ML20198S956
| ML20198S956 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | San Onofre  |
| Issue date: | 12/29/1998 |
| From: | Laura Smith NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | Ray H SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDISON CO. |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9901120056 | |
| Download: ML20198S956 (27) | |
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 3'
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611 R(AN PLAZA DRIVE. SUITE 400 ARLINGTON TEXAS 76011-8064 DEC 2 91998 Harold B. Ray, Executive Vice President Southem California Edison Co.
San Onofre Nuclear G3nerating Station P.O. Box 128 San Clemente, California 92674-0128
SUBJECT:
INSPECTION PLANNING REVIEW (IPR) - SAN ONOFRE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION (SONGS)
Dear Mr. Ray:
On December 2,1998, the NRC staff completed a unique Inspection Planning Review (IPR) of SONGS. The staff normally conducts Semiannual Plant Performance Reviews for all operating nuclear power plants to develop an integrated understanding of safety performance and adjust inspection resources. However, because of the suspension of the Systematic Assessment of Licensee Performance process, we implemented an abbreviated IPR for plant issues and to develop inspection plans. The IPR for SONGS invoNed the participation of both the Reactor Projects and the Reactor Safety divisions in evaluating inspection results and safety performance trends for the period April 23 to October 28,1998.
Based on the results of this review, inspection resources have been scheduled as listed in the inspection plan. The review resulted in no increase in inspection resources beyond the core program or beyond regioneJ initiatives planned as a result of your last Systematic Assessment of Licensee Performance. contains an historical listing of plant issues, referred to as the Plant Issues Matrix (PIM), that was considered during this IPR process to arrive at an integrated view of licensee performance trends. The PIM includes only items from inspection reports or other docketed correspondence between the NRC and Southern California Edison Company. The IPR may also have considered some predecisional and draft material that does not appear in the attached PIM, including observations from events and inspections that had occurred since the last NRC inspection report was issued, but had not yet received full review and consideration. Enclosure 2 is a general description of the PIM table labels. This material will be placed in the PDR as part of the normalissuance of NRC inspection reports and other correspondence.
This letter also advises you of our planned inspection effort resulting from the SONGS IPR review. It is provided to minimize the resource impact on your staff and to allow for scheduling conflicts and personnel availability to be resolved in advance of inspector arrival onsite. details our inspection plan for the next 8 months. The rationale or basis for each inspection outside the core inspection pr~1 ram is provided so that you are aware of the reason for emphasis in these program areas. Resident inspections are not listed because of their ongoing and continuous nature. We will inform you of any changes to the inspection plan.
9901120056 981229 PDR ADOCK 05000361 Q
Southern California Edison Co. if you have any questions, please contact me at 817-860-8137.
Sincerely,
/
ufL-L. J. Smith, in Chief Project Branch E l
Division of Reactor Projects Docket Nos.: 50-361 l
50-362 License Nos.: NPF-10 l
Enclosures:
- 1. Plant issues Matrix i
- 2. General Description of PIM Table Labels
- 3. Inspection Plan
. cc w/ enclosures:
Chairman, Board of Supervisors L
-_ County of San Diego 1
1600 Pacific Highway, Room 335
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l San Diego, California 92101 Alan R. Watts, Esq.
Woodruff, Spradlin & Smart 701 C. Parker St. Suite 7000 Orange, California 92868-4720 l
Sherwin Harris, Resource Project Manager i
Public Utilities De;mrtment i
City of Riverside 3900 Main Street Riverside, Califomia 92522 l
R. W. Krieger, Vice President Southern Califomia Edison Company San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station P.O. Box 128 San Clemente, California 92674-0128 i
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Southern California Edison 'Co. :
l Stephen A. Woods, Senior Health Physicist Division of Drinking Water and Environmental Management Nuclear Emergency Response Program California Department of Health Services P.O. Box 942732, M/S 396
- Sacramento, California 94334-7320 Mr. Michael R. Olson Sr. Energy Administrator San Diego Gas & Electric Company P. O. Box 1831 San Diego, California 92112-4150 Mr. Steve Hsu Radiological Health Branch State Department of Health Services P.O. Box 942732 Sacramento, California 94234 Mayor City of San Clemente 100 Avenida Presidio San Clemente, California 92672 Mr. Truman Burns \\Mr. Robert Kinosian California Public Utilities Commission 505 Van Ness, Rm.~4102 San Francisco, California 94102 P
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E-Mail report to D. Lange (DJL)
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E-Mail report to Richard Correia (RPC) -
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Carol Gordon The Chairman (MS: 16-G-15)
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Deputy Regional Administrator C. A. Hackney Commissioner Dicus B. Henderson, PAO j
Commissioner Diaz B. Murray, DRS/PSB Commissioner McGaffigan SRis at all RIV sites J
Commissioner Merrifield
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W. D. Travers, EDO (MS: 17-G-21) 1
- Associate Dir. for Projects, NRR
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W. Bateman, NRR Project Director (MS: 13-E-17)
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. E-Mail report to D. Lange (DJL)
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E-Mail report to Document Control Desk (DOCDESK) -
- E-Mail report to Richard Correia (RPC) )
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. E-Mail report to Frank Talbot (FXT) bec to DCD (IE01)
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. Branch Chief (DRP/TSS)
Carol Gordon L The Chairman (MS: 16-G-15)
- Records Center, INPO
. Deputy Regional Administrator C. A.' Hackney Commissioner Dicus
. B. Henderson, PAO l
L Commissioner Diaz :
B. Murray, DRS/PSB l
1 Commissioner McGaffige 1.
SRIs at all RIV sites I
Commissioner Merrifield p
- W. D. Travers, EDO (MS: 17-G-21)
Associate Dir. for Projects, NRR
' Associate Dir. for Insp., and Tech. Assmt, NRR SALP Program Manager, NRR/lLPB (2 copies).
'. W. Bateman, NRR Project Director (MS: 13-E-17) i l
J. Clifford, NRR Project Manager (MS-i
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ENCLOSURE 1 PLANT ISSUES MATRIX DATE TYPE SOURCE ID SFA TEMPLATE ITEM CODE 10/03/98 POS 1R 98-16 NRC OPS 3C Operations procedures were generally technically accurate and usable. Procedure revisions that included human factors enhancements significantly improved the procedure usability.
However, some inconsistencies in the information and requirements in a procedure and among procedures were identified 10/03/98 STR 1R 98-16 NRC OPS 1B 3C Overall throughout this assessment period, ncimal and transient performance by Operations remained strong with one exception that resulted in a minor violation. The preparations for and conduct of midloop operations were excellent, characterized by effective management oversight, thorough and safety-conscious preparation, and reliable equipment operation.
Operators demonstrated excellent overall performance during a salt water cooling system heat treat evolution, as evidenced by well coordinated gate movements, excellent communications between the control room and field operators, and effective management oversight.
The September 18 response to a steam generator tube leak was excellent. Operators identified the leak before a radiation monitor alarmed, quickly validated the problem, and promptly initiated a reactor shutdown to mitigate the event. The operators manually tripped the reactor 30 minutes later, as directed by the abnormal operating instruction for a reactor coolant leak.
Implementation of the steam generator tube rupture emergency operating instruction was effective, with the leak from the steam generator being isolated approximately 31 minutes after the manual reactor trip. The subsequent plant cooldown was well controlled. Technical support to operators was excellent, and Operations oversight of the event was effective.
On September 28, personnel displayed weaknesses in attention to detail during the Unit 2 reactor startup. The shift technicai advisor and the reactor engineer who reviewed the estimated critical position did not identify that a step had not been initiated, although the requirements of the step were met. A reactor engineering data transmittal contained obsolete pages of a procedure. A reactor operator did not follow procedure guidance when determining startup channel values used in the inverse count rate ratio plot; this failure constitutes a violation of minor significance and is not subject to formal enforcement action.
08/22/98 NEG IR 98-13 NRC OPS 3C SB The 480 volt circuit breaker procedure was not written in the format as recommended by the URI 2-9807-01 goveming procedure for writing procedures and the action request written to address an incorrectly racked out 480 volt breaker failed to identify the procedure weaknesses. The breaker was seismically restrained while in the incorrectly racked out position. Corrective actions to address operator performance when racking in and out breakers were thorough and included supervisory oversight of breaker racking evolutions. (Closes URI 362/98007-01) 08/22/98 POS IR 98-13 NRC OPS 1A 3A 3C The controls for the infrequently performed evolution of removing both trains of spent fuel pool (SFP) cooling from service were exceIIent. A control operator demonstrated attentiveness in identifying the potential for slightly diluting the SFP, which would have been contrary to the licensee's procedures. Monitoring of the SFP level and temperature was excellent.
i SAN ONOFRE October 28,1998
PLANT ISSUES MATRIX DATE TYPE SOURCE ID SFA TEMPLATE ITEM CODE 08/22/98 NEG IR 98-13
,NRC OPS 3A 3B Licensed operators failed to recognize all applicable TS limiting conditions for operation (LCOs) when an emergency chiller fai'ed, indicating incomplete review of applicable TS. Also, control room togs did not reflect late entry into an applicable TS LCO afta the inspectc<s identified the error. The operators did enter the most direct TS LCO, such that TS LCO actions times would not have been exceeded.
07/13/98 NEG 98-301 NRC OPS 38 3A Seven of eight applicants passed all sections of the operating test. One applicant failed the dynamic simulator portion as a result of poor supervisory performance during response to a small-break-loss-of-coolant accident scenario. Two of the four crews were significantly challenged by the small-break-loss of-coolant accident scenario. Also, applicant response to a diesel generator vital electrical bus failure to energize was inconsistent an' did not meet facility licensee expectations. However,iaased on review of overall applicant examination performance, the chief examiner determined that the performance weaknesses displayed were the result of individual knowledge and ability weaknesses rather than generic or broad training weaknesses. All applicants passed the written examination.
07/11/98 POS IR 98-07 NRC OPS 3B Licensed operator simulator training was effective and relevant during the one scenario observed. Crew actions in response to various failures, with the reactor at low power during a startup, were good. Crew supervisors and instructors provided good coaching in manual feedwater control and in the crew response to various decision points. The use of a low power scenario, given various low power industry events, was good 07/11/98 VIO 1R 98-07 NRC OPS 1A 1C A violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, was identified as the result of the SLIV licensee's abnormal operating instruction for severe weather being inadequate. The procedure did not differentiate between various disaster or weather conditions, did not establish entry conditions for severe weather that were consistent with the weather classifications that were used by the National Weather Service (NWS), and did not prioritize or require accomplishment actions within an appropriate time period. This resulted in operator uncertainty during implementation of the procedure when funnel clouds were sighted over the water near the facility on March 31,1998. Additionally, Operations management and shift supervision demonstrated weak attention io the review of a proposed procedure change in that a question for screening the change to determine if a 10 CFR 50.59 safety evaluation was required was not correctly answered 07/11/98 NEG IR 98-07 NRC OPS 1A 3A 3B Operators sdequately assessed a Unit 2 condenser off-gas radiation monitor alarm. However, validation of the alarm was weak in that the salidation instrument listed in the alarm response procedure was avai!able, but not used, and the alarm response procedure was not clear on whether use of the listed validation instrument was required or merely informational October 28,1998 2
SAN ONOFRE
PLANT ISSUES MATRIX DATE TYPE SOURCE ID SFA TEMPLATE ITEM CODE 07/11/98 POS 1R 98-07 NRC OPS 1A A nuclear plant equipment operator's performance during routine rounds was good in that the operator monitored equipment status beyond what was required to be logged, documented equipment deficiencies, and corrected minor housekeeping problems. The operator displayed in-depth knowledge of the plant equipment 06/06/98 POS IR 99-06 NRC OPS 1A 38 The assistant control operator displayed good awareness of control board indications by identifying a small pressurizer level deviation prior to any annunciation. Operator actions in response to the deviation were we!! controlled and illustrated good diagnostic skills 06/06/98 POS IR 98-06 NRC OPS 1A 1C Operators were thorough and methodical in preparing for and conducting routine evolutions.
Close management and supervisory oversight of operational activities was evident. Procedure use and operator communications were good 04/25/98 POS 1R 98-04 NRC OPS SA During a limited review of Operations audits and auditor performance during nuclear plan; equipment operator rounds, Nuclear Oversight was Sund to have been effective in assessing Operations
- performance and corrective actions.
03/31/98 URI 1R 98-04 NRC OPS 1A 1C 3B The licensee did not implement the abnormal operating instruction fc; overe weather, to place Units 2 and 3 in a design basis configuration for a tornado, after sighting funnel clouds and receiving a severe weather waming. An unresolved item was opened to review the information contained in a letter the licensee submitted to address the inspectors
- concerns about this situation and to further assess the process the licensee used to contiof the response to the weather conditions. Additionally, a minor knowledge deficiency was identified in operator recognition of the difference between control room envelope doors and missile doors.
03/26/98 POS IR 98-04 NRC OPS 1A 3A 3C Management oversight and operator skill of the craft were good during conduct of a Unit 3 reactor startup and power ascension. This was demonstrate 3 by clear communications, appropriate annunciator response and good control of steam generator water levels.
Additionally, a nuclear plant equipment operator conducted his rounds in a professional and thorough manner.
03/24/98 VIO 1R 98-04 SELF OPS 1A 3A 3B A violation of Unit 3 TS 5.5.1.1.a was identified as a result of two reactor operators failing to SLIV follow procedure steps in the sequence as written during reactor coolant system valve testing.
The unit was in Mode 4, and this failure resulted in a slight depressurization of two safety injection tanks, which are not required by TS for Mode 4. [ VIOLATION 98004-03 OPEN]
03/14/98 POS 1R 98-03 NRC OPS 38 1A 3C Conduct of an attempt to perform a reactor startup was exce!!ent overall. The prejob briefing for the startup was thorough, and management oversight was excellent. The operators' response to the failure of regulating group control element assemblies to move in the manual sequential mode was consistent with procedural guidelines.
October 28,1998 3
SAN ONOFRE
PLANT ISSUES MATRIX DATE TYPE SOURCE ID SFA TEMPLATE ITEM CODE 03/14/98 POS IR 98-03 NRC OPS SA 1A Operations management demonstrated excellent attention to detail during a routine review of operator logs in identifying improper operator response to a reactor trip circuit breaker problem.
03/14/98 STR IR 98-03 NRC OPS 1A 3C Operators were thorough and methodical in ;,reparing for and conducting routine and nonroutine evolutions associated with completion of an outage on Unit 2 and commencing an outage on Unit 3. Close management and supervisory oversight of operational activitics was evident. Procedure use and operator communications were excellent.
03/14/98 NEG IR 98-03 NRC OPS 1A Inadequate communications between the work process center and the control room resutted in the Unit 2 control room operators being uncertain as to why a saltwater cooling pump was removed from service, and procedural expectations for initiation of equipment deficiency mode restraint paperwork for inoperable equipment were not met.
01/31/98 STR IR 97-27 NRC OPS 1A 3A 3C Operators performed preparations for and entry into midloop conditions in a thorough and safety-conscious manner. RCS Level monitoring practices and performance improved since the previous period of midloop operations. Management oversight was continuous and effective, and contingency plans were in place. The time-to-boil calculation results were inconsistent, but conservative, due to an operator's error and some minor differences in the calculation methodology between operators. Overall performance for the drain to midloop was outstanding.
01/31/98 POS IR 97-27 NRC OPS 1A 3A During routine operator rounds a nuclear plant equipment operator (NPEO) was attentive and thorough. Communications with the control room were frequent and effective. Although some minor material deficiencies were first observed by the inspectors, the NPEO's responses to the conditions were rigorous. The NPEO's use of the hand-held computer's trend capability to identify a potential degrading condition was outstanding.
01/31/98 STR 1R 97-27 NRC OPS 1B Operator responses to an inadvertent Unit 2 loss of condensate polishing flow, a Unit 3 ground 3A on a nonsafety-related electrical bus, and a Unit 3 complete loss of the core operating limits supervisory system were excellent. All of these off-normal conditions occurred during a short time period. The excellent availability of extra reactor opera' ors enabled normal control board monitoring to occur during the responses.
01/31/98 NEG IR 97-27 NRC OPS 2A 28 3A Local monitoring of emergency diesel generator (EDG) operation was weak because a high fuel filter differential prcssure condition went urinoticed immediately after an EDG start, until brought to Operations
- attention by the inspectors. This was largely because EDG operating logs were not programmaticely taken until the EDG had been operating for about 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />, and because the local annunciator failed to remain illuminated, even though the fuel filter differential pressure was about 13 psid above the annunciation setpoint.
October 28,1998 4
SAN ONOFRE
P_LANT ISSUES MATRIX DATE TYPE SOURCE ID SFA TEMPLATE ITEM CODE r
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01/31/98 POS IR 97-27 NRC OPS 1A 3A During the planned reactor shutdown of Unit 2 for the midcycle outage, several strengths were observed. Operator communications were thorough and complete, augmented staffing was effectively coordinated, and supervisory oversight was evident. The use of scripting to help coordinate activities was effective. Performance of the standard posttrip actions was formal and professional.
01/31/98 POS 1R 97-27 NRC OPS 1A 4A The permanent reduction of reactor coolant system (RCS) cold leg temperature (T-cold) was well planned and smoothly executed. The prejob briefing was very thoiough. The facility change evaluation was thorough.
12/20/97 NEG IR 97-25 NRC OPS 3A Operations equipment control personnel and the operating crew failed to recognize an applicable Technical Specification limiting condition for operation (LCO) action statement that should have been entered, until brought to their attention by the inspectors. No action times were exceeded. However, this failure demonstrated a weakness in attention to detail while assessing LCO actions for equipment configuration. A noncited violation was identified for failing to create sufficient records, either in the operating logs or by separate LCO tracking sheets, to indicate that the action was entered late.
12/05/97 STR IR 97-22 NRC OPS 3B Operations personnel were well versed in the use of the safety monitor, which was well integrated into the work control process. This had resulted in the risk control of changing plant configurations being effectively managed.
11/08/97 NEG IR 97-23 NRC OPS 1A The operating crew authorized the performance of a surveillance on radiation monitors which, wf'ile allowable under license conditions, degraded the ability to diagnose the affected steam generator during a tube rupture event. This demonstrated a weak operator attention to detail regarding the overall status of radiation monitoring instrumentation.
11/08/97 NEG IR 97-23 NRC OPS 1A 3B Control room operators demonstrated weakness in knowledge and skill of the craft in attempting to close the EDG output breaker while a voltage mismatch automatically prohibited breaker closure.
03/13/98 NCV IR 98-04 LIC OPS 1A 3B A control room supervisor demonstrateo inadequate knowledge of the required valve configuration for the current plant status. Positions of the containment isolation valves for the waste gas decay tank system were incorrectly positioned after restoration from a leak rate test, resulting in the venting of the waste gas decay tank into containment. This was a noncited violation of Unit 3 TS 5.5.1.1.a. Unit 3 was in a midcycle outage at the time, and the worst case exposure increase to individual personnel in containment was 5 mrem skin dose, which was minimal. No unmonitored release to the environment occurred.
i October 28,1998 s
SAN ONOFRE
PLANT ISSUES MATllX DATE TYPE SOURCE ID SFA TEMPLATE ITEM CODE 03/05/98 POS IR 98-04 SELF OPS 1B 3A Operations during two off-normal conditions were good. Operators' rapid response to an inadvertent closure of a Unit 3 main feed water regulating valve, with the Unit at 100 percent power, prevented the Unit from tripping on low steam generator level. Operator response to a loss of Unit 2 automatic pressurizer pressure control, due to a maintenance error, resulted in a minimal pressurizer pressure transient.
10/03/98 POS iR 98-16 NRC MAINT 2A Good plant material condition was being maintained, although three minor deficiencies were identified. Specifically, inspectors identified: trash inside a security electromagnetic field control box that did not affect the function of the component, oil on three of four reactor coolant pumps that resulted from a past poor practice of overfilling, and leakage from a plug on the discharge of a motor-driven auxiliary feedwater pump.
10/03/98 NCV IR 98-16 LIC MAINT 2B 4A A noncited violation of Technical Specifications 3.3.1.12 and 3.3.2.3 in accordance with LER 1/2-98-011 Section Vll.B.1 was identified. The licensee determined that a Technical Specification surveillance requirement had not been property performed for verifying the setpoints for the automatic removal of the log power reactor trip byrass.
08/22/98 POS IR 98-13 NRC MAINT 3A 38 3C Operations test group personnel performance during a low pressure safety injection pump inservice test was good. Tha personnel were knowledgeable about the test process and methodology to perform the test. In addition, good ALARA and industrial safety practices were utilized. A test weakness was identified, in that the inservice test procedure criteria for declaring the pump inoperable based on seat leakoff was nonconservative and did not match the analysis assumed in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report. This had minimal safety consequence.
08/22/98 NEG IR 98-13 NRC MAINT 2A Licensee maintenance of radioactive floor drains in the common radwaste building and some of the Unit 3 emergency core cooling system pump rooms was deficient. Rubber devices used to prevent gas from exiting the drains had deteriorated and debris had been a!Iowed to accumulate in the drains. There was no safety consequence to the partially blocked drains.
08/22/98 NEG IR 98-13 NRC MAINT 3A 3C Machinists
- attention to procedural direction while adjusting charging pump crosshead bearings and then repacking the charging pump was weak. The applicable procedure contained a note that appeared to prohibit the sequence of work as,wrformed. The work was actually performed technically correctly, and the procedural note was in error. However, the procedural error was not noted or corrected until pointed out by the inspectors.
08/22/98 F'OS IR 98-13 NRC MAINT 2A The licensea had generally been proactive in preserving the firemain system, with the exterior condition of the firemain system being reflective cf those areas preserved.
08/22/98 NEG IR 98-13 NRC MAINT 3B Maintenance personnel displayed a knowledge weakness when installing a spent fuel pool cooiing system valve actuator 180 degrees off from the required position as stated in the maintenance order. This was identified by an NRC inspector while work was in progress.
October 28,1998 e
SAN ONOFRE
PLANT ISSUES MATRIX DATE TYPE SOURCE ID SFA TEMPLATE ITEM CODE 07/11/98 POS IR 98-07 NRC MAINT 2A Good plant material condition was being maintained, although three isolated minor deficiencies were identified 07/11/98 POS IR 98-07 NRC MAINT 1A 1C An Operations crew's performance during a control element assembly (CEA) quarterly operability test was good in that the evolution was properly supervised, operator distractions were minimized, and attention to detail effectively ensured compliance with the surveillance requirement without entering Technical Specification (TS) action requirements 07/11/98 POS 1R 98-07 LIC MAINT SA SC The identification of a flow instrument tubing fitting deficiency by Instrument and Control (l&C) personnel demonstrated good awareness of conditions outside the scope of their immediate assignment. Although the Boiler and Condenser (B&C) technicians who had installed the new tubing had identified a problem with the 3-way valve threading at the fitting location, they were not knowledgeable of the specific thread engagement requirement for the fitting 06/06/98 NEG IR 98-06 NRC MAINT 1A The inspectors identified a weakness in procedural adherence during the performance and supervisory review of a surveillance test. Electrical Maintenance technicians did not follow the proceduralized guidance in determining the desired (but not required) accuracy of the control room pressurizer heater ammeter and, therefore, did not identify an inaccurate ammeter. In addition, the electrical test supervisor's review of the heater capacity /operabiMy verification data record missed the discrepancy 06/06/98 POS 1R 98 06 LIC MAINT 5A SB The week-by-week self-evaluation of maintenance activities, recently begun by Maintenance personnel to improve efficiency, was comprehensive and self-critics!
06/06/98 NCV IR 98-06 LIC MAINT SC A noncited violation of Technical Specification 3.4.10 was identified as a result of pressurizer safety valve setpoints being out of tolerance. The licensee's corrective actions, following discovery of the out-of-tolerance condition, were acceptable 06/06/98 NEG IR 98-06 NRC MAINT 1C SC The licensee's preventive maintanance program was weak in that it did not provide for periodic inspection or maintenance of the gaskets on the electrolyte withdrawal assemblies on the Class 1E batteries. Many of the gaskets were degraded, although all the gaskets remained capable of performing their intended function. Station Technical and Maintenance's response to the inspector-identified gasket degradation was thorough and included comprehensive corrective actions.
04/10/98 POS IR 98-01 NRC MAINT 3B Unit 2 Outage MC9 eddy current examinations appeared effectively contre!!ed, with good overall contractor performance noted.
October 28,1998 7
SAN ONOFRE
PLANT ISSUE M ATRIX DATE TYPE SOURCE ID SFA TEMPLATE ITEM CODE 03/27/98 WK IR 98-04 NRC MAINT 3C SA The inspectors identified a programmatic weakness in measuring ASME Code production welding heat input. The licensee did not measure the heat input variables (voltage, current, and travel speed) during welding of 14 new pressurizer heaters, and so did not validate, during production welding, the assumptions made during qualification welding. In addition, a previously unrecognized error made by a licensee Quality Control inspector recording weld heat input values during other ASME Code welding done about 9 months earlier was identified by the licensee.
03/14/98 NEG IR 98-03 NRC MAINT 2A 3A The containment cleanup at the end of the Unit 2 midcycle outage was generally very effective, i
although the inspectors identified some debris in a steam generator keyway, including a metal socket, that could interfere with the thermal expansion of the reactor coolant system.
03/14/98 STR 1R 98-03 NRC MAINT 3A Seven maintenance and four surveillance activities were observed to be performed in a thorough and professional manner by knowledgeable personnel. Supervisors and system engineers were frequently observed monitoring job progress.
01/31/98 NCV IR 97-27 LIC MAINT 3A 2B 48 A noncited violation [per Section Vll.B.1 of Enforcement Policy] was identified based on the ENG licensee's determination that procedures had not been adequately followed in 1993 for inspecting the lubricant volume in a safety-related motor-operated valve actuator. The licensee's operability assessment was thorough, soundly-based, and well-documented. The corrective actions were broad and thorough.
01/31/98 STR 1R 97-27 NRC MAINT 2A A detailed walkdown of the component cooling water system revealed that the overall material condition was excellent, with only minor deficiencies observed.
12/29/97 NCV 1R 98-05 LIC MAINT 2A 3A SA The speed probe collar on turbine-driven aailiary feedwater Pump 2P140 was found loose, LER 2-98-001 rendering the pump seismically inoperably for a period of time that was indeterminate but estimated to be approximately 18 days. Additionally, a motor-driven auxiliary feedwater pump was concurrently inoperable for planned work for over 2 days. This was a violation of Technical Specification 3.7.5. The licensee's corrective actions were prompt and thorough. The licensee event report was clear and complete.
12/20/97 NCV IR 97-25 LIC MAINT 2B 4B A noncited violation [per Section Vll.B.1 of Enforcement Policy) was identified for failing to LER 2-97-015 implement an adequate charging pump surveillance procedure that tested all contacts in the start circuitry. The licensee had previously reviewed this procedure in response to NRC Generic Letter 96-01, but had failed to identify the inadequacy, demowtrating less than thorouch evaluation by Nuclear Enoineerino Desion in conductino the review.
October 28,1998 s
SAN ONOFRE
PLANT ISSUES MATRIX
+
DATE TYPE SOURCE ID SFA TEMPLATE ITEM CODE 12/20/97 POS IR 97-25 NRC MAINT 2B 33 Electrical technicians demonstrated excellent skill of the craft while replacing an emergency diesel generator govemor trip solenoid. The maintenance order used to perform the task was not sufficiently prescriptive because the engine govemor to be worked was not stipulated; however, this oversight was compensated for by alert technicians.
12/20/97 NCV IR 97-25 LIC MAINT 2B 3A SC Maintenance and surveillance activities were generally performed thoroughly, with work packages in active use, by knowledgeable technicians, and frequently observed by supervision and system engineers. A noncited violation [per Section Vll.B.1 of Enforcement Policy] was identified in one out of six maintenance observations, the licenses failed to provide adequate instructions to licensee Maintenance personnel The instructions did not provide adequate cautions, and the workers' foreman made a judgemental error and provided the wrong instructions to the workers, resulting in a boric acid makeup pump becoming degraded by touch-up painting causing a plugged vent.
12/05/97 NCV IR 97-22 LIC MAINT SA The failure to initially monitor the polar crane function of lifting and moving heavy loads over radioactive fuel and safety-related equipment was a noncited violation [per Section Vil.B.1 of Enforcement Policy] and demonstrated a weakness in the execution of the program controlling lifting of heavy loads.
12/05/97 STR 1R 97-22 NRC MAINT 5B Quality of the licensee's most recent self-assessment was good. The licensee's ase of personnel from industry sources to supplement the composition and knowledge level of this assessment team was beneficial 12/05/97 VIO lR 97-22 NRC MAINT SA The failure to include the nonradioactive sumps in scope of the Maintenance Rule Program was SLIV a violation [of 10 CFR 50.65(b)(2)] and demonstrated an example of the incomplete scope of the Maintenance Rule program. [V!OLATION 97022-01 OPEN] [ Denied by licensee letter dated April 9,1998.]
12/05/97 VIO IR 97-22 NRC MAINT SA The failure to adequately monitor the adequacy of preventive maintenance program to SLIV demonstrate the reliability of the containment isolation pseudo system and the instrument air system was a violation [of 10 CFR 50.65(a)(1) and (a)(2)] and demonstrated a weakness in the execution of the preventive maintenance program. [ VIOLATION 97022-03 CLOSED by IR 97022 - no response required, corrective actions were adequate]
12/05/97 STR 1R 97-22 NRC MAINT 3B The frequent involvement and valuable contributions by probabilistic risk assessment personnel in expert paners deliberations and the paners conservativa, consensus judgment decision-making process were programmatic strengths.
October 28,1998 s
SAN ONOFRE
PLANT ISSUES MATRIX DATE TYPE SOURCE ID SFA TEMPLATE
' ITEM CODE' 11/08/97 NEG IR 97-23 NRC MAINT 3B The instrumentation and control technicians demonstrated a knowledge weakness by calibrating the EDG day tank level instrument using an undesirable method that resulted in an unknown inaccuracy of the instrument. l&C supervision recognized the calibration deficiency and corrected the problem prior to retuming the component to service.
11/08/97 STR IR 97-23 NRC MAINT 2A 2B The licensee refurbished the Unit 3 charging pump rooms and significantly improved the material condition and appearance of the pumps and pump room. The refurbishment improved the accessibility around the pumps.
03/05/98 VIO IR 98-04 SELF MAINT 3A A violation of TS 5.5.1.1.a was identified as the result of instrument and Control technicians SLIV implementing an incorrect section of a procedure while troubleshooting a pressurizer spray valve contro!!er. This resulted in a loss of automatic pressure control and a small pressure increase while Unit 2 was at full power. The technicians demonstrated inadequate attention to detail. [ VIOLATION 98034-04 OPEN]
f i
t i
t October 28,1998 to SAN ONOFRE
PLANT ISSUES MATRIX DATE TYPE SOURCE ID SFA TEMPLATE ITEM CODE 11/12/98 NCV IR 98-05 LIC ENG 2A SA 5B Violations of Technical Specifications 3.5.2 and 3.6.6.1 was identified in Unit 2 as a result of VII.B 6 EA 98-226 both trains of the emergency core cooling system and containment spray systems being LER 2-98-003 inoperable for approximately 27 hours3.125e-4 days <br />0.0075 hours <br />4.464286e-5 weeks <br />1.02735e-5 months <br />, and Train A of both systems being inoperable for approximately 18 days. The simuttaneous inoperability of both trains resulted in a loss of a safety function necessary to prevent core damage in the event of a loss of coolant accident.
The Train B inoperability was planned, and by itself did not violate technical specification requirements. However, the Train A inoperability, caused by a stuck mechanical interlock on the line starter for a Unit 2 Train A containment emergency sump outlet valve, occurred before the Train B inoperability and was not discovered until later. During that time Train B would not have functioned following a recirculation actuation signal. The grit would not reasonably have been identified as a potential problem during the routine preventive maintenance and testing activities performed by the licensee. The preliminary and final root cause assessments were prompt and thorough, demonstrating an excellent analytical capability. The corrective actions were adequate and thorough, and the licensee event report was clear and complete.
This event was originally identified on 01/06/98. The isRC noted that given the loss of function of this safety system, this violation would normally have been categorized at Severity Level IL However, the event involved the only known failure of a linestarter due to grit in approximately 16 years of plant operation, indicating that this failure was isolated. Further, the risk significance was lessened by the relatively short duration of the loss of safety function (approximately 27 hours3.125e-4 days <br />0.0075 hours <br />4.464286e-5 weeks <br />1.02735e-5 months <br />) and the recovery potential by plant personnel. Based on these considerations, the NRC has concluded that this issue is more appropriately classified at Severity Level ll1. However, we acknowledge that the failure was discovered by SCE during planned replacement of linestarters, and the issue was aggressively pursued by SCE to determine the root cause. We agree with SCE's conclusion that this failure was not likely to have been prevented by reasonable quality assurance activities and other management controls. Therefore, the NRC is exercising its enforcement discretion to not propose a civil penalty and to not cite the violation in this case.
09/18/98 POS 1R 98-16 NRC ENG 48 The root cause assessment of the plug leak in Steam Generator 2 was thorough and provided adequate confidence that the other plugs of the same design would not fail as a result of the same root cause 09/01/98 POS IR 98-16 NRC ENG 4B An engineering analysis of a leak sealant repair to a charging system check valve seal weld was rigorous. The analysis thoroughly addressed all applicable additional stresses that could result from the weight of the leak sealant box. A nonconformance report accurately assessed ASME Code ramifications of the leak sealant repair, including the amount of allowable liquid sealant and valve operability.
t October 28,1998 ii SAN ONOFRE
PLANT ISSUES MATRIX DATE TYPE SOURCE ID
_SFA TEMPLATE ITEM CODE 08/22/98 POS 1R 98-13 NRC ENG 5A 58 Nuclear Oversight demonstrated aggressive, independent oversight of the fuel fabncation process, and took appropriate action in issuing a stop work order to the fuel vendor pending resolution of a quality problem that resulted in stainless steel contamination of welds in the Zircaloy grids.
08/22/98 POS IR 98-13 NRC ENG 48 Engineering support for the core operating limits supervisory system software change to implement a reactor power calculation based on a steam calorimetric was excellent, including contracting vendor support to address a potential problem, and developing test cases to ensure the validity of the software. The facility change evaluation and the software modification report fully addressed all relevant aspects of the change. Final implementation was very successful.
08/22/98 NCV 1R 98-13 LIC ENG 4A SA A noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion lit, was identified by the licensee LER 1-98-005 as the result of discovering that the voltage at three 120 VAC loads did not comply with the design information in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report. The condtion existed since original plant construction, but the licensee missed an opportunity to iden'.fy the condition when performing calculations in support of design basis reconstitution in 1996. The licensee's efforts in ultimately identifying, and correcting, the deficiency were excellent.
08/22/98 POS 1R 98-13 NRC ENG 4B All 41 recently completed operability assessments (OAs) reviewed adequately demonstrated the basis for operability. Recently implemented expanded guidance for completeness of the OAs resulted in generalimprovements in the quality of the OAs. However, some OAs contained minor deficiencies that reouired further explanation to complete the logical basis for operability.
06/06/9C NCV 1R 98-06 LIC ENG 4A 4B A noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, was identified as a result of the component cooling water (CCW) backup nitrogen system (BNS) design being inadequate. The design basis for the BNS was not correctly translated into design specifications, resulting in the operability of the BNS not assuring that sufficient pressure would remain in the CCW surge tanks under design basis conditions 04/10/98 POS 1R 98-01 NRC ENG 3B 4C Current steam generatcr initiatives were considered comprehensive, with the planned actions to reduce operating temperatures to 596* F viewed as particularly noteworthy.
04/10/98 POS IR 98-01 NRC ENG 4C The hcensee use of the plus point probe during Unit 2 Refueling Outage EOC8 and Outage MC9 was conside ed an indicator of management support for examination initiatives that would provide for early detection of degradation in steam generator tubing.
03/27/98 POS IR 98-04 NRC ENG 48 3C 5A Unit 3 midcycle outage steam generator inspections were good. The egg crete inspections were conducted in a methodical and well-documented manner, producing high quahty results.
The vendor used good communications and proper verification techniques while performing the Unit 3 steam generator tube plugging. Management cf the inspection process was outstanding.
October 28,1998 u
SAN ONOFRE
PLANT ISSUES r.~iATRIX.
DATE TYPE SOURCE ID SFA TEMPLATE ITEM CODE 03/20/98 VIO IR 98-04 NRC ENG 48 5A A violation of 10 CFR 50.59 was identified by the inspectors as a result of the failure of the SLIV licensee to perform a written safety evaluation for a plant modification that resulted from leaving 60 feet of cord in a plugged steam generator tube. A Site Technical Services engineer failed to recognize that leaving the cord constituted a plant modification. The licensee's planned corrective actions were extensive. Separately, the licensee demonstrated a weakness in screening, for a 10 CFR 50.59 evaluation, a proposed change to the severe weather abnormal operating procedure. Although the change was approved, it was never implemented.
[ VIOLATION 98004-05 OPEN]
03/14/98 POS IR 98-03 LIC ENG 4B The licensee's response to a failed 6-inch rroisture separator reheater drain line was prompt and thorough. Engineering's preliminary assessment of the failure, which was caused by flow accelerated corrosion, was rigorous.
03/14/98 VIO IR 98-03 NRC ENG 3B 3A One violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V was identified by the inspectors as the SLIV result of the hcensee's faillure to ensure that the locking tabs were properly bent on several nuts and bolts securing the mechanical nozzle seal assemblies (MNSAs), indicating a weakness in the skill of the craft and in the uttention to detail during Quality Control inspections. The licensee inadvertently over-drilled the counterbores on two holes on each of the two pressurizer MNSAs, but the error was identified by the licensee during the in-process Quality Control inspections. The over-drilling was partia!!y the result of the licensee *s intense focus on the most important parameter (total hole depth), that led to reduced focus on the less important parameter (counterbore depth). Other aspects of the MNSA installations were in accordance with the design. [ VIOLATION 98003-03 CLOSED in IR 98003 - no response required, corrective actions were adequate]
03/14/98 POS 1R 98-03 NRC ENG 5A Two Nuclear Oversight Division audits of technical orgnnizations were found to be effective in assessing performance. The licensee's apparent cause determinations, corective actions and followup on open items were good.
01/31/98 POS 1R 97-27 NRC ENG 1A 4A The facility change evaluation for the RCS T-coid temperature reduction was thorough.
01/31/98 NEG IR 97-27 NRC ENG 3A 3B The initial operability assessment, performed by design engineers, was weak, because it did not address all fire extinguisher locations and was not rigorous in supporting conclusions that the fully charged extinguishers did not represent missile hazards.
01/31/98 STR 1R 97-27 NRC ENG 4B The licensee's evaluation of the core damage probability for the planned Unit 2 midcycle outage was thorough. The recommendations of the Nuclear Sa'c/ Group resulted in the implementation of changes to reduce risk, in the planned odage, with little impact on outage operations.
October 28,1998 is SAN ONOFRE
PLANT ISSUES MATRIX DATE TYPE SOURCE ID SFA TEMPLATE ITEM CODE 12/20/97 VIO IR 97-25 NRC ENG 5A SB A violation [of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XI] was identified because adequate testing SL IV was not performed on the Units 2 and 3 charging line to Loop 1 A check valves, in that a design small break loss of coolant accident system flow requirement was not verified. This resulted in both Units 2 and 3 operating in an unanalyzed condition for some period of time. An analysis was utvier reivew by the NRC Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation that concluded that charging flow was not required for loss of coolant accident mitigation. [ VIOLATION 97025-03 CLOSED in IR 97025 - no response required, corrective actions were verified to be adequate]
12/20/97 POS IR 97-25 NRC ENG SB A thorough and probing root cause analys s of the f silure of Kerotest 2-inch charging system check valves was performed.
12/20/97 NEG IR 97-25 NRC ENG 4B An operability assessment of a degraded boric acid makeup pump was not thorough, in that it did not assess the operability of the pump in the degraded condition.
12/20/97 NEG IR 97-25 NRC ENG 3A 3C 4A A documentation weakness was identified by the inspectors associated with the number of pressurizer heaters required for plant operation. Nuclear Design Engineering's ongoing assessment of the minimum number of operable pressurizer heaters to support plant operations was timely. However, the communication of the preliminary results to Operations was in!ormal, and between November 6 and December 4,1997, the analysis of record did not support operation with the number of heaters that were in service. Operations management had provided appropriate guidance to the operators, based on the preliminary results of Engineering's ongoing assessment. At all times, TS requirements were satisfied.
08/27/98 NEG IR 98-15 NRC PS 1A Some zones failed during performance tests of protected area detection aids.
08/26/98 POS IR 98-15 NRC PS 1A Protected area access control of personnel, packages, and vehicles was efficiently controlled.
08/22/98 POS IR 98-13 NRC PS 1C 3A The licensee's conduct of the after-hours emergency preparedness drill was excellent. One exception to staffing the technical support center within the timeliness goals of the drill was identified by the licensee. Overall communications in the technical support center were good.
08/22/98 POS IR 98-13 NRC PS 3A Health Physics support of maintenance evolutions during a spent fuel pool cooling system outage was excellent in that the technicians aggressively monitored the activities and established appropriate contamination boundanes. Health Physics support of maintenance work on a charging pump was also excellent.
08/21/98 NEG IR 98-09 NRC PS 3A 3B Notifications to the NRC were not fully demonstrated due to simulation. Offsite protective measures were consistent with the licensee's procedures, but the results were significantly different; one crew recommended evacuation of the emergency planning zone while the other crew recommended shelter.
October 28,1998 u
SAN ONOFRE
PLANT ISSUES MATRIX DATE TYPE SOURCE ID SFA TEMPLATE ITEM CODE 08/21/98 POS IR 98-10 NRC PS SA An effective quality assurance program was in place. The biennial audit, when combined with the quality assurance observation program reports, provided management with a good assessment of the solid radioactive waste and transportation programs. No negative trends were identified during the review of solid radioactive waste and transportation action reports.
08/21/98 POS IR 98-10 NRC PS 1C Housekeeping in the rao' waste building, south yard multi-purpose handling facility, and radioactive equipment and materials storage areas was very good.
08/21/98 POS IR 98-09 NRC PS 3A 3B Overall performance during simulator walkthroughs was good. Both crews properly evaluated plant conditions, identified the correct emergency action levels, and properly classified the events. Notification of state and local agencies was correct and timely. Protective measures for plant personnel were prudent and timely.
08/21/98 STR 1R 98-10 NRC PS 1A 1C 3B Overall, a very good solid radioactive waste management program was implemented. The radioactive waste minimization program was effectively implemented. The volume and activity of dry active waste generated during the time period 1993 through 1997 showed a declining trend with a volume reduction of approximately 47 percent and an activity reduction of approximately 76 percent. Good facilities were maintained for the processing, storage, and management of solid radioactive materials and wastes and the performance of shipping activities. An excellent solid radioactive waste and materials storage and inventory / accountability system was maintained. A very good transportation program for radioactive waste and materials was maintained. Shipping documentation and packages were properfy prepared for shipment. A strong sohd radioactive waste and transportation training program was maintained.
07/31/98 STR 1R 98-08 NRC PS 1A 1C Overall, a good liquid and gaseous radioactive effluent waste management program was implemented which included implementing procedures, a qualified staff, good analytical instrumentation, and properly maintained tested, and calibrated effluent radiation monitors. A small reduction in the amount of liquid waste effluent volume discharged was noted from 1996 to 1997. The station's curie amount of liquid effluent discharged showed a slight decreasing trend since 1993. Since 1995, the gaseous effluent activity released also showed a decreasing trend.
07/31/98 NCV IR 98-08 LIC PS SA 5B SC A noncited violation was issued for a licensee identified violation of Technical Specification LER 1-98-006 5.5.2.3 involving the failure to establish an operating procedure to implement Offsite Dose Calculation Manual 4.1.1.2, which required the verification and recording that all circulating water pumps required to provide dilution were operating and providing dilution when required.
The root cause of this NCV (50-361/9808-01) was the failure to include the surveillance test in the initial development of the operating procedures. Discretion was applied to this issue as provided by Section Vll.B.1 of the Enforcement Policy.
October 28,1998 is SAN ONOFRE
c PLANT ISSUES MATRIX DATE TYPE SOURCE ID SFA TEMPLATE ITEM CODE 07/31/98 POS 1R 98-08 NRC PS SA SB Oversight of the radioactive waste effluent management program was good. In 1998, the chemistry department led a comprehensive performance based self assessment of the radioactive waste effluent management program.
07/31/98 POS IR 98-08 NRC PS 2A 2C The in-place filter and activated charcoal testing programs were property implemented for the control room emergency air cleanup system and fuel handling building post-accident cleanup fitter system.
07/24/98 STR 1R 98-11 NRC PS 3A Radiation exposure controls were very good. High radiation areas were controlled effectively, and radiation workers were well briefed on radiological hazards. Radiation protection 2
technicians provided good oversight of work activities.
A good calibration program was maintained for radiation protection instruments.
07/24/98 STR 1R 98-11 NRC PS 3A Management oversight of the radiation protection program through the Nuclear Oversight Division audit and obsrvations was good. The radiation protection self-assessment program was very active and provided good event trending information to management.
07/24/98 NEG IR 98-11 LIC PS 3A Although radioactive materials had apparently not gotten off of the licensee's property, the unplanned movement of contaminated items from the radiological controlled area to the restricted area on numerous occasions and an isolated example of radioactive material found outside the restricted area indicated that improvements were needed in radioactive material controls.
07/17/98 NCV IR 98-12 LIC PS 28 A noncited violation of 10 CFR 73.55(d)(7)(i)(B), paragraph 5.1.4 of the physical security plan and paragraph 6.7.1.2 of Security Procedure SO123-IV-5.1 was identified for failure to control personnel access control to a vital area 07/17/98 VIO IR 98-12 NRC PS 2B A violation of paragraphs 3.2.3 and 6.6.3 of the physical security plan and security procedures SLIV was identified for failing to adequately compensate for three separate failures of the security
)
computer system. Licensee corrective actions were reasonable and no response to this violation was required.
07/17/98 NCV IR 98-12 LIC PS 28 A noncited violation of 10 CFR 26.24(a)(1) and paragraph 6.3.1 of Procedure SO123-XV-7 was EA 98-405 j
identified for failing to complete a fitness-for-duty drug screen prior to granting access to an j
individual who was not fit-for-duty 07/17/98 VIO IR 98-12 NRC PS 2B A violation of 10 CFR 50.9 was identified involving the submittM of inaccurate information to the SLIV NRC.
07/17/98 NCV IR 98-12 LIC PS 2B A noncited violation of paragraph 6.2.1 of the physical security plan was identified for two instances of inattentive security officers manning the guard towers October 28,1998 is SAN ONOFRE
PLANT ISSUES MATRIX DATE TYPE SOURCE ID SFA TEMPLATE ITEM CODE 07/11/98 NCV 1R 98-07 LIC PS SC A noncited violation of TS 3.7.9 (effective pror to August 5,1996) was idenafied as the result of a fire damper hav'ng been omitted from a listing in a surveillance procedure following a 1993 design modification. The damper had failed a drop test in February 1996, and the omission was identified during an intemal licensee audit in December 1997. The corrective actions from previous missed surveillance issues would not reasonably have identified or prevented tNs violation. The licensee's corrective actions were prompt and thorough 06/06/98 POS IR 98-06 NRC PS 38 The Operations manager demonstrated excellent leadership while acting as emergency coordinator in the technical support center (TSC) during an emergency preparedness drill This was illustrated by high quality briefings of the TSC staff and timely and positive direction for personnel to anticipate future conditions and response plans 06/06/98 NEG IR 98-06 NRC PS 3B A weakness in radiation worker knowledge cf radiological conduns was identified by the inspectors during a site emergency preparedness drill An inadequate Health Physics briefir g of a Mechanical craft response team resulted in all the feam members, including a Health Physics technician, not knowing radiological limits for an assigned response activity 04/10/98 POS IR 98-01 NRC PS 3B Licensee efforts ia the last 2 years, including adoption in 1997 of ethanolamine for pH control, hue resulted in a significant reduction in iron transport to the Units 2 and 3 steam generators.
03/16/98 VIO IR 98-04 NRC PS 3A A violation of TS 5.5.1.1.a was identified by the inspectors as a result of Maintenance workers SLIV demonstrating poor radiological work practices in one instance by passing tools from a high
'ontamination area to a contamination area without having a survey performed, contrary to the licensee's high contamination area control procedure. After prompting by the inspectors the survey was performed, and the contamination on tools was found to be below the limits for a high contamination area. The licensee's corrective actions were prompt and comprehensive.
[ VIOLATION 98004-06 OPEN]
03/14/98 VIO IR 98-03 NRC PS 3A A Maintenance technician failed to maintain visual observation of contractor working in the SLIV protected area, which was a violation of the Physical Security Pian requirements for escorting visitors. [ VIOLATION 93003-06 CLOSED in IR 98003 - no response required, corrective actions were adequate]
03/14/98 URI 1R 98-03 NRC PS 1C An unresolved item was identified regarding the appropriate security classification of the temporary enuipment used for filtering the emergency diesel generator (EDG) fuel oil The temporary equipment was outside the vital area, but the fuel oil storage tanks are classified as vital equipment, and the EDGs were operable during the filtration process.
02/13/98 POS IR 98-02 NRC PS 3A 3C Good performance was observed in certain program areas. A very good safeguards event reporting system was in place. A good security organization capable of meeting security and contingency plan requirements was in place n
SAN ONOFRE October 28,1998
PLANT ISSUES MATRIX 4
DATE TYPE SOURCE ID SFA TEMPLATE ITEM CODE 02/13/98 NCV IR 98-02 LIC PS 3A A noncited viola
- don [per Sec%n Vll.B.1 of Enforcement Policy] was identified for inadequate searches of a vehicle and an employee.
02/13/98 NEG 1R 98-02 NRC PS 3A Overall a continued slight downward program performance trend [in security] was noted.
Communications problems were identified with the responding local law enforcement agency. A concem was identified invohring unescorted / uncompensated use of personnel boom trucks that could allow unauthorized access to vital areas 01/31/98 NEG IR 97-27 NRC PS 3A 3B The inspectors identified that a Unit 2 safety ;njection tank sample isolation valve located in containment had not been fully closed aftor a sample had been drawn, resulting in minor leakage from the sample point. This demonstrated a weakness in attention to detail on the part of the chemistry technician performing the sample.
01/31/98 VIO IR 97-27 NRC PS 2A 4b 1C The inspectors identified that the licensee failed to ensure that 3 fire extinguishers left in Unit 2 SLIV containment during Mode 1 operations were propedy seismical'y secured. Ultimately, the licensee determined that 7 out of 32 fire extinguichers in Unit 2 containment were not property 9 strained. This was a violation [of CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V] of the licensee's se'smic program requirements. [ VIOLATION 97027-02 OPEN]
12/12/97 NEG 1R 97-26 NRC PS 3A 3B Charcoal cartridges used for drills were not property labeled. Beards wom by operations LER 2-97-017 personnel could have affected the ability to don self-contained breathing apparatuses in a timely mar.ner. Some shift technical advisors were not qualified to wear respiratory protection equipment. An operability assessment was performed to determine the number of breathing air bottit's needed in the control room that identified the need to augment the staff early during a toxic gas emergency 12/19/97 NEG tR 97-26 NRC PS 3B Audit team members had limited emergericy preparedness expertise. The assessment of the offsite interface was incomplete in that it did not irclude interviews of state and local representatives.
12/12/97 STR IR 97-26 NRC PS 1C The operational status of the licensee's emergency preparedness program was well maintained.
Facihties, emergency plan reviews, and training were properly implemented.
12/12/97 NCV IR 97-26 LIC PS 1C A noncited violation [per Section Vll.B.1 of Enforcement Policy] was identified for not exercising the recovery /re-entry portions of the emergency plan every 5 years. The augmentation process
[
for craft personnel was not well defined or understood.
12/05/97 URI 1R 97-24 NRC PS 2A 2B An unresolved item was identified involving inadequate compensatory measures during three failures of the security computer system. [EA97-585, eel 97024-02]
12/05/97 STR 1R 97-24 NRC PS 3C Personnel access to the protected area was controlled in an effective manner.
October 28,1998 is SAN ONOFRE
(
PLANT ISSUES MATRIX DATE TYPE SOURCE ID SFA TEMPLATE ITEM CODE 12/05/97 VIO 1R 97-24 LIC PS 3A A violation [of 10 CFR 73.21(b)(1)(viii)] was identified involving the failure to adequately protect SL lli a copy of the safeguards contingency plan. [EA 97-585. eel 97024-04 CLOSED BY VIOLATION 97024-04 IN NRC LETTER DATED FEBRUARY 18,1998 - VIOLATION IS OPEN]
12/05/97 VIO 1R 97-24 LIC PS 4A A violation [of License Condition 2.E. implemented by Paragraph 6.3.4 of the licensee's physical SLIV security plan] was identified involving the failure to provide backup power supply to a portion of the detection aids system. [EA 97-585 eel 97024-01 CLOSED BY VIOLATION 97024-01 IN NRC LETTER DATED FEBRUARY 18,1998 - VIOLATION IS OPEN]
12/05/97 VIO 1R 97-24 NRC PS 3A A violation [of Licerise Condition 2.E, implemented by Paragraph 3.2.4 of the licensee's physical SLIV security plan] was identified involving the failure to correctly report safeguards events. [EA 97-585. eel 97024-03 CLOSED BY VIOLATION 97024-03 IN NRC LETTER DATED FEBRUARY 18,1998 - NC civil PENALTY IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECTION VI.B.2 OF THE ENFORCEMENT POLICY - VIOLATION IS OPEN]
12/05/97 VIO IR 97-24 LIC PS 28 A violation [of License Condition 2.E. implemented by Paragraph 9.2 of the licensee's physical SLIV security plan] was identified invoMng the failure to adequately secure (lock) safeguards contingency weapons containers. [EA 97-585, eel 97024-05 CLOSED BY VIOLATION 97024-05 IN NRC LETTER DATED FEBRUARY 18,1998 - VIOLATION IS OPEN) 11/08/97 NEG IR 97-23 NRC PS 3A G 3nerally, the inspectors observed gooo radiological conditions during routine plant tours; although, some isolated conditions needing improvement were identified. For example, three areas of loose surface conta nination were observed which were not previously identified by the licensee. The inspectors concluded that licensee personnel conducting plant tours needed to improve their attention to detail in identifying and posting areas of loose surface contamination.
10/31/97 NEG IR 97-21 NRC PS 3C Off-site agency notifications were timely, but approval of some verbal notifications was not property documented. Procedural guidance was unclear conceming who should approve the notifications. Protective action recommendations were timely and consistent with implementing procedures; however, Federal guidance conceming protective action recommendations for severe core damage events has not been incorporated into the emergency plan and implementing procedures. Briefings were held at regular intervals but were ineffective at times becsuse personnel did not pay attention or could not hear speakers. Incorrect and potentially confusing terminology was used for emergency classification levels. Dose assessment activities effectively supported protective action recommendation formulation. Interactions with off-site dose assessment center personnel contributed to the response effort by identifying and resolving differences in dose projections 10/31/97 POS IR 97-21 NRC PS 3A The Operations Support Center staff's perfromance was generally good. A strength was identified for oroactive review of the release path by health physics technicians.
October 28,1998 19 SAN ONOFRE
PLANT ISSUES MATRIX DATE TYPE SOURCE ID SFA TEMPLATE ITEM CODE
-10/31/97 MISC IR 97-21 NRC
-PS 3A An exercise weakness was identified for failure to properly conduct Operations Support Center habitability surveys.
10/31/97 NEG IR 97-21 NRC PS SA SB Post-exercise (EP] critiques were thorough, open, and self critical The management critique was detailed sind informative. However, there appeared to be an overall defensive attitude regarding NEGATIVEative findings sat detracted from the ability of the critique process to improve the program.
10/31/97 STR 1R 97-21 NRC PS 3A 1B SB The Control Room staff's performance was very good P uring EP exercise]. Operations personnel were aggressive and proactive througnout tne exercise. Accident detection and classification were prompt and accurate. Analysis of plant conditions and resultant corrective actions was well thought out and implemented. Notifications were made promptty.
Communications between CR personnel were clear and effective. The shift suparintendent conducted periodic briefings to keep the operations personnel aware of performed actions.
Noise levels were kept at a minimum. Ope ations personnel implemented the emergency plan correctly, using appropriate procedures. Command and control were very good; the shift superintendent provided effective direction and guidance and with support from the operations leader. The operations leader position could create confusion with regard to who was in command 10/31/97 NEG IR 97-21 NRC PS 3A 2A 3C The scheduling of the 1995 and 1997 general emergencies to occur at noon was a potential prompting issue. Simulator modeling problems resulted in inaccurate data, which prompted players to take actions that were not planned in the exercise scenario. Exercise control was generally good with some inappropriate or incorrect actions taken by controllers. Some activities were over simulated.
10/31/97 STR 1R 97-21 NRC PS
'3A 38 Overa!! performance during the [ Full scale EP] exercise was good. The scenario was sufficiently challenging. Notifications were timely. Off-site protective actions were formulated and issued consistent with dose assessment results.
October 28,1998 2o SAN ONOFRE
7 ENCLOSURE 2 '
i GENERAL DESCRII'l~lON OF PIM TABLE LABELS Actual date of an event or significant issue for those itens that have a clear date of occurrence, the date the source of the information was issued (such as the LER date), or, for inspection reports, the last date of the inspection period.'
Type The categorization of the issue - see the Type item Code tabic.
[
SFA SALP Functional Area Codes: OPS for Operations; MAINT for Maintenance; ENG for Engineering; and PS for Plant Support. -
l Sources
'Ihe document that contains the issue irformation: IR for NRC Inspection Report or LER for Licensee Event Report.
ID Identification of who discovered issue: N for NRC; L for Licensee; or S for Self Identifying (events).
Issue Description Details of the issue from the LER text or from the IR Executive Summaries. '
Codes Template Codes - see table.
TYPE ITEM CODES i
TEMPLATE CODF3 o
EA Enforcement Action Letter with Civil Penalty i
Operational Performance: A - Normat Operations; B - Operations During Transients; f
and C - Prograns and Processes ED Enforcement Discretion - No Cisil Penalty Strength Overall Strong Licensee Performance 2
Material Condition: A - Equipment Condition or B Programs and Processes Weakness Overall Weak Licensee Performance 3
Human Perforraance: A - Work Performance; Ili - Knowledge, Skills, and Abilities I Training; C-Work Environment i
eel
- Escalated Enforcement Item - Waiting Final NRC Action 4
Engineering /De-lan: A - Design; B - Engineering Support; C - Programs and Processes VIO Violation Level I,II,III, or IV NCY Non-Cited Violation 5
Problem Identification anc Resolution: A - Entification; B - Analysis; and C-l Resolution I
DEV Desistion from Licensee Commitment to NRC Positive Individual Good Inspection Finding NOTES:
}
EEIs are apparent violations of NRC requirements that are being considered for escalated Negative Individual Poor Inspection Finding enforcement action in accordance with the " General Statement of Policy and Procedure for LER Licensee E*nt Report to the NRC NRC Enforcement Action(Enforcement Policy), NUREG-1600. However, the NRC has not I
reached its final enforcement decision on the issues identified by the Eels and the PIM URI **
Unresolved item from Inspection Report entries may be modified when the final decisums are made. Before the NRC makes its enforcement decision, the licensee will be provided with an opportunity to either (1) respond Licensing-12censin?, Issue from NRR to the apparent violation or (2) request a iw;du' - ' enforcement conference.
I MISC Miscellaneous - Emergency Preparedness Finding (EP),
l Declared Emergency, Nonconformance Issue, etc.
URIs are unresolved items about whid more information is required to determine whether l
the issue in question is an acceptable iteu, a deviation, a = xf: mance, or a violation.
However, the NRC has not reached its final conclusions on the issues, and the PIM entries may be modified when the final conclusions are made.
f i
r ENCLOSURE 3 SAN ONOFRE SPECTION PL_A_N IP - Inspection Procedure Tl - Temporary Instruction C:re inspection - Minimum NRC Inspection Program (mandatory all plants)
INSPECTION TITLE /
NUMBER OF DATES TYPE OF INSPECTION / COMMENTS PROGRAM AREA INSPECTORS EFFECTIVENESS OF LICENSEE CONTROLS IN IP 40500 IDENTIFYING, RESOLVING, AND PREVENT!NG 1
12/98-1/99 CORE INSPECTION (4 WEEKS)
PROBLEMS IP 81700 PHYSICAL SECURITY PROGRAM i
12/7-11/98 CORE INSPECTION IP 83750 OCCUPATIONAL RADIATION EXPOSURE 1
12/7-11/98 CORE INSPECTION RADIOACTIVE WASTE TREATMENT, AND IP 84750 1
12/7-11/98 CORE INSPECTION EFFLUENT AND ENVIRONMENTAL MONITORING IP 73753 INSERVICE INSPECTION 1
1/11-15/99 CORE INSPECYlON IP 83750 OCCUPATIONAL RADIATION EXPOSURE 1
4/26-30/99 CORE INSPECTION REGIONAL INITIATIVE (followup of failures to establish compensatory IP 81064 COMPENSATORY MEASURES 1
4/26-30/99 measures discussed in NRC Inspection Report 50-361/98-12; 50-362/98-12 to confirm adequacy of corrective actions)
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