ML20197B091

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Proposed Tech Specs,Permitting Continued Operation During Installation of Mod to Lube Oil Sys of Diesel Generator 2A
ML20197B091
Person / Time
Site: LaSalle Constellation icon.png
Issue date: 10/14/1986
From:
COMMONWEALTH EDISON CO.
To:
Shared Package
ML20197B086 List:
References
2250K, NUDOCS 8610270471
Download: ML20197B091 (9)
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Text

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ATTAO9EBNT B 4

PROPOSED CHANGE TO APPENDIX A TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION TO OPERATING LICENSE NPF-ll Revised Pages:

NPF-ll 3/4 8-1 3/4 8-la 2250K -

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8610270471 861014 PDR ADOCK 05000373 P PDR

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ATTACIDENT C I

SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION I

Comanonwealth Edison has evaluated the proposed Technical Specification Amendment and determined that it does not represent a significant hazards consideration. Based on the criteria for defining a significant hazards consideration established in 10 CFR 50.92, operation of LaSalle County Station Unit 1 in accordance with the proposed amendment will not:

1) Involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated because in the event of a loss of offsite power with the "2A" diesel inoperable for this period sufficient onsite power with a single active failure will still be available to safely shutdown.
2) Create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated because emergency power is still available to those systems required to mitigate accidents evaluated in the PSAR.
3) Invol've a significant reduction in the margin of safety because the probability of a loss of offsite power ir addition to a remaining diesel generator failure during the period of these diesel generator modifications is sufficiently small to reasonably assure the health and safety of the public.

Based on the preceding discussion, it is concluded that the proposed system change clearly falls within all acceptable criteria with respect to the system or component, the consequences of previously evaluated accidents will not be increased and the margin of safety will not be decreased. Therefore, based on the guidance provided in the Federal Register and the criteria established in 10 CPR 50.92(c), the proposed change does not constitute a significant hazards consideration.

l 2250K

3/4.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS 3/4.8.1 A.C. SOURCES A.C. SOURCES - OPERATING LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.8.1.1 As a minimum, the following A.C. electrical power sources shall be OPERABLE:

a. Two physically independent circuits between the offsite transmission network and the onsite Class 1E distribution system, and
b. Separate and independent diesel generators , 1A, 2A and 1B with:
1. For diesel generator 0, 1A and 2A:

a) A separate day fuel tank containing a minimum of 250 gallons of fuel.

b) A separate fuel storage system containing.a minimum of 31,000 gallons of fuel.

2. For diesel generator IB, a separate fuel storage tank / day tank containing a minimum of 29,750 gallons of fuel.
3. A separate fuel transfer pump.

APPLICABILITY: OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1, 2, and 3.

ACTION:

a. With either one offsite circuit or diesel generator 0 or 1A of the e

above required A.C. electrical power sources inoperable, demonstrate the OPERABILITY of the remaining A.C. sources by performing Surveil-lance Requirements 4.8.1.1.la within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />, and 4.8.1.1.2a.4, l'8 for one diesel generator at a time, within eight hours, and at least once per 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> thereafter; restore at least two offsite circuits and diesel generators 0 and 1A to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.

! b. With one offsite circuit and diesel generator 0 or 1A of the above required A.C. electrical power sources inoperable, demonstrate the OPERABILITY of the remaining A.C. sources by performing Surveillance Requirements 4.8.1.1.la within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />, and 4.8.1.1.2a.4, for one li8 diesel generator at a time, within six hours, and at least once per 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> thereafter; restore at least ooe of the inoperable A.C.

sources to OPERABLE status within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />. Restore at least two offsite ciecuits and i diesel generators 0 and 1A to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> from the time of initial loss or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.

l LA SALLE - UNIT 1 3/4 8-1 Amendment No. 18 l

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  • For a 30 day period for diesel generator 2A during the Unit 2 first refueling outage, with Unit 2 in operational condition 4 or 5 or defueled, only 3 diesel generators, 1B and 1A, and 0 are required to satisfy the standby AC onsite power requirements for Unit 1. Surveillance requirements,4.8.1.1.la and 4.8.1.1.2a.4 shall be performed within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> prior to removal of the 2A diesel generator from service. During the 30 day period the remaining 3 diesel generators will be verifiedl operable at least once per day (in addition to any testing required by Table 4.8.1.1.2-1). The control circuit for the unit cross-tie circuit breakers between buses 142Y and 242Y shall be temporarily modified to allow the breakers to be closed with the diesel generator feeding the bus. In the event these conditions are not met, Unit I will be brought to HOT SHUTDOWN within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> and COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.

The provisions of Technical Specification 3.0.4 do not apply.

1 The term verify as used in this context means to administratively check by examining logs or other information to determine if certain components are out-of-service for maintenance or other reasons. It does not mean to perform the surveillance requirements needed to demonstrate the OPERABILITY of the components.

LASALLE - UNIT 1 3/4 8-la 2250K

ATTACHPENT 0 Station Blackout Assess.?ca.t I. PrcDability of Losing Of f-Site Pcwer curinc a ?O day Period A. Botn SAT's enercized, UAT ce-energized Unreliabilityl orceability2

1. Isolation Events
a. Grid Collapse 1x10-8 8.22x10-10
c. Tornaco thry switchyard 1.6x103 1.32x10-4
c. All 345kV lines out 2.5x107 2.05x10-8 Subtotal 1.32x10-*
2. Events which disable both SAT inputs
a. Line fault & breaker (5x10-3)2 1.69x10-7 failure
3. Events which fault both SAT outputs 7,09x10-4

. a. 345kV bus fault & prot. (0.324)2 system malfunction 1,09x10-4

b. SAT fault (0.127)2 Subtotal 6.iexiu ~

Total 9.5x10-4 B. Both SAT's and UAT enercized unreliabilityl Prceability2 F311ure Event (Same as I.A.1) 1.32x10-4

1. Isolation events
2. All aux transformer inputs cisabled 6.95x10-11
a. Line fault & breaker (5x10-3)3 failure
3. All aux. transformer outputs oisauled 1.89x10-5
a. 345kV bus fault & prot. (0.324)3 system malfunction D. Transformer faults 3 2x(0.127)3 2.28x10-6 Subtotal 2.12x10-3 1.53x10-"

Total D-1 e e e

,,----pg,, ,,,, - , - - - , , , , , . ,-,--,-+:. r- p,-,,- - . - -, .w-- , - ,w - , , , - - -n. o,,, w,-, e,n,-, - ,--,-

Notes: (1) Unrellaoility = prob. of failure event / year (from ref. 3)

For multiple incependent failure events such as transformer faults:

Unreliaoility = (prob. of failure event 1/ year) x (prob. of failure event 2/ year) x (prob. of failure event n/ year) i (2) Probacility = probability .of failure event /30 days

= unreliability x 30/365 For multiple incependent events:

Procability = (unreliability of event 1 x30/365) x (unrellacility of event 2 x30/365)

  • x (unreliability of event n x30/365)

(3) The procability that all three aux. transformers fail during tne same 30 cay period is:

unreliability of SAT 142 x 30/365+

unreliability of SAT 242 x 30/365+

(unreliability of UAT + power trsisformer) x 30/365 assuming all 4 transformers have the same unreliacility, the probacility is *

(0.127x30/365) x (0.127x30/365) x (0.127+0.127) x 30/365 =

(0.127)Z x (2x0.127) x (30/365)3 =

2x(0.127)3 x (30/365)3 =

2.28x10-6 l

II. Probability of a Diesel Generator Failure Assumptions: DG-0 Inoperable Unit 1 in colo shutdown

! A. One or Botn of the Remaining stanchy l Diesels (LA ano 2A) Fail on Demand' Probacility Failure Event

1. Random Failures 2
a. DG-LA fails 0.01 l b. DG-2A fails 0.01
c. Both 1A and 2A fail 0.0001 l 2. Cannon Moce Failures 3
a. OG-1A & 2A 0.002 i
0. DC-1A & 2B 0.002
c. OG-2A & 28 0.002
Total UTU75I l

D-2 i

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B. Both CG's lA ano 2A Fall on Cemanc Failure Event Precability Random failures 2 0.0001 Common Mode Failures 3 0.C02 Total N Notes: (1) The Calculations will yield the same valve no matter whiCn of the tnree stanoby diesels is initially assumed to be inoperable.

(2) The probability for a random failure is based on operational experience (references (c), (e), anc (f)).

(3) The value for the common mode failure is from reference (b).

III. Prceacility of a LOSP and Diesel Failure

. A. LOSP and One or Both Diesels Fails

1. UAT Oe-energized Prod. = 9.5x10-4x2.16x10-2 = 2.48x10-5
2. UAT Energized Prob. = 1.53 x10-4x2.61x10-2 , 3.99xlo-6
8. LOSP and Both Diesels Fail
1. UQT De-energized Proo. = 9.5x10 Ax2.1x10-3 = 2.0x10-6
2. UAT Energized i Proc. = 1.53x10-4x2.1x10-3 = 3.21x10-7 l D-3 0528K l

ATTACHMENT E Loss of Off-Site Pcwer Transient Analysis A. Unit 1 initially at full power, Unit 2 in colo shutdown, and CG-2A incoeracle.

1. OG-0 fails:

Incceraole Systems Functional Systems RHR Loop A HPCS LPCS ADS

. RHR Locos 6 anc C RCIC

2. OG-1A fails:

Inocerable Systems Functional Systems RHR Locos 8 and C WCS ADS RCIC mR Lxo A -

LPCS

3. DG-18 fails:

Inceeraole System Functienal Systems WCS ADS RCIC LPCS RHR Loops A, 8, anc C Note: dith Unit 1 at power, DG-0 or lA will not be allowed to be taken out of service for an extended time.

B. Unit 2 initially at full power, Unit 1 in cold shutdown, and DC-1A inoperaole.

1. 00-0 fails:

same as A.1

2. OG-2A fails:

same as A.2

3. OG-28 fails:

same as A.3 E-1

, - , ..,n. , , , - , - . . , -- -- -

C. Unit 2 initially at full power, Unit 1 in colo shutcown, and DC-0 inoperacle.

1. DG-1A fails:

Inoceraole Syste'.is Functional Systems RHR Loop A HPCS LPCS ADS RHR Loops B and C RCIC

2. DC-2A fails:

Inocerable Systems Functional Systems RHR Loop A WCS LPCS ADS RCIC RHR Loops B and C -

after unit tie breakers closeo

3. DG-28 fails:

Inoperacle Systems Functional Systems WCS ADS RHR Lcop A RCIC LPCS RHR Loops B and C i

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E-2 0528K

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