrichment. _ Number- ,,

~

1 0. 8 - 12 .

4 1.6 1 5 1.2 60 4 1.9 44 7A 2.8 48 73 3.2 12 -

8

16 3.~3 Lattica 17 I 17: 264 Fuel Rods, 25 Nelas Dimansions ,

Width 8.466"

Emight =153" NOTE: 1. 3 fuel rods / assembly replaced with SS rods in 303, 304, 312 Cla, D02, COS, D14, 202, 302, M14, 308, 704, F12, F13.

2. 5 fuel rods / assembly replaced with SS rods in A05, All, E01,'115, LOL, ,

L15, 105, 111. These assemblias also have 7-2 I 8 minigrids located midway between normal grids.

FUEL RODS Macertal Fuel: UOz - 88.6 Macric Tous of Uranium Fellets: 0.3225 in, diamatar - 95% density Fuel Clad: 0.0225 in. thickness O.374 in. OD, Zire -4 Thimblas: 0.0345 in. thickness. 0.482 in. OD, Zire -4 Grida: 8 Inconal - 718 grida par assembly Gap: Frapressurized with 350# Islium (Ragions 6, 7. & 8) l l

1 S

. Revision 11 Fase 4 of 14

. I l

'tDNTROL RODS

p. haber 33 j Arr h t Sg -8 Cg =4 1

i

s, - a C, - .

I SC = CC"I j g-A g-,

! Material Ag - 80%. In - 151. Cd - 5:

Clad semintass Sctel - 304 j WD/MIU ,400 (255 EFFD)

Weh 3411 TC" 357 - 544.7'T (0 - lo0: Power) 4: .0 1. to0x -, :

l Prassu e 2235 psig (Normal Operating) 2735 peig (Safety Limit)

. Baight 144*

1 .

Dimmeeer 132" I

}

i i

j . i l -

. Ravision 11 Page 5 of 14 l

E I

~ ~ - ~ ~ - ~

~

nu. t v

that 27.3 1 10u (30L) 31.96 10u (EOL) -

Tharsal 4.65 X 10u (BOL) 3.4 1 10 u (EOL)

EElft Westingboose ,

w - nesism 22.s ,

h== Postulated 18

Etaady State Peak 13.6 Scandy Average 5.44 Tq (Z) - Esat nus Bot Channal Factor 1(4.64][E(Z)] Power l 50% ,

1 T.33 [E(Z)], Power > 50%

._F J RCS Flowrata and T, - Combination of RCS flowrace and T, shall be above and to the lefe of curve shown in STS.

y , b (Esthalov rise het channel factor) _ . . . _ _ . , _ _ _ _

r 1.49 (1.0 + .3(1.0-F))

Quadrant Fower Tilt Eatio QTFTK 1 1.02 for P > SO:

DNER - >1.71 thimble coldwall calls (

(Three foal rods and a thimble tube)

>1.73 for typical calls (Tour fuel rods)

. l Revision 11

. Page 6 of 14

[NHOUR' APPROX '

' ' ' ~

Isgg se a b go (Gemarally the y seslected) . _ _ .

7 + 1 + TT

~

- - 2'I 10-8 eme. T = 0.1 ene**

T= (M are prompt tars is insignificant)

To ,

e .

E l P = F,e(*/2) (t = time 1. . 4.)

F = F,10(

) IE) (t = time in minutes) g K

I

= efyn (L L ) .K M * *

1" *** * # *

U" aff = 1 - O fC (noaleakage) = 3 umber a in pronous gen.

E,ff -1 R,f f E K ,ff sff Revision 11 Fase 7 of 14

suBCRITICAL MULTIPLICATION (M)

Def4n'ittaa: A stable or sacreastag asutros population in the suberitical core.

des to the presence of a source (So).

..g . m ,u . t.r. - ;

, 1 --

-

but 't = So(1 + k + k1 + k3 + . . .) ; if E < 1. then 't = So f M=g,g & f=1-k,ff ,butMt=h&Mz=h.whereC=countraca

, i

.. h = h = , a*fft or Ct (1 - k,gg ) = Ca(1-kgg)

ECCS DATA Shutoff Design Run-Out Press. Press. Mow Press. new Centrifugal Charging -

Pgs 2670 2510 150 610 550 Safoty Injection Pumps 1520 1080 425 650

650 Accumulators 600 - 673 600 - 673 - - - - variab le - - - - - -

Easidual Best Ramoval Pumps 200 160 3000 140 4500 l

l l

l Revision 11 Page 8 of 14 I

h

-..-.- . . _ __ .- -- - - - - - - - - - --L..-- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - --- - ---- -- ----~~ --

DELTA TEMPERATURE .

UKATg1 ATO El ~ N ** ( ~ * * ** ~ ~#1(#

5 -

Et = 1.32 .

Ea = .02109/*F L1 = .001/pai i

i AI = qT - g5

ft = 2 2% par I AI < -43% AI 2.66: per 1 AI > +3% AI 1

OPAT 1 AT O -

5 ( Sta)( aM) - 4 ( an - .)- 2 (Al L = 1.08 i

l Es = .02/*T l

Es = .00137'T for Tave > 584.8*

= 0 for Tave < 584.8* ,,,

f2 = 0 j 2To = 80 r I

l

ROD BLOCKS OTAT 3% < Trip 2/4 l

1 0 fit 3Z < Trip -

2 /t.

I Int. Range 20% 1/2 Fwr. Range 1032 g ff, l ,

) Imp. Press <151 Auto 1/1 223 scope M7 gjg fIKD i

i I,

I l

' Eavision 11 Page 9 of 14 6

5

-e----- + , - . - - . , _ . _ _ _ . -

p .,,. ,... - . - -- ,

' stat:r Cooling Water Law Flow 600 spe 1/d stator Cooling'Escar Low Pressura' 57 peig 1/1(I g8] sec eff on Stator Cooling Water Eigh Temp. . 81*C 1/1 OIAT = 31 < Trip serpoint 2Ti 2.3 see on; 27.7 sac CFAT = 33 < Trip serpoint 2fi off at 133%/ Min.

Esse of 1 MFF > 701 1312/secondto70%

REACTOR _ TRIP SETPQ1ftT LOGIC PERMISSIVES Sourca Bamse 108 cys- 1/2 P-4. P-10 Inc. Range 251 1/2 P-10 Pwr. Range la 15: 2/4 P-10 Pwr. Range El 109% 2/4-Pwr. Range Esta :t5% in < 2 sec. 2/4 OraT Yariable 2/4 0 fit Yariable 2/4 Par. Press. 11 2385 peig 2/4 Par. Press. Le 1865 psig (race sensitive) 2/4 P-7 Par. Laval E1 92% 2/3 P-7 Flow Lo 90: 2/3 in 1 loop >P-8 2/3 in 2 loops >F-7 .

Fr q. Lo 57.5 E: 1/2/ bus both buses F-7 t 1

valc Lo 64: 1/2/ bus both buses F-7 RC? Braskars

Open 2 > F-7 s/G Im-Lo Level 20: (Note 3) 2/3 any s/c Feed Flow Low Td 1.5 I 10' lbs/hr < sca. 1/2 any $/G Coincident to s/G 14Tel 25: 1/2 same S/G safety Injection Any, 1/2 Turbina Trip Scops Closed 4/4 P-7 Imv Emergency Trip 011 Presours (800f) 2/3 General Warniss Procactive Train Trouble 2/2 A. Loss of either 447 DC B. Loss of either 137 DC C. Amy PC Card out (escope Isolator)

D. Input Error Inhibit Switch in " Inhibit" E. Maltiplazar Test Switch in "Ishibit"

7. Logic Punctica Switch "A" eut of " Normal" G.

Permissives Function Switch out of " Normal" I.

Memorias Punction Switch out of "Wormal" i

i

1. Output Ralay Test Panel in " Test" ' .

J. Clastag Beactor Trip Bypass Breakar K. Grosed Return Fuse Open Manual 1/2 Revision 11 Fase 10 of 14 ,

l

SAFETY. INJECTION .

.. sIcx4L" EZ5 LIE locIC. .2ta.ussIvts Manual 1/2 .

Cantainment

~

EL Pressure 4 peig (Esta 2) 2/3 Pressuriser ,

~~ ~~~

la Pressure 1835 pois (Esta 3) 2/3 ~ ~F-11 (Pzr Pre Steam Fisw Ri Jenam Flow 40% flow f 0 to 20% load F-12 (Lo-Lo Ta-

. Variable between 20-100:

110% flow 0 100Z load 1/2 per loop. 2/4 loops U/Lo Staan Press 600 peig (rata sensitive) 2/4 loops or Lo-Lo Tave 553*F 2/4 loops Staan Differential One loop 100 psig less than 2/3 other loops CONTAINMENT ISOLATION SIGNAL SETPOINT LOGIC Manumi 1/2 sateer In.1.ction any ,

SPRAY ACTUATION SIGNAL SET?o rf7 LOGIC Manual 2/2 Conemi-==nt Pressure Ei-Ri 30 peig 2/4 STEAM LINE ISOLATION l 51GNAL SETP0Drf LOGIC Conemin==nt Ei-Ei 30 peig 2/4 Steam Flow Ri Steam Flew 40% flow 0 0 to 20% load Variable between 20 -- 100%

110% flow 0 100% load 1/2 per loop. 2/4 loops C/Lo-Scasm Press 400 peig (rate sensitive) 2/4 loops er Lo-Lo Tsve 353'F 2/4 loops 'l 1

I novision 11 '

Fage 11 of 14

l l

FM WATER ISOLATION

'.. ele!E * , .

M MEIE .

s/C Javel Ei-Ei 75% 2/3 any 1 gen.

saf:ty Zajeccisa 'any Enactor Trip'W/ta Tave 564*F. 2/4.'

AUXILIARY FEED PUMP STARTS g SETFOINT IACIC Dadervoltage on a-1 (A-2)(Nota 4) 4.56 ET > 1 see 1/2 taken twice 14-14 s/c Invol (usy be assually blocked)(Note 3) 20% 2/3/ gen Main Feed Pump Trip (any be manually blockad) 2/2 safety Injectica Any PERMISSIVES LOGIC C - 1 = 1.1.11 rod stop (Current .201) 1/2 C - 2 = P.R. Ei rod stop (103%) 1/4 C - 3 = OTAT rod stop sad turbina rumback (OTAT Trip - 3%) 2/4 ,

l C - 4 = OPAT rod stop and turbine rumback (OPAT* Trip - 3%) 2/4 C - 5 = Auto rod withdrawal block (Impulse Press. f.15%)(PT-505)

C - 7 = Load rejection arm steam dups (101 step or 5%/ min)(PT-506)

C - 9 = Condenser available for day (vacuum and cire. ustar)

C - 11 = Sank D Auto Rod withdrawal linic (223 steps)

F - 6 = Allow Ri volts OFF and Block of 5.1. Trip (10 amps) 1/2 F - 7 = 31ock "at power" trips (10% - P-10 er F-13) P-10 2/4 P-13 .... _ 1/2 7 - 8 = Allows loss of one loop flow (39%) 2/4 7 - 10 = Allows block of P.R. La trip (25%) allows block of I.R. 2/4 Ei rod block (20%) and trip (25%); block 5. E. Ei volts.

Input F-7 F -11 = Allows block of par press (1835 pois) low 5.I. 01915 psig 2/3 F - 12 = (ta-Lo- Tave 553*F) allows block of Ei steam flow SI. 2/4 blocks steam day (except cooldown valves can be reset) '

F - 13 = (Impulse Press 103) Das of the P-7 e4--1 = 1/2 7 - 14 = (31-E1 $/G 1evel - 75%) Trip turbine, trip feedpumps.

alase FET's & Whittakars, opes Cond. Pump recires. 2/3 any 5/G Revision 11 Page 12 of 14 a

9

.h

e e ,

p.,

'S57*F - S84.78F e '(0 - 100% pesar)

PIM LEVEL S0% - 61.31 span (557*F - S84.7*F Tave)

PIR PRESS sea Fase 14 Ron Cosmt0L Auto: 8 s/m; 1.5'F - 3*T e m t 8 s/s - 72 s/m; 3*F - 5'T error ;

e Manual: 48 s/n control Rods 64 s/n Shutdown Rods S/G LEVEL 33 - 44% span (0 - 20% turbine load) 44% (20 - 100% turbina imed)

FIRST $TAGE IMPULSE PRESSURE 66-570 pais 15 - 100% power STEAM DUMPS Parmissives:

1/2 cire pumps

. 2/2 vacuum (<5" Eg Ab.)

Arming:

Loss of Lead 5%/ min or 10% step (PT-506)

Turbine Trip 4/4 stop valves closed or 2/3 low emergency trip oil pressure Moda Salmeter Switch Fositioned to STIAM FRISSURI Opeaias:

Loss of Load: Tave - Tref (5*T - 16.4*T = 0 - 100% open)

T m Moda < Trip Open - 0 10.7'T; % (, 16.4*T

.Turbina Trio: Tave - 557'T (0 - 27.7'T = 0 - 100% open) y open - % 4 13.8*T; % 4 27.7'T ,

Pressure Mode r Auto = steam pressure - secpoint '

Manual = Operator Controlled Intarlocha Lo-Lo steam Generator level after time delay of .

5 minutas. lacks out all dup valves except l .

FCT-507A. 5. sad C. !

l Le-Em Tave locks out all staam 'deps; interlock l can be bypassed using the two bypass interlock I switches on CO2. for FCT-507A. 3. and C.

-Q Revision 11 Fase 13 of 14 i

e

. . g

r ~ PRESSURIZER PRESSURE

.By'drrststit Tast 3107 'Eydrc0tatic Teae Safc,'ty Limit "

2735 $ No ECS Breach Expected , , . ,

safety Valves Life 2&85 l Ei Press. Reactor Trip 2385 [

Pouer Operated Baliefs g . .. .

Armed and Open 2335 y a

2315 Power Operated Reliefs Shut 1

5 pray valves Fully open/

Mi Press. Alara 2310

Sprcy Valves Start open 2260 2250

Proportional Isaeers Tully of f Normal Operating Prassure 2235 (psia) 2220 *Froportional Easters yully On C5ackup Emacers Off y 2218 "a

2210

Backup Easters On & Lo Press.

. U A18#8 s

Auto Unblock SI $ 1915 1915 Fersissive to Block SI I l 3 1865' *Rasctor Trip 6j 1835 Safety Injection

2he signals to these components are race sensitive and as a result, the action may take place at a different system pressure than the listed setpoint.

EDTE 1: Setpoints provided in this data sheet are Standard Technical Specifications values. Actual setpoint will be slightly more conservative in most cases.

30TE 2: set at =3.5 peig due to an ad=tafatrative commitment.

NOTE 3: Prz. Prass. increased from 1763 pais and 5/G fo-lo Level increased from 15:

due to temperature emithrstion problems with Barton transultters. These values any change or revert dep=ading upon the permanent fix - to be announced.

EDTI at Also actuates if <3.85 E7 >4 secs (1/2 takan twice) with an SIS and normal idr brk shut, or if<3.85 ET >55 seca (1/2 taken twice) without an SIS.

Revision 11 Fase 14 of 14

\l

y

.. 1

. N' ,

. 1

. ATTACHMENT B. i RAME POSITION LICDISE 6 Auxiliary 0perator 10 Aniliary Operator 10 i i

l M A>M 14= 7 Operator RO l Auxiliary Operator 10

@ Asst Control Operator RO 6 Control Operator R0 h Asst Shift Supervisor SRO M Asst Shift Supervisor SRO M Shift Supervisor SRO M Shift Supervisor SRO Operations Supervisor SRO Shift Tech Adviser SRO g Asst Planner Scheduler SRO I e

Training Specialist IV SRO '

)

Did not take examination based upon the retraining procedure exception for training specialist directly involved with the conduct of the program.

4

-- . . . m .e - _. __ . . .

ATTACHMENT C

.. TROJAN NUCLEAR PLANT REACTOR OPERATOR LICENSE EXAMINATION R4B1 REACTOR TYPE: PWR WESTkNGPOUSE DATE ADMINISTERED: FEBRUARY 3, 1984_

EXAMINER:

APPLICANT:

INSTRUCTIONS TO APPLICANT:

USE SEPARATE PAPER FOR THE ANSWERS. WRITE ANSWERS ON ONE SIDE ONLY.

STAPLE QUESTION SHEET ON TOP OF THE ANSWER SHEETS. POINTS FOR EACH QUESTION ARE INDICATED IN PARENTHESES AFTER THE QUESTION. THE PASSING l GRADE REQUIRES AT LEAST 70% IN EACH CATEGORY AND A FINAL GRADE OF AT LEAST 80%. EXAMINATION PAPERS WILL BE PICKED UP SIX (6) HOURS AFTER THE EXAMINATION STARTS.

% OF CATEGORY % OF APPLICANT'S CATEGORY VALUE TOTAL SCORE VALUE CATEGORY 25 25 1. PRINCIPLES OF NUCLEAR POWER PLANT' OPERATION,

. THERMODYNAMICS, HEAT TRANSFER AND FLUID FLOW 25 2's 2. PLANT DESIGN INCLUDING SAFETY AND ENERGENCY SYSTEMS 25 _25_ 3. INSTRUMENTS AND CONTROLS 25 25' 4. PROCEDURES - NORMAL, ABNORMAL, EMERGENCY AND RADIOLOGICAL CONTROL 100 100 TOTALS I FINAL GRADE %

ALL WORK DONE ON THIS EXAMINATION IS MY OWN. I HAVE NEITHER GIVEN NOR RECEIVED AID.

APPLICANT'S SIGNATURE

. \

G M W % wW M y .n.c4 kb A\s s %M n m

, n*7,

.g:, p, g

,r . w% y.s+%A=n:\L. -

. . no s:CTu= 1 -

FEINCIFLES OF NUCLEAR FOUER FLANT OPERATION.

TEF8WmT5AMICS. IEAT TRANSFER AND FLUID TLOW

~

(25'Foints) -

1.1 If each variabla listed below as a. b, c. and d increased is angnitude, how would this affect the worth of a control rod in the imediata area.

Bastrict your answer to increase, ao change, or decrease.

a. Temperature (0.75)

b. Zenon Concentration (0.75;

c. Boron Concentration (0.75)

d. Fu-240 Concentration (0.75) 1.2 (CIRCLE III 3 CST CORRECT OF TIE TWO CROICES LISTED) (1.5) bg d As a core ages, the Doppler only Power comfficient gets more/less negative.

gQQ This is due to FU-240/ clad roep causing lower / higher fuel centerline temperatures. beh, has gol, ,Y,gs, oQg 1.3 a. If an ECF was calculated using 800 ppa Boron as reference and actual (1.0)

Q Baron was 900 ppe would the critical rod height be higher or lower than calculated?

b. .What 3 criteria could not be assured if criticality occurred with (1.5)

Control Bank C lower than the RIL?

Q 1.4 Explain how the phenomena of " baffle jet impingement" could result in an increase in the concentration of the fission fragment lodine in the (2.0)

Ndd coolant?

1.5 "As the core ages. Saff decreases".

hgk a. Define Inff. (1.0)

S b. uhy does Ieff decrease? (1.0)

c. As a result of this decrease does the neutron spectrum become more (2.0) or lasa "hard"? Explain.

y'Q 1.6 Explain why reactivity associated with Innon initially increases af ter (2.0) a duction in power from equilib um , condition.

1.7 he a.kd b $ t> bcag mt .

g Assume that a core thermocouple amp taken after a thCA shows incore T/C's (2.0) 7 average >710*F. Mac conclusion can immediately be drawn in regards to k._

the state of the fluid exitting the core? Explain.

1.8 a. What is the density of saturated staas at 1100 pais; 900 psia? (2.0)

b. Explain how the density changes demonstrated above are factored into (2.0) the stems flow signal of _SCELCS.

____l

"M . . , .. ~.'.. .

,,,. .. . . ~ . '. .r .o .. . .- . . - . .

1.9 Answer the following statements TRUE or FALSI and briefly explain your answer.

g a. As the temperature of coolant increases, it's riscosity changes to requirn more power to maintain the same flow.

.

) )

I h

b. Shutdown cooling requirements following a reactor trip are less at (1.0) 1 BOL than at EDL.

1.10 Of the following combinations of 4 variables, select the combination which (2.01 a' includes only those variables which are monitored to ensure that DNB does

=at ***=r-

% dst \ 3 gQQ a. Przr level RCS flow, RCCA position, RCS temperature

b. ECCA position, RCP amps, Rasctor power, Prrr pressure

c. Przr pressure, RCS flow, RCS temperature, reactor power

d. Tref, Basetor power, Przr level, RCS flow h \ m. b t\ b e $ '\w gw kwa hT. %s NwAS

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. t 30 SECTION 2 o FLANT Dt. SIGN DCLUDDC 5ATZTY AND EMERCDCT SYSTD15 (25 Foints) 2.1 Assume you are the CD performing a RCP haatup. The load dispatcher (2.0) I gx l

r., orts -e thund-sto e .e -in. ,-, outa.a. and . rid disturbancas. The Shif t Separvisor suggests that you put both EDC's j

[ d in parallel with offsite power to ensure continuity of power to the ESF busses. Describe your acticas in response to the SS's suggestion.

l 2.2 a. Of what concern is I 2in the cont =<r==at following a DEA? (1.0)

Nok '

b. Describe (1) how is prevented from accumulating in the done of (1.5)

A d the Containment (2) two means to reduce the amount of R. in the Contat-c 's atmosphere.

Agf 2.3 Assume the FASS is being placed in operation by the Plant ma=4=t (1.5)

N (PASS Coordinator). Why must the Operations Department keep the chemist Akt informed of plant status?

2.4 List or describe 3 systems which inform plant personnel that a seismic (1.5)

I event either is in progress or has occurred in the past.

2.5 Describe the interaction bei:veen the Master Controller and the individual controllers for the North and South mein feedpumps for the conditions M 'hown-g { a. Master Controller in AUTC MFP and STF Controllers in Manual. (1.0)

b. Master Contro ner in Manual IFF and STP Controllers in AUTO. (1.0)

c. Master Controllar in AUTC. IFF Controller in Manual, STP Controller (1.0) in AUTO.

2.6 a. Describe all automatic actions which occur when the main generator (2.0)

Ugk primary or backup lockout relays actuate (energi:o).

b. Why is a 30 second delay in a generator trip desirable? (Cive 2 reasons) 2.7 a. Explain how the inputs to the Core Cooling Monitors are used to (1.0) give a conservative **T Subcooled" reading.

(QQ b. If the Core Cooling Monitor were taken cut of service, how conid the Control Operator determine 'T subcooled using Control Room (1 0) instrumentation?

2.8 Uhat automatic actions occur at 100% power if; kg* a. A single feedpump is lost. (1.0)

%M b. A 30% load rejection occurs (rods in Manual). , (1.0)

c. Power to 12.47 E7 bus El is lost. (1.0) bb.skhbsd MA s.A wsbb A %bw& O=h M w ha A _ u.w d , h-.% s.u.k%.w.

__ ____________ l

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, . . ..~"'" ..

2 '.. . .: -

2.9 Deser n the location, purpose, and operation'of the DBA sequencers. (3.0)

.10 For'a controlled power decrease from 1002 to 502 (all systems in. Auto);

a. How will Teve change (beginning and ending Tave's)? (0.75.

ksNk gg b. How will pressuriser level change (beg 4==4= and ending levels)? (0. 75 '.

c. Describe how and stry the CTCS system will respond to this power (1.0) reduction. )

g.\.

bha. M b ktk % M e k O T

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kA gm%,sMA 3 s , W4 ss .

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.. no stCrIos 3 INSTRENDrIS AND CONTBoLS (25 Points) 3.1 s. List three signals which will cause an automatic start of'the Trojan (1.3 EDC's.

'Nk b. Under what condition will the EDG's Auto-load? (1.5 3.2 Secause of certain environmental inadequacies, the plant setpoint of pressurizar low pressure SIand SG low-low reactor trip were recently

changed.

SW *-

b.

"' C % C ' g i=J' *=*

what onnental condition (s) were involved?

(-

(1.0 K s%M 3.3 a. Draw a one line diagram of the reactor trip and bypass breaker ( 1. 5 '

system. Indicate on the drawing the coils used to cause a single reactor trip breakar to trip.

g b. Describe how the breakar/ coils you have shown respond (energize, desnergize, etc.) to; (2.0:

(1) a trip signal from the SSPS.

(2) a manual trip signal.

3. I. Describe how an operator can use the computer "aequence of events" to de ter:r.ine g a. the cause of the reactor trip, and (1 3:

b. the time frame between receipt of the reactor trip signal and the (1.0; reactor trip breakers opening.

3.5 a. Basically explain how the generator core monitor detects a main ( 1. 5 ',

. Q,k generator fault.

D. b. What operator action is required if a core monitor alarm is received (1.3) ,

while it's validity is being checkad.

1 3.6 Assume that the feedflow transmitter supply to the Control Signal for "B" ;

steam generator fails low at 1001 power and no operator action is l

$ . taken to compensate for the failure.

gQQ a. Describe how h CS will operate in response to the failure. (1.

b. ts 1 cause the reac r to trip? I

% 3. as hyr ght O Te h T G. hi k A\d 3.7 Describe how gamma effects on the ex-core NIS source range detector (2.0)

Q4 are minimized before source range counts are displayed. * .'

3.8 Explain how a 480 volt AC source can be paralleled with a DC power supply (2.0)

.M to supply a 120 V AC instrument load.

e

O

'3:9 A auclear plant recently had to add conaarvatism to ecrtain serpsints . (2,c because their & arrow range RTD's had poor cima response characteristics.

is from the narrow range RD's What reactor O at Trojan? protection

a. k k %signala s *husa (w \si s s @h7 ,gthT 3.10 .The in-core instrument system is used to verify hot chanaal factors are l within acceptable limits.

N2 a. What instruments comprise the in-core instrumentation system? (1.C EN b. Between measurements, how do the operators ensure that acceptable (2.C e

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t 30'$1CTION 4'

. FROCEDURES - WRMAL. AE50RMAL. IMERGENCY AND 1ADIOLOGICAL CONTROL

. (25 Foints) 4.1 From the values given in part b. select the most appropriate v,alue or (3.0 statement to insert in the blanks of the following statements.

a. At Trojen, the controlled access point is posted as a radiation area because dose rates of could be reasonably expected to exist. Inside the controlled access area, additional " radiation area" postings are required if the dose rate inches from the source is greater than . Eigh radiation area posting is required if the dose rate exceeds .

If airborne activity exceeds of a MFC. it utst be g posted as a "high airborne contamination area" and is required for personnel who are working in the area. In locations 4, where dose rates exceed . additional access controls such as locks and SS key control are required. Areas in which dose rates exceed are designated "Righ Radiation Exclusion Areas".

The threshold for detection of biological damage caused by an acute exposure is and is observable as .

LDf,representsanacutedoseofabout and the ter= t means that about SOI of those exposed will suffer . .

An operator of a test reactor received a neutron exposure of due to a prompt criticality accident in 1983. This dose resulted in severe a=posure symptoms such as and resulted in the operators death after a period of .

s

b. (1) nervous disorders (15) 500 Eam (2) blood cell changes (17) 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months (3) 25 ares / hour (18) 6 area (4) 100 Ram (19) 18 (5) 12 (20) one week (6) vomiting -

(21) 100 ares / hour (7) 7.5 (22) respiratory protection

. (8) 30 Rad / hour (23) death (9) Fatal cancers (24) 25 Rem / hour (10) 2 ares / hour (25) 75 Rad

~

(11) 1400 Rad (26) 1000 area / hour (12) a SCRA (27) 1500 Ram (13) a Bubble Suit (28) severe burna (14) one month (29) 25%

(15) 6 ures/ hour (30) 75%

e i

, , . . . . . . .. ... . 22. . _ . . , .

) . , . .

4.2 Defign or describe the following acronyms, phrases, or words found in the STS.

a. WRR d w k g k. h w wown. wo w % h* I (0.5 ) .

Q b. (g (0.5)

c. Isode 1 (0.5)

d. Safety Limits (0.5)

A NE\ 4 (0.5)

e. tCO

f. Channel Check (0.5) 4.3 Assume you are the reactor operator with Control Bank D at 180 steps, rod control in actoestic, 100% power. Rods start stepping out; l

a. What action should you take to stop the rod withdrawal? (1.0)

W i

b. If your action in a. above has no effect (rods continue to withdrav) what is your naxt action?

(1.0)

I l 4.4 There are, basically, two safety limits specified for Trojan.

ke\ a. Briefly describe each. (1.0) h hkd I. b. Describe their impact on continued operation of the plant if violatec. (2.0) l 4.5 In regards to Trojan Security procedures: (Select the one best answer.)

a. Under what conditions may security keys be removed from the Protected (0.5)

Area?

(1) When kept on the owner-controlled property.

(2) During a site evacuation.

(3) When the key is kept under control of the key holder.

(4) Never.

b. Who say exit a vital area through a secondary access portal? (0.5) ,

4 (1) Anyone, as long as security is later notified.

(2) No one, under any conditions.

(3) Any personnel when making an emergency escape from the room. '

(4) None of the above. ~l

c. At all times the shift PGE Security person is considered to be the (0.5)

Security Eatch Supervisor.

TRUE / FALSE -

d. For access purposes the 105' Yentilation Room is classified as . (0.5)

(1) A Type II Vital Area.

(2) A non-wital area where access is controlled the same as a vital area.

(3) A non M tal area with no access restrictions.

(4) Bona of the above.

L_____ . _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

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allowed pyray ustar to pressuriser vapor space 1T ' (2.0 Q A.6 shat is tha ==ri-and why does this restriction exist!

%YL Describe 4 conditions or alarms which are indicative of SC tube (1.0 '

4.7 a. -

l rupture.

(1.0 s

b. Describe how pressure reductions to the RCS are best enda with (1)

SIS /CIS conditions and (2) SIS /CIS reset.

(1.0 l

c. Describe 2 adverse conditions which could result if a SC overfill t

]

accompanied the tube rupture.

3 (2.5 4.8 Assume a SI has occurred. Describe how Functional Include Eastoration Procedure in your discussion FR-0 should be used in sitigating the accident.

who is the principal in their use, the significance of the color coding, Q and when they can be " returned to the shalf".

(2.0 If the SI occurring in 4.8 proceeding has been determined to be spurious; Q 4.9 what Conrain==nt. Pressurizer, hast sink and RCS condition's mast be hd established before the SI can be taruinated?

4.10 Answer the following TRUE or FALSE in regards to GOI- 2; (0.5

s. All Control Rod banks shall be withdrawn in their prescribed sequence.

(0.5

b. Criticality should be anticipated anytime ICCA's are being withdrawn or boros dilutions are being performed.

(0.5

(

c. Startup with only 3 RCF's running may be performed but power may not exceed 101.

(0.5

d. If the reactor goes critical 80 steps below ECF. the SS must be notified but the startup any continua.

(C.5

e. Startup rate should not exceed 0.1 DFM (steady state) when going critical.

9. s et %' 4 t. 8L *

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. . . s m rx smEEr

.s ..

, , , .f,f = as ,

A = AN A = 4,o~AE

' w = ms a '= ta2/ g = 0.693/tg zg eff = [g)(c t)3 ~

EE = % w* [(ty) + (th)I FE = ush g ,g ,-r=

o Vg = V* + at s

I=I."X o W= v AF I=I 10"*

IM AE = 931 Am g, g T7L - 1.3/u

, 57L = -0.693/u q = Cat.t 8 3 = S/(1 - E gg)

G ^= W/(1 - Eeff,)

F = P,10 sur(t) y = r,et/T 3 (13 - Eg g )

G ,(1 - E.gr )

1 2 e - - -n -

= 1,(1 - K.,,) = . ,, ,

T = (1*/o) + [(a - o)/ E] M = (1 - Eg f )/(1 - E,gg )

o 1 T= d(s -8)

T = (8 - o)/(la) snN = (1 - K*ff)/K*ff 1* = 10" seconds F = (E,gg-1)/K,gg = AEgg/Eg I = 0.1 seconds **

F = [t*/(IEg g)] + [_8,gg/(1 + TT)]

Id =Id F = (IdT)/(3 Z 10**)

g.g Id 2=Id 2 1 1 2 2

,= s/s a/hr (0.6 CE)/d8(moters)

- E/hr = 6 CE/d2 gg,,g) _

a = (V, - Y,)/t g w = e/t Cycle effirimary = (Estwork set)/

(Emergy ta)

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Uster Parameters .

g 1 sal.' = 8.345.lba.

L/ ' 1' gal. = 3.78 litars I ft.: , ,,43 ,,1, ansaity .62.4 lba/tc 8 Esat of vaporisation - 970 Scu/lba e

Esat of fusion - 144 Ecu/lba 1 Atm.= 14.7 psi = 29.9 in. Es.

1 ft. I o1 = 0.4335 lbf/in. .

Itiscellaneous Conversions 1 curie - 3.7 Z 101 ' dps 1 kg = 2.21 1ha 1 hp = 2.54 1 103 Bcu/hr g 1 at = 3.41 X 10' Ecu/hr , .

u lin = 2.54 cm-

F = 9/5'c + 32

C = 6/9 ('F-32) 1 ITU - 778 fr-lbf l

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- ATTACHMENT D TROJAN' NUCLEAR PLANT

., SENIOR REACTOR OPERATOR LICENSE. EXAMINATION S4B1 REACTOR TYPE: PWR WESTINGHOUSE DATE ADMINISTERED: FEBRUARY L 198f4 EXAMINER:

APPLICANT:

INSTRUCTIONS TO APPLICANT:

USE SEPARATE PAPER FOR THE ANSWERS. WRITE ANSWERS'ON ONE SIDE ONLY. l STAPLE QUESTION SHEET ON TOP OF THE ANSWER SHEETS.

POINTS FOR EACH QUESTION ARE INDICATED IN PARENTHESES AFTER TNE QUESTION, THE PASSING GRADE REQUIRES AT LEAST 70% IN EACH CATEGORY AND A FINAL GRADE OF AT LEAST 80%. EXAMINATION PAPERS WILL BE PICKED UP SIX (6) HOURS AFTER THE EXAMINATION STARTS.

% OF CATEGORY % OF APPLICANT'S CATEGORY VALUE TOTAL SCORE VALUE CATEGORY 75 25 5. THEORY OF NUCLEAR POWER PLANT OPERATION, FLUIDS, AND THERMODYNAMICS 25 25 6. PLANT SYSTEMS DESIGN, CONTROL, AND INSTRUMENT-ATION 25 25 7. PROCEDURES - NORMAL, ABNORMAL, EMERGENCY AND RADIOLOGICAL CONTROL 25 25 8. ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES CONDITIONS, AND LIMITATIC i 100 100 TOTALS FINAL GRADE %

l ALL WORK DONE ON THIS EXAMINATION IS MY OWN. I HAVE NEITHER GIVEN NOR RECEIVED A!D.

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' SRO SECTION 5 TEE 0ET OF N0 CLEAR FIANT OPERATION. FLUIDS. AND THERMODYNAMICS (25 Points) 5.1 a. At BOL the Doppler only Power coefficient is compared to its SOL value (0.5) gd ~(1) the same (2) more negative h k h ()0, g,g a ,. (3) less negative

b. List and describe a condition which tends to make this coefficient (1) more ogst . an (2) less nagative. (2.0)

N 5.2 Assume the plant is atse. h 4

power. equilibrium conditions when a RCCA from C3 "D" drops into the core. Assuming no reactor trip; (1) List 5 conditions indications, or alarms which would alert (2.5) the operator of this occurrence.

(2) If rods are in manual explain what happens to DNBR in the vicinity of the dropped rod and in the adjacent fuel assemblies. (2.0) 5.3 Assume an ECP is calculated for 1600 following a two week outage.

l How l

would each of the following events or conditions affect the actual critical rod position compared to the ECP? Limit your ansvers to " higher h than estimated". " lower than estimated". or "no significant dif ference".

a.

A steam generator's water level is rapidly increased 251 (during the (0.75 pull =25 steps below ECP)

b. The startup is delayed until 1800.

(0.75 l c.

The pull.

setpoints of the FOR's and steam dumps are increased during the (0.75

d. A boron sample shows boron concentration 10 ppm lower than the concentration used in the ECP. (0.75 5 .4 0

Explain or describe two modifications performed on new fuel assemblies Wk for cycle 6 ich were incorp rate ( to preclude fuel failure from baf fle (2.0)

QM jetting. t g gQk \ (g( hp .

Q 5.5 a.

Describe what is meant by the term " Neutron Spectrum Hardening". (1.5)

b. Describe or explain two factors which cause spectrum hardening. (1.5) 5.6 Using data from the graph below depicting Zenon reactivity versus time.

Q select from power history a, b c or d the one which most accurately describes the Zenon transient.

(2.0)

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y

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>. ~... 1.00 --- - - ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ' *

~

l

.~ I 1001

' 8 equal

.50 I I' 38

t ~( ;

.25 8 1 g

s !

e t ,

to t1 t2 t3 1

Time to - t1 t1 - t2 t2 - t3 t3 - =

a 0 - 75 75 - 50 50 - 100 100 - 70 b 0 - 75 75 - 0 0 - 75 75 - 100 e 0 - 50 50 - 0 0 - 50 50 - 100 d 0 - 50 50 - 100 100 - 50 50 - 100 5.7 Assume that the pressurizer has a steam bubble at 400 psia.

h a. If a POR is opened and the FRT is at 2.7 psig, what is the maxir.um tailpipe temperature?

(1.5)

b. What is the exact condition of the fluid as it passes by the tail- (1.5) pipe temperature indicator? '

5 5.8 If thermocouple readings taken after a LOCA are greater than 710*r. what (3.0) l conclusion can be drawn in regards to the state of the fluid exitting the <

{g core 7 Explain your answer.

5.9 As the plant progresses from BOL to EOL. there are variations in the LT (2.0) from fuel centerline to the RCS (which has a constant temperature at full power).

L List or describe four factors or variables which can change fuel center-g line temperature at full power from BOL to EOL.

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. . . 5R0 SECTION 6 FLANT SYSTEMS DESIGN, CONTROL AND INSTRUMENTATION

^

(25 Points) 6.1 Assume the plant is at 400*F during a RCP haatup when the load dispatcher (2.0) l reports severe electrical transients on the grid causing potential losses l of offsite power. The CO. desiring to provide continuity to loads on Al and A2. decides to start up the EDG's and parallel them to Al and A2.

Describe your advice / order to the CO and justify your prescribed action.

6.( a. List 3 post IDCA sources of Rydrogen gas. (0.75

b. Of what significance is B, in the Containment's atmosphere? (1.0)

LM4 c. List 2 means or systems which can reduce hydrogen gas quantity from the containment.

(1.0) 6.3 a. List 3 data points which can be obtained from the CA (Containment (0.75 g \ Atmosphere) PASS.

MO

b. 4 data points which can be obtained from the RCL (Reactor Coolant) (1.0) 6.4 s. What earthquake conditions and alarms require the operator to trip the (2.0) reactor?

g% b. Basically describe how a time - magnitude - duration history of a (1.0) seismic event is obtained.

6.5 a. Draw the output response of each of the following control components (2.0) given a step change in input.

N (1) lag unit

\ (2) rate lag unit 4 8U!t (3) lead - lag unit (4) P1 controller

b. A rate - lag unit is used for load rejection arming the steam dumps (0.5) instead of the lead - lag unit because; (circle the most correct ansver).

(1) Imad - lag units do not respond to the rate of change in the input.

4 *\ (2) An output is desired only when the input changes by a certain amount over a certain period of time.

(3) Lead - lag units are more difficult to calibrate.

(4) None of the above; either unit could perform the required function.

~

6.6 Describe the following in regards to automatic generator trips.

a. Two reasons for having a " delayed" trip circuit. (1.0) khd b. State the name of.the device or devices which directly cause an auto-matic generator trip.

(0.5)

L-

. c. 4 turbine problems which cause an imunediate generator trip signal. (1.0)

d. 5 conditions causing a delayed generator trip. (1.0) 6.7 s. Describe or list the inputs to the Core Cooling Monitor. ~ (1.0) l

~b. Explain why the "*F aubcooled" reading available on the CCM represents (1.0) kk a conservative value.

6.8 a. Draw a one line diagram of the reactor trip bresker scheme in use at (1.0) ,

, Troj an.

b. Describe how the reactor trip breakar's electromagnetic tripping coils (1.0) h %*. A respond when (1) a trip signal from the SSPS is generated (2) a manual reactor trip is initiated.

6.9 a. Describe the purpose of the " Main Feed Pump trip - Turbine Runback" (1.0) ked circuit installed in 1983.

t>- N %\. b. (1.0) w BasicblydeLri1howthe4c s cuitXe%es.eeu&

6.10 Describe how the A1/A2 degraded voltage scheme operates given (1) NO SIS (2.0) g AN % \ kss3st.C %% S O- \C 6.11 Explain the following in regards to the Design Bases Accident (DBA)

Sequencers.

a. their purpose Nk 4 (0.5)

3. Ak. b. signal (s) which actuate them M Mshh (0.5)

c. the loads they directiv control %.4k o T w (0.5)

M hs gtNN 0- " ) - \T,(.,b ,q hb. @\3 -SRM 9. A vs S

l - - - - _ _ _ . .

E . .

. .. SRO SECTION 7

. PtoCEDURES - 30tMAL. ABNORMAL. IMERGENCY AND RADIOLOGICAL CONTROL (25 Points)

(2.0) g 7.1 Describe the difference between the 2 current sections of the Annunciator Response Claide and describe how the operator should use each.

Ntk (3.0) 7.2 Assume a SI has occurred. Describe how FunctionalInclude Eastoration Procedure M- FR-O should be used in mitigating the accident. in your discussion g gand is the principal in their use..the significance of the color coding.

when they can be " returned to the shelf".

i 7.3 If the SI occurring in 7.2 proceeding has been determined to be spurious; (2.0) g what Containment. Pressuriser. heat sink and RCS condition's must be 4 established before the SI can be terminated?

7.4 a. Describe 4 conditions or alarms which are indicative of SG tube (1.0) rupture.

b. Describe how pressure reductions to the RCS are best made with (1) (1.5)

A h O SIS /CIS conditions and (2) SIS /CIS reset.

c. Describe 2 adverse conditions which could result if a SG overfill (1.0) accompanied the tube rupture.

7.5 C01-5 contains a precaution regarding extended operation (>500 5'D/MTU or two calender weeks) below 85% power.

(1.0) g a. What ultimate problems can this operation create?

b. How are control rods operated to minimize this problem? (1.0) 7.6 If RCP's are unavailable to remove decay heat, describe;

a. the mechanism by which decay beat is removed (explain) (1.5) 4 b. 3 plant conditions which enhance this mechanism (1.5)

c. 3 indications that it (and heat removal) is occurring. (1.5) 7.7 Assume control Room personnel must perform an offsite dose assessment during a radiological emergency.

a. what factors, or variables, are needed to calculate the total (1.0) activity released?

b. what additional factors are needed to determine dose rate at the (1.0) exclusion area boundary towards which the wind is blowing?

(1.0)

c. at what whole body and thyroid dose rates at the EAR aust the Site Evacuation Siren be sounded?

7.8 From the values given in part b, select the most appropriate value or statement to insert in the blanks of the following statements of part a:

h

M

(3,0)

. 7.5 a. At Trojan, the controlled access point is posted as a radiation area could be reasonably expected to u tinued because dose races of exist. Inside the controlled access area additional'" radiation area"

inches from the postings are required if the dose rate source is greater than . Righ radiation area posting is

. If airborne activity required if the dose rate exceeds '

of a MPC. it must be posted as a "hish airborne exceeds is required for personnel who are m conta=fnation area" and 6.

working in the area. In locations where dose rates exceed additional access controls such as locks and SS kay control are are desig-required. Areas in which dose rates exceed nated "high radiation exclusion areas".

The threshold for detection of biological damage caused by an acute Z.Dj exposure is and is observable as .

and the term means represents an acute dose of about An that about 50% of those exposed will suffer .

operator of a test reactor received a neutron exposure of due to the prompt criticality accident in 1983. This dose resulted in f severe exposure symptoms such as and resulted in the operators death after a period of about

b. (1) nervous disorders (15) 5 mrea/ hour (2) blood cell changes (16) 500 Ram (3) 25 ares / hour (17) 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months (4) 100 Rem (18) 6 mrem (5) 12 (19) 18 (6) vomiting (20) one week (7) 7.5 (21) 100 mram/ hour (22) respiratory protection (8) 30 Rad / hour (9) fatal cancers (23) death l (24) 24 Rem / hour

, (10) 2 mram/ hour (25) 75 Rad l (11) 1400 Rad 1000 ares / hour i (12) a SCRA (26) l (13) a Bubble Suit (27) 1500 Ram (14) one month (28) severe burns (2.0)

[.9 mat is the maximum allowed spray water to pressuriser vapor space .1T ~

and why does this restriction exist?

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.. , SRO SgCTION 8 1

' ADMINISTRATIVE FROCEDURES. CONDITIONS AND LIMITATIONS '

(25 Foints) 8.1 Define the following STS related tarma;

s. Fq(2) k ag %e %% (0.5) b .' FBA (0.5) t i c. Fry (Z) \ (0.5) 4 \.tth(er

d. DNBR (0.5)

Q 8.2 hM tR?are t four p1 t parameters dressed in STS as having an effect on (2.0)

Q % g Qg '

n(yp 8.3 To determine if Hot Channel Factors are being exceeded, we periodically (2.0)

Q(

5 %

perform surveillance using the in-core flux measurement and temperature indicating systems. h t four conditions must be met between surveil-lances to ensure that limiting Hot Channel Factors are not exceeded?

8.4 In regards to the Trojan Radiological Emergency Response Flan.

a. list the 4 categories of accidents from least to most severe. (1.0) g b. what is the title of the individual who categorizes the accident.

and who can fill this role? (1.0)

c. How are members of the general public notified if a serious (1.0) event , requiring their notification is in progress at Trojan?

8.5 There are, basically, two safety limits specified for Trojan,

s. Briefly describe each.

(1.0)

NN b. Describe their impact on continued operation of the plant if violated. (2.0) 8.6 A0-3-8 defines the " Control Room Boundaries" and the " Operation Area Boundaries".

ktL a. h t is the min h = license manning requirements for each area? (1.0) k b. When are no licenses required in the " Control Room"? (1.0)

c. hn during Mode 1 operation may the license leave the " Control (1.0)

Room"?

8.7 In regards to Trojan Security procedures: (select the best answer.)

a. Under what conditions may security keys be removed from the Protected (0.5)

Area?

y (1) h a kept on the owner-controlled property.

(2) During a site evacuation.

(3) h n_the key is kept.under control of the key' holder.

(4) Never.

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. . 8.7 .b. Who any exit a vital area th' rough a secondary access portal? (0.5)-

Continued (1) Anyone. as loss as security is later' notified.

(2) No one, under any conditions.

(3) Any personnel when making an emergency escapc from the room.

(4) Operations personnel,

c. At all times the shif t PCE Security person is considered to be the (0.5) i Security Watch Supervisor. '

TRUE / FALSE :

d. For access purposes the 105' Ventilation Room is classified as (0.5)

(1) A Type II Vital Area.

(2) A non-vital area where access is controlled the same as a vital area.

(3) A non-vital area with no access restrictions.

(4) None of the above.

g 8.8 Can the plant Shift Supervisor directly supervise fuel movement in Mode 6? (1.5)

(Explain) 8.9 Using Standard Technical Specification criteria define each of the following types / locations of leaks.

Qk a. Reactor vessel flange leakage by a damaged inner 0-ring. (0.5) l b. Laakage through a body crack of a annual drain valve. (0.5)

c. Laakage causing continual PERM-10 alarms. (0.5)

d. Leakage from #1 RCP asal leakoff. (0.5)

e. Valve packing leakage. (0.5) 8.10 Describe how the operability of the ECCS accumulator valves is assured...

a. By design on a bestup with control circuits for MO isolation valves (1.0) g energized.

b. In practice during Mode 1. (1.0) 8.11 While carrying out a procedure for upflow modifications, a procedure step (2.0)

N cannot be performed as written even though there is no change in intent.

gg so. can the proper ste, be is,1. ment.d?

4k w% MM _m.,d

(

hk Wk RM a sq

'. , g .' as A = AN A = Ago~A"

$ ,,' ir = as A=Aa2/c'=0.693/k g

E = ac 8 tg eff = [t g)(tb)I 8

. EE = % av [(tg ) + (tb }I '

FE = ash y ,g g,-Ix Yi*T o* *

g , gg ,-n We v AP-

~I=1 ' 10 ,j g AE = 931 as g, g TTL - 1.3/u EvL = -0.693/u 6=UAlt For = U fah SCE = S/(1 - E* I) y = p lo sur(t) Q "= W/(1 - E*ffx) g y . y ,t/T Q ,(1 - E,gg ) = m (1 K,f f )

o t M = 1/(1 - E,gg) = G / 3 ,

T = (1*/o) + [(8 - 0)/Io] " " II ~ Esff IIII ~ E eff 3 o 1 T = O (o - 8)

" ~

y (g , ,)f(x,) eff eff

= 10 seconds P = (E,gg-1)/E,gg = AE,gg/K,gf I = 0.1 seconds ~1 P = [1*/(TE,gg)] + [8,gg/(! + IT)]

i Id =Id 1

F = (IdV)/(31 10 ')

l I = es Id**1d*

st 2 i

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R/hr (0.6 Q)/d 8(asters) a

s = V,t _ % st 1/br = 6 m /d8 (feet) ,

a - (V, - 7,)/t w = s/t Cycle efficiency = (Notwork out)/

(Energy in)

p p r-- " -

- EQUATION SEEET (Contin:tcd)

... Mater F ramet re 1 gal. = 8.345 1ha.

1 sal. = 3.78 liters _

1 ft.: . y,43 g,g, Density - 62.4 lba/ft' l

Esat of vaporisation - 970 Stu/lba Esicoffusion-144Beu/lba -

1 1 Ata = 14.7 psi = 29.9 in. Es.

1 ft. E 2O = 0.4335 lbf/in.

Miscellaneous Conversions I curie - 3.7 I 10 " dps )

l I kg = 2.21 1ha 1 hp = 2.54 X 10' Btu /hr 1 sur = 3.41 1 10' Bcu/hr lin = 2.54 ca -

F = 9/5'c + 32 ,

C - 6/9 (*F-32) 1 BTU - 778 ft-lbf l

l I

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.'. ATTACHMENT E l

STRATEGY - (

1. We wanted to resist knee-jerk reactions, compose a game plan involving all parties to reduce fear and anxiety, and to maintain objectivity.

2. We wanted to reflect responsiveness and a preplanned, determined thoroughness with an open commitment to investigate the incident until

,- the individual was identified, no matter how long it took.

3. We wanted to emphasize the cons.equences of the incident to the reputa-tions of the person's fellow operators, Operations Department. Training Department. Trojan PCE, and the nucisar industry as a whole.

4. We reviewed the motives for each student. We wanted to interview 6 to recreate the finding and note specifics, and to investi-gate the possibility of a setup (ie, why would someone go into the towel holder to get a large quantity of towels? Why that specific towel holder?).

5. We wanted to make up a set of prepared questions that asked specific questions. The questions were agreed to be centered on identification of excessive pressures associated with the exam that would make a person feel like he had to cheat (ie, loss of job, promotions, peer pressure, etc). We felt the people would participate to join a problem solving investigation but not a " witch-hunt". We realized the serious-ness of the incident and the wrong approach could easily drive the person underground. We also realized that peer pressure, mutual respect and a guarantee of job security were our major assets in having the person confess.

6. After we interviewed 6 we decided a person in the class definitely put the asterial there. We wanted to approach the situation using peer pressure and job security as the focal points. We wanted to emphasize the sooner the person confessed the lighter the disciplinary action.

We decided to call each operating crew together before any student interviews were conducted on their shift. We wanted everybody to know what the investi5ation was about and to encourage openness to gain trustworthiness and cooperation. In this way we encouraged teamwork of the entire Operations Department.

7. We realized the involved studenta were basically divided into two crews.

One crew was on their last swfag shift and the other crew was starting swing shift the next day. We wanted to talk to the entire crew up front. We discussed the added tension if people ware called in special, so the investigation started as soon as the plan was developed.

1

O. -

hmCIDENT E

Page heo

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8. We suspected the guilty student was in the second group. Es was positioned behind the crew supervisors and before the other crew members purposefully. It was thought the up-front crew discussioc, the time to interview the supervisors, the normal crew peer pressure, the d

supervisors reinforcing job security, and the discussion of in. reasing i disciplinary action would bring him out. We also thought t!.at if the person did not confess during the interview, he would still have time i to confess before the end of the remaining interviews. We wanted to l make several methods of contacts available (ie, during tihe interviews, telephone call at home, meet 6 or 6 anywhere, etc).

9. We also wanted to recruit the help of all people to watch for behavioral deviations. We felt the person would either become exceptionally friendly or withdrawn.

10. Last of all we decided not to tell anyone what was actually found. We thought it might be a lead if the item was being talked about by nane because only a very small group of people knew what it was. This also became the confirmation item for positive identification.

S

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.- ATTACHMENT F INTERVIIW QUESTIONS e Esplain why the interview.

Something found (hidden) which could have been used to a compromise the exam.

No proof it was actually used.

Will be talking to all individuals. '

e Do you have any specific knowledge of this event?

e Have you heard /seen anything that could be construed as suspicious?

At this time?

In the past?

e Why would anyone want to cheat? .

h t would YOU have to gain?

Do you believe consequences of failing are bad enough to warrant cheating?

h t could be done (more training, etc) to reduce the fears or consequences of not doing well?

e Do you believe this is a serious event?

h t could be done to mitigate this particular event?

h t would be the appropriate consequences to the individual involved?

e h t could be done in the future to protect us against this type of thing?

r 1

!\

. . - - - .~

ATTACHMENT G 4

INTERVIEWS M - Auxiliary Operator 6 talked openly with us. Uben I stated I did not think he Igit the room He said throughout the entire exam, he corrected me stating he lef t twice. ,

he did not want to work with the individual again. He felt no pressure '

enking the exam and be put in no overtime during retraining this year. time M has excellent knowledge and does not generally put in extra Initial studying. He is extremely religious and has immense integrity.

conclusion was that h was not involved.

- Aasistant Planner Scheduler He did not M was in a state of disblief when informed of the incident.

know why anyone would want to compromise the exam. He has dropped sections in the past and has upgraded his knowledge. He stated the most pressure i came from within himself if a section were dropped. Initial conclusion was that g was not involved.

- Assistant Shift Supervisor M was very upset by the whole event. He could not understand how anyone could ever cheat on anything. It was a part of his upbringing and an inte-gral part of himself never to do such a thing. He had previously done very well on exams,and did not need any help. He felt no pressure to do well other than pride. Initial conclusion was that M was not involved.

__ - Shift Superviser Completely shor.kad, taken aback, then became upset. He offered to take a to retake lie detector test because he wanted to be cleared and did not want the exam. W came up with several suggestions to try to locate the person such as fingerprinting, handwriting analysis, typewriter tracing, etc.

Initial conclusion was that M was not involved.

- Assistant Shift Supervisor

@connented about how this made our training record appear too question-able. He was frustrated and emotionally drained. g has a history of admitting his oun mistakes, however petty. Initial ecnclusion was that Joe was not involved.

M - Auxiliary Operator S was very cooperative during the interviews. He thought it was very serious and we should try everything to find the individuals. He volunteered to take a lie detector test, retake the exam, or anything else we wanted. He stated be would feel very ur.confortable working around the person unless he had a very good reason. Initial conclusion was that $ was not invol'.'ed.

- Shift Technical Adviser S .was dismayed that a stigma may fall over everyone involved. Be was very concerned that something like this could dampen or taint his career.

Es would like to become a supervisor in Operations Department some day and 4 pows that a lingering stigma may affect this. M finished the test in about four hours and felt be knew adequate material and had no reason to.

compromise the exam. He thought the company should do everything possible to clear the innocent people. Initial conclusion is that he was not involved.

I M __ Shift Supe _rvisor M was upset about the event but could understand how a person could feel enough pressure to do something. He had some good thoughts on sotive and possible corrective actions, but did not feel be had any motives since he knew the consequences (had failed before) and knew they had not hurt him.

Initial conclusion was that M was not. involved.

- - Assistant Control Operato,r_

He had a valid reason for obtaining a bunch of paper towels. This was to carry his boat engine manifold over to the welding shop for repairs. It was dirty and had sharp corners. The tcwel holder in the kitchen area did not have a key in it to open the holder. During the past two weeks, M i had gone into the restroom towel holder to get large quantities for class-room coffee spills, lunch messes, etc so he knew the key was in place to allow the opening of the holder. He was very cooperative. Initial conclu-sion was that everything M stated was factual.

6 - Control Operator M was visually upset by the inciditut. M did not feel he had any motives to do well except pride. h e cooperative, and his only observation of suspicious activity was that it seemed that M was leaving the room a lot. When asked what we could do to limit the conse-quences of the incident, he stated emphatically, " find the person".

Initial conclusion was that M was not involved.

a-411ary Operator W stated be had failed his initial NRC oral exam and that he felt no excessive pressure afterward. Be felt everybody really helped him prepare

- for the next exam. M stated be would bring in a lie detector tester and clear everyone possible. Be wanted to be no part of a lasting stigma.

Initial conclusion was that be was not involved. .

M -__

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- Contract Cleaner

@ asked her if she had replenished the towel holder the week of the esas. She stated she only worked there Monday and had not done it that day. M asked her if she had possibly done it within the last month and aba responded that she was positive she had. haked her what she would have done with the material if she had found it. She stated it would have been turned over to her boss,N or tossed into the garbage. She said she was also sure that is what the other cleaning person would have done.

M - Operations Supervisor This interview was conducted in the presence of 6 and M .

It consisted of a briefing byS and W concerning the finding of the materials and initial options. W was visibly distressed and responded he knew nothing about it, was willing to take another exam, and was willing to take a lie detector test to show he was not involved. Initial conclusion was that M not involved.

6 - Auxiliary Operator The interview started with a briefing by S concerning the event and the possible consequences to the responsible person, other personnel in the class, and to the company. M acknowledged this and then said he was -

intending to leave the company based on another job offer. He had been ,

I waiting to discuss it with@ and then submit his resignation. He also stated that, based upon his other job, he had no reason to cheat. M asked 6 if he had any knowledge of the event. M responded he had heard about it Sunday night from 6 He then stated he did not know why he had done it, and the only reason he was saying anything now was to keep from hurting all the other people. He said he could have left with-out saying anything but that would not be fair to the other people in the company. W asked M if he had put the material there and M responded saying he had put it there but did not know why. He said that 15 - 20 minutes prior to the exam, he decided to put it in there. He said he had no reason to use it during the ev== and did not use it. We questioned M concerning motive and he responded he did not have one other than wanting to leave Trojan on a good note. We asked if he might have done it to get back at the company based upon his being passed over for promotion or the recent discussion regarding his leaving early one day while in retraining.

He said those items had no effect. We then set up an interview with M Tuesday at 1:30 FM to discuss the company's position and what M believed the appropriate action should be. ,

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l yartnmunY usm.Ts (s ynCuT) I l l RELICU SE IIAMS - 1451 and 54L1 2 3431 (Esactor Operator) l l g

' Cat 1 Cat 2 Cat 3 Cat 4 AVERAGE j

B Wane 94.4 95.6 78.8 90.5 93.2 92.4 96.6 81.6 90.35 90.8 88.6 84.0 86.375 81.0~ 91.9 83.6 79.6 78.4 81.7 85.2 88.2 83.4 71.0 81.05 81.6 9;.0 76.0 -72.6 80.85 84.8 II S431 Senior Reactor Operator Cat 1 Cat 2 Cat 3 Cat 4 Average Name 1 92.8 91.4 97.2 94.45 96.4 87.6 83.4 89.4 89.11 91.0 89.0 86.1 87.2 92.2 88.63 .

90.0 84.2 89.0 88.7 87.98 87.4 81.0 83.0 97.6 87.25 80.0 80.82 96.6 86.4 85.95 88.0 82.6 81.6 87.5 84.92 ,

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easmessaannamccourm ATTACHMENT I

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A i984'RetrainingExaminationInvestigation '

Subjsse I

i 1 would lika to formally thank you for your.recent action involving the possible compromise of retraining exams. It is very taportant to the Operations Department, Trojan, pCE and the entire auclear industry to have people of your integrity take proper actico in difficult incidents.

The proper action often is not the easy way out and is always subject to speculation by people after the fact.

Ethical integrity like this is what has made Trojan the ascellent plant it is. Thaak you.

c:

Personal Fiie i

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.Is STATEMENT '

s.,*...*/ .

S '04 9/1 6

statene who to M hereby make the following voluntary rue,ene J. Power M identified himself/ z as an Investigator (arvith the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission. 'I make this statement freely with no threats or promises of reward having been made to ine. This statement was prepared for my signature by Mr. Power. I understand that this statement is not c verbatim tranceript of the interview.

Q. It is the decire of the US Euclerr Reyulatory Commiscion that this interview be c or..!ucted under or th. /re you willing to be interviewed under oath et this time?

A. Yes,I am.

Q. Would you plence stand eni raire your rir,ht hcnd. Do you swer.r or affirm thr.t the inforantion you nre about to give is the tru th , the whole truth, and nothing but the truth?

A. I do. .

Q. Still you please stnte our full name and date of birth?

A.

Q. What is your present residence? _

I am tcaporarily staying at a rnd I A.

plan on movinc soon to Q. What is your present job title cnd with whoa are you employed?

A.

Q. As I previously indicated,the NRC has received information that in February 1984 you hid or secreted a document et the Troj

1

' clear Power Plant in Oregon somet;me prior to n written operrtor'c c>nmination. Would you plerse syplain the cir-cumstences rnd your involvement in that situr tion?

A.\ It ves during the relicensing clt ss. I think it wr's r bout s

two week class in which the operr. tors h:d to moet ell the regult. tory requirements for trainin6 and retroining. I hnd flown to Louisiena for a job interview du the two vectc _

On the day of the test, IhC se ' n period.

so I could study my notes end other reference materir1.

Each individual h d a desk in the training room where we kept our notes. It munt hr ve been a 1:.r t minute pcnic.

Mt ybe 10 or 15 minuter before the e:<aminction, I too:: the Cycle 6 Sata Sheet :nd put it in i.he hand towel rack in the rest room. I went and took the tert which I felt wt s I lef t, got into e asy . "he test took about four hours.

my car nnd went home. It was a 1: ct minute thing, and I do not really know why I did it. ,

Q.

Here is c copy of a document titled Nucler.r Data Sheet, Nuclear Design - Cycle 6, dr.ted hovember 15, 1983, of the Trojan Nuc1cer Plt:nt. Would you e: amine the document rnd tell me if this is e copy of the doct. ment in que.- tion?

A. Yes, that is the document.

Q.

Wh t v a the purpose o'? the written e> amini tion which wr.s civen to you by representstices of Port 1:end Ge'.crcl Electric on Februt.ry 3,1984 c.t the Trojan plant?

A. For relicensing which in required.

Q. Wh t wrs your job at the Trojan plent?

A. I wrr an rurilir ry operator.

Q.

Was the succesnful completion of the tert necenr.r ry for continued employment at the site?

A. No. If I didn't pasc it, I would nimply receive additiona Prre 2 of ' 9 Pagee I

' t- in is:g.. A person' wo ld study up t.nd simnly retake the exem. It wr,s no big deal in not passing the test.

Also, I did not need to pcss it since I was going to chan6e jobs enyhow.

Q.

On what di. te did you place the document in the towel re-ceptacle?

A. It was the day of the test. I do not remember the dr.te at this time.

Q.

We have received information that it was Februtry 3,1984.

Would that be correct?

A. Yes, tha t would be about the time.

Q. Did anyone assist you in the act?

A. No.

Q. Did you observe anyone in the rest room et the time you pinced the a nt in the receptacle?

A. No. -

you know if rnyone obser e t trie time o Q.

Q.

When did you decide to p1r ce the document in the hand towel l reccptacle? 1 A. Just a few minutes prior to the exam. P.aybe 10 minutes. l l

Q. Why did you decide on thrt location?

l A. I think I hcd the data sheet with ne wher I went to the rest room. It was not a premeditated cct.

It w a e spur of the moment decision.

Q. Whet was your specific purpose in p1r cing the guide in thr t location &

A. I really cen' t r nswer that. I just did it.

Q. Did you have rencon to believe thnt some of the inform tion contained in that study Guide might be the basis for a question on the examination?

A. Obviously. Otherwise I wouldnot have put it there.

\ Page 3 of 9 'peges -

M. - -m__ _ . _.. _ _ . _ _ _ _ _

n . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ .

. ' If during the examination, you hrd a question reltting to the information contrined in the study f;ulde, wt.s it your intention to go to the reet room for the specific purpose of answering the question?

A. Yes.

Q. Was the act of plccing the document in the rest room done of your own free will?

A. Yes.

Q. . Prior to the examination, hr.d you been advised or told thrt you couldn' t use any type of reference mr terirl, to include notes, guides, books, sketches, etc., or any other mcterial during the examinction?

A. No, not directly. It wr.s understood thr.t all necessary items such as a sheet with a formula or information on steam tebles would be furnished to each of us e t the time of the exam.

Q. Did anyone suggest, direct, or advise you to plrce the study guide in the rest room for the purpose of reference, if needed, in order to pasc or chert on the examinction?

A. No.

Q. Did you advise anyone, or discuss, your intention prior to placing the document in the lLvatory.

A. No. Like I seid, it v -a a spur of the moment thing.

G. Did you secret, hide, conceal, or pl: ce eny other type of mcteriel, such es notes, writings, sketches, discrems, books, guides, etc. on your person or other p1 Lee, for cae .

1 of subsequently using such mLteriel to escist yo swering l questions during the operetor's examination?

A. No.

Q. How long did the examinction Inst?

A. It s+.erted at 8 AM, end we had six hours for the exam. I took about four hours or so. I lef t about noon or 1 o' clock.

Q. Did you know th t you would be allowed access to the 18-vator Pace 4 of 9 Pages -

' M~ -.

pw - ,

i. e r rest room during the examine. tion?

. Yes.

Q. Did you leeve the extminrtion room cnd enter the rest ioom during the examin- tion on Februr ry 3,1984?

A. I reelly 't_ remember.

Q. You don' r iaber using the rest room r t all durin6 that period?

A. No. But I guess thet I probr.bly did becau e I hcd cocie in n t' hat day to study, :.nd I had drr.nk e lot of coffee.

Q. Do you remember going to the rest roon; then returnin6 and approaching the c1cscroom door; stopping >nd going back to the rest room; : nd less than a minute later, return to the classroom?

A. ?!o .

Q. Durin;. the examination did you refer to the study guide in qnestion for ar.y purpose?

A. No.

.; Q. To your knowledge, did anyone else have access to thr.t specific study guide during the examinetion?

A. 1;o, not to my knowledge.

Q. During the examination on February 3, 1984, did you use any other type of doc'nent, notes, or crib to aseist you in answering. the questions in the opert tor'r examination?

A. 1.'o .

Q. During the ex minetion, did you look ct, or ettempt to look r t, another individuel's examination, enswer sheet, papers, enl-culttions, notes, etc.?

A. 1:o.

Q. During yamine. tion, did you e.110w rny other individur.1 in room tre opportunity to observe, look r.t, or copy your enswers, calculatione, notes, etc.?

A. No. It is very controlled. There is elv.ys t.t ler et one procto Pace 5 of 9 peges -

<in the room during the examination.

K. To your knowled 6e, did enyone atte:r.pt to look . t eny of your papers during the examination?

A. No.

Q. Did you talk to anyone during the examit.ttion person seeking assistence in rnswering the questions?

A. No.

Q. Did enyone seek seriste.4ce from you, or esk you, for your answers to the quertions on the examinr tion?

l A. No.

Q. Did you have access to e copy of the examination, or r.ny pr-rt thereof, prior to the stcrt of the ext.mine tion?

A. No.

Q. Did anyone provide you, or offer, the answers or some type of direct assistance to the specific examinction prior to it being

~

given to you on Februtry 3,1984?

A. No.

Q. Did you cheet in ony way on the written extminetion which was G i ven to you on February 3, 1984?

A. No.

Q. Have you ever cheated on any operstor's examination which is subscouently accepted by the NRC rs pErtiel proof of your co cy?

A. No.

Q. Were there er.y other instances in which you hid or secreted a document for possible use in an excmination?

A. No. l Q. Are you nwr.re of t ny individue.1 who hr-a ever chet ted, or t ttempted to chen t, on ny type of oporr tor's err etni-tion r t the Trojan plant or any other nuclear fccility'- ,

A. No.

Q. When did you Tirnt become knowledgeeble of the PGE invcatigction of thic incident?

/

Pece 6 of f) pngen t

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p. a.,m,n ..y .- :

heard about it probably the next day. I saw s at one of the downtown clubs, and I believe he told me the exem had been compromised. I think he said we were going to take another test. I was eruprised. At that time, I hed no idea that the com r se was in reference to my placinc -

the guide in the rest r ,

Q. Did you admit to placing the study guide in the ret.t room during'the PGE investigetion?

A. Yes. I think it was on my next work day. It was explained to the whole crew that the examination hrd been' compromised. Then each of us was interviewed separately regarding the situation.

Q. Why didn't you come forwcrd and acknowledge that it was you who had placed the study guide in the rent room prior to being asked by the PGE representatives?

A. I was confused. Everything was movin6 fest at that time. I wanted to be sure that they vcre talking about the same thing. When I did figure it out, I wanted to cdmit to it . privately cnd not' in front of everyone. I know I mnde a mistake. I edmitted the mis-take. I vnnted it resolved as quickly as possible. I did not cheat. All operr tors make mistakes- they admit them rnd no adverse -

action is taken. I realize thu - integrity of the operator is probably the most important fcctor. I would like to remain in the

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nuclear business, and some dcy become an SRO.

Q. Did you initially lie in your answers t uestions asked by the PGE investigators?

A. No. Ne had talked for about 20 minutes when I admitted it. I wented to be sure what they were talking about,but-I wcs coing to tell them.

Q. Did you tell anyone you were going to ta'<c the blame to get everyone off the hook prior to being interviewed by susec and richols?

A. Yes, I believe e a comment. /. gain, I don't know why. ,

Q. 71d you return o e rest roo= af ter the examinetion to remove the study r;uide? .

A. No. I ht d completely fore:otten about it r f ter the exam.

O. You indiceted that you hr.d a job interview during the two week training period. . What were the dete11c' l .ne. o f 3 .,ases

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. Th'e previous Friday, before the exam, I took the day off.

I think I wcs to have a cleos on fire protection which is required once a yeLr. But it can be easily picked up Inter. ~

So I flew to for a job interview with f Planning & Schedulin6 Supervisor, Louisiana Power 3: Lii.h t >

I believe the interview wen on Saturday in l

It was a good job offer. After the PGE investigt. tion, ;

i I gave my resignetion on the bcsis thrt I would be hired at )

the g However, I believe that someone at the l Trojen p rn advired someone at nd

.the job offer was t. ogen away.

l Q. Is there enything you would like to 1.dd to this r.te tement?

l A. I believe that I was r: good operator et Trojan. I was a

! responsible individual which I think you can find out by j asking the personr.el t rojan. What I did vts for out.

It was a spur of t eit decision. I really don't know why I did it. I'could-hsve kept my mouth shut after the in-vestigation wes started, but I knew it would hurt the other l operstors, the company, and the industry. Shortly of ter the incident, I e*ien telephoned Lew Miller with Region V NRC re-l garding the situction, but heged me that the NRC would contact me when they wrnted to interview - I wanted to ,

clarify the rituetion r a soon as possi.) e. 'made a mistrike, and I admitted my nistake. But I never cheated on eny examinetion. g i

Page 8 of 9 Peges

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I have read the foregoing statement consisting of 9

. handwritten / typewritten pages. I have made and initialed any necessary corrections and have signed nty name in ink in the margin of each page. I j swear that the foregoing statement is true and correct. Signed on this 30th day of January , 198 S_ at 17 0(o (o.a4 . .

Subscribed and sworn t this 30th day of J nnu n rv 1981. at ,

M Eugefie J. dwer, Investigator, FRC gon- 1 Al n nf the Atomic Energy Act f 1954 WITNESS:

Page 9 of _9 pages

V' r

I r j,h UNITED STATES p'

, , , , g NUCLEAR CECULATORY CEMMISSION REGION V r

[E 145o MARIA LANE. SUITE 210 WWALNt1T CREEK. CALIFORNIA 945a6 oos.~ .

APR 101984 Doc 1ket No. 50-344 .

For-11and General Electric Company 121 Southwest Salmon Street Poc11and, Oregon 97208 Atta ntion: Mr. Bart D. Withers Vice President Nuclear Gen 11emen:

Subj ect: NRC Evaluation of the Trojan Nuclear Plant Requalification Program Thi.s refers to the requalification program evaluation conducted by March 1-6,1984 by Mr. Hiller and to the special inspection of your operator requalification program conducted by Messrs. Johnson, Richards and Johnston ,

on February 13-17, 1984, and to the discussion of our findings held with your pla.nt staff at the conclusion of the program evaluation and the special inspection. The findings of program evaluation were only partial preliminary findings as the evaluation could not be completed until we received and reviewed your evaluations of your operators and the comparison of these evaluations to our own.

As discussed in NUREG 1021, Operator Licensing Examiner Standards, the' overall evaluation of the program adequacy must fall into one of three categories: Satisfactory, unsatisfactory, or " marginal," that is clearly falling between a satisfactory and en unsatisfactory .: valuation. The criteria for this determination are summarized in the Enclosure and detailed in NUREG 1021, ES-601.

Based on these criteria, the requalification program at Trojan is evaluated as marginal:

Thirty-six per cent of the operators examined failed to pass all of the NRC portions of the examinations. Also, a large number of operators failed the combined NRC-PGE examinations. This suggests that many licensed operators at Trojan need additional requalification training.

The NRC and PGE pass / fail evaluations disagreed significantly in several instances. In each case the PCE evaluation was judged to be too lenient.

This suggests that the requalification program has not clearly identified those licensed operators needing additional training.

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8 Ad>R 11,1"""' 4 Por: land General Electric Company 2 l

This is supported by the dichotomy in the results of the 1983 written and l sral examinations (which were entirely administered by PGE) and the 1984 l written 'and oral examinations (which were jointly administered by the NRC and l PGE). The 1983 examinations resulted in only one operator requiring ccpelerated retraining in one section of the written examination and no l unsatisfactory oral examinations. Very few unsatisfactory responses to l questions on the oral examinations were noted in the record. In contra st, in 1954 significant numbers of operators failed the NRC/PGE written and oral craminations.

We have considered these deficiencies in reviewing your proposed program of corrective action in the March 15, 1984 letter (C. P. Yundt to R. J. Pate).

We believe that that letter provides an acceptable program of corrective action with the following modifications.

All personnel with section grades <70% or overall grades <80% on the NRC results should be relieved of licensed duties and assigned to the Training Department for Accelerated Retraining. All such individuals shall be promptly reexamined upon the completion of the Accelerated Retraining with a new examination. The examination should be a complete four section examination. The detailed results of this examination should be promptly reported to the NRC. .

8 Based on the large percentage of written and oral examination failures identified, PGE should schedule classroom refresher training for all operators on a frequent basis (at least bimonthly), until greater assurance is gained that the average level of operator preparedness is adequate. This assurance should be confirmed by the followup written and oral examinations for all licensed personnel no later than six months from the date of this report (exempting those operators who passed the combined NRC/PGE examination based on NRC grading).

In the interim, pending completion of the program of corrective action, PGE should submit a special monthly letter detailing PGE's progress in improving operator preparedness.

As you are aware, performance on a second requalification program audit by the NRC in the marginal range will result in an unsatisfactory evaluation.

To avoid this possibility, we believe prompt action is necessary. To this end, please notify this office within ten werking days of your commitment to this modified program, or propose a program which will address the deficiencies identified by our evaluation. Also we would like to discuss two coditional concerns: (1) we would like to review any actions you have taken l or planned in response to the issues discussed by Mr. Johnson of our staff with l Mr. Yundt of your staff following our special inspection of your requalification )

training program on February 15, 1984, (2) we are concerned with the l timeliness of the reporting of events of regulatory interest such as that i e,ssociated with the potential compromise of the operator requalification exam you administered on January 27, 1984. We believe that these types of acts should be proeptly reported to the NRC Resident Inspector or Regional .

Management (Inspection Report No. 50-344/84-04). A meeting to discuss the corrective action program will be arranged.

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y;+.:C 3orticad Gezarol'Elsetric Comp xy 3 APit 101984

!am accordance with 10 CFR 2.790(a), a copy of this letter and the enclosure udll be placed in the NRC Public Document Room unless you notify this office try telephone within lo days of the date of this letter and submit written arpplication to withhold information contained therein within thirty days of clue date of this letter. Such application must be consistent with the requirements of 2.790 (b)(3).

Embould you have any questions concerning this letter, please contact us.

Sincerely,

/

D. K. Kirsch, hief Reactor Safety Branch Division of Reactor Safety and Projects

Enclosures:

1. Examination Report (50-344/0L-84-01)

2. ,,

Examination Review Comments and Resolution

3. Inspection Report (50-344/84-04) -

cc: C. P. Yundt, Trojan S. Nichols, Trojan -

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&. . l U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY Cote 11SSION REGION'V Report No. 50-344/OL-84-01 Docket No. 50-344 .

I License No. NPF-1 i

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Licensee: Portland General Electric Company U 121 S. W. Salmon Street Portland, Oregon 97204 Facility Name:' Trojan Examination at: Rainier, Oregon Examination con ted: 3rch 1-6, 1984 Examiners: , / /

I(y hiller,' Chief Examiner Date Signed Approved by:

R.'J. PFte, Section Chief 8 Da(e signed Summary:

Examination on March 1-6, 1984 (Report No. 50-344/0L-84-01)

Areas Examined: Licensed operator requalification proEram.

Results:

The overall program evaluation was a marginal rating.

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REPORT DETAILS

1. Persons Examined Twelve licensed operators (six SR0s and six R0s) received a combined NRC/PGE written examination. Sections 1,4,6 and 8 were prepared by the NRC, while the balance were prepared by PGE.

Two oral evaluations conducted by the PGE Training staff were observed by the NRC examiner, and two oral evaluations were conducted by the NRC examiner. One RO and one SRO in each category were involved in each.

The NRC and PGE grades for the 16 operators examined during this evaluation are provided as an enclosure to this evaluation.

3. Examination Review Meeting At the conclusion of the written examination, the examiner met with S.

Nichols, G. Ellis, and J. Pickett of the Training Department to review the written examinations and answer key. The comments by licensee personnel and their resolution are listed in Enclosure 2.

3. Program Evaluation The requalification program was evaluated based upon the criteria of ' ~

Examiner Standard 601, NUREG 1021. The results were as follows:

a.

Four of twelve (33%) operators taking the combined PGE/NRC written examin'ation failed to pass both of the NRC sections.

1) Three of the failures were reactor operators with very low scores on Section 4., Procedures. -

b. One of two (50%) operators receiving en NRC requalification oral examination was unsatisfactory in several of the areas examined.

Evaluation: Marginal, in that more than 60% but less than 80% of the evaluation operators passed all sections of the NRC examinations administered to them. It is noted, also, that the average results on the PGE prepared sections of the examinations were 8.6% higher than on the NRC prepared sections, when graded by the NRC. This suggests that the PGE sections of the examination were less difficult.

I c.

Of 48 written examination sections and two oral examinations, the results reached by the NRC and PGE agreed within 20% in all cases, but in five cases the results differed by more than 101. The average grade on the written examination was 4.0% higher when graded by PGE rather than the NRC. This suggests that the PGE grading was slightly less severe.

Evaluation: Marginal, in that all of the results did agree within 20%

per section, but not within 10% per section. However, the average .

disagreement was only 4%, which would have resulted in a satisfactory l

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rcting if masv2rol Icrg?' grading dif forcnces ca o isw cp2rctors h:d n2t been Preseunt. j i

d. Of 14 pass or fail evaluations made by both PGE and the NRC,11 were 1 in ag:reement (78.6%).

Evaluation:. Marginal, in that more than 60% but less then 80% of the final pass,/f ail evaluations were in agreement.

e. The fascility prepared examination sections used (Section 2,3,5,7) adequately covered the technical subjects required by the requilification program and Appendix A to 10 CFR 55.

Evaluation- Satisfactory.

Based on dhese four criteria, the overall requalification program is evaluated as marginal.

4. Exit Meettmg At the conclusion of the site visit the examiner met with representatives of the pltat staff to discuss the results of the examination to that point. The examiner noted that based on a review of the 1983 requalification written examination, the weakest sections of the operators had been those which concentrate on knowledge of procedures (Section 4 on the RO and Section 7 on the SRO). The examiner observed that the 1984 examination continued that tendency.

It was also noted that the 1983 oral examinations indicated very few unsatisf actory responses (virtually none). The examiner stated that this suggested that the evaluations had not been adequately documented. '

The examiner informed the licensee that of the two oral evaluations performed by the licensee and observed by the examiner, both had been conducted satisfactorily; of the two evaluations performed by the examiner, one operator had satisfactory knowledge.

Finally, the examiner informed the licensee that upon ecmpletion of grading and comparison of the licensee's grading to the NRC, a meeting would be held to summarize and present the evaluation to the licensee, and to discuss any necessary corrective action.

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ENCLOSURE 2 - EXAMINATION REVIEW COMMENTS AND RESOLUTION With resPet to Question 1.2, additional reference material was provided to illustrat* that for certain fuel cycles, an exception to the general The Principles of the question existed, invalidating the desired answer. .

question uns therefore deleted.

With respect to Question 4.2, the licensee personnel claimed that the only 88tematic action which directly results from a condensate pump trip is a feedwater pump trip, contrary to certain statements in the reference material.

Elementary drawings were provided at the review for this system to substantiate this claim, and the key was modified.

With respect to Question 4.3, the licensee personnel claimed that symptoms of the instr % ment bus failure off normal instructions did not need to be memorized du the detail necessary to diagnose which specific bus had f ailed, given the complexity of possible symptoms, and the difficulty of predicting The in cny procA%ure the characteristic symptoms for this type of event.

examiner A greed to modify the key to require only " Loss of Instrument Bus" as j

the respounse for full credit.

With resp =ect to Qestion 4.9b, the licensee personnel claimed that the question cight not . solicit the desired response. The examiner concluded that the question was clear as stated. ,

With resPwet to Question 6.1, the licensee personnel stated that the reference Caterial pupplied for this system had been supplied prematurely since notr use. The. examiner accepted this explanation. The question was deleted.

With resp % ct to Question 6.2, the licensee personnel stated that knowledge of the 85 ps W g setpoint in this case should not beThe required examinerknowledge, disagreed, butstating rather the opera utor should be able to look them up. i that the w it load limitation with one feedwater pump out of service was a reasonabin e setpoint to be memorized. The questions was not changed.

With respt:mect to Question 6.4c, the licensee personnel claimed that the tPecific i power The supplies for the rod drive MG sets should not have to be examiner disagreed, stating that this load was sufficiently memorized. d.

important . to safety to memorize.

With resPtenect to Qestion 6.5, the licensee personnel Af terpreferred that itthe

.dia.cussion, was keyclear otate "inLa" the that eithe:ner usageguide wastubes rather than "out".Also, the licensee representatives observed acceptable.

that flow .w path d was through holes in the top of the core barrel into the Plenum betuetween barrel and baffle, then upward pa.st the upper former plate.

D e examih iner confirmed with the Senior Resident Inspector that this was the case, conL.r.ntrary to the reference supplied. The key was changed accordingly.

With resPupect to Question 6.7, the licensee personnel were concerned Thethat the Cominal Pi -plant condition was not adequately specified by the question. .

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. g examiner stated that the~ nominal plant conditions at 50% rated p: war were assumed, and no revisions to the question were appropriate.

With respect to Question 6.8, the licensee personnel claimed that low-low S/G water level did not block.all steam dumps. The examiner agreed, noting that the reference material cited was in error. The answer key was revised.

With respect to Qestion 6.9, the licensee personnel claimed that " reactivity control" was confusing usage in the question. The examiner disagreed. The question was not changed.

With respect to Question 6.10d, the licensee personnel stated that the correct answers were 1) Containment sump pump discharge valve open, and 2) DWDT inlet valve open. A revised procedure SD-VII-02 was provided to support this claim.

The examiner revised the key based on the new reference material.

With respect to Qestion 6.11c, the licensee personnel claimed that the trip of

both main FW pumps does not isolate S/G blowdown, and provided so elementary drawing to prove their claim. The examiner revised the key to reflect the drawing, noting that the ISAR was in error. The five conditions which isolate blowdown are AFP auto start, PERM 10 Alert, PERM 10 High, CIS, and Blowdown Tank High Level. The key was revised.

With respect to Question 8.1, the licensee personnel stated that SR0s were in no way involved in 10 CFR 50.59 determinations at Trojan. They substantiated -

their positions with sections of A0-2-1, Plant Review Board Charter, and A0-1-4, Shift Responsibilities. The examiner disagreed that an SRO should not be familiar with this concept, but deleted this question based on the licensee.s representation of the SRO's role at Trojan.

With respect to Question 8.6, the licensee personnel objected that this question's answer required memorization of the action statement of a Technical Specification with a 6 hour6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months time limitation, and this was too severe. The examiner stated that the grading of the question would not require knowledge a

of the specific interval, but would, in lieu of this, require knowledge that prompt shutdown and consultations of the Technical Specifications to determine the appropriate time intervals was required.

With respect to Question 8.7, the licensee personnel claimed that the Ifeensed personnel did not need to know the exact definition of vital equipment. The examiner disagreed, except that credit would be allowed for paraphrases in proportion to their accuracy.

With respect to Question 8.8, the licensee personnel insisted that the decision to perform Inservice Inspection following a major accident would not be made by the Shif t Supervisor, so that the knowledge of this Technical Specification was unreasonable. The examiner disagreed that it was unreasonable, but accepted that the question was moot given the unlikelihood that an SRO would be responsible for the decision. The question was deleted.

iWith respect to Question 8.10, the licensee personnel objected that the question required too detailed a knowlege of the Technical Specifications and that the wording of the question would confuse operators aceuctooed to testing. l

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, . ne systems at =-. more frequent intervals thatn required by the Technical s icifications. The examiner disagreed that the question was out of scope,

..ating that an n operator should recognize those surveillance intervals of less

-- =n or equel te to 72 hour8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months frequency. However, the examiner stated that an .

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'pwer which apt =ppeared based on the more restrictive Trojan surveillance l ptervals would d also be acceptable. . In that case all three answers to the

. = stion would t2 be yes.

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_ -a Question 8.33, the licensee personnel stated that the STA was m quired to be r_ motified due to a recent revision of EP-5. Based on the new m _fsrence mater- -ial, the examiner agreed to accept this revision.

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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY C0ttilSSION REGION V

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Report No. 50-344/84-04 ,

1 Docket No. 50-344 I Litense No. NPF-1 Licensee: Portland General Electric Company 121 S. W. Salmon Street Portland, Oregon 97204 Facility Name: Trojan Inspection at: Rainier, Oregon Inspection conducted Febru -17, 1984 Inspectors: w Alle D. Jo ,'Enforcemen Officer Date' Signed fary W. Jo n Senior /Re'sident Inspector Eate/$igned Bfuar fp 1 f& 5 N gate Signed A. Ri p ds, Reside 6t Inspector Approved By: / i n/ T.' Dodds , Section Chief h

Ifatd Signed Summaa ry:

Inspection on February 13-17, 1984 (Report No. 50-344/84-04)

Areas Inspected: Special inspection of the licensed operator requalification program including lecture materials, examinations, administration, security, audits, records, and management involvement in training. The inspection involved 87 inspector-hours by the NRC personnel.

Results: No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified. Several areas where improved administration of the program may be warranted were identified and are discussed in the details of the report.

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DETAll.S

1. Persons Contacted C. P. Yundt, General Laager, Trojan Plant ,

, R. P. Schmitt, knager, Technical Services S. B. Nichols, Training Supervisor J. B. Pickett, Training Specialist G. W. Ellis, Training Specialist T. C. Gaidos, Manager, Quality Assurance J. L. Dunlop, Branch Manager, QA C. H. Brown, QA Engineer

2. Requalification Trainina Program The inspectors examined course material, including lecture plans, system descriptions, and course schedules to determine the scope and adequacy of the requalification training program. The licensee's program included a selection of topics delineated in Procedure TP-2-2 "Requalification Training Program". The procedure governs the scope of the requalification training candidates received during the two year cycles of the NRC approved program.

The procedure defined th'e lecture mat rial given to each class as level I or level II. Level I ma'terial was that which must be given during the lecture series as prescribed by the requiremients in 10 CFR 55 Appendix A.

Level Il includes material not deemed necessary to be included in each ,

l lecture series. The inspectors examined selected lecture materials and determined the materials met the course requirements. The material was found to be up-to-date and comprehensive in scope. At the time of the inspection, the licensee was developing plans to upgrade the requalification program as necessary to obtain accreditation from INPO.

The present and past schedules for conducting the requalification training were examined by the inspectors to determine that the frequency of lectures was maintained in a regular fashion. The schedules showed that the lectures were routinely held during late winter and early spring prior to the annual refueling outage.

Annual evaluations of licensed operators were completed by the respective supervisors for each operator and by the training staff during the annual simulator training. The inspectors examined the evaluations for each operator for the last two years. The evaluations completed by the supervisors were found to be lacking in that a substantive narrative describing the overall performance of the operator was not included.

This point was conveyed to licensee management who stated that a review would be made of the evaluation system and necessary steps taken to assure that the evaluations were meaningful.

The licensee was maintaining records of the requalification training for

each operator. The records included exam results, monthly quiz results, lecture attendance, and annual simulator attendance and evaluations. The m__._... . . _ . _ . . . _ . _

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2 records were found to be complete and maintained as required by the licensee's Nuclear Projects Quality Assurance Program.

3. Annual Written Examinations .

Each licensed operator attends a two-week series of classroom lectures once each year. At the conclusion of the lectures, a six hour written examination is administered to determine the licensed operator's knowledge in the areas revered and to determine areas in which upgrading of knowledge may be warranted. The operators are divided into three groups for the lecture series with each group attending the lectures during consecutive two-week periods.

The examinations for recent training cycles contained six to eight sections, with each section containing five.to seven questions.

Discussions with the licensee's training personnel indicated that the source of questions for the examinations vary. One instructor was normally tasked with writing the examinations. The instructor may solicit potential test questions from the instructors who presented the lectures, or he may formulate questions on his own, or he may consult a bank of questions maintained by the Training Department. The question bank consisted of questions from past licensee and NRC administered examinations. The question bank was open for student use as a study aid and as such was not a controlled system for maintaining the confidentiality of examination questions. The instructor may or may not .

l revise questions taken from the bank for use on the annual examination.

The inspectors reviewed the examinations given for training cycles 3B and 4A and concluded that the type of questions asked were of sufficient scope and depth to adequately assess an operators knowledge. However, in comparing the exams administered to the three separate requalification groups within the same training cycle, the inspectors observed that approximately 75 percent of the questions on the second and third examinations were identical to the questions on a previous examination of the same cycle. Training representatives stated that personnel were not given direction to refrain from discussing the examination with personnel who would be taking a later test. The licensee training representatives contended that administering similar examinations allows for more effective auditing of the program, and should discussions occur among the licensed operators who have completed the annual examination with those who have not, such discussions would tend to enhance training by directing operators efforts in important areas and thus increase their knowledge. Training representatives further stated that in some cases writing additional test questions that addressed the same subject matter would be difficult.

The inspectors pointed out that a primary function of the annual examination is to ensure that the licensed operator has malatsined his knowledge at an appropriate level, and that indication of the et.aaication contents may c'ospromise the purpose of the examination. Present tr.,ining procedures do not provide specific guidance for composition of annual examinations other than to require that the examinations contain subject matter contained in all the sections found on the applicable NRC .

examination. The inspectors concluded that the licensee's program could e

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I be strengthenee in this area by establishing criteria for preparation of examination questions, including. whether or not the majority of questions of subsequent examinations of a training cycle should differ from questions on the preceding tests. .

The examinations are approved by the training supervisor prior to being administered. Answer keys for examinations are generally prepared by the

. individual writing the examination. Although the applicable training procedute requires the answer key be approved, the procedure does not specify whese approval is required or how such approval is indicated.

The training supervisor reviews the completed examinations for various

' factors, including consistency of grading, and when a grading discrepancy is apparent, he reviews the answer key. The training supervisor therefore reviews only selected portions of the key. The inspectors reviewed the answer key for several past examinations and noted at least one instance in which the answer key appeared to be incomplete. The inspectors informed the licensee representatives that an independent review and approval of examination answer keys appeared to be warranted.

The inspectors discussed examination security with the training staf f.

During preparation of the examinations, associated material was stored at night in locked areas. During working hours when test materials were being used, security of the material was the responsibility of the individual using the material. Training procedures were silent with regard to security requirements for protecting the content of examinations. The number of copies of examinations made was not controlled, nor were guidelines provided for examination reproduction.

Specific storage requirements were not prescribed and procedures did not limit personnel access to examinations. The inspectors observed that no _

regulatory requirements are placed on examination security and in general the " common sense" precautions taken by the licensee may be adequate.

However, the inspectors informed the licensee that established security -

requiremen6s would provide added assurance that any particular examination had not been compromised.

4. . Annual Oral Examinations The training cycle includes an annual oral examination normally given by a member of the training staff on a one-on-one basis. The examination takes 2\ to 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months to administer, and covers a variety of areas dealing with plant operation and emergency procedures. A form grading standard is provided to the individual administering the examination. In addition to grading instructions, the form provides guidance on the type and depth of questions to be asked.

The inspectors discussed administration of the oral examinations with the training staff. The training staff stated that the oral examinations may l be administered while the licensed operator is assigned to regular shif t duties. The individual being tested remains part of the operating shift, however, his effort is directed toward the oral examination unless an emergency should arise. The inspectors observed that the demands of shift duties could significantly decrease the effectiveness of the oral .

examinations if the individual being examined were not dedicated to the maximum extent possible to the examination process. The licensee

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indics'tsd that th2 matter woul.d be evaluated and determine whether or not changes in the process were needed.

5. Proctoring of Examinations .

The licensee's procedures provided that the examinations be proctored and that the proctors were responsible to assure that the examinations were

, act compromised. Subsequent to a discussion of the adequacy o'f this procedure, to ensure that proctors and candidates were aware of their responsibilities during an examination, the training supervisor indicated that a more detailed instruction would be published setting forth the

' guidelines to be followed by both the proctors and candidates during examinations. This was formulated and used during the examination given on February 17, 1984. These guidelices appeared to adequately establish the necessary conduct on the part of both the proctor and candidate

during an examination to assure against cheating by a candidate.

6. Audits The inspector examined the reports of the licensee QA audit performed during March,1983 of the licensed operator requalification program and

the INPO findings on the same subject during their audit in September 1983. No significant adverse findings were noted. The INPO report commented that the monthly quiz procedure was a good practice. These reports were sent to PGE Senior Management. The licensee's comprehensive audit was discussed with the auditor, a former NRC Operator Licensing l Examiner. He expressed several positive comments concerning the program and personnel assigned to the training group.

7.

Februa ry 17, 1984 Requalification Written Examination One inspector observed the administration of an annual written-requalification examination to 11 licensed personnel on February 17, 1984. The examination was continuously proctored by a member of the

( licensee's training staff. The measures taken by the licensee's proctors

. to ensure that the examination would not be compromised appeared adequate and at no time during the examination did the inspector observe any activity contrary to ensuring the credibility and validity of the examination.

8. Potential Compromise of Operator Requalification Examination The inspectors received a report on January 31, 1984 from licensee management that some written material had been found in a towel dispenser in the lavatory adjacent to the classroom where the annual requalification examinations were being administered. The inspectors examined the material which was found to be a study guide that is given to the operators prior to the annual series of lectures given for requalification training. The licensee's representative informed the inspectors at this time that the incident had occurred the previous

- Friday in the afternoon after an individual who bad finished his test had gone to the lavatory. The individual had gone in the lavatory to get some paper towels out of the towel dispenser. While doing so a sheaf of -

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5 papers stapled together fell out of the dispenser. The individual immediately reported this to the proctor.

The licensee's representat'ive stated that the investigation had been conducted over the weekend and the individual who had placed the material in the Javatory towel dispenser had been identified during questioning.

To determine if the scope of the incident was wider the individual was 4 questioned if there were others involved, his answer was that he bad acted on his own and that no others were involved. The individual also

- stated that although he had placed the material in the towel dispenser he

'had not used the material during the exse.ination. The licensee's representative stated that on review and questioning of the other candidates that they had determined that the examination had not been compromised.

No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified within the scope of the inquiry. However, the timeliness of reporting the occurrence to the Resident Inspector was discussed during a Management Interview on Februa ry 3,1984.

9. ManaEement Involvement in the training The inspectors discussed senior management involvement requalification process with the training staf f and various licensee managers. Members of the plant management staf f have monitored lectures presented during requalification cycles, however, participation in the present cycle had been minimal to date with the exception of the Reactor Operations ~ Supervisor who holds a license and therefore participates as a student. Copies of the monthly quizzes are sent to several licensee managers for information. Although the results of examinations and quizzes are reviewed by management, members of management do not periodically observe cral examinations in progress or review completed examination papers. In summary, the primary management invo.vement with the requalification training program is through examination of monthly l

quizzes, review of summary reports of training results and audits, and through discussion and meetings with members of the training staff.

10. Exit Inte rview l

The inspectors met with Mr. Yundt on February 15, 1984, to discuss the training scope and findings of the inspection conducted at the plant facilities. During the interview, Mr. Yundt indicated that (1) the inspector's observations concerning instructions for proctors and candidates would be considered and appropriate action taken prior to the examinations scheduled for February 17, 1984, (2) need for additional security of examination material would be evaluated, (3) documentation of the annual evaluations of operators will be evaluated and steps taken to l

ensure substantive and meaningful material is included, (4) conducting oral examinat. ions of operators while on duty will be evaluated to ensure that the individual is free from duty except for emergencies that could arise and (5) the advisability and pros and cons of using essentially the l same written annual examination for all groups during a training cycle l

will be evaluated. The licensee's actions on these items will be l examined during a future inspection. (Followup item 344/84-04-01) 1 1

l

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9 ES-601

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ATTACHMENT 6 ,

REQUALIFICATION PROGRAM EVALUATION REPORT Facility: Od Examiner: / M T /L M i Date(s) of Evaluation: 8[RC// /- 6, /fff Areas Evaluated: .. I Written 1 Oral Simulator Written Examination

1. Evaluation of examination: f4W 8dC70M

2. Evaluation of facility examination administration: 54T/Sfdcr04 7

3. If NRC examination was substituted for facility examination (or sections thereof), attach examination summary sheet to this form.

Summary sheet attached /:

4. Evaluation of examination grading: NId/M82.

Oral Examination

1. Overall evaluation S8WII*70(V

2. Number observed Number conducted k Simulator Examination 1; Overall evaluation l

l

2. Number observed

/

h Number conducted '

l Overall Program Evaluation Satisfactory Marginal Unsatisfactory (List major defi-ciency areas with brief descriptive comments)

Sub *tted: Forwarded: Appr ed:

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Examiner Standards 15 of 15 l . . ___ .

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. AVERAGE AVG %

.1 3.00 2.50 1.50 2.50 .50 2.50 2.50 2.00 66.67

.2 2.00 1.50 1.90 2.00 ~ 1.50 1.50 1.50 1.65 82.50

.3 3.00 2.50 3.00 2.50 2.50 1.50 1.50 2.25 74 00 o4 1.50 .50 1.00 1.00 1.50 1.50 1.50 1.17 77.78 5 2.00 .50 1.00 .00 2.00 1.00 .00 .75 37.50 0 3.00 2.25 2.00 3.00 .50 .50 1.00 1.54 51.39

.7 3.00 2.90 2.50 1.90 2.00 1.50 2.80 2.27 75.56 8

9 2.00 1.50 2.00 1.50 1.65 1.00 2.00 1.61 80.42 10 1.50 .75 .50 1.50 4.50 1.50 1.50 1.21 80.56 Il 2.00 1.60 2.00 1.67 2.00 2.00 2.00 1.88 93.92 CTION ITAL 23.00 16.50 17.40 17.57 15.65 14.50 16.30 16.32 CTION

ADE 100.00 71.74 75.65 76.39 68.04 63.04 70.87 70.96

'GE 73.70 79.30 83.90 73.40 74.20 81.50 C2 KEY MCGUIR.LAZ I ER KRAMER NELSON ROSS R ODR I G . OUE EIT .

AVERAGE AUG %

1 2.50 2.50 2.00 2.50 2.50 2.00 2.50 2.33 93.33 8 4.00 3.80 3.00 2.00 2.00 4.00 2.00 2.80 70.00 3 3.00 2.25 3.00 2.75 3.00 1.25 1.50 2.29 76.39 G 3.00 2.75 3.00 2.50 2.10 2.75 2.15 2.54 84.72 9 3.50 3.50 3.50 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.50 3.25 92.86 4 2.00 .10 1.40 1.50 .40 .95 .40 .79 39.56

? 2.00 1.30 1.80 1.80 1.45 1.90 1.30 1.59 79.58

@ 1.50 1.00 1.40 1.00 1.50 .75 1.50 1.19 79.44 0 1.50 1.50 1.50 1.25 1.50 1.00 1.50 1.38 91.67 00 2.00 1.40 1.60 2.00 1.70 1.70 1.70 1.68 84.17 CTION 9AL 25.00 20.10 22.20 20.30 19.15 19.30 18.05 19.85 3TIO4

%DE 100.00 80.40 88.80 81.20 76.60 77.20 72.20 79.40 3E 82.60 98.20 84.40 85.00 89.80 89.00 l

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> 1.50 1.50 .10 .30 1.30 1.15 .30 .74 49.44 i G.50. 4.13 4.03 4.13 4.25 3.75 3.25 3.92 87.13

, 2.00 1.90 1.05 1.90 1.'15 2.00 .90 1.48 74.17 O.00 2.50 2.40 3.00- 2.25 1.00 2.50 2.28 75.83 i O.60 3.60 3.60 3.60 3.60 3.60 3.60 3.60 100.00 2.4.0 2.40 2.40 2.40 1.20 2.40 2.00 2.13 86.89 9 2.00 1.30 2.00 1.75 1.90 1.60 1.50 1.68 lT!ON

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l 2.40 .30 2.20 1.80 1.20 .60 1.20 1.22 50.69 3.00 2.50 2.50 1.50 2.50 2.50 2.50 2.33 77.78 1.00 1.00 1 00 1.00 .00 1.00 1.00 .83 83.33 1.50 .75 .23 .70 .45 ~.35 .60 .51 34.17 2.00 '1.50 1.40 1.50 .50 1.00 .50 1.07 53.33 2.60 2.20 1.55 1.15 1.00 .30 1.15 1.23 47.12

2.00 2.00 1.50 1.50 2.00 - 2.00 1.00 1.67 83.33 3.00 2.00 2.50 2.50 .50 1.00 1.00 1.58 52.78 3.00 3.00 2.50 3.00 3.00 3.00 2.50 2.83 94.44

$ 2.00 1.50 1.30 2.00 .50 1.00 1.50 1.30 65.00 l1 2.50 1.50 1.00 1.50 .00 1.00 .50 .92 36.67 910N CL 25.00 18.25 17.68 18.15 11.65 13.75 13.45 15.49 T ION

@E 100.00 73.00 70.70 72.60 46.60 55.00 53.00 61.95 l

B 70.40 75.00 75.40 54.40 58.60 65.00

%L 76.93 70.60 77.02 66.75 66.80 66.60 72.12 fE

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AVG. AVG %

l>l 2.50 1.00 1.10 1.75 1.25 1.75 1.00' 3.31 52.33 h2 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 1.50 2.00 1.5C 1.83 91.67

.3 3.00 2.75 3.00 2.75 1.50 3.00 2.75 2.63 87.50 L4 3.00 2.13 2.33 2.03 2.50 2.25 1.20 2.05 68.19 L5 2.50 '1.75 2.00 1.50 1.50 2.50 .80 1,68 67.00 LS 2.20 1.20 1.45 1.70 1.40 1.45 1.25 1.41 64.02 L7 3.30 3.30 2.67 3.00 2.67 2.34 3.00 2.83 185.76 8 2.50 .50 2.00 2.00 1.45 2.20 1.50 1.61 64.33 9 2.50 1.20 1.00 1.25 2.20 2.10 .50 1.38 55.00 10 1.50 1.50 1.50 1.50 1.50 1.50 1.50 1.50 100.00

/CTION ITAL 25.00 17.33 18.85 19.48 17.47 21.09 15.05 18.21 CTION - - -

ADE 100.00 69.30 75.38 77.90 69.88 84.36 60.20 72.84 "GE 76.80 76.00 86.10 76.60 87.50 68.20 C8 KEY LAWSON KEffT WORL .' HANSON TAYLOR BUD 2. QUEST.

AVG. AVG %

2.00 -1.40 .70 1.40 2.00 2.00 .70 1.37 68.33 2.00* 1.50 2.00 2.00 1.50 2.00 1.50 1.75 87.50 2.00 .70 2.00 1.40 .50 1.60 .70 1.15 57.50 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 100.00 3.00 2.50 3.00 3.00 1.50 2.50 2.00 2.42 80.56 2.00 1.00 1.75 1.70 1.70 1.90 1.70 1.63 81.25 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 100.00 0 3.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 1.50 1.50 2.00 1.83 61.11 2 3.00 2.40 2.40 2.40 2.40 2.50 2.50 2.43 81.11 f!ON AL 20.00 14.50 16.85 16.90 14.10 17.00 14.10 15.57 ION

@E 100.00 72.50 84.25 84.50 70.50 85.00 70.50 77.87 h 72.60 82.40 86.10 65.40 86.30 66.60 W .

'ALS C00.00 290.40 310.63 326.50 303.18 351.76 276.90 .

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, October 23, 1979 MEMORANDUM FOR: T. Telford, Chairman Lessons Learned Steering Committee FROM: Chris Nelson, CE Team Leader

SUBJECT:

SUMMARY

OF MEETING REGARDING SHIFT TECHNICAL ADVISOR On October 12,.1979, a meeting was held in Bethesda, Maryland, regarding the requirement for a Shift Technical Advisor as discussed in N'JREG-0578,

. "TMI-2 Lessons Learned Task Force Status Report and Short-Term Recorinendations".

At this meeting, the NRC staff provided a summary of its position regarding the Shift Technical Advisor. The slides used for this summary are Enclosure 1.

A number of alternatives were presented by members of industry. Items in these alternatives which differ from the staff's position include:

1. Accident assessment and operating experience assessment functions performed by separate groups of people;

2. Accident assessment functions performed by personnel off-site, available within 30 minutes;

3. Operating experience assessment functions performed by personnel stationed off-site; .

. 4. Existing shift supervisors, upgraded as necessary, perform Shift Technical Advisor functions; and

5. The Shift Technical Advisor with normal duties as a member of the plant operations staff.

The position presented by the AIF is' Enclosure 2.

One method of meeting the requirement for Shift Technical Advisor, resented by SMUD, appeared to fully meet the intent of the staff's requirements, based on the infomation provided. In this method, the accident and operating experience assessment functions would be performed by the same group of qualified, onsite persons. The accident assessment function wculd te cer-fcered by a designated member of this grou: en a 48 hour5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months duty s:atus. The

.14 ability of :nis ;:ersen within 10 c.inutes would be assured.

9 4

2-Enclosure 3 summarizes the staff's clarification of the Shift Technical

Advisor requirement as discussed during the meeting.

/-

't J 7' h -

Chris Nelson CE Team Leader

Enclosures:

1. Slides for Shift '

Techni:31 Advisor

2. AIF Shift Technical J .

Advis r Position .

3. Shift Technical Adviser Clarification -

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U-LIFIC:TIONS

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TECHNICAL AREAS IMPORTANT TO SAFETY , ]

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' . . , . . . .'. a' o In the NRC pcsition the Shif t Technical Adviser is assigned

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. o One of the lessons 'of T:1I is' che need cc upgrade the k iou *' e' ledge of somh of the 1:.dividuals designated to be in charge -

in the centrol roc = and to reduce diversionary administrative assignments f rca the desigt.a:cd individuals responsibilitics.

CE:TIRIA o Accident Assessment and Respcnse In:.Sediate Phase

. An operator or supervisor in the direct operational chain of command on each shift (ncrmally in charge in the control rcom) will receive additional specific training in the respcase and analysis of the plant 4.

fer transients and accidents. Th;s training will be

> cecrdinated with the schedure for preparation and review of' analysis and guidelines under the NRC

' Bulletins and Orders Task Force. .

l All operators and supervisors will receive additional training appropriate to their responsibilities in the response of the plant to transients and accidents.

- This longer term training and qualification criteria will be provided by the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations.

Intermediate.P,h ace (Alternatives)

An operator or supervisor in the direct operations)

.chsin of command on each shift will receive substantial additional education in basic engineering and scienre .

sufficient to' aid him in assessing unusual situations

not explicitly covered in the current operator tralhing.

l - OR -

A graduate engineer or equivalent trained in the response j and analysis of the plant for transients and accidents and in plant design and layout, including the capabil-1 ities of instrumentation and controls in the control room, will be available to the individual in charge in the control roc = on ca*1. He may be stationed on er eff site at apprcpria:s to picnt 'ocati:n, ccmmunication capabilities, oper,ater training and edu' cation, extent and detail of emergency procedures, etc. ,

- 32::very Phase Ir.iividuals kncw.edgea..-. o; and .csponsible for enpineering and management suppor: of reactor operations in -he even c f an sci .; r.: .1'. . svailable on ::'.1

staff -he Cn-3;;e Te:nnical Supp::: Center. ,

I L

D

r o Operatin? Ixperience Assessmen:

Where it does not already exist, a te a. wC ' e

ics:.gnated by the licansee to assess the c; era :...; e>.per:.s..:n at his plant or plants and at plants of li?.e ie3_;... Tea: :e::ter-

, ship may vary as appropriate to the cpara-i..; e::psrience being assessed but will include e.s:perie..ce in systa=s engineering and familiarity with cr re;;i..s a::sss to persons experienced in the principles cf human engineering

! or human factors, t

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- - Erclosure 3 -

SHIFT TECHNICAL ADVISOR CLAD.IFICATION

1. Cae to t5e similarity in the requirements for dedication to safety,

training and onsite location and the desire that the accident assess-ent fun: tion be performed by soreone whose normal duties invcive review of operating experiences, our preferred position is that the sane peo:le perform the accident and operating experience assessment functisns. The performance of these two functions however, may be split if it can. be oemonstrated that the persons assigned accident assessment will be aware, on a current basis, of the work being done by those reviewing operating experience.

2. To provide assurance that the STA will be dedicated to concern for the se#e y of the plant, our position has been that STAS tave a clear measure of independence from duties asscciated with the

c9mercial operation of ,the plant. This woulc.minimi:e possible cistractions from safety judgements by the demands of commercial operaticns. We have determined that, while desirable, independence from the operations staff of the plant is not necessary to provide this assurance. It is necessary, however, to clearly emphasize

. the dedication to safety associated with the STA position both in the STA job description and to the personnel filling this position". We currently do not believe that the shift supervisor on duty or a person, who is normally the shift supervisors boss, can reet the intent of the STA as defined.

3. It is our position that the STA should be available within 10 minutes of being summonded and therefore should be onsite. The onsite STA may be in a duty status for periods of time longer than one shift, and therefore asleep at some times, if the 10 minute availability is assured, it is preferable to also locate those doing the operating -

experience assessment onsite. The desired exposure to the operatin plant and contact with the STA (if these functions are to be split)g may be able to be accomplished by a group, normally stationed offsite, with frequent onsite presence. We do not intend, at this time, to specify or advocate a minimum time onsite. ,

4. The implementation schedule for the STA requirements is to have the STA on duty by January 1, 1980, and to have STAS, who have completed all training requirements, on duty by January 1,1981.

While rinimum training requirements have not been specified for Jeruary 1, 1980, the Siis on duty by that ti-e should echance tne ac;i:ent and operatirg experience assessment functions at the

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. ,a MIMcKAEUM FOR: Con:=issione: Gilinsky

&C TRCM: James.A. Fitzgeral&7e -

. Assistant General CTunsel SU3JEC'": -

dCENSID REACTOR CPIRATOR I%AMINA"':CNS .

During the March 30, 1984 Cc==issien briefing en a full-power cperatine license fc: h"?PSS-2, you raised the questien of whether the staff's interpreta:icn.cf 10 C77. .

5 55.25(b) is consistant with the terms of tha: regulatien.'

,Zoth during the briefing *and in a retter dated April 3, 1934, ycu sought the views of the General-Ceu.sel. Che staff's interpretatien as stated in WRIG-0094, in our view, appears to cen.radict the plain .eaming of the regulatien.

10 CTE $ 55. 25 (b) , entitled "Ad d-istratic cf cperating

, test prior to initial criticality," reads:

The Cone:issien may administer a'si=ulated cperating

.es: to an applicant fer a license te operate a reac:c pric: :;o its initial criticality if a written reques:

by an authoriced repqesentative of the facility -

licensee is sufficient fer the Cc==issic te find that

kb) The applicant has had extensive actua'., .

cperating experience a a ec= parable reae:cr.

1 in 1976 the operater Licensing 3:anch, NRE, issued NURIG-0094, an NRC licensing guide antitled "A Gcide fc: the Licensing of Facility Opere.ters, Including Senic: Cpera-l ters." This guide was' designed sc revise and replace t:A s l' 1094, the AIC licensing guide. Section X: c f M*lEIG-00 9 4 ,

! entitled "Ad=inistratien cf Cpera::ng Tes: ? :.c c In:.:: a1 Criticality," defines what is mean; in S !!.25fc) by the ter: " extensive actual cperating e::perience at a =c=pt. 1ble reac ::." A une 22, *976 letter f c

. Ben C. .bs:he, Cirec:c: cf NER, te .he Cc .: ssicners indi:a es that ene cf

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e that utilize nuclear power plan: si=ulaters."-

C::=issi'ener Gilinsky pointed out during the March 20, 1984 cc==ission briefing that this interpreta:icn cf 5 55.25 (h) .

see=s te be incensistent with the plain =eaning cf the regulation,3vhich cal,ls fer attual, net sL=ula ::, cperating experience. Mr. Thompsen of NRA explained tha: the staff

.had used the M.ZG-0094 guidelines since thei ; c=ulgatten, and.cc sidared st=ulater enperience adequate := ensure safa plant cperatien.' .

A brief review of the legislative histcry of 5 55.25 (h) yields ncthing that would centradic the plain meaning of the regulation. The Stata=ent of Censideratien fer the ,

p c=ulgaticn of 5 55.25 states that 5 55.25 was added tc Far 55 te provide for the ad=inistratien cf an cperating tes: "previded the conditiens stated in the sectics are

.et." 26 Fed. Reg. 9654 (Oct. 12, 19'C1). The cendition stated in 5 55.25 (h) is " actual cperating experia =e" (e:phasis added). No p c'.- s n is made f c si=ulater experience, equivalent experience, c: ce= parable experience.

A.p:cvisien.si=11a: to 5 55.25 (h) is centained in i

5 55.24fa). Under that sggtien, the " extensive actual i eparating experience," withi we years of appli:atics, can centribu 'e te the basis fer waiver cf any c all Of the written e::aminations and operating test. It is interestier to neta tha: when read in light cf Sectic: X cf L ..EG-0054 and S 55.24 (h) this phraseclegy c=ntemplates hcnds-en

cperating experience rather than sc=o substi:::e.

c=: Chairman Palladinc

, Cc==issione: Rcberts

Cc==issicnar Assels:ine C:==issi=ner 3ern:hal

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! ~ ,% NUCLEAR RECULATORY COMMISSION s I was marow.o.c.aom Ocu!TE-

. e f .w-k.....'o# April 9, 1984 c,.4 m=4~ '84 A?P, -9 P 6 :03 MEMORANDUM FOR: Samuel J. Chilk, Secretary f. , -

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FROM: Nunzio J. Palladino , $~ ..

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SUBJECT:

LICENSED REACTOR OPERATOR EXAtlINATIONS Attached is a copy of a memorandum that I sent to my fellow Commissioners on April 9, 1984 I orally requested that Commissioner Gilinsky defer his plan to send the OGC memorandum dated April 6, 1984 to a number of parties and applicants until the Conmission had more time to research the background. However, he refused.

Since Commissioner Gilinsky insisted that his memorandum be served tonight, I want SECY to send this memorandum and its attachment along with his memorande.n.

Attachment:

Memo to Comm fm NJP dtd 4/9/84 w/ attached 1967 document

,,","', ((- J """ 7 5 313 cc: SECY OGC OPE .

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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMNU$SION wAsmwoTou, c. c. aossa y ..,,, e/ r CNAIRMAN April 9, 1984 MEMORANDUM FOR: 14 AC2 -9 P6:04 Commissioner Gilinsky Commissioner Rcberts ...

Commissioner Asselstine 'J-

- 4':il',1-Commissioner Bernthat n ~'~

FROM:

Nunzio J. Palladino .3.Q .nf

SUBJECT:

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LICENSED REACTOR OPERATOR EXAMINATIO I have just received a copy of Commissioner Gilinsky's request to serve the April 6, 1984 OGC memo addressing licensed reactor operator examinations on the parties in number of proceedings and on the applicants in uncontested cases. a reasonable I believe time to give thisthe action should NRC time be deferred to research the for a background of the interpretation to be given to 10 CFR 55.25(b).

For example, the OGC memo does not addressethe attach d 1967 interpretation, in which OGC concurred, which appears to conflict with the April 6, 1984 OGC position be other pertinent background. .

should address the issue rather than leaving the parties and applicants viewed as correct.to guess which OGC interpretation is to be !

to the parties and applicants what purpose is e be served by providing them this information. o Finally, since Commissioner Gilinsky has been on the Commission since 1975, I would like to know if he has any other background to contribute to the precedents that have been set by the staff, OGC, and Commission in this matter .

By copy of this memorandum.

background or other information that is pertinentt . .

Attachment:

I As stated i

cc: SECY OGC .

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Divimise of Emestes f4-===4=g 0FEIATOR LICENSIBC FEDERAM CONSIDERATIONS INYCLTING T*dZ CE NUCLZA1 TIAIKING CENTER ,

1 The General Eleatria Campany is coastnating a Naciaar Traislag Center in 1111 asis which p intended to provida virtually all of the training requirments for their amataner operating staffs in the future. This trainias vill be psweidad, is large part, by stilizing a Dresden II remeter plant stamLJacer.

We have had several dLassamimes with GE during the past two years regarding the assent of stadit that st==leter training vill receive under consideratissa of Part 55, e.g.. to what degree, if any, vill it sahatitute for '}astmal operacias arperiescat" te olution of this matter is needed mer by both GE and their u.tility customare elass staff training amai ha -ad savaral years before plant operation and in a ===eae amapacible vtth Part 55 resairements.

After review and djeesseien wit.h the Offica of the General Counsel and the Divisissa af Campti-- and teactor Standards, a proposed policy en the questies of aligibility for "celd" reactor operator and senior reacter epasatar esaminations was agreed upon to establish that i the applicant has M extensive actual operatint experience at a comparabia reactory as required by section $5.25(b). The applicant

' womid, of coarse, he required to qualify undar the other provisions of secties 55.25.

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Individuals from CE utility customers vbo formally couplete the program at the GI Maclear 1 raining Costar, using the Dresden II Simulator; vould be seasidered %'iad in accordance with section 55.25(b) for " cold" operator and semien, operstar license e===4 nations at their own facility, provided that.:

l (1) They have samplaced an appropriate course in Nuclear Technology .

1 fendementals.

(2) They have manipulated the centrois of a nacinar reactor throughout \

tea (lo)'essplete startupa. ..

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t (4) They have seaf essfully comipisted an AIC administered operator

==f naties f9r the Dreedom II plant as described in sectiona 55.11 and 55.23 teliacinde a walk-through oral examination in the Dresden U plint and manipulation of the Simulator controls for an operatingteoj.

1 3,aquirement No. 4 s taccative and is subject to further consideration.

The mattar of who er not the '*-1esion administera ====4 nations at the Traf=4== Cantakis,atthistime,actofimportanentoC?.andtheir

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cuateners for p' ~I It should be metad fthat theme requirements are normly shother alternative for establishing "e,s14" +-4== time aligibility and therefore are within the framework of the existing Part 55 regulation. Further, an individual who fails to ammt any one of thase requirements is not automatically deniad aligibility pursuant ta 55.25(b).

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Title:

TROJAN POWER PLANT CHEATING ON EXAMINATION FOR LICENSED CONTROL ROOM OPERATORS Licensee: Portland General Electric Co. Case Number: 5-84-009 121 S.W. Salmon Street Portland, Oregon 97204 Report Date: March 19,1985 Docket No.: 50-344 Control Office: 01:RV Status: CLOSED Reported by: Reviewed by:

YU !n

' Eugede J. P9pdr, Investigator Owen C. Shackleton Jr., Dirgyor Office of Investigations Field Office of Investigations FiFld Office, Region V Office, Region V Approved by:

mM n B. ,fayes, Director

~

ffice 6f Investigations 4

4

i SYN 0PSIS On February 7,1984, Region V, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (U.S. NRC), was advised by Portland General Electric Company (PGE), ,

a licensee, of a possible compromise during an annual relicensing examination on February 3,1984 On February 3, 1984, a written examination, with a six-hour time limit, was given to 13 members, or students, of a training class, which was the culmination of a two-week annual reactor operator's requalification course at Trojan Nuclear Plant in Rainier, Oregon.

The requalification program was administered by PGE to their control room auxiliary operators and senior reactor operators in

' order to meet the requirements of 10 CFR Part 55. The examination was proctored at all times by a PGE representative.

Between the hours of 11:30 a.m. and 11:55 a.m. on February 3, 1984, one member of the class, who had completed his examination, visited the rest room and he discovered a reference document in the paper towel holder. The rest room was located directly adjacent to the training classroom in which the examination was given, and the students were allowed to use the rest room, one person at a time, during the examination.

The discovered reference document was identified as a copy of a Nuclear Data Sheet, Nuclear Design - Cycle 6, dated November 15, 1984, which had been prepared by the Trojan facility. A copy of the document had been issued as a study guide to each student in the class for his use during the two-week requalification course.

The licensee conducted an inmediate and complete investigation into the incident, which included conducting interviews of all 13 students in the class, plus the rest room cleaning attendant. On February 6,1984, during his interview, an auxiliary operator confessed that he had placed the document in the rest room just minutes prior to the start of the examination, but he stated that he did not know why he did it. The operator averred that he did not use the data sheet during the examination. He further indicated that he could have easily left the site without saying a word since he had recently obtained another job and was going to submit his resignation. On the following day, February 7,1984, the individual specifically identified the Cycle 6 Design Data Sheet as that which he had placed in the towel holder. As a t- result, the operator resigned his position with the Trojan Power

. Plant on February 7,1984, and he was immediately denied access to the plant. The PGE report of investigation concluded that "this case of possible compromise is an isolated incident." There were no indications of involvement by other individuals.

i

ACCOUNTABILITY The following portions of this ROI will not be included in the material placed in the PDR. It consists of 10 pages,

Also as a direct result of the incident, Region V, U.S. NRC, conducted a special inspection of the operator requalification program at Trojan during February 11-13, 1984, which was contained in their Inspection Report No. 50-344/84-04. Additionally, Region V conducted an operator licensing examination of the PGE requalification program during March 1-14, 1984, which was contained in Examination Report No. 50-344/0L 84-01. In the forwarding letter of April 10, 1984, Region V categorized the overall evaluation of the licensee's requalification program as

" marginal," which was defined as that falling between a satisfactory and unsatisfactory evaluation. There were no items of noncompliance or deviation identified in the two NRC reports; however, several areas where impreved administration of the program may be warranted were identified.

On January 29, 1985 he former auxiliary operator was interviewed under oath in y an investigator with the Office of Investigations tieio e, Region V, U.S. NRC. During his interview, he provided substantially the same information as contained in the PGE investigation. He stated that he had hidden the specific document in the towel holder on February 3,1984, a few minutes before the examination. He stated, "It was not a premeditated act. It was a spur of the moment decision." He indicated that he did not know why he did it, but he acknowledged that if, during the examination, he had a question relating to the information contained in the document, it was his initial intention to 90 to the rest room for the purpose of answering the question.

He stated that he acted of his own free will, and he acted alone.

The operator further averred that he did not hide any other type of reference material on his person, or any other place for use during the examination. He stated that he did not remember using the rest room during the period of the examination; however, he guessed that he probably had. The operator testified that he did not use the study guide for any purpose during the examination. He averred that he did not cheat during the examination on February 3,1984, or on any other operator's examination. He further indicated that he had no knowledge of any individual who had ever cheated, or attempted to cheat, on any type of operator's examination. When asked why he did not acknowledge that it was he who had placed the document in the rest room prior to being asked during the PGE investigation, he answered, "I was confused. Everything was moving fast at that time." He further explained, "I know I made a mistake. I admitted the mistake. I wanted it resolved as quickly as possible. I did not cheat." On January 30, 1985, the operator executed a sworn statement on the results of the interview.

On the basis of the information obtained during the 01 investiga-tion, no further investigative effort is warranted. The status of the OI investigation is CLOSED.

2

.s.

+

TABLE OF C0'4 TENTS Page No.

Synopsis...................................................... 1 Ta bl e o f Co n ten t s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 Details of Investigation........... .......................... 4 Purpose of Investigation................................. 4 B a c k g ro u n d . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 Investigative Findings................................... 5 Su p pl eme n ta l I n f o rma t i o n . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 L i s t o f Ex h i b i t s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 l

i l

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1 DETAILS Purpose of Investigation The purpose of the 01 investigation was to investigate all the facts and circumstances surrounding the reported cheating on .the control room operator's examination, which was given on February 3, 1984 at Trojan Nuclear Plant.

Background

On February 7,1984, Region V, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (U.S. NRC), was initially advised by Portland General Electric Company (PGE), a licensee, that a licensed operator admitted on February 6,1984, that during the annual operator's requalification examination, he had hidden 10 to 15 pages of reference material for his use in a wash room at the Trojan Nuclear Plant (TNP) in Rainier, Oregon. The wash room was available for use by the operators during the examination, which was given by the licensee.

Another operator, who had finished the examination, discovered the material and reported the discovery to a PGE examination proctor.

The licensee interviewed all the operators who took the examination and concluded that the operator, who had admitted cheating, acted alone. On the basis of the preliminary information, Region V issued PNC-V-34-07, dated February 8, 1984 (Exhibit 1).

On February 7,1984, a memorandum by John B. MARTIN, Regional Administrator, Region V, requested that the Office of Investiga-tions Field Office, Region V (01:RV), participate with Region V in a review at TNP of the situation to gather additional information and interview personnel. A copy of the memorandum, subject:

Cheating on Operator Examinations at Trojan Nuclear Power Plant, dated February 7,1984, is attached as Exhibit 2.

On February 9, 1984, 01:RV received information that M was identified as the control room operator who cheated on reouired annual requalification exa ' ation. A copy of Operator License License ocket io. 55-8996, effective on file with Region V, is attached as Exhibit 3.

On February 10, 1984, by supplementa? memorandum of the same date (Exhibit 4), the Regional Administrazor, Region V, requested 01:RV to investigate all the facts and circumstances surrounding the reported cheating on the operator's examination at Trojan. It was further indicated in the memorandum that the Region V staff would undertake a review of Trojan's training and requalification program for reactor operators.

4

4 By memorandum, dated February 15, 1984 (Exhibit 5),

0. C. SHACKLETON Jr., Director, Ol:RV, confirmed that 01 was not able to send an investigator on February 9,1984 to Trojan as requested by Reg' ion V. The'01 field office director further indicated that an investigation would be subsequently pursued as soon as investigative manpower was available.

Investigative Findings On December 27, 1984 Gary W. JOHNSTON, Reactor Operator Licensing Examiner, Region V, U.S. NRC, who was formerly the Acting NRC Senior Resident Inspector at Trojan at the time of the alleged cheating incident, was contacted in his office. JOHNSTON advised that the licensee conducted a full and comprehensive investigation into the alleged cheating, or compromise, of the examination immediately upon the discovery of the document in th rest room.

JOHNSTON recalled that during the PGE investigation, an auxiliary operator, admitted to hiding a study guide in e m, which was immediately adjacent to the class room; but denied using the guide, or cheating of any nature, during e examination. JOHNSTON provided a copy of a Nuclear Data Sheet, Nuclear Design - Cycle 6 (Exhibit 6), which was a duplicate of the document discovered in the rest room. He further advised that the data sheet contained general technical information concerning the Trojan plant, and it was given to the operators at the start of the annual series of lectures for requalification training. He further indicated that there was no apparent involvement by any other individuals in the incident. JOHNSTON stated that a copy of PGE's investigation was not available within Region V; however, he believed a cooy could be obtained from the licensee. JOHNSTON further advised that in February 1984, he participated in a follow-up NRC special inspection of the operatcr requalification program at TNP. He indicated that no items of noncompliance or deviation were identified during the inspection; however, several areas were identified for improvement in the program.

On January 28, 1985, a copy of the PGE investigative report regard-ing the incident was received. The results of their investigation are contained in an interoffice communication, dated March 26, 1984, subject: "Possible NRC Licensed Personnel Retraining Exam Compromise (Cycle 4B)," which is attached as Exhibit 7. (Exhibit 7 was expurgated by PGE to delete personal privacy information.) The salient points of the investigation indicated:

(1) A two-week training course for annual licensing for seven senior reactor operators (SR0s) and six auxiliary operators was given at the Trojan plant by PGE. The culmination of the training course was a written examination, which was given on Friday, February 3,1984.

5

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l (2) The examination was given in a training complex, which included a training classroom and a rest room located directly outside the classroom. The rest room was available to all students during the examination, and only one person was allowed to leave the classroom at a time.

(3) The examination started about 8:00 a.m. on February 3, 1984, with a required completion time of 2:00 p.m. The examination was proctored full-time by a PGE representative. One of the auxiliary operators who took the course and final examination was _

(4) On February 3, .1984, f rom approximately 11:30 a.m. to 11:45 a.m., a student who had completed the examination accidently found a Cycle 6 Design Data Sheet in a paper towel holder in the rest room.

(5) The PGE investigation was conducted by the Operations Supervisor and the Training Director, both of the Trojan facility. It is to be noted that the Operations Supervisor, who was the supervisor of most of the students, was also a member of that specific training course; however, he was cleared of any complicity in the matter before assisting in the investigation.

(6) In their evaluation and prior to the individual student interviews, except for the student who discovered the document who had alraadv oen interviewed, the PGE investigative team identified as the primary suspect for the following reasons:

- During the examination, the Operations Supervisor, as he was waiting to leave the exam room to go the the rest room, noted that a person approached the classroom door apparently returning from the rest room, but the person stopped and went back for something. A person entered the classroom through the classroom d nr about 30 seconds later, and that individual was

- mpletion of the annual relicensing examination, as req take an overdue monthly retrain-ng quiz. When arrived in the training department to ta e the quiz, his face and neck were flushed. The PGE training representative thought flushed features were abnomal.

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(7) One of the investigative strategies (Attachment 6 to the PGE report) used by the PGE investigative team was "we decided not to tell anyone what was actually found. We thought it might be a lead if the. item was being talked ' bout by name because only a very small group of people knev ,nat it was. This also became the confirmation item for positive identification."

(8) One group of the students was briefed during their work shift on Sunday, February 5,1984, regarding the incident and the purpose of the PGE investigation, and the remaining students were briefed in a similar manner on their work shift on Monday, February 6, 1984. Individual interviews with each student were subsequently conducted after the briefings on the respective days. The contract cleaner of the rest room was also interviewed by the investigative team.

(9) the PGE report, it was stated, in part, started the interview with the statement he was eaving the company. . He had accepted a job with another company and was going to submit his resigna-tion on February, February 10, 1984. He stated he had no reason to cheat due to this circumstance. We then asked when he had heard about the incident, and if he had any other knowledge. He then confessed saying he did not know why he had done it, but that he had not used the data sheet for the exam. He then stated he could have easily left without saying a word, but decided that would be unfair to the people he worked with and to the company. He said he put it there about 15 to 20 minutes prior to the exam. He again stated he did not know why, and he also stated he did not know why he finally decided to confess. He became very emotional at this point."

(10) On the following day, Feb v7 984, in a subsequent schedu d~ ussion with the Operations Supervisor ask exactly what he place in the towel holder. c stated, " general information ...a Cycle 6 Design Data neet.

(11) As a result of the incident, resigned his position with Trojan and took of vacation from February 7-15, 1984. " security badge was pulled denying his access to e p ant immediately after the meeting (i.e. February 7, 1984)."

(12) As the Operations Supervisor was leaving the plant on Tuesday, February 7, 1984, an auxiliary operator, who also was in the training class, asked to talk to him. The Auxiliary Operator 7

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stated that he had talked t Sunday night, February 5,1984, durinc) whi told him he was leaving Trojan anyway, so he co o Jus dmit he did it to get everybody off the hook." The Auxiliar perator related his concern at this time that might be taking a fall for everyone else, perations Supervi told the. _

Auxiliary Operator that it was confirmed that "was the person by having him explicitly ident fy what was found."

(13) The PGE report concluded by indicating, "it is believed that this case of possible compromise is an isolated incident."

There was no indication of involvement by other individuals.

(14) Attention is invited to the sumary of the interviews of the 13 students and contract cl r ich was Attachment G to the basic PGE report. W asked if he had any knowledge of the event, " responded he had heard about it Sunday night (from an individual who was a SR0 and a member

~ of the training class)."

INVESTIGATOR'S.N0TE: acknowledgement of having heard about the investigation rom another class member was only contained in Attachment G and was not indicated in the cover interoffice comunication report of investigation.

On January 29, 1985, who was formerly employed as an auxiliary cont o room opera ir at the Trojan Nuclear Plant, was interviewed under oath at the by Eugene J. POWf.R Investigator, Otfice et investigat' . Nuclear Regulatory Commission. During this interview, rovided substantially the following:

(1) testified that he hid a Nuclear Data Sheet, Nuclear esign - Cycle 6, dated November 16, 1983, in a hand towel receptacle in the rest room at Trojan on February 3,1984, a few minutes prior to the annual reactor operator's examination.

(2) He advised that he decided to place the document in the towel receptacle just prior to the examination. He stated, "it was not a premeditated act. It was a spur of the moment decision."

(3) stated that he could not really answer why he placed the guide in that location. "I just did it." He did acknow-ledge that if, during the examination, he had a question relating to the information contained in the study guide, it 8

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was h'is initial intention to 90 to the rest room for the specific purpose of answering the question.

(4) He f'urther advised that the act of placing the document in the rest room was done of his own free will, and that he acted alone with no assistance.

(5) He stated that he did not secretly hide, conceal, or place any other type of material on his person or other place, for the purpose of using such mate' rial to assist him in answering questions during that specific examination, or any other examination.

(6) indicated that he did not remember using the rest room curing the examination, but he stated, " guess I probably did because I had n that day to study, and I had drank a ot o cottee.

(7) He testified that he did not refer to the study guide in question for any purpose.

(8) He averred that he never cheated in any manner during the examination on February 3,1984, or on any operator's examina-tion.

(9) He stated that he was not aware of any individual who had ever cheated, or attempted to cheat, on any type of operator's examination.

(10) further related that he probably heard about the PGE inves igation regardin the .nssible compromise of the examination from probably on the day af ter the examination.

(11) When asked why he did not come forward and acknowledge that it was he who had placed the study guide in the rest room prior to being asked by the PGE representatives, he answered, "I was confused. Everything was moving fast at that time." He further stated, "I wanted to admit to it privately and not in front of everyone. I know I made a mistake. I admitted the mistake. I wanted it resolved as quickly as possible. I did not cheat."

(12) Regarding a question if he told anyone he was going to take -

the blame for the incident to get everyone of ok prior to being asked during the PGE investigation, acknow-ledged, "Yes, I believe I made a comment. gain, on't know why."

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On Janu;ry 30, 1984, executed a sworn statement on the results of the in erview, whic i~s attached as Exhibit 8 i

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1 SUPPLEMENTAL Ihf0RMATION Also pertinent to this matter were the NRC inspection and enforce-ment efforts, which were' accomplished following the reported incident. The outcone of the Region V evaluation of the Trojan control room operator's requalification progran was reflected in their letter, dated April 10, 1984, to Portland General Electric .

Company, subject: NRC Evaluation of the Trojan Nuclear Plant Requalification Program (Exhibit 9). The letter forwarded:

(1) the results of the requalification program evaluation conducted during March 1-4, 1984 as contained in Examination Report 50-344/0L 84-01, and (2) the special inspection of the operator requalification program conducted during February 13-17, 1984 as contained in Inspec-tion Report No. 50-344/84-04.

In their forwarding letter, Region V categorized the overall evaluation of the licensee's progran as " marginal," which was defined as that following. between satisfactory and unsatisfactory.

There were no items of noncompliance or deviations identified in the two reports; however, several areas where improved administra-tion of the program may be warranted were identified.

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LIST OF EXHIBITS Exhibit No. Description 1 Preliminary Notification of Event or Unusual Occurrence - PN0-V-84-07, dated February 8, 1984 2 Memorandun of Regional Administrator, Region V, U.S. NRC, dated February 7, 1984, subject:

Cheating on Operator Examination at Trojan Nuclear Power Plant 3 Ope +nr ense of License No. Docket No. Sb-8996 ~-

4 Memorandum of Regional Administrator, Region V, U.S. NRC, dated February 10, 1984, subject:

Reported Cheating on Operator Examinations at Trojan Nuclear Power Plant 5 Memorandum of Director, Office of Investiga-tions Field Office, Region V, U.S. NRC, dated February 15, 1984, subject: Trojan Cheating on Examination for Licensed Control Room Operators (05-84-009) 6 Nuclear Data Sheet, Trojan Nuclear Plant, dated November 15, 1983, Nuclear Design -

Cycle 6 7 (COMPANY CONFIDENTIAL) Interoffice Communica-tion, Portland General Electric Company, dated March 6, 1984, subject: Possible NRC Licensed Personnel Retraining Exam Compromise (Cycle 4b) 8 Sworn Statement of taken on Janua ry 30, 1985 9 Letter of Region V, U.S. NRC, dated April 10, 1984, subject: NRC Evaluation of the Trojan Nuclear Plant Requalification Program i

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'RE1.1y.INARY NOTIFICATION 0F EVENT OR UKUSUAL OCCURRENCE--PNO-V-84-0Dotn: February 8,1904 t

).

N ia prelicitry n:tificctia c(castitetcs EARLY btica cf cvnto' cf POSSIBLE.ocfcty cr pub!ie htcrutsignificance'. The information is as initially rsesivsd with:ut varificcticn or iv h :ticn and is basically all that is known by IE staff.on this date.

i-

' Licensee Emergency Classification:

. Notification of Unusual Event

Alert .

ft.:::.:n: Pii:-tland Gas Plant Trojan Nuclear and Electric Co. Site Area Emergency ceneral Emergency Docket No. 50-344 X Not Applicable EUBJECT: CHEATING ON ANNUAL REQUALIFICATION EXAM ,

The lictnsee reported on February 7.1984, that one licensed operator admitted on Fcbeenry 6.1984, that during the February 3,1984, annual requalification exams, he had hidden 10-15 pages of reference material for his use in the washroom. The washroom is available for use by operators during the exam. The licensee discovered the examination compromise during the examination when another operator who had finished the examination discovered the material and reported the discovery to the proctor. The licensee has inter-viewed all operators who took the examination and concluded that the operator who admitted J.s t ng acted alone. *That operator has been removed from licensed duties and has volun-tarily resigned.

10, 1984, to gather further infomation to assess A R:gien V team will arrive on site FebruaryThe licensee has not made a press release. Region V liccnste's action related to this event.

do:s not plan to issue a press release at this time. 01 has been notified.

This infomation is current as of 3:00 p.m. on February 8,1984.,

L. Miller FTS 463-3869 T. Bishop FT5 463-3751 C ntact:

DISTRIBUTION:

R St. d', . T8 HSBB3.8f Phillips1.'od E/W ef.6l.W111 step.6 fair Rights 4'6C Mail:

NMSS ADM:DMB Chairmin Pallidino EDO NRR IE DOT:Trans Comm. Cilinsky PA OIA RES AEOD Only Comm. B2rnthal MPA Comm. R berts ELD Comm. A:selstine Regions:

SECY INPO NSAC

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ACRS .

- Licensee:

CA (Reactor Licensees) REGION V: FORM 211 PDR Resident Inspector _ (Revised 3/14/83)

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