ML20198N016

Informs of Final Status of Info & Rept Developed by Working Group

ML20198N016
Person / Time
Issue date:	08/26/1997
From:	John Lubinski NRC
To:	NRC
Shared Package
ML20198N013	List: ML20198N016
References
FRN-62FR43556, RULE-PR-MISC NUDOCS 9710310020
Download: ML20198N016 (1)

Text

..

p pv t

,f j UNITED STATES

% e NUCLEARwasmwoTow, RECULATORY o,c. - =i COMMISSION

%*...+/

August 26,1996 A

MEMORANDUM TO: / ,

Working Group to Evaluate Control a Accountability of Licensed Devices /

FROM:

John W. Lubinski, co-Chair

SUBJECT:

FINAL STATUS REPORT This and memorandum report it developed. is to inform the working group (WG) of nthe final status o July 2,1996. Copies of the report were. Theforwarded gart on report has to you a Public Document Room (PDR) and the report plan is now a is to have the report issued as "NRC-Agreement State Working Group to E o

and Accountability announced of Licensed Devices," NUREG-1551. Publication of NUR in the Federal Register.

Please note that the copy of the report originally forwarded n to you contained a Appendix G

• ESTIMATED COSTS OF DISPOSAL OF A SOURCE " Specif .

estimated costs was for a 1 curie source, not a 1 millicurie source. The atta contains the correction.

meeting, March 7,1996, both held in Vancouver Was minutes for the fourth and fifth working group me,etings were not deve for both meetings was to discuss the final recommendations and the report of the meetings is included in the WG report. . A brief overview

• REVIEW GROUP - RADIOACTIVE DEVICES." Copies ng of allinform If you have any questions, you may call me at (301) 415-7868.

Attachments: As stated cc(w/ attachments):

WG mailing list 9710310020 971015 PDR MISC 9710310018 PDR -

July 2,1996 MEMORANDUM TO: Carl J. Paperiello, Director Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards, NRC Richard L. Bangart, Director Office of State Programs, NRC FROM: /JohnW.Lubinski,co-Chair h.s NRC-Agreement State Working Group to

' l\\" Evaluate Control and Accountability of Licensed Devices

./ Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards, NRC i I ;lG

\

4tobert Free, co-Chair

! l[< '

NRC-Agreement State Working Group to Evaluate Control and Accountability of Licensed Devices Texas Department of Health

SUBJECT:

FINAL WORKING GROUP RECOMMENDATIONS AND REPORT On June 20, 1995, the Comission approved a staff plan to form a working group (WG) to evaluate current regulations concerning general- and specific-licensed devices. The task of the WG was to assess the current regulatory programs for general- and specific-licensed devices and determine the baseline for regulating these devices.

The WG has completed its task and developed a report (copy attached) that includes its recommendations. The WG attempted to achieve consensus among all members to develop its recommendations and report. In cases where full agreement could not be reached, the WG relied on the consensus of the majority of its members.

The WG would like to note that it held public meetings, a public workshop, participated in an NRC/ Agreement State Technical Workshop, and presented for comment preliminary recommendations during the Conference of Radiation Control Program Directors' annual meeting. All meetings of the WG were open to the public and announced on the NRC Public Meeting Notice System. The meetings were designed to encourage open communications between the WG and stakeholders and to allow for interested parties to express their opinions. The WG expects that its report will be made available to the public as a NUREG document.

The co-Chairs would like to thank the members of the WG for their dedication and contributions. Special thanks to Jim Yusko for his contributions of incident data collected and for his dedication to providing his resources to the WG. Thanks also to Martha Dibblee for her contributions of time, energy, and creativity while meeting the demands of her routine duties and to Joel Lubenau for his contributions and creative effort in establishing the WG and developing its focus.

pull

I I C. Paperiello July 2,1996 R. Bangart The co-Chairs a~1so wish to express appreciation to the participants in the WG meetings and the public workshop. They were instrumental in the davelopment of the WG recommendations.

If you would like to discuss the report or the WG activities, please contact either John Lubinski at 415-7868 or Robert Free at (512) 834-6688.

Attachment:

As stated cc(w/attschment):

Rita Ald-ich, WG Lloyd Belling, WG Martha Dibblee, WG Robin Haden, WG Joel Lubenau, WG John Telford, WG James Yusko, WG Liaison

o j .

E.

l e NRC-Agreement State >

Working Group to Evaluate Control and Accouritability of Licensed Devices July 2,1996 P

i ..

NRC-Agreement State Working Group to Evaluate Control and Accountability of Licensed Devices CONTENTS 1.0 EXECUTIVE

SUMMARY

, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I 2.0 THE PROBLEM PRESENTED TO THE WORKING .............. GROUP 2 3.0 APPROACH AND EVALUATION PROCESS FOLLOWED 5 BY 3.1 Charter . . . .

3.2 Working Group Meetings. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 3.2.1 October 24-25, 1995 First Meeting ..... 6 3.2.2 December 19-21, 1995, Second Meeting ........... 7 3.2.3 January 18-19, 1996, Public Workshop .......... 7 3.2.4 March 5-6, 1996, NRC/AS Technical Workshop .......... 8

> 3.2.5 March 7, 1996, Third Meeting ........ ....... 9

. . . . 10 3.2.6 April 16-17,1996 Fourth Meeting . . . . . . . . . . 10 3.2.7 May 6-8,-1996, CRCPD Annual Meetin 3.2.8 May 9-10, 1996, Fifth Meeting . . g . . . . . . . . . . 10 3.3 Identification of Stakeholders .......... . . . . . . . . . . . . Il

. . . . . 11 3.4 Importance of the General Licensing Program . . . . . . . . . 12 3.5 Evaluation of Stakeholders' Recommendations for Improvements . 13 4.0 WORKING GROUPOversight 4.1 Increased Regtlatory RECOMMENDATIONS . . . . . . . 15. . . . . . . . .

4.2 Penalties for Lost Devices ................16

.4.3 Disposition of Orphaned.......... Devices...................20

. . . . 20 4.4 Recommendations for State Regulatory Programs . . . . .. . 22 4.5 Recommendations for Non-Licensed Stakeholders . . . . 22. . ..

5.0 ISSUES 5.1 NRC and AND CONCERNS AS Compatibility ......

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23. . . .

23 5.2 Cost and Fee Considerations . . . . . .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 24 5.3 Radiation Exposure Savin 5.4 Device Design . . . . . gs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25

....................26 5.5 Changes That Affect All Devices Versus Only Newly Acquired Devices 5.6 Device Disposal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

27

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 5.7 Device Identificatior. . . . . . . ..............29 5.8 Devices Requiring Increased Oversight . . . . . ........

30 5,9 General-Licensed versus Specific-Licensed Devices . . . . . . . 31 a.10 Identification of Current Users and Devices .........32 5.11 Imposing Restrictions on Portable Devices and Storage of Devices

..............................32 Appendix A: PROTECTION OF PROPERTY

,..................34 Appendix B:

WORKING GROUP CUARTER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .37.

Appendix C: JOHN DUKES' JANUARY 20, 1996, PROPOSAL

...........40 i

l Appendix D: TABLE OF ISOTOPES TYPICALLY USED IN DEVICES . . . . . . . . . 44 Appendix E: CRCPD SURVEY .......................45 Appendix F: OVERSIGHT PROGRAM COSTS AND EXPECTED BENEFITS . . . . . . . 51 Appendix G: ESTIMATED COSTS OF DISPOSAL OF A SOURCE . . . . . . . . . . . 56 Appendix H: TEXAS RADIOGRAPH't INCIDENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57 ii

p 1.0 EXECUTIVE

SUMMARY

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission staff acknowledged that licensees are having problems maintaining control over.and accountability for devices contafhing radioactive material. In June 1995, the Commission approved the staff's suggestion to form a joint NRC-Agreement State Working Group (WG) to evaluate the problem and propose solutions. The staff indicated that the formation of the WG was necessary to address the concerns from a national perspective, allow for a broad level of Agreement State (,^.S) input, and to reflect their experience. AS perticipation in the process is essential since some AS already have implemented effective programs for oversight of device users.

To obtain information tnat would allow the WG to address the problem adequately, the WG held public meetings, workshops, and made formal and informal presentations to professional and public groups. Participants in the meetings and workshops included AS, vendors, specific- and general-licensed device users, metal manufacturers and recyclers, insurance companies, the U.S.

Department of Energy (DOE), the U,S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA),

waste compact representatives, and members of the public.

The WG determined that the problem it was addressing has four parts:

1) inadequate regulatory oversight; 2 inadequate control over and accountability for devices by users;)3) improper disposal of devices; and 4) problems associated with " orphaned devices.* Orphaned devices are those 3

devices that make it into the public domain and are discovered by someone other than the rightful owner, usually a non-licensee.

The WG proposes five reccmmendations to increase regulatory oversight, increase control and accountability of devices, ensure oroper disposal, and ensure disposal of orphaned devices.

Specifically, the WG recommends that: 1)

NRC and AS increase regulatory oversight for users of certain devices; 2) HRC and AS impose penalties on persons losing devices; 3) NRC and AS ensure proper disposal of orphaned devices; 4) NRC encourage States to implement similar oversight programs for users of Naturally-Occurring or Accelerator-Produced Material (NARM); and, 5) NRC encourage non-licensed.stakeholders to take appropriate-actions, such as instituting programs for material identification.

The WG evaluated the costs of its recommendations against both the costs of radiation exposures, based on $2,000 per person-rem,2 and property damage2 associated with the loss of control over and accountability for devices. The WG determined the expected that the costs to implement its recommendations does not exceed benefits.

1 Based on Regulatory Analysis Guidelines of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory

-Commission, NUREG/BR-0058, Revisicn 2.

2

, property.

Appendix A includes the WG's justification for including protection of I

2.0 THE PROBLEM PRESENTED TO THE WORKING GROUP The WG examined the information provideu by NRC and determined that the problem facing the WG was a lack of licensee oversight by the regulators.

ReguTators have not had an active role in ensur'.ng that licensees maintain control over and accountability for devices, and in ensuring that licensees possess, use, and transfer devices in accordance with the regulations. The WG determined that the problem needed to be separato. into four parts:

i

1. Inadequate Regulatory Oversight -- Regulators do not routinely inspect or have contact with general licensees and users of certain specific-licensed devictc.

2. Inadequate Control Over anu 'ccountability For Devices by Users -- Both general and specific licensees have demonstrated loss of control over and accountability for devices. The WG believes that there are losses of devices that are not reported.

3. Improper Disposal of Devices -- Even licensees who maintain control over and accountability for devices may not be aware of the requirements for proper disposal or may have only limited options for disposal. In addition, the high cost of disposal may discourage licensees from acting responsibly.

4. Orphaned Devices -a Orphaned devices will continue to present problems.

No program for ensuring proper control over and accountability for devices would be 100 percent effective. The WG believes that some devices already are lost and will become orphaned, in its May 31, 1995, memorandum, the NRC staff indicated that the following seven issues should be addressed by the WG:

1. NRC and AS Compatibility -- NRC and AS regulations need to be compatible since approximately two-thirds of the devices are used by AS licensees.

2. Cost and Fee Conside ations -- There are various epi 1ons for licensing devices that would provide better control and accountability. The cost of implementation to NRC and AS and the appropriate cost recovery method need to be considered.

3. Radiation Exposure Savings -- The savings in radiation exposures resulting from better control over and accountability for devices need to be considered in the selection of the nethod for licensing of devices.

4. Device Design -- Currently, the design requirements for general-licensed devices are more stringent than those for specific-licensed devices.

The safety impact of using a different licensing method, which may rely on administrative controls rather than the design of the devices, must be evaluated.

2

[ -

5.

Changes That Affect All Devices Versus Only Newly Acquired Devices --

/ Since there are cerrently about 1.5 million general-licensed devices in NRC and AS, changes in the licensing of devices need to address both new requirements acquired devices. for devices currently possessed by licensees and newly 6.

Device Disposal -- Options for the disposal of devices need to be delineated.

devices rather than be subjected to increased regulation.Many curren 7.

Device Identification -- Added requirements to ensure that device labels could better withstand harsh, unexpected environments may enhance the ability to identify devices that are disposed of or improperly transferred.

The WG agreed with the NRC staff that these seven issues were important. The WG identified four additional issues:

1.

Devices Requiring-Increased Oversight -- Nany of the de members of the public.

concern to the WG.

Therefore, only a portion of devices were of 2.

devices to possession and use under a specific license does no necessarily resolve the problem.

3.

Identification of Current Users and Devices -- Since regulators do not have a complete listing of all users and devices, it is important to address how to identify all current users and devices.

4.

Imposing Restrictions on Portable Devices and Storage of Devices --

Portable devices frequently are har.dled and moved and are very susceptible to loss of control and accountability.

storage frequently are subject to loss of control and accountability. Devices in l The WG also discussed regulating-sources rather than devices. In looking at current practices, the WG determined that persons licensed to h two' year frequency. This type of licensee perfoms frequent

-accountability for theirinventories sources. and has a goo,d record of control over and=that hand not appear necessary. Additional oversight of these users does There are similar accountability problems associated with loss of control over and for NARM.

domain are NARM. Many of the radioactive sources found in the public NRC does not have the authority to regulate NARM.The WG did not examine regu indicated that there are problems associated with contaminated metalsMany stakeholde unauthorized import of devices, and contaminated baghouse dust as a re,sult of smelting a device.

These present similar obstacles to the stakeholders, but 3

the WG with associated didthese not situations. address these issues since there are differ e

i 4

approximately 1000 hours0.0116 days <br />0.278 hours <br />0.00165 weeks <br />3.805e-4 months <br /> annually to manage 1,000 selected licensees. Annual costs include mail and on-site inspections and collection of fees.

Texas already had established a program to improve control over certain general.-licensed devices. The program is intended to improve licensee control over devices and enforcement for users that violate regulatory requirements.

Those that are added to a specific license are still identified separately.

Users pay fees and submit self inspection reports for agency review. They corrently are required to maintain transfer and receipt records and complete an inventory worksheet annually. The program was evolving when the WG was formed, it is anticipated that the program will include devices covered by the WG recommendations. A great deal of time was spent in contacting general licensees and developing a database of vendors and users.

The WG attempted to achieve consensus among all members to develop its recommendations and rcport. In cases where full agreement could not be reached, the WG relied on the consensus of the majority of its members.

3.1 Charter The first task of the WG was to develop a charter that detailed the mission of the WG.

The charter was reviewed and approved by the WG at its first meeting.

A copy of the charter is included in Appendix B. The charter clearly defines the problem facing the WG and includes the seven issues and concerns identified by the NRC staff in its May 31, 1995, memorandum to the Commission.

Once the WG started to perform a detailed chemination of the problem, it quickly determined that in addition to the seven issues and concerns identified in its charter, it also needed to address the four items listed below:

Devices Requiring Increased Oversight General-Licensed versus Specific-Licensed Devices Identification of Current Users and Devices Imposing Restrictions on Portable Devices and Storage of Devices in performing its analysis and evaluation, the WG concentrated on identifying effectiveness indicators for regulatory options, agreeing on goals, and obtaining input from interested parties, to develop regulatory options.

Consensus among WG members was seen as the most significant indicator when addressing specific issues.

3.2 Working Group Meetings To achieve its goals, the WG held public meetings, a public workshop, participated in an NRC and AS Technical Workshop, and presented for comment preliminary recommendations durinC the CRCPD annual meeting. A summary of each meeting is listed below. All meetings of the WG were open to the public and announced on the NRC Public Meeting Notice System. The meetings were designed to encourage open communications between the WG and stakeholders and to allow for interested parties to express their opinions.

6

approximately 1000 hours0.0116 days <br />0.278 hours <br />0.00165 weeks <br />3.805e-4 months <br /> annually to manage 1,000 selected licensees. Annual costs include mail and on-site inspections and collection of fees.

Texas already had established a program to improve control over certain general.-licensed devices. The program is intended to improve licensee control over devices and enforcement for users that violate regulatory requirements.

Those that are added to a specific license are still identified separately.

Users pay fees and submit self inspection reports for agency review. They currently are required to maintain transfer and receipt records and complete an inventory worksheet annually. The program was evolving when the WG was formed. it is anticipated that the program will include devices covered by the WG recomendations. A great deal of time was spent in contacting general licensees and developing a database of vendors and users.

The WG attempted to achieve consensus among all members to develop its recomendations and report. In cases where full agreement could not be reached, the WG relied on the consensus of the majority of its members.

3.1 Charter The first task of the WG was to develop a charter that detailed the mission of the WG. The charter was reviewed and approved by the WG tt its first meeting.

A copy of the charter is included in Appendix B. The r.harter clearly defines the problem facing the WG and includes the seven issues and concerns identified by the NRC staff in its May 31, 1995, memorandum to the Commission.

Once the WG started to perform a detailed examination of the problem, it quickly determined that in addition to the seven issues and concerns identified in its charter, it also needed to address the four items listed below:

Devices Requiring Increased Oversight General-Licensed versus Specific-Licensed Devices Identification of Current Users and Devices Imposing Restrictions on Portable Devicet and Storage of Devices ,

In performing its analysis and evaluation, the WG concentrated on identifying effectiveness indicators for regulatory options, agreeing on goals, and obtaining input from interested parties, to develop regulatory options.

Consensus among WG members was seen as the most significant indicator when addressing specific issues.

3.2 Working Group Meetings To achieve its goals, the WG held public meetings, a public workshop, participated in an NRC and AS Technical Workshop, and presented for comment preliminary recommendations during the CRCPD annual meeting. A sumary of each meeting is listed below. All meetings of the WG were open to the public and announced on the NRC Public Meeting Notice System. The meetings were designed to encourage open comunications between the WG and stakeholders and to allow for interested parties to express their opinions.

6

3.2.1 Octcher 24-25, 1995, first Meeting The WG held its initial public meeting October 24-25, 1995, at the Doubletree Hotel, Rockville, Maryland. The first part of the meeting focused on devel5 ping background infonnation for the WG. The second portion of the meeting centered on further defining the problem (inadequate inventory control and improper disposal of licensed devices), regulatory options, agreeing on goals (minimize the negative indicators, maximize the positive indicators),

and how to develop regulatory options. Agenda planning for the next WG meeting and organization of the public workshop scheduled for January 1996 als, was covered.

The 7 heard introductory remarks from Carl Paperiello, Ph.D., Direc. tor, NMSS.

Dr. P,ariello challenged the group to determine how regulatory agencies could control the entry of radioactive devices into scrap streams while minimizing demands on government resources. Presentations from the Steel Manufacturers Association (SMA) described the steel industry's participation in the discovery of these devices in scrap streams and the costs in millions of dollars to a group that should be considered fiinocent bystanders.

An overview of the current experience with radioactive materials in recycled metals was provided by James Yusko.

The overall approach taken by the co-Chairs was to reach out to as many stakeholders as possible and to maximize the opportunity for exchange of views and concerns between the stakeholders (including the regulators). Ample opportunity was provided in the conduct of the meeting and this was favorably commented upon, particularly by the vendor representatives. Vendor representatives offered to provide additional statistical info mation to define the population of radioactive devices. The SMA submitted written recommendations for regulatory action at the meeting. SMA representatives urged swift regulatory action by NRC to address the problem.

To assist the WG effort to identify other regulatory options for consideration, the attendees were invited and agreed to submit their suggestions no later than December 1,1995. Other stakeholder groups were identified and well represented at the public workshop.

3.2.2 December 19-21, 1995, Second Meeting The second public meeting was held on December 19-21, 1995, at the Doubletree Hotel, Rockville, Maryland. Prior to this meeting, a questionnaire was developed and mailed to AS to determine their views of the problem.

The first day's activities included finalizing the minutes of the first meeting. The WG then reviewed some recent events involving radioactive devices, and reviewed NRC's databases for licensing, inspection, enforcement, and events related to radioactive devices. Recent trends in NRC's budget also were discussed.

The second day of the meeting covered the review of the regulatory exemption criteria and a risk assessment study. Oregon's recent experience in 7

implementing an expanded regulatory oversight program for general licensees was discussed. The remainder of the meeting covered the planning of the public workshop scheduled for January 18-19, 1996. This discussion extended into the morning of December 21, 1995, and included review of "strawmen" submitted by stakeholders and development of a conceptual outline for the workshop agenda.

As in the first meeting, the overall approach taken by the co-Chairs was to maximize opportunity for stakeholders to participate in the meeting.

3.2.3 January 18-19, 1996, Public Workshop The Public Workshop was held as scheduled at NRC Headquarters, Rockville, Maryland, with opening remarks by Chairman Shirley Jackson, NRC. There were 16 panelists and 35 others in attendance. There also were several State programs listening in on a bridge line. The panelists represented a variety of interests including State and Federal regulatory agencies, manufacturers and distributors of radioactive devices, steel manufacture,s, and professionals from health physics and industrial hygiene, as well as a union representative.

There were a number of descriptions of the problems associated with radioactive devices reaching the public sector. Costs incurred by tne steel manufacturing and metal scrap processing industries were discussed and suggestions for improving control of these devices were made.

The discussions centered primarily on identifying the problems. There appeared to be broad agreement that the problems with the loss of devices revolved around accountability and improper disposal. Additional concerns were expressed about orphaned devices encountered in the metal recycling process and how to fund their disposal. For certain devices constituting greater than Class C waste, DOE may be able to provide assistance. For other devices, no standard approach or formal assistance is available.

A proposal was presented by a panelist that addressed the problems. The proposal included six items for consideration (see Appendix C). They were:

1. All licensees maintain current records of inventory (i.e., a continual inventory),

2. All licensees perform semi-annual inventories to verify the running inventory,

3. Regulatory agencies must identify the radioisotopes and quantities of concern for the problem under discussion,

4. All licensees report annually to their regulatory authority, those isotopes of concern. This would be signed by and name the radiologically responsible person in the organization and a back-up person, 8

5.

This and should be a Division-1 item of compatibility to achieve uniformity, 6.

Regulators should maintain a database of the reported inventories.

- Regulatory agencies should enforce the rules.

This proposal was widely accepted by the panelists and the audience participants, as it appeared to contain elements for addressing anti solving the problems associated with loss of control and accountability. It became the focus of the discussion for the first day.

It also became the center point for the WG in future meetings and discussions because of its wide acceptance at the public workshop.

The workshop was summarized at the end of the second day with the commitment of the WG to follow up on the proposal discussed at the meeting and to address technological solutions to melting sources, review detection ca scrap and metal manufacturers, and continue to explore solutions for orphaned devices.

solutions be submitted to the WG 31, by1996. JanuaryThe WG also asked that any 3.2.4 March 5-6, 1996, NRC/AS Technical Workshop This mieting was set up to get technical input for the WG to consider. It was conductedWA.

Vancouver, as part of the Organization of Agreement States' meeting in session for the first day, March 5, 1996.The meeting was a technical session and th The second day, March 6, was a plenary and the WG'ssession and future Robert Free presented an overview of the breakout session plans.

Many of the participants in the first day session were AS personnel who had not attended the previous WG meetings.

overview of the WG's previous meetings and a description of the problem ofT accountability, improper disposal, and orphaned devices. A background paper previously prepared for the public workshop was provided to the participants.

Becausewere workshop of its wide acceptance, presented and discussed. the proposed solutions presented at the public license registration program was presented and generated a lot of discusA prese because of cost and concerns about the implementation of such a program.sion A discussion of the need to prioritize the devices into those that were of more concern for health, safety, and disposal consideratiotis resulted in development of a table that has been used to develop the WG recomendations for devices of concern (see Appendix D).

The WG participants continued discussion of issues after the AS meeting ended and turned to issues of registration of devices, compatibility, and orphaned devices.

9

3.2.5 March 7, 1996, Third Meeting The WG held its third m6ating in Vancouver, WA, following the NRC/AS Technical Workshop. This would encourage persons attending the workshop also to attend the WG meeting. Holding the meeting in Vancouver facilitated the inclusion of stakeholders located on the west coast.

Once the meeting was called to order, Joel Lubenau announced that he would be l leaving the WG and that John Lubinski would succeed him as co-Chair. The meeting agenda included: ensuring all avenues for information gathering had been explored; ensuring that the WG was in a position to address all issues identified in the charter; reviewing information for possible WG recommendations; and, developing a workplan for finalizing the recommendations and writing a final report.

A waste compact representative, David Stewart-Smith, Northwest Compact, was invited to attend the WG meeting. Mr. Stewart-Smith discussed the options available for device disposal and indicated that the Northwest Compact might-be willing to provide astistance for emergency situations. The details, including the legal and financial ramifications, had to be clarified. No solutions were identified, but the WG was encouraged by the fact that a compact may be willing provide assistance.

To enhance communications among the WG, it was decided that the WG would '

participate in weekly conference calls. These calls were in addition to the public meetings.

3.2.6 April 16-17, 1996, Fourth Meeting The fourth WG meeting was held at the Doubletree Hotel, Rockville, Mr.ryland.

The purpose of the meeting was to discuss the draft of the WG's recommendations and rationale for its evaluation of the issues and concerns.

The WG concentrated on the-recommendations, including rationale end the compatibility issues associated with each recommendation. The WG had supported a Division-1 item of compatibility but, after two days of discussion, it appeared that the WG had changed direction on the issue and now believed that regulation of devices should be a Division-2 item of ,

compatibility for AS. The WG concentrated on recommendation:: necessary to ensure adequate control and accountability of devices.

During the conference calls following the meeting, the WG reached a consensus and concluded that its recommendations should be a Division-2 item of compatibility for AS. The WG reached consensus on most of the critical elements of its recommendations and solidified its list of devices that it believed should be subject to increased eversight.

3.2.7 May 6-8, 1996, CRCPD Annual Meeting As a result of information gathered during the NRC/AS Technical Workshop, and the fact that the WG decided to recommend that AS implement the recommendations as a Division-2 item of compatibility, the WG decided to present its preliminary recommendations at the CRCPD Annual Meeting. The WG 10

/

s co-Chairs May presented the recomendations in the form of a poster session on 6-8, 1996.

the co-Chairs. This allowed interested parties to converse one-on-one with impromptu meeting on May 7, 1996.In addition to the poster session, the co-Chairs als descNbed the activities and preliminary recommendations of the WG andDurin provided time for an open discussion.

The WG voting co-Chairs also presented a survey to the CRCPD participants and members. its May 31, 1996. The co-Chairs asked that written responses be p ovided by recomendations.The majority of the responses supported the WG's preliminary A sumary of the responses is included in Appendix E.

3.2.8 May 9-10, 1996 Fifth Meeting The fifth WG Albuquerque, NM meeting was held at the Albuquerque Hilton and Fairfield Inn, would encourage, following the CRCPD Annual Meeting. The WG believed this persons participating in the CRCPD Annual Meeting, including persons meeting. from bota AS and non-AS radiation control programs, to attend the WG The purpose of the meeting was to finalize the details of the WG recomendations and discuss the structure of the final report.

that the additional details could be finalized during the weekly conferenceThe WG agree calls.

3.3 Identification of Stakeholders Early in the project, the WG identified persons affected by the loss of control over and accountability for devices.

identified as stakeholders: The following persons were AS - The AS are obvious stakeholders as evidenced by their inclusion on the WG.

material and regulate NARM.AS regulate both the distribution and use of devices conta They will be affected by the WG recommendations since any of compatibility. regulatory changes implemented by NRC could ultimately be a matter increased control over and accountability forTheir devices.Some experience is AS have been acti reflected in the WG recommendations.

maintaining control and accountability of devices during pos Any implement changes implemented additional by NRC and AS would require specific-licensed users to regulatory requirements.

General-Licensed Users - General-licensed users also are responsible for maintaining control and accountability of devices during po Any WG impact significant recomendation on general to increase accountability requirements would have a licensees.

Vendors - Vendors have a significant stake in the WG activities. If increased their customers, both general and specific licensees, are subject to 11

l regulation, it would have a direct effect on their sales and servicing business. Vendors also would be affected by recommended changes to device design and distribution procedures. Vendors also are affected by the uniformity of regulations since most vendors distril Jte devices across reguTatory jurisdictions. Non-uniform regulation of devices presents high administrative costs to vendors.

Metal Recyclers - The WG recommendations will have a large impact on recyclers. Metal recyclers are likely recipients of lost devices. They may unknowingly receive a device as part of a load of scrap metal. Once they take possession of the device, they may be subject to radiation exposures and costs of disposal. Metal recyclers will continue to be affected negatively by loss of control over and accountability for devices if regulatory changes are not implemented.

Metal Manufacturers - Metal manufacturers are using more recycled materials.

It is possible for manufacturers to receive unknowingly a device from a recycler. If the device is smelted by the manufacturer, the manufacturer will incur high costs associated with decontamination, disposal, facility down-time, and loss of business.

Insurance Companies - The W5 invited insurance companies to meetings since some insurance companies may provide policies for persons who receive radioactive devices unknowingly. No representatives from the insurance industry attended the meetings.

DOE and EPA - Both DOE and EPA have responsibilities fc- devices found in the public domain. Decreasing the occurrences of loss of devices will have an affect on their responsibilities.

Waste Disposal Sites - Waste disposal sites may be able to provide assistance for disposal of orphaned devices. A representative from a waste compact attended a WG meeting.

General Public - All meetings were announced on the NRC Public Meeting Notice System to allow for public participation. Representatives from labor unions and professional societies attended the meetings.

International Organizations - Other countries experience similar problems with loss of control over and accountability for devices. The WG informed regulatory agencies in other countries and professional organizations that represent stakeholders of its activities.

3.4 Importance of the General Licensing Program Many persons commented, either during the WG meetings or at other times to WG members, that they believe the problem of control over and accountability for devices is most prevalent to general-licensed devices. To ensure control over and accountability for devices, they felt the general-licensing program should be abolished.

12 I

4 While it is true that some general licensees have lost control over and accountability for devices, abolishing the general-licensing program would not usure total control and accountability (see Section 5.9). The WG believes it is imgortant to note the general-licensing program has provided, and continues to provide, a benefit to both licensees and regulators.

The general-licensing program saves resources for both licensees and regulators. Since the users are not required to apply for a license, no effort is expended completing and filing a license application. A regulater does not have to expend resources to evaluate the application and issue a specific license. The general license allows the users to take possession and use the devices without having to wait for the licensing process to be completed. This saves the users of the devices from having costly down-time.

General licensees also save resources by not having to implement the requirements of 10 CFR Parts 19, 20, and 21. These requirements are not necessary based on the engineered safe design of the devices, it is estimated that there are almost six times as many general licensees as specific licensees in the United States. Even though it is not appropriate to estimate that NRC and AS resources would need to increase by six times their current amount to regulate general licenstes as specific licensees, it would be a significant increase in resources.

The WG believes that simply abolishing the general-licensing program would cause significant increases to regulatory budgets and impose significant costs, both direct and indirect, on licensees and would provide only a small benefit to public health and safety.

3.5 Evaluation of Stakeholders' Recommendations for Improvements During its public meetings and-workshop, the WG suggested that-stakeholders provide their proposed solutions. The WG received more than 20 responses that outlined several different proposals. One of the proposals, submitted by John Dukes, ABB Industrial Systems, Inc., received relatively wide acceptance. Mr.

Dukes presented this proposal riuring the public workshop. The proposal was formally submitted on January to,1996. A copy of Mr. Dukes' proposal is included in Appendix C.

Mr. Dukes' proposal identified the need for a national inventory of all devices, whether general- or specific-licensed. It required, in part, users of devices to perform semi-annual inventories and report their inventories annually, including transfers of products during the reporting period, to the regulators. For the proposal to be effective, Mr. Dukes indicated that regulation of the devices must be uniform (i.e., a Division-1 item of compatibility for AS) and the national inventory must be maintained as a centralized database.

Mr. Dukes' proposal also introduced the philosophy of " devices of regulatory concern." In talking through his proposal during the third WG meeting, Mr. Dukes indicated that NRC needed to identify v.Mch devices, based on the risk associated with the devices, are of regulatory concern and ensure, at a minimum, that tnese devices are included in the national inventory program.

13

He indicated that identification of such a category of devices would allow for the regulatory authorities to determine the level of effort needed to follow up on reports of loss or theft of the devices. Mr. Dukes indicated that the goal of the program should be to have all devices included in the program.

Many of the proposals submitted by stakeholders supported Mr. Dukes' proposal with only minor modifications. Most agreed that the program only would be effective if it were implemented as a Division-1 item of compatibility for AS.

The WG decided to use the proposal as its basis for providing recommendations to the Commission.

A modification of Mr. Dukes' proposal that included certain recommendations discussed during the third WG meeting, was drafted for alscussion during the fourth WG meeting. After lengthy discussion, the WG determined that it would be impractical to have the regulation of devices as a Division-1 item of compatibility for AS. The WG had to determine ninimum aspects of the draft proposal that were necessary to ensure adequate control over and accountability for devices. Once this was established, it constitutes the criteria for a Division-2 item of compatibility. Many of the stakeholders disagreed with the WG and strongly believed implementation should be a Division-1 item of compatibility. Further discussion on the compatibility issue is included in Section 5.1.

14

4.0 WORKING GROUP RECOMMENDATIONS Agreepent States and CRCPD meetings, the WG conside input1.provided Table and identified the problems and strawman solutions listed in I

Table 1 - Overview of Problems and Solutions

___ Problems Strawman Solutions Inadequate Regulatory

• Oversight Increase contact between users and regulators (e.g., user reports of inventories, provide annual Identify early warning signsregulators verify).

i.e.,

regulators track transfers of(devices).

Inadequate Control and -

Accountability of Devices Require devices to have labels or tags that contain certain information and maintain durability.

Require users to perform six month inventories.

Require users to maintain current inventory records.

Require users to assign Responsible Individual and backup.

Improper Disposal of -

Devices Require users to demonstrate evidence of proper disposal or face significant penalty. Include an initial grace period for enforcement.

Require vendors to provide disposal information prior to initial transfer of the device.

Orphaned Devices -

Define responsibilities for DOE and EPA acceptance of orphaned devices.

Ensure that all orphaned devices are disposed of properly.

Recommend training to non-licensed stakeholders economic conse(e.g., health and safety risk, quences, how to identify devices, who to contact if a device is located).

Require devices to have permanent labelitig that indicates that the device contains radioactive material.

• The WG evaluated the problems and strawman solutions and developed the following problems. recommendations that it believes will adequately address the 15

W 4.1 increased Regulatory Oversight The WG recommends that both NRC and the AS implement programs for increased regulatory oversight of general and specific licensees who possess and use certarn devices.

To implement these programs, NRC should promulgate the recommended requirements as regulations and the AS should adopt these requirements as Division-2 items of compatibility. This action is necessary to ensure that the users maintain adequate control over and accountability for the devices and comply with recomended requirements.

The accountability and WG believes for there are a number of reasons that licensees lose control over devices. These include the loss of licensee personnel who had knowledge of the devices or applicable regulations, the loss of or illegible warning labels, and the fact that the licensee loses an awareness that radioactive material is present. The WG agrees that a major contributing factor to licensees oversight by regulatorylosing control and accountability is the lack of adequate authorities. Specifically, many users do not have routine contact with the regulatory authorities. In many cases, specific licensees obtain prior approval for use of the devices and then ma contact with the regulatory authority-until an inspection occurs, ywhich not have may be up to five years later. In some cases, the contact may not come until renewal of their license. For almost all general licensees, the only connection between the licensee and the regulatory authority is through the vendor of the device. For possession and use of devices, general licensees are not required to obtain prior approval from the regulators and they are rarely inspected.

Due to the large population of devices, both specific- and general-licensed, and the low risk associated with the design of many of the devices, the WG believes that the increased oversight program should only be implemented for users of certain devices. Specifically, the WG believes the increased oversight program should only be implemented for licensees using devices containing at least 370 MBq (10 mci) of cesium-137, 3.7 MBq (0.1 mci) of strontium-90, 37 MBq (1 mC1) of cobalt-60, or 37 MBq (1 mci) of any transuranic. Section 5.8 of this document provides the detail, including the WG's justification, for including only these devices as part of the increased oversight program.

The WG considers this program to be a minimum set of standards that needs to be implemented to provide an adequate level of protection of health and safety, property, and environment. There are three distinct parties that will be affected by the requirements of the oversight program: users of the devices; and AS.

vendors of the devices; and the regulatory authorities, that is, NRC For users of the devices, the WG reviewed the current NRC regulations for both general- and specific-licensed devices. Many of the requirements currently in place, either through the regulations or through license conditions are appropriate.

However, in some cases, additional requirements are necessary.

The WG recommends that users of the identified devices be required to meet the following:

16

Responsible Individual (BRI). Licensees must assign a Responsible Indiv that has the authority and responsibility for complying with theThe R1 and regulations and license conditions for possession and use of the

- devices.

This will provide assurance that at least one individual regulatory requirements. employed by the licensee has current knowledge of th device at intervals not to exceed six months. Licensees must perfo The physical inventories must confirm the physical location of each device within the facility and whether the device is in use or in storage. The ph assures the licensee can still account for the device, ysical inventory in addition, the visible and legible and that the label includes the model nu material, and the name of deviceif vendor. serial number of the device, th the labeling remains working around the device. visible and legible, it can provide important informa inventories and inspections. Licensees must maintain re:ords of the Licensees must keep current inventory reccrds, including the physical location of each device within the facility, whether the device is in use or in storage, the model number and serial number of each device, the isotope and quantity of the radioactive material included in each device, the name of device vendor, the name, title and telephone numbers of the RI and BRI for each device, the name, of the individual performing the inventory, the date of the inventory, and a list of any devices received, transferred, or disposed since the previous inventory .

Licensees must compare the results of each inventory with the previous inventory and reconcile any discrepancies.

Any deficiencies with the device labeling found during the inspection must includesbe the corrected requiredtoinformation.

ensure that the labeling is legible and visible and disposals of devices from theirThis facility. Licensees must report chan report of any change must be made to their regulatory authority within 30 days of the event.

The report must show that the recipient is authorized to receive the material.

different regulatory authority, the licensee also must report the transfer to that regulatory authority. The WG determined that many of the problems licensees' with loss of devices occurs when changes take place at the facilities.

regulators. This provides early notification to the listing of their current inventory of devices. Licensees must report a This allows the regulator to verify independently that the licensee has maintained accountability and control of the devices.

17

t Licensees must report to their regulatory agencies immediately following the filing of a voluntary or involuntary petition for bankruptcy.

Specific licensees already are required to file such reports.

The WG. recognized that general-licensed devices are adequately labeled to ensare proper identification and vendors are required to report, quarterly, tr&nsfers of devices to general licensees. The reports should include additional information needed to track the users and devices. Vendors of specific-licensed devices are not required to provide such reports. All vendors should be required to report, and keep records of, transfers of all devices covered by the oversight program. Vendors should report certain information to the users of the devices and ensure devices are adequately labeled to ensure proper identification. The WG recommends that vendors of devices subject to the oversight program be required to do the following:

Vendors must report transfers of each device covered by the oversight program. The transfer reports must be submitted quarterly to the regulatory authority responsible for the reciaient of the devices. The transfer reports must include the name, telepione number, and complete mailing address of the cecipient of the device, the address of use of the device, the model oumber and serial number of the device, the isotope and activitv sf the radioactive material contained in the device, any interrsediate holders of the device, including the function

• of the intermediate holders, the specific reporting period covered by the report, and the name and license number of the reporting company.

Regulators could verify that users maintain control and accountability of devices by comparing this information with the reports provided by users.

Vendors must maintain records of transfer for all devices they have distributed, including final disposition, if known. The records must be maintained for three years after final disposition of the device.

Vendors must provide recipients with disposal information prior to transfer of the device to the recipient. Providing this information allows the potential user to make an informed decision prior to taking possession of the device.

Vendors must ensure that each device is labeled with the device model number and serial number, the isotope and activity of the radioactive material, ,the trefoil symbol, the words

• Caution - Radioactive Material," and the name of the device vendor. The labeling must be durable and capable of withstanding likely conditions associated with handling, storage, and use of the device and must be visible to users of the devices.

If the device is not the source housing (i.e., the smallest separable part of the device that still provides the primary shielding for the source), vendors must ensure the source housing also is labeled with the 3

or similar wording pursuant to 10 CFR 20.1902(e).

18

/

i

• device model number and serial number, the isotope and activity of the radioactive material, the trefoil symbol, the words " Caution -

Radioactive Material,'3 and the name of the device vendor. The labeling

.aust be durable and capable of withstanding likely conditions associated with handling, storage, and use of the device and must be visible to users of the device. Since source housings provide the primary shielding, they typically are removed from the device when servicing is performed and usually transported separately from the rest of the device. Labeling the source housing will ensure that it can be identified as containing radioactive material and can be uniquely tracked by the licensee.

Vendors also must ensure that source housings are permanently marked

-(e.g., engraved or embossed) with the trefoil symbol and the words

" Caution - Radioactive Material,* as practicabb This will increase the likelihood of identifying that the device mains radioactive if it is lost.

ncreased regulatory oversight, requires that there are certain actions both NRC and AS must perform. Therefore AS implement the following measures:, the WG recomends that both NRC and each Verify that all transfers by their users are in accordance with their regulations and license conditions.

Compare the annual inventories reported by their users against previous inventories and against transfer reports from vendors and other users.

This provides an independent verification that licensees have maintained accountability and control of the devices.

Resolve any discrepancies in the information with the assistance of the licensees.

Acknowledge to their licensees that the transfers and inventories have been reviewed.

These four recomendations should be adopted as essential program elements within all radiation control programs. Also, the WG evaluated the need for AS compatibility ef. regulation of devices and concluded that the regulation of the devices should include all of the recomendations listed in this section.

The WG believes that the AS must continue to have flexibility in the methods they use to implement the oversight program. The WG recomends that these requirements for users and vendors be adopted by the AS as a Division-2 item of compatibility. This would ensure that the minimum requirements would be implemented but would allow the AS to be more stringent.

• The WG was asked to provide and consider the costs of any program it recommended.

The WG developed expected cost tables for the oversight program and has included this information in Appendix F. In addition, Appendix F includes an estimate of the benefit that could be expected as a result of NRC and AS implementing increased regulatory oversight.

19

The WG's estimated costs includes the costs for both NRC and AS to implement the oversight program. However, the costs for AS to implement the program were derived by assuming that AS would implement annual registration programs.

In actyality, the WG expects that each AS would implement an oversight program that best fits its own regulatory structure. Since some AS already have implemented registration programs for general licensees that meet our recommendations, the costs estimated for AS are conservative.

The annual operating costs of an increased oversight program, including the costs to licensees and regulators, is estimated to be approximately $5 million (see Table F.1). This cost is offset by an estimated annual benefit, from Table F.2, of approximately $12 to $14 million. If only the property savings to the affected non-licensees is considered, there still is an estimated benefit of approximately $12 million, 4.2 Penalties for 1.ost Devices To make the oversight program described in Section 4.1 effective, NRC must ensure that licensees are discouraged from losing devices. Therefore, the WG recommends that NRC establish a significant penalty for persons who have lost a device, that is, failure to provide written evidence of proper disposal. l l

A review of cnforcement actions for persons improperly disposing of devices .

2 shows that the typical civil penalty is $2,500. This penalty does not provide a sufficient disincentive since proper disposal can cost up to $20,000 (see Appendix G). The WG recommends that NRC establish severe civil penalties for persons who lose control over and accountability for devices. The civil penalty should be sufficient to deter loss. A penalty much higher (2 to 3 times the costs of authorized disposal of the device) should be assessed. The WG believes the severity of the penalty recommended is warranted based on the possible consequences associated with loss of a device.

The baseline information provided by licensees must be complete and accurate.

The WG recommended a severe penalty for persons losing a device; however, the WG believes that NRC should exercise discretion during the first year of implementation of the oversight program. This will encourage licensees to report accurately. In addition, subjecting licensees to harsh penalties without allowing an amnesty period would encourage licensees to provide false information and to dispose of devices in an unauthorized manner.

The WG also encourages each AS to implement severe penalties for loss of a device and a discretionary period for the first year of implementation. If an AS cannot impose a civil penalty, the WG recommends that it impose a penalty that has the same impact and effect as a civil penalty equal to 2 to 3 times the costs of authorized disposal of the device.

4.3 Disposition of Orphaned Devices.

With the implementation of an increased oversight program and increased penalties, regulatory authorities still will be faced with the problem of orphaned devices. Many devices already are lost or cannot be accounted for.

These dev'.ces may find their way into the public domain. NRC must ensure that 20

a program is implemented to properly handle and dispose of all orphaned devices found within its jurisdiction. The program should include even those devices not subject to increased oversight since these devices still would represent a risk to public health and safety.

The WG understands that DOE and EPA currently have some responsibilities for orphaned devices. However, the scope of these responsibilities is unclear.

It appears that DOE will take possession and provide for the ultimate disposal of devices that cannot be traced to a licensee and pose an eminent threat to public health and safety. The responsibilities of EPA are unclear. The WG recommends that NRC work with both DOE and EPA to clearly define the responsibilities of each agency. The responsibilities should be delineated in a memorandum of unde" standing among the agencies.

There may be some category of orphaned devices for which neither DOE nor EPA will take responsibility. If so, the WG recommends that NRC t<tke responsibility for this category of orphaned devices, including funding for the ultimate disposal of the devices. This action will ensure public health and safety, if no agency takes responsibility for the devices, the finders of the devices may eventually be held responsible for the costs of handling and disposal. This would provide a disincentive for the finder to act responsibly. It may encourage the finder to transfer the device to an unknowing party. In doing so, the device may continue to be handled by members of the public, could become damaged causing higher radiation exposure rates from the device, or could find its way into the metal scrap stream.

Devices making it through the scrap metal stream undetected have caused unnecessary exposures and millions of dollars in damage and lost revenue.

The WG understands that it may require changes to legislation for NRC, or DOE or. EPA, to provide funding for handling and ultimate disposal of orphaned devices. However, the WG believes that NRC should be the cognizant agency since NRC is responsible for ensuring public health and safety. As stated, not having a program for handling and disposing of the devices may lead to exposures to the public and high costs to industry. Almost all orphaned devices were at one time possessed by general or specific licensees. One of the reasons for the loss of control and accountability of devices is the lack of oversight of the licensees by NRC. Since NRC is partially responsible for the inadequate control over and accountability for the devices, it must have some responsibility in resolving the problem.

The WG discussed how to fund a program for disposal of orphaned devices. This included talks with waste compacts about managing and supporting a disposal fund. The WG rer.hed two conclusions about funding. First, finders of devices should not be responsible for supporting the disposal of orphaned devices. This could lead to devices remaining in the public domain and possible exposures to members of the public. Second, the mechanisms for supporting the program will be complex and will probably require legislation.

NRC needs to investigate and determine the most effective irethod of collecting and managing a fund for disposal of orphaned devices.

21

l l

l l The WG also encourages each AS to implement a fund to support the handling and disposal of orphaned devices not accepted b" DOE or EPA. Each AS would to determine the most effective method of supt srting disposal.

4.4 Recommendations for State Regulator ograms The WG encourages all State regulatory rograms to implement the recommendations provided in Sections 4.. 4.2, and 4.3 for devices containing NARM. States should use the same criter. used by the WG to determine which devices should be subject to the increased oversight progran. These actions are necessary since many of the devices found each year contain NARM material.

Devices containing NARM have caused exposures to members of the public and also have caused industry to experience high costs for clean up and disposal.

4.5 Recommendations for Non-Licensed Stakeholders Problems associated with lost devices affects many non-licensees.

Specifically, persons finding lost devices face radiation exposures and expenses associated with handling and disposing of devices. The radiation exposures and expenses may be significhnt, especially if the containment integrity of the source is breached. The WG recommends that NRC provide non-licensees who are likely to come in contact with lost devices with information that provides guidance. This would include the health and safety risk, economic consequences, identification of lost devices, and whom to contact if the devices are found.

NRC cannot require this recommendation to be implemented since it suggests non-licensees provide training to their employees. NRC can provide the information to the non-licensees and encourage the non-licensees to provide this information to its employees. This includes notices, posters, or training materiais. The WG believes that added guidance will encourage the finders to act properly, notify the proper authority, and help ensure the device gets ott of the public domain.

22

l 5.0 ISSUES AND CONCERNS Sections 5.1 through 5.7 include the seven issues and concerns raised by the NRC staff in its May 31, 1995, memorandum to the Comission. The WG agreed that rach of these concerns needed to be addressed in detail. However, the WG identified other aspects of the problem that needed to be addressed. These are included in Sections 5.8 through 5.11.

5.1 NRC and AS Compatibility -- NRC and A5 regulations need to be compatible since approximately two-thirds of the devices are used by AS licensees.

The WG considered all possibilities of compatibility for its recommendations.

These included Divisions-1, 2, and 3 items of compatibility. Division-1 means AS must adopt requirennts that are essentially identical to NRC's requirements. Division-2 mearts AS mus,t adopt the same requirements but may be more stringent than NRC. Division-3 means AS do not have to adopt the same requirements.

In cor:% ring a Division-3 item of compatibility, the WG determined that if -

the eS did no? implement these recommended requirements, then the nation-wide program would be ineffective because the devices lost by users in States not having tha nragram could be expected to turn up in the scrap stream of other States.

In considering a Division-2 item of compatibility, the WG determined that since AS would need to adopt the same requirements the nation-wide program would be at least as effective as NRC's program with respect to protection of health and safety, property, and environment. The WG could not identify any negative consequences associated with allowing AS to have more stringent requirements.

The WG determined that a Division-1 item of compatibility also would ensure an effective nation-wide program. However, the WG could not identify any advantages with respect to increasing protection of health and safety and property when comparing a Division-1 with a Division-2 item of compatibility.

The WG identified that a Division-1 item of compatibility would not allow an AS to exercise local control and be more stringent.

The WG racommends a Division-2 item of compatibility for its recommendations.

The WG also would like to note the following recommendations and comments that it received during the open meetings:

The majortty of vendor and user comments received by the WG indicated that regulations covering the peneuion and use of devices should be uniform nation-wide, i.e., a Division-1 item of compatibility. Their reasons centered on ease of doing business nation-wide with a single set of requirements. Vendors believe that if requirements were not uniform nation-wide, they would have to track 30 sets of regulations and it would not be pcssible to have a national inventory, as described in Mr.

Dukes' proposal. If a few AS have more stringent requirements, the cost of using the devices in those AS could be adversely affected.

23

l l

AS were asked to provide input on this issue. Eleven AS provided input.

The majority were not averse to increasing the oversight of certain devices. Some believed the cost-benefit may be difficult to justify and most were opposed to establishing a national inventory and database. Of

'those reporting, one supported a Division-1, nine supported a Division-2, and one supported a Division-3 item of compatibility.

The WG noted that at least six AS had adopted more stringent requirements for these devices including annual registration, annual fees, or restricting their use to a specific license. The WG could not identify any benefits by requiring these AS to change their programs with respect to increasing protection of health and safety, property, and environment.

S.2 Cost and Fee Considerations -- There are various options for licensing devices that would provide better control and accountability. The cost of implementation to NRC and AS and the appropriate cost recovery nethod need to be considered.

The WG addressed funding of the program, estimated costs, and attempted to minimize the overall coet of its recommendations.

The WG considered all of the general- and specific-licensed devices as possible candidates for increase oversight. The WG used a rationale based on health and safety principles to identify the minimum set of these devices to be subject to increased oversight. By focusing the requirements on only certain devices, identified in Table 2, Section 5.8, this has the effect of minimizing the overall cost of a nation-wide program.

The WG estimated the cost of a nation-wide program. Estimated costs include the costs of implementation of regulations by HRC and each AS, start-up cost, annual operating cost, and licensee record keeping and reporting requirements.

Total costs for all parties are approximately $5 million per year. These costs are described in Appendix F, Table F.1.

The WG noted that all AS that have currently implemented increased oversight programs for these type devices have supported such programs with annual user fees. Since NRC is funded by user fees fn recovery, it also could charge an annual fee to device users. The ~wu nas assumed that most AS would charge such a fee and the remaining AS would support their program through other funding. The WG concluded that the nation-wide program could be supported by user fees.

The WG recommends that the annual .ser fees should be based on the number of devices possessed by a licensee. This would encourage users to report promptly transfers of devices and evaluated annually whether to keep the device.

24

5.3 Radiation Exposure Savings -- The savings in radiation exposures resu.' ting from better control over, and accountability for, devices need to be .

considered in the selection of the nethod for licensing of devices.

The WG-identified a limited number of references that contained estimated radiatio'n exposures attributable to lost devices. 1he WG also used

. information on actual exposures based on reported licensee events. From this information, the WG estimated the expected benefit due to exposure savings that would accrue from adoption of the recommendations.

The WG noted that data to provide estimates of exposures were insufficient.

Tha information that is available is based on best estimate calculations using plausible assumptions. Therefore, the WG estimates should not be interpreted as having high precision or accuracy.

The radiation exposures are estimated to range from about 70 mSv to 10.53 Sv (7 to 1053 rem) annually. These estimates are included in Appendix F, Table F.2, and were reported by Pacific Northwest Laboratory (PNL) in

• Peer Review of Improper Transfer / Disposal Scenarios for Generally Licensed Devices," June 1994. The estimates are for devices containing cesium-137 and are based on time and proximity assumptions developed by PNL using data from known incidents. PNL estimated the likely source strength and number of annual events using assumptions about the numbers of devices distributed in NRC States.

The WG considered likely scenarios based on recent incident experiences. In Texas an incident involving stolen radiography devices and the subsequent transfer of the devices between scrap yards highlighted potential consequences of lost devices (see Appendix H). The radioactive devices were sold as scrap and were transferred between several scrap dealers before they were recognized as being radioactive. The lack of detection or identification capability in the scrap yards prevented scrap dealers from taking appropriate safety measures. In this incident total estimated exposures equaled 1.85 person-Sv (185 person-rem).

Another incident in Illinois was discovered when a scrap dealer purchased a radiation detection instrument and found a radioactive source buried on the site. The source was discovered in backfill used to re-grade the site.

Excavation of the area by an incident response team recovered the source. It was determined to be cesium-137 with an activity of approximately 13.7 GBq (370 mci). Exposure rates were calculated to be approximately 1.45 Sv/hr (145 mrem /hr) at 0.91 m (3 ft). There is no way of knowing how long the source had been on the site or whether it may have been exposing workers and other individuals prior to being discovered.

The two incidents described above illustrate the mechanisms and potential harm that could occur to scrap workers and other members of the public. These sources could have caused serious exposure if located near individuals.

There is insufficient information to determine the probability of loss of a device requiring increased regulatory oversight, the probability of an event such as containment shielding breach from such a lost source, and the 25

l probability of either external or internal radiation exposures from this type of event. Information available indicates that for at least a few incidents (e.g., Goiania, Estonia), significant exposures or even fatalities have occurred as a result of loss of a device. Radiation exposures associated with the loss of a device may be significant both in terms of individual dose or population dose. The WG believes that many exposures occurred that were not reported to regulatory authorities. There are too many uncertainties to estimate adequately the total exposures attributable to the loss of a devices.

The WG notes that the estimated economic benefits resulting from protection of property and environment outweigh the benefits of exposure savings. This information is presented in Appendix F.

5.4 Device Design -- Currently, the design requirements for general-licensed devices are more stringent than those for specific-licensed devices. The safety impact of using a different licensing method, which may rely on administrative controls rather than the design of the devices, must be evaluated.

The two main issues discussed by the WG concerning device designs were changes to designs that could increase control over and accountability for the devices and whether certain device designs should no longer be authorized for use under a general license.

Suggestions for changing designs to increase control and accountability centered on identification of devices or sources. Specifically, persons attending the open meetings suggested including dye packets that are released if the device is crushed, mechanisms that would alarm at timed intervals to alert licensees to inventory the device, designing sources so they would survive smeltings of the device, and designing device labeling that would withstand conditions encountered after the device is lost.

The WG believes that most of these suggestions would increase costs for industry but would not provide a commensurate increase in protection of health and safety, property, and environment. Many of the suggestions only provide for identification of a device after loss but do not provide increased control or accountability. The WG believes the only reasonable change to device designs that would improve contrel and accountability, and identification of devices after the loss, is that all devices incorporate labeling that contains sufficient information to identify the device as radioactive, provide a method of identifying the last licensee who possessed the device, and that the labeling is sufficient to withstand conditions associated with loss of the device.

The WG evaluated use of devices under a specific license, rather than a general license. Supporters indicated that this would increase regulators' oversight and licensees' accountability of devices. The WG does nat believe this would result in an increase in safety for the following reasons:

Information reviewed by the WG indicates that simply moving the devices to specific licenses does not provide adequate assurance of control and 26

l accountability. This is supported by the fact that many of the devices found in the public domain can be traced to a specific-licensed user.

- Currently, regulators plan to inspect specific licensees on a 5 year frequency. However, inspections can, and do, extend to 6 or 7 year intervals due to resource constraints. If a number of general-licensed >

devices were moved to use under a specific license, this would increase NRC and AS staff workload without a commensurate increase in staff.

Therefore, this would lead to a decrease in inspection frequencies for specific licensees.

The WG concluded that merginal improvements could be made regarding design cf devices (i.e., label information) but requiring specific licenses, rather than oeneral licenses, would not result in an increase in protection of health and safety, property, and environment.

As instructed, the WG considered the design of general-licensed devices in light of recent changes to 10 CFR Part 20. Specifically, the NRC staff's May 31, 1995, paper discussed whether general licensees should be considered a special class of occupational worker, between occupational workers a'j members of the public, since the dose limit for general-licensed devices is 5 mSv (0.5 rem). Since the Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research, NRC, is currently assessing the design dose criteria in 10 CFR Part 32 for general-licensed devices, the WG did not address this issue.

5.5 Changes That Affect All Devices Versus Only Newly Acquired Devices --

Since there are currently about 1.5 million general-licensed devices in NRC and AS, changes in the licensing of devices need to address both new requirements for devices currently possessed by licensees and newly acquired devices.

The WG focused its recommendations on certain devices as identified in Section 5.8, Table 2, which would amount to approximately 126,000 devices rather than increasing regulatory oversight for the estimated 1.5 million devices used under NRC and AS general licenses. The justification for this limited focus is discussed in Section 5.8.

The WG agrees that it is necessary to address devices both currently possessed and those to be distributed in the future. If only future devices are subject to increased regulatory oversight, the existing 126,000 devices would not be subject to adequate oversight and there would be no effect on the expected number of lost devices. Since the likelihood of a lost device increases the longer the licensee has possessed the device without being subject to inspection, the number of lost devices could not be expected to decrehse. It is necessary to include both under the WG recommendations.

The WG notes that even if all current and future devices are subject to increased oversight, there may be devices that today are not accounted for.

These devices could be expected to show up in the public domain in the future as orphaned devices. Discussion of orphaned devices is provided in Section 5.6. It should be noted that the work to identify current users of 27

devices will costs approximately $2.7 million for NRC and AS. Discussion of the cost is provided in Section 5.1.

5.6 Device Disposai -- Options for the disposal of devices need to be delineated. Many current general licensees may wish to dispose of the devices rather than be subjected to increased regulation.

Many of the stakeholders involved in the WG meetings were concerned uith the cost of disposal options, insolvent and bankrupt users, and orphaned devices.

The responsibility for the ultimate disposition of devices should continue to rest with the users of the devices. Many users may not be aware of all their regulatory responsibilities when they acquire a device. Vendors should provide users with options, including costs, for final disposal of devices, allowing them to make better informed decisions prior to obtaining devices.

The WG debated over whethor it could make any recommendations that affect insolvent or bankrupt users. The only recommendation is for general licensees to report to regulatory agencies immediately following the filing of a voluntary or involuntary petition for bankruptcy.

Proper disposal of orphaned devices was of great concern to the WG and stakeholders. As stated, orphaned devices will continue to exist. This is due to some licensees already having lost devices, licensees not ever knowing of the existence of the devices, or WRC and A$ not being aware of some general licensees which increases the likelihood that a device will be lost. NRC and AS must implement procedures that will ensure that orphaned devices will not present a hazard.

Currently, few options exist when someone finds an orphaned device. If the device meets the criteria established by DOE or EPA, the respective agency will assume responsibility for disposal. A few AS, including Texas and Oregon, may assume responsibility for an orphaned device at no cost to the person finding the device. However, additional options are needed because those currently available don't provide for the disposal of all orphaned devices.

If finders of devices know that they may be held responsible for disposal of the device, then finders may attempt to transfer the device to an unknowing party. In doing so, the device may be handled by members of the public, may become damaged causing radiation exposures, or it may find its way into the metal scrap stream. Devices coming through the metal scrap stream undetected have caused millions of dollars in damage and lost revenue. An example of a device that continued to be passed around once the scrap dealer found out it contained radioactive material was the incider.t that occurred in Texas (see Appendix H).

Although notification procedures (e.g., to State radiation control programs, shippers, and originators of the load) exist for Department of Transportation exemption E10656, not every detection of radioactive material in scrap leads to notification. In cases where scrap recyclers have installed monitors to detect devices, those recyclers will not take possession of the device since

- 28 I

they may become responsible for its disposal. The possessor takes the device back into the public domain and may attempt to sell the load to a facility that does not have monitoring devices.

• The WG believes that all orphaned devices must be properly disposed. NRC must work with DOE and EPA to solicit their help. A memorandum of understanding must be developed disposing among of orphanad NRC, DOE, and EPA to delineate each agency's role in devices.

Based on wnat has historically happened with orphaned devices, there may be some category of orphaned devices that will not be disposed of by either DOE or EPA. NRC and AS each should accept the responsibility for disposal of all other devices that are found within their jurisdictions.

One possibility for NRC is to contract with one or more waste compacts for the disposal program. A funding method must be identified for such a disposal program.

should be sought through congressional legislation.The NRCIfmay not, already it have such aut Finders of orphaned devices should not be held responsible for the cost of duposal of devices.

5.7 Device 1dentification -- Added requirements to ensure that device labels could better withstand harsh, unexpected environments may enhance the ability to identify devices that are disposed of or improperly transferred.

Device control would be improved and devices would be more likely to be identified af ter loss, if device labels are durable and contain sufficient information to identify the device as radioactive, the label provides identification of the last licensee that possessed the device, and the labeling is sufficient to withstand conditions associated with loss. For example:

Devices must be labeled with the device model number and serial number, the isotope and activity of the radioactive material, the trefoil symbol, the words " Caution - Radioactive Material.d and the name of the device vendon.

likely conditions associated with handling, storage, and use of theThe lab device and must De visible to users of the device.

If the device is not the source housing (i.e., the smallest separable part of the device that still provides the primary shielding for the source), the source housing also must be labeled with the device model number n

and serial number, the isotope and activity of the radioactive h

stial,"the ial, trefoil symbol, the words " Caution - Radioactive d, and the name of the device vendor. The labeling must be sie and capable of withstanding 1ikely conditions associated with handling, the device.storage, and use of the device and must be visible to users of typically are removed from the device when servicing is performed and usually transported separately from the rest of the device. Labeling

• or similar wording pursuant to 10 CFR 20.1902(e).

29

-__-_-_ _ _0

the source housing will ensure that it can be identified as containing radioactive material and can be uniquely tracked by the licensee.

,The source housings must be permarently marked (e.g., engraved or embossed)~ with the trefoil symboi and the words " Caution - Radioactive Material," as practicable. This will increase the likelihood of identifying that the device contains radioactive material even if the device is lost.

The nG notes that it is not necessary to provide recommendations for identification and labeling of sources for the following reasons:

- General licensees, and most specific-licensed device users, are not authorized to remove sources from devices. These users ensure control and accour.tability of the devices, not sources. Having users remove or view the sources would be costly, result in unnecessary exposures, and would not be consistent with as low as reasonable achievable (radiation).

- If users and regulators tracked sources, it would require removal of a source from a lost device to trace it to the last responsible licensee.

This would result in both high handling cost and unnecessary exposures.

The devices can be traced to the last responsible licensee by their serial numbers.

4 5.8 Devices Requiring Increased Oversight In evaluating the isotopes 1.nd activities contained in devices currently used by both specific and general licensees and after reviewing documentation, the WG determined that only a small percentage of the total number of radioactive sources in the United States would cause detrimental effec'.s to the population. Of these, only a very small fraction actually were smelted or created health at,d safety, property, or environmental problems.

The WG reviewed two reports by NRC contractors, the " Improper Transfer / Disposal Scenarios for Generally Licensed Devices," Oak Ridge Associated l'niversities (0RAU), April 1987, and " Peer Review of Improper Transfer / Disposal Scenarios for Generally Licensed Devices," PNL, June 1994.

The WG concurred with NRC staff that ORAU's findings were unreasonably conservative. Even though the WG agreed with the methodology used in the PNL study it couldn't entirely agree with its conclusions since it only examined the radiathn exposures associated with known accidents and did not consider the damages to property associated with loss of a device. However, the PNL study does support the WG's conclusion that the increased oversight should only apply to a subset of devices. Specifically, PNL concluded that 83 percent of all general-licensed devices, excluding tritium exit signs, represent a small risk, due to radiation exposure, even if the general-licensed devices are improperly disposed of and handled by members of the public.

30 i

L. [.

The_.following parameters were used to define a subset of devices:

!the hazard from external and' internal exposure, the typical quantity of isotope contained in a device,

- costs and' availability of disposal of the devices, the half-life oi the isotope, and the cost-associated with clean-up and disposal from. accidents resulting from loss.

-Isotopes used in measuring, gauging, and controlling devices were ranked for each of these: parameters. An overall ranking was established for each isotope (Appendix D)". This ranking process was conducted during the March 5,

1996, open meeting with the assistance of NRC and AS personnel, vendors, users, and other health physicists. The ranking process relied on the

-collective education, training, and experience of this group. Devices-containing cobalt-60,-cesium-137, strontium-90, and all transuranics were identified as the subset that should be subject to increased oversight.

. Isotopes less than 1000 times the activity specified in 10 CFR 30.71, ,

appendix B, " Exempt Quantities," were excluded from:the subset. Transuranic isotopes that are not-included in 10 CFR 30.71, appendix B, with an activity of less than 37 MBq (1 mci), also were excluded. The; result of using both the parameter ranking,--and the. activity criteria, is provided in Table 2.

Table 2 Isotopes and Activities Selected for Increased Oversight Activity Isotopes.

Cesium-137 370 10 Cobalt-60 37 1 --

Strontium-90 3.7- 0.1 All Transuranics 37- 1 l

If an isotope in a device meets or-. exceeds the criteria provided in Table 2, it must be subject to increased regulatory oversight. .Notwithstanding the

' increased oversight for these isotopes, t5ere still exists the possibility for

-loss of other devices. These-Iosses are not expected to result in-significant health, safety, or environmental concerns based on the WG parameter ranking.

The Cosmiission should review and determine if this is an acceptable approach.

5.9 General-Licensed versus Specific-Licensed Devices Some persons attending WG meetings suggested that the general-licensing program be abolished and that specific licenses be required for possession and use of all devices. The WG addressed this issue as follows:

31

- Data show that metal manufacturers and recyclers find devices that can be traced to both general and specific licensees. Allowing use of these devices only under a specific license would not prevent loss.

'The subset of devices identified is a small fracticn of the total number of general license devices. Subjecting all general-licensed devices to a specific license would impose unnecessary burdens without a commensurate increase in protection. Users also would incur costs to implement measures that address issues not identified by the WG.

5.10 Identification of Current Users and Devices lhere is no complete list of current users or devices. NRC and AS could develop such a list. The following are elements required for its development:

NRC should update the computerized database of general licensees and devices. This should begin by reconciling the information in the database with information from vendors. Vendors should be required to submit information about devices that they distributed to general licensees within the last five years.

NRCshouldrecommendthatvendorsprovideasmuchinformatiopas practicable on a voluntary basis to the regulatory agencies. Voluntary dissemination of information would be less costly in terms of time and resources than formal surveys requiring responses from each individual general licensee.

AS should follow the saae process. The information from the vendors should serve as the initial database of general licensees and devices for AS.

NRC and AS should contact each user to establish a baseline database.

Given that general license distribution was started in 1956, the WG would expect that not all devices will be accounted for. However, establishing a current baseline is essential. This process will provide most of the required information.

5.11 Imposing Restrictions on Portable Devices and Storage of Devices Some people attending the open meetings suggested that both possession and use of portable devices and long-term storage of any device should be restricted to a specific license. Portable devices used at temporary job sites are more susceptible to loss or theft. Devices stored for long time periods are equally susceptible to being forgotten. The WG agrees with these concerns.

Restricting possession and use to a specific license will not necessarily 6

During the open meetings, several venJors indicated that they retain this information until a device is returned or they become aware of its disposal.

32

4

- prevent -loss. - _Unless a device meets the specific criteria provided in Table 2,. Section_5.8, the device should not be subject to increased oversight.-

j i

33

Appendix A: PROTECTION OF PROPERTY The goal of minimizing hazard to property is contained in the Atomic Energy Act at Section 161 and the Commission has mude use of it in several Parts of 10 CTR. including Parts 20, 30, 40, 61 and 70. Notably, with respect to byproduct, source, and special nuclear materials, and radioactive waste, the Commission has used it in 33 instances as a decision criterion regarding enforcement actions, exemptions, general requirements for issuance of specific licenses, standards for issuance of a license, conditions of licenses, contents of applications, and requirements for the approval of applications.

The WG recommends using this as a decision criterion for the issues surrounding conditions of use, control over, and accounting for, certain devices containing specific isotopes and activities of byproduct material.

The following is a listing of the Commission's use of this criterion.

II. Statutory Authority and Procedural Framework A. Statutory Authority The NRC's enforcement jurisdiction is drawn from the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, and the Energy Reorganization Act (ERA) of 1974, as amended.

Section 161 of the Atomic Energy Act authorizes NRC to conduct inspections and investigations and to issue orders as may be necessary or desirable to promote the common defense and security or to protect health or to minimize danger to life or property.

10 CFR Part 2, Appendix C -- General Statement cf Policy and Procedure for NRC Enforcement Actions 10 CFR 19.31 Application for exemptions --

...will not result in undue hazard to life or property."

10 CFR 20.2301 Applications for exemptions --

...would not result in undue hazard to life or property.'

10 CFR 20.2302 Additional requirements --

...necessary to protect health or to minimize danger to life or property."

10 CFR 21.7 Exemptions --

...will not endanger life or property. . ."

10 CFR 30.11 Specific exemptions --

...will not endanger life or property. . ."

10 CFR 30.20 Gas and aerosol detectors containing byproduct material --

. ..to protect life or property. . ."

10 CFR 30.33 General requirements for issuance of specific licenses --

(a)(2) "... adequate to protect health and minimize danger to life or property;"

34 l

(a)(3) "....to protect health and minimize danger to life or property;"

(e)(2) " Protect health or to minimize danger to life or property;"

10 CFR 32.26 Gas and aerosol detectors containing byproduct material:

Requirements for license,to manufacture, process, produce, or initially transfer -- >

...to protect life or property. . ."

10 CFR 32.210 Registration of product information --

(c) "... adequate to protect health and minimize danger to life and property."

(d) "... minimize danger to life and property."

10.CFR 34.51 Applications for exemptions --

...will not result in undue hazard to life or property."

10 CFR 35.19 Specific exemptions --

.. .will not endanger life or property. . ."

10 CFR 36.17 Applications for exemptions --

.. .will not endanger life or property.. ."

10 CFR-39.91 Applications for exemptions --

...will not endanger life or property. . ."

i 10 CFR 40.14 Specific exemptions --

...will not endanger life or property..."

10 CFR 40.28 General license for custody and long-term care of uranium or thorium byproduct materials disposal sites --

(f) "...to minimize or eliminate danger to life or property..."

10 CFR 40.32 General requirements for issuance of specific licenses --

-(b) "...to protect health and minimize danger to life or property;"

(c) "...to protect health and minimize danger to life or property;"

(e)(2) " Protect health or to minimize danger of life or property;"

10 CFR 61.6 Exemptions --

.. .will not endanger life or property. . ."

10 CFR 61.23 Standards for-issuance of a license --

... minimizes- danger to life or property."

10 CFR 61.24 Conditions of licenses --

(h)(2) " Protect health or to minimize danger to life or property;"

10 CFR 70.14 Specific exemptions --

(a) "...will not endanger life or property..."

10 CFR 70.22 Contents of applications --

(a)(7) ". .. minimize danger to life or- property.. ."

(a)(8) "... minimize danger to life or property..."

35

l i 10 CFR 70.23 Requirements for the approval of applications --

(a)(3) "... minimize danger to life or property;"

(a)(4) ". .. minimize danger to life or property. .."

10 CfR,70.32 Conditions of licenses --

(b)(2) "...to minimize danger to life or property;"

10 CFR 71.,7 Specific exemptions --

...will not endanger life or property..."

10 CFR 71.65 Additional requirements --

... minimize danger to life or property."

36

Appendix B: _WORKING GROUP CHARTER CHARTER Scope A working group of Federal and State regulators is to evaluate current regulations concerning the control of and accountability for generally and specifically-licensed devices and develop recommendations for alternative regulatory approaches, as appropriate, taking into consideration the costs of any recommended changes. A part of the effort should be. devoted to defining a method of measuring the effectiveness of the current and proposed programs.

Backaround On June 20, 1995, the Commission approved a staff plan to contact the Organization of Agreement States (OAS) to form a working group (WG) to evaluate current regulations concerning generally and specifically licensed devices.

The Problem Inadequate control of licensed devices by licensees has lead to radioactive materials being included in metal scrap intended for recycling. Inadvertent smeltings of radioactive materials in mills have occurred resulting in contamination of_ mills, mill products and byproducts. Subsequent costs for each incident that required decontamination, waste disposal and mill-shutdown have totaled as much as S 23 million. While exposures to radiation from radioactive sources in metal scrap in the U.S. have been minimal, significant

- radiation exposures of workers and the public resulted from incidents which occurred in Mexico and in Estonia, in the latter case causing one death.

"Near-miss have occurred in the U.S.: In 1994-95.an unshielded 14 GBq

-(370 mC1) g"s- source was found buried at a scrap yard in Illinois, a 12GBq (330 mci)Cs13'C became-separated from its shielded holder when the holder went through a shredder at a scrap yard in Kentucky, and 137 Cs contamination of soil was found at a scrap yard in Michigan.

While various types of radioactive material have been found in metal-scrap, the principal source of concern are devices such as nuclear gauges. Under NRC regulations specifically licensed gauge users are subject to annual fees and a schedule calling for inspections every 5 years while general licensees are not subject to fees nor to routine inspections.

The Task The task of the WG is to assess the current regulatory programs for generally and specifically licensed devices and determine the baseline for regulating these davices. The assessment should address the question of whether there is an adequate level of assurance that these devices are properly controlled and accounted fpr by licensees, and that they do not present unacceptable levels 37

of risk of exposure to radiation to workers and the public or financial risk to the metal recycling industry. An integral part of this assessment is to determine how to measure the success or failure of a regulatory program. The WG should examine regulatory alternatives including the costs of the alternatives for device vendors and users, the regulating agencies and other potentially affected groups and provide a recommendation to the Commission, lhe issues Seven issues were identified by NRC staff that require a coordinated Agreement State and NRC review, i.e. addressed by the WG:

1. NRC and Aareement State Comoatibility -- NRC and Agreement State regulations need to be compatible since approximately 2/3 of the devices are used by Agreement State licensees and loss of a device will often have effects in States other than the licensing State.

2. Cost and Fee Considerations --'There are various options for licensing devices that would provide better control and accountability. The cost of implementation to the NRC and Agreement States and the appropriate cost recovery method need to be considered.

3. Radiation Exoosure Savinas -- Tha savings in radiation exposures resulting from better control over, and accountability for, devices need to be considered in the selection of the method for licensing of devices.

4. Device Desian -- Currently, the design requirements for generally licensed devices are more stringent than those for specifically licensed devices. The safety impact of using a different licensing method, which may rely on adminis.rative controls rather than the design of the devices, must be evaluated.

5. Chanaes That Affect All Devices Versus Oniv Newiv Acauired -- Since there are currently about 1.5 million generally licensed devices in NRC and Agreement States, changes in the licensing of devices need to address both new requirements for devices currently possessed by licensees and newly acquired devices.

6. Device Disoosal -- Options for the disposal of devices need to be delineated. Many current general licensees may wish to dispose of the devices rather than be subjected to increased regulation.

7. Device Identification -- Added requirements to ensure that methods of identification are used that could better withstand harsh, unexpected environments. Such requirements may enhance the ability to identify devices that are disposed of or improperly transferred.

In addition to these issues the WG should also answer the following question which is central to evaluating both the present regulatory program and any contemplated changes:

e 38 1

How can the success (or failure) of a regulatory program for ensuring adequate control and accountability of licensed sources be most effectively measured?

Committee Oraanization and Ooerations Joel 0. Lubenau, Senior Health Physicist, NMSS/IMNS/SCDB and Robert Free.

Branch Administrator, Emergency Response and Incident Investigation, Texas Bureau of Radiation Control have been named WG co-chairs by the NRC and 0AS respectively. Other GAS members are Marth Dibblee, Manager, Radioactive Materials Program, Oregon Radiation Protection Services, J. Robin Haden, Chief, Radioactive Materials Section and Rita Aldrich, Principal Radiophysicist, New York State Department of Labor (alternate). Other NRC members are Lloyd A. Bolling, Office of State Programs and John L. Telford, Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research.

The Conferance of Radiation Control Program Directors, Inc. (CRCPD) has tasked its E-23 Committee on Resource Recovery and Radioactivity to review the issue of radioactive materials in metal scrap and develop recommendations. The committee has worked closely with the metal recycling industries and State and Federal agencies to develop guidance particularly for educational efforts and protective measures. The WG co-chairs will request the CRCPD to designate an E-23 representative to serve as liaison to the WG.

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has reported on the problem of assuring adequate controls and disposal of " spent" radiation sources, i.e.,

sources that are no longer needed or usable. The NRC co-chair will request the NRC f.uclear Safety Attache assigned to the U.S. Mission to the UN System Organizations (James Richardson) to serve as liaison to the WG.

The co-chairs will be jointly responsible for developing a work plan for the WG, monitoring progress, preparing minutes of WG minutes and drafting a report of the WG's work and recommendations. Secretarial, logistical and travel support for WG meetings will be provided by the NRC. WG meetings are not subject to the requirements of the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA) but they will be publicly announced in advance through the NRC Public Meeting Notice Systam. Maximum use will be made of other appropriate media, e.g.,

professional and trade newsletters, to announce meetings to as broad an audience as possible. WG meetings will be open to the public and will be held in the Washington, DC area. NRC will fund the travel and per diem costs for the OAS co-chair and two additional 0AS members. The CRCPD liaison is welcome to attend all meetings but NRC will not fund the travel costs.

Persons attending WG meetings will be welcome to provide comments to the MG for its consideration in either written form or orally at times specified by the WG, co-chairs. A public workshop will be held to enable stakeholders to participate more directly in this process. The WG will be responsible for developing a plan for the workshop. NRC will provide the logistical and associated funding support for the workshop. The workshop will be held in the DC area.

39

Appendix C: JOHN DUKES' JANUARY 20, 1996, PROPOSAL ABB January 20,1996 Mr. Joel Lubenau USNRC Office of Nudear Materials Safety and Safeguards M/S T 8F5 Wastungton. DC 20555-0001 Ref NRC/ Agreement State Working Group - Radioacove Matenals in the Scrap Stream

Dear Joel & Working Group Members:

Thank you for the opporturvy to be a panelst at the January 16-19. 1996 pubhc workshop in Rockvme I felt trus was a very procudue session. I was pleased vnth the positue response to the 6pt proposal I presented for reducing the potential of radcactive sources and devu:es frorn acodentally getting into the metal scrap and other pubhc waste streams. There appeared to be a strong consensus among the interested partjes that this could be a viable approach to a::hieve improved accountabihty and control of sources and devees contairung radioactrve matenats.

I gave you a pnnted copy of the 6-point proposal whien i presented. This was an a very abbreviated form; i thought it might be useful for the Wortong Group if I expanded this o'*Jine vnth more detailed recommendabons, some of which we did not discussed at the meetmg. (Some of these details were in my letter of January 2,1996). The expanded proposal is attached for your further consideration.

I hope this more detained proposal will be helpful in your ongoing reinew and final recommendatens to the Commrssion Since NORM and NARM have been identifed as problems in ttus issue I would hope that the NRC cot.id at least recommend these matenals be induded in the national data base.

TNs would facihtste the effort of agreement state.s in exerasrng greater control over these non-AEA radioactue matenats.

Sincerely, (Jack) R. Dukes, Director Nucleorucs and Radet Operatens mcot m ooc ABB Industrial Systems Inc.

Po 7ama" M ao  !~m l%.cn c~o ...

40

q NRC/ AGREEMENT STATE WORKING GROUP PUBUC WORKSHOP January 16-19,1996 Panehst Jack Dukes, ABB Industrial Systems Inc.

Issue: improper disposal of radioactrve materials (RAM) and devices containing RAM that (t) result in entry of RAM into the metal scrap recyding streams and then bemg acodentally smelted (pnmarily an economic issue);

(2) represents potential health & safety hazards to indmduals involved and the pubbe, Cause: Pnmarity an accountability and control problem (An awareness (or lack of awareness) problem that results in urudentifed, riisplaced, lost, abandoned, and stolen devices / sources, Disancentues may also contribute to willful improper disposal]

1) Inadequate inventory control of RAM & devices containing RAM (2) improper disposal of RAM & devices containing RAM Recommended Solution:

(1) Require AB bcensees to maintain current rewds of att RAM in their possession and an RAM that has been transferred or otherwise disposed of, all GL as weg as au SL licenseas under NRC and agreement state jurisdiction au radioactrve matenals, induding NORM & NARM

. inventory records to show device name, model number, and senal number ('f r applicable) and manufacturer, source form; source senal number; isotope, quantrty, and date of manufacture; device / source use and whether fixed or portable; physical locatkinf s); date of last location venfication; name of person venfying its location; all transfers or disposals of devices / sources to other licensees; and tr.e name of the current radiologically responsible person (and a backup person).

. the

• radiologically responsible persons' can be anyone in authonty who has responsibility for complying with radictogical regulatioris and beense condrtions such as the radiabon safety officer, the plant safety officer, the firm's regulatory comphance officer, knowledgeab6e corporate officers, etc.

. inventory records to be available at aR bmes for inspection by regulatory authontes.

(2) Require aB bconsees to perform mami-annunt ehveient inven ories.

must account for all inventory changes since the last physicalinventory and report any unresolved dtscrepanoes to the appropnate authonbes.

Ana.Jmo m cottas.coe

. 41

. physical inventories might logically be done in coriunction with the required periodic source leak testing and radiological safety feature check.s of devices (shutter mechanisms, ON-OFF indicators, shielding, labels, etc.).

. if the radiologicalinspections, physical in,entory and inventory records are done under 3rd party service contracts, the Econsee (RAM possessor) must acknowledge compl*%n and cornirrence with the results by affixing signature of the radiologicany respc ole person or backup person.

(3) The regulatory authonty (NPC) must identify the radiotsotopes and quantstses which are to be of regulatory conce.m for ant.ual reporting (see point (4) below)..

(4) Require al Ecensees to reno t annuanv to their appropnate regulatory authonty as a minimum, they must report au devices / sources which are of regulatory concem (see point (3) above). (From the broader concem of accountability and control of RAM for health and safety of the pubGc it would be desirable to consider reportog an RAM that could get into the various Waste streams arid the environment.)

report must irvJude the current inventory, and at transfers to other Econsees, disposals, methods of disposal, etc. since the last annual report.

. report must also include the names of the current radiologica8y responsible persons (pnmary and backup).

. reports should be in a standardized format suitable for e4ectronic transfer or,if on paper, suitable for scanning and electronic processing.

. If these reports are completed and submrtted under 3rd party service contracts, they must be venfied/ authenticated by the radiologicany responsible person (or backup) of the Scensee possessing the RAM and identify the service omantzation submrtting the report.

(5) Make this a Category 1 levet requirement for e==AN between the agreement states and tne NRC.

(6) Regulators must maintarn a etment Hm+=hase and enforce the rules.

. a single national registry of devices / sources should be implemented and contain all of the information identified in point (1) above.

. using a 3rd party to maintain the data base vms suggested by George Brown, Ohmart Corp., at the public workshop. This might case NRC manpower and pnonty issues and faoktate joint funding by 40 involved regulatory agences (federal and state)

.the cata base program should be capable et finding descrepancies between consecutrve swentory repcis submitted by each bcansee; detecting dNferences between the manufacturers and distnbutors quarterly GL distnbution reports and the Econsees inventory reports; and, prepanng reports for fotow up review and actions by the appropnate enfortement agency.

. follow up with Ecensees could be by phone, mail, visit or other means which is determined to be appropnate on a cass-by-case basis.

ase: .mo 2* NRCe11s6.coC 42 1

3

- Related requwements:

4

• good commurucahons between vendors. customers, regulatory ageroes, and other stakeholders

• proper ancentaves for regulatory comphance and .'emoval of danoentives

• appropnote pennities for norH:ornpEence

• means of funding Ass. Jin .3- wicones.coe 43

l -

Appendix D: TABLE OF ISOTOPES TYPICALLY USED IN DEVICES Table 0.1 Table from March 5,1996, Meeting ISOTOPE EXT. INT. QTY DISP Tg COST OVERALL 30.71 x1000 (mci)

Cs-137 H H H H H H H 10 H-3 L L H L M L L 1000 Co-60 H L H L M H H 1 Am-241 L H H H H H H Cm-244 M H M H H M H Ni-63 L X L L H X L 10 Ir-192 H L H L L H H 10 Sr-90 M H M M H H H 0.1 1-125 L M L L L M L 1 PU-238 L H H H H H H Kr-85 L L H L L L L 100 Pm-147 L L L L M L L 10 Po-?l0 L X M L L L L 0.1 Legend for Table D..

H - High M Medium L - Low X - Unknown EXT. - potential hazard from external expostne to the material.

INT. - potential hazard from internal exposure to the material.

QTY - typical quantity of the isotope when used in a device.

DISP - availability of disposal.

Tw - half-life of the isotope.

COST - costs associated with clean-up and disposal from incidents involving the isotope.

OVERALL - the overall ranking assigned to the isotope based on the six factors identified.

44 l

Appendix E: CRCPD SURVEY RADIOACTIVE DEVICE WORKING GROUP QUESTIONNAIRE

)..

The Working Group reviewed information from a number of sources.

They included; steel manuf acturers, metal scrap processors and users of the radiological devices potentially encountered in

=_ scrap and waste streams. To, approach a solution, the working group separated the problems into three groups. They are inadequate accounting, improper disposal and orphaned devices.

The working group also attempted to identify devices of greater concern and developed a table with assistance from agreement r- state and vendor participants.

Inadecuate accountiner includes the loss of devices due to inaccurate inventories or no inventory.

Imoroner discosal includes the disposal, knowingly or unknowingly, so that a device reaches an rea that is no longer controlled to prevent exposure to members of the public. This may be non radiation workers within plants where devices are used or areas outside the boundaries of the facility where the source was to be used.

Orchaned devices include sources cnat are no longer in the

, control of a person licensed to possess or use them.

The following survey questions are categorized to address each of the problem arean. Please indicate a Yes, No or Undecided response by marking the box af ter each question with a Y, N or U.

Feel free to use the space between statements or the back of the page for comments.

FEY:

Y = YES C = MADE COMMENT N = NO  ? = ASKED FOR CLARIFICATION U = UNDECIDED 1,2,3 = COMPATIBILITY LEVEL RECOMMENDEP O = NO RESPONSE Inadequate accountability:

The following applies to devices identified as " higher concern" .

Do you agree with the following statements?

1. Semiannual invantories wou2 d improve accountal lity.

Y=12 N=1 U=1 45

2. Annual reporting of inventories to regulatory agencies by users would improve accountability.

Y=12 N=1 U=1

3. Users must maintain current inventory records.

Y=14 N=0 U=0

4. General licensees must assign a Radiologically Responsible Person and a backup as contacts.

(The duties of the RRP will be to assure accuracy of inventory, sign off on or perform leak tests and report inventories and losses. )

Y=13 N=1 U=0

5. The durability of the label on the device should meet or exceed the durability of the device.

Y=11 N=1 U=2

6. The label should contain the currently required information and a serial number.

(Current rules require, on the label, instructions and precautions for safe installation, leak test requirements, testing on-off system, radioisotope, activity, date of assay as well as a statement indicating the devices are under NRC and Agreement state jurisdiction, that labels are to be maintained in a legible condition, removal of labels is prohibited. the words " caution - radioactive material" are to be included and the name of the manufacturer or initial transferor.)

Y=14 N=0 U=0 Improper Disposal:

Do you agree with the following statements?

7. Annual reporting of inventories should be required of users.

Y=13 N=0 U=1

8. Users must be able to demonstrate proper disposal or pay penalty.

Y=12 N=2 U=0 46

o

9. Regulatory agencies should review reports of device transfers and receipts.

Y=13 N=0 U=1

10. Users should provide worker training to improve knowledge of health and safety risks, penalties for violations, identification and locations of devices.

Y=10 N=0 U=4 1.1. . Distributors should provide disposal information to include options, costs, etc. to users at the time of initial transfer.

Y=13 N=0 U=1 Manufacturers and some agreement state representatives have suggested the creation of a national inventory for the devices included in the WG recommendations. The database for such an inventory would receive reports from regulatory agencies and would identify discrepancies from previous submittals.

In light of the preceding suggestion, do you agree with the following statements?

12. A national database is necessary to adequately track devices in distribution.

Y=5 N=6 U=3

13. A national database would benefit state regulatory programs' attempts to track devices?

Y=10 N=1 U=3

14. A national database for tracking devices of higher risk should be established by the NRC.

Y=8 N=3 U=3 Anticipated Orphaned Devices:

Do you agree with the following statements?

15. In addition to current labeling requirements, labels conspicuously identifying the device as radioactive should be affixed to devices in the most likely visible location if the device is lost. .

5 Y=11 N=0 U=3 47

_ _ . . - _ _. . . _ _ _ _ . . _ _ _ _ _ _ . . _ ~ . _ _ _ _ _ _ . - _

t i

16. Labels should be permanently affixed to the device, e.g., l

. embossed, engraved, etc. and the strength and durability of i the label nmst meet or exceed that of the device.

Y=1r N=2 U=1

17. Innocent "findersi of orphaned devices should not be required to take responsibility for possession, storage and/or disposal of radioactive materials.

Y=14 N=0 U=0 i

NRC should take the lead in- the followina crocosed solutions: l

18. Arrange for manufacturer to recycle or DOE / EPA disposal of l orphaned sources (can be accomplished via MOU between NRC, DOE and EPA).

Y=13 N=0 U=1

19. A fund should be established to pay for disposal of orphaned sources under certain circumstances.

Y=12 N=0 U=2 i

20. Develop nonuser training recommendations to improve safety and recognition of devices. The Institute of Scrap Recycling Inc.(ISRI) has done this for its membership, but its members do not include all recyclers.

Y=13 N=0 U=1 The Working Group, with assistance from some agreement state representatives and vendors, attempted to derive a table expressing the isotopes and factors of-concern for radioactive devices. The resulting table attached to this page is the result of the participants' work experience in dealing with radioactive devices.

The table represents isotopes of concern versus f actors of concern and ranks the isotopes as high, medium or low level of concern.

The factors of concern are:

EXT. EXP. = external exposure INT. EXP. = internal exposure QTY = quantities most commonly encountered l DISP DIFF = Disposal difficulty l T1/2 = half life L COST DISP = cost of disposal 48 l

1

The Working Group has also attempted to identify activities of concern at this time two options are being considered. One is to use 1000 times the exempt quantity limits in 30.71 (10 CFR 30.71) and the other is to use 1 mci for the isotopes in the table iith a limit to be detemined later for the transuranics.

Please review the attached table and responti to the questions following it:

ISOTOPE EXT. INT. OTY DISP T, u COST OVERALL 30.71 EXP. EXP. DIFF DISP RATING x1000 (mci)

CS137 H M H M H H H 10 CO60 -

L H L M H H 1 AM241 ?n j H H H H H H -

SR90 M H M M H H H 0.1 PU L H H H H H H -

IR192 H L H L L H M 10 H3 L L H L M L L 1000 N163 L X L L L X L 10 I125 L M L L L M L 1 KR85 L L H L L L L 100 PM147 L L L L M L L 10 PO210 L X M L L L L 0.1 ALL -

TRANS LEGEND:

H = HIGH M = MEDIUM L = LOW X = UNKNOWN

21. Do you agree with the Working Group's rankin5 of isotopes of concern? Please indicate changes you would make.

Y=14 N=0 U=0

22. Do you agree with the " Factors of Concern"? Please indicate your suggested changes.

Y=12 N=1 U=1 49

23. What suggestions would you make for activities of concern?

Y=4 N=0 U=0 O=5 C=5 24.- What other suggestions would you make?

O=9 C=4  ?=1 The questions and statements above lead to a possible set of recommendations that would address the three problems stated at the beginning of this questionnaire.

25. What comments would you offer relating to implementation of the implied solutions.

O=3 C=9  ?=2 The following questions are an attempt to gather information on issues fer the solutions we have identified.

Compatibility with NRC rules is a major concern for these recommendations in terms of the way states accept and implement them because due consideration should bc given to the transboundary impacts of placing radioactive devices into interstate commerce.

26. In light of the above statements, what compatibility level would you recommend?

1=3 2=9 3=1 C=1

27. With individual states taking independent action to control the problems mentioned at the beginning, do you feel that this would lead to one state's rules effectively overriding another state's rules when devices cross state boundaries?

Y=4 N=5 U=1 C=4

28. What other reciprocity issues do you see as concerns?

Y=1 N=0 U=0 O=9 C=4 1

50

9' IA ppendix F: OVERSIGHT PROGRAM COSTS AND EXPECTED BENEFITS W .

Table F.1 includes _ the overall costing for NRC, AS, and licensees to develop ._

and implement-an oversight program for certain devices. The WG has determined that both general- and. specific-licensed devices incorporating the isotopes listed in Table 2-included in Section 5.8 must be subject to the oversight program.- - The costing and benefits in this appendix- are-based on regulation of these devices._ The WG estimates that 24,000 general licensees,. possessing a total of-90,000 devices, and 6,000 specific-licensees, possessing a total of.

36,000 devices, would be subject-to the increased oversight program. In

- addition, approximately 50 vendors would be subject to increased requirements

-Table F.1 Estimated Costs-of-Increased Oversight Programs NRC AS Affected Totals

($) -($) Licensees (S)

($)

A. First Year of 985,000 2,400,000 0- 3,385,000 Implementation B. Annual Operating Costs 246,000 492,000 4,305,000 5,043,000 C. Annual Operating Costs 6 '6 34 40 per Device (B./ Number-of Devices)-

O. Annual Operating Costs _25 25- 144- 168-per Licansee-(B./ Number of Licensees)

The WG estimated that it will costs NRC $75,000 to setua its initial database. -

It is estimated that it will cost each AS $20,000-for-t11s activity. The WG estimates that during thel first year of implementation of this program -

approximately:25 percent of the licensees-will not respond or will. provide an inadequate response and another 30 percent will call the regulators for-technical assistance. During the first_ year, regulators must expend 52.73 million (based on a rate of $54/ unloaded hour) of- additional resources to follow up with these licensees. It is estimated that two-thirds of the cost will be expended by AS since there are approximately _twice as many. AS licensees as-NRC licensees.

' Estimates of affected licensees are based on information from the NRC general license. database and information from a 1990 survey of NRC specific

licensees.

.- 51-

The annual operating costs for NRC and AS are btsed on the WG's estimate of the time required for each agency to compare antually users reported inventories against its records and to update itJ listing of users' inventories. The annual operating costs for affected licensees are based on the WG's estimate of the time required for each user to assign an RI and BRI, perform semi-annual inventories and inspections, maintain current inventory records, annually report inventories to regulators, and report changes in RI and BRI and transfers of devices to regulators. It also includes an estimate of the time required for vendors to provid: disposal information to potential users and meet the additional labeling requirements. The costs were determined using a rate of $48/ unloaded hour for licensees.

Benefits Both exposure and property benefits may result from increased oversight of device users. In 1987, NRC issued a contract to ORAU to determine the likelihood of exposure associated with improper transfer or disposal of general-licensed devices. ORAU estimated exposure savings from additional oversight of devices and concluded, in part, that there was a potential for significant doses from several types of general-licensed devices.

In 1991, the Commission suggested a peer review of the ORAU study. Another contractor, PNL, performed a peer review of the ORAU study, which concluded that the ORAU_ study provided a good start for assessing worst-case consequences of improper transfer and disposal scenarios for general-licensed devices. However, PNL showed that the study did not provide an adequate basis for regulatory decisions for the following reasons:

The study did not include probabilities of the scenarios occurring on a per device, per year basis; The study did not include a complete enough enumeration of the numbers of devices, and the distribution of source activities, within each category of device; and The study did not include the probabilistic distributions of outcomes needed to assess realistically assess the probable human health consequences of such scenarios.

PNL attempted to address the shortcomings of the ORAU study but concluded that it had neither enough information nor adequate time and resources to predict doses expected from an accident resulting from improper transfer or disposal of a general-licensed device.

The WG reviewed both studies and concluded the following:

- The conclusions of the ORAU study were conservative due to the reasons cited by PNL.

The PNL study provides an appropriate method for determining likely exposures associated with loss of control and accountability of devices but additional work in this area is needed. ,

52

_Neither study accounts for the probability or consequences of loss-due to property damage.

' From the data available,- the WG concluded int, eased oversight of device users will-result in significant savings both for property and the environment. An estimate of the radiatien exposure savings and property damage savings is

, included in Table F.2.

Tabl e . F.2 Estimated Annual Exposure and Property Damage Savings Number of Number of Number of Average Average Byproduct Years Smeltings/- Costs / Annual Material (1983-1995) Year Smelting' Savings Smeltings Property 20 13 1,54 $8,000,000 512,320,000 Damage-Swings to 5t2,el Mills' Average Maximum Average Maximum Annual

- Annual Dose Annual Dose -Annual Annual Savings From From Savings Savings Incidents Incidents Exposure -7 rem 1053 rem $14,000 $2,106,000 $14,000- 1 Savings for (70 mSv) (10.53 Sv) $2,106,000 Devices Containing Cesium-137 Annual $12,334,000-Savings: $14,426,000 Table F.2 is an estimate of the savings that may result from increased '

oversight. The following should be noted.about the estimates:

-The estimates for radiation exposures are from the preliminary analysis included in the PNL study. PNL provided the analysis to demonstrate its methodology and has indicated that further review and calculations are necessary.

' the average cost is based on smeltings that have occurred. It-should be noted that cost could be' as high as $100 million if a larger integrated

. steel mill smelted a source.

' from a database. maintained by James Yusko.

' PNL, " Peer Review of Improper Transfer / Disposal Scenarios for

-Generally Licensed Devices," June 1994.

53

1 l

Factors that may increase the estimated benefit include property damage savings by metal mills 1.s a result of not smelting a device and intermediate costs savings as a result of fewer lost sources.

- The average costs / smelting is based on smeltings that have occurred.

All of these smeltings were at small steel making facilities. With larger steel mills now using more recycled materials, the probability of a larger steel mill smelting a source will increase. It is estimated that the average costs (including costs for facility decontamination, facility down-time, and costs for material disposal) for a larger integrated steel mill smelting a source could be $100 million.

The PNL study concentrated only on a sample of NRC general-licensed devices. Exposure estimates to the public would increase if the study included all general-licensed devices, all specific-licensed devices, and all AS devices.

The exposure savings included only estimates for incidents involving cesium-137. The WG's recommendations included increase oversight for other isotopes that may be involved in incidents.

The exposure savings were from the analysis included in the PNL report.

Although the United States has never had an exposure from an out-of-control source that caused death among a large Ppulation, worldwide, individuals have received high exposures due to loss of a device. The pathways taken by the devices after loss of control and accountability have been similar.

As examples of loss of control and accountability, a cobalt-60 teletherapy unit was removed from storage in Ciudad Juarez, Mexico. It was disassembled and sold to a scrap yard. As a result, the source was breached, causing exposures to some workers and the public and significant contamination of metal products from the thousands of millimeter-sized pellets containing radioactive material. In this case, a limited study by the ORAU of 10 workers and residents using blood chromosomal aberration techniques showed that the 'nost likely doses received by these individuals ranged from 0.13 Gy (13 rad) to 5.5 Gy (550 rad).

In 1987, a cesium-137 source was breached in Goinai, Brazil, and the resulting dispersion of the cesium chloride powder (the physical form of the isotope) contaminated a large portion of one district of the city and caused at least one death attributed to radiation exposure as well as radiation injuries to others."

Other factors that may affect the dose savings:

" Lubenau, J. 0., and Yusko, J. G. , " Radioactive Materials in Recycled Metals, " Health Physics, Vol. 68, p440 (April,1995).

54

Metal manufacturers and recyclers are becoming more aware of the -

problems associated with loss of control over and accountability for devices and the effects these have on their industry. The use of radiation'monitt,rs and programs.to identify sources is becoming more

! -common. This cautious approach of monitoring should decrease the number -

4 of smeltings but still represents a significant cost to the industry.

The oversight program-implemented by NRC and AS will not be 100 percent -

effective at stopping loss of control and. accountability of devices.

Some devices are already lost and carry the possibility of causing

exposures or property damage, i

e - Comoarison:

Table F.3 - Costs Comparison Year NRC -AS Licensee Total- Benefit 0.- 1,231,000 2,400,000 4,305,000 8,428,000 14,426,000 l 1-10 246,000 492,000 4,305,000 5,043,000 14,426,000 Present Worth 1,728,000 3,456,000 30,236,000 35,420,000 101,322,000 Flow of Total i Funds years 1-10" l Present Worth 2,959,000 5,856,000 34,541,000 43,848,000 115,748,000 Flow of Total L Funds

" 0-10" years I

l

(

l-j' " Based on Regulatory Analysis Guidelines of the U.S. Nuclear i Regulatory Commission, NUREG/BR-0058, Revision 2.

55

Appendix G: ESTIMATED COSTS OF DISPOSAL OF A SOURCE lhe following is an estimate of the costs of disposal of a 37 GBq (1 Ci),

cesium-137 sealed source at a waste disposal site. The costs were provided in June 1994 by ' waste disposal site.

Estimated Costs

($)

Pre-encapsulation Drum 600.00 Pre-encapsulation Charge 250.00 Transportation 7,134.00 (based on 1000 miles one-way)

Broker Charge 2,600.00 Out of Compact Surcharge 1,650.00 Disposal Charge 7,405.50 TOTAL: 19,639.50 56

Appendix H: TEXAS RADIOGRAPHY INCIDENT On February 27, 1996, two cobalt-60 cameras and an iridium-192 camera were stolen from a location in Houst.,a, Texas. The company is in bankruptcy and the sources had been impounded in place by the Texas Department of Health, Bureau'of Radiation Control BRC The Ir-192 had decayed to minimal activity. _ The Co-60 cameras (, one),large, 755 kg (1665 lbs), and one small, 286 kg (631 lbs), contained 1.3 TBq (35.3 Ci) and 0.32 TBq (8.6 C1) of Co-60 respectively. The following chronology of events occurred after the devices were stolen.

February 27, 1996 -- The three individuals who stole the cameras stripped the cameras of their caution radiation labels and took the cameras to a scrap metal dealer (A) where they were sold as scrap. The dealer sold the small Co-60 camera to a second dealer (B) the same day.

February 28, 1996 -- Dealer A sold the large Co-60 camera to Dealer B. The Ir-192 camera remained at Dealer A. Dealer B determined the cameras were not stainless steel.

February 29, 1996 -- Dealer 5 shipped both Co-60 cameras to a third scrap dealer (C) in a large load of scrap. Dealer C has radiation detectors at their plant entry and-detected the radiation from the cameras. The manager of dealer C and his two assistants were not at the site when the cameras arrived.

A trainee was on duty when the cameras arrived. They segregated the cameras from the rest of the scrap shipment and returned the cameras to dealer B informing them that the cameras contained radioactive materials.

The large camera's lock box, holding the pigtail and the 35.3 curie Co-60 source, was torn loose by a forklift as it was being loaded onto a pallet for loading onto a truck at dealer B for return to dealer A on the afternoon of the 29th. The lockbox, with pigtail and source, was loaded on to the pallet with one of the forks of the forklift. The exposed radioactive source and lock box remained on the pallet with the cameras.

Dealer B attempted to return the cameras to dealer A on the afternoon of February 29th,-but the site had closed for the day. The manager of dealer A showed up and the dealer B driver informed him tha: the cameras were radioactive and that dealer B was returning the cameras. The dealer B driver returned to his facility and parked the truck contgining the cameras and the exposed source in a remote area of the scrap yard.

March 1,1996 -- Dealer B returned the cameras to dealer A. While unloading the cameras-from the truck, the lock box and source fell through the pallet and remained on the truck. It was then picked up by the driver, at the source capsule, and thrown to the side after the cameras were unloaded. It was then kicked under the corner of the office building located at dealer A. by an employee.

Neither individual was aware that what they were handling and kicking around eas an unshielded source.

The owner of dealur A was told that the cameras were radioactive. He then sold the large camera, without the source inside, to another scrap yard (D) 57

~

and sold the small camera, with the source inside and shielded, to a fifth scrap dealer (E) without advising anyone that the cameras contained radioactive materials. Dealer E in turn sold the small camera to another recycling co. (F). The manager was unaware that the Co-60 source was on the ground at his scrap yard. The BRC was never notified by any of these companies that they were in possession of radioactive sources.

March 5,1996 -- The 1.3 TBq (35.3 Ci) Co-60 source remained unshielded at dealer A until March 5,1996, where it was located by BRC Health Physicists at 1:30 pm. The scrap yard was evacuated and secured and the source was recovered and secured later that evening. Eleven adults and two children were exposed to high levels of radiation at the ? crap yard and one adult from dealer B was exposed when he transported and handled the camera and source.

Five Houston Police Officers were exposed to low radiation levals when they cer. ducted interviews at dealer A. Doso assessment of the incice9t are in.luded in Table H.l.

Table H.1 DOSE ASSESSMENTS OF THE INCIDENT Estimated Dose (mSv) (rem)

Scrap Yard Owner 180 18 Scrap Yard M ..ager 530 53 Scrap Yard Manager's Wife 550 55 Two Children at Scrap Yard 390 39 Workers at Scrap Yard 150 15 Customers at Scrap Yard 1.6 0.16 A Scrap Yard Worker - wholebody: 5.0 0.50

- extremity: 25,000/30,000 2500/3000 Police Officers 5.0/30 0.5/3 'J i In this case, BRC was notified by the Texas Natural Resources Conservation Commission, which was wot king at the site of the bankrupt capany, that the door from the building where the devices were stored was removed. Upon investigation, BRC determined that the three devices had been removed. On March 4,1996, BRC issued a news release that was highly publicized by the local media. This assisted in BRC eventually locating the devices.

58 I

NRC/ AGREEMENT STATE WORKING GROUP TO REVIEW DEVICES CONTAINING RADIDACTIVE MATERIALS Minutes for March 5, 1996

~

The Lubenau. Working Group The data inc (WG)luded known source meltings in the U S. and worldwide, session be which included about 1700 documented detections of radioactivity at scrap yards and steel mills in the U.S. Most of these are NORM. 168 are Atomic

- Energy Act materials (AEA). Issues included the obvious disincentives that now are associated with NRC licensed mat

• rials.

Attendees reinforced the fact that stakeholders have no regulatory incentive for identification and recovery ~of renegade sources that are found during the scrap metal recycle process. As compared with other hazardous materials and their responses, some Agreement States' and the NRC's response automatically pronounces the possessor ' guilty' before any research can show that there was or was not a hazard.

The overview of this meeting-included a review of previous presentations at WG meetings and discussion of the WG charter. Co- Chairs Lubenau and Free explained the focus of the working group, which included impacts of the source meltings, discoveries of devices in scrap recycling facilities, and ,

disincentives for proper disposal of radioactive devices. These topics have been recorded and can be reviewed in previous meeting minutes.-

Much of the information was included in a background information peper (attachment 1) originally prepared for the Public Workshop in January 18-19, 106 and provided to the participants in this meeting.

Strawman proposals had been presented in earlier meetings and workshops by working group members:

- Robin Haden, who described the North Carolina GL program; Bob Free, who presented Texas' general licensee acknowledgement (GLA) program;

- Rita Aldrich, who provided the WG with copies of New York's propesed licensing plan for GLs; and

- Martha Dibblee, who presented Oregon's device licensing and registration program, Bob Free presented and discussed Jack Dukes' proposal to the Group. This proposal was suggested at the public workshop in Washington, D.C. in January and was widely accepted by the panelists and participants. During the presentation, participants asked a number of questions related to accuracy of the Oregon information, start up problems, and cost and fee considerations.

, Martha Dibblee presented a description of the Oregon program, which includes both Specific License (SL) and General License (GL) devices. She discussed in some detail associated " start ep" costs and fees associated with the implementation of this program. As stated:

In 1995, Oregon began licensing and registering each measuring, gauging, or

controlling device (" device" means both specific and general license devices, excluding those that produce light or an ionized atmosphere) in the state.

Each device, either licensed (specific license device) or registered (general license device) in the state was charged either a license or registration fee.

The fees did not impact the licensing aspect of the program because initially they provoked an intense negative response from General License device manufacturers.

The Oregon Plan required approximately 1.5 FTE to develop fees and create a database of devices, which now tracks both physical locations and revenues.

1.5 FTE now are supported from revenues generated from license and registration fees. The Oregon Plan appears to have met the accountability criterion, which stakeholders put high on their agenda of recommendations.

Oregon's license fees for specific license devices are $174 per device for fixed gauge specific license; $464 for portable gauge specific license; $116 for specific license XRF or ECD; and $100 for general license ECD, fixed gauge, or ECD. All portable devices are specifically licensed, regardless of their SS&D status.

As background, Oregon began mailout inspections (self-inspection) to GLs and SLs over 10 years ago. Mail inspections of general license XRFs and gauges, and specific license portable and fixed gauges were done approximately biannually. Oregon observed that this frequency (of contact) was essential in retaining current inventory, use, and managtment information among licensees.

Inventory information received from mail inspections was collected for follow up for discrepancies.

Jack Dukes' proposal (attached 2) recommended a system of regulation to bring radioactive device inventories under a national database that would track device. inventories for ALL radiocetive materials.There was no specific proposal on the table for implementing this database, but it was assumed that the NRC would take the lead in developing it. The scope of the database required additional discussion.

The proposal recommends:

1) ALL licensees maintain current records of all radioactive materials in their possession, that those records contain specific information identifying the radioactive source and device, the name of the person verifying its location and name of the radiologically responsible person (RRP);

2)

ALL licensees conduct semi annual physical inventories. In the case of third party invcntories require ths RRP to acknowledge and concur by affixing signature;

3) The regulatory authority must identify the radioisotopes and quantities which are to of concern for annual reporting; 4)

All licensees report inventories to regulatory authority annually including current inventory, transfers disposals and meti.ed of disposal 2-1

S since last report, name of current RRP, and 3rd party inventories verified by RRP;

5) Should be category I level of compatibility;

6) Regulators must maintain a current database and enforce rules.

The proposal explained the scope of the ree.ommended database and suggested that a third party could manage it. The proposal further recommended that the database should be capable of finding discrepancies in inventory reports, detecting differences between the manufacturers' and distributors' quarterly GL distribution reports and the licensees inventory reports and preparing reports for follow-up review and action by appropriate regulatory agency.

The preceding is not a complete reproduction of the proposal and the attachment should be reviewed to understand the complete scope of the recommendations.

The working group, with participation of representatives from agreement states and device manufacturers, discussed the need to prioritize devices into those of concern for being encountered in the public sector. Joel Lubenau devised a chart (attachment 3) that listed several isotopes including cesium-137, cobalt-60, iridium 192, iodine 125, strontium-90, americium-241, and some others. Radium-226 was not on the list because the WG only is addressing Atomic Energy Act materi ls.

The workshop group ranked isotopes by hazard category. Hazards included cost of disposal and decontamination as well as health risk. They were ranked as high, medium or low relative hazard. The hazard categories included internal ami external exposure, half life, difficulty of disposal in terms of cost and availability of disposal facilities, and activity. By using this participatory method, the group came up with a scheme that ranked the isotopes according to their relative concern. Highest on the list were cesium-137 and cobalt-60. Iridium-192 was next because of the activity of some of the sources that may be encountered. Strontium- 90 was included because of the internal hazard and americium-241 because of its internal hazard and the difficulty of disposing of it.

l This was a brainstorming session to get a ranking that most could agree on.

However, the participants agreed that a pathway analysis and risk assessment should be performed to refine the list and determine the activities of concern.

The next discussion dealt with identification of devices and sealed sources.

Possible improvements it. labeling were discussed to determine whether improvemente could be made to make devices more easily recognized when encountered in the public sector. The discussion then centered around the j definition of " device". Some devices are contained in housings that, if labeled, would not contribute much to identification. Some devices have associated equipment attached that create the same set of problems. The discussion did not resolve the definition, but helped clarify the labeling issue so that it could further be address by the WG.

f

The discussions then addressed the unique identification of sealed sources and The participants seemed to ?qree devices to make them more easily tracked. Bryan Baker of Amersham poirted out that unique identification was necessary. Don Bunn from the state that some of the sources were too small to engrave.

of California suggested a bar code marking on the devices that wo durable. The working group will attempt to address labelling if sources were crushed.

in its recommendations.

NRC/ AGREEMENT STATE WORKING GRWP TO REVIEW

DEVICES CONTAINING RADIDACTIVE MATERIALS Minutes of the 4th Meeting of the Working Group - March 7, 1996

1. Call to Order The meeting was called to order on the morning of March 7, 1996. Joel Lubenau announced that he was leaving the working group to take a position on the i staff of Commissioner Greta Dicus. Mr. John Lubinski would assume the l position of co-chairman. This action would be formal on Monday, March 12, 1996. Effectively, beginning at this meeting, Mr. Lubenau allowed Mr. .

, Lubinski to assume the role of co-chair.

2. Registration Program implementing a system to register devices will be costly. The State of Oregon implemented a registration program. The costs were significant and 20 percent to 40 percent of the general licensees (GLs) did nct initially respond. l Should NRC implement a nation-wide registration system, the agency would have to follow up on the non-responses. This could be costly. Although NRC is a

100% fee-recoverable agency, Congress must approve NRC's budget. This means

an increase in budget may not be approved. Many questions remain on how to implement and maintain a registration system.

Under what regulatory level of compatibility should a registration system be implemented and maintained?

Should the registration system be maintained by the NRC or a non-

governmental organization?

How would a non-governmental organization be funded?

Should the licensees support the system?

! - What sealed sources or devices should be included in the registration

, system?

- What information about the devices should be reported? -

- Should the registration system be implemented only for new devices or should it be retrofitted to existing devices?

2.1. Compatibility A registration system must be uniform and compatible among the Agreement States. The level of compatibility will be a large issue. However, some

, Agreement States, and the industry, may not want to collect information that has no readily apparent use.

. 1

(

,. >, - - - , - ,-- , , , - --,,-e

2.2. Funding Several vendors had no objections to small fees being added to the cost of their products. .A fee for each device may get a user to think about getting or keeping a device; some devices are in storage and not in use. A way to get an idea of the funding necessary to maintain a system is to construct a mathematical model of costs. Spreading the costs in an equitable way will be difficult. A fee on a device is not only to register a device but to follow-up on other lost oevices. But should a licensee pay for the mistakes and careles ness of another l'censee who may not even be in business anymore?

Direct fees might be charged for follow-up. The cost of follow-up includes both the cost of finding who is responsible and the cost of finding-the device. Organizations who are irresponsible with devices should be paying more than a responsible organization. These costs are approximately

$125/ hour. Charging a fee for follow-up and inspections would make the licensees more res)onsible. For NRC to impose a fee, -formal ch nges to regulations would 1 ave to go through the rulemaking process. It is fair to charge whoever made the mistake of failing to report or of losing a device.

Another aspect of the cost issue is the extent to which to bring a problem through the regulatory process. Each discovery of a problem should not have to go through an enforcement action; the regulators should be allowed some enforcement discretion.

The American Iron and Steel Institute said that the costs of a registration system are minuscule compared to the cost of an integrated mill smelting a sealed source. The costs to a mini-mill have ranged from $2 million to $23 million. While an integrated mill has not smelted a sealed source, the estimated cost is $100 million.

2.3. Devices to Register Determining which devices to register is difficult. Only devices containing AEC material would be registered because that is what NRC is charged to regulate; radium would not be registered, even though it can be a problem.

Most devices are self-luminous exit signs and static eliminators. Registering all devices, even exit signs, is less cost effective for both licensees and regulators. However, from a regulatory view, losing even an exit sign indicates neglect. Devices should be registered according to some, as yet undefined, priority. The Working Group made a first attempt at identifying these devices at the March 5, 1996, Agreement State technical workshop. But there is no reason to spend resources on registering devices that pose little risk. Following up on a report of even a lost exit sign can be costly, or it can be as little as the cost of a telephone call.

At one .ae sessions of the Agreement St1te technical workshop on March 5, 1996, ( .on-mathematical assessment of " risk" was done. In general, devices

. v were ranked as fo11ows3 :

"Co > *C s > "Sr > T RV But phasing in a registration system by device, not by radionuclide, would be easier than by radionuclide, for both the vendors and the users.

The problem with assessing risks is that the risks of the same device may differ from one population to the next. Krypton is not a hazard to the steel mills. However, devices containing krypton should be to registered because dose rates can be high. There was an incident where, at a plastic extruding facility, a krypton device was taken apart; the source was placed on a desk, leading to unnecessary exposurr..

SL Gauges Also Are a Problem There 1s a disparity across the nation an how states deal with GL gauges.

A part of the solution to improving controls is to have annual reporting.

At a facility, an radiation safety officer insisted that a nucioar gauge had been removed. An inspector insisted on seeing the location where the gauge had been. After an hour of searching for keys to an old building, the gauge was found on an old pipe.

The criteria for assessing risks or hazards needs to be examined. Maybe the working group will be unable to decide upon an exhaustive list of criteria or a ranking of risk. Maybe only recommendations can be made.

Regulations need to include existing devices. However, registering devices that are already missino will be difficult. To do this a licensee had to know of the device, know that it is missing, and know that the missing device needs to be reported. But retrofitting a registration system would find at least some of the lost devices and prevent other from being lost. NRC has given consideration to a bounty program as an interim measure to find lost devices while the rulemaking process occurs. The objections were that the draft bounty program had the finders of devices (e.g., the steel mills) establishing a fund to reward a person for finding a source and paying for disposal.

Static eliminators present a problem for registration because of their short half-life compared to the suggested reporting interval of a year.

2.4. Location of a Registration System Idaho National Engineering Laboratory might be a choice for maintaining a registration system. The laboratory currently is developing AEOD's system for recording events, the Nuclear Material Events Database.

1 ree minutes from the March 5,1996, Agreement State technical workshop meeting.

r 2.5. Implementation Establishing a registration system will take years. A nation-wide system will have to be phased into operation. During the phase-in period, problems requiring regulatory action will be encountered. But a way to implement the program without high start-up costs in some form is not evident. The State of Oregon took 10 years to esth.lish  % their registration system; the system appears to be paying off in one form or another. Maintenance costs have come down from the start-up c9sts.

Another benefit of a registration system is a basis for determining devices to inspect. A list of devices can be randomly sampled, from the sample, inspections can be arranged. Given the outcome of the inspections, the extent to which there is compliance can be determined.

2.6. Model Registration System A registration system that was discussed is in Reference 1. The reference discusses what should be done as a minimum. The term minimum has regulatory significance.

The registration system should also record transfers of the sealed sources themselves. The sealed source is the hazard, not the device. But placing a identification number on the sealed source may be difficult for two reasons:

- Some are sealed sources are small.

Reading the serial number off of a sealed source would require locating a facility that can do the work.

2.7. Summary

- GLs should pay a " fair share".

CLs and specific licensees (SLs) should pay some costs for follow-up.

How much should NRC/ States pursue a problem when it is no longer cost effective?

The working group needs to make recommendatRns in general terms and identify details that need to be worked out.

NRC must recover c W s.

The working group weds to decide if registration system is to be forward looking or retrofitted.

The working group needs to determine which licensees and which devices to register.

- The beginning of a registration system can be the records of vendors

- A registration system will be phased-in to use

3. Insurance Options The working group attempted to involve the insurance industry with little success. A steel mill that smelted a device was insured by Lloyd's of London; the claim was paid and the staff person of Lloyd's who issued the policy was let go from the company. Reasons for asking insurance companies to

pkrticipate in the working group are as follows:

- An insurance company might write a rider to defray the cost of disposal.

. Insurance companies may place financial pressure on scrap yards and steel mills by giving discounts when monitors are used. Many small scrap yards are reluctant to invest in expensive monitoring equipment.

Many companies are self-insured, such as U.S. Steel, Honeywell and 3M.

Integrated mills are self insured because of large premiums. Insurance boards are not interested in insurance as a solution to the problem of radioactive material is scrap metal. The Steel Manufacturers Association (SMA) is looking into joint insurance. In general, insurance companies fear accidents with radioactive material; they do not give out information on paid claims.

Amersham Corporation belongs to an association that explored getting under the Price f.nderson Act.

4. Nuclear Gauges Using Exempt Sources A company was distributing nuclear gauges without the sealed sources. The user would then go to a source distributor and obtain exempt sources. NRC had questioned the vendor, who claimed that there was nothing in the regulations to preclude this practice. The NRC Office of the General Council agreed with the vendor and the NRC is bound to the interpretation of its legal staff.

A licensee cann.ot physically combine check sources. Check sources can be stackd (not legally viewed as combining). NRC allows stacking of sources, e.g., during storage.

The risk from exempt sources is much lower than the risk from GL and SL sources. But the practice of stacking exempt sources is of concern to the NRC for other reasons besides risk.

A nuclear gauge with exempt sources may be a concern because it ould yet contain, say 100 mC1, of radioactive material. NRC's Office of Research is looking into the hazard associated with this practice.

Check sources, like other benign sources such as refractory brick, create false alarms duiing monitoring, increasing the difficulty in detecting hazardous sealed sources.

Many stacked exempt source may contaminate the furnace dust of small mills to unacceptable levels.

The WG agreed not to address the issue of exempt sources.

5. Removing Disincentives for Disposal David Stewart-Smith, Administration of Energy Resources, Oregon Department of Energy, and Oregon's delegate to the Northwest Compact, discussed how the compact might be of some use in addressing the problem of radioactive material in scrap metal. The State of Washington leases land from DOE. Part of this land is leased to U.S. Ecology, which operates the compact for the State of Oregon. Operators of the Oregon compact are regulated by the state utility comission. The Hanford facility is regulated, so disposal costs will stay down. The Hanford site in Wa:hington State has a long term arrangement; the Barnwell site, in North Carolina, has a year-to-year arrangement. The fees at the Hanford facility are deternined by both the volume and the activity of radioactive material. Licensees in the State of Oregon pay because there are no general state funds for this purpose.

A means to manage a general fund would have to be established. This too could be discussed with the compact. A general fund could be maintained by licensing fees, as the SMA r.roposed. Formal rulemaking would be needed to impose a fee.

The compacts cannot help in short term, especially for states not having access to a compact. Opening a compact to non-member states defeats the purpose of a compact. Mr. Stewart-Smith will ask the compact about accepting devices on a case-by-case basis during an emergency. The conditions under which devices would be accepted would have to be clearly defined.

Examples of difficulty of disposal include the following:

A Sr-90 source was found on the floor of a tavern. The State took possession of the source at no charge to the tavern. The disposal cost to the tavern owner could be significant. ,,iis might be a case for the compact to accept the sealed source.

- A bank may own a company going into receivership. The cost for disposing of the source might be considered a part of the liquidation cost.

- If a resident were to come out of their home in the morning for the newspaper and find a bomb on their front lawn, they would call the 911 emergency number. Th authorities would come and take the bomb away, asking only enough questions to complete a policy report.

If the same person were to find a device that had been improperly disposed, the authorities would tell the resident to cordon off the area. The resident would be issued a possession-only license, but the licensing fee would be waived. The resident would have to pay for disposal.

While the story exaggerates the difficulty of disposing radioactive material, it underscores the lack of a system to readily address the problem.

Waste compacts have provisions for emergencies. DOE is called to take a device only when there are no other options and it presents an eminent threat to health and safety.

If a state, for example Oregon, can respond easily, then the state will do so.

Large sealed sources are another matter because they are difficult to shield.

Two concerns are securing an uncontrolled source and then disposing of it.

Disposing may be less expensive that trying to find the cener of an sealed source having a serial number if there is a general fund to pay the costs.

Getting to a facility with a hot cell that will look at the sealed source, and paying-for the work, may be expensive.

Who should pay for disposal? The victim, e.g., the scrap dealer, should not pay. The disposal cost to a state is not the same as the cost to the NRC. A state is a small fraction of the problem. NRC represents a much large jurisdiction. Because equity is a problem, and everyone benefits from the use and safe disposal of devices, NRC might pursue getting general funds to dispose of devices.

Disposal might also be funded with a bond that is purchased at the time a device is purchased. This would give some assurance of funds being available for disposing of a devices should a licensee become bankrupted. Utilities are responsible for decommissioning. But NRC is not responsible for fundiny disposal.

6. Review of the Charter The working group has gathered much information. The next question is what to do with the information. The Commission expects a report by the end of June 1996. The current schedule is very tight. The working group should not slip the schedule, as delays will de-emphasize the importance of the report. All aspects of the final report should be referenced. The issues that need to be addressed are as follows:

NRC and Agreement State Compatibility Cost and fees considerations Expected reductions in radiation exposure Design of devices Devices effected by regulatory changes Disposal Identification and labeling of devices Other issues are accountability and what to do about orphan devices.

The working group needs to determine if it has enough information to discuss the problem and make recommendations where possible. Although the problem was stated in the meeting of October 1995 (Ref. 2), constraints need to be discussed, given the information that has been collected. The working group needs to establish assurances that something obvious has not been overlooked.

For example, a registration system, such as in Reference 1, addresses future orphaned devices, but not currently orphaned devices. More discussion will be needed, such as the possibility of converting some GL devices to SL devices.

Guidelines on the form of the recommendations need to be established.

Compatibility may be difficult to address. If the Commission agrees with the recommendations made by the working group, the staff will have to develop a rulemaking plan. Workshops can be conducted to introduce the plan. The s

1

• , l

. -- ,i l

l workshops would have to address why recommendations are at a specified level of compatibility. Unless compatibility issues are addressed, the process will ,

not work. States will need time to phase in programs, such as a registration 1 system, due te the expected high implementation costs.

Referencas:

1. Letter from John (Jack) R. Dukes, Director, Nucleonics and Radiological Operations, ABB Industrial Systems, Inc., to Joel Lubenau, USNRC, Office of Nuclear Materials Safety and Safeguards, dated January 20, 1996.

Re: NRC Agreement State Working Group--Radioactive materials in the Scrap Stream.

2. Minutes October 1995 WG meating.

l

Exhibit "E" 1

p. ...

s. h POLICY ISSUE (Notation Vote)

October 18, 1996 SECY-96-221 EQ3: The Commissioners FROM: James M. Taylor Executive Director for Operations

SUBJECT:

SECY 95139 STAFF REQUIREMENTS COMGD 94-003 -

lMPROVING NRC'S CONTROL OVER, AND LICENSEES' ACCOUNTABILITY FOR, GENERALLY AND SPECIFICALLY LICENSED DEVICES PURPC SE:

To provide the Commission with the final report submitted by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory

> Commission / Agreement State Working Group (WG) which evaluated current regulations on general and specific licensed devices. Further, the staff requests Commission approval to develop an action plan that would address the recommendations included in the WG report. ,

BACKGROUND:

In a Staff Requirements Memorandum dated October 18,1994, the Commission directed the staff, among other things, to continue to explore the problem of accidental smeltings of NRC licensed and Agreement State licensed devices and to develop recommendations for future staff actions in this area.

On June 20,1995, the Commission approved a staff plan to form a WG to evaluate current regulations on general and specific licensed devices. The formation of the WG was necessary to address the apparent inadequate licensee control of devices that has led to radioactive materials being included in metal scrap intended for recycling. Inadvertent smeltings of radioactive materials in mills have occurred, resulting in contamination of mills, mill products,

Contact:

NOTE: TO BE MADE PUBLICLY AVAILABLE AT John W. Lubinski, NMSS COMMISSION BRIEFING ON NOVEMBER 13. 1996 415 7868

The Commissioners 2 and byproducts. Subsequent costs for each incident that required decontamination, waste disposal, and mill shutdown have totaled as much as $23 million. Tne task of the WG was to assess the current regulatory programs for general and specific licensed devices and suggest a baseline for regulating these devices.

DISCUSSION:

The NRC, with assistance from the Organization of Agreement States, formed the WG in July 1995. The WG consisted of both NRC and Agreement State personnel and encouraged the involvement of all persons having a stake in the process and its final recommendations. To achine maximum involvement, the WG held public meetings, a public workshop, participated in an NRC/ Agreement Statt, Technical Workshop, and presented for comment preliminary recommendations during the Conference of Radiation Control Program Directors' annual meeting. All meetings of the WG were open to the public and announced on the NRC Public Meeting Notice System. The meetings were designed to encourage open communications between the WG and stakeholders and to allow for interested parties to express their opinic,ns.

The WG completed its task and submitted its final report on July 2,1996 (Attachment 1).

The report includes the WG's recommendations to: 1) increase reguleory oversight of users of certain devices: 2) impose penalties on persons losing devit o,: 3) ensure proper disposal of orphaned devices (those devices that appear in the public domain and are discovered by someone other than the rightful owner, usually a non-licensee.):

4) encourage States to implement similar programs for users of Naturally Occurring or Accelerator Produced Material; and 5) encourage non-licensed stakeholders to take appropriate actions, such as instituting programs for materialidentification.

In a letter dated July 29,1996, Rita Aldrich, State of New York, Department of Labor, provided comments on the WG report and her proposed solution. In her letter she indicated that she agreed with some of the intermediate conclusions of the WG, but disagreed strongly with the regulatory construct that the group derived from them. Ms.

Aldrich served as ar alternate member to the WG and as such, participated in some WG meetings. However, she did not participate in the writing of the final report. A copy of Ms. Aldrich's letter was forwarded to the members of the WG. The WG Co-Chairs have indicated that the WG does not intend to provide a response to the letter. However, the 1 Co Chairs hsve indicated that Ms. Aldrich was given ample opportunity to participate in the WG, in addition, the Co Chairs indicated that programs such as the one implemented by the State of New York could be implemented by an Agreement State if the recommendations of the WG are implemented as Division 2 items of compatibility. This was a driving force behind the WG's suggestion to have its recommendations implemented as Division 2 items of compatibility.

The WG report and Ms. Aldrich's letter were provided to the Agreement States in preparation for the Organization of Agreement States meeting in September 1996, in addition, the WG report and Ms. Aldrich's letter were placed in the NRC Public Document Room.

On November 9,1995, Seaman Nuclear Corporation submitter! an application for a license

,,,,,,p . - , . , .

4

- The Commissioners 3 to distribute portable moisture density gauges to generallicensees. Approval of the application could set a procedent that may add several thousand portable gauges containing cesium 137 to the general licensed device population, in January 1996, based on a cursory review of the application, the staff determined that the application may meet the requirements of 10 CFR 32.51, " Byproduct material contained in devices for use under

$31.5; requirements for license to manufacture, or initially transfer." However, since the WG was evaluating accountability of devices used under a general license, since portable

_ gauges are more susceptible to loss, from being frequently handled and moved, and since the device contains cesium 137, which has been the most common radioisotope

- accidentally smelted by steel mills, the staff decided to put the application on hold until the WG completed its evaluation. The review of the application commenced on July 22, 1996, and the staff has requested Seaman Nuclear to provide additional information to support the application.

To assist in reviewing the WG's recommendations, I also have included a chronological history of the general licensing program (Attachment 2). _ The history includes significant events and actions taken by NRC, Agreement States, and other govemment agencies, it should be noted that the major recommendations for improvements to the general licensing program have been cyclic in nature usually due to resources being reprogrammed to meet higher priority needs. Specifically, the recommendations for requiring a specific license for use of certain higher risk devices, implementing a registration and response system for general licensed devices, and issuing an exemption for use of lower risk devices continue to appear as viable recommendationn However, due to resource constraints, none of these three recommendatiero have bwan implemented by NRC, Some Agreement States have taken actions to enhance control and accountability of devices. Changes to Agreement State regulations have ;.icluded generallicense registration programs and restricting use of certain products to specific licenses.

The staff is continuing to evaluate the WG report, Ms. Aldrich's comments, and the risks associated with the current programs for oversight of both general- and specific licensed devices, in doing so, the staff has noted the following preliminary conclusions with respect to the risk associated with general and specific licensed devices:

• Under ordinary conditions of handling, storage, and use, neither general nor specific licensed devices represent a high risk to users or members of the public.

This is supported by operational data.

• The me}ority of devices used under a general license represent a low risk to users or -

members of the public even under conditions associated with loss of control.' This -

is supported by the findings of a study performed by Pacific Northwest Laboratories (PNL). Under an NRC contract, PNL completed a project entitled "Revicw of improper Transfer / Disposal Scenarios for Generally Licensed Devices Study." Some of the ma}or results of the PNL study are summarized in Attachment 3.

• . Some devices currently used under general licenses contain'relatively high activity

, - sources, if loss of control occurs with a device containing a higher activity source, the radiation exposures to members of the public or workers could be significant.

i The Commissioners 4  ;

• Loss of control of either general or specific licensed devices may cause damage to  !

property as a result of entering the metal recycling stream. As stated, the costs  :

incurred due to en inadvertent smelting of a desce could be as much as $23 l million.  ;

• The current general and specific licensing programs do not account for radiation i exposure or property damage as a result of loss of control of licensed material.

, Specifically, the programs are based on ordinary and likely accident conditions ,

associated with handling, storage, and use of a device. _The consequences associved with accident conditions are based on licensees knowing that radioactive materie!isas been involved in the accident. Licensing and design criteria do not account for hazards associated with loss of control of material, t- t in light of the preliminary conclusions identified above, the staff presents the following ,

altematives for development of future staff actions to address the problems of control  ;

i over, and accountability for, both general and specific licensed devices:

• i 1.- The staff could maintain the status quo. Specifically, the staff would take no action with respect to oversight of persons currently using devices under a general license. The staff would continue to evaluate the methods of regulating specific >

licensees as part of Business Process Redesign of the materiallicensing program.

This would require no changes to resources in the current budget.

i j 2. The staff could continue with its previous plans to increase control over, and i

accountability for, generallicensed devices. Specifically, the staff could re initiate '

the rulemaking to establish a registration system for generallicenses, change the i priority of the rulemaking to restrict the accessible air gap for generallicensed .

devices from a low priority to a higher priority, and also change the priority of the rulemaking to exempt from regulatory requirements persons using lower risk devices from low to high. The current status of each of these rulemakings is ,

discussed in Attachment 2. A contractor is currently _ assessing the feasibility of l

exemptions for lower risk devices as part of a broader systematic assessment of exemptions. The value/ impact summary and resource requirements are included in i the rulemaking plan for each action. The rulemaking plans for the registration j system for generaliicensees and the restrict!on on accessible air gaps for general-licensed devices had been estimated to require approximately 5 FTE and $450,000 each year. Resources for these actions are not included in the current budget and will need to be re-evaluated if the Commission decides to proceed with this .

alternative.

' 3. The staff could develop a modified rulemaking plan to increase control over, and l . accountability for, generallicensed devices. Specifically, the staff could revise the

'previously proposed rulemaking to establish a registration system for general licensees to include both general and specific licensees who possess devices identified in the WG report as needing increased oversight. The staff could change the priority of the rulemaking to exempt from regulatory requirements those persons using lower risk devices from a low priority to a higher one, The staff could

- terminate the rulemaking to restrict the accessible air gap for generallicensed i

- -.- - - - . - - , . = - - _ . - . - - . - - - . - . - - - - - - . . - . . --

The Commissioners 5 devices. This course of action is based on information provided in the WG report currently undergMng evaluation by the NRC staff. The WG report includes the

, value4mpact summary for these actions and estimates the associated resource l requirements at approximately 12 FTE and $75,000 in the first year of

! - implementation and approximately 3 FTE each of the following years. Actual resource requirements to modify the peuposed registration program will be

[

-determined during the development of a modified rulemaking plan.

i .To implement this alternative, the staff proposes to develop an action plan in FY 1997 that would address: the staff's preliminary conclusions of the risks associated with the current program for general ond specific licensed devices; all of the WG's recommendations; Ms. Aldrich's comments; and the other items raised

previously by the Commission affecting possession, use, and transfer of devices used under general and specific licenses that were not addressed by the WG -The action plan would include evaluation of the general and specific licensing programs

!- from a risk informed, performance based perspective as identified in Direction-

i. Setting lasue 12 of the Strategic Assessment and Rebaselining Project. In addition,

?

I the staff would likely conduct a pilot program in FY 1998 to verify any preliminary conclusions. Resources to develop the action plan (1 FTE in FY 1997) and to  ;

! conduct the pilot program (1 FTE and $100,000 in FY 1998) are included in the current budget. Resource requirements to impl6 ment the final recommendations will be developed as part of the action plan.

i=

i RECOMMENDATION:

That the Commission approve the staff's recommendation to implement altemative #

- number 3 (listed above) since it provides for evaluation of all of the WG's recommendations, evaluation of all factors affecting general and specific licensed devices, and ensures the evaluation is performed from a risk informed, performance based

- perspective.

Prior to the Commission approving implementation of staff's recommendation, the staff requests an opportunity to brief the Commission on the history of the generallicensing  ;

program and its recommendation.

l i

9 -

A

= = - .-eme-,-nv-,--.-,..-- ~wm...w . , , , . .e-.-.+,e v..- -~ e.x--- -m.....y-n--,,-,, _m..~..--,,,,ec.,,-, - y .

9--, ~+ -,-,e...-~r1-,cw-- -------w--

The Commissioners 6 COORDINATION The Office of the General Counsel has reviewed this paper and has no legal objection, s /

es xecutive Director for Operations Attachments:

1. WG Final Report

2. Chronological History of the General Licensing Program

3. Major Results of the PNL Study Commissioners' comme'nts or consent should be provided directly to the Office of the Secretary by COB Friday, November 22, 199.5.

4 Commission Staff Office comments, if any, should be submitted to the ..

Consnissioners NLT November 15, 1996, with an *.nformation copy to the Office of the. Secretary. If the paper is of such a nature that it requiles additional review and comment, the Commissioners and the Secretariat should be apprised of when comments may be expected.

DISTRIBUTION:

Commissioners OGC OCAA 01G OPA OCA EDO.

SECY 4

4

Exhibit "F" u -

Discoveries of radioactivity in metal scrap (selected cases)

• reported / documented U.S., Canadian cases only

• Time span: January,1985 - June,1996

• 1898 events (1873 discoveries,25 US smeltings)

• How discovered: -

- stationary monitors - 1827 (96.3%)

- hand surveys - 31 ( 1.6%)

- warning labels - 12 (~0.6%)

- unknown - 26 (~1.4%)

- other -2 (~0.1%)

(revised July 02,1996) JOY Detections, Smeltings of Radioactivity in Scrap ('83-date 800 600 - -- -- - ' - - - - - - ---

400 - - - - - - - - - ~ - -

200 - - - - -- - -- -- -- - ' - - --

' ^ ~ ' ' ' ' ' ' '

0 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 Incidents Smeltings Flevised July 02.1996 JGY

Discoveries of radioactivity in metal scrap (continued) 1 -

• Radioactive materials found:

- cs-137 - 52 ( 2.7%)

- co-60 -

11 ( .6%)

- Sr-90 -

2 ( 1%)

- Kr-85 -

3 ( 2%)

- H-3 -

2 ( .1 %)

- Am, Am-Be -

11 ( .6%)

- Thorium -

27 ( 1.4%)

- Uranium- -

28 ( 1.5%)

- Radium, + --105 (~5.5%)

- NORM -

1231 (64.9%)

- accel. produced - 4 (~.2 %)

- unknown - 422 (22.2%)

(revised July 02,1996) JGY Discoveries of radioactivity in metal scrap (continued) thru 06.30.96 N O R M 1231 e Radium + 105 s

Am- 4111 miti fn n "

Cs-137 52 H.Kr.Sr 7 3 . unknown 422 8CCel prod 4 (Na1898; revised July 02. 396 JGY)

Discoveries of radioactivity in metal scrap (continued) i Sources or devices found/ smelted:

cs-137 -

49 Co-60 -

5 l

Sr-90 -

2 Am, Am-Be -

11 Uranium -

15 Thorium -

18 Kr-85 -

3 H-3 -

2 1

Ra-226 -

93 accel. produced - 2 i

unknown -

5 (revised July 02,1996 N . 205 JGY) i Sources or Devices found

in metal scrap (thru 06.30.96) l Ceslum-137 49 "Acce erator 2 Cobalt-60 5 AmeriClum 11 Hydrogen-3 2 i

Uranium 15

~

Krypton-85 3 Radium-226 93 Thorium 18 i Strontium-90 2 (N = 205; revised July 02,1996 JGY)

't a.- - , - w- - - , . - - - - - - - - - -. ,.

Smelting of radioactive materials Confirmed .World-wide Smeltirigs (ciobai sunmary) of Radioactive Sources

. Since 1983, forty (40) confirmed instances of accidental smelting of radioactive materials e,,,w gyppyffggggpggg

= of these, twenty-five (25) occurred in the U. S.,

15 raported foreign events (Mexico, Taiwan, om., % y Brazil, Italy (3), Ireland, India, Russia, Estonia "***'"E*" E

M Kazakhstan,' South Africa, Bulgaria, Canada, Austr w- g l = 10 Co; 20 Cs; 3 Ra; 1 Acc.; 3 Th; 1 U; 1 Am; 1 ? . om r e p.

]

• 27 in steel mills; Al-6; Cu-2; Pb-1; Zn-1; Au-2; V-1 = 3

. most U3 events discovered monitoring byproducts * **

3 (slags or dross or flue dust) o a so is no n (w Anguer,9998; (N - 40; Aug.1996 Jgy)

Confirmed World-wide Smeltings Confirmed World-wide Smeltings of Radioactive Sources of Radioactive Sources leon /9e e Co-is7 Asumsinuun Co-00 a.w n.-rre Copp r Th omer en.zn vi om r m?!

,o a to is ao as so as o e io is no as (N - 40; Aug.1996 Jgy) (N - 40: Aug.1996 Jgy)

- - - - - - ~ . - - - - - - - - - - - - --

Global Sme tings of R/M by affected industry Iron / Steel 64%

73 %

Gold 8%

4:) ,, r ana{um Copper Zinc 4%

Lead 4% 7E Copper 4%

Aluminum 16% Aluminum United States Other countries N = 25 N = 15 N = 40; August,1996 JGY Global Smeltings of R/M by material smelted Cs-137 60% Cs-137 33% i

. i.n .

Am-241 4 % . ' ' unknown 7 Acc.4%

Co-60 4%

Th 12%

Ra-22612% Co-60 60%

y 4g United States Other Countries N = 25 N = 15 N = 40; August,1996 Jgy

Sources, devices found in metal scrap,1983 - date 50 '

~ - - . - . . - . . - . ~ . - . . - - - . - . . - - , . - ,

E - - . ,

~

g - -_ .

.--.. --- --.- ---. w

= .

K a- w 0 _ . ,.f. .

1 7.

. [ M. . . _unm !. _ ..,

, . . . .. i i i 19831984198519861987198819891990 199119921993199419951996 C Re 226 C Unknown C As 137 E Co 60 C Thorium C Uranium E Other N = 205; 06.30.96 JGY Radioactive Materials Found in Scrap:

Detections, Smeltings Radium, + EE, NORM l --

Accel. prod. -3' Thorium I

{3 ,

I Uranium {-

Cobalt-60 d3  !

Cesium-137 F4MMMMbMMSi Americium-241 d3  :

Sr-90, H-3, Kr-85 d- .

unknown  ; , ,l -d l i ,

15001200 900 600 300 0 6 10 15 20 I I # detections * # US smeltings Revised July 02,1996 JGY j

1 i

! )

I l

Issues & Concerns from PRC - AS Charter 1

• NRC / AS competabuity f I

• Cost & lee considerations -

NRC - AS Working Group -

• a === s-iaos

Membership

• Dwho daign

• AR vs. newly-acqueed devices J. O. Lubenau*, NRC

• Device disposal L. Bolling, NRC . Device identmention  !

J. Telford, NRC l J. W. Lubinski*, NRC '

i R. E. Free *, TX -

M. Dibbiee, OR J. R. Haden, NC Additional issues &' Concerns R. Aldrich, NY (alt) identied by wing W  !

J. G. Yusko, PA (CRCPD)

. Device, needing ine,e.**d -sight

!

• Co-chairs

• General- vs. specMch dwices i

4 (Lubinski replaced Lubenau, 3.96) e identification of current imers a devices q

- Restrictions on portable devices u

) storage of devices j

4 I 1

i i-3 .

NRC - AS Working Group Preblems '

<-

• Inadequate Regulatory Oversight g A

• Inadequate Control and Accountability of Devices

= improper Disposal of Devices a Orphaned Devices c

Isotopes & Activities Selected for Increased Oversight Isotoqes Activities Cesium - 137 10 mci / 370 MBq Cobalt - GO 1 mci / 37 MBq Strontium - 90 0.1 mci / 3.7 MBq Transuranjos (all) 1 mci / 37 MBq from NRC - AS Working Group l

n .

NRC - AS: Working Group Licensee Responsibilities Recommendations (Working Group reconwnendations)

• Increased Regulatory Oversight

• assign Responsible individual and Back-up; by NRC,'AS on identified devices

• perform physical inventories every 6 months:

/ physical location of device (or storage)

• Penalties for Lost Devices - / inspect labelling visible, legible (monetary or enforcement) / labels contain required information a keep current inventory records;

• Disposition of Orphaned Devices . compare results, resolve discrepancies;

-(NOT by innocent finders) . correct label deficiencies;

• Similar implementato, n for NARM a report transfers, disposals of devices;

• file annual report with' regulators; (by all States) . notify regulators upon bankruptcy Vendor Responsibilities Regulator Responsibilities (Working Group recommendations) (Working Group recommendations) e report transfers of all identified devices

• verify all transfers by users are to regulators, quarterly; in accordance with regulations, licenses;

[name, mailing address, telephone number,

• compare reported annual inventor, e s with model and serial numbers, isotope, activityl

• maintain records of transfers (to 3 y); previous and transfer reports; e provide recipients with disposal information;

• resolve' ANY discrepancies;

• ensure devices / source housings are labelled properly

• acknowledge licensee inventories, transfers ltrefoil, caution sign engraved, embossed)

L .

- - - ' ' - ' - ~

Smumm NRC - AS Working Group NRC - AS Working Group Recommendations Recommendations l

! / lacreased Regulatory oversight / Penalties for Lost Devices by NRC, AS on identified devices

• Penalty significant - -

6 month Physical Inventories 2-3 times cost of disposal e Better Device Identification

• Civil penalty, escalated enforcement

• Annual Reports of Inventories, (if state RCP can't fine licensee)

• Reports of Transfers, Disposals

• Exercise discretica; in start-up year (actions by both vendors and licensees) -- !a achieve baseline inventories

• State RCP inventories, contact w/ users Resolve discrepancies, inspect if needed NRC - AS Working Group NRC - AS Working Group Recommendations Recommendations

/ D sposition of Orphaned Devices / Recommendations for State RCPs

• Finders should not be held responsible Working Group encourages ALL state

. Orphaned devices will continue Radiation Control Programs to

. Even with increased oversight, implement similar programs, etc.,

other sources pose risks to public for devices containing NARM (e.g., Ra)

. Specify NRC, EPA, DOE responsibilities

• NRC should be cognizant agency States should use same criteria i

. Funding probably complex far NARM as WG used for devices; NAHM devices pose similar problems

Exhibit "G" 1

)

1. 'o, UNITED STATES

/ o NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 3 W ASHIN GTON, D.C. 20555

%,'****/ Septembe 18, 1997 OFFICE OF THE COMMISSIONER 3

Christina Becnak Vice President Steel Manufacturers Association 1730 Rhode Island Avenue Washington, DC 20036-3101 Ci

Dear hrid e chak:

Next month, the International Atomic Energy Agency, the P azilian Nuclear Energy Commission and the Government of the State of Goias will hold an international conference, The Radiological Accident with Cs-137, 10 Years Later. The enclosed paper,

" Problems in the United States With Control of Radiation Sources," by James G. Yusko, CHP, and me, will be presented at the conference and has been submitted for inclusion in the conference proceedings under the topic, control of radioactive sources.

The paper focusses on the risks that have been. encountered by the U.S. steel-making industry as a result of radioactive sources that are subject to the Atomic Energy Act, as amended becoming mixed with ferrous metal scrap used in steel-making.

If you have any questions, please feel free to contact either Jim Yusko or me.

Sincer ,

x Jpel . Lubenau, CHP O echnical Assistant to ,

Commissioner Greta J. Dicus

Enclosure:

As stated cc r/o encl: J. Yusko

PROBLEMS IN THE UNITED STATES WITH CONTROL OF RADIOACTIVE SOURCES JoelO. Lubenau U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, MD 20852-2738 INTERNET:JOLONRC. GOV and James G. Yusko Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protecbon 400 Waterfront Drive, Pittsburgh, PA 15222-4745 INTERNET:yusko.}ames@a1.dep. state.pa.us ABSTftACT in the U.S. about two million radioactive sources and devices are used which contain radioaciive materials regulated under the Atomic Energy Act, as amended. Each year, about 200 of these are reportedlost, stolen or abandoned. As a result, rad.tactin sources have entered the public domain in an uncontrolled manner and become potential sources of radiation exposure and contamination. The U.S.

steel-making industry, for example, has been put at risk as a result of radioactive sources becoming mixed with ferrous scrap metalintended for recycling. On 18 occasions, radioactive sources have been accidentally melted by U.S. steel mills resulting in radiation exposures of mill workers and contamination of the mill and millproducts and byproducts The average resulting cost to a steel mill operator has been US$ 10 million but individualmill cost has been as high as US$ 23 million. Each year, of the 200 radioactive sources reported lost, about eight emerge in scrap metalreceived by steel mills but 1 to 2 escape detection and are subsequently melted in fumaces. The annual risks to date for a U.S. steel mill have beer about 1 in 16 of ciiscovery of a radioactive source in r.:etal scrap and about 1 in 100 for accidentally melting a source.

Key words: contamination, exposure, metal scrap, radioactive sources, radiation, recycling, risk, steel INTRODUCTION in the U.S. much concern has been expressed by the metal recycling industries about unwanted radioactive materials, principally radioactive sources and devices containing radioactive materials, in metal

- scrap [1] The following is a preliminary analysis of the risk that has been faced by the segment of the recycling industry that hcs been most adversely affected by this probiern, U.S. steel makes for the period 1994 to June 30,1997. The analysis is based mainly upon data derived from a data base on radioactive materials reported found in recycled metal se: rap that is maintained by Yusko [1], [2]. This database includes data on the steel-making industry dating from 1983 but the 1994 - June,1997 time frame was selected as the most representatrve of recent experience by the U.S. steel-making industry. Information on the U.S. steel-making capacity was prcaided by the American iron and Steel Institute (AISI) [3].

The analysis relates only to radioactive materials subject to the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended ("AEA materials"), to ferrous metal scrap, and to the U.S. steel-making industry. AEA materials comprise only about half of the radioactive sources and devices found in all metal scrap with radium comprising most of the remainder [2]. In the U.S., radium is not subject to licensing by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (USNRC) although itis licensed or otherwise regulated by most of the States.

The 18 reported meltings of radioactive materials by U.S. steel makers have involved AEA materials.

Thus, their concems are directed primarily at the US NRC and this risk analysis focusses on AEA materials.

2 This analysis is preliminary and has not been subject to indepenc'ent review, Accoraingly,

% thkuld be used with appropriate cautaan.

Disclaimer- This papur does not represent agreed-upon staffposhions of the NRC or the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection, nor have these agencies approved the technicalcontent.

RISKS o There are 128 steel-making mills in the U.S. operating steel-making fumaces that use ferrous scrap, i.e., electric arc fumaces (EAFs) and basic oxygen famaces (BOFs). These steel makers represent the bulk of the U.S. steel-making capacity and consumption of ferrous scrap for steel making.

o There are approximatety 2 million licensed sources and devices containing AEA materials in the U.S.

1.5 million of these are held under NRC and Agreement State generallicenses [4]. Another 800,000 are estimated to be held under US NRC and Agreement State specific licenses. [5]. Given the uncertainties of these estimates, the totalis rounded off to one significant figure, or,2,000,000.

o According to the NRC, each year, abo it 200 AEA sources and devices are reported to the NRC or the Agreement States as lost, stolen or abandoned. [6] This represents a 10d loss rate.

This, h wever, is probably not the true lost rate. Licensees who report losses of licensed matenal must know a) that they possess licensed material, b) the material has been lost or stolen, c) that there are requirements to report the loss and d) that tney make the report. If any one of these conditions is not met, then the US NRC or the Agreement Sta'.e does 'M get a report. Since most generallicensees are not routinely inspected (and they possess three-quarters of the sources), there is no regulatory program backup to identify unreported general licensee losses.

o Each year, about 8 AEA sources or devices are reported found in metal scrap or melted by U.S.

steel makers (Table 1). This means about 4% of the AEA sources and devices reported lost by licensees are discovered by U.S. steel makers.

Additionally, each year about 9 sources o- devices containing radium are found in metal scrap received by U.S. steel mills. Other sources containing AEA and other radioactive materials, or unidentified sources, are also found by metal scrap processors.

o There has been about a f in 16 annual nsk that an AEA source or device will be in metal scrap received by a U.S. steel-making mill.

This is based on an annual rate of 8 AEA sources and devices found by 128 U.S. steel-making mills over 3.5 years.

o There has been about a f in 7 annualnsk that an AEA source or device will not be detected and consequently will be melted by a U S. steel-making mill. The derivation of this risk is as follows:

it is believed that most, if not all, of the U.S. steel makers perform radiation monitoring of incoming ferrous scrap. Over tae period 1994 - June 30,1997 24 AEA sources of materia' were detected and 4 AEA sources were melted (i e., were not detected) by U.S. steel mills or a ratio of 1 to 7.

o As a result, there has been about a 1 in 100 annual risk that each U.S. s, teel-making mill will molt an AEA source or device. This risk factor was derived as follows:

c c

w . _ _ _ -

3 in the historical time period,1983 to June 30,1997, there were 18 meltings of AEA material by U.S. steel-making mills. [2] For a population of 128 steel-making mills, this works out to a 0.010 or a 1 in 100 risk, but not all steel-making mills were performing radiation monitoring of incoming ferrous scrap during this period, especially in the early years. For the period under review,1994 to June 30,1997, there have baen 4 meltings of AEA material which represents a similar risk of 0.00893 or 1 in 112.

DISCUSSION 3 The 10d annual rate of loss of licensed AEA sources and devices results in an annual risk of 108 for a U.S. steel-making mill of inetting an AEA source or device. Although this ar.nual loss rate of AEA radioactive sources and devices appears to be relatively low, the large population of sources and devices msults in a relatively large number of sources and devices lost each year, a si'.aation that the Intemational Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) warned about. [7]

U.S. steel makers who have melted AEA materials have suffered multi-million dollar losses resulting from the costs of decontaminating their mills, waste disposal and mill downtime. The Steel Manukturing Association has reported average losses for its members who melted AEA material of US$

10 million and, in one case, a cost to the mill operator of US$ 23 million.

U.S. steel makers have also invested in installation of radiation manufacturing systems to detect radioact;ve sources in metal scrap Technicalimprovements in these systems have enhanced the effectiveness of these systems, nonetheless, metal scrap radiation detection systems, while very sensitive and clearly providing a significant degree of protection,(i e.,24 avoided meltings in the 1994 -

June 30,1997 time period), cannot provide 100% protection.

CONCLUSIONS Each year about 200 AEA sources and devices are rrported lost, stolen or abandoned, about 8 will show up at U.S. steel-making mills and 1 to 2 wtil escape detection and be melted.

As a result, in the period 1994 - June 30,1997, each of the 128 U.S. Steel making mills faced the following risks:

About a 1 in 16 annual risk of an AEA source or device in metal scrap received for recycling.

About a 1 in 7 annual risk that the AEA source or device would not be detected by radiation monitoring of the scrap and consequently will be melted in a steel-mak' g fumace, and About a 1 in 100 annual risk of melting an AEA source or device in a steel-making furnace.

3 The financial impact on the U.S. steel-making industry resulting from lost radioact;ve sources becoming accidentally melted in steel-making fumaces is significant. Thus far, in the U.S., radiation exposures of workers and the public resulting from such events has been minimal. It must also be bome in mind, however, that there is always a risk of serious radiation exposure when a licensed source enters the public domain in an uncontrolled manner such as becoming mixed with metal scrap destined for recycling.

The IAEA observed, in its report on the radiolog'.:al accident in Goiania, Brazil, that the accident

" bears out a cardinal rule of radiological protection, namely that the security of the source is of paramount importance."[8] Primary responsibility for radiation safety including security of a radiation source lies with the licensee. However, it is also recognized that actions by regulatory authorities can influence the overall performance by licensees with respect to this responsibility. In the U.S.. the Steel Manufacturers Association is on record as advocating ieguletory changes by the NRC to improve the control and accountability of AEA sources by licensees, a recommendation that was also made by NRC staff in a 1996

4 report [4] NRC staff have been directed by the Commissiol to develop regulatory options to accomplish this forits consideration. [9] 3 Table 1: AEA Materials Found by U.S. Steel makers in Metal Scrap AEA Materials Found AEA But Not Materials Total Y. tat Melted Melted 6E6 94 8 2 10 95 6 0 6 96 6 0 6 E 3 2 0 Totals 24 4 28 Notes

• 7hrough June 30,1997 REFERENCES

[1] LUBENAU, J.O.; YUSKO J.G. Radioactive materials in recycled metals. Health Phys 68.440-451,1995.

[2] LUBENAU, J.O.; YUSKO, J G Radioactive materials in recycled metals. f.*;;alth Phys. In press.

Requests for copies of the database should be sent to J. Yusko.

[3] HERNANDEZ, P. Personal communication to J. Lubenau, dated September 15,1997.

[4] U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION. Finalreport of the NRC-Agreement State Working Group to Evaluate Control and Accountability of Licensed Devices, NUREG-1551.

AvailaF. from the National Technical Information Service, Springfield, VA 22161 0002, U.S.,

1996.

[5] U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY CO'MMISSION. Memorandum to Files from Joel O. Lubenau dated September 4,1997, subject: Risks to U.S. Steel Mills of Radioactive Sources and ' Devices Being Mixed With Recycled Metal Scrap, Available from the NRC Public Document P >om,2120 L Street, NW, Washington, DC 20555-001, U.S.,1997.

[6] U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION. Memorandum from James M. Taylor, Executive .'

Director for Operations to the Commissioners dated April 5,1995, subject' Revised abnormal oxurrence reporting criteria, SECY-95-083. Available from the NRC Public Document Room.

2120 L Street, NW, Washington, DC 20555-001, U.S.,1995.

[7] INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY. Nature and magnitude of the problem of spent radiation sources,IAEA TECDOC-620. Intemational Atomic Energy Agency,Venna, Austria, 1991.

[8] INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY. The radiologicaf accidentin Goldnia, STvPU&B15. Intemational Atomic Energy Agency. Vienna, Austria,1991.

5

- 19] U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION. Memorandum kom John Hoyle. Secretary to James M. Taylor, Execut.% Director for Operations dated December 31,1996, subject: StaW requirements SECY-96 221... Available from the NRC Public Document Room,2120 L Street, NW, Washington, DC 20555-001, U.S.,1996.

. _