ML20198S228

Forwards Info to Supplement Presentation to Southeast Nuclear Plant Managers Meeting Held on 970821.Info Listed

ML20198S228
Person / Time
Site:	Vogtle
Issue date:	10/29/1997
From:	Collins S NRC (Affiliation Not Assigned)
To:	Beasley J SOUTHERN NUCLEAR OPERATING CO.
References
NUDOCS 9711140005
Download: ML20198S228 (71)

Text

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• j NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION .

, J W AsHINoToN, o.C. MH001 .

9 8 k'... . October 29, 1997 J. Bamle Beasley, Jr., P.E.

General Manager Vogtle Electric Generating Plant Southem NucJeer Operating Company, Inc.

P.0, Box 1600  ;

Waynasboro, Georgio 30830

Dear Mr. Beasley:

Af.er all this time, I am forwarding to you the promised information to supplement my )'

presentation to the Southeast Nuclear Plant Managers' Meeting held August 21.

t In response to quartions raised during the piesentation by Jon Johnson and me I have enclosed.

l

. the following information. j

1. Attachment i lists NRC generic correspondence issued in 1996 97. This listing shows an increase in Information Notices, decreases in Bulletins and Generic Letters for power  ;

reactors.  ;

i

2. Attachment 2 provides the the NRR management report showing the number and age of .

licensing actions.

3. Attachment 3 provides the NRR management report showing the number of allegations received by NRR for licensees.

4, Attachment 4 provides a history of design bases activities and a summary of findings from NRC A/E inspections conducted to date. Twelve A/E inspections were conducted in  :

fiscal year 1997 with ten scheduled for 1998. The total nuinber may be reduced by transitioning to a region based inspection progi ..lin the future. ,

5. A question was raised regarding NRC release of the Plant issues Matrix (PIM). The NRC '

t intends ;o make public plant specific PIMs starting in June 1998. The PIM will be forwarded to licensees and the public docket as part of a package resulting from the regions periodic plant review (PPR). The package willinclude the site specific inspection ,

schedule, PPR insights and the PIM. The intent of the forwarding memotandum will be to clearly communicate that the PIM contains previousiv docketed plant specific information covering a period of approximately 1 year Revisions to current NRC guidance on the

/

^/

PIM and PPR will be forthcoming to define this process. A current revision of this Inspection Manual Chapter is provided as Attachment 5.

6. Attachment 6 provides a current Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation organization chart.

7. In response to questions raised about extended bumup fuel and the uncertainty that exists regarding pending NRC action, Attachment 7 provides a brief description of NRC /) .

review activity in this area. I1(O f m"an m8A "" ?

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MlC RLE CEVIER G8PY- <

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1 I trust this letter has been responsive and thank you for the opportunity to interact with the Southem Nuclear Plant Managers' representatives.

Sincerely, OrWW$  !

WJ.0ies i Samuel J. Collins, Director Omca of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Attechments: As statei '

cc

L Reyes, Region ll )

J. Johnson, Region 11 )w/o Att' DISTRIBUTION File Center PUBLIC SCollins R/F 4

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DOCU E:Beasley NR -

ol ns 1 /97

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g*l 4 UNITED STATES

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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.C. 30%H001

., October 29, 1997  !

J. Bamle Beasley, Jr., P.E.

General Manager Vogtle Electric Generating Plant i

' Southem Nuclear Operating Company, Inc.

P.O. Box 1600 .

t Waynesboro, Georgia 30830

Dear Mr. Beasley:

After all this time, I am forwarding to you the promised information to supplement my f presentation to the Southeast Nuclear Plant Managers' Meeting held August 21. ,

in response to questions raised during the presentation by Jon Johnson and me I have enclosed the following information:

1. Attachment i lists NRC generic correspondence issued in 1996 97. This listing shows an increase in Information Notices, decreases in Bulletins and Generic Letters for power reactors,

2. Attachment 2 provides the the NRR management report showing the number and age of licensing actions.

3. Attachment 3 provides the NRR management report showing the number of allegations received by NRR for licensees.

4. Attachment 4 provides a history of design bases activities and a summary of findings from NRC A/E inspections conducted to date. Twelve A/E inspections were conducted in fiscal year 1997 with ten scheduled for 1998. The total number may be reduced by transitioning to a region based inspection program in the future.

5. A question was raised regarding NRC release of the Plant issues Matrix (PIM). The NRC '

intends to make public plant specific PIMs starting h June 1998. The PIM will be forwarded to licensees and the public docket as part of a package resulting from the regions periodic plant review (PPR). The package willinclude the site specific inspection schedule, PPR insights and the PIM. The intent of the forwarding memorandum will be to clearly communicate that the PIM contains previously docketed plant specific information covering a period of approximately 1 yeair. Revisions to current NRC guidance on the PIM and PPR will be forthcoming to define this process, A current revision of this inspection Manual Chapter is provided as Attachment 5.

6. Attachment 6 provides a current Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation organization chart.

7. In responte to questions raised about extended bumup feel and the uncertainty that exists regarding pending NRC action, Attachment 7 provide 5 a brief description of NRC review activi.y in this area.

- . - . . .- .- _.. _ .. - - . - = . . _ - _ - _ . . . _ _ - _ . _ . = _ - . -

o a i

2 I trust this letter has been responsive and thank you for the opportunity to interact with the Southem Nuclear Plant Managers' representatives, i

Sincerely, u .

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation ,

Attachments: As stated cc: L. Reyes, Region 11 J. Johnson, Region ll 1.

i

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lNFORMATION NOTICES January July 1996 January July 1997 NRR- 34 NRR- 42 (+8)

NRR REV- 0 NRR REV- 1 (+1)

NRR SUP - 2 NRR SUP - 6 (+4)

NRR/NMSS - 0 NRR/NMSS - 2 (+2)

NMSS- 7 NMSS- 14 (+7)

NMSS SUP - 0 NMSS SUP - 1 (+1)

BULLETINS P

January July 1996 January July 1997 NRR- 3 NRR- 0 ( 3)

NRR REV- 0 NRR REV - 0 NRR SUP - 0 NRR SUP - 0-NRR/NMSS - 1 NRR/NMSS - 0 ( 1)

NMSS- 0 NMSS- 1 (+1)

NMSS SUP . O NMSS SUP . O GENERIC LETTERS January July 1996 January July 1997 NRR- 4 NRR- 2 ( 2)

NRR REV- 0 NRR REV . O NRR SUP. 1 NRR SUP. 1 NRR/NMSS - 0 NRR/NMSS - 0 NMSS- 0 NMSS- 1 (+1)

NMSS SUP - 1 NMSS SUP - 0 ( 1) m ,. w - , - .,+m-, . - , , - ..- ...g_ .

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LISTING OF ins ISSUED JANUARY - JULY 1996 j IN NO. Delf Il[LE 96 01 01/03/96 POTENTIAL FOR ii!3H POST ACCIDENT CLOSED CYCLE COOLING WATER TEMPERATURES TO DISABLE EQUIPMENT I

l IMPORTANT TO SAFETY 96 02 01/05/96 INOPERABILITY OF POWER-0PERATED RELIEF VALVES MASKED  :

BY DOWNSTREAM INDICATIONS DURING TESTING 96 03 01/05/96 MAIN STEAM SAFETY VALVE SETPOINT VARIATION AS A RESULT OF THERMAL EFFECTS NHSS 01/10/96 INCIDENT REPORTING REQUIREMENTS FOR RADIOGRAPHY 96 04 LICENSEES 96-05 01/18/96 PARTIAL BYPASS OF SHUTDOWN COOLING FLOW FROM THE '

REACTOR VESSEL 96 06 01/25/96 DESIGN AND TESTING DEFICIENCIES OF TORNADO DAMPERS AT NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS 96-07 01/26/96 SLOW FIVE PERCENT SCRAM INSERTION TIMES CAUSED BY VITON DIAPHRAGMS IN SCRAM SOLEN 0ID PILOT VALVES.

96 08 02/05/96 THERMALLY INDUCED PRESSURE LOCKING OF A HIGH PRESSURE ,

COOLANT INJECTION GATE VALVE 95 03. 03/25/96 LOSS OF REACTOR COOLANT INVENTORY AND POTENTIAL LOSS .

SUP, 1 0F EMERGENCY MITIGATION FUNCTIONS WHILE IN A SHUTOOWN ,

CONDITION 96 09 02/12/96 -DAMAGE IN FOREIGN STEAM GENERATOR INTERNALS 96 10 02/13/96 POTENTIAL BLOCKAGE BY DEBRIS OF SAFETY SYSTEM PIPING WHICH IS NOT USED DURING NORMAL OPERATION OR TESTED DURING SURVEILLANCES  ;

96 11 02/14/96 INGRESS OF DEMINERALIZER RESINS INCREASES POTENTIAL l FOR STRESS CORROSION CRACKING OF CONTROL R0D ORIVE MECHANISM PENETRATIONS 96-12 02/15/96 CONTROL R0D INSERTION PROBLEMS

'96-13' 02/26/96 POTENTIAL CONTAINMENT LEAK PATHS THROUGH HYDR 0 GEN ANALYZERS 96-14 03/01/96' DEGRADATION OF RADWASTE FACILITY EQUIPMENT AT MILLSTONE NUCLEAR POWER STATION, UNIT 1 I

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IN NO. DAJ[ 11 Jig 96 15 03/08/96 UNEXPECTED PLANT PERFORMANCE DURING PERFORMANCE OF NEW SURVEILLANCE TESTS 96 16 03/14/96 BWR OPERATION WITH INDICATED FLOW LESS THAN NATURAL CIRCULATION 96-17 03/18/96 REACTOR OPERATION INCONSISTENT WITH THE UPDATED FINAL i SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT NMSS. 03/25/96 COMPLIANCE WITH 10 CFR PART 20 FOR AIRBORNE inuRiUM  ;

96 18 l 96 19 04/02/96 FAILURE OF TONE ALERT RADIOS TO ACTIVATE WHEN  !'

RECEIVING A SHORTENED ACTIVATION SIGNAL NMSS 04/04/96 DEMONSTRATION OF ASSOCIATED EQUIPMENT COMPLIANCE WITH .

96 20 10 CFR 34.20 NMSS 04/10/96 SAFETY CONCERNS RELATED TO THE DESIGN OF THE 000R 96- .

21 INTERLOCK CIRCUIT ON NUCLETRON HIGH-DOSE RATE AND PULSED DOSE RATE REMOTE AFTERLOADING BRACHYTHERAPY DEVICES 96-22 04/11/96 IMPROPER EQUIPMENT SETTINGS DUE TO THE USE OF  :

NONTEMPERATURE-COMPENSATED TEST EQUIPMENT 96 23 04/22/96 FIRES IN EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR EXCITERS DURING ,

OPERATION FOLLOWING UNDETECTED FUSE BLOWING 96 24 04/25/96 PRECONDITIONING 0F MOLDED-CASE CIRCUIT BREAKERS BEFORE SURVEILLANCE TESTING 96 25 04/30/96 TRANSVERSING IN CORE PROBE OVERWITHDRAWN AT LASALLE  :

COUNTY STATION, UNIT 1 96 26 04/30/96 RECENT PROBLEMS WITH OVERHEAD CRANES

-96 27- 05/01/96 POTENTIAL CLOGGING 0F HIGH PRESSURE SAFETY INJECTION THROTTLE VA1.VES DURING RECIRCULATION NMSS 0S/01/96 SUGGESTED GUIDANCE RELATING TO DEVELOPMENT AND 96 28 IMPLEMENTATION OF CORRECTIVE ACTION L

96 29 05/20/96 REQUIREMENTS IN 10 CFR PART'21 FOR REPORTING AND EVALUATING SOFTWARE ERRORS 1

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96 30- 05/21/96 INACCURACY OF DIAGNOSTIC EQUIPMENT FOR MOTOR OPERATED  :

BUTTERFLY VALVES

-96 31 05/22/05 CROSS-TIED SAFETY IMECTION ACCUMULATORS

]

96-32 06/05/96 IMPLCHENTATION OF 10 CFR 50.55a(g)(6)(11)(A). AND

" AUGMENTED EXAMINATION OF REACTOR VESSEL"- 3 NMSS ~05/24/96 ERR 0NEOUS DATA FROM DEFECTIVE THERM 0 COUPLE RESULTS IN 96 33 -A FIRE- .

96 34: 05/31/96- HYDROGEN GAS-IGNITION DURING VSC-24 MSB CLOSURE- .

i WELDING NMSS 06/11/96 FAILURE OF SAFETY SYSTEMS ON SELF-SHIELDED IRRADIATORS 96-35 BECAUSE OF INADEQUATE MAINTENANCE AND TRAINING 96 36 06/12/96 DEGRADATION OF COOLING WATER SYSTEMS DUE TO ICING 96 37 06/18/96 INACCURATE REACTOR WATER LEVEL INDICATION AND INADVERTENT DRAINDOWN DURING SHUT 00WN 96 38 -06/21/96 RESULTS OF STEAM GENERATOR TUBE EXAMINATIONS  !

96 39 07/05/96 ESTIMATES OF DECAY HEAT USING ANS 5.1 DECAY HEAT STANDARD MAY VARY SIGNIFICANTLY 96 09 07/10/96 DAMAGE IN FOREIGN STEAM GENERATOR INTERNALS SUP. 1 96-40 07/25/96 DEFICIENCIES IN MATERIAL DEDICATION AND PROCUREMENT PRACTICES AND IN AUDITS OF VENDORS 96-41 07/26/97 EFFECTS OF A-DECREASE IN FEEDWATER TEMPERATURE ON NUCLEAR INSTRUMENTATION 1

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LISTING OF ins ISSUED JANUARY - JULY 1997 1

IN NO. DaTI TIJ1E .

97 01 01/08/97 IMPROPER ELECTRICAL GROUNDING RESULTS IN SIMULTANE0US FIRES IN THE CONTROL ROOM AND THE SAFE-SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT ROOM 97-02 02/06/97 CRACKS FOUND IN JET PUMP RISER ASSEMBLY ELB0WS AT BOILING WATER REACTORS NMSS 02/20/97 DEFACING 0F LABELS TO COMPLY WITH 10 CFR 20.1904(b) 97 03 NMSS 02/24/97 IMPLEMENTATION OF A NEW CONSTRAINT ON RADI0 ACTIVE Am 97 04 EFFLUENTS 97-05 02/27/97 0FFSITE NOTIFICATION CAPABILITIES 91 85 02/27/97 POTENTIAL FAILURES OF THERMOSTATIC CONTROL VALVES FOR REV. 1 DIESEL GENERATOR JACKET COOLING WATER 97 06 03/04/97 WEAKN SSES IN PLANT-SPECIFIC EMERGENCY OPERATING PROCEDURES FOR REFILLING THE SECONDARY SIDE OF DRY ONCE-THROUGH STEAM GENERATORS 97-07 03/06/97 PROBLEMS IDENTIFIED DURING GENERIC LETTER 89-10 CLOSE0VT INSPECTIONS 97-08 03/12/97 POTENTIAL FAILURES OF GENERAL ELECTRIC MAGNE-BLAST CIRCUIT BREAKER SUBCOMPONENTS 97-09 03/12/97 INADE0VATE MAIN STEAM SAFETY VALVE (MSSV) SETPOINTS AND PERFORMANCE ISSUES ASSOCIATED WITH LONG MSSV INLET PlPING 97-10 03/13/97 LINER PLATE CORROSION IN CONCRETE CONTAINMENTS 97-11 03/21/97 CEMENT EROSION FROM CONTAINMENT SUBFOUNDATIONS AT NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS 92 27. 03/21/97 THERMALLY INDUCED ACCELERATED AGING AND FAILURE OF SUP. 1 ITE/G0ULD A.C. RELAYS USED IN SAFETY-RELATED APPLICATIONS 97-12 03/24/97 POTENTIAL ARMATURE BINDING IN GENERAL ELECTP.IC TYPE HGA RELAYS 97-13 03/24/97 DEFICIENT CONDITIONS ASSOCIATED WITH PROTECTIVE C0ATINGS AT NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS 97-14 03/28/97 ASSESSMENT OF SPENT FUEL POOL COOLING

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i IN NO. DAl[

A HILE 97 15 04/04/97 REPORTING 0F ERRORS AND CHANGES IN LARGE BREAK LOSS-0F-CODLANT ACCIDENT EVALUATION N0DELS OF FUEL VENDORS AND COMPLIANCE WITH 10 CFR 50.46(a)(3) 97-16 04/04/97 PRECONDITIONING 0F PLANT STRUCTURES. SYSTEMS, AND i

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COMPONENTS BEFORE ASME CODE INSERVICE TESTING OR TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION SURVEILLANCE TESTING 97 17 04/04/97 CRACKING 0F VERTICAL WELDS IN THE CORE SHROUD AND l DEGRADED REPAIR 97 18. 04/14/97 PROBLEMS IDENTIFIED DURING MAINTENANCE RULE BASELINE INSPECTIONS 94 14. 04/14/97 FAILURE TO IMPLEMENT REQUIREMENTS FOR BIENNIAL MEDICAL SUP. 1 EXAMINATIONS AND NOTIFICATION TO THE NRC 0F CHANGES IN LICENSED GPERATOR MEDICAL CONDITIONS .

97 19 04/18/97 SAFETY INJECTION SYSTEM WELD FLOW AT SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR POWER PLANT, UNIT ?

NHSS - 04/17/97 IDENTIFICATION OF CERTAIN URANIUM HEXAFLUORIDE 97 20 CYLINDERS THAT DO NOT COMPLY WITH ANSI N14.1 FABRICATION STANDARDS -

97-21 04/18/97 AVAILABILITY OF ALTERNATE AC POWER SOURCE DESIGNED FOR STATION BLACK 0UT EVENT 97 22 04/25/97 FAILURE OF WELDED STEEL MOMENT RESISTING FRAMES DURING THE NORTHRIDGE EARTHQUAKE NMSS 05/07/97 EVALUATION AND REPORTING 0F FIRES AND UNPLANNED-

-97 23 CHEMICAL REACTION EVENTS AT FUEL CYCLE FACILITIES NMSS- 05/08/97 FAILURE OF PACKING NUTS ON ONE-INCH URANIUM 97 24 HEXAFLUORIDE CYLINDER VALVES 97 05/09/97 DYNAMIC RANGE UNCERTAINTIES IN THE REACTOR N SSEL LEVEL INSTRUMENTATION 87 05/15/97 POTENTIAL FOR WATER HAMMER DURING RESTART OF RESIDUAL SUP,1 - HEAT REMOVAL PUMPS

97 26 '

05/19/97. DEGRADATION IN SMALL-RADIUS U BEND REGIONS OF STEAM GENERATOR TUBES

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IN NO. Q61E TITLE 7 97 27 05/16/97 EFFECT OF INCORRECT STRAINER PRESSURE DROP DN AVAILABLE NET POSITIVE SUCTION HEAD ,

97 28 05/30/97 ELIMINATION OF INSTRUMENT RESPONSE TIME TESTING UNDER ,

THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR 50.59 97 29 05/30/97 CONTAINMENT INSPECTION RULE i NHSS 06/03/97 CONTROL OF LICENSED Mt.TERIAL DURING REORGANIZATIONS, 97-30 EMPLOYEE MANAGEMENT DISAGREEMENTS, AND FINANCIAL i CRISES j 97 31 06/03/97 FAILURES OF REACTOR COOLANT PUMP THERMAL BARRIERS AND CHECK VALVES IN FOREIGN PLANTS 97-32 06/10/97 DEFECTIVE WORM SHAFT GEAR IN A LIMITOROUd MOTOR-OPERATED VALVE ACTUATOR 95 36. 06/10/97 POTENTIAL PROBLEM WITH POST FIRE EMERGENCY LIGHTING '

SUP. 1 97-33 06/11/97 UNANTICIPATED EFFECT OF VENTILATION SYSTEM ON TANK LEVEL INDICATIONS AND ENGINEERING SAFETY FEATURES '

ACTUATIONS SYSTEM SETPOINT 97-34 06/12/97 DEFICIENCIES IN LICENSE: SUBMITTALS REGARDING 1ERMIN0 LOGY FOR RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS IN ACCORDANCE Wlhi THE NEW PART 2' NMSS 06/18/97 RETROFIT T0 INDUSTRIAL NUCLEAR CO. (INC) IR100 97 35 RADIOGRAPHY CAMERA TO CORRECT INCONSISTENCY IN 10 CFR '

PART 34 COMPATIBILITY 97 36 06/20/97 UNPLANNED INTAKES BY WORKER OF TRANSURANIC AIRBORNE RADI0 ACTIVE MATERIALS AND EXTERNAL EXPOSURE DUE TO INADEQUATE CONTROL OF WORK

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97 37 06/20/97 MAIN TRANSFORMER FAULT WITH ENSUING OIL SPILL INTO TURBINE BUILDING NHSS 06/24/97 RETROFIT TO AMERSHAM 660 FUSILOCK ROiOGRAPHY CAMERA 96 53. TO CORRECT INCONSISTENCY IN 10 CFR PART 34 SUP. 1 COMPATIBILifY i

97 38- - 06/24/97 LEVEi.-SENSING SYSTEM INITIATES COMMON MODE FAILURE OF HIGH PRESSURE-INJECTION PUMPS

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. 4 IN NO. T DAT.I HILE NMSS &- 06/26/97 INADEOUATE 10 CFR 72.48 SAFETY EVALUATIONS OF NRR INDEPENDENT SPENT FUEL STORAGE INSTALLATIONS 97-39 97 40 06/26/97 POTENTIAL NITROGEN ACCUMULATION RESULTING FROM-BACKLEAKAGE FROM SAFETY INJECTION TANKS f 97-41 06/27/97 POTENTIALLY UNDERSIZE 0 Ei!ERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR (EDG) OIL COOLERS i NMSS- 06/27/97 MANAGEMENT WEAKNESSES RESULTING IN FAILURE TO COMPLY 97 42 WITH SHIPPING REQUIREMENTS FOR SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIAL 97-43 07/01/97 LICENSE CONDITION COMPLIANCE 97 44- 07/01/97 FAILURES OF GAMMA METRICS WIDE-RANGE LINEAR NEUTRON FLUX CHANNELS i

97 45 07/02/97 ENVIRONMINTAL QUALIFICATION DEFICIENCY FOR CABLES AND CONTAINMENT PENETRATION PlGTAILS 96 44. 07/02/97 FAILURE OF REACTOR TRIP BREAKER FROM CRACKING OF SUP. 1 PHENOLIC MATERIAL IN SECONDARY CONTACT ASSEMBLY 97 46 07/09/97 UNIS0LABLE CRACK IN HIGH PRESSURE INJECTION PIPING ,

NMSS 06/27/97 INADE00 ATE PUNCTURE TESTS FOR TYPE B PACKAGES UNDER 97 47 10 CFR 71.73(c)(3) .

97 07/09/97 INADE00 ATE OR INAPPROPRIATE INTERIM FIRE PROTECTION COMPENSATORY MEASURES 97 07/10/97 B&W ONCE-THRCUGH STEAM GENERATOR TUBE INSPECTION FINDINGS NMSS 07/10/97 CONTAMINATED LEAD PRODUCTS 97-50 NMSS & 07/11/97 PROBLEMS EXPERIENCED WITH LOADING AND UNLOADING SPENT

'NRR . NUCLEAR FUEL STORAGE AND TRANSPORTATION CASKS I

i97 51

! ~ 91 - SO ,' 07/17/97- WATER HAMMER EVENTS SINCE 1991

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5-IN NO. ggi Igj,g 97-52 07/17/97 INADVERTENT LOSS OF CAPABILITY FOR EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEM MOTORS ,

97-53 07/18/97 CIRCUIT BREAKERS LEFT OUT IN NON SEISMICALLY OVAllFIED POSITION-  ;

97-54 07/18/97 NRC LICENSED OPERATORS AT SIX NON POWER REACTOR FACILITIES ALLOW THEIR OPERATOR LICENSES TO EXPIRE i

NMSS '07/23/97 CALCULATION OF SURFACE ACTIVITY FOR CONTAMINATED-i 97-55. EQUIPMENT AND MATERIALS

. NHSS '07/28/97- POSSESSION LIMITS FOR SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIAL AT THE 97 56 ENVIROCARE OF UTAH LOW LEVEL RADI0 ACTIVE-WASTE ,

- NMSS 07/30/97 LEAK TESTING OF PACKAGING USED IN THE TRANSPORT OF ,

97 57 RADIDACTIVE MA1ERIAL NMSS 07/31/97 MECHANICAL INTEGRITY OF IN SITU LEACH INJECTION WELLS 97 58 AND PIPING t

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LISTING OF BULLETINS ISSUED JANUARY - JULY 1996 l

- BL NO. Q611 TITLE 1 96-01' 03/08/96 CONTROL R0D INSERTION PROBLEMS 96 02 04/11/96 MOVEMENT OF HEAVY LOADS OVER SPENT FUEL. OVER FUEL IN THE REACTOR CORE. OR OVER SAFETY-RELATED EQUIPMENT-  !

96 03_ 05/06/96 POTENTIAL PLUGGING 0F EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SUCTION STRAINERS BY DEBRIS IN BOILING-WATER REACTORS l NMSS & 07/03/96 CHEMICAL. GALVANIC. OR OTHER REACTIONS IN SPENT FUEL l NRR STORAGE AND TRANSPORTATION CASKS

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NMSS 04/30/97 POTENTIAL FOR ERR 0NE0US CALIBRATION. DOSE RATE, OR 97 01 RADIATION EXPOSURE MEASUREMENTS WITH CERTAIN VICT0REEN MODEL 530 AND 53051 ELECTROMETER/DOSEMETERS l

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l LISTING OF GLs ISSUED JANUARY - JULY 19%'  :

GL=NO. Q6IE IIILE l

- 96 01. 01/10/96 TESTING OF SAFETY RELATED LOGIC CIRCUITS  ;

t 89-10. 01/24/96 CONSIDERATION OF VALVE MISPOSITIONING IN PRESSURIZEO-  !

SUP . 7 -- WATER REACTORS  ;

. 96 02 -02/13/96 RECONSIDERATION OF NUCLEAR POWER PLANT SECURITY  !

REQUIREMENTS ASSOCIATED WITH AN INTERNAL THREAT  !

- 96 03 s1/31/ % RELOCATION OF THE PRESSURE TEMPERATURE LIMIT CURVES AND LOW TEMPERATURE OVERPRESSURE PROTECT 10N' SYSTEM ,

LIMITS i 04/05/96-NHSS- MONITORING AND TRAINING OF SHIPPERS AND CARRIERS OF 95 09. RADI0 ACTIVE MATERIALS  :

SUP. 1 i

- 96 04 06/26/96 BORAFLEX DEGRADATION IN SPENT FUEL PODL STORAGE RACKS l i

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LISTING OF GLs ISSUED-JANUARY - JULY 1997  !

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GL NO. DM.E HILE  !

l 95 06. 01/31/97 CHANGES IN THE OPERATOR LICENSING PROGRAM l SUP. 1 ,

i 97 01 04/01/97 DEGRADATION OF CONTROL ROD DRIVE MECHANISM AND OTHER' VESSEL CLOSURE HEAD PENETRATIONS i

97 02- '05/15/97 REVISED CONTENTS OF THE MONTHLY OPERATING REPORT l

NHSS '07/09/97 ANNUAL FINANCIAL SURETY UPDATE REQUIREMENTS FOR 97-03- URANIUM REC 0VERY LICENSEES j

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NRR Licensing Actions and Licensing Activities July 1997 l

SUMMARY

Totallnventory (Licensing Actions + Licensing' Activities)

The totalinventory decreased from 2721 to 2690 TACs, with most of the decrease attributable to closing out licensing actions and activities for Maine Yankee, which has entered decommissioning status. Refer to the following figures for totalinventory trends.

• Licensing Actions The licensing action inventory of 1306 TACs is 1 more than last month's total. There were 100 TACs closed, compared to 111 that were opened. All of the TACs opened and closed were plant speelfic actions.14 of the closed TACs were for Maine Yankee.

Refer to the figure for ll:ensing action trends. .

The distribution of TACs completed by priority is: Priority 1 = 18.2%, Priority 2 = 26.4%.

Priority 3 = 51.8%, and Priority 4 = 3.6% The distribution of the open TACs by priority is Priority 1 = 7.7% Priority 2 = 34.3%, Priority 3 = 56.8%, and Priority 4 = 1.2%

For TACs > 2 years old, the number decreased by 14 to 106 TACs. The number of TACs > 3 years old decreased by 3 to 16 TACs, representing approximately 1.2% of the total number of licensing actions. 5 of the TACs > 2 years old and 2 of the TACs > 3 years old that were closed in August were Maine Yankee TACs.

Licensing Activities The licensing activity inventory decreased by 32 to 1384 TACs. There were 22 TACs completed last month, compared to 54 opened. Refer to the figure for licensing activity trends.14 of the closed TACs were for Maine Yankee.

The distribution of TACs completed by priority is: Priority 1 = 10.0%, Priority 2 = 30.0%

Priority 3 = 50.0% and Priority 4 = 4.0% The distribution of tha open TACs by priority is Priority 1 = 12.7% Priority 2 = 54.4% Priority 3 = 31.6% and Priority 4 = 1.3%

No specific age or priorit) oals have been established for licensing activities, l'he data was retrieved from WISP and is current as of 09/16/97.

I

l 4

a Inventory Trend -

NRR 1

4 3000 -

I i

1 h ,1, s j 's M 1 2500 - - - - - - - - - - - -

! a

/4 /pg

~

i

e -

O ~

l

\ 4> 2000 ~

u. -

O ~

et 1500 ---------------,----,y'-

- i ,

-l l x ir----,--------- i

.i uJ m

t i -

1. • I f~

2 _

u 3000 z -

500 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

l -

~

0 AUG SEP OCT NOV DEC JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG 96 l 97

• ACTIONS l ACTIVITIES

• TOTAL

R l

1, LICENSING ACTION AGE GOALS 1 O TO 1 Year O TO 2 Years 1

100% 100%

~

~ 0o.1 oos ................................ oos ........................ %..... ..

1 eos m aos ................................

i

< ptps ......................... .... yos ........................ .......

eos ................................ .os ................................

l 3os , , , , , , , ,

3os AUG SEP OCTNOVDEC JAN FEB MAR APR MAYJUN JUL AUG AUG SEP OCTNOVDEC JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG 96 l 97 96 97 l

100 %

O TO 3 Years >3 Years i Goal 5%

k i *

gog ................................ 4% ---------------------- - - ------

80% -------------------------------- 3% ---------------------------------

i 3 ........................... .. 3 ..... .

1 N

................................ 1, .................................

g , , , ,,.,,,,,

g m.g 1 AUG SEP OCT NOVDEC JAN FEB MAR APR MAYJUN JUL AUG AUG SEP OCT NOV DEC JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG es 3 37 as or 4 e

LICENSING ACTION INVENTORY - NRFt Opened vs Closed 175 -

~

E s ,

s AUG SEP OCT NOV DEC JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG

5 Age of Licensing Activities in years - Region II 0-1 >1-2 >2-3 >3 Total BRUNSWICK 1 6 3 2 3 14 BRUNSWICK 2 5 3 2 3 13 HARRIS 5 3 2 1 11 NORTH ANNA 1 6 2 0 2 10 NORTH ANNA 2 6 , 2 0 2 10 ROBINSON 2 7 3 1 1 12 SUMMER 7 3 1 1 12 SURRY 1 7 2 1 2 12 '

SURRY 2 6 3 1 2 12 PD II-1 55 (52%) 24 (23%) 10_( 9%) 17 (16%) 106 CATAWBA 1 10 2 0 1 b CATAWBA 2 10 2 0 1 13 FARLEY 1 7 3 1 1 12 FARLEY 2 6 3 1 0 10 HATCH 1 7 4 0 1 12 HATCH 2 7 4 0 1 12 MCGUIRE 1 7- 2 0 1 10 MCGUIRE 2 7 2 0 1 10 OCONEE 1 5 5 0 1 11 OCONEE 2 5 4 0 1 10 OCONEE 3 5 4 0 1 10 VOGTLE 1 6 4 0 0 10

.VOGTLE 2 6 4 0 0 10 PD II-2 88 (62%) 43 (30%) 2 ( 1%) 10 ( 7%) 143 BROWNS FERRY 1 7 3 2 3 15 BROWNS FERRY 2 6 3 0 2 11 BROWNS FERRY 3 6 3 1 2 12 CRYSTAL RIVER 3 7 5 1 3 16 SEQUOYAH 1 6 3 1 2 12 SEQUOYAH 2 8 3 1 2 14 ST LUCIE 1 8 4 1 1 14 ST LUCIE 2 6 3 2 1 12 TURKEY. POINT 3 6 3 0 2 11 TURKEY POINT 4 6 3 0 2 11 WATTS BAR-1 8 3 1 1 13

-PD II-3 74 (52%) 36 (26%) 10 ( 7%) 21 (15%) 141 REGION II 217 (56%) 103 (26%) 22 ( 6%) 48 (12%) 390

ALLEATION3 RECEIVED 9/30/97 10/9/97

. whmer* 3 Site l1993 l1994 l1995 l1996 l1997 ARKANSAS i 4 4, 8, 2 3

'BE AVER VALLEY i 9 7i 7; 6' 8 BRAIDWOOD ._  ! 3,__11 l 3, _ 10, _12 BROWNS FERRY l 40 16' 13 26 14 BRUNSWICK  ! 26l 11{ 7 _8,_17 BYRON _  ! _ _ 3, _ 8_ 4 _ 67,_ 10 CALLAW4.Y i 6 6; 3 CALVERT FOiIS l . 6, 2[?

7 8 9 4, C ATAWBA CLINTON 4

_3 12' 7 _2__6L3 18' 8 20 29 COMANCUE EE'AK i 19 6: 14 20 J COOK l 6 10 4 4 4 COOPED ~ 1 3 16: ill 14 J 6

. CRYSTAL RIVER DAVIS-BESSE

(__6 _3_6 10

_21 2 12

! 176 10, DIABLO, CANYON 13 13 17L21]_14 0RESDEN .

1 21 13 12 W 2; 16 DU_AN_E ARNOLD  : 2' 2: 2 _ 1_3 6;

FARLEY . i 1; _2 3 2 FERMI 8 9 19_ 8 21! 4 FITZPATRICK .  ; 8 3 7l E __3 FORT _ CALHOUN 7 4' 4' 4 7 OINNA _ _ i 1] 11 1}_4_1 GR AND_ O_ULF i 3 2 2_ 10 3 HARRIS  : 2 4' 3 2: 2 HATCH _ _ _ _ ___ l 4_8,_ _6, 6 14 HOPE CREEK ' 6 7j 10 24 6 INDIAN POINT _2

6. 11 6' 6 8 fNDIAN POINT 3 -

26- 14t 11! 6 14 KEWAUNEE 4 li '

II li 1 LASALLE j 6 16 7I 11! 11 LIME RICK 16 12, 4' 5 6 MCOUIRE -

8 3 4' 1 Mit LSTONE i 42 46; 47 2 77;__69 MONTICELLO i 2

1 6 3 NINE'M_lLE POET' C O,_7J h 14[ 7 NORTH ANNA j 12 2 8 4+ 6 OCONEE ~

i 1! 4 15 8' 1 OYSTERIdREE K  ! 9 3" 5: 3' 6 PALISADEf ~ 76- 6_ 9 7g, 3 PALO_ VERDE  ! 40 _ 23 J 8- 22 16 PEACH 80TTOM  ! 6- 8 3 4- 6 PERRE- ~ ~ 7i 2 20 9 PIU3MM 19 9' 8 Vi 2 POINT .BE ACH_ _

1l 4! 3' 6 10 PRAIRIE ISLAND 4 2- 3 7. 4 OUAD_CITIE.S 6,__9, 7; 13' 10 RIVER BE_ND y_22; 111 211_ 18 7 ROBINSON 4 3. 3 1! 1 SALEM 13 20 16' 37: 17 SAN ONOFRE 13 16 3 21 44 28 SEABROOK 4; 6: 3 7 1 SE_QUOYAH _31! 8 19' 29 9 SHOREHAM i 6' 2 1! il 3871l 16L2%

~ ~

SOUTH TEES i 7

ST LU.CIE 4 111 2 11 47: 68 SUMMER ' 2, 3 2', 9 SURRY'  ! 6; .' ~ 6 3 3,. _1

,SUSOU_EHANNA_ _  !

7 8 8 36: 17 THREE MILE ISLAND i 7, 3 li 3; 6 TURKEY POINT 13 9 12 '- 16' 17 VERMONT YANKEE 3 2 6 til 4 Page1 i

, - . .- . - _ ~ - . . . .. ~ _ ~ . . . .

. . . , .. . .. -_n, . . _ .-..~ .... - - . . . . ~ . . - -,

i I

ALLE@ATONS RECEIVED 9/3007 - 10/9/97 J i

. t ties l1993l1994litellittel1997 I

, VOOTLE 74 11 t _i_1J 71 11 WASMNGTON NUCLEAM - 0 T 14' 19 it

@AIkRF# 6; 3$ 16:

8 .4!. 60.

2'1]J WA._TTS_.. S.. AR

_6._9.  % 2. 9. . 14 i, WOLF CREEK 6~ 12: - -- 6 13 13 j ZION 71 17! S 14' 42 5 4,

i r

i r

t s

i h

.')

4 5

0 s

I a

E L

t

?

'?

o i

b

- Pope 2 '  !

-N,+=

.0+ - m + ~% n+--,vr a csv-s + .+ - w e -e, -+ ,~ em

l ALLIO.a. TONS RECEIVED MOST TO LEAST IN CY97 9/30/97 10/9/97 l Site l1993 h pS4 h p96 l1996 l1997 MILLSTONE _  ! 42,_46,._47j3 77]_69 ST LUCIE l 4111.L21,1_47 _68 ZION I 74 17 L _14L42 8

CLINf0N __ J 12: 18 _ 8,_ 20 _29

$AN ONOFRE  ! 13 16 32' 44' 28 WASHING 10_N NUCLE AR g_ 8, 6 14 19 ] 8 CRYSTAL Rivt_R  ! _6: 3 6: 21]_ 17 BRUNSWICK L 26 11; 7! 8J7 S ALE M_ _d j 3_20,_16;_37h 17

$USOUE_HANNA i ,73 8, _ 8, _ 36 L 17 TURKEY POINT __J i3 9 12i 16' 17 COOPE R I 3,_16; jib 14g16 DRESDEN _ L12;_13 12 12; 16 PALO VERDE., i 40' 23, j 8 _ 22 15 8ROWNS FE RRY l 40 16' 13 INDIAN POINT 3 26 R 11l _

26;]14

__ 6, 4 WATTS.BAR 69 _ 64 4

60 29, 14 DIABLO_ CANYON 13 ; 13  ; 17L_21}__14 HATCH. __4; _,_8, 6,__.6;_14 WOLF CREEK 6,_12; 6 13 13 BRAIDWOOD. __3_11L_ 3,_10,_12 WATERFORD_ L 6; _ 3 16,_21j_12 LASALL E t Si 16 7; ill 11 COM ANC..H....(..P..E AK _ _

19 6 14 ' .._20#~~il QU AD C. .I.T..IE S.

POINT BEACH I.6'_

L 1,i

' .9 4' 3 7, 13 6

10 to BYRON  ! _ _ 3, _ 8,,,_ ,4,_ , 6JO PERRY _ _ _

l 8 7g.2! s0 9 SE_ QUO _YAH _,, ]_, 31[ _8,___19__2 9,_ _9 INDIAN POINT 2 _6 _ 1] _ 6 6 8 BE AVE R VALLEY ___4_9,_74 7i 6 8 FORT _CALHO_UN _!_7: 4 4 4; 7 SOUTH TEXAS i 38 21 16 26 7 NINE3IIfPoljNT RIVER BEND.

i_10,_7_11{18

_ _ _ _j _ 22,_ 11 2h 14 7 7

HOPE CREE _K i 6_ 7j 10 24 1 .6 LIMERICK __ ] 10 12i 4 6; 6 OYSTER CREE _K _ 9,_ _3g_ _6,_ _ 3 6 PE ACH BOTTOM 6 8 3 4- 6 iH'REE[ MILE 'ISLANO OAVIS;.BESSE

_7g l_,10 j0,_2; 3 lb3[6 12 4,_4 ,6 6

NORTH ANNA _

PRAIRIE ISLAND

[J 2_8, 4 2< 3 7g._4, VjRMON1_Y_ANKE E 3, _2L,._ _6;,_ _111_ _4 CALVERT CLIFFS 6 7' . 9 4, COOK- 6 10,__4_; 4 4 F ERMI 9 19; 8 11;L 4 CATAWBA 3 7;_2p _6, 3 CALLAWAY 6' 2; 6; 7! _3

.G_ RAND _ GULF 3; 2; 2 j0_,_3 F;lTZ, PATRICK ____ 8, 3,_ 7; 6,_3 MONTICELLO ARKANSAS 2,,

d' 4' 1 J 6_3 8 2 3 P liSAD'ES f'6' 9 7 3 DU.ANE ARNOLD 2l 2i 2: 3

,PILORIM 19 ; 9. 8 6,___2 FARLE_Y 11__2; 3; 6, _ .2 HARR. lS I 2; 4; 3 2! 2 MCOUIRE L8 4' 3, 4l 1 OCONE_E 1! I g__8, 1 GINNA 11 11 ti 4 1 Page 1

ALLE@ATIONS RCCEIVED MOST 10 LEAST IN CY97 9/30/97 100/97 SHe l1993 l1994 l1995 l199611997 ROBINSON  !

4 3; 3 1: 1 SURRY < 6 6 3 3 1 KlWAUNf E I 1t i

~7~[I '~l6'~~ ~3 i ti SEABROOK 7 1 1I'~1'l

~

SHORf HAM I 6 2 SUMMER I 2- 3 2 9 i

Page 2

- ._ . . . . - _ _ ._ ..- __.. .. _. _ ._ _ _ __.._m

• 10/9/97

. D:CCRIMINATION ALLE!ATIONS RECEIVED . 9/30C7 .

Y  :

She! 11993 l19M l1995 l1996l1997 -l ARKANSAS-  ! 1 di '

BEAVER VALLEY I 4I 1 2 -

1 -

1. 10 3GCK_ POINT -

sRAiDWoOD_ _

_ -4 1 _

2! 1  ;

BROWNS FERRY 6! 41 3 6 2 SRUNSWICK 6: 1 1 3 4 SYRON i 1 1 CALLAWAY 1! 1 1 1 CALVERT_ CLIFFS F 3 3 1 CLINTON 14_ 2 4= 6 COMANCHE PEAK _T I 1 4 1 C OK ~

3 1 1 1 2  !

$UdPER T l 5, 1 -

3

,Cg h $ 31VER . , , , ,

2: IT 3 DAVIS 9 ESSE 21 Il 2L _1 DIABLO_ CANYON - _ _2- 2) 26 6; 3 Dr.ESDEN -

^

3 1 4! 2 DUANE ARNOLD  ! 1 1

..[

FERMt_ _ ,_i 4!- _3 3 4 1 FITZPATRICK j l- 2 4"

1 1

[6RT[ATLSDUN [ j_2 '

2_ 1 1 GRAND GULF

~

11 T 3

,HARNIS } l' =

HATCH 1 4

1 HOPE CREEK 11 1 4 2 INDIAN _PO!_NT 2 _j 3; 1]

• INDIAN POINT 3 3 3 E' 2. 2 LASALLE . _ L 21i 3 1 uMERICK .1,..__2; 1! 1 MCOUIRE t I 4l i MIL (y[ONE. 11l 15j 12.l 30 19 NINE MILE _ POINT 1

2 __1] 4: 1!

NORTH ANNA  ! 1!

t il '

l OCONE_E -  !

[ 1[ 11 . 1 OYSTER CREEK 1 2 1! 1

.PEO5A6E5~ 1 1 3

PALO VERDE 14 1 11 4' 4{_l_ 2 .

PEACH BOTTOM 1C[2: ]

3 11 _ 1 4

PERR_Y 24 1l PILGRIM PO,l.NT__BE ACH 2.

y 242 1 t

2 2

• 1l PRAIRIE ISLAND

~

1 i

'OUED' CITIES - l 1 2. 2 BlVER_ BEND 6, 1 10 9' 1 RO_BINSON 3; 1 l l SALEM 3' 6 4 71 2 SAN ONOFRE - 5l 4' _ 2' 91 6 SEABROO_K _'I _

II' 11 SEQUO_YAH 11 2l 3 _2 bOUTH TEXAS ST LUC'E 16 7i 2

5 3l. 2t 6)'

7 2 SUMMER - 1 SURRY '1 SUSOUEHANNA 2- 1 ,1 1

_THREE M_i_LE ISLA_ND 1 1 T_URKE,Y POINT 4 .

2 1 VERMONT YANKEE t 2 1 VOGTLE 4; IL2 WASHINGTON NUCLEAR 4! 4- ; 3_3 WATERFORD -

_ 2l 6l - 7  !

2 WATTS BAR - , 18: 18 16; 6' 3 WOLF CREEK -I i ti i 1

_ Page 1

L D CCRIMINATION AllEGA'lONS RECEIVED 9/30/97 10/9/97 She l199311994 l199611996 l1997 ZION  ! t 4 11 1 7 s

1 4

Page 2 l

- -____-_----__------_---_____-_-___._-___-_--______________-_____-__-..__-___-_L

DISCRIMINATION ALLEGATIONS RECElVED MOST TO LEAST 1997 9/30/97 10/9/97 l Site l1993 l1994 l1996l1996 l1997l MILLST ONE Li l ' 16: 12 30 19 ZLON CLINTON_

l l $

2__,,_,1 if 4; I 7 6

{  !

SAN ONOFRE i 6; 4; 2: 9 6 DRUNSWICK l 6 1! 1 3 4 PERRY _ i 2j 2; 1 3 4 DIABLO CANYON  !

2 1 2' 2 6' 3 WATTS BAR 18! 18 7 6# 6! 3 COOMR I 6' i il 3 WAS_HINGTON NUCLE AR 4! 4' 3 3 OUAD CJTJES l 1 2: 2

. POINT .BE ACH 1{  !; 1 1 2 PILGRIM 2; 2j 2! 2 PAL _O VER_DE 14; 11! 4l 4 2 INDIAN POINT 3 3 3; 6! 2! 2 COOK 3 ti 1 11 2 DRESDEN_  ! 3 1 4 2 WATERFORD l 2i 61 71 2 SALEM ' 3 6 7 2

~

4l  !

BEAVIR VALLEY j i 1 4; ig2 V_OGTLE j 4 j  ! 1! 2 BROWNS FERRY I 6' 4' 3 6~ 2 SOUTH TEXAS  ! 16 7 6, _ 7; 2 SE QU.OYAH_

11L_2L _3 6; 2

.FOR,T CALHOUN j 2'  ! 2; Q 1 i 11 1 WOLF _ CREE K  !  !

THREE MILE ISLAND ~

I I I il 1 P[dCH[BOTTdti j 1 2i ti 1 FITZPATRICK  ! 2; 1 1 1 LASALLE I  !

2 3 1 Ll51ERICK j 2,_ l 1! 1 FERMt i 4- 3 3' 4' 1 DAVIS-BESSE t 2 1 1l; 2- 1 TURKEY POINT i 4 i 1 2 1 CALVERT CLIFFS  ! 1{_ j ( 3, 1

.O_CONEE  !

! 1 1l X 1 OYSTER _ CREEK  ! 1l ', 2 1l 1 PALISADES 1L 1l  !  ! 1 SUSOUEHANNA 2'  ! 1' 1! 1 BRAIDWOOD i 4' 1 2' 1

. RIVER BEND _ l 6 Il 10 9 1 C_OMAN_CHE PEAK l  ! 1[ II 4_ 1

. CRYSTAL RIVER  ! 2; 11 4' 3, BIG ROCK POINT

~

! 1!  !  !

CAELAWAY 1! 11 1 1 BiRON T 1 NUhTH ANNA II 1

%ERMONT' YANKEE l 2; 1 SURRY 1 SUMMER 1 ST LUCIE 2' 3 2:

SEABROOK tl 1 MCGUIRE 4.

_ PRAIRIE ISLAND 1l DUANE ARNOLD 1 11 NINE MILE POINT 2: 1 4' 1 ARKA_NSAS 1 4 INDIAN *OINT 2 3 1 H_ OPE _ CREEK. 11 1 4: 2

.H.ATCH 1) { _ __11 HARRIS  ! i 1!  !

GRAND GULF I il 3 Page 1

e DISCRIMINATION ALLEGATIONS RECEIVED . MOST TO LEAST 1997 9/30C7 '10/9/97 i She l1993 l1994 l1995l1996 l1997 ROBINSON 1 3 1! t i Page 2

PE.iCENT SUBSTANTIATED FO?, YEAR RECEIVED 9/30/97 10/9/97 She l 1993 l1994 l1995 l1996l1997 A_RKANSAS 4 25_ _ 25I 50 M 00j,'

,BE AVE R_ VALLEY i 11 43! 14 l

. BRAID. WOOD i 33 441 67i 40j_17_

BROWNS FERRY 35 53 38 29i 10 BRUESEVICI i 42755 71 60i 100

'ByR6N l I 13 33

~

33F17~ '

d 'Li WAY i 60l i 60~6 5 5 ! 14 T CIQR_T CLIFFS 100_

CATAWBA 33i 43 50t 40 50 CLINTON 11 50 501 44 44 COMANCHE PEAK 37 60 29J 33 50 COOK 331 56 50 COOPER 67i 33t 64 : 54t 17

~

CRYSTAL RIVER 20I 67 33 61 l T DAVIS BESSE 2,0! _40 50 27!

DIABLO CANYON 81 62 50 26l 33_

DRESDEN 55L 33 55i 40i 50 DUANE ARNOLD 100! 50 501 FAR_ LEY i j 33! 33I F E RMt._ 56L26 l 13i 351

.FITZPATRICK L 6 L 43( Q_,.

FORT CALHOUN  ! 141 50i 50!  !

33 GINNA

^

__.g_00[ti6300[

, GRAND., GULF _1 50 i 100L33 !!

HARRIS _ 50i i  ! 33:

UAiCH 50! _38 L 33J 50l 50

,H_ OPE _CRE E K  !  ! 434 30 l 24 67 INDIAN POINT 2 1 33: 1 40l 40L20_

INDIAN POINT 3 ,

40! 29J_18 j 20i 10 i

' 100l 1 1

K.EWAUNEC g LASALLE 33! 27i 67i 205 L_IMERICK 4 44j 33L25{B(_

MCOUIRE  !

! 13j 33j_a MILLSTONE 4Bl 42! 234 28!i 7 MONTICELLO 4 100t  ! I NINE MILE POINT D 67 14I 27 f j 3 N.O.RTH ANNA 17! j 254_50!

OCONEE_ _  ; 50i  ! 29i OYSTER CREEK 22 i 33! 60: I

'P LISI6E5~  ! 20E33I22 i 33!

fLO[ VERDE ,

13{4[_.i4._j,._.4(22 PEACH BOTTOM i 17i 25! 33i 67:

PERRE~ 25l 43{56[33d PILGRIM _

i 21 l 11 !_ _1  !

. POINT _BEAC,H .  ! i 75j 67i  ! 50_

PRAIRIE ISLAND I 25_L50 i i 17i _ _

QUAD CITIES I 20i 57I 401~33 20 RIVER B_E,ND 5_0 I 55 43! 2iI-ROBINSON 50I 50 j100l SALEM 23 45 29! 2 Q_25_

SAN ONOFRE 8 50 38! 22 ! 20 SEABROOK 25, 20  !  !

SEQUOYAH l 23i 13 44i 41i 75

.SH_OREHAM i l 1 SOUTH TEXAS 42 { 43 l _40 28J_50_

ST LUCIE 25_l 18l 60 Bel 55 SUMMER t i 331 501 71 !

SUENU 80! 20 [ 3j ) Y SUSOUEHANNA- 29> 25i 17 50i 14 THREE_MlLE ISLAND 29 L 33l 501 _33 TURKEY POINT 54 i 44 5 36l'461 44 UERUONT YANKEE 67! 60 5 45M3 ;

i Page 1

PERCENT SUSSTANTIATED FOR YEAR RtCf8vfD

• 9/30/97. ' 9ofgfg7

- Sees l1993 l1994l1996l199611997 Y.ooILE as! se - 27t 71 29 WASHINGTON NUCt. EAR 60J;67 - 601- 31 WATERFORD 60 67 69 30 .

WATTS _BAR _ _48 47 36 43 _ 67 V!OLF CREEK -

83 .68 17 42y ZION 21 60i 38 1 13 C

a C,-

e e

Page 2

1 L)

-9> '

ALLEGATIONS OPEN . 9/30/97 ; 10/9/97'-

J Sees ~ l1993l1994l1996l1996l19971 Total Osen ~ j ARKANSAS 2: 2 GEMR VALLEY 1 3i -4 i

~

DRAIDWOOD -1 El 6 ORO_WNS_ FERRY 3. d' - 7 BRUNSWICK - 1 3i - 15) 19  !

BYRON 3' __ __ 3 CALVERT CLIFFS 2! 2 --

CATAWSA '

1 -1  !

CLINTON > 1 15 16 C_OMANCHE PEAK 1 7i 8 COOK- -1 -- 4! 5 QOOPER 1 - 7i 8 CRYSTAL RIVER ' 3- 2' 6: -11 .!

DAVIS-SESSE 4' 4 DIABL_O CANYON 1 2 . O' 11 DRESDEN 7; 7 DUANE ARNOLD

~

-2! 2 FARLEY 11 1 i FERMI 4 3: 7 FITZPATRICK - 2} ' 2.

F_ ORT CALHOUN - 1 2j 4 -

ORAND OULF ~

1 11 ~2 HARRIS 2 2 ,

HATCH- <

1 4' 5

^ - '

> - HOPE CREEK - 5! 3' 8

,1N_DIAN POINT 2 - 1 3' 4_ +

,1NDIAN POINT 3 1 di 5 KEWAUNEE II 1 L_ASALLE 5! 6 LIMERICK -' 3' 3 MQGUIRE - II 1 MILLSTONE 1 3 22! 32, 58 MONTICELLO - i l 2! 2 NINE MILE POINT 3- 2: 3 NORTH ANNA 3' 3

.O_C_ONEE 1 Il 2 OYSTER CREEK 4; 4 PALISADES - 2i - 2 PALO VERDE 1 5I 6 PEACH BOTTOM 1 3: 4 PERRY 2, 5! - -7 PILORIM 1 2i 2! 5 gP OE MACH -

1 7i _ _. 8 PRAMIE ISLANO QUAD CITIES ly 1 1 5: 6

, i R_IVER_8END 1 1 2 ROBINSON 1 1 9

. SALEM 1 4 9- 14 SAN ONOFRE -- 51 ; 1 2! 17

.H _

SEABROOK 11 11 2 SEQUOYAH - 1 1 6; 5! 13

_ SOUTH TEXAS ' 6L 5! 11 ST LUCIE 1 1 29: 31 SUMMER 1 1 1 SURRY- 1 1 SUSOUEHANNA 1 10 11

<*~

' ' ~

~

THREE MILE ISLi.dD - 1 2i 3 TU_RKEY POINT 3; 6. 11 VE_RMONT YANKEE 3; 3' 6 .

V_OG_TLE - 1 4! 4 .

WASHINGTON NUCLEAR 3! 9 12 WATERFORD I 5! 5

^'

h.

Pe9e 1 V-

.,1 ., . , , . _ - . ,. , ,, _ ,. .

e ALLEGATIONS OPEN 9/30C7 - 10C/97 s

Site l199311394l1996l1996l1997] Total Open WATTS BAR i i I 4' 6 Iti 21 50 U~CRIEK +

i l il 8 9 ZION i i 3 31i 34 Page 2

Aucchun4 (

o TECHNICAL AND PROGRAMMATIC HIGHLIGHTS To date, twelve inspections have been comaleted, resulting in the identification of several significant tecinical issues. The following is a brief sumary of the more significant issues (note, inspection findings from DC Cook have not yet been characterized):

At several plants. issues have been identified concerning operation of the plant outside of the licensing bases as stated in the FSAR. In some instances, licensee 50.59 evaluations failed to identify unreviewed safety questions, and as such, significant changes were made to plant operations or equipment without appropriate NRC review and approval.

Such issues were identified at Farley and Vermont Yankee regarding the lack of protection from tornado missiles: at Perry regarding the continuous operation of the suppression pool cleanup system and the use of operator action to ftll the emergency component cooling water system surge tank in a post-LOCA environment: at Vermont Yankee regarding operation with a suppression 2001 temperature in excess of that assumed in the accident analysis; at Jiablo Canyon regarding the inability to use the c mtainment spray system under certain design basis conditions; and at G 2 where the licensee uscd the 50.59 process to institute a work are a wiring erro' . in the ADS system.

At three plants, issues were identified that questioned the ability to successfully complete the swapover from the refueling / borated water storage tank (R/BWST) to the reactor sump during a postulated loss of coolant accident. At THl. both the decay heat removal system and the reactor building saray pumps were declared inoperable as a result of this concern. At Robinson, the team found that insufficient net positive suction head would be available to the safety injection pumps B and C and that these pumps would be rendered inoperable under certain accident conditions, ibis situation at Robinson was caused by a 1987 modification which allowed operation of a single safety injection pump.

At Ginna, procedure changes were enacted after a slight negative net positive suction head was calculated for the A residual heat removal pump: operability of this pump was not in question.

Numerous examples of inadecuate testing of safety related components have been identified inclucing issues concerning: testing of molded case circuit breakers at St. Lucie. ANO and TMI: leak and functional testing of valves (including check-valves) at THl. St. Lucie Ginna. Farley, and Davis Besse: post modification testing of safety in Robinson; heat exchanger testing at Vermont Yankee;jection and testing pumps of at sections of the auxiliary sea water supply path and pumps at Diablo Canyon.

Three inspections have identified issues regarding the computer evaluation models used for analyzing ECCS response to postulated design bases accidents. Some of these concerns have been significant, including a previously unreported second peak in fuel clad temperature at the Robinson plant. Issues concerning the validity of the inputs used in the analyses were identificd at Ginna and DC Cook.

'Other significant issues' identified during the course of the inspections include:

0>eration of RHR aumos at minimum flow values significantly less' t1an recommended ;~y the pump vendor at Vermont Yankee At Robinson, control cables for all three safety injection pumps were found to be routed-in the same conduit, thus violating single failure and separation criteria.

At Arkansas Nuclear One, vendor specified flow limits for the steam generators were not incorporated into plant procedures. As a-result, operators were unaware that flow limits were exceeded during a-plant transient that occurred.

6 i

9 AE Design inspection Significant Issues

1) Unreviewed safety question conceming use of operator action to compensate for design weakness in maintaining sufficient water inventory in emergency closed cooling (ECC) surge tenk during accident conditions. (Perry)

2) Design of suppression pool cleanup (SPCU) system results in HPCS system continuously aligned to suppression pool instead of CST, as

-described in FSAR. Isolating non-safety SPCU results in loss of HPCS function. (Perry)

3) Inadequate missile protection of HPCS and RCIC suction piping and instruuent lines from the CST necessitated realignment of these systems to the suppression pool. (Perry)

4) Misapplication of pipe break criteria (assuming crack vs. break) to non-safety, non-seismic piping resulted in inadequate flooding analysis.

(Perry)

' 5) Borated water storage tank (BWST) level setpoint for initiating manual switch-over of emergency core cooling system (ECCS) pumps from BWST to containment sump based on incorrect analyses. If manual switch-over during post-accident conditions were commenced at this setpoint, ECCS pumps could become air bound and inoperable.

Licensee issued L8:9 and revised level setpoint. (TMI)

6) Check valves in ECCS suction lines from BWST, decay heat removal pump discharge check valves, and ECCS room floor drain ball check valves not periodically tested to verify reverse flow prevention safety function. (TMI)

7) Nonconservative calculation inputs resulted in incorrect outputs for determining makeup tank pressure and temperature limit curves, differential pressure across BWST outlet check valves, and BWST low-low level setpoint. (TMI)

8) Reverse flow testing of check valves in low pressure injection suction lines from BWST and leakage testing of stop check valves on high pressure injection recirculation lines not included in inservice testing program. These valves prevent water from containment sump from reaching BWST during post-accident conditions. (Dsvis Besse)

9) Piping connections including instrumentation, cables and conduits for condensate storage tank; diesel generator exhaust silencers; and turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater system stack not protected from tornado missiles as stated licensing / design bases documents. (Farley)

10) Unreviewed safety question for FSAR change deleting requirement for tornado missile protection for CST piping connections. (Farley)

11) Safety evaluations resulting from changes to battery load profile and voltage requirements did not identify the required Technical Specification changes. (Farley)

12) No inservice testing of turbine driven auxiliary feedwater check valves and Class 1E auxiliary feedwater battery service tests. (Farley)

13) For turbine driven auxilicry feedwater pump, testing procedures %t developed to transfer DC control power from failed to operable bus.

Circuit breakers used to complete transfer never tested and were inoperable. (St. Lucie)

14) Maximum allowable sea water temperature to component cooling water (CCW) system affected by limits on CCW temperature to the 1

3 control room air conditioning system. Bounding calculation indicates potential operational limits for high sea water temperatures. (St. Lucie)

15) Failure to test val'/?=: a) motor-operated valves and a check valve which prevent release of radioactivity from containment sump to atmosphere via refueling water storage tank; b) check valves which form a boundary between high pressure reactor coolant (resulting from reactor coolant pump thermal barrier rupture) and low pressure portions of component cooling water system; c) motor-operated valves in containment spray system which formed closed system boundary outside containment. (Ginna)

16) Errors in implementing current accident analysis computer models, including example where significant input was changed in non-conservative direction without adequate basis. (Ginna) 17)!Icensee modification permitted operation of single Si pump, which incmased flow and NPSH required. As a result, with single pump operation (supplied from the RWST), both SI pumps B and C have insufficient NPSH when responding to LOCA during pump A failure.

Licensee required to raise upper level RWST setpoint 10.68%. (HB Robinson)

18) Redundant autostart cables for Si pumps A and C were routed in the same raceway, in violation of separation requirements. Licensee declared Si pump C inoperable and placed spare pump B in service. (HB Robinson)

19) Licensee failed to report significant PCT changes within ECCS evaluation model or its application, as required by 10 CFR 50.46. (HB Robinson)

20) Licenseo had history of not complying with DBD or installation i

8 procedure for_ establishing correct slopes of instrument sensing lines. (HB _

Robinson)-

21) Original design had " manual initiate" push buttons to operate -

automatic depressurization system (ADS) valves as group. Licensee modidication inadvertently eliminated system level manual actuation, as committed to through RG 1.62. (WNP-2) s

22) Potential for exceeding ADS actuator design pressure by initiating .

containment spray during post-LOCA elevated containment temperatures.

(WNP-2)-

23) Licensee did not incorporate vendor emergency feedwater flow limits-

_-(to-limit steam generator tube vibration) into plant operating procedures.

Limits exceeded on one occasion with no effect on the steam generators. ,

(ANO-1) ,

24) Failure to electrically test safety-related molded-case circuit breakers supplying penetration feedthroughs. -(ANO-1)

25) Failure to adequately evaluate impact of higher suppression pool temperature following LOCA. This, in addition to other analyses, caused the licensee to establish administrative controls on suppression pool temperature. (Vermont Yankee)

. 26) Available RHR pump minimum flow (350 gpm) considerably less than pump vendor recommended minimum flow (2700 gpm). (Vermont Yankee). -

27) Concems regarding heat exchanger test resulte and instrument inaccuracies caused licensee to restrict plant operation to river water below 80 degrees F. (Vermont Yankee) i

! DESIGN BASES ACTIVITIES

! e IN 1980s, NRC IDENTIFIED THAT DESIGN l BASES INFORMATION NOT PROPERLY l MAINTAINED '

• IN 1995, ABOVE CONCERNS RE-EMERGED

! AT MILLSTONE AND OTHER FACILITIES

• IN OCTOBER 1996, NRC ISSUED 10 CFR l 50.54(F) LETTER ON DESIGN BASES e PRIORITIZING SITES FOR DESIGN TEAM INSPECTIONS THROUGH FY 1998 i

f DESIGN BASES ACTIVITIES (CONT'D.)

• NRC DESIGN TEAM INSPECTIONS:

ARCHITECT ENGINEER DESIGN INSPECTIONS SAFETY SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL INSPECTIONS SAFETY SYSTEM ENGINEERING INSPECTIONS

-______ _ J

l . . .

e

! ARCHITECT ENGINEER DESIGN '

! INSPECTIONS .

l e RESOURCE INTENSIVE AND IMPACTS LICENSEES

• 3 TEAMS OF 5 CONTRACTOR INSPECTORS i e TEAMS PERFORM SAFETY SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL .

INSPECTIONS OF TWO RISK SIGNIFICANT SYSTEMS i

e INSPECTIONS INVOLVE 4 SITE WEEKS l e 12 INSPECTIONS COMPLETED IN FY 97 i

• 10 INSPECTIONS PLANNED IN FY 98

J I- ,

INSIGHTS FROM DESIGN INSPECTIONS l-

• INDUSTRY DESIGN ENGINEERING PERFCRMANCE MIXED 4

. e POTENTIAL GENERIC WEAKNESSES BEING l

EVALUATED i

DESIGN BASES NOT WELL MAINTAINED AND/OR NOT CORRECTLY TRANSLATED INTO PLANT OPERATIONS t APPROPRIATENESS OF 10 CFR 50.59 REVIEWS APPROPRIATENESS OF CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

, 1 l

FSAR DISCREPANCIES l

l 1 i

SOME SAFETY SIGNIFICANT FINDINGS e INADEQUATE NET POSITIVE SUCTION HEAD TO ECCS PUMPS e EFFECTS OF TEMPERATURE ABOVE ANALYZED REGION i

IMPACT dF ARCHITECT ENGINEER

. DESIGN INSPECTIONS e SIGNIFICANT IMPACT ON LICENSEES e OPERABILITY ISSUES REQUIRING APPROPRIATE LICENSEE ACTIONS .

e IDENTIFICATION AND RESOLUTION OF POTENTIAL UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTIONS

p meryg hbhmud 5 3 nu E

k UNITED STATES

. E NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION f WASHINGTON, D.C. 3066H001 Y...../

NRC INSPECTION MANUAL PIPB MANUAL CHAPTER 0304 PLANT PERFORMANCE RFVIEW 0304-01 PURPOSE 01.01 To provide guidance for aeriodically conducting a plant performance review (PPR) of each nuclear power p' ant.

01.02 To provide a standard format for the Plant Issues Matrix (PIM) and the PPR acknowledgement letter that is sent to licensees subsequent to each PPR.

0304-02 OBJECTIVES 02.01 To perform an integrated assessment of licensee safety performance such that trends can be identified. The PPR is a short-term assessment that focuses on performance and changes that may have occurred since the last assessment.

02.02 To review the current inspection plan for each plant to determine if changes are needed based on the assessment results.

0304-03 RESPONSIBILITIES AND AUTHORITIES 03.01 Reaional Administrator. Ensures the PPR process is implemented according to the guidance contained in this manual chapter. Remains informed of PPR results with particular attention given to significant changes or trends in licensee performance.

03.02 Reaional Division Level Manaaement. Attends PPR meetings to provide oversight and consistency for the PPR process as implemented for all regional plants.

03.03 Reaional Branch Chiefs in the Division of Reactor Proiects. Responsible for the overall coordination of the PPR process. This includes ensuring that discussion material i.e. PIM. initial PPR summary. are made available to PPR neeting participants. Participates in PPR planning. PPR meeting, and followup actions.

03.04 NRR Pro.iect Manaaers and/or Proiect Directors. Actively participate in the PPR process including reviewing and providing input for the PPR summary, attending or teleconferencing the PPR meeting, and incorporation of assessment results into licensing actions and/or inspection activities as applicable.

Review and comment on the PIM as requested. The project managers is responsible for providing the regions with any input from headquarters that will require a PIM entry.

Issue Date: 09/26/96 0304

[-

'A 03,05: DInsoection Staf f. Membersiof the inspection staff involved with the inspection effort for a plant are encouraged to participate in the PPR for that-m.

plant to strengthen the assessment process and ensure accurate presentations of 111censee performance. Participation in the PPR meeting can occur by. attending or teleconferencing.the meeting..

10304 04 POLICY-On=a semiannual basis a PPR shall be performed for-each nuclear power plant to-evaluate performance trends-and identify the necessary inspection focus; Each PPR-meeting should evaluate-objective information such as inspection' report findings, event reports and enforcement history. The PPR assessments should be-focused in the four SALP functional areas, The goal of- the PPR process is to Lperform a short-term integration of licensee performance with the results being the early identification of performance trends. The results of a PPR will be used as a rational basis for making changes to the master inspection plan (1.e.,

increased or reduced inspection ef fort or schedule changes).

To minimize staff resources and reduce repetitionH10 the preparation of assessment packages for the- PPRs. NRR screening: meetags and the- Senior-Management Meeting (SMM) notebooks the scheduling of PPRs to coincide with these other assessment offorts is recomended. The-development of a standard PPR package (PPR summary and PIM), which contains a minimum Jet of required information and covers equivalent time periods, will allow use of the PPR package in the NRR screening meeting and the SMM notebook. j 0304 05- -PPR PROCESS The primary role of the PPR is to provide for a thorough assessment of licensee performance, more frequently than SALP, to detect and pursue performance trends The PPR pror.ess consists of preparation, the actual PPR meeting, and post meeting activities. The process should provide the proper balance between the amount of assessment performed while preparing for the meeting and the assessment completed during the meeting. A key attribute of the PPR meeting is the determination of future inspection activities that are commensurate with the assessment for that plant. Following the PPR meeting, any changes to individual plant inspection efforts shall be integrated into the overall regional inspection effort and the '

MIP revised to reflect the changes. During the PPR meeting the assessment discussion must include a sufficient level of detail such that licensee i performance is adequately evaluated. Also, the assessmt:nt discussions should focus on relevant issues since sufficient time will not Le available to discuss all items that occurred during the past six months.

Since one of the primary goals of the PPR is the early identification of performance trends, the need to direct the inspection program into areas that appear to have-declining-performance is crucial, important elements of early identification - are the promotion of open discussions on recent licensee performance in the PPR meeting and the need to have a questioning attitude when discussing licensee performance. If previous SALP ratings are relied on too

' heavily there may be some hesitancy in directing regional initiative inspections ifor plants with. high SALP ratings. Recognition is given to the difficult management decisions required to properly balance the need for-reduced inspection

effort at good performing plants and the need for early identification of

declining licensee performance. A possible method to resolve this concern is the

-targeting of apparent areas of declining performance with inspection initiatives IO304 -- Issue Date: 09/26/96

that fall eithin the guidelines of the core inspection program or do not involve large regional initiative efforts.

Performance trends do not typically occur within six month time periods.

therefore. the results of previous SALPs and/or PPRs should be reviewed in a summary manner to detect long term performance trends. The continuation of 1mproving or declining performance trends and the results of inspection initiatives from previous SALPS or PPRs are important items for consideration when reviewing previous assessment results. Planned inspection activities that were not completed should also be reviewed to determine if the ins)ection activities are still needed and the cause for not completing the scleduled inspections.

Actual licensee performance should be the focal Joint during PPR assessments.

Overall management effectiveness may be cons de.ed as being a possible contributing cause to performance related issues: however, assessments of individual managers should be avoided. The effectiveness of the licensee in identifying and resolving problems is a key area that the PPR assessment should focus on. When available, the results of conducting, or preparing for core inspection procedure (IP) 40500. " Effectiveness of Licensee Controls in Identifying. Resolving and Preventing Problems." should be included in this area of assessment.

0304-06 MATERIAL TO BE REVIEWED in the assessment of licensee performance, the crimary source of information will be NRC Inspection Reports. Additional soun : of information that may be used in the PPR include: the open items list: sous of allegations: enforcement history: Licensee Event Reports: performance indicators: and data from the Human Factors Information System. The regions have the option of utilizing these additional sources of information or other sources as appropriate.

To allow more efficient and thorough integration of information a historical listing of plant issues should be developed for the PPR. This collection of issues will be referred to as the Plant Issues Matrix (PIM). The PIM and other selected sources of information will be the raw assessment data used in the PPR 3rocess. Attributes for describing each PIM entry include the date (items should

)e listed in reverse chronological orderi, type of item (e.g. weakness, strength, violation. NCV. etc.), source of information (e.g. Inspection Report. LER etc.).

identifying source (e.g. licensee. NRC, self-disclosing. Others). SALP functional area, brief item description, and apparent cause/ comment section. For PIM items that are identified in inspection reports, the item description should be taken directly from the report with no editing allowed. Only the pertinent portion of the report should be translated to the item description such that the description does not become too lengthy. This will allow the PIM readers to understand that the information in the " Item Description" has been directly communicated to the licensee. Inspector insights on a particular issue / topic that would be useful when assessing licensee performance may be included in the " Apparent Cause/ Comment" section. This type of information may not have been included in the source document, yet the inspector has formulate this posuion based on the inspection results. PIM reader will recognize that this information may not be in docketed correspondence with the licensee.

The region should designate the position (e.g. SRI. 3roject engineer etc) that will be responsible for maintaining the PIM unto-cate. Other organizations, such as NRR, with information for the PIM shou'd provide the input for the item to the responsible individual for PIM update.

Issue Date: 09/26/96 0304 i

Since the P!M will also be utilized-during NRR pre-briefs, senior management meetings and SALPs. consistent development of the PIM between plants and between regions is crucial, To ensure PIM consistency, the format of the sample PIM (Enclosure 1) and the guidance for determining which issues should be PIM entries (Enclosure 2) should be followed. Only items from inspection reports or other docketed correspondence between the staff and the licensee should be included on the PIM. To ensure an up-to-date list is evailable for the PPR. pending items which have not had time to be included in docketed correspondee.e may be included on the PlM. If any required PIM changes are identified.after the correspondence is issued or any errors are discovered, the PIM should be promptly uMated.

Particular attention should be provided for any Unresolved Items to ensure PIM entries are consistent-with followup information as it becomes available. For the PPR process approximately 15 months of data should be included in the PIM.

Earlier PIM information should be archived for use during the SALP or other purposes. The PIM should be updated as a minimum once every six weeks (to correspond to resident inspection reports) and within two weeks of PPR meetings.

On a regular basis the PIM should be made available to the regional technical staff and managers and NRR projects for their reviews and possible incorporation of PIM insights into inspection and licensing activities.

0304-07 DOCUMENTING PPR RESULTS The results of the PPR shall be docbmented in a PPR Summary. The primary function of the PPR summary is to document changes and trends in licensee 3erformance and resulting inspection effort changes that were identified in the

?PR assessment. The PPR summary is not intended to include all the PPR details, but snould provide a summary of PPR conclusions and the rationale for inspection initiatives recommended by the PPR.

As part of the continuir effort to reduce staff workloads. PPR summaries should be formatted for subsequent use during the NRR screening meetings and in the SMM notebook. To promote this concept, provide uniformity between the regions, and ensure the required items are evaluated during the PPR. the structure of the PPR sample summary (Enclosure 3) should be followed during development of the PPR summary. At the region's discretion additional items may be ir.cluded in the PPR summary. Any additional information should be formatted as an attachment so that it can be easily separated from the basic PPR summary. Caution should be taken to avoid placing sensitive material (e.g. INP0 ratings for plants, allegation related material, etc.) in the PPR summary.

0304-08 COMMUNICATING PPR RESULTS The PPR results shall be communicated to the licensee upon completion of the PPR process. This communication shall be in the form of a letter to the licensee with an attachment that delineates the proposed announced inspection schedule and other NRC activities for the next six months. A sample letter (Enclosure 4)

-along with the inspection / activity alan format (Enclosure 5) are enclosed. As an option the regions may issue a ~ onger inspection plan i.e., eight months, that will provide overlap- into the next >PR 3eriod. Both regional and headquarters inspection activities should be incluced on the inspection / activity plan. Other NRC non-inspection activities conducted at licensee facilities which require licensee resources to accomplish should be placed on the inspection / activity plan. Examples of other non-inspection activities include NRC site visits to gather data or assess a particular licensee process (e.g.

review and calculation of the plant risk profile). Activities that would only 0304 Issue Date: 09/26/96

have a minor impact 'on the licensee, such as Project Manager's routine visits to ~

the site, should not-be included in the plan. s

. Prior to issuing the letter to the licensee, the~ regional: administrator ~-should -

' be informed of any significant changes in performance that were identified by the '

PPR. To avoid duplication of-staff efforts,- the inspection plan from the PPR

-summary.should also be used as'the inspection schedule that is provided to the licensee. --The DRP Branch Chief or higher level manager shall sign the letter to the licensee. To improve communications with the licensees, the regions may also .

= decide-to verbally discuss the PPR results with the licensee.

The PPR results coverletter to the licensee should nat contain broad statements of program assessment similar to assessment statements provided-in SALP report coverletter. Trends or changes in licensee performance should be discussed in the PPR results cover letter. Include in this discussion a listing of issues or prublems that formed 'the basis for the PPR assessments- and any -resulting ,

change (s) in the inspection effort. For assessments of licensee performance that -

are neutral or unchanged. PPR results should be communicated to the licensee in  !

terms of no changes in the overall NRC inspection focus for the facility.

Changes to the planned inspection schedule will be generally limited to reactive efforts, however. it is recognized that changes .to the )lanned inspection schedule may occur due to unforeseeable circumstances. "he regions should establish guidelines for allowing changes to inspection schedules. The licensee should be verbally informed of any changes.

END

Enclosures:

o 1. Plant Issues Matrix i 2. Guidance.for the Issues Matrix

3. Sample PPR Summary

4. PPR Standard Letter

5. Inspection / Activity Plan t

I-

)

l I'ssue Date: 09/26/96 0304 j

Enclosure 1 PLANT ISSUES NIATRIX PLANT NAME DATE TYPE SOURCE ID SFA ITEM DESCRIPTION APPARENT CAUSE/ COMMENT 11/14/1995 WEAK IR 45 N E MULTIPLE EXAMPLES OF UFSAR ERRORS PERSONNEL ERROR DURING UFSAR REGARDING SW SYSTEM. ITEMS WERE REVIEW AND UPDATE.

MINOR IN NATURE.

11/11/1995 LFR LER 95-05 5 M UNIT 2 REACTOR TRIP (RETURN TO POWER LOSS .T0 BOTH R0D DRIVE MG' OPERATION 11/12/95L SETS DUE TO LOOSE VOLTAGE REG FUSE HOLDERS.

11/06/1995 VIO IR 95-20 L M FAILURE TO MEET TS ACTION FOR PERSONNEL ERROR AND NO SECOND SL IV INOPERABLE CONTAINMENT AIR LOCK VERIFICATION. CONT AIR LOCK PRES 5 000R. TEST CONNECTION LEFT OPEN FOR 6 DAYS.

11/03/1995 STREN IR 95-20 N O PROACTIVE OPERATOR ACTION IN THE OPERATOR ID SilBTLE MFRV PROBLEM.

IDENTIFICATION OF AND RESPONSE TO CONTROLLED PLANT WELL DURING MFRV PROBLEM PREVENiED A PLANT REPAIRS.

TRIP.

11/01/1995 WEAK IR 95-17 N- E 50.59 EVALUATIONS FOR TEMPORARY TEMPORARY MOD PROGRAM GUIDANCE WAS MODIFICATIONS CONTAINED LIMITED WEAK AND MANAGEMENT OVERSIGHT WAS TECHNICAL F JAILS. OVERALL LACKING.

DOCUMENTATION PACKAGES WERE POOR.

09/13/1995 WEAK IR 95-19 L PS IMPROPER PROCEDURE USAGE BY PROCEDURE USAGE FOR NON-SAFETY NONLICENSED OPERATORS DURING SYSTEMS HAS NOT BEEN EMPHASIZED.

MANIPULATIONS OF NON-SAFETY EXAMPLES IDENTIFIED INCLUDED THE SYSTEMS CHEMICAL ADDITION. TURBINE COOLING AND INSTRUMENT AIR SYSTEMS.

Issue Date: 09/26/96 El-1 0304. Enclosure 1

Enclosura 1 PLANT ISSUES MATRIX PLANT NAME DATE TYPE SOURCE ID SFA ITEM DESCP,IPTION APPARENT CAUSE/ COMMENT 09/07/1995 NCV IR 95-18 L M. N-16 MONITOR INOPERABLE. 'TS SWITCH FOR SELECTING REACTOR POWER LER LER 95-04 SURVEILLANCE F"SSED FOR CONDENSER INPUT TO THE N-16 DETECTOR WAS AIR EJECTOR W SAMPLES. STUCK.

08/30/1995 STREN IR 95-16 N 0 STRONG PROCESS FOR ORIGINATING AND OPERATIONS MANAGEMENT STRONGLY TRACKING OPERATIONS IMPROVEMENT COMMITTED TO PROBLEM ITEMS. CONTROL ROOM DEFICIENCIES. IDENTIFICATION AND IMPROVEMENT AND OPERATOR WORK AROUNDS. PROGRAMS.

08/21/1995 NCV IR 95-16 L 0 SPENT FUEL R0D STUCK WHEN LOCATION ALREADY FILLED WITH ROD:

RETURNING TO SPENT FUEL ASSEMBLY INCORRECT ROD REMOVED FOR AFTER INSPECTIONS. INSPECTION ON 08/04/95.

08/09/1995 WEAK. IR 95-15 N E WEAK DOCUMENT MANAGEMENT SYSTEM POOR USER INTERFACE & TRG RESULTED FOR MOVATS TESTING CONTRIBUTED TO IN OUTDATED DRWG USED FOR FIELD ,

MOV 25I-118B FAILURE EVENT. WORK.

08/08/1995' VIO IR 95-15 S M TWO CHARGING PUMP DISCHARGE MOVs MAINTENANCE TECH MADE UNREVIEWED SL IV OVERTHRUSTED CAUSING VALVE DAMAGE. CHANGE TO MOV WIRING.

08/01/1995 STREN IR 95-15 N PS STRONG PERFORMANCE ANNUNCIATOR GOOD STATION MANAGEMENT RESPONSE-PROGRAM IDENTIFIED ADVERSE HUMAN TO SELF-ASSESSMENT RESULTS.

PERFORMANCE TREND.

07/16/1995 VIO IR 95-15 N M MAINTENANCE ON ONE TRAIN SAVS OPERATIONS SUPPORT ERROR DURING SL I'I INADVERTENTLY AFFECTED BOTH WORK PLANNING.

TRAINS.

0304. Enclosure 1 El-2 Issue Date: 09/26/96

w u

. j Enclosure 1  !

PLANT ISSUES MATRIX PLANT NAME SOURCE ID SFA ITEM DESCRIPTION APPARENT CAUSE/ COMMENT DATE TYPE IR 95-14 N E WEAK ENGINEERING EVALUATION INATTENTION TO DETAIL BY IST 07/07/1995 WEAK CONCERNING OPERABILITY FOR SW TO ENGINEERS. TWO SIMILAR WEAK CHILLER PUMP FOLLOWING IST TEST ENGINEERING EVALUATIONS DOCUMENTED FAILURE. IN IR 95-10.

IR 95-15 L M MISSED TS ACTION FOR AUTOMATIC RPI TWO MAINTENANCE TECH ERRORS WHEN 06/10/1995 NCY LER LER 95-02 MONITORING OUT OF SERVICE. MANIPULATING PLANT COMPUTER.

06/06/1995 VID IR 95-11 N M SPENT FUEL IWJDLED WHEN VENT SYSTEM OPERATOR UNAWARE OF STATUS: POOR SL'IV HAD INOPERABLE HEATER. SUPERVISION.

SALP Functional Areas: ID Code:

E ENGINEERING L LICENSEE M MAINTENANCE N NRC 0 OPERATIONS S SELF-REVEA' ED PS PLANT SUPPORT Issue Date: 09/26/96 El-3 0304. Enclosure 1

Enclosure 2

,, Guidance for the Plant Issues Matrix The majority of all inspection report related PIM entries will be contained in inspection Repert Executive Sumaries. Therefore, Executive Sumaries are a good i starting point for identifying which inspection report items should be included ,

in the pit LERs and NCVs are some exceptions of PIM entries that will not be mentioned in the executive sumary. The following items are specific exam)les-of issues that thould be included in the PIM. Further clarification for t1ese ,

-items and general guidance for the PIM is provided below.-

o Enforcement Related issues: Includes NOVs. NCVs, Escalated Enfercement, deviations, and N0EDs. ,

e LERs: Do not include LERs that are administrative in nature or lack significance. The criteria for 'i not including a LER on the PIM should be LERs that do not require staff followup.

e Strengths and Weaknesses: Utilize the guidance in Ins)ection Manual .

Chapter 0610 when determining w11ch issues are strengths or weaknesses. In IMC 0610 a +

strength or weakness can be (1) an overall assessment of a licensee program or (2) .an individual finding that has either high safety significance or programatic implications.

e Emergency Preparedness (ED)

Findings: Include EP findings such as " exercise weaknesses". Any FEMA Deficiencies outstanding at the site that could affect continued plant operation if unremedied should be included, e Inspection Followup Items: Only include IFis which clearly demonstrate  !

licensee performance and deal with safety significant issues.

e Unresolved Items: Utilize the same guidance given for --IFis,

, Caution is _ needed to ensure sufficient information -has teen documented that will

support the safety significance determination '

and any overall conclusion (s) developed by the PIM entry, if sufficient information is not available, delay the possible PIM entry _until followuo actions are performed.

t

-Issue Date:- 09/26/96- E2-1 0304 Enclosure 2

)

0 Miscellaneous Itemsi This category is for infrequent items such as  !

licensing- actions. significant plant  !

,, operational occurrences not included as another item. etc.. which are representative of licensee performance that should be factored  !

ato the hRC's assessment process. Examples of operational events include emergency notifications and forced shutdowns.  ;

i

1. A licensee strength should only be identified or recognized by the NRC.  !

While licensees may identify areas where they have performed well. the NRC must pass judgement and recognize that the item is truly a

" strength". Consequently, for PIM entries a strength should only be >

identified "10" by the NRC. .

2. Self+ revealing refers to those !ssues that are identified .by an becurrence or action that was not an initiative of the licensee or NRC.

Exam 91es include valve misalignments identified during a TS required surveillance test, modification errors that are not identified until an actual system demand occut4. etc. t

3. To discourage comparisons of PIMs based only on the number of issues, the -  ;

'IM should not include a total entry listing. l

4. For PlH entries which describe an event or significant issue that has a clear date of occurrence, use this date when documenting the item in the PIM, . For other entries, use the date that the information source was issued with the exception of NRC Inspection Reports in which the last date of the inspection period should be used.

- 5. The " Apparent Cause/ Comments" field should contain a brief description of the cause or reason for the occurrence which provides the reader with a '

better understanding of the circumstances that lead to event / issues.

When - a "cause" has not yet been determined, briefly provide any e insightful information known at that time.

6 .- For those issues that are facumented by multiple sources, both " Types' of items i.e. LER and NOV, and both " Sources" of information (the LER and .

NOV numbers) should be listed in one entry.

7. For issues that involve more than one SALP functional area. multiple classifications can be made for the "SFA" category.

8. .The following standard abbreviations should be utilized in the PIM:

e VIO - Notice of Violation e NCV - Non-cited Violation 4

o LER - Licensee Event Report-e URI - Unresolved item o IFl - Inspection Followup Item +

e STREN - Strength- -

e WEAK - Weakness e MISC < Miscellaneous Item .

0304. Enclosure 2 E2-2 Issue Date: 09/26/96

+ y- --y ,x- , , .,y,,,,.,m,-w--- ,w ww.-,,,,,,---.v. m.-,-,.m,-

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Enclosure 3

. SAMPLE PPR

SUMMARY

PRE DECISIONAL I SEMlANNUAL PLANT PERFORMANCE ASSESSMENT (PLANT NAME)

Assessment Period: Month / Year to Month / Year SALP Period: Mn/ Day /Yr Through Mn/ Day /Yr (list the current SALP period)

Pervious SALP Rating: OPS MAINT ENG PS

1. Performance Overview This section should discuss the overall performance of the plant during the past six months. Include the " big picture" assessment that was developed during the PPR in this section. Problem areas that occurred in multiple SAI.P ,

functional areas should also be discussed. Conclusions reached in the PPR on SA0V which do not fit well in a > articular functional area discussion should be included in this section. Tne format for this section should include a brief narrative write-up on the general PPR assessment conclusions and the plant's operating history for the past six months. To provide the PPR Summary reader with a more complete picture of licensee performance, also include a brief writeup on previous assessments and significant events. This type of information should be available from earlier SALPs or PPRs.

11. Functional Area Assessments There shoult' be a section for each SALP functional area. Each section should use the same format. If sufficient data is not available to draw new conclusions on performance for a particular area then this should be noted and no new assessment will be provided.

The write-up for each functional area should focus on the changes and trends in licensee performance and avoid an excessive amount of details. The rationale for performing future inspections should be clearly stated.

l Issue Date: 09/26/96 E3-1 0304. Enclosure 3

Use the following format for each section:

. A. Provide a general statement on performance trends for that functional area.

B. Briefly describe each assessment item and conclusion (s) reached in the PPR. Examples of the objective information that were used as the basis for the assessment should follow the assessment description and be in bullet format. Since most of the examples will be taken from the Plant issues Matrix, the listing of items in this section should only include a brief description that allows recognition of the example, if additional information is needed, the PIM car, be reviewed.

C. Based on the results of the assessment, list the recommended inspection focus (e.g. increased inspections, continuation of previous developed inspection plan, or decreased inspections) and specify the inspection activities that will be performed for the next six months. Describe the rational for proposing these insper. tion activities. Also, discuss any deviations from the previously planned inspection offort and why the deviations were necessary. Determine if the basis for planning the inspection is still valid and if the inspection activity should be rescheduled.

At the end of this enclosure is a sample write up for the operations functiorul irea sectis n.

Nole1 Once the inspection initiatives from each functional area have been factored into the region's overall inspection plan and any non inspection activities have been identified, each individual plant inspection /ac".ivity plan can be formulated. Include the inspection / activity plan as an attachment to the PPR package.

III Attachments

1. Plant Issues Matrix (Included as Enclosure 5 to this guidance).

2. Inspection / Activity Plan Include other attachments as determined by the region 0304. Enclosure 3 E3 2 Issue Date: 09/26/96

g. ' SAMPLE WRITE.UP FOR OPERATIONS FUNCTIONAL AREA

• a  ;

II. Functional Area Assessments

1. ' Operations A. An overall decline in perfoncence was noted in the area of operations.

Additional personnel errors by rperators was the main contributor to the decline. -

B. Recent examples of operator personnel errors represent a continuing trend that was noted during the previous six month review period. Based on the j most recent example occurring after the licensee's corrective actions -

were completed. these efforts have not been fully successful.

o An operator failed to fully close a RHR vent valve following a-pump surveillance test. .

e The control switch for the inservice main feedwater pump was .

incorrectly selected and the pump was tripped during the August l startup. -

t e Failure to ensure recuired radiation monitor was operable while  ;

pressurizing the conta'nment to maintain pressure within the TS  ;

pressure limits.

Operato s continued to perform well during plant events and transients, o During the main feedwater pum3/ reactor trip the operators quickly recognized the malfunctioning AFW flow control valve and took action to prevent overfilling a S/G.

e The operators responded well to the partial loss of annunciator during a lightening storm. >

Operators do not appear to be performing thorough plant tours. The -

minimum procedural requirements are being satisfied; however, a questioning attitude and an observant behavior has not been demonstrated. 3 e The leaking RHR vent valve was not discovered for two days.

During this time period three shift tours of the RHR heat exchanger room were performed.

e The licensee did not recognize the poor housekeeping condition of the cable spreading room until it was identified by the resident-inspectors. ,

i Issue Date: .09/26/96 E3-3 0304. Enclosure 3 I

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C. Increased inspection effort in this area is recomended.

. Continue with the routine core inspecticns for the operations area. This will allow the resident inspectors to continue monitoring the problem ereas described above.  :

i Perform a one week inspection concentrating on operator personnel errors, the scope of the licensee's corrective actions and the effectiveness of operator plant tours. This inspection will provide additional review of the licensee's corrective actions and ine thoroughness of operator tours. Recomend that the back-up site SRI perform this inspection.

No deviations occurred from the previously planned inspection activities.

0304 Enclosure 3 E3-4 Issue Date: 09/26/96

Enclosure 4 PPR STANDARD LETTER Licensee distribution designate Licensee name/ address

SUBJECT:

PLANT PERFORMANCE REVIEW (PPR) - SITE NAME On (date), the NRC staff com)leted the semiannual Plant Performance Review (PPR) of (plant name). The staff conducts these reviews for all operating nuclear power plants to develop an integrated understanding of safety performance. The results are used by NRC management to facilitate planning and allocation of ins)ection resources. The PPR for (plant name) involved the participation of all tecinical divisions in evaluating inspection results and safety performance information for the period (months and years). PPRs provide NRC management with a current suory of licensee performance and serve as inputs to the NRC Systematic Assessment of Licensee Performance (SALP) and senior management meeting (SMM) reviews.

(In this paragraph discuss the assessment of licensee performance as directed in paragraph 0304 08. Saecific examples that support any changes in performance assessment should be isted.)

This letter advises you of our planned inspection effort resulting from the (plant name) PPR review. It is provided to minimize the resource impact on your staff and to allow for scheduling conflicts and personnel availability to be resolved in advance of inspector arrival onsite. The enclosure details our inspection plan for the next 6 months. (Change the time period if a longer inspection schedule is given). Also included in the plan are NRC non-inspection activities. (Include this sentence only when non inspection activities are provided in the inspection / activity plan). The rationale or basis for each inspection outside the core inspection program is provided so that you are aware of the reason for emphasis in these program areas. Resident inspections are not listed due to their ongoing and continuous nature.

We will inform you of any changes to the inspection plan. if you have any questions, please contact (DRP Branch Chief) at (telephone number).

(Signed by). Chief Reactor Projects Branch Division of Reactor Projects Docket Nos. 50-ABC. 50-XYZ License Nos. NPF-0. NPF 00

Enclosure:

Inspection Plan Issue Date: 09/26/96 E4-1 0304. Enclosure 4

1 Enclosure 5 PtANT NME INSPECTION / ACTIVITY PtAN

~

IP - Inspection Procedure

! TI - Temporary Instruction

Core Inspection - Minimum NRC Inspection Program (mandatory all plants)  ;

INSPECTION / TITLE / NUPEER OF MtC PLANNED TYPE OF INSPECTION / ACTIVITY-

t. ACTIVITY PROGRAM AREA INSPECTORS / DATES C019ENTS j- INDIVIDUALS IP 81700 Physical Security Program 1 8/21-25/ % Core Inspection

, for Power Reactors TI 2515-109 Inspection Requirements Area of Emphasis - Part 2 of TI i

for Generic Letter 89-10: 3 9/11-15/ % involves evaluation of 5/R MOV Valve Testing and implementation by sampling of Surveillance: Rev. 1 MOVs for detailed review -

j (Part 2) ['

IP 83729 Occupational Exposure Initiative - Implementation of During Outages 2 10/23-27/ % improvements for deficiencies (one trainee) in oversight and exposure controls for contract workers (IR 94-02: SALP 94-99)

IP 62700 Maintenance Program Initiative - Emphasis on  !

Implementation 2 11/13-17/96 maintenance & testing of safety relief and power relief valves based on past problems (IR 94- ,

24: LERs 94-10 & 94-17)

N/A Development of plant risk 4 1/8-12/97 Based on equipment availability profile and plant operating history an '

actual plant risk profile will be calejlated.

IP 64704 Fire Protection Program 1 2/12-16/97 Core Inspection i

i Issue Date: 09/26/96 E5-1 0304. Enclosure 5

~

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MARGARET S. CHATTERTON REACTOR SYSTEMS BRANCH ,

OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION 4

_, ., y.7 ,,e --_.._,-- .. . - , . --

.-y-., w - , .--,

. l PURPOSE e CONTROL ROD INSERTION PROBLEMS l

e BULLETIN 96-01 RESULTS l e FOREIGN EXPERIENCE e ROOT CAUSE e STAFF ACTIONS e BULLETIN SUPPLEMENT ACTIONS e ALTERNATE CLOSE-OUT STRATEGY l

l 1

. (

STAFF CONCERNS

• POTENTIAL LOSS OF SHUTDOWN MARGIN

• EVENTS REPRESENT POTENTIAL PRECURSORS

• APPARENT CORRELATION OF PROBLEMS WITH illGH BURNUP 2

1 BULLETIN 96-01 i

l l

• REQUESTED ACTIONS

• PROMPTLY INFORM OPERATORS OF RECENT EVENTS AND PROVIDE ADDITIONAL l TRAINING .

• PROMPTLY DETERMINE CONTINUED i OPERABILITY OF CONTROL RODS

• MEASURE AND EVALUATE ROD DROP l TIMES, ROD RECOll, AND DRAG FORCES AT NEXT SHUTDOWN  !

l

• ASSESS ROD PERFORMANCE AND l OPERABILITY FOR EACH REACTOR TRIP i DURING 1996 1

3

l BULLETIN 96-01 RESULTS i

• ALL ROD DROP TIMES MEET TECH SPEC LIMITS (OVER 35 SETS REPORTED)  !

• DASHPOT DRAG ABOVE CRITERIA AT 3 PLANTS; HIGH AT ANOTHER 6 PLANTS

+

• THIMBLE TUBE DRAG ABOVE CRITERIA AT 6 PLANTS: HIGH AT ANOTHER 3 PLANTS r

4

ROOT CAUSE 4

e THlMBLE TUBE DISTORTION CAUSED BY EXCESSIVE COMPRESSIVE LOADS e (WOLF CREEK) EXCESSIVE COMPRESSIVE LOADS CAUSED BY UNUSUAL FUEL ASSEMBLY

, GROWTH OVER AND ABOVE NORMAL RADIATION EXPOSURE GROWTH e (SOUTH TEXAS) INADEQUATE RESISTANCE TO BUCKLING IN THE FUEL DESIGN .

l l

I i

5 i

RECENT STAFF ACTIONS

• ISSUED SUPPLEMENT TO BULLETIN 96-01 FOR COMMENT (MAY 20,1997)

• REVIEWED COMMENTS

• REVIEWED ADDITIONAL INFORMATION FROM '

WOG, FRAMATOME AND SIEMENS

• CONCLUDED FRAMATOME FUEL DIFFERENT -  ;

NOT SUSCEPTIBLE

• CONCLUDED SIEMENS FUEL DIFFERENT, BUT STILL SUSCEPTIBLE AT Hit ' BURNUPS

• WESTINGHOUSE FUEL SUSCEPTIBLE AT l HIGH BURNUPS 1

l 6

P

-e. . . _ _. - - . . . , . . _ . . . . . . _ _ - - - r. , , - _ ---_. . . . _ _ _____.

F SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE

• RECONSIDER INITIAL STAFF CONCERNS

• LOSS OF SHUTDOWN MARGIN

• STICKING HIGH - PROBABILITY VERY LOW

• STICKING LOW - CONSEQUENCES LOW

• POTENTIAL PRECURSORS i e CORRELATION WITH HIGH BURNUP

• CONCLUSION - LOW SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE

• BASED ON PLANT DATA AND ANALYSIS 7

~ ~

CATEGORY 2 ,

REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRICUTION SYSTEM (RIDS)

ACCESSION NBR 9711140152 DOC.DATE: 97/05/31 NOTARIZED: NO DOCKET #

FACIL:

AUTH.NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION 0 Oak Ridge National Laboratory RECIP,NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION NRC - No Detailed Affiliation Given

SUBJECT:

" Appraisal of Data Concerning Residual Stresses in Main Pressure Vessel Welda.n C DISTRIBUTION CODE: DF03D COPIES RECEIVED LTR [ ENCL SIZE _ A TITLE: Direct Flow Distribution: Subject Files & 40,70,71 Dkts w/out LPDRs NOTES:

E RECIPIENT COPIES RECIPIENT COPIES LTTR ENCL ID CODE /NAME LTTR ENCL G ID CODE /NAME INTERNAL: FILE CENTER 01 / 1 NUDOCS-ABSTRACT #- 1 O

[ R EXTERNAL: LITCO BRYCE,J H [ 1 NRC PDR 1 Y

2 D

0 C

U M

E N

T NOTE TO ALL " RIDS

• RECIPIENTS:

PLEASE HELP US TO REDUCE WASTE. TO HAVE YOUR NAME OR ORGANIZATION REMOVED FROM DISTRIBUTION LISTS OR REDUCE THE NUMBER OF COPIES RECEIVED BY YOU OR YOUR ORGANIZATION, CCNTACT THE DOCUMENT CONTROL DESK (DCD) ON EXTENSION 415-2083 TOTAL NUMBER OF_ COPIES REQUIRED: LTTR [ ENCL 4 0