ML20197H098
| ML20197H098 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 04/19/1988 |
| From: | Harold Denton NRC OFFICE OF GOVERNMENTAL & PUBLIC AFFAIRS (GPA) |
| To: | Bernthal, Roberts, Zech NRC COMMISSION (OCM) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20197H036 | List: |
| References | |
| FOIA-88-220 NUDOCS 8807180203 | |
| Download: ML20197H098 (11) | |
Text
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[ ,f., g NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION W ASMNGTON. O. C. 20555
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/ APR 15 3g9 MEMORANDUM FOR: Chaiman Zech Connissioner Roberts Comaissioner Bernthal Comissioner Carr Comissiener Rogers FROM:
Harold R. Denton, Directorf Office of Governmental an6 Public Affairs
SUBJECT:
NEA WORKSHOP ON PUBLIC INFORMATION OURING NUCLEAR EMERGENCIES, FEBRUARY 17-19 , PARIS, FRANCE -
HAROLD CENTON, MICHAEL CONGDON (GPA) AND KARL ABRAHAM (REGION 1)
I chaired a three-day workshop February 17-19 devoted to improving western public affairs activities and coordination during nuclear or radiological emergencies. US attendees also included Michael Congdon and Karl Abraham (NRC), Stacey Gerard and Bill McAda (FEMA), and Mary Ann Novak (DOE). The workshop demonstrated that most advanced nuclear countries have strengthened their crisis comunications structures at the national level since the Chernobyl incident. One of the goals expressed by all participants in the closing session was to establish better fonnal and infonnal lines of comunication among governmental experts in the field of emergency planning for radiological emergencies. A aseful suggestion was to set up a network of national crisis infomation centers to provide authoritative infonnation both toThe theworkshop's general public in each reccanendations country and to other national governments.
emerged from four working groups.
RECOMMENDATIONS Discussing general strategies among the i articipants in the light of national experience was useful in identifying innovative techniques which might be employed in the future. Attendees recommended further meetings among interested Member countries on r ore detailed aspects of emergency comunications systems. Issues thought to be worthwhile included:
Centralization and Decentralization in Public Information Strategies. Examining the factors that influence the selection of the best cccrdination mechanisms for information dissemination and the factors that affect their perfemance.
- Strategies for Staffing and Training Staff for Crisis Information Units. Staffing in normal circumstances and obtaining reacy auxiliary staff in an emergency.
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- Scenario Building and Exercises te Maintain Readiness.
Planning the most effective and e "icient means to maintain readiness.
- Information Flow on Health Advisories. What information should be exchanged between governments to avoid conflicting advice to the public near international bcur.oaries.
In accition, participants agreed that a group of information specialists suct as that assembled for the Workshop could be miintained as an informal network for personal early information exchanges at the international level during emergencies, without prejudice to the formal international networks already in existence. A list of participants with all details for quick contact will be circulated.
Working Group One: -Internal Domestic Coordination and the Concept of a Crisis Information Unit.
Discussion in this Working Group focused on the organization, coordination, and implementation of crisis management units in providing accurate, timely and consistent information to the pubite in the event cf an accident, whether domestic or foreign. The group emphasized the need for detailed planning and implementation of assignments and appropriate division of responsibilities between goverrment and utility officials in order to bolster public confidence and trust in their ability to control the situation and to mitigate its effects.
A rarber of countries participating reported detailed plans for reaching the public by means other than reliance on the news media. Programs in the FPG, Sweden, France, Turkey, Austria, the UK, and the US were des:.ribed, and coordination plans, concerns and issues still requiring resolution were, discussed. It was generally agreed that the scope of activities involved in getting information to the public requires massive rescurces including equipment, personnel, training, educational materials, time and money. Most countries acknowledged that current communication systems might not be able to handle the load of a truly major accident, based on experience af ter Chernobyl -- an accident hurdreds (or thousands) of miles away. This is due in part to the l
public's almost insatiable desire to be informed and reassured.
There was disagreement over, and inconclusive debate regarding, the many fa:ets and limitations of centralizing all public communication -- most representatives coming down on the side of the issue that most closely represented their own government's structure, whether highly centralized l or more federally organized. France maintains all communication, education, and decision making at the national level. Sweden has adopted a very local, decentralized structure while Austria inclines toward a certralized system. National variations on this question over-shadowed alt discussions in this working group, and national solutions were l
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con >idered central to all planning efforts for public comunication. The U.K., for example, has decided that its national authorities will not be able to respond to all enticipated requests for infonnation from the public, and has, therefore, chosen to base their plans on a wide, controlled dissemination of material throughout the governrent 50 that any department or office receiving public requests will resocnd consistently. Nevertheless, there was wide recognition that scce aspects of centralization would be necessary, even in a highly decentralized system.
Despite structural differences, there was a strong consensus that, in order to traintain public confidence and government credibility, it is necessary for one national spokesperson to be identified and to remain constant throughout the response period. Some countries identify that individual as part of their plan, while others choose a person at the time of the accident, depending on other factors considered at the time.
It was also agreed that decision makers need to be separated from the constant demands of supplying information in the crisis situation, and that a "filtering" team of personal staffers should concentrate on sifting through infonnation to analyze it, define the issues, and present alternatives for clear and precise decision. Yet, it was also recognized that this was not always possible, and that procedures would depend on national and personal styles of leadership.
The group recognized that, despite even the best planning efforts, perfection in comunication with the public was impossible, both because of preconceptions prevalent in the public mind regarding nuclear affairs and because the redia can normally comand the context in which both public and government operate. Nevertheless, none were distracted from the task of trying to stay even with the press in defining the nature of the issues, based on extensive experience during TMI and Chernobyl.
Working Grou) Two:
Maintaining Readiness and the Role of Communication Channels.
This group esphasized the neeo to use professional and interest groups other than the media to help sh 'pe the agenda and response to radiation emergencies. After the originai notice of an accident is distributed through traditional, unambiguous media channels, more complex information needs arise as an accident progresses. Chernobyl showed that there are a l number of grogs to which media will turn as trusted and familiar local sources of advice and counsel.
Such groups include individuals as disparate as local radio personalities; security officials such as police and fire chiefs; l neighborhood civil defense organizations; professional groups and persons such as doctors or pharinacists; public health officials; yeterinarians and nurses; agriculture and union leaders; clergy; teachers; scientists; power plant workers; and environmental spokesmen. Few of these can
4 actually be a part of established channels to the public. Nevertheless, there was unanimity of opinion that, as part of supplying the background knowledge to the public on nuclear issues, attention should be given to targeting these people and groups. Then, during a crisis, they need do no more than endorse official advice in order to make their own strong centribution.
The workino group also promoted other ways to inform groups in advance tnrough brochures, materials from local sources, site visits to improve awareness, training courses, speeches to local clubs, adult education for teachers and school administrators, participation of the public in simulation exercises, and, mainly, involvement of the public at the local level. Thus, even if these other professional sources cannot be part of the established channels of comunicr. ion during a crisis, they can be very useful in getting the (accur.e) wc d out in a trustworthy atmosphere.
Working Group Three. Some International Aspects of Public Information:
This group emphasized the IAEA, EC, and Scandinavian emergency notification systems. It did not deal in depth with infonnal and formal intergovernmental connunications. A representative frcm the IAEA discussed the setting up of the Global Telecomunications System (GTS) network for emergency notification under the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident on Radiological Emergency. He emphasized the emergency notification aspects of the GTS structure, in contrast to US views that the GTS is best suited to convey largeIn arrounts U.S. view, of meteorological data on a non-crisis basis. (Comment:
prompt notificatinn by Agency to other concerned countries should be by telephone or telex. End Coment. )
The EC representative described an EC Council Decision of 14 Decerber 1987 on Comunity Arrangerents for the Early Exchange of Information in the Event of a Radiological Emergency. The EC decision, he said, is similar to the IAEA Convention, but it adds two categories of infonnation to the requirement for early notification. These are: 1) Information on measures taken, or planned, to infom the public ana 2) the results of
.measureeents of foodstuffs, feedstuffs, and drinking water; both to be :
included, "as for as practicable and appropriate."
The working group emphasized that besides official contact points between and among countries (discussion of which was not fully developed in Working Group sessions) there should be established a network of unofficial ccatacts such as those represented at the present meeting. It advocated, therefore, continued interest in further meetings on this I subject at the NEA. Scandinavian countries reported on a system of errergency notification via a series of data exchange agreements and expanded cooperation with Eattern European countries, l i t
Working Group Three also mentioned the need for reliar:e on professional groups, as noted in Working Group Two, as well as broc*ures prepared by international organizations to help inform such groups. It emphasized the need for creater consistency in international consnanication across common borders with emphasis on comon units of measurenent and public understanding of such units. It was suggested that tre CEC had a major role to play in regard to public information, and that it needed to take certain decisions on detailed mechanisms for harmonizaPen.
The NEA was exhorted to serve as a central clearinghouse for useful publications and relevant films on public affairs aspects of nuclear and radiological accidents. NEA is currently distributing information on radiological aspects of waste management. It was aisc suggested that the NEA Secretariat publish the results of the current meeting and create an expert group to 1} prepare a document which outlines certain basic rules for comunicating with the public, 2) identify concep*3 that need to be comunicated and prepare a glossary of terms for pubhc understanding, and 3) identify for national leaders pitfalls to be avoided in comunicating with the Public.
The Chairman (Denton) provided his own sumary of the proceedings by pointing out that the primary problem of comunicatirs with the public is establishing and saintaining credibility. This problen is resolvable only by providing complete, accurate, and timely information to the public and, of course, to each other. The Workshop, te said, demonstrated that mucn progress had been made in a number of countries, but that more work needed to be done to adequately prepare for public information requirements in the event of a future nuclear emergency.
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Working Grcup Four: Improving the Message.
The Fourth Working Group was established to try to fi ish the work of the previous workstop on the same subject that had met ir. Paris in November 1987. The group saw its task as analyzing methods and language allowing the public to understand the scientific concepts underlying radiation protection. Ore of the most serious problems in ccm.nicating effectively with the public during a radiological eme gency is to explain i
the causes aco consequences of an accident in clear a'd simple language.
The Working Group based its discussion on the previous workshop and divided the problem into two categories of infonnatior, needed by the public. First, the public requires crisis infonnatim A) to to provide reassurance in order to eliminate irrational behavior, and B)provid l
instructions on how to behave in such a clear and repetitive way that l
there would be little chance of misinterpretation. Seccrd, governments need to convey long-tenn education. This is a more cyplex process of
' transferring krewledge about radiation and risk in order to create a i
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radiation consciousness in society so that people are better prepared t:
cope with a crisis.
It was agreed that it is not necessary to provide all types of information to all grcups. Rather, it is necessary to identify target groups similar to those identified:ninthe Working Group short tem, 2 and the to decide Working Group which stM need what type of infomation.
it was pessinistic-about getting long-tem information to the public.
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the mecium term, there was less ;essimism about the possit,ility of ,
generating a more positive and literate radiation culture. But, in the longer tem, it may be possiole to shape society's perceptions to understand better the relative risk of nuclear energy and the relatively low risk from radiation. It was agreed that because nuclear energy exists, it is necessary to generate such an understanding, and the working group emphasized the potential use of advanced systems, such as the French Mini Tel, for public education and in schools.
Working Group Four emphasized the internal limitations of sumarizing a difficult message. The so-called radiation protection structure is based on the "linear relationship" between dose and risk. The whole questior of relative risk compared to other societal ills is hard to convey in simple tems, especially when the publi, tends to look ct risk in tertns Radiation of "danger" when applied to nuclear energy and radiation.
specialists frecuently appear te equivocate, in their dealings with the public. They should be careful to present instructions in a positive and imperative way, and avoid trying to convey the complicated theory behird radiation protection. Rather, they should be willing to make a ,
judgement, and a decision, and then to explain it in simple tems.
information provided to support such decisionc should be quantitative tut limited. The public does not need lots of data. The public does require easily understood units to which it can relate.
Reference points could be established for the public in tems of 1) natural background, 2) medical irradiation, and 3) regulatory limits.
Discussions of relative risks on the basis of these reference points, however, may be counterproductive, if only because it introduces the concept of "risk" which, even trough incredibly low for nost radiation.
leads the public to emphasize the "consequence factur" (e.g., cancer) rather than the "relative facter", when comparing radiation with other risks that are considered "voluntary" (e.g., that smoking or flying are "riskier" but are "voluntary " or, risks many are willing to take).
Finally, the working group advised that while simplicity is a goal, simplistic explanations are not acceptable. Hence, note emphasis must be placed on long ters public education, cc: ED0 SECY !
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- 11 EMS OF INTEREST
' 0FFICE OF GOVERhMENTAL AND PUBLIC AFFAIFS i
WEEK ENDING MARCH 11, 1968 i
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IAEA Heeting Harold Centon, Director of the Office of Governmental and Public Affairs, l
recently visited IAEA beadquarters in Vienna to represent the NRC in the
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first meeting of the newly constituted Nuclear Safety Standards Advisory l l
Group (NUSSAG). This group reviewed and found to be generally acceptable the IAEA power reactor safety codes ("NUSS") wnich were revised by technical working groups last year in light of the Chernobyl accident. ;
l These NUSS codes and associated safety guides covered five broad subject l l areas: 1) governmental organization, 2) siting, 3) design, 4) operations, l
' and 5) quality assurance, and are written ratht:r generally, compared to the !
corresponding U.S. regulatory practice. Additional errphasis was added to '
operational safety aspects and emergency planning. ,
in addition, a report on INSAG Basic Safety Principles will be cublished as an INSAG advisory document to the IAEA Director General and will be presented publicly for the first time at the Sorrento meeting on severr accidents later this month.
In a separate meeting with Morris Rosen, IAEA Assistant Director Generai for Nuclear Safety, Mr. Denton discussed plans for the IAEA General Conference in September and the USSR plans for hosting an Operational Safety Assessmen+. Review Team (OSART) visit in December. Discussions with
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IAEA Safeguards Personnel covered impressions of the NUKEM affair, the safeguardability of large-scale reprocessing plants, in general, and ongoing IAEA activities.
The NRC should continue to take the lead in this activity, coordinating cicsely with State Department. 00E, and the U.S. nuclear safety standards a comunity. The next NUSSAG meeting will be held in March 1989,
- Informaticn in this recctd was dekted in a:rctd3nce mth the Fgedom of Int: ation Act, eed Mdl- -%
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