Text

Proposed Tech Specs,Incorporating NRC Comments Resolved During 971027 Telcon
	ML20198S874
Person / Time
Site:	05200003
Issue date:	08/31/1997
From:	; WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC COMPANY, DIV OF CBS CORP.
To:	;
Shared Package
ML20198S864	List: ML20198S874; NSD-NRC-97-5415, Forwards AP600 TS 3.3.1 & 3.3.2,incorporating NRC Comments Resolved During 971027 Telcon.Ts Changes Will Be Incorporated in Rev 8 & Ssar Markups Will Be Included in Next Ssar Rev.Open Item 6152 Is Statused Confirm-W;
References
	NUDOCS 9711140149
	Download: ML20198S874 (51)
	v • d • e

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~ 1.0 USE AM) APPLICATION

. 1.1 Definitions

......................................N0TE. . ... ...... ..................

The defined tenas of this section appear in capitalized type and are applicable throughout these Technical Specifications and Bases.

Tenn Definition ACTIONS ACTIONS shall be that part of a Specification that prescribes Required Actions to be taken under designated Conditions within specified Completion Times.

ACTUATION DEVICE TEST An ACTUATION DEVICE TEST is a test of the actuated equipment. This test may consist of verification of actual operation but shall, at a minimum, consist of a continuity check of the associated actuated devices. The ACTUATION DEVICE TEST shall be conducted such that it provides component overlap with the ACTUATION LOGIC TE T JThese two types of tests demonstra that the 6tuated vice ldhaye]

re imulated ac%spp'ndedtoa ated equ nt inel tuatio signal in t For /

Inse iceT3st /

/ (IST) Prog m, the In rvice Tests can used as the /

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, ACTUATI DEVICE TEST F -'

m y

ACTUATION LOGIC TEST An ACTUATION LOGIC TEST shall be the application of various simulated or actual input combinations in conjunction with each possible interlock logic state and the verification of the required logic output.

The ACTUATION LOGIC TEST shall be conducted such that it provides component overlan with the ACTUATION DEVICE _ TEST,1 etwt s of ests nstrate 7 a c Watio i a ' '

J AXIAL FLUX DIFFERENCE AFD shall be the difference in nonnalized flux (AFD) signals between the top and bottom halves of a two.section excore neutron detector.

CHANNEL CALIBRATION A CHANNEL CALIBRATION shall be the adjustment, as necessary, of the channel so that it responds within (continued) l 1

h AP600.-, - ,

1.1 1 08/97 Amendwnt 0 9711140149 971105 PDR ADOcK 052OgO 3

A - 4 - A._ == %.. +.me-- p

- - Table 3.3.1 1 (page 4 cf $)

nesct:r trip System Instruunntation APet1CAett empts on SPECIFile at0Utst0 $Uavt!LLamCE 4LLeheL8Lg fa{p PWesCTION Come0!TIONS C8tammet$ Come!Tr>5 attastatsatsis VEug $(TPotwf

16. neactor trip System Interlocks

4. Intermediate 2 4 nanee neutron m 54 3.3.1.6 (a 18 10 plus. P.6 sa 3.3.1.9 N s)

b. Power manos 1 4 o mestron #1va. P 8 sa 3.1.1.6 (s das atr) sa 3.3.1.9

c. Pomer aanoe 1.2 4 m sa 3.3.1.6 mestron Fiva. Sa 3.3.1.9 (losatP)

P.10

d. Pressuriter 1.2 4 m sa 3.3.1.6 Pressure. P 11 (s1970 Sa 3.3.1.9 psig)

17. neactor trip areakers 1.2 P.0 3 sa 3.3.1.5 m/a 3(I) 4(l) 5(3)

. . with atos per division

16. aeactor trip steaker 1.2 1 each per P,Q (afs) undervoltage ats sa 3.3.1.1 n/a and shunt Trip 3(3).4(II.5(1) mechanise mechantses for required afs:

19. autWtic trip Logic 1.2 4 m sa 3.3.1.6 m/a 1(I) 4(3). 5(l)

. 4 a sa 3.3.1.6 n/a

20. 405 Stages 1. 2 and 3 actuation

a. manual 1.2 2g' s sa 3.3.1.10 n/A 3(1). 4(II.5(l) 26W.6ch a sa 3.3.1.10 w/a

<W t 5

b. automatic 1.2 4 m sa 3.3.1.6 n/a 3II) .4(I) 5. II) 4 a $a 3.3.1.6 h/a

21. Core makeup tank actuation

4. M#nva) 1,2 25*'O Sr.t %

e sa 3.3.1.10 m/a 3(I) 4(l) 5(3)

. 2 5mich 8 Sa 1.3.1.10 m/a

b. automatic 1.2 4 m $a 3.3.1.6 w/a 3(I} 4(I} $. $I)

. 4 a 5a 3.3.1.6 m/a (j) With neactor Trip treakers Closed ad Plant Control Systee capable of rod withdrawal.

hm.=u AP600 owm.m wm 3.3 15 08/97 Anenchent 0 1

BASES

. ACTIONS B.1, B.2.1, and B.2.2 (continued)

Ccadition B applies to the ManuaJ1 e ctor Trip and Manual Safeguards Actuation in H00ES 1 W)2.Actions l These Recuired m 14cDES 9,4,W5 address inoperabt11ty of one manual initiation cevice of the Manual Reactor Trip Functio,', .nd/or Maneal Safeguards dh tht fewer fr4 Actuation Function. One device consists of an actuation N3 MCg #g 4D switch and the associated hardware (such as contacts and

61. cmbl Syskm' wiring) up to t,ut not including the eight Reactor Trip i Breakers. With one device inoperable, the inowrable device SpMM d fC4 Wg gl, must be restored to OPERABLE status within 48 wurs. In this

% - Condition, the remaining OPERABLE device is adequate to perform the safety function.

If the manual Function (s) cannot be restored to OPERABLE status in the allowed 48 hour5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months Completion Time, the unit must be tsrought to a MODE in which the requirement does not apply.

To achieve this status, the unit must be brought to at least H00E 3 within 6 additional hours (54 hours6.25e-4 days 0.015 hours 8.928571e-5 weeks 2.0547e-5 months total time) followed by opening the RTBs within 1 additional hour (55 hours6.365741e-4 days 0.0153 hours 9.093915e-5 weeks 2.09275e-5 months total time). The 6 additional hours to reach MODE 3 and the 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months to open the RTBs are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach H00E 3 and open the RTBs from full power operation in an orderly manner and without challenging unit systems. With the RTBs open and the unit in H00E 3, this trip Function is no longer required to be OPERABLE.

C.1 and C.2 Condition C applies to the Manual Reactor Trip in H00ES 3, 4.

and 5 with the RTBs closed and the PLS capable of rod withdrawal. These Required Actions address inoperability of one manual initiation device of the Manual Reactor Trip Function. One device consists of an actuation switch and the associated hardware (such as contacts and wiring) up to but not including the eight Reactor Trip Breakers. With one device inoperable, the inoperable device must be restored to OPERABLE status within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months . In this Condition, the I remaining OPERABLE device is adequate to perform the safety function.

i l

(continued) i b AP600 B 3.3 33 08/97 Amenchnent 0 IP01\tepspe<\16010101.r07 10J75/ i l

BASES M.1 and M.2

. ACTIONS

~. (continued)

Condition M applies to the Safeguards Actuation signal fron l ESFAS reactor trip, the RTS Automatic Trip Logic,1st ste.g I

p*tomaticDepressuMnthandCMTinjectioninMODESl' E'

uIosufic.,)

t\ DS Sp I,7. , (td ' With one or two channels or divisions inoperable, the -

Required Action is to restore three of the four channel iWSecAS

{L 3 dtJdl N within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months Restoring all channelebut one to LE

,,-status ensurth~tM t a single failure will neither cause nor g( ...

provent the protective function.

one channel > inoperable, providesIn theaddition, having only ca> ability for survet nance testing on the remaining t1ree channels? The

/J,gg

)

('/ d.Hisgns 6 hour6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months Completion Time is considered reasonable since the protective function would still function even with a single failure of one of the two remaining channelspigs;g If Re uired Actions described above cannot be met within the

/dr/@cA s)eci ied Completion Times, the unit must be ) laced in a H00E w1ere this Function is no longer required to )e OPERABLE. A Completion Time of an additional 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months is allowed to place the unit in H00E 3. The Completion Time is a reasonable time, based on operating experience, to reach MODE 3 from :

full power in an orderly manner and without challenging plant ;

systems. Allowance of this time interval takes into

consideration the redundant ca I remaining two redundant channels OPERABLkability a50 the low C provided b probability of occurrence of an event during this period that may require the protection afforded by this Function.

N.1, N.2, and N.3 Condition N applies to the P G, P 10, and P 11 interlocks.

With one or two channels inoperable, the associated interlock must be verified to be in its required state for the existing plant condition within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months , or the Functions associated with inoperable interlocks placed in a bypassed condition within 7 hours8.101852e-5 days 0.00194 hours 1.157407e-5 weeks 2.6635e-6 months , or the unit must be placed in MODE 3 within

. 13 hours1.50463e-4 days 0.00361 hours 2.149471e-5 weeks 4.9465e-6 months . Verifying the interlock manually accomplishes the interlock condition.

If one or two associated Functions are bypassed, the logic becomes two out of three or one out of two, respectively, while still meeting single failure criterion (a failure in one of the three or one of the two remaining channels will (continued) i 1

h AP600 IM3\tedspe<\14050301 r07102717 B 3.3 40 08/97 Amendment 0

. BASES

, ACTIONS P.1, P.2.1. and P.2.2 (continued) l o $N ivisions i rable (one or two the-RTBs 3 x 2 W ==,ssoc ed on division), the breaker rable required division glge.d. gI t must-be-opened within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months , b 1 a w .

out of two while s d ur,9 A'le failure criterion (a failure the three or-one of~t emaining di ' ons will_not prevent the protective funct o .

If Required Actions described above cannot be met within the s)ecified Completion Times, the unit must be ) laced in a H00E wwre this Function is no longer required to se OPERABLE within an additional 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months . This is done by opening all of the RTBs. With the RTBs open, these Functions are no longer required.

0.1. 0.2.1 and 0.2.2 or Condition 0 applies to the RTBs in H0 DES 1} 2.er3,5 4 ank with the RTBs closed and the PLS capable of rod withdrawal.

With three divisions of RTBs and/or RTB Undervoltage and Shunt Tri) Mechanisms inoperable, I hour is allowed to restore tw three of the four divisions to OPERABLE status or the unit must be placed in H00ES 3. 4 or 5 and the RTBs opened within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months . The Completion Time of 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months is reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach H00E 3 from full power in an orderly manner and without challenging unit systems. The 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months and 6 hour6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months Completion Times are equal to the time allowed by LC0 3.0.3 for shutdown actions in the event of a complete loss of RTS Function.

Placing the unit in H00E 3 removes the requirement for this particular Function.

R.1 and R.2 aukmdue 8 6 l b gN O e

Condition R applies to ht St3 ADS Actuation,CMT f Actuation and the RTS Automatic Tri) Logic in MODES 3. 4. and 5 with the RTBs closed and the P S capable of rod withdrawal.

(continued),

h AP600 B 3.3 42 08/97 Amendment 0 tP01\techseec\160WM1.r0F 142717

/

' AP600 October 29,1997

. INSERT BASES 3.3.1 PAGE B 3.3 42 ACTION P

With one required division inoperable, the reactor trip breakers in the I inoperable required division must be opened within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months . The RTBs in i the division not required to be OPERABLE should be maintained closed. ;

regardless of their operability status,'since opening of two divisions of RTBs i

will cause a reactor trip. A division is inoperable, if, within that division. I

'D W IL P one or both of the RTBs and/or one or both of the trip mechanisms is ! ;

l inoperable, With one required divisioa inoperablefrith its RTBs open)and with two OPERABLE divisions remaining, the trip logic becomes one out of two .

The one out of two trip logic meets the single failure criterion (a failure in \'

one of the two remaining divisions will not prevent the protective function).

] . - -

s 1

r f

I

BASES ACTIONS R.1 and R.2 (continued) Q

' ~ With one or two channel inoperable, three of the four t JISfolb /

channels a must be restored to OPERABLE status in 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months .

Restoring all channels but one to OPERABLE ensures that a

/ single failure will neither cause nor prevent the protectivejm function, In addition, having only one channelanoperable,7/ffy

, provides capability for surveillance testing on theThe, 48 the cnanne"iP.

remaining three considered reasonable since the protective function would

/M' g still function even wit 1 failure of one of the two remaining channels.- /dmsa to If Required Actions described above cannot be met within the smcified Completion Times, the unit must be ) laced in a H00E w1ere this Function is no longer required to le OPERABLE. A Completion Time of an additional I hour is allowed to open the RTBs. With RTBs open, these Functions are no longer required.

S.1 and S.2 Condition S ap) lies to one or two inoperable Source Range Neutron Flux clannels in H00ES 3, 4, or 5 with the RTBs closed and the PLS capable of rod withdrawal. With the unit in this Condition, below P 6, the NIS source range performs the monitoring and protection functions. With one or two of the source range channels inoperable, 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months is allowed to restore three of the four channels to an OPERABLE status. If the channels cannot be returned to an OPERABLE status, 1 additional hour is allowed to open the RTBs. Once the RTBs are open, the core is in a more stable condition and the unit enters Condition L. The allowance of 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months to restore the channel to OPERABLE status, and the additional hour to open the RTBs, are justified in Reference 7.

T.1, T.2, and T.3 mopercWit Condition T applies when the required r of GFERABLE-SourceRangeNeutronFluxchannelf'isant le:et ii1 MODES , 3. 4 or 5 with the RlBs open. With the unit in this Condition, the NIS source range performs the monitoring and protection functions. W h h:: ther,the required n' A r of source range channel ORS MBLE, operations involving positive reactivity itions shall be suspended imediately. This operdit will preclude any power escalation. In addition to (continued) h AP600 1801\te<* spec \160MMt.r07-14279F B 3.3 43 08/97 Amenchent 0

BASES-

-* . SLRVEILLANCE SR 3.3.1.9

. REQUIREENTS (continued) SR 3.3.1.9 is the )erformance of a CHAML CALIBRATION every 24 months. This St is modified by a Note stating that neutron detectors are excluded from the CHNSEL CALIBRATION.

The CHM 0EL CALIBRATION for the )ower range neutron detectors consists of a normalization of tw detectors based on a power calcrimetric and flux ma) performed above 20% RTP. Below 20% RTP, the design of tw incore detector system, low core power density, and detector accuracy make use of the incore detectors inadequate for use as a reference standard for .

comparison to the excore channels. The CHANNEL CALIBRATION for the source range and intermediate range neutron detectors consists of obtaining the detector plateau or discriminator curves, evaluating those curves preampand comparing-

' the curves to the manufacturer's data. This Surveillance is not required for the power range detectors for entry into MODE 2 and 1, and is not required for the intermediate range detectors for entry into MODE 2. because the plant must be in at least MODE 2 to perform the test for the intermediate range detectors and MODE 1 for the power range detectors.

The 24 month Frequency is based on the need to perfons this Surveillance under the conditions that apply during a plant outage and the potential for an unalanned transient if the Surveillance were performed with tw reactor at power.

O mrating experience has shown these components usually pass tw Surveillance when performed on the 24 month Frequency.

SR 3.3.1.10 SR 3.3.1.10 is the performance of a TADOT of the Manual Reactor Trip, "CP E d:r "nitba, and the SI. ADS Actuation, and CNT Injection inputs from the ESFACs. This TADOT is performed every 24 months. The test shall L independently verify the OPERABILITY of the undervoltage and shunt trip mechanisms for the Manual Reactor Trip Function for the Reactor Trip Breakers.

The Frequency is based on the known reliability of the Functions and the multichannel redundancy available, and has

been shown to be acceptable through operating experience.

2 The SR is modified by a Note that excludes verification of setpoints from the TA00T. The Functions affected have no setpoints associated with them.

(continued) h AP600 pe1\tethspec\100MM1.f97 142797 B 3.3 51 08/97 Amendment 0

ESFAS Instrumentation

. . 3.3.2 ACTIONS (continued) iCONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME U.1 Initiate action Imediately g,Ifact U. R ired Action and sociate(Completto v iny00E5with S slh LA

' Time noVmet.' ,/ open and vir e

' level in pressurizer. ,

nitiate action t be V. Requi as ciated Com 7 me not i Action a ion V.1 MODE 5 with ilC and visib pen svel in

- f 168 hours0.00194 days 0.0467 hours 2.777778e-4 weeks 6.3924e-5 months f , h6 g \/

pres ter.

W. Required Action and W.1 If in MODE 5 with the Immediately associated Completion RCS open and level Time not met, not visible in pressurizer. initiate action to be MODE 5 with the RCS open and visible level in pressurizer.

AND W.2 If in H00E 5. isolate Immediately the flow path from the demineralized water storage tank to the RCS by use of at least one closed and de activated automatic valve or closed manual valve.

3 A

(continued) b AP600 t p01\ap600\t ec hstec\16C l0102. rof.182797 3.3 24 08/97 Amendment 0

Revised kten U . Inesit on page 33 24

CONDITION REQUIRED ACil0N COMPl.ETION TIME

,- ~ . - -

, LWCI' '

U. Required Acton and U.1 Be in MODE 5 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months 'N y ;' associated Com ' ebon Trne g M/ cf Table 3.321 spac6ed 6NQ t Condibon not met.

Instate achon to open the RCS I U2 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months

.( and establish a visible level in /

, pressurizer. /

~

b4 Revised Bases . Insert on pages B 3 3113 & .114

]

U1 L,,xN s !

If tt.e Required kbon arid 1he associated Completion Time of the Condibon grven in Tabb 3 1 is not '

met, and me required sutch o7liMotuet is not restored to OPE tatut wthin 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months , the pl ustk be pl a condibon in which the likelihoc(and consequences of an ev are minimized. This is accomplish . acing the plant in MODE 5 usin 42 hours4.861111e-4 days 0.0117 hours 6.944444e-5 weeks 1.5981e-5 months . Once in MODE , stion shall be immediate9 initiated to open t. S and establish a visible level inh pressunzer. The 12 hour1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months mplebon Time is a -

reasonable ame to reach E 5 from MODE 4 wth RCS coolitigpovided by the RNS ( oximately 350'F) in an orderly rnanner wthout nging plant systems Opening the RCSpressure boundary ures that ,

cookng water can be injected wthoutMoperation. Filling the RCS to provha,yjsible levcl in be pressurizer minimizes the consequences of a loss of decay heat removal event. N J

~ ~^

l k e

ii AP600 Tech Specs DRAFT October 29,1997

Remed Acton V Insert on page 33 24

,- CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPT.ETION TIME-

, ~

/kj)/g/ V. Required A*on and V.1 Restore the inoperable dannel(s). 168 hours0.00194 days 0.0467 hours 2.777778e-4 weeks 6.3924e-5 months ' ,

aseodated Complebon Trne N MI of Table 3 3.21 speci6ed QB

^

\

tyj/j;> Condibon not met.

V.2.1 Be in MODE 5. 180 hours0.00208 days 0.05 hours 2.97619e-4 weeks 6.849e-5 months ,

$194\ ~. - !

y stamms

'- V22 Initiate action to open the RCS 180 hours0.00208 days 0.05 hours 2.97619e-4 weeks 6.849e-5 months /

and establish a visible level in

,~x-. _,. ,

pressurizer.

bR evised Bases Insert on pap B 33-114 -

! N V 1. V 21. and V.2.2

' If the Required Acton and the hated Completion Time of the st Condition listed in Table 332 t is not f met h the required channel (s) or 'dyision(s) is not bypassed ethin% hours, the inoperable channel (s) or -

must be restored within 168 hours0.00194 days 0.0467 hours 2.777778e-4 weeks 6.3924e-5 months . The 168 hour0.00194 days 0.0467 hours 2.777778e-4 weeks 6.3924e-5 months Completion Time is based on the ability of the two j

devision(s)bPERABt.E remaining channels or divisioris to provide the protective Funcbon ev If the channel (s) or division (s) is not restored wthin the 168 hout Completion Time, the plant shall be placed (n a conditon in which the likelihood and consequences'of an event are mirdmized. This is accomplished by I placing the plant in MODE 5 wthin 180 hours0.00208 days 0.05 hours 2.97619e-4 weeks 6.849e-5 months (the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months ). Once in MODE 5,htion shall be initiated to open the RCS and establish a visible level in the pressurizer. The 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months is a reasonable time to reach 3

M00E 5 from MODE 4 with RCS cochng provided by the RNS (approximataly 350*F) in an orderty manner wtho'tu challenging plant systems.

\ \

Opening the RQS pressure boundary assings that cooling water can be injected withmt ADS operabon. Filling the RCS to provide a visible level in the pressunzer minimizes the conseque of a loss of decay heat ,

(sfemoval event. - - - - - _

'k s.

AP600 Tech Spec.s DRAFT October 29,1997

p 3.3.2 i

. ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION- REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION T!HE

,_ 7

! Y. RequirefA:tionand Y.1 If in H00E 5 initiate Immediately t assoct'ated Completion on to be in >

TJme not met. 5 with the.RCS j f' intact and visible f level in pressurizer.

AND /

Y.2 If in H00E 6, Immediately upper internals in

&_ /

F / place and cavity leve': less than full.

initiate action to be

@ .h ,/ in MUDE 6 with the pt@ge

/ '

upper internals Y --

removedanp AND Y.3 Suspend positive - Immediately t_ reactivity additions.

b AP600 3.3 26 08/97 Amendment 0 1901\ap400\techspec\160303C2 4 r07 102117

. . Revised Acton Y Insert on page 3 3-26 r

gged CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPi.ETION TIME Y. Required Acton and Y.1.1 if in MODE 4. be in MODE 5. 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months Mated Completon Time , . , f of Iable 3.321 speci6ed Condebon not met (AND991a[

Y.1.2 If in MODE 4 or 5, initiate acton 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months to establish a visible level in the pressurizer wth the RCS intact s 6MQ k

Y.2 If in MODE 6, initiate acbon to be Imrmdiately in MODE 6 with the upper internals removed and the cavity full.

k g f Y.3 Suspend positive reactrvh; immediately Dewm-inserron pagdH3115~' ~ --

)

Y.11 Y 12. Y 2. and Y V

/ /

/

) /

if the Recured Acton and the associated Compleben Time of the fast Condbon hsted en Tade 3 3 21 is nofmet wtule in

, MODE 4, with RCS cochng pnmded by the RNS, MODE 5, or MODE 6 the plar't must be placed in a MODE in wNch tte I tikehhood ano consecuences of an event are manuzed if in MODE 4, this is accomplished by placing the plant in MOOli 5 etNn 12 fours. The 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months ,n a reasonabe time to reach MODE 5 frorp MODE 4 wth RCS cochng provided by the RNS (ap6roximately 350*F) ir)in ordetty manner ethout challenging piart' systems if M000 4 or 5, Recpjeft Acton Y.12 requires 1rubabon of ach n 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months to open the RCS and estabh s6e leniin the preswnzer. The 12 hour1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months Cotmieton Time allows transtion to MODE 5'in usedi.re wmt1.1, if

/needed. pnar to iritamng action to open the. RCS pressure bound'ary

' /

If in MODE 6,

/ l /

red Acton Y.2 regdres the plant to be,.r'naintained in M00EJ and nuabon of acion to remove mper int and to All he ca / j

- Recp Adions Y.1 md Y.2pinimize the consequences of the loss of h heat remov maximdng R rnventori and mentanng RCS termynture as low as practical. Opening the RC$ pressure assures that ing watw can be iryocted wthout ADS tm Addtionally, lhe potenbal for a enbcahty event is nemized by of postrve roectmty skitons t

AP600 Tech Specs DRAFT October 29.1997

__ . ._ _ . _ - - ~

- - -E5FAS"Instruraentation ~~'

3.3.2 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

SURVEILLANCE FRE@ENCY SR 3.3.2.7 NOTC ..... -

- This Surveillance is not required to be- i perfonned for actuated equipment which is

-s included in the Inservice Test (IST)

Program.

Perform ACTUATION DEVICE TEST. 24 months i

SR 3.3.2.8 PerformACTUATIONDEVICETEST,,6<- 24 months Sguibvalvet. _

SR 3.3.2.9 Perform ACTUATION DEVICE TEST, & 24 months pressurizer heder circuib hreabrs.

{

b AP600

- 1301\ap400\ t ech spec \16030302. r07 10279 F

- 3.3 28- 08.'97 Amendment 0

-1 4

- + - - ,- _ . _ _ - _ _ . .-%r

ESFAS Instrumentation

. 3.3.2 i l.-

= f Engineeeed Saf.ableguards3.3.2 1 (page actuation Systee 2 ofInstrumentation 12)

'APPt!CA8tt moptl on otNta 5P!Cirito at0V!AED Svevi ttt Aaett AltonA4L E tair FUNCTION Crpoo!T10NS CHANNEL 5 -CON 0!TIONS AtQuintatMTS )ALVE $ttPOINT .-

2. Core makeup fank (Cart) Actuation >

a.-Nanual Initiation 1,2,3,4(3) 2 switches t.N la 3.3.2,3 N/A 4("). 5(C) 2 switches t,v sa 1.3.2.3 N/A

b. Pressuriser mater 1.2.3,4(j) 4 s,N sa 3.3.2.1 Level . tow 2 sa 3.3.2.4 ((a F.M*)

a 1.M) 5m ].3.2.1 J.).2.6 h $4 4(l). 5(C) 4 t,v in 1.3.2.1 54 3.3.2.4 ((a F.M*)-

a 1.04) sa 3.3.2.5 5R 3.3.2.6 C. Safeguards Defer to Function 1 (lafeguards actuatinn) for initiating functions and Achation requirements.

d. ADS stages 1. 2. aefer to Function 9 (A05 Stages 1, 2 & 3 Actuation) for all initiating

& 3 Actuation functions and requirements.

3, Containment isolation

a. manual Initiation 1,2,3,4 2 switchet t.o sa 3,3.2.3 N/A 5.6(*) 2 switches r. , y SR 3.3.2.3 m/A

.- b. manual Initiation aefer to Function 12.a (Passive Containment Cooling Actuation) for of Passive initiating functions and requirements.

Containment Cooling

c. lafeguards Refer to function s (Safeguards Actuation) for initiating functions and actuetton requirements.

(continued)

(c) above the P-12 (Pressurtter tevel) interlock.

(i) with the aCs pressure boundary intact.

(j) with the RCs not being coolid by the Normal aesidual No.st memoval system (RNS).

(m) Not applicable for valve isolation Functions whose associated flow path is isolated.

- (n) with the aCs being cooled by the RNS.

5 i

AP60 3.3 30 08/97 Amendment 0 k.eaoou.0 aton <n.o.<uacio m e tom >

6

, . - , , . - - - r., r,. ...,em_', o e_e . ,h, .. , . , , i, ,. ,

ESTAS Instrumentation :

3.3.2 Table 3.1.21 (page 3 of 12)

Engineered safeguards actuation Systee instrumentati6a ,

_r aPPtICA4Lt 1 MODil On OTHta '-

SPtCIFIED aEQuta(D -

.$UavtittAMet AttcwAtt( Ta!P .

FUNCTION CONDITIONS CHAmttl CON 0! TION 5 REQUIntMENT5 utVE SETPotNT-niew_ g

4. Steam Line Isolation r

4. Manual Initiation 1.2.3,40) 2 switches t.5 Sa . 3. .U. 3 h/A I

b. Contatament 1.2.3.40) 4 t t. 54 3.3.2.1 ls 8.0 psig)

Prs; p re - High 2 la 3,3.2.4 ,

54 3.1.2.5 '

la 3.3.2.6 i

c. Steam Line Pressure.

11) Steam Line 1.2.3(a) 4 per e.m 5a 3.3.{.1 (a 521g05or I J p$i Pre.,4ure . Steam line la 3.).J.4 tow Sa 3.s.2.5 See mote 1 Sa 1.3.2.6 e,m 5a 3. 3. 2.1 '

(2) Steam tine 3(d) 4 per steam line la %.3.2.4 (sh00 psi with Pressure.

hecative 54 3.3.2.5 ties naie . High Sa 1.3.2,6 constant a 50 seconds) 1.2.3(a) 4 per loop 4.4 sa 1.3.2.1 :(e 510 or

d. Tcold - Low 54 1.3. 470*F Sa 3.3.{.a4.5 tew Note 2) sa 3.3.2.6

5. Turbine Trip

a. manual main 1.2 tefer to Function 6.a (manual main Feedwater Cont'o1 Feedwater valve Isolation) for requirements.

Isolation b.- SC Narrow aange 1.2 4 per 50 S.t la I.3.2.1 (s95%)

. water Level la 3.3,2.4 High 2 sa 1.3.2.5 sa 3.3.2.6

c. Safeguares Refer to Function 1 (Safeguards Actuatior.) for initiating functions and actuation requirements,

d. Reactor Trip nefer to Function 18.4 (t$FA5 Interlocks, Reactor Trip. P+4) for requirements.

(continued)

(a) above the P-11 (Pressuriser Pressure) interlock, when the aC5 boron concentration is below that necessary to meet the shutdown margin reautrements at an ecs temperature of 200*F.

(b) Time consthats used in the lead / lag controller are tg a (50) seconds and og s (5) se:onds.

(d) selow the P.11 (Pressuriter Pressure) interlock.

(1) Not applicable if the usivs are closed.

Note 1: 405 psig is for a steamline break outside containment.

525 psig is for a steamline break inside contatnment.

Note la 470** is for a steam 1tne break. 310*F is for CVS malfunction.

$i potAP600-

\ae40o\ t e ch s eec\ l6o lo lot . ro f .102757 3.3 31 08/97 Amendment 0

. , . + - . - - - - - , e ne wn

ESFAS Instrumentation.

. . 3.3.2 I t

- Table 3.3.2 1 (page 8 of 12)

, engineered safeguards Actuation system anstrument uion APPLIC4ett MODES OR OTHER SPECIFIED Rtoulato SuavstLLAnCE At ttasaatt TatP FUNCTIOrt CONDITIONS CHAhmtL5 CON 0!T1045 atQuintmENT5 VALUE 5tTPo!NT

13. Pastive aesidual Heat Somoval '3 eat (schenger Astuativr

a. manual Ititiation 1.2.* 4 0 switches t ,1f h sa 3,3.2,3 m/A

[5(i) 2 switches E.0 58 !.3.2.3 h/A

b. SG warrc , aange 1,2,3,4(j) 4 per % s,w . Sa 3.1.2.1 (a 45.000 water '.evel - Low Sa .3.2.4

}03,2.5 lbe)

Sa sa 3.3.2,6 Coincident with 1.2,3.4(I) 2 per M4 54 3.3.2.1 (a200goe Startup *ee1 water feedwater sa 3.3,2.4 per SG ]

tlow - Low Inne sa 3. 3.2. 5 -

5m 3.3.2,6

c. $c side aange 1,2,3,4(D 4 per SG e,N ta ).3.2.1 (a 25.000 water Level . Low

'e

3. 3.2. 4 lbel M 1.3.2.5

, la 3.3.2.6

d. ADS Stages 1,2 & nefer to Function 9 (Aos stagt-s 1, 2 & 3 Actuation) for initiating 3 Actuation functions and reautrements.

e.-(MT Actuation 1,2,3,4 nefer to Function 2 (Cut Actuation) for initiating functions and requirements.

/5(1) nefer to Functions 2.a d 2.b (Cut Actuation) for initiating functions and requirements.

f. Pressuriser water 1,2,3,4(I*P) 4 S,N SR 3,3.2.1 (s80t')

Level, High 3 SR 3.3.2,4 SR 3.3.2.5 at 3.3.2,6 (continued)

(t) with the RC5 pressure boundary intact.

(j) with the RC5 not being cooled by the hormal Residual Heat Removal System (RN5).

1.m m -~ % ,o u .< - - .3 4

(p) abovs the P.19 (aC5 Pressure) interidct.

1 b Aoowua.euuaorem.,or.im,,

P600 3.3 36 08/97 Amendment 0 4een.e

. ESFAS Instrumentation 3.3.2 v

Table 3.3.21 (page 9 of 12)

- Engineered safeguards Actuation System Instrumentation APPLICA8Lt H0045 OTMit

-SPECIFIED SEQUlatD Suavt!LLaMCt 46LOWAt.t TRIP FUNCTION CON 0!TIONS CMANutL5 CONDITIONS aEQUlatWENTS VALUE SETPOINT

14. SG tiondown Isolation

a. Passive mestdval 1,143.4(3'") toler to Function 13 (Passive mesidual Heat aemoval Heat menaval Heat weet tachanger actuation) for all initiating functions tachanger and requirements.

Actuation

b. SG Narrow Range 1,2, 3. 4(N 4 per SG S.A sa 3 5 2.1 (a 45.000 water Level - Low SR 3.3.2.4 lba)

Sa 3.3.2.5 54 3.3.2.6

15. soron Oilution Block

4. Source mange 2N).3.4(*) 4 S.7 Sa 3.3.2.1 (s Source Neutron Figu 54 3.3.2.4 mange Fluu x multipitcation sa 3.3.2.5 1.6 in 50 54 3.3.2.6 minutes]

5(*) 4 0,P SR 3.3.2.1 (s Source

. Sa 3.3.2.4 Range Flum x sm 3.3.2.5 1.6 in 50 Sa 3.3.2.6 minutes

b. neactor Trip nefer to Function 18.4 (ESFAs Interlocks, meactor Trip, P 4) for all requirements,

c. Sattery Charger 1,2,3.4(*) 4 s.T sa 3.3.2.3 (a 343 v*)

, Input voltage - divisions sa 3.3.2.4 Low 5(") 4 sP Sa 1.3.2.3 (a 343 v*)

. divisions sa 3.3.2.4

16. Chemical volume and control System makeup Isolation

4. 5G Narrow aan 1,2,3,4() *) 4 per SG 8.R SR 3.3.2.1 (s 954) water tevel ge Sa 3.3.2.4 Migh 2 Sa 3,3,2,$

sa 3.3.2.6

b. Pressuriser water 1,2,3(*) 4 s,0 sm 3.3.2.1 (s lot *)

Level - High 1 sa 3.3,2.4 sa 3.3.2.5 l- s SR 3.3.2.6 T s ""tc ,I % - -

M c. Pressuriter water 1,2,3,4(1 **P) 4 s.T Sa 3.3.2.1 [s 67% or gh D tevel - High 2 ga 3,3,2,4 74g, $gg sa 3.3.2.5 Note 3]

Sa 3.3.2.6

d. Containment l'2.3(*)

, 4 e,Q 5R 3.3.2.1 (s 100 m/hr) madioactivity - 5R 3.3.2.4 Migh 2 sa 3.3.2.5 SR 3.3.2.6 (continued)

(f) selow the P-6 (Intermediate mange Neutron Fluu) interlocks.

(j) with the aC5 not being cooled by the Normal aesidual Heat memoval system (RMs).

(m) Not applicable for valve isolation Functions whose associated flow path is isolated.

(p) Above the P-19 (RC5 Pressure) interlock.

Note 3: 67% is the nominal setpoint.

744 is the analyzed setpoint.

M AP600 .

3.3 37 08/97 Amendment 0 t oo1\aeto0\ tech seec\16010)o2. rof.1o2797

3.3.2

/ Table 3.3.21 (page 9 of 12)

(t)ginnered Safeguards Actuatienjystem Instrumentation -

l APPLICA4LE -

/

, M00t$ 04OTMa / / /

SPECIFIt0 /

' NCMINAL '

COM0!T10=$ REQUIRED / Suavt!LLAMCt TRIP FUNCT10s: CMANNELS CONDITIONS REQUlatM NTS $tTPOINT

/ ! ,

. Chemical volume'and Control /

System makeupftsolation /

1,2,3,45+8) 4 per SG

a. Leve SG -wkrroer'nanf evigh water ./ h, a $a J.;1 .1 / [s 9$5]

/ Sa sa

.4

./

Sa i. .

b. Press $riter water Level - 1.2.3 ') 4 t,Q (s305*)

Migh 1 Sa l.'I.M. '

Sa .l..l.;

se .;'s'A sa M- b. . 4 Coincident with Safeguards Actuation 1,2,3(a) nefer initiat Function 1 tkng functions (ar.d reovfrements.safeguar s actuation) f kb' .

wri 1,2, 3,4(l e P) 4 s,T sa .:1.F.1

c. Presle

- a ier water Level a . a.P.4 ~ hs s. 67% see or

/ , 5a 54 l.i

.i

. mote 3. /

j f . .

d. Containment Radioactivity 1,2,3(*) -

4 s,Q $4 .3.J.1 (s1 n/hr)

Migh 2 '/ Sa .L .. .e Sa .u.P .

.f ./

/

$a . .L.

17. morsal aesidual w,at memoval <

/

/systee Isolation /

a. Congainment d&dioactivity 1,2,3(M 4 e,Q sa 3.1.2.1 (s 100 m/hr)

- w gh 2 j sa u.l.v Sa .

Sa .J.P.6 I,'3(*) Refer to nction 1 (safeguards Actuation) for all

b. SafegY ds Actuation initiating funtttons and requirements. \

14. E5FA$ InterlQcks \ N k

k a. neactor Trip y P-4 1.2.t h /\ivisions D4 SR 3.3.2.3 N/a

\b. Pressuriger Pressure, 1,2,3 \4 3.M Sa :l. .a.1 (s 19 0 P-11 % $a l. .P 4 psig

\ sa . .v.s N sa 3. .P.6

c. ntermediteaane\

Neutron F us, Pe 2 4 3L 54 S. .U 1 La it to

'I. P.4

'k

. Sa amps

\ $a .'..P.$ \

sa 3. 0,6

\

d. Pressuriser Level. P 12 b2,3 4 J.M Sa . . M (Above P4 Pressuriter N 't 5a 5a J5

.2.6 water Level

- Low 1 setpotat of 204)

e. Pressuriser L el, P-19 1.2.3.4(I) 4 3.N Sa .3.2.1 (a?00 psig)

Sa ',.4 Sa . .5

$a i.>. .6 (continued) h AP600 3.3 37 08/% Amendment 0

, aMi\ s sa r.ta t \16c le lo2 . ro f .o72197

., ESFAS Instrumentation

=C -

3.3.2 -

-n .

Table 3.1.2 1 (page 11 of 12)'

.- Engineered safeguards Actuation Systee Instrumentation

. A APPLICAett Noots oTNta SPECIFitD REQUIAfD SURvt!LLANCE AL LCheatti TRIP FU>CTION CONDITIONS CNANNELS . CON 0!TIONS REQUIR(MENTS vs.Ut 5tfro!NT 20.' main control aoom isoletion and Air Supply initiation

a. Control aoom Air 1,2,3,4 2 r,o la 3.3.2.1 [s 2:10

supply madtation 54 3.3.2.4 curies /m' i

Nigh 2 58 3.3.2.5 -- Dose

$a 3.3.2.6 toutvalent 1 131)

Note (h) 2 GE SR 3.3.2.1 (s 2:103 SR 3.3.2.4 curies /m 5R 3.3.2.5 Dose 54 3.3.2.6 tau 1 valent I 331] *

b. sattery Charger 1,2,3,4 4 s.o 5m 3.3.2.3 (a343 v')

Input Voltage - divisions 5A 3.3.2.4 Low Note (h) 4 c,K sa 3,3.2.3 (a 143 v']

divisions SR 3.3.2.4

21. Autillary spray and Purification Line Isolation

a. Pressuriter water 1,2 4 s.L SR 3.3.2.1 (20.04')

Level - Low 1 54 3.3.2.4 5R 3.3.2.5 SR 3.3.2.6

22. In containment nefueling water storage Tank (tawST)

Injection Line valve Actuation

a. Manual Initiation 1.2.3,4(N i switch E.N 54 3,3.2.3 N/A

b. ADS 4th stage e)e nction ""Id54thstage'jctuation neferloku# uds c s s32 for innt ating functions L/A Actuation and requirements.

c. Coincident aC5 4(").5,6(9) 1 per loop Ny sa 3.3.7.1 (a 3 in.

Loop 1 and 2 Mot 5A 3.3.2.4 above bottri Leg Level - Lon 2, sa 3.3.2.5 inside 54 3.3.2.6 surface of ther et I

bc Sol (e

, 23. law rculation va necfTContaineenkve actuation

a. Nanual Initiation 1. 2. 3. 4(N 2 switch t.N SR 3.3.2.3 N/A sets 4(*),5,6(9) 2 switch Gy 54 3.3.2.3 N/A sets i b. Safeguards Refer to Function 1 (Safeguards Actuottor) for all initiating functions

'7 Actuation and requirements.

LDSgbn >

D j/ (continued)

(g)

~

with upper internals in place and refueling cavity less than full.

(h) ouring movement of irradiated fuel assemblics.

(j) with the RCS not being cooled by the Normal Residual Heat Atmoval system (RNS).

(n) with the RC5 being cooled by the RNS.

HAP 600 3.3 39 08/97 Amendment 0 ipot\as400\techseec\16030902.r07 lo27s?

3.3.2 t le 3.1.2 1 (page n of 12) tagineered $apeguards Actuation System Instrumentation AepticAstr j

'/

oa c cDNE coe m ons $

N'!adiNi! .s kh *

23. Innst t ,

societintainmentati e valve Actuatyon

/

a, manual Initiation 1,2,3,4(D 2 switch t,= st 3.3.2.) =/A sets 4(a)-l.6(9)

. 2 Switch G,Y 54 3.3.2.) N/A j .

sets -

b. Safegwerd6' Actuation aefer functions to Function }re(ments. Safeguards Actuation) for all initiati and requi i 1,2,3,4(N s,N (acontain-Coinldent"$thInws?

teve - to 4 se se q}. ment 4(a),s.s(9) 4 r,v

:t:1 "taf51Si' '

sa 3. ;

se u.c a. a.

. sn .

.c.g (a c.ontain-ent

/ 58 - <-

El{ffijtye

/ -(continued) k

$S0 Ik 00. )

)

/non..AP600 u.m se sam.nr.on m h.339 08/% ndment 0

. _ _ . . _ . . _ . . _ _ . _ _ _ _ . _ . _ _ __ _ _ _ _ . ~ __

"_ ESFAS Instrumentation

1. 3.3.2

.' , table 1.3.2 1 (pa-Je 12 of 12)

Ingineered Safeguards Actuation Systee Instrumentation i

APPLICASLE N00(5 OTHta -

SPfCIFitD at0Utat0 5Uavt1LL A6 CE ALLCnsAT.L t TRIP FUNCTION CON 01'!ONS CHANNELS CONo! TION 5 atoutatMENT5 VALUE SitPOINT

24. Spent Fuel Pool Isolation

a. Spent Fuel Pool 6 I C.P sa 3.1.2.1 (31.5 ft.)

Level - Low Sa 3.1.2.4 sa 1.1.2.5 54 3.1.2.6 2$. E5FACs Logic

4. Actuation 1.2.3.4 4 0.0 SR 3.3.2.2 N/A subsystees divisions.

1 battery-backed subsystee per division 5.6(9) 4 C.w 54 3.3.2.2 N/A divisions.

1 battery-backed subsystem per division

26. Ptts

a. Functional Logic 1.2.3.4 4 0.0 54 1.3.2.2 N/A Subsystem divisions. SR 3.3.2.7 1 battery- sa 3.1.2.8 backed subsystem per cabinet 5.6(0) 4 G.= sa 1.3,2,2 N/A divisions. Sa 1.3.2.1 1 battery-backed subsystem par cabinet 27 Pressuriser Heater Trip

a. Core MJkeup Tank Refer to Function 2 (Core Makeup Tank Actuation) for all initiating Actuation functions and requirements. In addition to the requieements for Function t. 54 1.1.2.9 also applies.

28. Chemical end voluet control Systee l

Letdown tsolation . d thil, 2

( a. Hot Leg Level - 4(").5.o(93 1 per loop C.T SR 3.1.2.1 [ c i tr.

Low 1 SR 3.3.2.a above inside sa 1.3.2.5 surface of ,

SR 3.1.2.6 t r.

(d~~tu (continueds (g)- with upper internals in place and refueling cavity less than fuil.

(e) .Not applicable for valve isolation Functions whose associated flow path'is isolated.

~

(n) with the aC5 being cooled by the RNS.

b AP600' i p01\ aeao0\ t e ch s ee t\ 16050102. ro? .102797 3.3 40 08/97 Amendment 0

. . . _ ~ . . _ - , . - . . . _ . - - . . _ . -

. ESFAS Instrumentation

', B 3.3.2 BASES APPLICABLE 1.c. Pressurizer Pressure - Low (continued)

SAFETY ANALYSES, LCOs, and The transmitters are located inside containment.

APPLICABILITY with the taps in the vapor space region of the pressurizer, and thus possibly experiencing adverse environmental conditions (LOCA. SLB inside containment). Therefore, the Trip Setpoint reflects the inclusion of both steady state and adverse environmental instrument uncertainties.

The LC0 requires four channels of Pressurizer ow to be OPERABLE in H00ES 1, 2, and 3

- Pressure-A)#tomitigatetheconsequencesofahigh (above F 11 7" energy line rupture inside cont 61nment. Four channels are provided to permit one channel to be in Twh :n the RCS boron concentration is trip or bypass indefinitely and still ensure no oelow that necessary to inset the SDM single randes failure will disable this tria Function. This signal may be manually blocted by requirsments at an RCS temperature f the operator below the P 11 zetpoint. Automatic

{200F, j actuation below this pressure is then performed by

' the Containment Pressure - High 2 signal.

This Function is not required to be OPERABLE in H00E 3 below the P 11 setpoint. Other ESF Functions are used to detect accident conditions and actuate the ESF systems in this H00E. In H0 DES 4, 5, and 6.

this Function is not needed for accident detection and mitigation.

1.d. Steam Line Pressure - Low Steam Line Pressure Low provides protection against the following accidents:

- SLB:

. Feed line break; and

. Inadvertent opening of an SG relief or an SG safety valve.

(continued)

! b AP600 IPot\techspec\160305C2.r07 102797 B 3.3 64 08/97 Amendnent 0 j

I i

~

ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.2

". BASES APPLICABLE 1.d. Steam Line Pressure - Low (continued)

SAFETY ANALYSES, LCOs, and It is possible for the transmitters to experience APPLICABILITY adverse environmental conditions during a secondary side break. Therefore, the Trip Setpoint reflects both steady state and adverse environmental instrument uncertainties.

1 This Function is enticipatory in nature and has a typical lead / lag ratio of 50/5.

The LCO requires four channels of Steam Line iPressure - Low to be OPERABLE in H00ES 1, 2,

' ^

\ and 3 (above P 19) when a secondary side break wh:n the RCS boron concentration is )orstuckopenvalvecouldresultintherapid below that necessary to meet the SDM depressurization of the steam lines. Four channels requirements at an RCS temperature of are provided in each steam line to permit one channel to be in trip or bypass indefinitely and 200 F~ /

j still ensure no single rancom failure will disable this trip Function. This signal may be manually ,

blocked by the operator below the P 11 setpoint.

Below P 11, feed line break is not a concern, inside

, containment SLB will be terminated by automatic actuation via Containment Pressure - High 2, and outside containmeret SLB will be terminated by the Steam Line Pressure Negative Rate - High signal for steam line isolation. In MODES 4. 5 or 6, this Function is not needed for accident detection and mitigation because the steam line pressure is below the actuation setpoint. Low steam line pressure in these MODES is not an adequate indication of a feed line or steam line break.

1.e. RCS Cold Leg Temperature (Tcold) - LOW This signal provides protection against the following accidents: ,

. SLB:

. Feed line break; and

. Inadvertent opening of an SG relief or an SG safety valve.

(continued) h AP600 B 3.3 65 08/97 Amendment 0 IP01\tecMeec\16010302.r07 102797

ESF/'i Instrumentation B 3.3.2 BASES APPLICABLE 1.e. RCS Cold leg Temperature (T go) - Low (continued)

SAFETY ANALYSES, LCOs. and The LC0 requires four channels of Teoid - Low to be APPLICABILITY B ABLE_in M SJ and 2. and in MODE 3, with any

~

main steam isolation valve ope), when a secondary

--- side break or stuck open valve could result in the x rapid cooldown of the primary side. Four channels

/cnd cbove P 11 when the RCS boron ;are provided in each loop to permit one channel to

.be in trip or bypass indefinitely and still ersure concentration is below mrt the SDM requirements e.t anthatRCS necessary to/no single random failure will disab Function, in H0 DES 4, 5. and 6, this funct.on is (t;mperature of 200'F' /notneededforaccidentdetectionandmitigation because the cold leg temperature is reduced tielow the actuation setpoint.

2. CNT Actuation CNT Actuation provides the passive injection of borated water into the RCS, Injection provides RCS makeup water and boration during transients or accidents whe gthe normal makeup supply from the Chemical and Volume Control System (CVS) is lost or insufficient. Two tanks are available to provide passive injection of borated water.

CMT injection mitigates the effects of high energy line breaks by adding primary side water to ensure maintenance or recovery of reactor vessel water level following a LOCA, and by borating to ensure recovery or maintenance of SHUTOOWN MARGIN following a steam line break, CMT Valve Actuation is initiated by the Safeguards Actuation signal. Pressurizer Level - Low 2, or manually.

The LC0 requires that manual and automatic CMT Valve Actuation be OPERABLE in H0 DES 1 through 4. Manual actuation of the CMT valves is additionally required in i

MODE $ with the loops filled. Autoutic actuation initisted by Pressuriser W.ater Level - Low 2 is required to be OPERABLE in H0DL 5 with the RCS pressure boundary

- intact, above the P 12 setpoint. Automatic actuation of this Function is not required in MODE 5 with no visible level in the pressurizer, or HFE 6 bvcause the CMis are not required to be operable in these MODES.

2.J. Manual Initiation Manual CMT Valve Actuation is accomplished by either of two switches in the main control room. Either switch activates all four ESFAC divisions.

(continued) i B 3.3 66 08/97 Amendment 0 b AP600 mw.mmummve mm i

ESFAS Instrumentation

- - B 3.3.2 ,

t BASES _

APPLICABLE 4.b. Containment Pressure - High 2 (continued)

SAFETY ANALYSES, LCOs, and The LC0 requires four channels of Containment APPLICACILITY Pressure - High 2 to be OPERABLE in MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4, with any main steam valve open, when there is sufficient energy in the primary and secondary side to pressurize the containment following a pipe break. Four channels are provided to permit one channel to be in trip or bypass indefinitely and still ensure no single random failure will disabic this trip Function. There would be a significant increase in the containment pressure, thus allowing detection and closure of the HSIVs. In H0 DES 5 and 6, there is not enough energy in the primary and secondary sides to pressurize the containment to the Containment Pressure - High 2 setpoint.

4.c. Steam Line Pressure (1) Steam Line Pressure - Low Steam Line Pressure - Low provides closure of the HSIVs in the event of an SLB to maintain at least to limit the mass and energy release to containment and limit blowdown to a single SG.

The LCO requires . ur channels of Steam Line

. _ _ , Drouure - I nw Function to b OPERABLE in MODES 1. 2, and 3 (above PT11), with any main when the RCS boron concentrat,on is i

i steam isolation valve open, when a secondary i bslow that necossary to meet the SDM side break or stuck open valve could result in requirements at an RCS temperature of the rapid depressurization of the steam lines.

2007. / Tour channels are provided in each steam line to

'% ' permit one channel to be in trip or bypass indefinitely and still ensure no single random failure will disable this trip Function. This signal may be manually blocked by the operator below the P 11 s"*'oint. Below P 11. an inside containment SLB will be terminated by automatic actuation via Containment Pressure - High 2, and stuck open valve transients and outside containment steam line breaks will be terminated by the Steam Line Pressure Negative Rate - High signal for Steam Line Isolation. In MODES 4. 5, and 6, this Function is not needed for accident detection and mitigation.

(continued) h AP600 l*01\techapec\16010lC2,r0P 102797 B 3.3 70 08/97 Amendment 0

ESFAS Instrumentation i . B 3.3.2 BASES i

APh.! CABLE (2) Steam Line Pressure Negative Rate - High '

SAFETY ANALYSES, LCOs, and Steam Line Pressure Negative Rate - High APPLICABILITY provides closure of the HSIVs for an SLB, when (continued) less than the P 11 setpoint, to maintain at least one unfaulted SG as a heat sink for the reactor and to limit the mass and energy release to containment. When the operator manually blocks the Steam Line Pressure - Low when less <

than the P 11 setpoint, the Steam Line Pressure.

Negative Rate - High signal is automatically enabled.

lhe LCO requires four channels of Steam Line -

~

Pressure. Negative Rate - High to be OPERABLE in N00E 3, with any main steam valve open, when less tha1 the P 11 setpoint, when a secondary side brehk or stuck open valve could result in the roid depressurization of the steam line(s).

Four cwnnels are provided in each steam line to

, permit one channel to be in trip or bypass indefinitely and still ensure no single random failure will disable this trip Function. In and 2, and in MODE 3 when above the P 11 JH00 isetpoiQnt, this signal is automatically disabled

~

(when the RCS bcron concentration isIhohifa le bolow that necessary to meet the SDM requirements at an RCS temperature of In MODES 4, 5 and 6, this Function is not 2007. . needed for accident detection and mitigation.

While the transmitters may experience elevated ambient temperatures due to a steam line break, the Trip Function is on rate of change, not the absolute accuracy of the indicated steam pressure. Therefore, the Trip Setpoint reflects only steady state instrument uncertainties, 4.d. Teolo - Low This Function provides closure of the HSIVs during a SLB or inadvertent opening of a SG relief or a safety valve to maintain at least one unfaulted SG as a heat sink for the reactor and to limit the mass and energy release to containment.

,_, (continued)

..$.00],,n,,,,,w,,

B 3.3 71 08/97 Amendment 0

wr e a amouwc -

B 3.3.2 BASES ,

APPLICABLE 4.d. Teoid - Low (continued)

SAFETY ANALYSES, LCOs, and This Function was discussed as Safeguards Actuation APPLICABILITY Function 1.e.

The LCO requires four channels of Tcold - Low to b)e OPERABLE in H00ES 1 and 2, and in H00E 3 above P 11*,

with any main steam isolation valve open, when a wh:n the RCS boron concentration is below that necessary to meet the SDM ( secondary side break or stuck open valve could result in the rapid cooldown of the primary side, ecquirements at an RCS temperature og Four channels are provided in each loop to permit 200*F. '

) one channel to be in trip or bypass indefinitely and still ensure no sin l d failure will disable In H00E 3 below P 11 and in H0 this tri DES 5, and 4,p6 this Function.g e ran Function is not neededomfor accident detection and mitigation because the cold leg temperature is reduced below the actuation r# point.

4

5. Turbine Trip The primary Function of the Turbine Tri) is to prevent damage to the turbine due to water in tie steam lines.

This Function is necessary in H0 DES 1 and 2, and 3 above P 11 to mitigate the effects of a large SLB or a large Feed 11ne Break (FLB). Failure to trip the turbine following a SLB or FLB can lead to additional mass and energy being delivered to the steam generators, resulting in excessive cooldown and additional mass and energy release in containment. In H0 DES 4, 5, and 6. the energy in the RCS and the steam generators is low and this function is not required to be OPERABLE.

This Function is actuated by Steam Generator Water Level - High 2, by a Safeguards Actuation signal, or manually. The Reactor Trip Signal also initiates a turbine trip signal whenever a reactor trip (P 4) is generated.

5.a. Manual Main Feedwater Isolation Manual Main Feedwater Isolation can be accomplished from the main control room. There are two switches in the main control room and either switch can initiate action to close all main feedwater control, isolation and crossover valves, trip all main feedwater pumps, and trip the turbine.

(continued) b AP600 imv..m nnamover iom, B 3.3 72 08/97 Amendment 0

. B 3.3.2 i

.,' BASES APPLICABLE 8. Startup Feedwater Isolation SAFETY ANALYSES.

LCOs, and The primary Function of the Startup Feedwater i APPLICABILITY ! solation is to stop the excessive flow of feeNater (continued) into the SGs. This function is necessary in HuoES 1, 2, 3, and 4 to mitigate the effects of a large SLB or a large FLB. Failure to isolate the startup feedwater system following a SLB or FLB can lead to additional mass and energy being delivered to the steam generators, resulting in excessive cooldown and additional mass and t energy release in containment.

Startup feedwater isolation must be OPERABLE in H0 DES 1,

. 2, 3. and 4 when there is significant mass and energy in the RCS and the steam generttors. This Function is not applicable in H0DE 4 when the startup feedwater flow paths are isolated. In H00ES 5 and 6. the energy in the RCS and the steam generators is low and this Function is not required to be OPERABLE.

8.a. Steam Generator (SG) Narrow Range Water Level -

High 2 If steam generator narrow range level reaches the High 2 setpoint in either steam generator, then all startup feedwater control and isolation valves are closed and the startup feedwater aumps are tripped.

Four channels are provided in eac1 steam generator to permit one channel to be in trip or bypass indefinitely and still ensure no single random failure will disable this trip Function, 8.b Teoid - Low This Function closes the startup feedwater control and isolation valves and trips the startup feedwater pum)s if reactor coolant system cold leg temperature is >elow the T setpoint in any loop. Startup feedwater isolliNon on this condition may be manually blocked when the pressurizer pressure is below the P 11 setpoint. This function is I

7~ % ,eut = tically unblocked when the pressurizer pressure is above the P 11 setpointT. Four channels f wh:n the RCS boron concentration is are provided in each loop to permit one channel to below that necessary to meet the SDM be in trip or bypass indefinitely and still ensure

' rcquirements at an RCS temperature of no single random failure will disable this trip

, 200 F. Function.

W (continued) b AP600 mm.o.r.w w m . m.m,,, B 3.3 78 08/97 Amendment 0 l

. B 3.3.2

,, BASES APPLICABLE 10.b CMT Level - Low 2 Coincident with Delayed SAFETY ANALYSES, Function 9 and RC5 Wide Range Pressure - Low LCOs, and (continued) ;

~

APPLICABILITY pressure signal such that the fourth stage ADS is not actuated unless the RCS pressure is below a predetermined setpoint. Four channels of CMT level are provided to permit one channel to be in trip or bypass indefinitely and still ensure no single '

random failure will disable this trip Function.

This Function must be OPERABLE in H0 DES 1, 2, 3, and 4. This Function must also be OPERABLE in H0DE 5 when the ADS valves are not opent =4 @ M 1:';:15 0; preeevrinr vuibic. '

F) dbat f he f '1. 'rY

11. Reactor Coolant Pump Trip -

Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) Trip allows the passive injection of borated water into the RCS. Injection provides RCS makeup water and boration during transients or accidents when the normal makeup supply from the CVS is lost or insufficient. Two tanks provide )assive injection of borated water by gravity when t1e reactor coolant pumas are tripped. CMT injection mitigates the effects of ligh energy line breaks by adding primary side water to ensure maintenance or recovery of reactor vessel water level following a LOCA, and by borating to ensure recovery or maintenance of SHUTDOWN MARGIN following a steam line break. RCP trip on high bearing water temperature protects the RCP coast down. RCP trip is actuated by High RCP bearing water temperature ADS Stages 1, 2, and 3 Actuation (Function 9) and CMT actuation.

11.a. ADS Actuation The RCPs are trip >ed any time stage 1 ADS is actuated. The RC) trip Function requirements

. for the stage 1 ADS are the same as the requirements for their ADS Function.

Therefore, the requirements are not repeated in Table 3.3.21. Instead Function 9 is referenced for all initiating functions and requirements.

(continued)

, u.Y.f.g0,,,,,,,,,,,,,, B 3.3 82 08/97 Amendment 0

- - M inw uonu u un" ~ -

B 3.3.2 i

o BASES APPLICABLE 16.b. Pressurizer Water Level - High 1 Coincident with SAFETY ANALYSES, safeguards Actuation LCO's and APPLICABILITY Four channels of pressurizer level are provided on (continued) the pressurizer. Two.out of four channels on indicating level greater than the High 1 setpoint coincident with a Safeguards Actuation signal (Function 1) will close the containment isolation valves for the CVS. This function prevents the pressurizer level from reaching a level that could lead to water relief through the pressurizer safety valves during some DBAs. This function is required to be OPERABLE in MODES 1, 2, and 3. This function is not required to be OPERABLE in MODES 4. 5, and 6 because it is not required to mitigate a DBA in these MODES. This Function is not applicable in H00ES 3 and 4 if the CVS makeup flowpath is isolated.

16.c. Pressurizer Water Level - High 2 A signal to close the CVS isolation valves is generated on Pressurizer Water Level - High 2.

This Function results from the coincidence of prasurizerlevelabovetheHigh2getpointinany two of the four divisions. This Function is automatically blocked when the pressurizer pressure is below the P 11 permissive setpoint to armit pressurizer water solid conditions with tie plant cold and to permit level makeup during plant cooldowns._ This Function is automatically

" unblocked whenTpressure is above the P 19.fetpoint.

@- This Function is required to be OPERABLE ih MODES 1. 2 and 3 and in H0DE 4 when the RCS is not being cooled by the RNS. This Function is not required to be OPERABLE in MODE 4 if the CVS makeup flowpath is isolated. This function is not required to be OPERABLE in MODES 5 and 6 because it is not required to mitigate a DBA in these MODES.

16.d. Containment Radioactivity - High 2 Four channels of Containment Radioactivity - High 2 are required to be OPERABLE in H00ES 1, 2, and 3 when the potential-exists for a LOCA, to ensure that the radioactivity inside containment is not released to the atmosphere. This Function is not (continued)

B 3.3 91 08/97 Amendment 0

,A g00,, ,, ,,

-- =- - -__ _-- _ . - .

B 3,3,2 l.

't

. BASES m !

APPLICABLE 18 d. Pressurizer Level, P 12 {IRWST aciutdsm j ,

SAFETY ANALYSES, 1 LCOs, and The P.12 interlock is provided to permit midloop APPLICABILITY operation without core makeup tank actuation,e (continued) reactor coolant pump trip, or purification line l 1 solation. With pressurizer level channels less l than the P 12 setpoint. the operator can manually 7 -

T block low pressurizer level signal used for these actuations,7 When the pressurizer level is above l

't L.Mg wi{h efehig tht-blccK -

automatically cfenabled CMT Mg# onopen(c.W \=

and a confirmatory signal is issued to the isolation valves on the P'cy,ariter leveliIRWST CNT cold leg balance lines. This function is Mkudich Co LfW' A gg required to be OPERABLE in H0 DES 1, 2, and 3.

gRS lcytl 15 re me,'<d. -~IB . e . RCS Pressure, P 19 The P 19 interlock is provided to permit water solid conditions (i.e., when the pressurizer water level is [>92*]) in lower H0 DES without automatic isolation of the CVS makeup pumps. With RCS pressure below the P 19 setpoint, the operator can manually block CVS isolation on High 2 pressurizer water level. When RCS pressure is above the P 19 setpoint, this Function is automatically unblocked. This Function is required to be OPERABLE IN H0 DES 1, 2. 3, and 4 with the RCS not being cooled by the RNS. When the RNS is cooled by the RNS, the RNS suction relief valve provides the required overpressure protection (LC0 3.4.15).

19. Containment Air Filtration System Isolation Some DBAs such as a LOCA may release radioactivity into the containment where the potential would exist for the radioactivity to be released to the atmosphere and exceed the acceptable site dose limits. Isolation of the Containment Air Filtration System provides protection to prevent radioactivity inside containment from being released to the atmosphere.

19,a. Containment Radioactivity High 1 Three channals of Containment Radioactivity -

High 1 are required to be OPERABLE in H0 DES 1, 2, and 3 when the potential exists for a LOCA, to protect against radioactivity inside containment (continued)

^6 .,,g,,,u, , m ,,,

B 3.3 96 08/97 Amendment 0 u.

ESFAS Instrumentation

. . B 3,3.2 O

BASES

~

ACTIONS s>ecified only on a per steam line, per loop, per SG, basis, (continued) tien the Condition may be entered separately for each steam line, loop. SG, etc., as appropriate, When the number of inoperable channels in a trip function exceed those sweified in one or other related Conditions associated wit 1 a trip function, then the plant is outside the safety analytis. Therefore, LC0 3.0.3 should be immediately entered if applicable in the current H0DE of l operation.

~

A)

Condition A is applicable to all ESFAS protection Functions.

Condition A addresses the situation where one or more channels / divisions for one or more functions are inoperable at the same time. The Required Action is to refer to Table 3.3.21 and to take the Required Actions for the protection Functions affected. The Completion Times are those from the referenced Conditions and Required Actions.

B,d With one or two channels or divisions inoperable, the affected channel (s) or division (s) must be placed in a bypass condition within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months . If one or two are bypassed, the logic becomes two out of three or one out of two, respectively, while still meeting single failure criterion (a failure in one of the three or one of the two remaining channels or divisions will not prevent the protective function. However, with two channels or divisions in bypass, a single' failure in one of the two remaining channels or divisions could cause a spurious protective function. The 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months allowed to place the inoperable channel (s) or division (s) in the bypass condition is justified in Reference 8, A

C With one channel inoperable, the affected channel must be placed in a bypass condition within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months . The 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months allowed to place the inoperable channel (:) r divistenft3 in the bypass condition is justified in Reference 6. If one (continued) u.Y.60g,,,,,

,,, ,,m, B 3.3 104 08/97 Amendment 0

.~-r. .

. . i BASES ACTIONS F.1, F.2.1, and F.2.2 (continued) l unable to meet single failure criterion, Restoring all channels to OPERABLE status ensures that a single failure will not prevent the protective Function.

Alternatively, radiation monitor (s) which provide equivalent information and control room isolation and air sun 1y '

initiation manual controls may be verified to be PERABLE.

These provisions for operator action can replace one channel of radiation detection and system actuation. The 72 hour8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months Completion Time is reasonable considering that there is one remaining channel OPERABLr, and the low probability of an event occurring during this interval.

G.1 'N With one switch, switch set, channel, or ivision inoperable, the system level initiation capability i reduced below that required to meet single failure criterio . Therefore, the required switch, switch set, channel, division must be-returned to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months . The specified Completion Time is reasonable considering the remaining switch, switch set, channel, or division is capable of performing manual initiation.

H_:!

With one channel inoperable, the inowrable channel must be placed in a trip condition within 6 wurs.

Condition H is applicable to the PRHR heat exchangers tion or SG narrow range water level low coincident with

~

startup feecwaterT1ow (Function 13.b). With one startup ho* feedwater channel inoperable, the inoperable channel must be placed in a trip condition within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months . If one channel is tripped, the interlock condition is satisfied. The specified l Completion Time is reasonable considering the time required to complete this action.

Condition H is also applicabic to Function 22.c. IRWST injection line valve actuation (open). If one channel is tripped, the logic becomes one out of one and is unable to ,

meet single failure criterion, A single failure of the (continued) ,

i AP60 B 3.3 107 08/97 Amendment 0

, ,,9 ,,,,

B 3.3.2

. BASES ACTIONS Hj (continued) remaining channel could cause spurious IRWST injection, The sxcified Completion Time is reasonable considering that tiere is one remaining channel OPERABLE and the low probability of an event occurring during this interval.

I.1 and I.2 Condition I applies to IRWST containment recirculation valve actuation on safeguards actuation coincident with IRWST level Low 3 (Function 23.b). With one IRWST level channel inoperable, the one inoperable channel must be placed in a bypass condition within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months . With two channels ino>erable, one channel must be placed in a bypass condition wit 11n 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and the remaining inowrable channel must be placed in a trip condition within 6 Tours. If one or two channels are inoperable, the logic becomes two out of three while still meeting single failure criterion (a failure in one of the three or one of the two remaining channels will not prevent the protective Function.) However, with one channel in bypass and one channel in trip, a single failure in one of the two remaining channels coincident with safeguards actuation could cause a spurious actuation. The 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months allowed to place the inoperable channel (s) in the bypassed or tripped condition is justified in Reference 6.

J.1 and J.2 Condition J applies to the P 6, P 11 P 12, and P 19 interlocks. With one or two required channel (s) inoperable, the associated interlock must be verified to be in its required state for the existing plant condition within I hour, or any Function channels associated with inopertble e interlocks ) laced in a bypassed condition within 1iour Verifying tle interlock state manually accomplish (es the r7) interlock role.

If one or two associated Function channels are bypassed, the logic becomes two out of three or one out of two, respectively, while still meeting single failure criterion (a failure in one of the three or one of the two remaining channels will not prevent the protective Function.) However, (continued)

.YNeom.cor.w,, B 3.3 108 08/97 Amenchent 0

B 3.3.2

+

. BASES ACTIONS S.1, S.2.1.1, S.2.1.2 S.2.1.3, and S.2.2 (continued) 1 continuous communication with the control room. In this way the flow path can be rapidly isolated when a need for flow path isolation is indicated.

T.1.1, T.1.2.1 T.1.2.2, T.2.1, and T.2.2 If the Required Action and associated Comp % tion Time of the first Condition listed in Table 3.3.21 istmet, the plant must be placed in a Condition in which the likelihood and consequences of an event are minimized. This is accomplished by isolating the affected flow path within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and isolating the affected flw path (s) by the use of at least one closed and deactivated automatic valve, closed manual valve, blind flange, or check valve with flow through the valve secured within 7 days or verify the affected flow path is isolated once per 7 days.

If the flow path is not isolated within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months the plant must be placed in a H00E in which the LC0 does not apply.

This is accomplished by placing the plant in MODE 3 within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months and in H00E 5 within 42 hours4.861111e-4 days 0.0117 hours 6.944444e-5 weeks 1.5981e-5 months . The allowed Completion Time is reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner without challenging plant systems.

This action is modified by a Note allowing the flow path (s) to be unisolated intermittently under administrative control.

These administrative controls consist of stationing a dedicated operator at the valve controls, who is in continuous communication with the control room. In this way the flow path can be rapidly isolated when a need for flow i path isolation is indicated.

\f n. g,b '

U/

If Requir Actionandthe7associatedC pletion Time of 3

t first C dition given iyTable 3.3.2- is not me and g\\N N ' k. tw requi d switch or s itch set is n restored t PE E status thin 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months he plant be placed a condition in which t likelihood a d conseque es of event are minimized. This is accomplished by initiat ng k _

(continued)

,Ag00,, ,, , ,,,

B 3.3 113 08/97 Amendment 0 i

w wing, v,wnt g ivn B 3.3.2 BASES ACTIONS ont ) -

3 act on to p1 ce the p [nt in HpdE 5 witi)/the RCS pen vi ible le 1 in t pressur fcr immedMtely, ni the/a/ :

R press re bound y assur s that cp611ng w r ca injectedtwithout S oper ion. F fling t RCS visiblelevelinthepresurizerm)inimizesthecosegpronce de a f.Jecey h6L iwvvat event. ~

7.1 ~

~

]

IftheRequiredActionandtheassociatedCompletionTimeof the f st Condition listed in Table 3.3.21 is not met, and N (j kb the 6

utred chan 1(s) or division (s) is not h rs, the plan must be pl ced in a/condit%ypassed n1 which t within

\qh. ' liplihoodandcnsequences an eve is accomplishe by initiati action o pla the ant in t are nimi d. This

\#}Ngk H0DE 5 with t RCS own arjd a visib1 leva in tht.

g 'L pressurizer thin 163 hours0.00189 days 0.0453 hours 2.695106e-4 weeks 6.20215e-5 months . The 168 hour0.00194 days 0.0467 hours 2.777778e-4 weeks 6.3924e-5 months Completion I me t is reasonabl basedontheabilityofthetworemaining

\ ').fi '

OPERABLE Function even channels with a singleor failure, divisions to provide the protective j W.1, W.2. W.3, and W.4 If the Required Action and the associated Completfor. Time listed in Table 3.3.2 1 is not met while in H0 DES 5 and 6.

the plant must be placed in a MODE in which the likeliho)d and consequences of an event are minimized. This is accomplished by immediately initiating action to be in H0DE 5 with the RCS open and a visible level in the pressurizer or to be in H0DE 6 with the upper internals removed and the reactor cavity level full. The flow path from the demineralized water storage tank to the RCS shall also be isolated by the used of at least one closed and de activated automatic valve or closed manual valve. These requirements minimize the consequences of the loss of decay heat removal by maximizing RCS inventory and maintaining RCS temperature as low as practical. Additionally, the potential for a criticality event is minimized by isolation of the demineralized water storage tank and by suspension of positive reactivity additions.

(continued)

A u.E.I.0jm,,,mm,, B 3.3 114 08/97 Amendment 0

. - _ _ - - ._.- - -.- ___- . . . -_ - __ _ _=. - . . -_ . -.

~

. rRwined 4toriEineert ok pigD 3 24 .

/ 3

~

REQUIRED ACT!ON C

., / CONDITI ETlON TIME

/U.

Requeed and

/

c U.1 Be in MODEp/ '

/

,12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months !

aseco. Completon Time /

/

oft 3 321 speeded 62 0 tion not het U2 inits achon to open the 'S 12 houts and stablish a viesbie el in /

essunzer.

fevised/asep Insert pn pages,B 3 3-1.13 &/114 ydd u ki and U 2 ]

1[

Y' if the Required Acbon and be associated Complebon Time of the Arst Condibon gNen in Table 33.21 is not met, and the required swtch or swich cet is not restored to OPERABLE status wthin 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months , the plant must

' be placed in a condition in which the likelihood and consequences of an event are minimized This is N@3 h accomplished by pejng the plant in MODE 5 wthin 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months . Once in MODE 5, acbon shall be immediately inibated to open the RCS and establish a visible level in the pressurizer. The 12 hour1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months Complebon Time is a reasmable bme to reach MODE 5 frc:n MODE 4 wth RCS cooling provided by the RNS (approximatelv 350'F) in an orderty manner ethout challenging plant systems Opening the RCS pressure boundary assures that cooling water can be injected #thout ADS operabon. Filling the RCS to provide a visible level in the pressurizer minimizes the consequences of a loss of decay heat removal event AP600 Tech Specs DRAFT October 29,1997 l

_ . . _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ , __ _, _ . , _ _ _ .. U

. 7 - -

- i

. Memned Acbon v . Insert on page 3 3 24 - - -

. i

, ,/

, REQUIRED ACTION COMPL.ETION TIME ;

CONDITON/ ,

/

V.

/

Regured kton and V.1 / estore R

/

he inoperable chant'el(s).

168 hours0.00194 days 0.0467 hours 2.777778e-4 weeks 6.3924e-5 months i

=enad Completon Trne / /

/ of Tatie 3321 speeded /QB / i Co/drbon not met / l

/ '

,/ V2.1 Be in MODE 4 180 s i l

/

j mo / !

l ,

/ V22 Initialer acbon to open the RCS ,/ 180 hours0.00208 days 0.05 hours 2.97619e-4 weeks 6.849e-5 months j ang establish a visbie level iny f

pressunzer. /

I .

( i 1

- - Revised Bases insed on page B 3 3-114_ --

^;

f

, ~ m.

4] V.1. V 21. and V 2 2 If the Requred Acbon and the associated Completion Time of the first Condibon listed in Table 3.32 t is not h met and the required channel (s) or dhrision(s) is not bypassed ethin 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months , the inoperable channel (s) or (devir.cn(s) must be re.iored wthin 168 hours0.00194 days 0.0467 hours 2.777778e-4 weeks 6.3924e-5 months The 168 hour0.00194 days 0.0467 hours 2.777778e-4 weeks 6.3924e-5 months Complebon Time is based on the ability of de two gt) remaining OPERABLE channels or divisions to provide the protective Funcbon even wth a angle failure.

If the channel (s) or division (s) is not restored ethin the 168 hour0.00194 days 0.0467 hours 2.777778e-4 weeks 6.3924e-5 months Completion Time, the plant shall be pla:ed in

$4 g a condibon in which the likelihood and consequences of an event are minimized. This is accomplisned by

$g placing the plant in MODE 5 wthin 180 hours0.00208 days 0.05 hours 2.97619e-4 weeks 6.849e-5 months (the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months ). Once in MODE 5, achon shall be initiated to open the RCS and establish a visabs level in the pressurizer. The 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months is a reasonable bme to reach MODE 5 from MODE 4 wth RCS cooling provided by the RNS (approximately 350'F) in an orderly manner wthout challenging plant systems. .

/

Opening the RCS pressure boundary assures that cooling water can be injected wthout ADS o the RCS to provde a visible level in the pressunzer minimizes the consequences of a loss of decay heat removal event (k

AP600 Tech Specs DRAFT October 29,- 1997 -

., . B 3.3.2

.. BASES ACTIONS X.1. X.2, and X.3 (continued)

If the Required Action and the associated Completion Time of the first Condition listed in Table 3.3.21 is not met while in H0 DES 5 and 6 the plant must be placed in a H00E in which the likelihood and consequences of an event are minimized. ;

This is accom)lished by immediately initiating action to be in H00E 5 wit 1 the RCS own and a visible level in the pressurizer or to be in 400E 6 with the u>per internals in place and the reactor cavity level less t1an full. These -

requirements minimize the consequences of the loss of decay heat removal by maximizing RCS inventory and maintaining RCS temperature as low as practical. Additionally, the potential for a criticality event is minimized by suspension of positive reactivity additions.

. ,.-- s -

Y.1, Y.2 /and Y.3

/ / ,h If the Required Action and th# associated Completion Time of the,first Conditie'n listed ir}/ Tat,le 3.3.21 is not met while ipd400ES5and i Abe likelihood an p'd consequp6ces t of areai, mi evthe mized, plant >h wA b (This is accomblished by i diately in iating ac on to be in H00E 5 ft1 the RCS tact and a y sible leve in the

@^@g%d pressur or to be i H00E 6 with he u)per ternals the reactor cavity leve ess t1an 11. They

-[6 i place requirementr, minimi the consequences of t loss of de (y/

heat removal by m imizing RCS dnventory afid maintaining /RCS temperature as aspractic/I. Additionally,the' potentia) for a criticali event is minimized by suspension of j sitive teacti ity additiont SURVEILLANCE The Surveillance Requirements for each ESF Function 6re REQUIREMENTS identified by the Surveillance Requirements column of Table 3.3.21. A Note has been acded to the Surveillance Requirement table to clarify that Table 3.3.21 determines which Surveillance Requirements apply to which ESF Functions.

SR 3.3.2.1 Performance of the CHANNEL CHECK once every 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months ensures that a gross failure of instrumentation he not occurred. A CHANNEL CHECK is a comparison of the parameter indicated on 4

(continued)

$3,E......,,,,,, 8 3 3 225 osm Anendnent 0 ,

' ' ~

~ ~~~'

., piesif 3 Eiert on page'33 26 %

I :

,, / COWTION QUIRED ACTION COMPl.ETION TIME l Y.

Requred Acton and

/ Y.t.f

! if in MODE 4, be n M00EI / S.

12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months l

- associated Complete Time ,

' ~

of Table 3321 speceed NO Conditon not mel

/ Y,1.2 If in MODE 4 or 5, ntato achon 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months

/ to establish a esbie levelin the pressunzer wth the RCS intact

/

Y ,

Y.2 If in MODE 6, neate acbon IdN immediately in MODE 6 eth the upper' internals removed and the cavity full. /

/

p

/ MO

/ Y.3 Suspend postrve reacWity immediately addito s. ,

j

/ ,

d'

/ !

(

Reened Bases Insert on page B 3 3115 _ . .

~~

,. .-p a :T~~~ -

Y 1 1. Y.i 2. Y 2. andlj

')

If the Regared Acbon and the associated Cormiebon Time of the first Condbon listed in Table 3 3 21 is not met while in MODE 4. eth RCS coohng provided by the RNS, MODE 5. or MODE 6. the piant must to placed in a MODE in which the M '{ hkeMood and consemences of an event we trunemeed if in MODE 4, this is accomphshed by placing the plant in MODE 5 wtun 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months The 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months is a resemable bme to reach MODE 5 fmrn MODE 4 mth RCS cooling prowded by the RNS (asposumetely 360*F) in an ordetty manner ethout challengng plant systems. ,

"1 N g6 if in MODE 4 or 5, Requwod Acbon Y.12 regares nbabon of acbon wthm 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months to open the RCS and estabhsh a j~{tSk. entdo 'wel in the pressuruer, The 12 hour1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months Cormlebon Time allows transinon to MODE 5 in weh eth Y.1.1, if

') needed. pnot to ntiabng acbon to open the RCS pressure boundary grA N It in MODE 6 Regiated Achon Y.2 remares the plant to be mentaened in MODE 6 and neaban of ac6an to remove the

@per intemels and to fill the cavity.

f

\

Regared Acbons Y.1 and Y 2 mnemee the consegances of the loss d decay heat removal by mammmng RCS inventory and aantaning RCS termeratue as low as prac6 cal Operung the RCS pressure boundary assures that cooling watw can be irpceed wthnut ADS cperabon. - Ad$60ndy, the potenbal for a entcehty ownt is mrumeed by suspenseon of posibve meeswty adstens.

-- ~~-

AP600 Tech Specs DRAFT October 29,1997

. ESFAS Instrumentatien

, B 3.3.2

', BASES SVRVEILLANCE SR 3.3.2.1

- (continued)

REQUIREMENTS one channel to a similar parameter on other channels. It is based on the assumption that instrument channels monitoritg the same parameter should read a> proximately the same value.

Significant deviations between tie two instrument channels could be an indication of excessive instrument drift in ore of the channels or even something more serious. A Cf%NNEL CHECK will detect gross channel failure; thus, it is key to verifying the instrumentation continues to operate properly between each CHANNEL CALIBRATION.

Agreement criteria are determined by the plant staff, bar.ed un a combination of the channel instrument uncertainties, including indication and readability. If a channel is outside the match criteria, it may be an indication that the sensor or the signal processing equipment has drifted outside its limit.

The Surveillance Frequency is based on operating experience that demonstrates channel fail'are is rare. Automated o;>erator aids may be used to facilitate performance of the-CiANNEL CHECK.

SR 3.3.2_.2 SR 3.3.2.2 is the performance of an ACTUATION LOGIC TEST.

The ESFAC and PLCs within a division are tested every 92 days on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS using the automatic tester. One half of the microprocessor subsystems in a division are tested while the remaining microprocessor subsystems continue to provide protection. Then the second half is tested while the first half provides protection. Through the automatic tester, the possible logic conditions, with and without applicable permissives, are tested for each ESF Function.

Prior to the start of testing, the calibration of tha automatic tester shall be verified and adjustments made as required. After the automatic tester has completed the tests of the ESFAC and PLCs within the division. the results of the automatic test shall be reviewed to verify completeness and

- adequacy of results.

f, /

/ \

This test, in conjunction with the ACTUATION DEVICE TEST, demonstrates that the .

Lctuated device responds to a simulated actuation signal.

/

(continued) u,N.g0,,m,,, ,a ,,t,,

8 3.3 116 08/97 Amendment 0 l

e ESFAS Instrumentation I 8 3.3.2 l

, BASES ,

SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.2.6 (continued)-

REQUIREMENTS exceeds the Trip Setpoint value at the sensor, to the point ;

at which the equipment reaches the required functional state ,

(e.g., valves in full open or closed position).

~

For channels that include dynamic transfer functions (e.g..

lag lead / lay rate / lag, etc.). the response time test may be performed with the transfer functions set to one with the resulting measured respouse time compared to the appropriate SSAR (Ref. 2) response time. Alternately, the response time test can be perforr.,cd with the time constants set to their ;

nominal value provided the required response time is analytically calculated assuming the time constants are set at their nominal values. The response time may be measured by a series of overlapping tests such that the entire response time is measured.

ESF RESPONSE TIME tests are conducted on an 24 month STAGGERED TEST BASIS. Testing of the devices, which make up l the bulk of the response time, is included in the testing of each channel. The final actuation device in one train is tested with each channel. Therefore, staggered testing -

results in response time verification of these devices every '

24 months. The 24 month Frequency is consistent with the typical refueling cycle and is based on unit operating L experience, which shows that random failures of instrumentation components causing serious response time degradation, t,ut not channel failure, are infrequent ,

occurrences.

SR 3.3.2.7 SR 3.3.2.7 is the performance of an ACTUATION DEVICE TEST.

This Surveillance Requirement is applicable to the equipment which is actuated by the Protection Logic Cabinets except squib valves. The OPERABILITY of the actuated equipment is checked by exercising the equipment on an individual basis.

The Frequency of 24 months is based on the need to perforra this surveillance during periods in which sne plant is shutdown for refueling to prevent any upsets of plant x opfr_ation. :

This test, in conjunction with the ACTUATION LOGIC TEST, demonstrates that the actuated device responds to a simulated actuation signal.

(cat %ued)

KAP 600-1P01\techspec\1603050L r07 102797 B 3.3 119 08/97 Amendment 0

., . ,~ ESfAS Instrumentation

. __ __ _ B 3.3.2

~

3 actuated device responds to a simulated actuation _j sig SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.2.7 (continued)

REQUIREHENTS This Surveillance Requirement is modified by a Note that states that actuated equipment, that is included 1.7 the Inservice Test (IST) Program, is exempt from this surveillance. Tr4 IST Program provides for exercising of the safety related valves on a more frequent basis. The results e from the IST Program can therefore be used to verify OPERABILITY of the final actuated equipment.

SR 3.3.2.8 SR 3.3.2.8 is the performance of an ACTUATION DEVICE TEST, similar to that performed in SR 3.3.2.7, except this Surveilla s swcifically 3pplicable tn squi valves. OPERABILITY o { 1e squ1D v8h is cnecked by' wrforming a continuity check of the circuit from the

)rotection Logic Cabinets to the squib valve.

The Frequency of 24 months is based on the need to-perform this surveillance during periods in which the plant is '

shutdown for refueling to prevent any additional risks associated with inadvertent operation of the squib valves.

SR 3.3.2J t SR 3.3.h.9 is the wrformance of an ACTUATION DEVICE TEST.

This Su'veillance lequirement is applicable to the circuit breakers which de. energize the power to the pressurizer heaters upon a pressurizer heater trip. The OPERABIL!fY of thew treakers is checked by opening these breakers using the ,

Plant Control System.

The Frequency of 24 months is based on the need to perform this surveillance during periods in which the plant is shutdown for refueling to prevent any upsets of plant operation. This Frequency is adequate based on the use of multi le circuit breakers to prevent the failure of any singl circuit breaker from disabling the function and that all circuit breakers are tested.

/

( This test, aciuated devicein conjunction responds with to a simuiated the signai.

actuation ACTUATION LOGIC y TEST, dem (continued) 1.Af,E..,....,,,,, a 3.3 120 osa7 An.neent o

~ ^

7. lastrweentetkm and Contt TaNe 7.2 3 ($ beet 2 of 2)

REACTOR TRIP PERMISSIVES AND INTERLOCKS Deetsmaties Dortvedes Function 190 Power range nuclear powcr bdow (a) Prevents ibe Wock of power range now seapoian set p ot textor inp (b) Prevents the block of mtennedtate range reactor tnp (c) Peruuts manual reset of eact source range charinel reactor trip (d) Blocks reactor trip ce low coolant flow ci textor coolant pump high beanog water temperature in multgle locgu (c) Blocks reactor inp on low rescur coolata pump speed (O Bktks reactor trip on tugh pressuruer maaer level (g) Blocks reacsor inp oc low pressuruer pressure P.ll riessurua pressure below Allows men Aal block of Egh.2 sicam getmior water setpotat level reactor tnp lq1 Pressuruer pressure atove Automatically rer:ts High 2 steam getwrator waier setpoint level textor inp P.lb Pos.cf range nuclear power Blocks autorsaoc tod withdr1:wal negaeve rate below setpost M Power rage nuclear power Permits automanc rod wtMawal negan,e rase above setpotot l

I dokSi l, This inks' lock decs id meet 4)e. Tuly IW6 Grwl PclicU MMOwib 00 Technical G fecl6Catim Tenprevem<nb crikra Md is rd included in Ac, Technical Spa:Gcatiew g.

Revision: 3 Febevary 29,1996 7.2 24 3 Weeghouse

i *

.., Table 7.31 (Sheet I of 8)

ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SIGNALS No.et Chamnene/ Actantion Acwties Signal Switches L4 sic Perimissives and later4ecks

1. Safessards Actuation Signal Gigure 7.21, Sheets 9 and 11) a_ bw pressunter pressure 4 2/4.BYP' Manual block pernuned below P.il Automat >cally unblocked above P.ll b.1.ow lead-lag compensated 4/ steam line 2/4.BYP' in Manual block peruutted below P ll steam line preuurt either steam Automaucally unblocked above P il line

c. l.ow reactor coolant inlet 4/ loop 2/4 BYP' Manual block perauned below P.il temperature either loop' Automatically unblocked above P ll (Low T,,,,)

d. High4 'cktairiment 4 2/4 BYP' None pressure

e. Manual safeguards 2 switches 1/2 switches Can be manually reset to block trutianon safeguards actuanon upon P 4 Block automaucally removed on absence of P-4

2. Costalanwet isolation Figure 7.21 Sheets 11 and 13)

a. Automatic or manual (See items la through le) safeguards actuation signal

b. Manualiniuation 2 switches 1/2 switches None

c. Manualinination of (See item 10a) containment cooling

3. Autosmatic Depressuritation System (Figure 7.21. Sheet 15)

(Initiate Stages 1,2, and 3)

a. Core makeup tank (See items 6a through 6e) injection coincident with Core makeup taak level 4Aank 2/4 BYP' None less than Low l setpoint either tank 2

b. Extended und voltage to 2/ charger 1/2 pee chstger None Class IE bouery chargers and 2/4 chargers

c. Stages I,2 and 3 manual 4 switches 2/4 switches 5 None initiatioe s

Revision: 15

$ Westkighouse 7.3-25 August 8,1997 I

o e *

, Tatde 7.31 (Sheet 2 of 8)

ENGINEEEED SAFTTY FEATURES ACTUATION SIGNAL 3 No. et Chamaels/ Actuation Actuatlee Signal Switches (Ag6c Persalesives and later%cks (lantiate Stage 4)

d. Stage 4 manual uuuanon 4 sw1tches 2/4 switches 8 None l coincident math one of the I following two conidsoons:

4 2/4 BYP' None Low reactor coolant I system prenure or l Actuanon of stages I,2, (See items 3a through k)

I and 3

e. Core makeup tank level 4/ tank 2/4 BYP' None less than Low 2 serpotet either tank' coincide.it with Low reactor coolant 4 2/4 BYP' None system pressure and coincident with 3rd stage depressuruanon

f. Coincident loop i and 2/2 Manual unblock permitted below P.12 fg i per loop loop 2 low.2 hot leg 'evel Automaucally bloc'. ed above P 12 (after delay)

4. Main Feedwater isolation (Figure 7.21. Sheet 10)

(Clorure of Control Valves)

a. Safeguards actuanon signal (See items la through le)

(automatic or manual)

b. Manual trutinuon 2 switches 1/2 switches None

c. High-2 steam generator 4/ steam 2/4 BYP' in None narrow range level generator either steam generator

d. Low recar coolant 2/ loop 2/4 BYP' Manual block peruutted below P 1I temperature (Low l T,,,) Automancally unblocked above P il coincident with Reactor trip (P-4) 1/ division 2/4 None Revision: 15 August 8,1997 7.3 26 T Westinghoust

_ _ _ _ - . -. ^- -

Table 7.31 (Shen 3 of s)

ENGINEERED $ATETY FEATURES ACWA110N SIGNAL $

No. d Chammeln/ Actuaties Actestnee Signal Sw6tebes 14 sic Permissiva med Interiocks (Trip of Male Feedwater Puisps and Closure of Isolation and Crossover Valva)

a. Safeguards actuation signal (See stems la through le)

(automaue or manual)

b. Manual iruuanos 2 : witches i/2 : witches None

c. High 2 sitarn generator 4/ swam 2/4.B YP' in None nanow range level generator either stearn generator

d. Low remetor coolant 2/ Imp 2/4 BYP' Manual block penrutted below P.it temperature (Low.2 T,,,) Automaucally unblocked above P.it coincident with Reactor inp (P-4) 1/dmsion 2/4 None S. Reactor Cootast Paune Trip (Figure 7.21, Sheet 5,7,12, and 15)

(Trips AB Reactor Coolant Pumps)

a. Safeguards actuauon signal (See items la through le, (automaue or manual) 1,. Automaue reactor coolant (See items 3a thrrugh 3c) system depressuriuuon (first stage)

c. Low.2 pressunter level 4 2/4 BYP' Manual bicck permitted below P.12 Automaucally unblocked above P 12

d. Low wide range stearn 4/ steam 2/4.BYP' in None generator water level generator 'c xh steam coincident with ',enerators IMP 2/4-BYP' None High m coolant temperuure (High TJ

e. Manual core makeup tank (See item 6e) initianon (Trip Affected Penny)

f. High reactor coolant pump 4/ pump 2/4.BYP' in None weser beanag temperature affected pump o &

Revisioet 13 y Westighouse 7.3 27 May 30,1997

g r

o .

o Table 7.31 (Sheet 4 of 8)

ENGINEERED $AFETY IT.ATURES ACTUATION SIGNALS No. et g Chamasief Actuaties N Actandse $lgaal Switches Log 6c Permhains and later$ecks N.

4. Core Makeup Tank lajwtion (Figure 7.21, Sheets 7.12 and 15)

a. Safeguards actusuon signal (See items la through le)

(automabc or manual)

b. Automaue reactor coolant (See items 3a through 3c) sysicm depressuntauon (first stagf)

c. Low 2 pressunzer level 4 2/4 BYP' Manual block permined below P 12 Automaucally unblocked above P 12

d. lew wide range steam 4/ steam 2/4 BYP' in None generator oater level generator both steam coinex$ent with generators High reactor coolant outlet 2/ loop 2/4 BYP' None temperanse (tbgh Tf)

e. Manual iniuauon 2 switches 1/2 switches None

7. Turbine Trip (Figure 7.21, Sheet 14)

a. Safeguards .ctunuon signal (See items la through le)

(automaue or manual)

b. Manual feedwater isolauon (See item 4b)

c. Reactor inp (P-4) 1/ division 2/4 None

d. Hsgh 2 steam generator 4/ steam 2/4 BYP' in Nonc nartos range level generator either stearn generator

8. Steaan lame ladation (Figure 7.21, Sheet 9)

a. Manualinitiauon 2 switches 1/2 switches None 3.)

b. High-l containment 4 2/4-BYP' None pressure

c. Iow lead lag compensated 4/ steam line 2/4 BYP'in Manual block permined below P Il sneaan line preasure' either steam Automaucally unblocked above P il line

d. High steam line negative 4/ steam line 2/4 BYP' in Manual unblock permined below P Il prasure rase either steam Automaucally blocked above P ll line' Reyhlos: 13 May 30,1997 7.3 28 y@

~

M

- , Table 7.31 (Shoot 7 of g)

ENGINEERED $AITTY FEA'!VRES ACTUATION SIGNALS No. et ChanneW Actuatlee Aetmatlee Signal Switches 14 Permissivos and laterlocks

/ 16. Male Coetrol Rooes 1sedatt.se and Air Sepply taltistion (Figure 7.21, Sheet 13) a_ Rgh 2 control room 2 1/2 None supply air radia6on

b. Undervoltage to Class IE 2/ charger 2/2 per charger None bacery chargers and 2/4 chatteri

c. Manual iniuauon 2 smiehes 1/2 : witches None

17. Aussiary Spray and Purifkation Line Isolation (Figutt 7.21. Sheet 12)

a. Low l pressuruer level 4 7/4 BYP' Manual block permitted below P 12 Autoruocally unblocked above P 12

18. Costanament Air F8tration System isolation (Figure 7.21, Sheu 11 and 13)

a. Containment isolauon (See items 24 through 2c) b.. Ibgh.I containment 4 2/4.B YP' None radioacuvity

19. Norunal Res6 dual Heat Reinoval System Isolation (Figure 7.21. Sheet 13)

a. Automaue or manual (See items la through le) safeguards actaatan signal

b. Wgh 2 containment 4 2/4 BYP' Manual block permmed below P il radioactmry Automaucally unblocked above P il

20. Spent Feel Pool isolation (Figure 7.21. Sheet 13)

a. Low spent fuel pool level 3 2/3 None

, 21. Open la Containament Refusiing Water Storage Tank (IKWST) lame IJoe Valves (Figwe 7.21, Sheets 82 and 16)

a. Automanc reactor coolant (See items 3d and 3c) system depressuruanon (fowth stage)

b. Coincident loop I and I per loop 2/2 Manual unblock permitted below P 12 loop 2 low.2 bot les level Automancally blocked above P 12 (afke delay)

c. Manual 1.titianon 4 switches 2/4 switches 8 None Reridos: 13 T Westing!**JII 7.k31 May 30,1997 s i

g .

n g *

. 3 o Table 7.31 (Sheet 8 of 8)

ENG!NEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACIVATION SIGNALS Ne, et ChammeW Actuation Actaat% Sgoal Switches Logic Penniedvm end laterlocks j 12 Open IRWST C*etalamiest Recirculation Valem la Settes with Check Valves (Figure 7.21 Sheet 15)

a. Estended under.oltage to 2/ charger 1/2 per charger Norn Class IE banery chargersN and 2/4 charger

13. Open AN IRWST Centainment Recirculation Yahes (Figutt 7.21. Sheet 16)

b. Safegwds actuation signal (See stems la through le)

(automaue or manual) coincident m,th Low [RWST lev 4 2/4 BW None (Low.) setpoint)gI

c. Manual initiacon 4 switches 2/4 switches None

24. Cheadcal and Volume Control Systeen Letdewa Isolation (Figure 7.21, Sheet 16)

a. Low I hot leg level I per loop 1/2 None Et!'U

l. 2/4.BYP indicates automatic bypass logic. The logw is 2 out of 4 with no bypasses; 2 out of 3 with one bypass, I out of 2 with two bypasses; and, automatically actuated with three or four bypasses.

2. Any two channels from either tank not in same dmsgsn.

3. Two swiiches must be actuated simultaneously.

4. Also, closes power-eperated relaf block valve of respecove steam generator.

5. The twowt-of.four logic is based on undenoltage to the banery chargers for dmsions A or C coincident with an undervoltage to the batter / chargen for divisions B or D.

6. Any two channels from either loop not in same division.

7. Any two channels from either line not in same division.

S.Thi% fi.tActsh dC<S nd niec6 fhe. Tulj l%3 Final fblic{ Skkmulf en Technicd Speci Acdien rmpreve,neds ulkna. Md is net. included in A Technical Spec &cahins.

3tnidea: 13 May 30,1997 7.3 32 y Westhghouse W-

ML20198S874

Text

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