ML20198A373
| ML20198A373 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Surry  |
| Issue date: | 12/04/1997 |
| From: | Guttmann J NRC OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REGULATORY RESEARCH (RES) |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REGULATORY RESEARCH (RES) |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9801050358 | |
| Download: ML20198A373 (86) | |
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISGION WASHINGTON, o.C. asseHe01
%,e...+ December 4, 1997 MEMORANDUM TO: THE FILES o FROM: Jack Guttmann gd 'M/, p _ _._ "#
Sr. Reliability an isk Assessment Engineer Probabilistic Risk Analysis Branch Division of Systems Technology Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research
SUBJECT:
MEETING
SUMMARY
MEETING WITH THE WESTINGHOUSE OWNERS
- ROUP ON IMPLEMENTATION OF RISK INFORMED INSERVICE INSPECTION PROGRAMS FOR PIPING On November 19,1997, representatives from the Westinghouse Owners Group met with the NRC staff to discuss the completion of the WOG topical report (WCAP-14572, Revision 1), the conclusions from the results of the Surry pilot plant submittal, and the schedule for approving the Surry submittal and the associated WCAP for risk informed inservice inspection programs of piping.
The Westinghouse Owners Group requested approval of the topical report and the Surry submittal by June / July 1998. This would permit application of the Rl ISI program during the Fall outage at the Surry Unit 1 plant.
Results from the Surry analysis identified improvement in risk from piping failures can be obtained when implementing a risk informed inservice inspection program, while at the same time reducing radiation exposure to plant personnel. Cost for developing the program would be paid back in approximately 2 years. The estimated cost for performing the analysis was
$300,000.
The major contributors to risk came from mitigating system failures. The augmented inspection programs for sensitized stainless steel and erosion / corrosion appear to reduce the risk by an order of magnitude. Current Class-1, 2, and 3 piping do not contain all of the high-safety-significant segments.
The WOG imposed a criterion that no single systems centribute more than 10% of the piping risk. This criterion is more restrictive than the guidance presented in DG 1063.
The analysis and criterion outlined above, led to 45 NDE examinations on Class 3 and non-Class piping. This was comprised of 35 ND5 and 10 visualinspections.
In response to tho WOG request to receive an approval of the topical report and the Surry I
submittal by June / July,1998, the NRC staff informed the WOG that it was working on developing such a schedule. The staff stated that a letter to the WOG will be forthcoming in the <1 5
near future that addresses the scheduling issue. {j l) g 9001050358 971204 ~
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2 Attached is a copy of the attundance list, the handouts, and the Federal Register Notice annotincing the meeting.
Attachments:
Attendance List Handouts Public Meeting Announcement Distributiori: PRAB Subject File Center File MWHodges BSheron MCunningham GBagchi MMayfield Glainus JStrosnider SAli DJeng SDinsmore DJackson GMillman FSimonen (PNNL) DWhitehead (SNL) DWeakland (WOG)
K Balkey (W) EThrockmorton (V, Power) PDR Document Name: G: meeting.n19 T9 receive a copy of this document, Indicate in the box: "C" = Copy without attachmentconclosure *E" = Copy with attachment / enclosure *N" = No copy OFFICE DST /PRAB E DSVPRAEl / _
NAME JGuttmann/mb GY MCt)hbihgham DATE t1/3/97 NM7 _
OFFICIAL RECORD COPY (RES File Code) RES 2C1 A & -1B
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WOG Implementation of Risk-
- Informed Inservice Inspection woG .
.- EE500001 Presentation to NRC
, November 19,1997 by:
Westinghouse Owners Group /
Virginia Power /
Westinghouse 1
11/18/97
i i !
[
- Agenda woe. Hi
~
l m introduction / Purpose of Meeting a Final Surry Risk and Expert Panel Results l u Structural Element Matrix Mapping for Surry a Perdue Model Overview, inputs, Outputs and insights
~
m Element Location /NDE Selection a Change in Risk Calculations m Comparison to Current ASME Section XI a Economic Evaluation a implementation, Monitoring and Feedback u Documentation a How We Meet the General Risk-informed Framework u Where We Differ from Draft RI-ISI RG/SRP l
m Additional items / Actions I1/18/97 2 k
l i
Introduction / Purpose of Meeting
. wOG -
]DDl l m Purpose of meeting l - To discuss complete WOG Topical approach l (WCAP-14572, Revision 1 and Supplement 1 on l SRRA) and Surry Submittal results from :
Risk evaluation -
Expert panel categorization Element /NDE Selection Program implementation and Feedback
- To discuss DG-1063 and WOG differences
- To discuss schedule 1I/18/97 3
Overall WOG Risk-Informed ISI Process woe
~
- DDI Expert Panel 4............ '
Consec,uence Categorization ,... -
Evaluation ,-
. i Scope and ***"
Risk- -
Implement Segment Evaluation Program ,
Definition Select i on Structural Element '
Failure Probability Feedback Assessment Loop I1/18/97 4 I
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Surry Risk Results Summary wOG -
O[]DDl i m Piping CDF/LERF Results {not plant totalXpoint estimates}
- CDF No Operator Action = 6.28E-05/ year
- CDF Operator Action = 4.05E-06/ year
- LERF No Operator Action = 5.18E-06/ year
- LERF Operator Action = 4.46E-07/ year i
11/18/97 6
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Table 3.6 2 SURRY UNIT I NUMBER OF SEGMENTS AND PIPING RISK CONTRIBUTION BY SYSTEM Number CDF CDF LERF LERF of No Operator with Operator No Operator with Operator System Segawats Action Action Action Action l ACC 15 4.68E Il 3.06E Il 2.76E Il 3.81E Il l AFW 32 6.54E-6 2.59E 7 2.66E 7 1.28E 8 l AS 2 7.84E 9 7.84E 9 7.85E-9 7.85E-9 l BD 12 4.60E 7 4.60E 7 2.68E 7 2.68E 7 l CC 66 2.34E.8 1.90E-8 1.97E-8 1.60E 8 l Cif 44 2.73E 7 2.73E 'I l 54E 9 1.54E 9 l CN 9 1.20E 6 4.27E 8 6.74E.8 1.13E 9 l CS 16 1.42E 7 9.74E 9 1.21E 8 2.17E 9 l CW 16 1.00E-7 1.00E 7 2.79E 9 2.79E 9 l ECC 8 9.78E 11 9.78E Il 8.08E 12 8 08E 12 l EE 7 5.56E 10 5.56E.10 7.82E 12 7.82E 12 l FC 9 N/A N/A N/A N/A l FW 20 4.76E 7 4.75E 7 2.5IE 8 I315 8 l HHI 27 8.0$E 7 1.71E 7 7.17E-8 1.88E-8 l LHI 18 8.79E 8 1.44E 9 7.43E 9 5.02E Il l MS 38 4.25E 7 4.25E 7 1.03E 8 1.03E 8 l RC % 1.61E-6 1.60E-6 4.56E 9 4.54E 9 l RH I1 6.54E 8 6.54E 8 6.55E 8 6.55E-8
- l RS 13 3.81E 9 1.58E 9 5.85E 12 0 l
l SW $4 4.37E 5 1.43E 7 4.13E-6 1.02E 8 l VS 2 6.84E-6 0 2.24E 7 0 l TOTAL 515 6.28E 5 4.05E 6 5.18E 6 4.46E 7 l
l l
o us27..t.wpr 1b.800597 107
Surry Sensitivity Results Summary woe E
>4 E E DDI s Sensitivity study results
- No credit for augmented programs a Piping CDF/LERF Results (not plant totalXpoint .
l estimates) ;
I
- CDF No Operator Action = 1.35E-04/ year CDF Operator Action = 1.84E-05/ year
- LERF No Operator Action = 1.04E-05/ year
- LERF Operator Action = 3.32E-06/ year u No additional piping segments identified other than those already in augmented programs ,
i i1/18/97 8
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Table 3.6 6 l
l SURRY UNIT 1 l .
AUGMENTED PROGRAM SENSITIVITY l PIPING RISK CONTRIBUTION BY SYSTEM Number of CDF CDF with LERF LERF with System Sessments No OP Action OP Action No OF Action OP Action l ACC 15 4.68E Il 3.06E Il 2.76E Il 3.81E Il l AFW 32 6.35E 5 7.92E 7 2.56E-6 7.30E 8 l AS 2 7.84E 9 7.84E 9 7.85E.9 7.85E 9 l BD 12 4.60E-6 4.60E 6 2.68E 6 2.68E 6 l CC 66 2.34E 8 1.90E 8 1.97E B 1.60E 8 l CH 44 2.73E 7 2.73E 7 1.54E 9 l 54E 9 .
l CN 9 1.32E-6 1.63E 7 6.96E 8 3.33E 9 l CS 16 1.48'J 7 9.74E.9 1.26E 8 2.17E 9 l CW 16 1.00E.7 1.00E 7 2.79E 9 2.79E-9 l ECC 8 2.41E 10 2.4tE 10 8.14E 12 8.14E 12 l EE 7 5.56E 10 5.56E 10 7.82E 12 7.82E 12 l PC 9 N/A N/A N/A N/A l FW 20 4.76E-6 4.75E-6 2.5iE 7 2.5IE 7 l HHI 27 3.43E-6 1.60E-6 2.60E 7 1.07E 7 l LHI 18 9.97E.3 2.25E 9 8.53E 9 2.32E 10 l MS 38 4.02E 6 4.02E-6 9.73E 8 9.73E-8 l RC % 1.83E 6 1.82E-6 4.82E 9 4.80E 9 l RH II 6.54E B 6.54E 8 6.55E 8 6.55E 8 l RS 13 3.8tE 9 1.58E 9 5.85E 12 0 l SW $4 4.37E.5 1.43E 7 4.13E-6 1.02E 8 l VS 2 6.84E 6 0 2.24E-7 0 l TOTAL 515 IJ5E 4 184E 5 1.04E 5 3.32E 6 oAM27=.I.wpf.lbl00597 124
Uncertainty Study Results
~
woG ..
_ _ [ 01 m Uncertainty study process
- Fit a distribution such that the median of the lognormal distribution is equal to the point estimate
- Assumed factors for analysis (conditional CDF/LERF or failure probability)
Point estimate <1 E-04, factor =20 Point estimate >1E-02, factor = 5 I
Otherwise, factor = 10
- Recalculated CDF, LERF, and RRW and RAW values 11/18/97 s .
Uncertainty Study Results (cont.)
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~
1 WOG m Piping CDF/LERF Results (not plant totalXmeans)
- CDF No Operator Action = 2.11E-04/ year
- CDF Operator Action = 2.71E-05/ year
- LERF No Operator Action = 2.41E-05/ year
- LERF Operator Action = 2.74E-06/ year a Additional segments identified as HSS
- AFW-28
- CS-5, 6, 7, 8, 9
- HHI-4A, 5A, 6A
- RC-10,11,12,13,14,15
- RS-9,10
- SW-9,10 1I II/18/97 t <
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. i l Table 3.6 7
, l SURRY UNIT 1 l UNCERTAthTY ANALYSIS ,
l MEAN PIPING RISK CONTRIBUTION BY SYSTEM E
LERF Number CDF CDF LERF With of No Operator With Operator No Operator Operator System Segments Action Action Action Action ACC 15 3.07E 9 3.10E 9 7.40E 10 8.74E 10 AFW 32 2.82E 5 1.41E 6 1.87E 6 1.74E 7 ,
AS 2 3.24E 8 3.29E 8 3.31E 8 3.41E 8 BD 12 1.20E 6 1.16E 6 6.98E 7 6.95E 7 CC 66 1.3SE 7 1.16E 7 1.03E 7 8.70E 8 CH 44 1.94E 6 l.97E-6 1.51E 8 1.32E 8 CN 9 8.39E 6 5.23E 7 4.61E 7 1.07E 7 CS 16 2.54E 6 4.98E 7 3.45E 7 4.61E 7 CW 16 5.20E 7 5.23E 7 2.30E 8 2.41E 8 ECC 8 7.50E 10 8.28E 10 1.09E 10 9.83E-Il EE 7 4.56E 9 3.80E 9 3.26E 10 2.79E 10 FC 9 N/A N/A N/A N/A FW 20 2.27E-6 2.22E-6 1.56E 7 1.56E 7 ,
HH1 27 4.0lE 6 1.27E 6 6.05E-7 2.45E 7 ,
l.HI 18 4.49E 7 2.00E 8 6.04E 8 2.58E 9 MS 38 2.13E-6 2.09E-6 8.94E-8 8.65E 8 RC % 1.26E 5 1.29E 5 7.00E-8 7.26E 8 RH 11 4.60E 7 4.70E-7 5.42E-7 5.08E-7 RS 13 1.16E 6 1.25E 6 2.75E 10 0 SW $4 1,17E-4 6.98E 7 1.76E 5 7.03E 8 VS- 2 2.80E 5 0 1.43E-6 0 TOTAL 515 2.llE 4 2.71E 5 2.41E 5 2.74E 6 .
. us27..i wprib ioos97 128
- t O l
l Expert Panel Evaluation
- ~ Bl
~
WOG .
l s Expert Panel Guidance Document Contents
- Purpose and Scope
- Expert Panel Membership Plant Maintenance Rule Coordinator, Safety Analysis, PSA, Plant Operations, Plant Engineering, System Design and Operation, inservice Inspection, Plant I Maintenance, NDE, and Stress and Materials Expert
- Expert Panel Quorum Operations, PSA, ISI, and system engineer '
- Expert Panel Leader (or alternate) l 4'
i1/18/97 13 !
a
- Expert Panel Evaluation l WOG .
00l m Expert Panei Guidance Document Contents (cont.)
[
j - Expert Panel Training i
Overall process, use of PSA and SRRA, acceptance
[ criteria, etc.
l
- Member's Responsibility l - Meeting Decisionmaking Process l Consensus -unanimous first time then 2/3 vote second l
time
- Records
- Minutes, master list of systems, master list of r worksheets, master list of elements selected, training l documentation i i1/18/97 14 i
i i
j < .
r at i
l Expert Panel Evaluation
- WOG DDj j u Information Provided to Expert Panel l - Piping System Summary i System Safety Function l
Maintenance Rule Functions ;
! RI-ISI Summary (scope, consequence, failure probability,
) risk significance, deterministic considerations) i l;
- Piping Segment Worksheets
! - Failure Probability Worksheets I
- 11/18/97 15 l
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TABLE 3.616 SURRY UNIT I
SUMMARY
OF HIGH SAFETY SIGNIFICANT SEGMENTS AS DETERMINED BY PLANT EXPERT PASTL Number of High Number of Low Safety Significant Safety Significant System Number of Segments Segments Segments l ACC 15 0 15 l AFW 32 11 21 l AS 2 2 0 l BD 12 6 6 l CC 66 6 60 l CH 44 8 36 l CN 9 0 9 l CS 16 0 16 l CW 16 4 12 l ECC 8 7 1 l EE 7 0 7 l FC 9 0 9 l FW 20 13 7 l HH1 27 14 13 l LH1 18 7 11 l MS 38 3 35 l RC 96 11 85 l RH 11 4 7 l RS 13 2 11 l SW 54 8 46 l VS 2 2 0 l TOTAL 515 108 407 ousn..I wpr ib-ioo697 152
e e
Table 3.617 SURRY UNIT 1
SUMMARY
OF HIGil SAFETY SIGNIFICANT SEGMENTS l Segment ids Description of Segments Baals for Safety Signifiennee AFW-4.5,6 AFW pumps to check valves Loss of emergency condensate storage tank (CST) and all flowpaths to each AFW pump; fligh leak probability from corrosion AFW 15,16,17,lB,19 hping between check valves and MOVs Loss of craergency CST and all auxiliary feedwatar, including crosstie from Unit 2; flow-assisted corrosion (FAC) program needs to continue AFW 30,31,32 Piping from check valves to manual Loss of turbine driven AFW pump and valves motor driven AFW pump oil cooler; possible water spray impact resulting in loss of all AFW pumps AS 1 hping above the component cooling Indirect effect of spray and jet water pumps impingement on component cooling water (CCW) pumps, Unit 1 CCW system disabled AS 2 hping above component cooling pumps; indirect effect of spray and jet piping under power cables to the impingement on 3 CCW pumps and charginF pump I charging pump D D-2D,3,$ D,6,8 D,9 Containment penetration to containment Loss of containment intytrity, small isolation valve, piping beyond outside steam line break outside co.*tainment containment isolation valves with no reactor trip, loss of blowdown, loss of SG isolation on steam generatur tube rupture (SGTR); indirect effects of spray and jet impingement on CCW supply, main steam (MS) trip valve, 3 safety injection (SI) LlOVs CC 25,30,33 CCW for the RCPs from containment Loss of Unit I and 2 CCW systems, penetration loss of coolms to the RCP motors causing reactor trip, previous leaks on line CC 28A,2SD CCW pipe on the discharge of RCPs Loss of Unit I and 2 CCW systems inside containment, loss of cooling to the RCP motors causing reactor trip, potent.at thermal barrier leak CC 29 CCW pipe on the RCPs thermal barrier Loss of Unit I and 2 CCW systems, discharge paths loss of cooling to the RCP motors causing reactor trip, potential thermal barrier leak ous27..uptwme97 153
l I
e l Tame 3.617 (cont.) ,
SURRY UNIT 1
SUMMARY
OF HIGH SAFETY SIGNIFICANT SEGMENTS I l Sessnest ids Description of Sesaments Basis for Safet,' Signineamee CH 5 Containment penetration for RCP seal !
l Indirect effects of spray and jet injection return to MOV impingement causing loss of CCW to RHR,3 MS uip valves,3 St MOVs.
one blowdown MOV CH.7A,8,9,10 Bypass line on seal return from RCPs; t.ine failure resulu in small LOCA; piping to RCP seals between 3 pump vibratory fatigue concerns casings and check valves CH.ll 12,13 Seal injection path between containment Loss of charging system support to penetration RCPs: vibratory fatigue concerns CW.5,6,7,8 Condenser circulating water (CW) Loss of each CW header to condenser, supply header from intake structure to loss of cooling to recirc spray heat intersection of exchangers (HX); loss of service water supply to bearing cooling HX and emergency switch gear chillers; indirect effects from flooding ECC0 Piping from refueling water storage tank Loss of RWST outside containment; (RWST) to check valves crosstic to Unit 2 would not automatically activate ECC. I .2,3 Piping to cold legs between 18 and 2d Loss of RWST inside containment; isolation (check) valves potential inter system (IS) LOCA initiating event; degradation of cold leg injection; only one injection path to a cold leg, flow restrictors limit flow; common mode failure mechanism ECC.5,6,7 Piping to hot legs between 1" and 2"' Loss of injection to each hot leg on isolation (check) valves recirculation from high and low
. pressure trains; Potential ISLOCA initiating event; degradation of hot leg injection path FW. I .2,3,4,5,6,7 From feedwater (FW) headers to 18t24 Loss of main feedwater reducer; supply lines to FW pumps; recirculation header to conderwr; FW i
pump discharge header l FW 12,13.14,15,16,17 Feedwater header to steam generatcrt, Loss of main feedwater
! HHl l.2.3 Piping from RWST to suction of Loss of RWST and loss of Unit 2 charging pumps P.WST cross-connect to charging pumps l
ova:7..i *pt it, io*97 154 l
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- i Table 3.617 (cont.)
SURRY UNIT 1
SUMMARY
OF HIGH SAFETf SIGNIFICANT SEGMENTS l Segmeent ids Description of Segments Basis for Safety Signincance HHI 4C,5C,6C Discharge piping from charging pumps Loss of RWST, loss of Unit 2 RWST l cross-connect to Unit I charging pumps and loss of Unit 2 charging pumps cross-connect to unit, loss of volume control tank (VCT) and boric acid tank (BAT) to the charging pumps HHI 8.9 Normal charging / injection to cold and Loss of RWST outside containment, ;
hot legs / scal injection between several loss of Unit 2 RWST cross-connect to i valves Unit I, and loss of Unit 2 charging pumps cross connect; loss of VCT and '
BAT HHI 10.ll Normal injection paths to cold legs Loss of RWST outside containment, between several valves and containment loss of Unit 2 RWST cross-connect to Unit I, and loss of Unit 2 charging pumps cross-connect; potential interruption of high head now until operator recognites, isolates and aligns alternate charging HHl.12A To cold legs between several valves less of all cold leg in>cetion HHi 13,15 Alternate / normal injection path to Loss of RP'tT outside containment, cold / hot legs beteen MOVs and loss of Unit 2 RWST cross-connect to containment Unit 1, and loss of Urn. 2 charging pumps cross connect, and loss of alternate path of HHSI to cold legs:
, indirect effects from spray and jet impingement on CCW supply and several MOVs HHI17 Normal injection path to hot legs Loss of containment sump inventory if between MOV and containm-nt MOV is open; loss of alternate path of HHSI to hot legs (but normal path available) if MOV is closed LHI 3,4 Containment sump to MOV Loss of recirculation from each low pressure injection train LHI 7,8 Train B/A from check valve to HPl Loss of RWST outside containment.
suction MOV, RWST recire, hot leg Break momentarily disrupts now, injection MOV and cold leg injection Large break LOCA LH pumps most important depening on timing, HH pumps could provide core cooling.
o 9 :2 4 i =pfItui00691 155
l 0
Table 3.647 (cont.)
SURRY UNIT 1 SUMh1ARY OF lilGli SAFETY SIGNIFICANT SEGh1ENTS ,
l Segment ids Description of Segments Basis for Safety Significance LHI9.10 Cold leg injection from SI MOVs to SI- Loss of RWST outside containment. ;
MOV and CV Si valves Break momentarily disrupts flow.
Large break LOCA LH pumps most important depending on timing, HH pumps could provide core cooling.
i LHI18 Piping from 1 SI.MOVs to I.CH MOVs Loss of RWST outside containment and loss of Unit 2 cross connection; Loss of low and high pressure recirculation.
Break momentarily disrupts flow.
Large break LOCA LH pumps most important depending on timing, HH pumps could provide core cooling.
MS 32 Common main steam supply header to Main steam line break (MSLB) outside turbine driven AFW pump from check containment. Jet impingement from valves to normally closed valves and MS line crack would damage all steam trap components in MS valve house (all 3 AFW pumps, both containment spray pumps,3 MS relief valves. Concern also in blowing down all 3 steam generators. (FAC program currently in place).
MS 33,34 Common main steam supply header to Loss of main steam to turbine-driven the turbine driven AFW pump from AFW pump. MSLB outside normally closed valves containment. Jet impingement from MS line crack would damage all components in MS valve house (all 3 AFW pumps, both containment spray pumps,3 MS relief valves.
RC 16,17,18 Safety injection from first isolanon Potential large, medium, or small check valve to Reactor coolant system LOCA depending on break size with a loop hot leg potential for striping / stratification and thermal fatigue.
RC 37.38.39 Loop fill header from Reactor Coolant Potential small LOCA with high System to cold leg. potential for vibratory fatigue RC-41,42,43 Safety injection from first isolation Potential large, medium, or small check valve to reactor coolant loop cold LOCA depending on break size with a leg. potential for striping / stratification RC 58,59 crom PORV block valve to pressurizer Loss of cold overpressure mitigation PORV, capability during shutdown oVu?..twpf it too697 156
o Table 3.617 (coat.)
SURRY UNIT 1
SUMMARY
OF HIGH SAFETY SIGNIFICANT SEGMENTS l Segawat ids Description of Segments Basis for Safety Signincance RH 2 Header line between the two Residual Loss of RHR during steam generator Heat Removal suction isolation valves tube rupture (leads to LERF). Also loss of RHR and potential LOCA during shutdown RH 3 From Residual hesi .emoval suction Loss of RHR during steam generator isolation valves through pumps and heat tube rupture (leads to LERF). Also i eschangers to discharge motor operated loss of RHR and potential LOCA valves during shutdown RH 3B Line off main RHR header after RHR Loss of RHR during steam generator heat enchangers to RWST return line tube rupture (leads to LERF). Also isolation valve. loss of RHR and potential LOCA during shutdown RHil RWST return line between two isolation Loss of containmeni boundary if the valves and through con *.ainment path is open. Previous containment penetration integrity issue ,
RS 3A 4A From containment sump penetration to Loss of ORS pumps. Containment pump inlet isolation valve penetration. Failure could lead to direct release outside containm.:nt (LERF).
SW 4.5.6 From service water pump discharge Loss of one ser se water pump with through the diesel cooler and shaft wastage potential; previous fiberglass bearing oil cooler to the intake structure failures at plant SW 44,45 Line from header to the charging pump Loss of cooling to one of the charging intermediate seal cooler pumps; potential spray may disable all charging pumps SW t6.47 From charging pump intermediate seal Loss of cooling to one of the charging cooler to discharge header pumps; potential spray may disable all charging pumps SW 54 Charging pump cooler discharge header Loss of cooling to one of the charging to unit I and Unit 2 isolation valves to pumps; potential spray may disable all main discharge header charging pumps VS 1 Makeup supply to surge tank Loss of Units I and 2 control Rooms and Emergency Switchgear Rooms Water Cooled Chillers VS 2 *the main piping of the chilled water Loss of Units I and 2 control Rooms system and Emergency Switchgear Rooms Water Cooled Chillers l OVs27w l.wpf Ib ID(87 1$7
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Mapping of Surry Segments on Structural Element Selection Matrix +
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- EDM (a) S U S C E P TIB LE LO C A TIO N S OWNER (100 % )
H IG H -------------------------------
F A ILU R E D E FIN E D PROGRAM (b) IN S P E C TIO N IMPORTANCE LO C ATIO N SEGMENT S E L E C TIO N PROCESS 1
3 153 S E G M E N TS 70 SEG M EN TS O N LY IN S P E C TIO N LO W LO C ATIO N F A ILU R E SYSTEM PRESSURE
' TEST & VISU AL S ELE C TIO N IM P O R TA N C E E X A M IN A TIO N PROCESS SEGMENT 4 2 254 SEG M EN TS 38 SEG M ENTS LOW H IG H SAFETY SAFETY SIG NIFIC AN T S IG N IFIC A N T o
S E G M E N T. SEGMENT 24 11/18/97
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woe .
. e 9]DI Perdue Model C'verview, Inputs, Outputs and Insights i
l 25 1I/18/97 1
Perdue Model Overview
. J was .
EEC :001 m Perdue Model used to assist in selecting minimum number of locations for inspection - primarily for Regions 1(b) & 2 m Uses consumer risk to assess how many structural elements need to be inspected to meet a specified level of reliability a Models several sampling schemes 26 iI/I8/97 O E
i l
l Perdue. Statistical Model Inputs l woG '
4 Bl 1
m Number of welds in segment { lot?
l m Prob of flaw (a/t>.10) @ at a given weld at current plant life (from SRRA?
m Conditional leak probability of leak /yr/ weld during remaining life {from SRRA) m Sample size, including prob of detection a Target leak rate /yr/ weld
{ leak rates based on DG-1063, Table A2.9?
m Confidence level - 95%
11/I8/97 27
Perdue Model Inputs woG .
- 2 001 SUGGESTED TARGET LEAK RATES (PER YEAR /PER WELD) FOR PERDUE MODEL NOMINAL PIPE SIZE (Inches)
MATERIAL s1 1< Diameter <4 24 Stainless Steel 1.0E-5 1.0E-5 1.0E-6 Ferritic Steel 1.0E-5 1.0E-6 5.0E-6 28 11/18/97
i 1
Perdue Model Outputs WOG -
E ]DDI L m Outputs i
! -5 sampling plans '
l Pre-ISI (no inspection)
Double sample plan (sample size = 1)
Double sample plan (sample size = 2) ;
Single sample plan (POD = 1)
Single sample plan (POD input) ,
i 11/18/97 29
Perdue Model Outputs
<wQG . .
EE ]_00l m Outputs (cont.}
- Consumer risk (prob. that leak rate /yr/ lot >
target) for each sample plan
- Confidence (prob. that leak rate /yr/ lot <
target) for each sample plan
- Mean leak /yr/ lot
- Variance (leak /yr/ lot)
- Prob. of sampling 100% of lot 30 iI/18/97
Perdue Model Uses wee . .s 00001 r; Used to assess / defend appropriate number of inspections for:
- HSS pipirg where exams may be added, reallocated, or reduced from current ASME Section XI requirements
- Highly reliable LSS piping where Section XI NDE requirements are eliminated (for WOG Topical only) m Confidence levels > 95% are acceptable 31 11/18/97
Perdue Model Uses woo E E DDI m Limitations
- Not recommended for high failure potential degradation mechanisms accelerated cracking from high vibratory fatigue, stress-corrosion, other aggressive !oading conditions degradation from flow-assisted corrosion, erosion, general corrosion socket welds (surface and volumetric exams of little value)
- Not recommended for locations where corrective actions have.been taken (e.g., coatings programs, weld overlays)
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l Table 3.7-3
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l SURRY UNIT 1 1 l SAMPLE RESULTS FROM PERDUE MODEL ANALYSIS k
l Nominal Prabability of Conditional Pre-ISI Doobie Sample Plan Number of Pipe Size Number Flaw (att = 0.10) Probability of Cerfidence Confidence (POD = 8 2) Samples per l
Segment (inches) of Welds at 25 Years Leak (per yr) (%) (%) Segment l
ECC-3 6 6 5.38E-02 5.0lE4)6 100 100 I l
l ECC-4 6 138 4.99E-02 1.34E-07 100 100 Om lilli-4C 3 9 3.08E-32 1.56E-06 100 100 I l
y l 11111-9 2 82 2.87E-01 2.06E-05 99.99 99.99 I lilli-12A 2 38 2.87E-01 2.06E-05 99.55 99.55 1 l
Lill-4 12 2 1.53E-02 6.42E-07 100 100 I l
l RC-7 36 10 7.66E-04 1.07E-06 99.24 99.24 Om l RC-16 6 7 3.38E-02 3.15E-07 100 100 I RC-58 3 4 3.08E-02 3.40E-07 100 100 I l
l l Notes:
l (1) L.ow safety significant segments. Results show high confklence with no subsequent inspe:tions (Pre-ISI column).
l l
~
i Statistical Model Results woe _
. . OE : 01 m 53 NDE exams defined to complement existing augmented programs to address segments (or portions of segments) requiring 100% examination m 67 NDE exams identified per statistical evaluation of 1
high safety significant piping segments a No NDE exams required per statistical evaluation where current ASME Section XI exams being removed from low safety significant segments a 16 NDE exams added for defense-in-depth and change in risk calculations 35 iI/18/97
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Perdue Model Insights l wOG . .
]I]ODl a Differences with DG-1063 .
i a Perdue model verifies if a segment has a high or low
- failure importance; no "in-between" situations were j discovered from approximately 135 evaluations t
s Limitations in the target leak rates determined - need
- to obtain target leak rates as a function of pipe
- diameter, pipe thickness, geometry, material, q degradation mechanism and loading conditions
- a The Abramson global systems assurance model has i not been applied
. :/l8/97 37
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1 Element Location /NDE Selection was - j -
300l m Confirmed Failure Mechanism Postulated and Susceptible locations j l
m Selected Susceptible Location:s Based Upon l Failure Mechanism, Stresses, and Piping l Configuration (100%}
m Perdue Model Selections Based Upon Stresses and Piping Configuration, Distributed Locations on Similar Multiple Loops i 11/18/97 39 1
j i
Element Location /NDE Selection
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{ cont.)
wOG .
C .
EEE 3001 m Physical Constraints {e.g., Buried} May In Some Instances Preveni The Most Susceptible Location Selection m NDE Method Based Upon Failure Mechanism i
a Used WCAP Table 4.1-1, Team Sometimes Required More, Geometry Sometimes Necessitated Less (e.g.,
Socket Welds)
l l
- l Table 3.7 4 ;
l INSIGHTS FOR IDENTIFYING INSPECTION LOCATIONS -
Failure Mechanism General Criteria Susceptible Areas Thermal Fatigue Areas where hot and cold fluid mix, areas of Nozzles, branch pipe rapid cold or hot water injection, areas of connections, safe ends, potential leakage past valves separating hot welds, heat affected zones, and cold water base metal, areas of concentrated stren Corrosion Areas exposed to contamination and areas Base metal, e .., and Cracking with crevices; high stresses (residual, steady- heat affected .ms state, pressure), sensitized material (304 SS) and high coolant conductivity are all required; lack of stress relief or cold springing could also lead to residual stresses Microbiologically Areas exposed to organic material or Fittings, welds, heat-influenced untreated water affected zones, crevices corrosion Vibratory Fatigue Configurations susceptible to flow induced Welds, branch pipe vibration and flow striping or for vibratory connections resonance with rotating equipment (pump) frequencies Stress Corrosion Areas of high oxygen and stagnant flow ,\ustenitic stect welds and Cracking heat affected zones Flow accelerated Areas of low chromium material content, high -
corrosion moisture content, and high pH, high pressure drop or tuming losses Low cycle fatigue Areas with high loads due to thermal Equipment nozzles and expansion for heat up and cool down thermal other anchor points, near cycling, snubbers, dissimilar metal joints o van.. ..pr.ib io0697 179
n
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k EXAMINATION CA7EGORY R.A. RISK-INFORMED FIPfMG EXAMINATION 5 d Enemimetion p leeen R;,_* _ " Deferral et Acceptance Soceessive8 Fu6 to Ne- Ports Enemised Fig No2 ." Examiestine Metised Standard" les laserval lueervals End of Imeerval
-d RI.10 High Safety-Significant Piping Structural Bements Rt.Il E's..~as SOME to Thrmal IWB-2500-8(c)' Volumetrie IWB-3514 Element 2.4 Fatigue Same as 1st Not Permissible IWB-2500-9.10.Il IWC-2500 7(a)'
RI.12 E*a ..a.as '4 to High IWB-25CS.8(c)' Visual. VT-1" IWB-3142 Each Refueling Cycle Mechanical Fatigue Same as ist Not PermissiNe IWB-2500-9.10.1 I IWC-2500-7(a)'
, R t.13 E*a ;.was SdMt to Co.. ive, he 8 Volumetric * (for Internal IWB-3514 i Element 2 Same as ist Not PermissiNe Erosive, or Cavitation Ws;tage Wastage) or Surface (for Nose 8 Element 2 External Wastage)
E RI.14 Elements Schi to Crevice Note 7 Volumetne IWB-3514 Element 2 Same as ist Not PermissiNe Corrosion Cracking RI.15 E*g aa.as Ssjeci to Primary Note 7 Visual VT-2" IWB-3142 Each Refueling Same as ist Not Permissible Water Stress Corrosion Cracking (PWSCC)'
RI.16 E'A..~.as Subject to IWB-2500-8(c) Volumetric IWB-3514 Dement 2 Same as ist Not Permissible Intergranular Stress Corrosion IWB-2500-9 IO.f l Cracking (IGSCC)
RI.17 E'A..~.as Subject to IWB-2500-8(c)
Visual. V4-3 Internal
! Note 8 Dement 2 Same as ist Microbiologically influenced Not Permissible IWB-2500-9.10 ll Surfaces or Volumetrics Corrosion (MIC)
RI.18 E'g azins Ssjcci to Flow Note 9 Note 9 Note 9 Note 9 Note 9 Note 9 Accelerated Corrosion (FAC)
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i l n l 'g Table d.1-1 (coat.)
t
- r EXAMINATION CATEGORY R-A, RIS!C-INFORMED PfPING EXAMINATIOM5 h
l 1u Maees:
i I l
l (I) ' The length' for the examination volume shall be increased to includ : t/2 in. beyond each side of slee base metal thickness transition counterbore.
l .
! (2)' includes all examination locations identified in accordance with the risk-informed selection process in Section 3.7.
T 1
- (3) laciudes 100% of the examination location. When the required exanunation volume or area cannot be examined due to interierence by another component or part geometsy, limited exanunations shall be evaluated by the Expert Panel for acceptability. Areas with accepta limited examinations, and their bases, shall be / ... W.
i t
(4) 1 l
"the exannnation shall include any longitudinal welds at the location selected for exaannation in Note 2. The 's " ' weld examination requirements shall be met for both transverse and parallel flaws exanunation volume defined in Noec 2.
(5)
E leitially. selected examination locations are to be emanneed in the same sequence during successive inspection intervals, to the extent pr!
(6) Applies to mill annealed Alicy 600 nozzle welds and heat affected zone (HAZ) without seress relief. -
(7)
"The examination volume shall inchsde the volarre -.._ ":,, the weld, weld heat affected zone, and base metal, where apphcable, in the -
crevice region. Examination should focus on detection of cracks initissing and propagating frein she inner surface.
i (8)
The examination volume shall include base nietal, welds and weld HAZ in the affected regions of carbon and low alley steel, and the welds
- and weld HAZ of austenitic steel. Examinations shall verify the minirainn well thickness required. Acceptance criteria for localized thinn is in course of preparation. The examination enethod and examination region shall be sufficient to characterire the extent of the element '
degradation.
(9) In accordance with the Owner's existing FAC program.
4 1
(10) Paragraph and Figure numbers refer to the 1989 Edition.
- (11) VT-2 examinasions may be conducted during a system pressure test er a pressure test specific to that a- - _ --- e'_ i i
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- Identify segments addressed by current section XI program
- Identify segments addressed by risk-informed Isl program
- - For segments being inspected by NDE, assume l 100% effectiveness in detection Includes credit for augmented programs
- NOTE: Assumption is made that current Section XI location within the segment addresses the risk associated with that segment
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Comparison of Risk for Surry
. woG .
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]~001 m More Refined Calculation Process
- Identify segments addressed by current Section XI program
- Identify segments addressed by risk-informed ISI program ,
- For segments being inspected by NDE, use failure probability that credits ISI effectiveness (probability of detection and frequency)
- Compare change in risk for current Section XI program and risk-informcd ISI program by segment and by total plant PiiP ng l
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1I/I8/97 48 l .
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Change in Risk Calculations woe '
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a Total change in piping risk should be risk neutral or a risk reduction in moving from the current ASME Section XI to RI-ISI
- If not, the dominant system and piping. segment contributors
- to the RI-ISI risk should be reexamined in an attempt to l identify additional examinations which would make the
- application at least risk neutral m Evaluate dominant system contributors to the total risk for l the RI-ISI (i.e., system contribution to the total is greater than approximately 10%) to identify where no
- improvement has been proposed i
- i.e., where moving from no ISI or ASME Section XI ISI to RI- I t
ISI, the risk has not changed and it is still a dominant 11/18/97 Contributor to the total piping CDF/LERF 49
Change in Risk Calculations
. woa . 1 4 7.
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E ;001 m Results should be reviewed to identify any system in which there is a risk increase in moving from the Current ASME Section XI ,
i program to the RI-ISI program
- If the CDF increase for the system is approximately n a) greater than two orders of magnitude below the risk-informed ISI CDF for that system or b) greater than 1 E-08, (whichever is higher),
Then at least one dominant segment in that system should be reevaluated to identify additional examinations 50 11/18/97
- i
- Change in Risk Calculations f
i
- woe -
g igg l
! m Results Evaluation
- If the LERF increase for the system 1s
[ a) greater than two orders of magnitude below the risk-
)
b) greater than 1 E-09 (whichever is higher),
Then at least one dominant segment in that system should be reevaluated to identify additional examinations 1
l l
11/18/97 51
Change in Risk Calculations ,
.a WOG w . .
- L ..
~
1::Dl m Segments identified as dominant contrib'itors in RI-ISI program and additional exams were suggested
- AFW-17,18,19
- BD-02B,03,05B,06,08B, and 09
- CC-25 and 33
- FW-12,13 and 14
- MS-33 and 34
- SW-4, 5, 6 and 9,10
- SW-44,45,46,47 and 54 52 II/I8/97
Change in Risk Calculations WOG , .
.. o ?."r 0000l m Segments for which Surry has proposed to do a better examination than they are currently doing and thus a factor of 3 improvement was credited in the RI-ISI program are:
- AFW-17,18,19
- BD-028, 03, 05B, 06, 088, 09 L - FW-01,02,03,04,05,06,07
- MS-32,33
- HHI-12A 53 1I/I3/97
Change in Risk Calculations WOG -
00Dl a Segments identified for risk increase within a system
- Segments were added to the RI-ISI program based on the initial change in risk calculation
- CS-1,2
- HHI-4A,5A, and 6A (note that no additional credit has been I added for HHi-4A)
- LHi-1,2
- RC-27,28,29 and 60A (factor of 3 improvement added for RC-60A)
I1/18/97 54 i !
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100E-10 CDF No Operator Atman COFOperstar Ackm LEM No Operstar Acton LEM Operaeor Acton ENo ISI ESectan XI E m ISI l l
l l Figure 4.44 Sorry Unit I Coneparison of CDF/LERF for N ISI, Current Section XI, and Risk-Infornied IS: Program
Change in Risk Insights woG MER][]DM m Much of the benefit in the comparison is due to credit for augmented programs m Conclusion is that RI-ISI program is either risk neutral or risk reduction iI/I8/97 56
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l Comparison to Current ASME Section XI i.
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l m Current ASME Section XI requires 385 NDE exams m Proposed RI-ISI suggests 136 NDE exams plus 30 additional visual exams (reduction of ~S5%?
! u RCS exams reduced from 164 exams to 33 exams
! l 80% reduction? (radiation exposure reduction = 60-65 Rem each 10 year interval) l m Additional exams added to Class 2 and 3 and some
( nonCode class systems (AFW, SG blowdown, auxiliary steam, component cooling and service water) 1 11/18/97 58
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Table 4.4-2 e ,
p SURRY UNIT I STRUCTURAL ELEMENT SELECTION 1t, RESULTS AND COMPARISON 10 ASME SECDON XI k 1999 EDITION REQUIREMENTS h
Number d High i Safrey-SigelRcast ASME Section XI ISI Segenenes (No. In Risk-Interused ISI Prograan Programs Teesi Number d
. Augenessed High SafetyC. ~~ a 1999 Em== F=h Segmenes Cndleed in Syseems i Progense) Serocesral Eleasents' Cseegory Wdd Selecelens Augenmeed 7.,
j-l CLASSI CLASS 2 CLASS 3 NON-CODE B-F B-J C-F-I C-F-2 l AT 0 9 0 l
l AIN' II(5) 5 3+3' 6 16 l
l M 2 2 0 l BD" 6 (6) 3 3 12
$ l CC 6 13+4' O 6
i l CH 8 12+6 +4' 1 + 3' 39 3 l CN' O 6
, l C 0 f 9 2 i l CWd 4- 0 i l ECC 7 12 I 4 24 I '
l E O O I t
l FC 0 0 f l FW' 13 (13) 7 6 17 ;
l HHI' 14 (1) 15+2" 63 5 i 1
l LHI* 7 (I) 7+3*+2" 23 I 1
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- Table 4.4-2 (cout.)
y SURRY UNIT I STRUCTURAL FJKMENT SELECTION lt. RESULTS AND COMPARISON TO ASME SECTION XI . i
[ 1999 EDITION REQUIREMENTS h
Memeer of High I Setety-Sigolflemet ASME Section XI ISI i Segiments (Me. Im Risk-letoesned ISE Powgense Fregemme Teest Numeer et Augsneated High Safety-Signincast 1999 FAal-- Fah Segaments Cegdited la I Sy ne Prege.ne) Seescoural Eleasemes* Categeey Weld Setueeless Augemented 7.
l CLASSI CLASS 2 CLASS 3 NON-CODE B-F EJ C-F-I C-F-2 l MS* 3 (3) 2+18 18 23 i l RC II 20+10M+3" 18 146 3 t l l ,
l RH 4 I 4 4 12 0 l RS 2 2 4 0 y l SM 8 5 +3' O l VS 2 2 0 I l TUTAL 10s 68 53 33 12 18 202 49 116 89 ;
E_ -y. Carvent ASME Sectione XI selects a total of 385 non.desmscrive emanes while the pegesed RI-ISI prograse selects a total of IM emanas (l% - 30 visual emanas).
Wh results in a 651, seductsen.
[
1
[
Nases for Table 4.4-2 i
- s. Syseevn pressene test vesyserements and VT-2 visual emanunations sher connaue to be perforneed in all ASME Code Dans 1. 2 and 3 sywems. j l b. VT-2 area emani at specific locanon.
- c. Augmented programs for u_. ..._. andfor hi-h energy line teemit continue.
- d. phe coanngs progran win be enemaasned.
- e. VT-2 for entwe segment.
- f. UT thecitness only.
I g. Segment MS-34 has no weht VT-2 for entire segment. a 3 h. Ten ema__ _ m added for change in risit considermions.
[
l i. Sin exasmaations added for defense m-depth at the reactor vessel outlet noule to pipe welds. l e
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! Surry RI-ISI Results Summary woo im DDggl
! m Economic Benefit Assessment
-VP estimated S300K for project l - Cost savings would be paid back in
) approximately 2 years (considering l radiation exposure reduction benefit'j for 3-loop plant
- Cost savings would be paid back in approximately 12-18 months for 4-loop plant 11/18/97 62
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Implementation, Monitoring and Feedback WOG DDDBl 1
im Monitoring
- Encompasses many facets of feedback or corrective action which includes periodic updates based on inputs and changes resulting from plant design features, plant procedures, equipment performance, examination results, and individual plant and industry failure information iI/18/97 66
~
- - . - - - - - . _ _ . _ _ ' i.:. l
Implementation, Monitoring and Feedback ;
I WOG .
_ :Dl ,
l - Verify- Verify the RI-ISI program has been updated based on the completed corrective action.
l (Audit the Program?
1 ,
- Trend- Look at other corrective actions to see if the problem has really been fixed. (Look at All Examination Results on a Period Basis}
- 11/1857 70 i
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[ Implementation, Monitoring and l
Feedback
[000l WOG -
i-j - Evaluate - (a) Determine the cause and extent of l the condition, and (b) Develop a corrective action l plan. (Additional Examinations Performed No
( other Flaws Found) (Plan to Replace the Weld)
- Decide - Make a decision to imple t the plan.
(Yes or No)
- Implement- Complete the work necessary to correct the problem and pre'. 2nt recurrence.
(Replace the Weld) (Perform Preservice NDE)
,,,,, (Update the Program) ,,
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- Definition' tf sk RI-ISI Examinatson Resuks oo ?
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t implementation, Monitoring and Feedback
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0 001 a Feedback or Corrective Action Example
- identify- Examination results and analytical evaluation conclude an unacceptable flaw is found during a scheduled NDE.
- Characterize - (a) Perform an operability evaluation; (b) Determine if regulatory c porting is i
required (10 CFR 50.72 or 50.73); and (c} Assess
- if an immediate plant / personnel safety or operational impact exists. (Yes or No Answers?
11/18/97 68 i
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1 i
DISTRIBUTION: (For Meeting Notice) (
NRR and LPOR PRAB Subject File Central File Ashok Thadani, OEDO
+
Malcolm Knapp, OD/RES Bill Morris, OD/RES M. Wayne Hodges, RES/ DST Lawrence Shao, RES/DET Thomas King, RES/ DST Gus Lainas, NRR/DE Mark Cunningham, RES/PRAB Michael Mayfield, RES/EMMEB Syed All, NRR i Stephen Dinsmore, NRR
- Deborah Jackson, RES James, Johnson, OCM/SJ t.
Gilbert Millman, RES/DET Joseph Murphy, RES Jack Strosnider, NRRIEMCB Michael Markley, ACRS PMNS (by e mail) r DOCUMENT NAME: FRN N18.MTG w . wecop, v.. ...,o., w i.in w. e . con,..o, oui.u.c.,m.ms.acio.u,. . con, . in .n. cam.m,.neio...
OFFICE PRAB ,. THAB g PRAB l l NAME JGuttmann/mb - MCaruM MCupnbghism DATE / /97 f/97 N / ~ /97 OFFICIAL RECORD COPY (RES File Code) RES C21 A
- I L
l
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- /gue.w#'c, UNITED STATES 3 .
j j
) NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION wAswinof ow, o.c. somoooi g f
%,. ', , , , / October-27, 1997 MEMORANDUM TO: Mark Cunningham, Chief '
- Probabilistic Risk Analysis Branch Division of Systems Technology i
FROM: Jack Guttmann ,
Sr. Reliability and Risk Assessment Engineer Probabilistic Risk Analysis Branch .;
Division of Systems Technology i
SUBJECT:
CHANGE IN MEETING DATE: NRC/WOG/ VIRGINIA POWER MEETING ON RISK INFORMED INSERVICE INSPECTION PILOT T PLANT RESULTS DATE: Wednesday November 19,1997 TIME: 1:00 p.m. 4:00 p.m.
- LOCATION: 11545 Rockville Pike i Room T 8A1 ,
Rockville, Maryland 20852 2738 :
CHANGE: Meeting date was changed from the 18th to the 19th in room T 8A1.
PURPOSE: To discuss the final results frr m the Surry project and insights contained in the Westinghouse Owners Group (WOG) WCAP report on risk informed inservice inspection programs.
PARTICIPANTS: NRC INDUSTRY Jack Guttmann Ken Balkey (Westinghouse)
Syed Ali Nancy Cicsky (Westinghouse)
Stephen Dinsmore Alex McNeill (Virginia Power)
Deborah Jackson Dave Bucheit (Virginia Power)
Donnie Whitehead (SNL) Ray West (NE Utilities)
Fred Simonen (PNNL)
DISTRIBUTION: See next page.
L CdNTACT: - Jack Guttmann, RES,415 7732
- Meetings between the NRC technical staff and applicants or licensees are open for i
interested members of the public, petitioners, intervenors, or other parties to attend as l{ '
observers pursuant to Commission Policy Statement on Staff Meetings Open to the Public l
! 59 Federal Register 48344, September 20,1994, i
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Where We Differ From Draft RI-ISI RG/SRP ,
WOG '
BBl m Where we did more
- Integrated review through detailed and structured expert panel process
- Clearly defined how augmented programs and leak detection are taken into account !
- Secondary criteria provided for change in risk calculations
- From approximately 135 statistical evaluations, we identified i the need for better target leak rates a Where we did less Have not applied Abramson global system assurance model Did not submit all the information that has been identified
- 11/18/97 80 i
j . .:.
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1 Relation of WCAP to Draft NRC Regulatory
[ Guide DG-1061 Steps and Principles WOG. : : :Bl i
I Key Steps Comments Define the proposed Proposed change provides an change alternative inspection location
- selection method for NDE for Class 1,2, and 3 systems currently in the scope of ASME Section XI, systems identified
, through PSA, or systems i identified through Maintena.x:e Rule Perform engineering Probabilistic and deterministic analysis engineering analyses are performed and integrated through the use of a plant expert panel Define implementation Consistent with the requirements and monitoring of ASME Section XI J' Submit proposed change Topical submittal and Surry submittal 11/18/97 77
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! Documentation
, WOG -
+ BBl Westinahouse a Calc. Note # CN-RRA-019/97, Rev. O, "Surry Risk-based ISI l CDF and LERF Calculations"
) a Calc. Note # CN-RRA-024/97, Rev. O, "MS Access database for i the WOG Risk Based in Service inspection (RB ISI) for Surry l Unit 1 piping segments. Some inputs to the database are from i
- preliminary Surry caiculations notes.
l u Calc. Note # CN-RRA-025/97, Rev. O, "Surry Change in Risk
[ Calculations for Risk-based ISI" l m Calc. Note # CN-RRA-026/97, Rev. O, "WOG/Surry 1 Risk-l Informed ISI Perdue Model Calculations" -
m Calc. Note # CN-STD-97-027-R0, Rev. O, "Surry ISI @ Risk Simulation" II/18/97 75 l
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I Documentation wo EE E DDI m WCAP-14572, Revision 1 and Supplement 1 on SRRA m Surry plant-specific submittal m Supporting calculations that reside at site 1I/t8/97 73 I --- - .
l Documentation woa .
+ , m}l Va. Power a Calc. # SM-1124, Rev. O, " Segment Definitions for Surry 1 'RI-ISI Program" j u Calc. # SM-1087, Rev.1, " Risk-Base'd Inservice inspection Pilot Program - Quantification of Risk" a Calc. # SM-1088, Rev.1, " Risk-Based inservice Inspection -
Indirect Effects Analysis" a Calc. # SM-1090, Rev.1, " Risk-Based Inservice Inspection Pilot l Program - Quantification of Large Early Release Frequency" '
a ET # MAT-97-0014, Rev. O, " Estimated Failure Probabilities for Risk-Based ISI Surry Unit 1" 74 l1/I8/97
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