ML20198N589
| ML20198N589 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | River Bend  |
| Issue date: | 12/29/1998 |
| From: | Marschall C NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | Edington R ENTERGY OPERATIONS, INC. |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9901060163 | |
| Download: ML20198N589 (22) | |
Text
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UNITiiD STATES 2
p, NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
-l REG!0N IV 0,,
4 611 RYAN PLAZA LAIVE. SUITE 400 D
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%.'....,o ARUNGTON. TE XAS 76011-8064 DEC 29 iEE5 Randall K. Edington, Vice President - Operationc River Bend Station Entergy Operations, Inc.
P.O. Box 220 St. Francisville, Louisiana 70775
SUBJECT:
INSPECTION PLANNING REVIEW (IPR)- RIVER BEND STATION
Dear Mr. Edington:
On December 2,1998, the NRC staff completed a unique Inspection Planning Review (IPR) of River Bend Station. The staff normally conducts Semiannual Plant Performance Reviews for all operating nuclear power plants to develop an integrated understanding of safety performance and adjust inspection resources. However, due to the suspension of the Systematic Assessment of Licensee Performance process, we implemented an abbreviated inspection Planning Review for plant issues and to develop inspection plans. The IPR for River Bend Station involved the participation of both Reactor Projects and Safety divisions in evaluating i
inspection results and safety performance trends for the period April 23 to October 28,1998.
This IPR provided NRC management with a current summary of licensee performance trends since the last Plant Performance Review.
Based upon this review, inspection resources have been prioritized and scheduled. No changes have been made to the inspection resources for your facility. contains an historical listing of plant issues, referred to as the Plant issues Matrix (PIM), that was considered during this IPR process to arrive at an integrated view of licensee performance trends. The PIM includes only items from inspection reports and other docketed correspondence between the NRC and Entergy Operations, Inc. The IPR may also have considered some predecisional and draft material that does not appear in the attached PIM, including observations from events and inspections that had occurred since the last NRC inspection report was issued, but had not yet received full review and consideration. is a general description of the PIM table labels. This material will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room.
This letter also advises you of our planned inspection effort resulting from the River Bend Station IPR. It is provided to minimize the resource impact on your staff and to allow for scheduling conflicts and personnel availability to be resolved in advance of inspector arriva?
onsite. Enclosure 3 details our inspection plan for River Bend Station over the next 8 months.
The rationale or basis for each inspection outside the core inspection program is provided so that you are aware of the reason for emphasis in these program areas. Resident inspections are not listed because of their ongoing and continuous nature. We will inform you of any changes to the inspection plan.
9901060163 981229 PDR ADOCK 05000458 G
Entergy Operations, Inc.,
if you have any questions, pletise contact me at (817) 860-8185.
Sincerely, d
Charles S. Marschall, Chief Project Branch C 4
Division of Reactor Projects Docket No.:
50-458 Licensr, No.: NPF-47
Enclosures:
- 1. Plant issues Matrix
- 2. General Description of PIM Table Labels
- 3. Inspection Plan cc w/ enclosures:
Executive Vice President and Chief Operating Officer Entergy Operations, Inc.
P.O. Box 31995 Jackson, Mississippi 39286-1995 Vice President Operations Support N
Entergy Operations, Inc.
P.O. Box 31995 Jackson, Mississippi 39286-1995 General Manager Plant Operations River Bend Station Entergy Operations, Inc.
P.O. Box 220 St. Francisville, Louisiana 70775 Director - Nuclear Safety River Bend Station Entergy Operations, Inc.
P.O. Box 220 St. Francisville, Louisiana 70775 Wise, Carter, Child & Caraway P.O. Box 651 Jackson, Mississippi 39205
Entergy Operations, Inc. Mark J. Wetterhahn, Esq.
Winston & Strawn 1401 L Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20005-3502 Manager - Licensing River Bend Station Entergy Operations, Inc.
P.O. Box 220 St. Francisville, Louisiana 70775 The Honorable Richard P. leyoub Attorney General Department of Justice State of Louisiana P.O. Box 94005 Baton Rouge, Louisiana 70804-9005 H. Anne Plettinger 3456 Villa Rose Drive Baton Rouge, Louisiana 70806 President of West Feliciana Police Jury P.O. Box 1921 St. Francisville, Louisiana 70775 William H. Spell, Administrator Louisiana Radiation Protection Division P.O. Box 82135 Baton Rouge, Louisiana 70884-2135
Entergy Operations, Inc.
-4 gg i
E-Mail report to T. Frye (TJF)
E-Mail report to D. Lange (DJL)
E-Mail report to NRR Event Tracking System (IPAS)
E-Mail report to Document Control Desk (DOCDESK)
E-Mail report to Richard Correia (RPC)
E-Mail report to Frank Talbot (FXT)
,, bec to DCD (IE01) bec distrib. by RIV:
Regional Administrator Resident inspector
, DRP Director DRS-PSB Branch Chief (DRP/C)
MIS System Project Engineer (DRP/C)
RIV File Branch Chief (DRP/TSS)
Carol Gordon The Chairman (MS: 16-G-15)
Records Center, INPO Deputy Regional Administrator C. A. Hackney Commissioner Dicus B. Henderson, PAO Commissioner Diaz B. Murray, DPS/PSB
)
Commissioner McGaffigan SRIs at all RIV sites Commisssioner Merrifield W. D. Travers, EDO (MS: 17-G-21)
Associate Dir, for Projects, NRR Associate Dir. for insp., and Tech. Assmt, NRR SALP Program Manager, NRR/lLPB (2 copies)
J. Hannon, NRR Project Director (MS: 13-H 3)
R. Fretz, NRR Project Manager (MS: 13-H-3)
DOCUMENT NAME: G:\\DRPDIR\\lPR\\RBS
//
To recolve copy of document, Indicate in box: "C" = Copy without enclosures *E* = Copy with enclosures "N* = No copy RIV:C:DRP/C l
D:DRS'l l
DD:DRP l/ D:DRP Q
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12/17/98 12/' 38 17 / /98 12/1f/98 OFFICIAL RECORD COPY j
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4 Entergy Operations, Inc. DEC 2 9 1998 E-Mail report to T. Frye (TJF)
E-Mail report to D. Lange (DJL)
E-Mail report to NRR Event Tracking System (IPAS)
E-Mail report to Document Control Desk (DOCDESK)
E-Mail report to Richard Correia (RPC)
E-Mail report to Frcnk Talbot (FXT) bec to DCD (IE01) bec distrib. by RIV:
Regional Administrator Resident inspector DRP Director DRS-PSB Branch Chief (DRP/C)
MIS System Project Engineer (DRP/C)
RIV File Branch Chief (DRP/TSS)
Carol Gordon The Chairman (MS: 16-G-15)
Records Center, INPO Deputy Regional Administrator C. A. Hackney Commissioner Dieus B. Henderson, PAO Commissioner Diaz B. Murray, DRS/PSB Commissioner McGaffigan SRis at all RIV sites Commisssioner Merrifield W. D. Travers, EDO (MS: 17-G-21)
Associate Dir. for Projects, NRR Associate Dir. for insp., and Tech. Assmt, NRR SALP Program Manager, NRR/lLPB (2 copies)
J. Hannon, NRR Project Director (MS: 13-H-3)
R. Fretz, NRR Project Manager (MS: 13-H-3)
DOCUMENT NAME: G:\\DRPDIR\\lPR\\RBS To receive copy of document, indicate in box: "C" = Copy without enclosures *E" = Copy with enclosures *N" = No copy RIV:C:DRP/C D:DRS/
DD:DRP
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D:DRP P
l C Ma schall;df ATHdAkiP KEBrocipmin TPGwynn 12/17/98 12/' $8 1 7 /98 12/d/98 OFFICIAL RECORD COPY
PLANT ISSUES MATRIX RIVER BEND DATE TYPE SOURCE ID SFA TEMPLATE ITEM DESCRIPTION CODE 10/23/98 POS IR98-19 NR OPS 1C The licensee had effectively communicated to plant personnel the importance of identifying and resolving C
operator workarounds and the licensee's efforts to identify operator workarounds were being adequately implemented. The workarounds documented by the licensee on the workaround ust were consistent with the definition in the established guidelines.
The licensee had performed limited scope assessments of operator workarounds but had not applied any formal evaluatir'n criteria. Past assessments of workarounds had not addressed the potential for operator error during, or resulting from, the implementation of workaround compensatory measures. Despite the informal nature and limited scope of the assessments, the licensee appeared to be emphasizing the timely resolution of operator workarounds.
10/20/98 NEG IR 98-18 NR OPS 1A Nuclear equipment operators demonstrated poor attention to detail during the Division I diesel generator C
24-hour run in that they failed to property monitor governor oil level during the surveillance. Subsequently, unacceptable power swings were observed when oillevel dropped below that required for proper governor operation. Planned corrective measures to address the oil leak and nuclear equipment operator performance were acceptable.
10/14/98 POS IR 98-13 NR OPS SA SB SC Corrective action processes were well designed and effectively implemented.
C 10/14/98 POS IR 98-13 NR OPS SA The recent quality assurance audits were effective in the identification of specific and programmatic C
deficiencies within the corrective action program.
9/19/98 NEG 1R 98-17 NR OPS 1A 3B Operator awareness of most plant problems was considered good but in one inctance operators did not C
demonstrate a proper understanding of the potential plant response to a failed -22 VDC electro-hydraulic controls bus. The bus was degraded at the time. Bus failure, absent operator action, would have resulted in closure of the main steam isolation valves. Main steam isolation valve closure would have significantly complicated any subsequent operator response. Similar operator knowledge observations were made in NRC Inspection Report 50-458/98-05. As documented in that report, Operations personnel did not understand the basis for operability when questioned about reactor core isolation cooling, p! ant stack monitor, and hydraulic control unit problerns.
7/4/98 NEG 1R 98-15 SE OPS 1A 3A While a trend in human performance problems was identified approximately one month prior to the fire LF pump failure, short-term corrective actions were not timely. A nuclear equipment operator (NEO) demonstrated poor self-checking practices when he failed to properly reposition the diesel fire pump fuel oil tank outlet valve per clearance order specifications, which resulted in pump failure during postmaintenance testing. This was the fourth " plant impact" type of Operations human performance problem identified during the past three inspection periods.
October 28,1998 1
RIVER BEND STATION
PLANT ISSUES MATRIX RIVER BEND DATE TYPE SOURCE ID SFA TEMPLATE ITEM DESCRIPTION CODE 6/1/98 VIO 1R 98-12 SE OPS 1A 3A One violation of Technical Specifications 5.4.1 (procedures) was identified for operating a different breaker SLIV LF than specified on a clearance order. The Division il diesel generator output breaker was mistakenly operated, instead of the C residual heat removal pump breaker, which momentarily rendered the diesel generator inoperable. This was the third operator related human performance problem in the last two report periods which has affected plant operation.
5/16/98 NEG 1R 98-08 SE OPS 3A 1A A nuclear equipment operator demonstrated poor self-checking practices in that he had failed to properly LF reposition plant valves on two occasions. In the first case, cooling water was inadvertent!y secured to the B feedwater pump speed increaser. In the second instance an accumulator pressure switch, that activates an accumulator trouble alarm in the control room, was inadvertently isolated for over three weeks 4/27/98 STR 1R 98-08 NR OPS 1A The plant startup was orderly and the control room supervisor demonstrated excellent command and C
control during the evolution. Control room briefs were thorough and the control room supervisor provided exceptional guidance and direction to the crew.
4/13/98 POS IR 98-08 NR OPS 1A The plant shutdown was well controlled. The control room supervisor provided appropriate and timely C
briefings during the evolution and properly anticipated entry into the emergency operating procedures when the plant was scrammed.
3/17/98 NEG IR 98-05 NR OPS 18 Operations' respanse to the unexpected actuation of a fire water sprinkler system in Tunnel F was effective C
at controlling the event. However, management expectatkm were not met in that three-way 4
communications were not consistently utilized and comma.6 and control was not initially streamlined through the control room supervisor.
2/21/98 NEG IR 98-04 NR OPS SA 58 4B Operations and Engineering erroneously concluded that only one abnormal operating procedure and no C
emergency operating procedures could be impacted by standby gas treatment system (SGTS) induced dp across the auxiliary building. The actual operation of the SGTS following an event and the force required to open doors with one train of the SGTS in operation were not appropriately considered in the evaluations.
Errors made in one calculation resulted in significantly underestimating the force required to open doors.
in addition, when an engineering manager and supervisor were unable to enter the auxiliary building (with one train of SGTS in operation) they failed to inform upper management and Operations of this information. Consequently, misperceptions regarding the difficulty accessing the auxiliary building were not corrected.
+
2/4/98 POS IR 98-04 NR OPS 18 3A Operations' response to a control rod drive control circuit power supply failure was prompt and effective.
C The flow control valve failed closed and operators had to establish manual controlin the field.
1/10/98 POS IR 97-19 NR OPS 3A A nuclear equipment operator trainee demonstrated excellent attention to detail during a diesel generator C
surveillance. While looking for fluid discharge on the cylinder head test valves, the operator noticed oil residue on piping adjacent to the number eight cylinder (versus the cylinder head test valve itself),
October 28,1998 2
RIVER BEND STATION
PLANTISSUES MATRIX RIVER BEND DATE TYPE SOURCE ID SFA TEMPLATE ITEM DESCRIPTION CODE 1/10/98 VIO IR 97-19 NR OPS 28 Operations and Maintenance personnel were not effective in maintaining the post accident sampling SLIV C
system. PASS has been out of service for approximately 50% of the time during the past 10 months.
Repairs were often not performed in a timely manner and the overali material condition of the system was poor.
12/29/97 STR 1R 97-12 NR OPS 1C 3C The inspector concluded that the requahfication examinations were well constructed and disenminated at C
the appropriate knowledge level. The licensee responded promptly and effectively to an identified examination security vulnerability.
12/29/97 STR 1R 97-12 NR OPS 1A 3A Crews observed practiced good, consistent communications and exhibited good teamwork during the C
dynamic simulator scenarios. Crews met all planned critical tasks and successfu!!y passed the requalification examination. The licensee's remedial training program conformed to the administrative requirements and appeared to be effective.
12/29/97 STR 1R 97-12 NR OPS 3C Licensee eva!uators were consistent and objective in their evaluations and their overall performance was C
considered a strength. Critiques effectively identified strengths and weaknesses. The extensive involvement of operations management was considered a strength.
12/4/97 SLIV IR 97-19 NR OPS 3C The separation criteria between a temporary cable and an uncovered safety related cable tray was not VIO C
maintained consistent with the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report and plant procedures.
11/17/97 VIO IR 97-15 LIC OPS 18 3A The plant was inadvertently allowed to transition operating Modes without first meeting 11 required LCOs.
SL lli 11/17/97 VIO IR 97-15 NR OPS 1C 4B The Shutdown Operations Protectior' Plan, shutdown cooling guideline, and contingency actions failed to SL 111 C
adequately address the " time-to-boil" curves located in Procedure OSP-0037.
11/17/97 NEG 1R 97-15 NR OPS 1B The FRC demonstrated weak performance by accepting a postmodification test procedure that did not C
contain adequate controls and precautions for use during periods of high reactor decay heat rate.
11/14/97 STR 1R 97-14 NR OPS 1A 3A Refueling operations were consistently performed resulting in an error-free refueling.
C 10/30/97 VIO IR 97-17 NR OPS 1A After the appropriate ACTION Statement was entered for an inoperable air lock, operators failed to initiate SLIV C
actions to ensure that the overall containment leakage rate (using air lock test results) did not exceed that permitted by TSs.
10/30/97 NEG 1R 97-17 NR OPS 1A Subsequent to the failure of a containment air lock overallleak rate test, the operations shift C
superintendent (OSS) entered the wrong Technical Specification (TS) ACTION Statement.
October 28,1998 3
RIVER BEND STATION
PLANT IISUES MATRIX RIVER EEND DATE TYPE SOURCE ID SFA TEMPLATE ITEM DESCRIPTION CODE 10/28/97 STR 1R 97-16 NR OPS 1A SC Following a 1966 management conference to discuss fuel handling concerns, there were extensive C
corrective actions implemented at River Bend Station. Management has subsequently become proactive, I
and the licensee's performance during this inspection demonstrated a marked improvement in implementing the safe handling of fuel.
10/28/97 POS IR 97-16 NR OPS 1A 3A The refueling crews performed in a very professional and knowledgeable manner. Excellent C
communications between the control room refueling coordinator, refueling floor supervisor, refueling crew supervisor, fuel building bridge operator, and the two inclined fuel transfer system operators was established. There was clearfy a marked improvement in refueling crew performance over what was observed during Refueling Outage-6. A good team attitude was displayed with all personnel cognizant of their responsibilities.
10/28/97 STR IR 97-16 NR OPS SA 3B Assessments (internal and extemal) were focused, candid, in-depth, and self-critical. Quality assurance C
personnel conducted frequent surveillance activities and demonstrated a thorough knowledge of refueling operations.
10/23/97 NEG IR 9717 NR OPS 3A 3B 5A A nuclear equipment operator misoperated the system. Consequently, the suppression pool cleanup C
system was damaged. This condition ultimately resulted in aggravating a plant conductivity excursion.
The inspectors determined that the licensee's investigation into the conductivity excursion failed to identify the operations related issues 10/18/97 POS 1R 97-17 NR OPS 1A The plant startup on October 18,1997, was conducted in an orderly manner and in accordance with C
procedural requirements. The control room supervisor demonstrated good command and control during the evolution.
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October 28,1998 4
RIVER BEND STATION
PLANT ISSUES MATRIX RIVER BEND DATE TYPE SOURCE 10 SFA TEMPLATE ITEM DESCRIPTION CODE 10/14/98 POS IR 98-13 NR MAINT SA Self-assessments were comprehensive and of appropriate scope and depth to meet their objectives. The C
type and number of findings indicated the assessments were thorough and appropriately self-critical.
9/19/98 NEG IR 98-17 NR MAINT 2A Plant material condition was generally good with some significant deficiencies. Material condition concems C
included: 1) degraded Division I and 11 diesel generator control air systems, requiring the use of operator actions and non-safety related equipment to maintain the diesels operable; 2) a fuel leak; and 3) an erratic emergency response information system real time computer. Conversely, the degraded -22 VDC electro-hydraulic controls power supply was repaired this inspection period.
8/8/98 POS IR 98-15 NR MAINT SA 5B SC Management involvement to address a through-wall feedwater flow venturiir:strument line crack was C
excellent. Managers responded to the site in the evening to assess the problem and plan corrective measures. The resultant maintenance reflected careful planning, good coordination with OperatK)ns, and appropriate consideration of plant risk.
8/8/98 NCV IR 98-15 LIC MAINT 28 3A A noncited violation was documented to address three licensee identified instances where surveillances were not performed per Technical Specification (TS) 5.4.1 required procedures. Missed surveillances included: (1) the overall annulus bypass leakage evaluation; (2) a high pressure core spray pump vibration surveillance; and (3) the 2-year diesel fire pump inspection. Additionally, Technical Requirements Manual (TRM) Surveillance Requirement (SR) 3.3.2.1.12, Source Range Monitor Channel Function Tests, were not performed prior to plant startup on April 27, but did not constitute a violation of NRC requirements.
Subsequent performance of the surveillances was satisfactory. Contributors included inadequate management oversight, poor implementation of scheduling activities, inadequate training, weak surveillance procedures, and confusing surveillance tracking methods. The licensee's investigation was thorough and self-critical Planned corrective actions were sound and expansive.
8/8/98 NEG IR 98-15 LIC MAINT 2A Plant material condition was, overall, good. Material condition concems included repeated trips of instrument air compressors, a through-wall crack of a feedwater flow venturi instrument line (repaired), a degraded -22 VDC electrohydraulic control bus, elevated axial vibration on the high pressure core spray pump, and an erratic emergency response information system transient analysis computer. The instrument air compressor trips were not of major concern due to automatic backup features. Material condition improvements included restoration of the Division 11 suppression pool pumpback pumps and the suppression pool cleanup system. Suppression pool cleanliness was substantially improved.
6/27/98 POS IR 98-12 SE MAINT 2A Plant material condition was, overall, very good, with a few relatively minor exceptions. Material condition LF concems included two out of service suppression pool pumpback pumps, an out of service suppression pool cleanup system, and repeated trips of instrument air compressors. The instrument air compressor trips were not of major concem due to automatic backup features.
October 28,1998 5
RIVER BEND STATION i
e-
PLANT ISSUES MATRIX RIVER BEND DATE TYPE SOURCE ID SFA TEMPLATE ITEM DESCRIPTION CODE 5/16/98 NEG 1R 98-08 LIC MAINT 3C Causes for a seal oil leak and excessive main generator hydrogen leakage included weak contractor oversight and poor coordination of maintenance, without adequate verification of critical steps, dunng refueling outage number 7. A sealant plug was not properly reinsta, led and hydrogen seal assembly bolts were not properly torqued. Conversely, corrective maintenance performed during the forced outage was thorough, well controlled and effective at correcting the problems.
5/16/98 POS IR 98-08 NR MAINT 2A Plant material condition was very good. Material condition concerns included an out of service suppression C
pool cleanup system, excessive standby gas treatment system induced differential pressure across the auxiliary building, and a sealleak on feedwater pump B. Conversely, action was taken to correct main generator hydrogen leakage, a high pressure turbine steam leak, and a control building HVAC chiller.
Additionally, a " black board" was achieved in the control room.
4/4/98 POS IR 98-05 LIC MAINT 2A Overall, plant material condition was good. Material condition challenges included excessive main generator hydrogen leakage, a high pressure turbine steam leak, excessive d:fferential pressure across the auxiliary building when the standby gas treatment system was in operation, and an inoperabie control building chiller. The emergency response information system transient analysis computer and the post accident sampling system were repaired and retumed to service.
2/25/98 NEG IR 98-05 SE MAINT 3A 18 Poor self-checking on the part of two instrument and controls technicians resulted in the inadvertent LF isolation of cooling water to the reactor water cleanup nonregenerative heat exchanger and the reactor recirculation pump bearings and seals. Operations
- response to the event was prompt and effective.
2/21/98 WK iR 98-04 LIC MAINT 2A Overall, plant material condition was generally good. However, several significant material condition problems still challenged the plant. including excesWve main generator hydrogen leakage, main turbine steam leakage, a failed emergency response inforru4ron system computer, an inoperable postaccident sampling system, excessive dp across the auxiliary building due to high suction from the SGTS, and an inoperable control building HVAC chiller. Conversely, a suppression pool pumpback pump was repaired and retumed to service.
2/20/98 NEG IR 98-04 NR MAINT 3C 5B A special auxiliary building accessibility test was poorly coordinated, which minimized the value of the test.
C Specifically, when two trains of the SGTS were running, door testing was initiated and completed before the peak building differential pressure (dp) was reached. Additionally, when one train was running, the building dp was not permitted to stabilize after an initial entry resulted in pressurizing the building above the test pressure As a result, only one relatively well built indMdual gained access through the door at the test dp. Finally, problems with the test were not appropriately communicated to plant management, who had believed that the test was successful.
2/12/98 STR IR 97-09 NR MAINT 28 The licensee's online and shutdown maintenance risk-assessment programs were well developed and C
implemented, with use of the equipment-out-of-service computer program for both online and shutdown risk-assessment.
October 28,1998 6
RIVER BEND STATION
PLANT ISSUES MATRIX RIVER BEND DATE TYPE SOURCE ID SFA TEMPLATE ITEM DESCRIPTION CODE 2/12/98 NCV IR 97-09 LIC MAINT 2A 28 A noncited violation was identified for the failure to include six systems, structures, or components within the scope of the Maintenance Rule program on July 10.1996.
2/12/98 WK IR 97-09 NR MAINT 2B The governing procedures and guidelines for implementing the Maintenance Rule program were weak, as C
evidenced by a lack of clear boundary definitions, function definitions, and quantitative performance measures.
2/12/98 VIO IR 97-09 NR MAINT 2A 28 Four examples of a violation of 10 CFR 50.65(a)(2) were identified for the failure to demonstrate that the SLIV C
performance or condition of six systems, structures, or components had been effectively controlled through the performance of appropriate preventive maintenance.
1/10/98 MISC IR 97-19 NR MAINT 2A While overall plant material condition was good, there were notable 3xceptions. The inspector noted C
material condition concerns involving excessive main generator hydrogen leakage, an inoperable post accident sample system, an inoperabie suppression pool pumpback pump, a degraded control rod drive pump, a failed containment isolation damper, and air entrapment in the instrument sensing lines to safety related instruments. Conversely, spent fuel cooling Pump 1B and the suppression pool cleanup mode of the attemate decay heat removal system were repaired and retumed to service.
1/10/98 WK IR 97-19 NR MAINT 3A On-line risk assessments were not always thorough. In one instance operators ir appropriately assumed C
that a delay in placing standby service water pumps in service would not adversely affect the availabihty of the standby service water pumps or the associated diesel generators. In another case, the potential consequences associated with a freeze seal failure were not properly considered in the risk assessment.
1/8/98 VIO IR 98-04 SE MAINT 2B Petcock valves on maintenance actuators for containment purge and ventilation Dampers HVR-AOV-128, SLIV LF 165 and 166 were not appropriately controlled and were not positioned in accordance requirements contained in plant drawings. Consequently, the mispositioning of one of the petcock valves resulted in rendering Damper HVR-AOV-165 inoperable. The lack of controlled precluded opportunities to identify this problem prior rendering the damper inoperable.
11/29/97 MISC IR 97-17 SE MAINT 2A Plant material condition was generally acceptable. Concems were identified with damaged drywell LF insulation, the inoperable SPC mode of the alternate decay heat removal (ADHR) system, an inoperable postaccident sampling system, excessive main generator hydrogen leakage, an inoperable spent fuel cooling pump, and a degraded control rod drive (CRD) pump.
11/29/97 NCV IR 97-17 LIC MAINT 3C Some procedures goveming local leak rate testing for containment isolation valves were inadequate because testing was specified with lift check valves in the air pathway. In some cases, the test configuration resulted in unacceptably low test pressures, while in other cases the effects of the test configurations were not known. Corrective actions to address this finding were comprehensive.
October 28,1998
'T RIVER BEND STATION
PLANT ISSUES MATRIX RIVER BEND DATE TYPE SOURCE ID SFA TEMPLATE ITEM DESCRIPTION CODE 11/29/97 NCV IR 97-17 SE MAINT 3A 3B 3C The inspectors noted multiple instances where maintenance and/or surveillance activities were delayed or LF had to be repeated. The causes for these problems were (1) poor coordination and preparatxm for maintenance and/or testing; (2) questionable understanding of design; (3) a less than expected questioning attitude; or (4) failure to adhere to procedural requirements. This has been noted to be a continuing problem.
11/29/97 NEG IR 97-17 NR MAINT 3A 3B Mechanical maintenance department personnel inappropriately deferred the overall air lock leak rate test C
until after startup without considering how the use or maintenance of the air lock could have affected its operability.
11/14/97 POS IR 97-14 NR MAINT 2A The installation and post-modification testing of the new ECCS strainers was well executed.
C i
11/14/97 STR IR 97-14 NR MAINT 2A Improvements to material condition which were implemented in RO-7 included: suppression pool cleanup C
system; upgraded ECCS strainers, Cleaning of Div 11 RHR heat exchangers; repairing approximately 150 valves; and the overhaul of Rx FW pumps A and C.
11/14/97 NEG 1R 97-14 NR MAINT 3B Test engineers applied weak testing practices by failing to property configure a local leak rate test manifold C
to prevent leakage between the pressure source and the test boundary, during surveillance testing of the inboard and outboard MSIVs.
10/30/97 NEG IR 97-17 NR MAINT 3A During local leak rate testing, maintenance technicians failed to vent the leak rate monitor bypass C
manifolds, as specified by the procedure. This was the second time that a leak rate monitor bypass manifold venting problem was identified in the past.
10/28/97 POS IR 97-16 NR MAINT 2A SC To improve material condition related to fuel protection, the licensee installed a permanent instrument air C
and backup nitrogen supply for the containment building pneumatic gate seals and main steam line plugs.
10/28/97 POS 1R 97-16 NR MAINT 2A To improve the material condition of the suppression pool, the licensee installed permanent protective C
barriers in various locations and a permanent cleanup system.
10/28/97 POS IR 97-16 NR MAINT 2A SC To improve material condition related to fuel handling, the licensee installed a high intensity lighting system C
in the reactor vessel, and mounted a high resolution video camera on the refueling mast to assist in fuel bundle placement and identification.
October 28,1998 8
RIVER BEND STATION
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PLANT ISSUES MATRIX RIVER BEND DATE TYPE SOURCE ID SFA TEMPLATE ITEM DESCRIPTION CODE 10/14/98 eel EA 98-478 NR ENG 1A 2A An apparent violation of Technical Specification 3.8.1b regarding diesel generator inoperability was C
identified.
10/14/98 eel EA 98-478 NR ENG 2A 4A An apparent violation of Criterion til of Appendix B to 10 CFR Part 50 regarding the failure of design control C
measures to adequately verify or check that the safety-related diesel generator control air instrument and controls systems remained functional during a loss-of-offsite-power event was identified.
10/14/98 NEG IR 98-13 NR ENG 4A SA With some exceptions, engineering personnel were not consistently identifying problems and resolving C
them in a timely manner. Those exceptions indicated that engineering personnel were not always providing complete, thorough, and technically appropriate resolutions.
10/14/98 NEG IR 98-13 NR ENG 48 While all engineering personnel contacted displayed positive attitudes and solid commitment to nuclear C
safety and high standards of engineering, a questioning attitude, rigor, and attention to detail exhibited by some of the engineering work was less than desirable.
10/14/98 NCV IR 98-13 NR ENG 4A SA A noncited violation in accordance with Section Vll.B.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy was identified C
regarding a failure to identify and properly translate design requirements of control building chilled water system Pump 1D into the applicable surveillance test procedure.
10/14/98 eel EA 98-478 NR ENG 1A 2A An apparent violation of Criterion XI of Appendix B to 10 CFR Part 50 regarding a failure of preoperational C
and operational testing to assure that the diesel generators would perform satisfactorily in service was identified.
10/14/98 eel EA 98-478 NR ENG 5A An apparent violation of Criterion XVI of Appendix B to 10 CFR Part 50 regarding a failure to document, C
report, and promptly correct a significant condition adverse to quality was identified.
9/19/98 POS IR 98-17 NR ENG 48 Engineering and instrument and Controls staff provided excellent support of operations, in troubleshooting C
and repairing a degraded -22 VDC EHC power source. The performance of troubleshooting and preparation of work documents using a system mockup helped to preclude the risk of perturbations on the plant. The resultant work documents provided very clear direction. Maintenance was conducted in en effective and well controlled manner..
8/8/98 POS IR 98-15 LIC ENG 3A A design engineer demonstrated excellent attention to detail in that, while walking down a design drawing, he identified that the high pressure core spray diesel ground wire solder joint was cracked and about to break free from the post. The connection was promptly repaired.
6/27/98 URI 1R 98-12 NR ENG SA The OA review of an old open corrective action item (inaccurate CST level switches associated with HPCS
)
C and RCIC suction valves) was not thorough and failed to identify that: the engineering evaluation credited a l
compensatory measure canceled in 1993, USAR discrepancies were not corrected in a timely manner, j
engineering repeatedly authorized deferral of measures to correct the problem without the plant manager's concurrence, and the engineer assigned ownership of the item did not have an appropriate understanding l
of the 10 CFR 50.59 evaluation and applicable TS and USAR sections.
October 28,1998 9
RIVER BEND STATION
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PLANT ISSUES MATRIX RIVER BEND DATE TYPE SOURCE ID SFA TEMPLATE ITEM DESCRIPTION CODE 6/3/98 POS IR 98-12 NR ENG 4B The diesel generator system engineer demonstrated exce!!ent support of Operations in identifying the C
cause of anomalous Division il diesel generator power variations in a very prompt manner (1.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> after the problem was first identified). This helped to minimize the out of service time for the diesel generator.
The engineer determined that the problem was caused by a failed relay. The function of the relay was test related and did not affect the operabil6ty of the diesel generator.
4/4/98 VIO IR 98-05 NR ENG 4A The standby gas treatment system differential pressure across the auxiliary building when the standby gas SLIV C
treatment system (4.0 inches W.G.) was in excess of that specified by the River Bend environmental design criteria, which indicated a maximum vacuum of -0.5 inches W.G. under accident conditions.
Departure from the environmental design requirements was not property controlled in accordance with design requirements. In addition, some standby gas treatment system design information was difficult to retrieve and other important information was either not documented or was lost. The specific information of intercst included as-built design requirements for the recirculation ducting and dampers.
2/21/98 NEG IR 98-04 NR ENG 3A 4B Engineers demonstrated poor attention to detail when they utilized an inappropriate section of a design C
specification to accept sma!!er than permitted instrument ensing lines for flow meters. Lines of 3/8-inch diameter were utilized in some cases and the minimum size permitted by documents referenced by the specification was %-inch diameter.
2/21/98 NEG IR 98-04 NR ENG SC Corrective actions to address the long-standing problem accessing the auxiliary building due in.,xcessive C
SGTS induced dp were minimal and untimely. The primary corrective measure (a feasibOy study to evaluate potential solutions) was not funded at the close of the inspection period.
1/10/98 POS IR 97-19 NR ENG 4B The diesel generator system angineers promptly and effectively evaluated the significance nf fuel oil C
discharge coming from a diesel generator cylinder. The prompt assessment helped to minis.aze the out of service time for the diesel generator.
1/10/98 NEG IR 97-19 NR ENG 48 Engineers did not assess in a timely manner the significance of exceeding the flammability threst old for C
hydrogen concentration at the seal oil detrainment tank vent. Consequently, the flammability threshold was exceeded before safety issues were thoroughly evaluated.
1/6/98 STR 1R 97-18 NR ENG A strong inservice testing program had been developed and the component scope was found to be all C
inclusive and correct. Development and use of the component information sheets, which constituted the inservice testing data base, was considered excellent.
12/12/97 SL IV IR 97-19 NR ENG 5B Corrective actions to address air entrapment in RCIC minimum flow valve instrument lines (January,1997)
VIO C
were inadequate to prevent recurrence. Subsequently, one high pressure core, spray and two residual heat removal eystem minimum flow valves malfunctioned for the same or similar causes (air entrapment in the instrument lines),
11/14/97 NCV IR 97-14 LIC ENG 1C During the conduct of the control rod scram time test a half scram signal existed invalidating the test results.
October 28,1998 10 RIVER BEND STATION
PLANT ISSUES MATRIX j
RIVER BEND DATE TYPE SOURCE ID SFA TEMPLATE ITEM DESCRIPilON CODE 10/2/98 NEG IR 98-14 LIC PS During walk throughs with two crews using the training simulator, one performance weakness was identified related to the failure of one crew to properly assess plant conditions which led to declaration of a generat emergency instead of a site area emergency.
10/2/98 STR 1R 98-14 NR PS 1C The emergency preparedness program was property implemented. With one exception involving the C
declaration of a notifcation of an unusual event, all events reported to the NRC operations center since June 1996 were property evaluated and classified. Changes made to the emergency plan were implemented in accordance with 10 CFR 50.54(q). Prccedure changes accurately reflected changes in the emergency plan. The emergency preparedness staff was well trained and maintained good awareness of industry issues. The emergency response organization training program was implemented satisfactorily.
Annual reviews of the emergency plan, implementing procedures, emergency action leve:s, and letters of agreement were property performed and documented. Emergency response facilities were property equipped and maintained in a state of proper operational readiness. The corrective action request p'ocess effectively tracked resolution of emergency preparedness issues, and these issues were resolved in a timely manner. Quality assurance audits of the emergervy preparedness program were performed by technmally qualified personnel and were of proper scope id depth.
8/8/98 NEG IR 98-15 NR PS 2B Foreign materials were not property controlled in the containment, a foreign material exclusion (FME) zone.
C Two cloth towels were found near hydraulic control units to collect leakage but were not captivated or captured on the FME log. Additionally, a large roll of plastic bags, several cloth towels, and a 30-page procedure were in a closed room within the containment. The items were not on the FME log and were not logged when taken into the main containment. Corrective measures were acceptable (Section 02.1).
8/8/98 NEG IR 98-15 NR PS 3A The inspector observed several poor radworker practices. When wearing clean cotton liners, craftsmen C
touched their used anticontamination clothing in potentially contaminated parts r4 the garments, grabbed a potentially contaminated support, ano picked up potentially contaminated bags of components that had spi!!ed in a clean area. Some of the cotton liners were found to be contamineled at the exit of the radiologically controlled area. The Radiological Work Permit provided weak controls in that tlie noted practices were not specifically prohibited.
6/27/98 POS IR 98-12 NR PS 2A Housekeeping was, overall, very good but a few problems were identified. One large garbage bag of C
debris was not properiy removed from the high pressure core spray pump room after the completion of work and a small metal buckle was found in containment.
6/3/98 VIO IR 98-12 LIC PS 4A 3A SA One violation of 10 CFR 50.54q (emergency preparedness requirements) was identified for the failure to SLIV maintain the capability (for 19 days) to activate all emergency preparedness sirens within 15 minutes of the notification of the state and local government offcials. Only 18 of 93 sirens activated during a surveillance. The problem was caused by a defective software upgrade. An opportunity to identify the problem earlier was missed because post i" "ation testing of the software upgrade was inadequate.
October 28,1998 11 RIVER BEND STATION
PLANT ISSUES MATRIX RIVER BEND DATE TYPE SOURCE ID SFA TEMPLATE ITEM DESCRIPTION CODE 5/21/98 POS IR 98-07 NR PS 5A SB SC Excellent, comprehensive and performance-based annual audits nf the radiological environmental C
monitoring and meteorological monitoring programs were perfom ed. Timely corrective actions were implemented. The Entergy Operations corporate office conducted a through compliance-based assessment of the corporate environmentallaboratory located at the River Bend Station.
5/21/98 POS IR 98-07 NR PS 3A 3B Good training and qualification programs were implemented. The knowledge and performance of the C
environmental program's management and *echnical staff were excellent.
5/21/98 STR 1R 98-07 NR PS 1A 1C Overall, good radiological environmental and meteorological monitoring programs were implemented.
C Environmental sampling locations were operational and property maintained. Environmental sampling equipment and environmental laboratory radiochemistry analytical instruments were property calibrated and maintained. Very good radiological environmental monitoring implementing procedures wera in place.
The annualland use censuses were property conducted. The meteorological tower instrumentaion was properly calibrated and maintained. The meteorological data recovery rate was greater than 92 percent.
5/16/98 NEG IR 98-08 NR PS 2A Overall, plant housekeeping was considered good with some items identified by the inspectors as needing C
improvement. The preservation of the reactor core isolation cooling, residual heat removat A. B and C pump rooms and piping systems was poor. Surface corrosion was evident on a majority of the system piping runs. Scattered tools and a disassembled sump pump were left on the lower level of the Residual Heat Removal C pump room, undisturbed, since at least January,1998. In several locations in the auxiliary building, tools and other materials were staged for extended periods of time without the performance of work on the prospective jobs.
5/1/98 POS IR 98-06 NR PS 1A 1C A good in-place filter and charcoal adsorber testing program was implemented for the standby cas C
treatment system, control room ventilation system, and fuel building ventilation system.
5/1/98 POS IR 98-06 NR PS 2A 2B Liquid and gaseous effluent radiation monitors were properly maintained, tested, and calibrated.
C 5/1/98 STR 1R 98-06 NR PS 1A 1C Overall, a good liquid and gaseous radioactive effluent waste management program was implemented.
C Challenging performance goals were initiated and met in 1996 and 1997 for the reduction of radioactive effluent waste releases. A significant reduction in the amount of liquid waste effluent volume and activity discharged was noted in 1996,1997, and the first quarter of 1998. Since 1995, the gaseous effluent activity released has shown a slight increase.
3/24/98 WK IR 98-03 NR PS 3A SA The licensee continued to have probiems with personnet performance; specifically, a tack of attention to C
detail. Condition reports written by the licensee cited personnel error as the cause.
3/24/98 V'O IR 98-03 LIC PS 3A A violation was identified for two examples of failure to follow udiation protection procedures regarding SLIV contaminat;cn area posting requirements and personnel decontamination.
October 28,1998 12 RIVER BEND STATION
PLANT ISSUES MATRIX RIVER BEND DATE TYPE SOURCE ID SFA TEMPLATE ITEM DESCRIPTION CODE 324/98 STR 1R 98-0;S NR PS 1C 2A An effective radiation protectiun program was implemented. Extemal exposure controts included proper C
radiological access controls, proper posting and control of radiological areas, and proper extemal dosimetry issue and tracking. Internal exposure controls included the effective implementation of whole-body counting and internal dosimetry programs and proper evaluations for respirator use. The portable radiation protection instrumentation program was property maintained. Radiation protection procedures contained appropriate detail. An appropriately staffed radiation protection organization was maintained. Generally, corrective actions for radiation protection activities were implemeded in a time!y manner.
3/24/98 STR IR 98-03 NR PS 2A Housekeeping within the controlled eccess area was good.
C 3/24/98 STR 1R 98-03 NR PS 1C 2A improvement was noted in the radiation protection program based on enhancement items implemented by C
the licensee. These included: entry tumstiles to prevent personnel from entering the controlled access area without electronic dosimetry, the use of standardized radiological postings, the initiation of the supervisory observation program, and the licensee's effectiveness in identifying adverse trends.
3/24/98 VIO IR 98-03 NR PS 1C A violation was identifieo for failure to maintain records of the radiation protection program content and SLIV C
implementation.
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3/4/98 SIR IR 98-01 NR PS SA SB The critique process was identified as a program strength and was significantly improved when compared C
to the 1996 biennial exercise self critque.
3/4/98 NEG IR 98-01 NR PS 3B The initially submitted scenario was not acccp because it was too similar to the 1996 exercise C
scenario (two cf four events were the same).
3/4/98 WK IR 98-01 NR PS 1B The Operations Support Center (OSC) staffs performance was satisfactory. Due to the potentialimpact C
on mitigation efforts, the failure to promptly and property dispatch inplant response teams was identified as an exereire weakness. It took up to an hour to dispatch several teams, and some teams, including a high priority team, were cancele J before the teams could be dispatched. Work team order documentation was incomplete and would have hampered event response reconstruction.
l a 4/98 STR 1R 98-01 NR PS 1B Overall, performance was generally very good. The control room (CR), Technical support center (TSC),
i C
and emergency operations !Miity (EOF) successfully implemented all assigned emergency plan functions.
Performance in these facilities was very good.
2/2/98 VIO IR 97-20 NR PS 3A A violation was identified involving the failure of a radiation protection technician to adhere to radiation work SLIV C
permit anti-contamination clothing dress requirements.
2/2/98 STR 1R 98-02 NR PS 1C The compensatory measures program was effectively implemented.
C 2/2/98 STR 1R 98-02 NR PS 2A Very good radio and telep*one communication systems were maintained.
C October 28,1998 13 RIVER BEND STATION
PLANT ISSUES MATRIX RIVER BEND DATE TYPE SOURCE ID SFA TEMPLATE ITEM DESCRIPTION CODE 2/2/98 STR 1R 98-02 NR PS 1C Changes to security plans were properly reported.
C 2/2/98 NCV IR 98-02 LIC PS 3A A noncited violation was identified involving the failure to tingerprint an individual prior to granting temporary unescorted access into the protected area.
2/2/98 STR 1R 98-02 NR PS 3B 3C A very good training program for security contingency exercises and table top drills had been implemented.
C 2/2/98 STR 1R 98-02 NR PS 3C Senior management support for the security organization was excellent. The security program was C
implemented by a well trained and highly qualified staff.
2/2/98 STR 1R 98-02 NR PS 1C An effective access authorization program was in place.
C 2/2/98 STR 1R 98-02 NR PS 1C 28 An effective testing program had been implemented to demonstrate proper operability of security systems.
C 2/2/98 STR 1R 98-02 NR PS 1C An excellent security event reporting program was in place.
C 2/2/98 STR 1R 98-02 NR PS 2A Assessment aids provided effective and complete assessment of the perimeter detection zones.
C 2/2/98 STR IR 98-02 NR PS 1C A very good program for searching personnel, packages, and vehicles was maintained.
C 2/2/98 STR 1R 98-02 NR PS 2A 3A 3B Alarm Stations were redundant and well protected. Alarm station operators were alert and knowledgeable C
of their duties and responsibilities.
11/14/97 STR 1R 9714 NR PS 2A During RO-7 housekeeping was very good due to strong day-to-day management support.
C 11/14/97 NCV 1R 97-14 LIC PS 1C Four different problems were identified involving the failure to property maintain high radiation area boundaries.
11/14/97 STR 1R 97-14 NR PS 1C The licensee demonstrated excellent performance in reducing radiation exposures ALARA. Even with an C
expandeo work scope and extended outage duration radiation exposures were less than goal. The total outage exposure was only 207 person-rem.
11/14/97 VIO IR 97-14 LIC PS 1C 3A The LHRA gate to the Radwaste drum storage area was found unlocked and unguarded SLIV October 28,1998 14 RIVER BEND STATION
PLANTISSUES MATRIX RIVER BEND DATE TYPE SOURCE ID SFA TEMPLATE ITEM DESCRIPTION CODE 11/14/97 VIO IR 97-14 LIC PS 1C 3A The LHRA barricade and posting which surrounded Valve E12-AOV41 A was partially removed and not SLIV controlled.
10/17/97 NEG IR 97-17 NR PS 1C Health physics personnel did not meet managemer.i expectations because drywell entries were permitted C
while the traversing in-core probe system was not danger tagged off.
i October 28,1998 15 RIVER BEND STATION
ENCLOSURE 2 ENCLOSURE 2 GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF PIM TABLE LABELS Actual date of an event or significant issue for those items that have a clear date of occurrence, the date the source of the intorn.ation was issued (such as the O#I' LER date), or, for inspection reports, the last date of the inspection period.
Type The categorization of the issue - see the Type item Code table.
SFA SALP Functional Area Codes: OPS for Operations; M AINT for Maintenance; ENG for Engineering; and PS for Plant Support.
Sources The document that contains the issue information: IR for NRC Inspection Report or LER for Licensee Event Report.
ID Identification of who discovered issue: N for NRC; L for Licensee; or S for Self identifying (events).
12 sue Description Details of the issue from the LER text or from the IR Executive Summaries.
Codes Temptate Codes - see table.
TEMPLATE CODES TYPE ITEM CODES 1
Operational Performance: A - Normal Operations; B - Operations During Transients; EA Enforcement Action Letter with Civil Penalty and C - Programs and Processes ED Enforcement Discretion - No Civil Penalty 2
Material Condition: A - Equipment Condition or B - Programs and Processes Strength Overall Strong Licensee Performance 3
Human Performance: A - Work Performance; B - Knowledge, Skills, and Abilities /
Weakness Overall Weak Licensee Performance Training; C - Work Environment eel
- Escalated Enforcement item - Waiting Final NRC Action 4
Engineering / Design: A - Design; B - Engineering Support; C - Programs and l
VIO Violation Level 1,11. Ill, or IV ocesses I
NCV Non-Cited Violation 5
Problem Identific. tion and Resolution: A - Identification; B - Analysis; and C -
Resolution DEV Deviation from Licensee Commitment to NRC NOTES:
Pcsitive Individual Good inspection Finding Eels are apparent violations of NRC requirements that are being considered for escalated enforcement action in accordance with the " General Statementof Policy and Negative individual Poor inspection Finding Procedure for NRC Enforcement Action"(Enforcement Policy), NUREG 1600.
LER Licensee Event Report to the NRC However, tne NRC has not reached its final enforcement decision on the issues identified by the Eels and the PIM entries may be modified when the final decisions URI **
Unresolved item from inspection Report are made. Before the NRC makes its enforcement cecision, the licensee will be Licensing Licensing issue from NRR provided with an opportunity to either (1) respond to the apparent violation or (2) request a predecisional enforcement conference.
MISC Miscellaneous - Emergency Preparedness Finding (EP),
URis are unresolved items about which more information is required to determine l
Declared Emergency, Nonconformance issue, etc.
whether the issue in question is an ace ptable item, a deviation, a nonconformance, or a violation. However, the NRC har r
- ached its final conclusions on the issues, and the PIM entries may be mortified
- final conclusions are made.
ENCLOSURE 3 RIVER BEND STATION INSPECTION PLAN IP - Inspection Procedure Tl - Temporary Instruction Core inspection - Minimum NRC Inspection Program (mandatory all plants)
Regional Initiative - Additional inspection based on performance concerns INSPECTION TITLE /
NUMBER DATES TYPE OF INSPECTION / COMMENTS PROGRAM AREA OF INSPECTO RS IP 83750 Occupational Radiation 1
01/4-8/99 Core inspection Exposure IP 81700 Physical Security 1
01/4-8/99 Core inspection IP 83750 Occupational Radiation 1
04/12-16/99 Core inspection Exposure IP 71001 Requalification Inspection 1
08/23-27/99 Core inspection
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