Text

Forwards Response to NRC Questions Re NUREG-0737,Item II.D.1,re Relief & Safety Valves.W/Five Oversize Drawings
	ML20154B031
Person / Time
Site:	Summer
Issue date:	05/05/1988
From:	Nauman D; SOUTH CAROLINA ELECTRIC & GAS CO.
To:	Hayes J; NRC OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION & RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (ARM)
Shared Package
ML20154B036	List: ML20154B031; ML20265D880; ML20265D885; ML20265D890; ML20265D895; ML20265D900;
References
	RTR-NUREG-0737, RTR-NUREG-737, TASK-2.D.1, TASK-TM NUDOCS 8805170039
	Download: ML20154B031 (110)
	v • d • e

4. '

M th Car inno Elect 3c & Gas Company Den A.

Jenkinsville. SC 29065 Nuclear Operations SCE&G (83*

May 5, 1988 l

Document Control Desk U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20555 Attention: Mr. J. J. Hayes, Jr.

SUBJECT:

Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station l

Docket No. 50/395 Operating License No. NPF-12 Relief and Safety Valves NUREG-0737, 11.0.1 Gentlemen:

Please find attached the South Carolina Electric & Gas Company (SCE&G) response to NRC questions dealing with NUREG 0737, item 11.0.1.

These question responses have been structured to provide the most concise and applicable answers to the NRC specific requests on the original submittal.

If you should have any further questions, please advise.

I Very truly yours.

h<1 t~

0. A. Nauman AMM: DAN / led 4

Attachment pc: J. G. Connelly, Jr./0. W. Dixon, Jr./T. C. Nichols, Jr.

t E. C. Roberts W. A. Williams, Jr.

J. N. Grace J. J. Hayes, Jr.

General Managers C. A. Price

- R. B. Clary W. R. Higgins R. M. Campbell, Jr.

K. E. Nodland J. C. Snelson G. O. Percival R. L. Prevatte ON J. B. Knotts, Jr.

NSRC L

RTS (NRR 1591) 8 t

File (811.11) l i

8805170039 880505 PDR ADOCK 05000395 a ---

r.w - - - - -

9 i

RESPONSES TO SAFETY EVALUATION QUESTIONS TMI ACTION NUREG-0737 11.0.1 FOR V. C. SUMMER UNIT 1 EG&G 00ESTION NO. 1 The Westinghouse valve inlet fluid conditions report stated that liquid discharge through both the safety and Power Operated Relief Valves (PORVs) is predicted for a FSAR feedline break event. The Westinghouse report gave-expected peak pressure, pressurization rate, and fluid temperature range for an FSAR feedline break at the V. C. Summer Plant.

The V. C. Summer Plant specific submittal, however, does not address this event.

NUREG-0737 requires analysis of accidents and occurrences referenced in Regulatory Guide 1.70, Revision 2, and one of the accioents so required is the feedline break.

L Therefore, assure that the fluid conditions for this were enveloped in the EPRI tests and that the time period of water relief in the EPRI tests was as long as expected at the plant. Demonstrate operability of the safety valves 7

and PORVs for this event and assure that the feedline break event was i

considered in analyses of the piping system.

[

i

RESPONSE

The issue of feedline break analysis and its relevance to safety valve performance is addressed in WCAP-11677, "Pressurizer Safety Relief Valve Operation for Water Discharge During a Feedwater Line Break."

V. C. Sumer was encompassed by the WCAP (see Table 2-1) and it was shown that following the liquid discharge predicted for the feedline break l

event, the valves would reseat and continue to operate reliably.

The WCAP also concluded that the number of cycles the valves would experience are within acceptable limits.

i j

While pressurizer PORVs are conservatively not assumed in the FSAR feedline break analysis or included in WCAP-11677, if the valves should 1-1

r,<

fail during operation, the remotely-operated block valves downstream of the PORVs can be shut by the operator to terminate the flow.

In fact, the Emergency Operating Procedures were designed to have the operators perform this action if this scenario is diagnosed.

From a piping design standpoint, loop-seal discharge transients (liquid followed by steam) are more severe, i.e., produce higher loads, than all liquid discharge transients.

RELAP5/M001 analyses of the V. C. Summer SRV/PORV system for both liquid followed by steam and all liquid discharge reaffirmed this assessment.

The FSAR feedline break transient would result in all liquid discharge through the SRV/PORVs.

Thus, it can be concluded that a VCS SRV/PORV system piping design based on a loop seal discharge transient (liquid followed by steam) is more conservative than a design based on an all liquid discharge transient.

Therefore, the feedline break transient is bounded by the analysis.

1-2

.9 EG&G OVESTION NO. 2 Results from the EPRI test on the Crosby safety valves indicate that the test blowdowns exceederi the derign value of 5% for both "as installed" and "lowered"ringsettings./Iftheblowdownsexpectedfortheplant(see Question 4) also exceedj3%, the higher blowdowns could cause a rise in pressurizerwaterlevel/suchthatwatermayreachthesafetyvalveinletline andresultinasteam/haterflowsituation. Also the pressure might be sufficiently decreasr,6 such that flashing occurs in the primary loop or the

?

reactorvessel,natp/ralcirculationisinterrupted,andadequatecoolingfor decay heat removal /is not achieved.

Discuss these consequences of higher blowdowns if incry/ased blowdowns are expected.

!l

RESPONSE

i!

The impaci on plant safety of excessive pressurizer safety valve blowdowns (up to 14%) was evaluated for V. C. Summer.

The results of this I

evaluation showed no adverse effects on plant safety.

i i

Safety valve blowdowns in excess of that assumed in the V. C. Summer FSAR I

will have the following effects on the events in which safety valve actuation occurs:

1. Increased pressurizer water level during and following the valve blowdown.

E

2. Lower pressurizer pressure during and following valve blowdown.

3. Increased inventory through the valve.

1 The impact of the increased safety valve blowdowns with respect to the above etfects were evaluated for the V. C. Sumer FSAR events in which the safety valve actuation occurs (i.e., Loss of External Electrical Load, Single Reactor Coolant Pump Locked Rotor, and Major Rupture of the Main FeedwaterPipe).

I r

2-1 t

a,-_*_

m--

-,r-.

,+--+,--+-,---,,m-n,--.,-------.--,..--.r,w

x, 4

i i

For the Loss of External Electrical Load event, results from sensitivity analyses performed for a 4-loop plant were used for the evaluation.

These analyses investigated the effects of different blowdown rates on the event.

Similar results are expected for a 3-loop plant. The results of i

these analyses showed only marginal increases in pressurizer water volume and the maximum pressurizer water levels were well below the level at which liquid relief would occur.

The V. C. Summer FSAR analysis results show that a small increase in pressurizer water volume, due to increased safety valve blowdown, will not result in liquid relief. The sensitivity analyses also showed that peak RCS pressures were unaffected by the increased blowdowns. The increased blowdowns did result in lower j

. pressurizer pressure and increased RCS inventory loss; however, these had 3

no adverse impact on the event and adequate decay heat removal was maintained.

For the Single Reactor Coolant Pump Locked Rotor event, increased safety j

valve blowdewns have little impact on the event. As analyzed and l

presented in the V. C. Summer FSAR, the opening and closing of the safety valve occurs over a short time period (less than 3 seconds). As a result, there is little change in either pressurizer level or RCS inventory.

Increased safety valve blowdowns would have no impact on peak pressure, peak clad temperature, or DNBR as these occur prior to the closing of the safety valve.

l For the Major Rupture of a Fain Feedwater Pipe, the current FSAR analysis, I

as explained in WCAP-11677, will result in three cycles of water discharge (Table 4.4).

The concern about potential cressurizer fill as a result of l

the increased blowdown is meaningless for this event since water relief is already predicted. The overall effect on the transient would be to relieve more mass with each opening.

Thus, it is possible that under

{

these conditions only two cycles might result.

)

The increased blowdown of the safety valves will have no adverse impact on the transient or the ability to mitigate the transient which is provided t

by the Emergency Feedwater System.

l l

2-2

n s

EG&G QUESTION NO. 3 The submittal does not identify the ring settings to be used on the Crosby 6M6 safety valves or what effect these settings have on valve performance in the V. C. Summer installation.

Provide the final ring settings selected for the V. C. Summer safety valves.

Identify the expected olowdowns corresponding to these plant ring settings and explain how the blowdowns were extrapolated or calculated from test data. Verify that at these ring settings the valves can perform their pressure relief function and the plant can be safely shutdown with the blowdown and fluid conditions occurring at the plant.

RESPONSE

Ring settings for the V. C. Summer safety valves are as follows:

Valve Serial Number Nozzle Rino Guide Rino N56964-01-0079

-18

-250 N56964-01-0078

-18

-225

[

N56964-01-0077

-18

-250 Please note that the ring setting given above were measured by Crosby from the "highest-locked position," as noted in Crosby procedures and in the

)

EPRI reports "Definitions of Key Terms for Safety Valves." Ring settings reported by EPRI were measured from the "level position."

These ring settings were established by a method which includes a steam operational test on each valve by Crosby.

Blowdowns measured during these j

production tests were equal to or less than 5 percent for all valves.

The l

j Crosby 6M6 valve EPRI tests seen with "typical PWR plant settings" had i

ring settings that were established by the same methods.

Therefore, these j

EPRI tests can be used to show that the V. C. Summer valves can perform i

their intended function and the plant can be safety shut down.

c 1

3-1 l

t I

o EGLG OVESTION N0. 4 Results from EPRI tests on the Crosby 6M6 safety valve with loop seal internals show that during some tests the valve attained rate lift and rated flow at 3% accumulation while during other tests it did not. Provide a demonstration that the plant safety valves will pass their rated flow with the ring settings used.

RESPONSE

EPRI report NP-2770-LD, Volume 6, for the Crosby 6M6 safety valve shows in Table 4.4 that in every test for which data was taken, the valve achieved at least the rated flow.

This was true at 3% accumulation regardless of the ring settings tested.

Since the V. C. Summer valve ring settings were established by the same methods used to establish some of the EPRI test ring settings, the V. C. Summer valves can be expected to also achieve rated flow at 3% acc :mulation.

4-1

EG&G OUESTION N0. 5 During two EPRI hot loop seal-steam tests and one subcooled water test on the 6M6 safety valve, the valve fluttered and chattered upon closure. These tests were terminated by manually opening the valve to stop the chatter. The hot lonp seal tests appear to be representative of conditions at the V. C.

Summer plant and the liquid flow tests may be representative of a feedline break event (see Question 1).

Justify that the valve behavior exhibited in these tests is not indicative of the performance expected for the V. C.

Summer valves.

RESPONSE

Based on the temperatures corresponding to the actual V. C. Summer FSAR analysis, WCAP-11677 demonstrated that the Crosby 6M6 pressurizer safety l

valves would operate reliably.

The particular test resulting in "chatter upon opening that stabilized" (Test 931b) was actually experiencirg fluttering just prior to popping full open.

This conclusion is based on a detailed review of the actual stem position tracings.

Fluttering is defined as stem motions below half o' the lift while chattering is defined as stem motion equal to the lift.

Fluttering does not have any adverse impact on valve performance. Thus, this test did result in a "stable" discharge.

Note that the predicted temperature of the water being discharged for V. C. Summer is in excess of 630 degrees-F.

This information is also presented on page 10 of WCAP-11677.

The test that disch?rged subcooled liquid (Test 932) utilized fluid at 463 degrees-F.

Since this temperature does not envelope the conditions indicative of the V. C. Summer Feedline Break analysis, it can be neglected.

In other words, the test is not representative of the performance expected at V. C. Summer.

5-1

EG&G OVESTION N0. G NUREG-0737 Item 11.0.1 requires that the plant-specific PORV control circuitry be qualified for design-basis transients and accidents.

Please provide information which demonstrates that this requirement has been fulfilled.

RESPONSE

The circuitry is class 1-E and qualifications of the solenoids are documented in the response to NUREG-0588, Revision 4 "Environm. ental Qualification of Safety Related Equipment." Class 1-E circuitry is powered from safety related power systems and is seismically designed.

C-1

s.

EG&G OVESTION NO. 7 Bending moments are induced on the safety valves and PORV's during the time they are required to operate because of discharge loads and thermal expansion of the pressurizer tank and inlet and outlet piping. Make a comparison between the predicted plant moments with the moments applied to the tested valves to demonstrate that the operability of the valves will not be impaired.

Response

A.

SRV aualification The loads on the inlet side of the SRV's were generated by TES.

The loads were transmitted to C. C. Barbier (GAI) (page 7-2), who 4

subsequently passed them on to Crosby Valve & Gage.

They were accepted per August 18, 1981 telephone memo of D. T. Klinksiek (GAI) i and David Allen (Crosby Valve & Gage Company) (page 7-3).

The thermal loads subsequently changed, but were lower than those originally used. Therefore, TES considered the valves as remaining qualified without need to contact Crosby Valve & Gage.

The loads on the outlet side of the SRV's were calculated by G/C.

They were' transmitted to Westinghouse, letter CGGW-1815 dated 7/15/82 (pages 7-4 through 7-9), which found the loads acceptable, letter CGWG-2628 dated 8/10/82 (page 7-10).

Subsequently, new loads were generated on one valve (8010-A) and re-transmitted to Westinghouse, letter CGGW-1824 dated 7/30/82 (pages 7-11 and 7-12).

Once again, the new loads were found to be acceptaule, letter CGWG-2639 dated 8/13/82 (page 7-13).

B.

PORV and block valve cualification The loads on both the inlets and outlets of the PORV's and block valves were calculated by TES. The loads were qualified and found to be acceptable by TES in accordance with the guidelines set forth in Westinghouse Specification G-677458, and G/C Design Specification OSP-544R-044461-000. The loads are summarized on page 7-14.

C.

Comparison of calculated loads to EPRI test loads A comparison of the loads calculated to be imposed on the SRV outlet flange prior to lift, and the measured loads on the EPRI tested i

valve are illustrated in a table on page 7-15.

Please note that Report EPRI NP-2770-LD, Volume 10 in section 3, part 3.1, page 3-1

)

states, l

'The loads imposed on the safety valves during thLs test program had no measureable etTect on valve

{

operability. The maximum recorded bending moment acttng on the safety valve discharge flange is reported for each valve test in Table 31. These valves are as-tested bending moments and do not constitute i

a maximum allowable moment above w hich the valve will no longer funtion,"

Therefore, although the loads calculated to be imposed on the outlet flange are significantly less than the EPRI test loads, operability Cannot be assured by this method. Operability was assured by having i

valve loads acceptable to the valve vendor as was demonstrated in Section A and B above.

1 To assist with the reviews, the details of the SRV supports have been included and are on pages 7-16 thcougn 7-23.

Please note that the SRV is anchored at its base and guided on the discharge to allow only axial movement.

The only EPRI PORV moment was 43,000 in.-lb.

i which is larger than any allowable moment (page 7-14) to which the valves are qualified.

7-5L-

/}77AC//phn.Z

!?160 24 RE FE R,CN C.E ii "pPTELEDYNE ENGINEERING SERVICE.

303 BLAN M4 L HOAD vsA&1w BAA5'ACNUSif15 0me (61 f) 9% 33501sn (710) 324-75c4 SCE t, G Co August 13, 1981 P.O.07"g.h,y],

)

Mr. Charles C. Barbier V. C. 5U!.'l.'..i t; t,*.I Gilbert Associates, Inc.

152 Fairbanks Road Oak Ridge, TN 37830

Subject:

Class 1 Analysis of Pressurizer Relief System CROSBY SRV Inlet loads, V. C. Sumer Station, Unit 1

Dear Mr. Barbier:

Per your request in our telephone conversation today please find the loads on the inlet side of the CROSBY SRV at the valve f ace for loops A, B and C.

Please take note that Mx, M, F, Fr are horizontal and that My and z

x Fy are vertical. Also note that the units are Ibs for Fx, F, Fz and in-lbs y

for Mx, My and Mz. The coordinate system is Global.

Loop A Loop B Loop C F

+ 2,712, - 1,808

+ 5,037, -

5,307

+ 1,693, - 2,007 y

x W

F

+ 12,016, - 8,500

+ 13,097, - 9,925

+ 16,099 - 12,287 y

F

+ 3,717, - 3,705

+

503, -

441

+ 3,525 - 3,819 M,

+171,410, -206,374

+ 10,765, - 18,537

+295,596. -245,336 M

+ 16,246, - 5,720

+ 11,108, -

3,810

+ 4,095, - 8,125 y

M,

+130,711, -103,609

+209.755, -266,043

+103,610, -159,034 If you have any questions or cements, please call me.

Sincerely, T

DYNE EtiGitrER f SERVICES d [ti fd/4M 4

Patrick D. Harrison, P.E.

Manager, Projects PDH/ba cc:

D. F. Landers (TES)

R. D. Ciatto (TES) l K. W. Nettles (SCELG)

C. C. Barbier (GAI) l C.A. Price (SCC &G)

0. W. Dixon (SCE&G)

D. R. M00re (SCEAG)

11. E. Yoccm (gal)

R. J. Hoffert (gal)

J. F. Bailey (SCE&G)

M A. R. Hoffert (gal)

Carl Rentschler (GAI)

P. H. Schmitzer (GA!)

John Palmer, Crosby Valve f4PCF/Whitaker (SLEAG)

T. Matty, Westinghouse Tim Adam!., Wee.tinghouse TES Document Control 7-2 M

w r a. n

~..

.,.. n -

e

//T]/iLil N C H ] g

/

-el-RGFGdGw%I3u....cn.

>-0.

TELEPHONE AND CONFERENCE MEMORANDUM Aucust 18,1981 DATE D.T. Klinksiek 044461-000 woRc oRoER Ho.

TELEPHCHE CALL hh CON /ERENCE []

David Allen

,ng, Crosby Valve & Gage i

Qualification of RCO3 W UECT p1 y

!G & G CO.

P, O. C25:15!.E3 V. C. 5'".'?.':2 l':::T 1 e, _

Mr. Allen called this date to inform me that the review against the piping loads from Teledyne was completed.

Crosby has no problems accepting these loads.

A later telecon with Charles Barbier indicated that Crosby had been requested to use 700 psi at valve discharge during the review of the Toledyne load.

GAI as s umes tha': this pressure was used during the review of the Teledyne loads.

%U r*A

~

D.T. XLINKSIEK o

C.C. Barbier (GAI-Qakridge)

K.W. Nettles (SCE&G) rM O.W. Dixon (SCE&G) s f.,t.

1.i M.D. Quinton (SCE&G)

R. Ciatto (TES)

P. Schmit:qer (GAI)

D. Kershner P. Harrison (TES)

C.

Rentschler J. King (TES)

-2 K. Ch ang (We s t)

Y 7.

Suchanan 9

%,3.,

,,,,_g

_c

RCol 2 0. ?--

I 6

.o e

~

r.'

Gilbert / Commonwealth en;eeen ce uvum GtBEAT ASSOCIATES. INC. P 0 Bc4 MW Pea:ng. ?A 13503 ft 215 775 IG Cat e Grasx feu sh O' I

Juiy 15, 1982 l

1815 l

CGGW Mr. J.

B. Cookinham Westinghouse Electric Corporation PWR System Division P.

G.

E,x 355 Pittsburgh, Pennuylvania 15230 Re:

V.

C. Su n ner Nuclear Station Unit 1 GAI.

W.O. 04-4461-003 Pressuricer Relief Syste-Filo Code:

40.G

Reference:

CGGW-1811 Response Code:

RR, Dear Mr. Cookinham-Attached to this letter are the forces and eccents being applied to the outlet flanges of the three (3) safety relief valves 1-8010A, 1-9013S, and 1-8010C from the non-safety portlen of

.he Pressurizer Relief System piping.

These values supercede the previous values transmitted via CGGW-1811 o.-

July 9, 1982.

Also attached to this letter are the f:rces and eccents being applied to the Pressurl:er Relief Tank Nozzle from the non-safety piping system.

These values supercede the cre"ious values trans-mitted via CGGW-1811 on July 8, 1982.

Please evaluate the loads applied to the sa i '-

valves and also tne loads applied to the Pressurizer Relief Tar, for acceptability and inf orm 's11bert Associates of the revtew results.

If you have any questions, please contact me.

DRY.:CNR:GJB:ca:

' ' e r ', truly foars, Attachments b*,: /.%

k D.

R.

':e r s nn e r r

Piping Engineer O 72. MM C.

S.

RentsChler As-Bullt Pip;ng.'er.:.:at cn T a c '- Manager T. r.

~

, ?.v. a r t ; }..- f C.J.

brade.lc.

Project Manager

~h I

w

'd L e%W

-* 0 :Aj 2 0 V;',P L4 -

4; < ft

l '484 'i 50 4"

g-g

T dilbert/Commonwe:lth r,w, v4 tesa,v

't (' 4 ri**'

263 2

6

't s o u na am n m u ts m.u c.u ww 'ne u o Letter No. CGGW - 1315 Kershner/Rentsch'.or to Cookinham July 13, 1982 Page two cc:

J.

B. Cockinham (4) w/att.

C.

A.

Price (2) w/att.

NPCF/Whitaker V. C.

Summer L:. !!. Crews, Jr.

D.

R.

Moore O.

S.

B ra dh a:n O.

W.

D i:<o n K.

W.

Mettles M.

Cuinton R.

F a i:<

w/att.

G.

J.

3radd'ck (2) w/att, eE D.

T.

i,linksiek w/att.

C.

N.

Rentschler M.

2.

Lee w/att.

L.

Y.

Chou w/att.

K.

R. Gabel w/att.

l l

e o

. ' ''***'* y[l l[

}

{

'0 GILfili:T ASSOCI ATES, INC.

V. C. $LWCl!

4.0.

NL MhEl' l'!I.! % CODE PE\\ DING, PA.

SLCLEAR STiT!0s 01 1101-2C4

( I:C o l

)

PIPINC E.NCISECRISC ORISCINA OR:

V E!!!FICIj:

PACE not t>I.I' f. S LMlil.'It 0132

,6 Ad

=' M. J.m 0!

Oh!

D ATL I )h t- /2 %

Ir t#,

2.10 NO22LE L0AD

SUMMARY

EQUIPMENT : SAFETY RELIEF VAI.YE TAG S0. : 1-E0104 N0ZZLE SIZE : 0" SERVICE : I:C JOINT NO. : A23(MEYrER-1100)

I!EFEi!ESCC PRES 50RIZER SRV OLTLET FLANCE ORIENTATION : LOCAL (X - AXIAL, Y - VERTICAL)

LUAD CASE FO!!CES (LES)

MOYESTS (FT-led)

(RUN !.D.)

FX FY F2 MX MY MZ DE A D v. !;I Cl!T

' A' (ATCRIIP )

-1.

-507.

2.

-10.

13.

587.

Ti!E P.M A L (ATCRl!P )

-78.

123.

11.

107.

200.

-1115.

OLE (ATCRIIP )

3.

3.

l.

l.

11.

a2,

~%E (AILl:!!P )

3.

3.

eg.

.g,

els, eg, i

L10;LO45

(\\TCPMLS )

1111.

7710.

1015.

1457,

1111.

.S202.

EUID RES tATCl!!!P )

CD.

401.

'311.

1C3.

205.

313.

(

)

.NUTE

1. RLN ATCRIIP DtTED 7/11/S2

2. MUN ATCILMLS DATED 7/12/S2 3.

- I'OSITIVE AND NEC\\TIVE VALLES

}-h I

Vestoer"C RCOI 202 f

6 i Gil.Iti:i:T ASSOCI ATE %'.

INC.

V. C. SL'NE!!

'A. O. M M f:El 1ILING CODE

.READINC l'A.

.\\tCLEilt STATION 01-4101-201

( PC01

)

"!P!NC ENGINEERING OI:!NCI.\\ ATOR:

\\Cl!IFIEP:

l' '. C E 001 3

DEPT. MNi!ER 0102 Ns/'%

D f L'al-OI-001 DATE(S A c.4 >

pler/n 2.10 NOZZLE L0AD

SUMMARY

~"

EqCIPMINT : SAFETY 1:ELIEI YALVE TAC NO.

1-80100 N022LE SIZE : C" SERVICE : RC JOINT NO. :

A l ( ME'.f r E T:- 1010 )

1:EFLIENCE : PRESSLRIZER SRV OUTLET FLANCE 01:!ESTATION : LOCAL (X - AXIAL, Y - VERTICAL)

LOAD CASE l'01:CLS ( LES)

M0'.:ENTS (FT-L b)

'Blh I.D.)

FX FY FZ MX MY MZ LEur EICllT (ATCRIIP >

1.

-503.

4.

-20.

-C.

-10S.

Ill!.I'J! A L

( ATCitIIP )

-S2.

310.

-105.

1715.

3S3.

010.

UllE

<iTCRIIP )

ei.

2.

7.

12.

C.

0.

SSE

( '.TCl:1 !!' )

eC.

32.

0.

e10.

e7.

i11.

i !.u.' b rrA N

< iTCP,'!LS )

1175.

803S0.

1823.

el403.

2157.

80700.

It!GID RLS.

<iTCRIIP )

214.

3S0.

250.

155.

217.

103.

(

)

~61 rl -

1. RLN ATCRIIP DiTED 7/14/S2

2. !!LS.iTCRMLS DiTC) 7/12/S2

- P0;!TI\\ f iSD NEC',7!\\E V'.LLES l

g

.ia/

N/

- RCbi 2.13 d S

6 V . t a -

GILI:ERT ASSOCI ATES, !>C.

V. C. Ste:Elt

v. 0 N LNI:El: l'!I.!NG CODl;

!!EADING. PA.

NCCLEAR STATION 01-1101-201

( Ptol

)

PIPING E.NCINEElt!NC ORINCINAT0l!:

VERIFIERj PAGE 001 del'T. NLMiitil 0432 8t/ fbi

!)/ L1..s OF 001 DATEI 7 M /V2 1,hT/pu.

2.10 N022LE L0AD SUStMARY EQUIPMENT : SAFETY DELIEF YALVE TAC 50. : 1-8010C N0Z2LE SIZE : 6" SERVICE : RC J0!NT NO. : A37(MEvrER-1410)

REFERENCE : Pl!ESSURIZElt SRV OLTLET FLANCE ORIENTATION : LOCAL (X - AXIAL, Y - VERTICAL)

LO\\D CASE FORCES (LCS)

MOMENTS (FT LBS)

(PLN 1.D.)

FX FY FZ MX MY Mz DLADVEIGl!T (ATCHIIP )

11.

-02G.

-3.

1.

-4.

-538.

l-Tiltr"iL (ATCR11P )

-0G.

GIS.

-43.

1450.

11.

-508.

OCE (ATCRl!P )

83.

13.

l.

0.

11.

'G.

$$E (ATCPl!P )

ei, e17.

1.

3.

11.

es.

1:LO A D0'A N

( ATCitMLS )

1500.

13S13.

19 C'l.

e1501, e:C30.

14317.

1:1GID RES.

(iTCRI!P )

113.

141.

12G.

100.

0C.

e20.

t Wl E ;

1. CLN ATCR!!P DATED 7/11/S2

2. CL'N ATGltvlS DiTED 7/12/50 3.

- POSIT!\\ E BD NECATIVE VALL ES

,r-i n

\\

V

'" ' " RCo l

' l ll 6

6 31.I'.1:1:T ASSOCI ATI:5. INC.

v. C. SUNElt

4.0. SLMCEliTIENCCODI

1:EADING PA.

SECLEAR STATION 01 1101-201

( CC01

)

PIPISC ENGINEERISC Ol!!SGISA It:

VERIFIEJ!:

l' '.C E 001 Dl:PT. SDt0 Eft 0132

.M 'M B P #cL,.

Of 001 DATE:9 man, W h:

2.10 NO22LE L0AD S U bl M A R Y LQUll":ENT : PRES. IIELIEF TASK TAG S0. : XTK-G-l'C S07.2LE SIZE : 12" SEnv!CE : RC J01.NT h0. : A55(MEMI:CR 1980)

ItETERENCE : PDESSlit!2ER DELIEF TANK TLANCE On!CNTATION : LOCAL (X - AXIAL: Y.2 - SllEAR )

LOAD CAS FORCES (LES)

MOMENTS (fT-LES)

( R L'N 1. D. )

FX FY FZ MX MY M2 DE ADV.EIGi!T (ATCI:I!P 1 219..

8.

-131.

-31.

122.

lo7.

M' TilCI'>t A L (ATCILMAL )

+0010.

-57.

-G557.

001.

7723, 3051.

OllE tATCRIIP )

SOG.

S90.

120.

1001.

8233.

3S50.

SSE tATC0!IP )

083.

1054.

Col.

1103.

277.

,178.

LLO/ DOD (ATCP.MLS )

23310.

3000.

1115.

7100.

21Cri.

el2SG5.

RICID RES.

(\\!Cn!!P i

2C3.

314.

37.

G10.

13C.

1223,

(

)

NOTE :

1. PLS ATCRI!P DiTED 7/11/S2

2. ItCN ATCn"LS D ATED 7/12/S2

':. * - POSIT!vt TND SECAT!\\ r VALEES

n a n

E.1 R

RECEIVED

! I_

CGwo 2628 l

AtlG 131982 2

500'.CK I

J f

Ic's jl-l,tl l""

G. J. BRADDICK

,BITTLE g

~

WfG'4h00!8 Vi2ter Res: tor PA0llNI

- ~: ni t:.o F.'

fle:ff tC C0fp0f 3 hon Divisions

^LINKSIEK

.., ' ~

~

GABEL i:.; rr,.;, n. ;;

u tR A'.t ER August 10, 19S2 SEIl0C" AM-SSA-2308 I

isae0N 5.0. CGE/145 0

t'r. G. J. Braddick RillNAUER R

Gilbert Associates, Inc.

P.O. Eos 14-8

.l 7gg,. u N

Reading, PA 19603 I__1BARUIS'"

i A.

f.

,; C l4

r/elst SOUTH CAROLI!;; ELECTRIC ARGAS CCMP U;Y VIRGIL C. SU'P.ER fiUCEEAR STATftli

Dear l'r Braddick:

Westin;nouse has evaluated the pressurizer safety valve cutlet flanges and the pressurizer relief tank flange based en the revised calculated loads I

as transnitted in Gilbert Associates, Inc. letter CG%,'-1815, 7/15/82.

l Our Systems Structwral Analysis Group has deterr.ined that the pressuri:er f

relief tank flange leads are acceptable.

The applied loads en the three safoty valves have been shewn te be acceptable by our Purp and Yalve Engineering Grcup.

If there are any questiens, please centact re.

b Very truly yours.

WEST!hGHOUSE ELECTRIC C0F.PC M TICN L.C.bith/jm Jaees E. Coctir.h n, Manager cc:

G. J. Braddick (GA!), 4L I

SCE&G Project C. A. Price (SCE&G), IL

" ~ ' nitaker, 0,/hPCT (::EIG), IL E. H. Crews, Jr. (SCE&G), IL D. A. Nauman (SCE&G), IL

0. 5. Bradhan (SCE1G' Site), IL H. Radin (SCE&G Site), IL R. J. Hoffert (gal), IL Plor.t Nu erical Records Systen (SCELG Site), il f

fre.,c u s L 7Tece/vect b'

M' W g/)

G' y

7-1 m

o...

c..-,--

p>(3j

[ 13.10 l

2

' (./'

I

~

Gilbert / Commonwealth e ;nn ne c:mw.s CLE!AtASSOATES. INC. P O B:n usi. Re W FA ECF iet 24U52600. Cai'e G.im:' frei 52H31 July 30, 1982 CGCW -

1824 Mr. J. P. Cookinham Vestinghouse F.lectric Corporation PWR System Division F. O. Box 355 Pitt sbur;h, Pennsylvania 15230 Re:

V. C. Su ::er Nuclear Station L' nit 1 GAI V.O. 4461-000 Pressurizer Relief Syste:

File " de:

40.G

Reference:

CGGV - 1815 Response Code:

RR, 6-10-52 Lear "r.

Cockinhas:

A:tached to this letter is a revised outlet flange load sur.. ary sheet for the Pressuri:er Safety Valve 1-5010A.

Tne only changes reflected en the attached f

had r.urnary sheet as cc pared to the loadings sent via the letter CCCW-1615 J

are that the (Fy) and (P.:) values were increased by 20!..

~hese increases were required based upon the completien cf the RL' LAP 5 f orcing f un:tien verificatien.

Tnese intreased blevdov. loads for loop 'A' vill still te enveleped by the loop

'C' blevdown loads which were used fer the previous qualifications cf the SRV catlet flanger and the SRV outlet flange studs (Ref. CCCW-lE15).

F12tse evaluste th* leads applied te the SRV l-6010A for acceptability and I

in f e r: CAI of the review results.

If y N have any questiens. please centact =e.

E: C:7.: CJS : c at Very truly yours.

At tach: en:

cc:

J. S. Cockinha: (4) v/at:.

C. A. Price (2) v/att.

D. R. F.e r shner SPOT /kTaitaker Piping Engineer V. C.

Su=er C }?. Wo N'--^

, yo e O.

S. S t a d '.:a =

C. N. Rentschler O. W. Dixon As-Euilt Fipir.g Verificatien K.

W.

Settles Task Manager

".. Quinten

\\

I R.

Taix v/a:?.

.(

3,,,.

3.

J.

3reddici (2)./a:-

d Cr n v

D. ' '. Klinks'.ek v h ::.

C.

J.

E r a c.n c e K r Cm; 2.

hentschler Prcject Pe na n t T. c. Eretros s

}- / l C. Lee v/att.

D. R..'ershnet v a.

..r s,. :. r s w... u: ;,r - 4:;n

a

i.n.-

..a v. r,..t.. c i. s.,,.,,.. c - -

y i

yee r.s e, -- ggt g,1), jn gg

~*

~ CILCERT ASSOCIATES. IhC.

V. C. SUSNER t.0. SUM 0ER FILING CODE READING. PA.

SUCLEAR STATION 04-4401-204

( RC01

)

PIPISC ESCINEERING ORISCINATOR:

VERIFIER:

PACE 001

_ w%

PJ P -

0F 001 DEPT. NUMBER 0432 D ATC s WW)/V.%

fjultt i

2.10 N022LE iUAD

SUMMARY

~ EQUIPMEST t SAFETY RELIEF VALVETAC 60. i 1-8010A XO22LE SIZE : C" SERVICE : RC JOINT h0. : A23(MEMBER-1400)

REFERENCE : PPJSSURIZER SUV OLTLET FLANCE ORIENTATION : LOCAL (X - AXIAL. Y - VERTICAL)

LOAD CASE FORCES (LES)

M0GNTS (FT-LCS) l (RUN !.D.) -

TX FY F2 MX MY MZ

~ DE A D'.E lCIIT

( ATCRl!P )

-1.

-507, 2.

-10.

13.

SS7.

~

Tl!EP. MAL (ATCR!!P )

-tS.

123.

11.

197.

200,

-1445.

l I

OBE (ATCRIIP )

3.

83.

el.

1.

14.

2.

i SSC (ATCRIIP )

3.

3.

1.

1.

18.

2.

~ LLO4DOWN (ATCRMLS )

1411.

892SS.

104C.

1467.

1411.

'9914.

RICID RES.

(ATCRIIP )

C9.

401.

311.

103.

298.

8343.

(

)

bOTE s

1. RUN ATCRIIP DATED 7/14/E0

2. RUh ATCP,xtS DATED 7/12/E0

3. * - POSIT!YE AND NEC ATIVE V AltES

4. FY ASD M2 0F LLOIDOvh SERE MULTIPLIED 1.0 CORRECTION F ACTOR B ASED COMPUTER O';TPUT DATA. (REF. AEA-MEMO) t An

_-__-__--____m

Q"gCGy)G-a637 g.c.n n,-

-- acol s.svia ic?.I n

Rect 1VED p, c g.,, g eninIhcut.:

wer nea: tor AM.UI1 E' me*

,m ein :.. a flectric Corporatica oms (ons G. J. BRA 00lQK-eim mevestm= min August 13,1952 Mr. G. J. Braddick

)

Gtibert Associates, lnc.

P. O. Box 1493 f 75 Lancastei Avenue

%adina, PA 19503 i

i 50'JTil CAROL!flA ELECTRIC & GAS COMPA3r VIRGIL C. SECR HU; LEAR STATION Derssurizer Safoty Valve J!o::le Ma,ds.,

j or:ar Mr. Crad.1ick:

1.cstin.;h00se h3s evabled the SJicty v3hc odtict fl3rge icads (On.Jrcef a

1 r.y cGGW-1824 catec July 20, 1932 ter saftty relief vahc el-E010A.

4 j

in: 1eads on vstve 416010A are accetable.

1 Yery truly your;,

4

'vC571!@0USE E!ECTRIC CORFORt.!!LS i

--.I '../

y L,6,.

-l...

1 R. J. Dix. Projact Engineer South C1rolina Electric a Gas M

%~W

' f lLE :

I M*f:jt 11 Al fil.NC l

cc:

t.

J 5.*ttdick (G.* I) 4L

(. A. E "i:e (5CE15)

L

!!. 'i i itJLer, Jr./:iTCF (SC JG));

p:.;;,3

f. H

f. sn3, Jr. (5.CEM) Il gj9 gg' l

9. A. it..r+a (SCE4G) it

6. L. 1.cNc: (1213 5i te)

IL 1

MA0l"'I N. ha (SCf13.'ite) 1L

_MUN' ^

l

k. J Trt(51)1t Pl. nr

.uir.ti hards Sys..x. (5 CZ Site) 1L

& c ett ifwin Sil L C".t HPs i R(Cls.IS f

[

M I

l~l 79 1

)

N p.

W

'.m

,.:.L h p N hit f.I i

l w

(/ -

-lr

PORV VALVE QUALIFICATION

~

SUB-5YSTEM RC-01

SUMMARY

MB (IN-LB)

MT (IN-LB)

MAX (PSI)

CONDITION VALVE Actual Allow Actual Allow Actual Allow Actual Allow 1 -PCV-445 A 15573 37139 510 37139 9907 19350 462 11094 DESIGN 1-PCV-4458 9720 37139 5833 37139 9287 19350 1303 11094 1 -PCV-444 B 9824 37139 8535 37139 9644 19350 1881 11094 NORMAL / UPSET-2 1 -PCV-445 A 33323 37139 14836 37139 18079 19350 3716' 11094 1-PCV-4458 15196 37139 8111 37139 11996 19350 1842 11094 1-PCV-444B 13607 37139 9928 37139 11693 19350 2191 11094 1-PCV-445 A 14833 26228 2792 26228 10413 13665 865 7835 NORMAUUPSET-3 1-PCV-4458 12756 26228 3483 26228 9908 13665 895j 7835 1-PCV-4448 8041 26228 6132 26228 9269 13665 1472 7835 FAU LTED 1 -PCV-445 A 17037 25800 3969 14706 7

1 - PCV-4458 13211 25800 2485

-14706 E

1-PCV-4448 11887 25800 2117 14706

r i

COMPARISON OF PRESSURIZER SRV OUTLET FLANGE LOADS gal (0 EPRim i

Bending Moment u.m Design Measured i

t Valve Load Case M

Mr Moment Moment l

y 8010A Thermal 13 587 Deadweight 290

-1445 Norm. Design 303

-1445 1477 24,895/2074(0 t

8010B Thermal 6

468 Deadweight 383 916 Norm. Design 383 916 993 24.895/2074(0 8010C Thermal 4

583 Deadweight 11 808 Norm. Design 11 1346 1346 24,895/2074(0 1)

Moments are ft. lbs.

2) The moments shown were transmitted to Westinghouse for evaluation and approval on GAlletters CGGW-1815 (pages 7 4 through 7 9) and CGGW-1824 (pages 7-11 and 7-12). These loadings were deemed acceptable on Westinghouse letters CGWG 2628 (page 10) and CGWG 2639 (page 13).

3)

Moment shown is the lowest moment measured as given in Table 31 of the EPRl/CE Safety Valve Test Report for the Crosby HB BP 86 6M6 valve (series 900 and 1400 tests) with inlet loop seal conditions similar to V. C. Summer.

7 15

e wi7 IM

'UE OtScalPtioN

" ". Y

'I U U*

SIZ E NO ELV-17 t c.

M0ftt ho.

4[QO l

l CS 2.4 7 lIt 2 D & (SEL DL m L 5HT cm s) 5A34 ay 4Ve O ft A l'-53'LG. (5tE D E. TAIL E Hf. < li f )

SAM f

2 i'

CS l S D"LG.(SLE DETAIL S KT. S f 3 G I S AM S

I 17M' r Y (( K 3

2 C$

4 T/ E'" ft A l ' 6 4 L P, (SEE D ETAIL $dT v f 4 5" ')

$A?6 9

4 E

C5 8 % i ft A 2 0 ' LG w/(d i W He tE $ (its_5HT. C f 3 D')

SAM

+-

1 6

I C5 2 4 ' r l It x 3 ' 2 " LG. ( S E E D E TAtt SHf J It t)

~

SAM S

6 I

CS l"It A 2 d" LG. (SE E rerA iL SHT.>l5E)

$A3(

5 t

2 f*4 7

I CS 18'd Pl9e A B i 4 " LG _ ScH 15 (SEE N rAit W 7 e Il Ci ',4 m 9e 5

S CS al's I"ft ( 2 '- 4 " LS I S t E M Tait s u r.

vi5 O SA 3 /

6 9

4 CS 20 d PlfE x l' 6 LG ScH XS S AA. 9 6

~' s lo I

CS il l

.CS FoV PlPC = l'-o" L G MH ($

A w. a

5 l ' d 4 4" Lo FloLT w/AHH N vT*

S A n c. rq,

5 If 26 l V Myf LG. R ouT w/AHH wr 5A Ms m o F

5 10 o

.3 wxiet a eu

__O C T M S W T. < 1 3 M )

'3 A M 5

4 i

cs

!5'A IW 't A 1 1 10 " LG (SEE ti d

C5 J

n-v-

-w we.w m

- ~

_ _ mu m (V/

I4't l '/t' 1a J. 3 " LO ' / $ C f DET A lt S HT H ? Ti)

.i _,

i (5

'A L th g F-F L.G ~

46 i

5

\\unt.u. m 3)

,[~~;l~1,-OAFLi'r D

(f MO LO FAJM 5 H E.Af\\

I'

+ 4 AriN, T WT.,

THRE AD,

6461 e

f"'

~. w a

v,uc.

3

.r o g._. j [

3 Eb. %,* ?.h 6

'4 L T E.H 6 '; O t.

h t? E D fM 7

,4 rv w., c s: 6 ' - e s : v '*

a 4

/* LA a6 L

[' LF c fi t.

i i., C

i I

L.

....'l E L. 4 7 9, *, a e

gg ;3 3,g g 7,

I 4

2 rt w r 2 T t.*1

, d 'c f L P. t T.m4 E. L

/

'/ c -,-.\\

j N

t, E t t ; n t F u, A W E v l.

L.-

' / -

N @s /

/

i F

O*.

D 'T.

/

M A C{ ;, N R N i

)

At e c i.7 )

T i.. s ten ;L O t

2 5'-

I'I ' % '

M9 e '- d c.0 " 9 f < N ~ANL

,,,q k.

'f' a

,,utt o

3

)

U.. C 7 '- i n '. d" p W. AL

)), Y (4)

,+

-w t.= t.

~LLO 3

'N

, m'.,:

y X

nmW e

m, m ar %, / v J b,, M e t. m o

i N >'. n 3 i

=

N,<

u T.e es wr4 c #.

f CL. 4 75' 6' TTTTI'TD i_11111 111 b

h B

N l

N e f l

(

.wh l

/ %p t- -

x

/

,/

\\{',

N. h-g i,7,7 LOCATION PL AN tra)>

j s

a, q

L 1

i=,i is a m

~

. t. - f 4.p t,, A

@p *

NUCLEAR SAFETY RELATED T -ru.~we. cu

.it=t. e :iviatt o s.aa et q

Q,) g g d. t a Cp 4,34"t h t=itlift: 08 PitF aut: tift:.t Pf4C#

% E c_ 'T ic N A,A

.etatatica s*: esittt= a**a: vat SOUTH CAROLINA ELECTRIC & GA5 COMPANY peg gigggigggg gas pg,1510h5 $([ !=(ET t,ETTER A FOR TML PIPE SUPPORT in:lCAT(0 SELCw.

VIRGIL C. SUMMER NUCLE AR ST ATICH UNIT 81 i

wti i mt s. Gu 04I 4461 ll S-321-6C /

0 I.? B!, MX-B CH 0 F-GILBERT ASSOCI AT ES lHC.

C EMCiMitRS & COM5 ULT ANT 5 i

sta N Pa.

DaAsimQ m u Wlli DESCRIPTici et hf

1 5

4_.'

n io )

2 m7 )

l l

3"M 1t

.g1 h3 t

44 M3 M,

r. - -

I

'e

$3

.is t ol i

4o g

" [*,. l,,\\ i')YO -y

~-j r!

4 i.,

Ov ;t o

,g

" ' ' ' l, o I

2 tt_-__

6

+ +

F

, 0, 3 r 1;

--i

/

N 1

I 1

t

! k) i f

6 h

1 b

"'"E?m 1

g entisvai: M A s a 474'e M _

/d L

UO 68d'sl'3" E u s r i s c.

p~ O p~ F6L5h8CE.8 LUC 5 (2)

A ii P

i ;. o. c.] ei w ar:Ncrecv:c)

~ ;s A WE L O JciN'N 4 ll (j N

i rtM 15 7; ITEM L4 l

! /

To 6L MACC M 7EN

/

4

- gi i

ev w. g-r

--- ' 1 ca p r,o u r.i s svi'ra r r

~4 1

/

rir n ravc vcartc.At i s '3) t o Di '

1'

~

2

,, [ -- v-f g3 3) i,.', o 4 f I, _. '

T 4 -.

( f e t. Q w-- -

(-

t_A two,

I 3 l

E *_CT iC M E6

- 9 l

_f, 1

k fait is a NUCL E AR S AFETY RELATED

(;;.el%T. 40 ttitallCh !*ALL tt intilaite CA P(IFOsslO elfPCut 78408 C:tLulmf4flCN L%D titifth 8PF40 VAL SOUTH CAROLlHA ELECTRtc & GA5 COMP ANY FCI Sl6h ATutt3 AMD REviltCn3 $tt $Miti LETTit A FOR TML PIPE $UPPORT la;tCATED OEL0s.

VIRGtL C. SUMMER NUCLE AR ST ATION UNIT q 3

i telli PIPE Syte;ti CtLBERT A550CI AT E5, lHC.

i

' ' b.,, M" D d) $

~

INGINEERS & COM5 ULT ANT 5 l

a t A-

- Pa.

Dias.s0 EUndait Otsca:Pflot tii~

9"

-. _ _,o( 4

. _ _. s

- 3"

., p, o 2

\\

i f

'M

._o _b o-k fO

~.

a

\\

-m, O

i

,, ~ OO N

g c

pn x

o

\\7; s l

.. O O'

o

,0 0,'

W o

50 c,

's go

}

.9 4'

s

,s

~

y 6

o o

t i y

5' I n-*

j

l(l 4f*

- - +

S EC T ION 0C i-5 ' ( Tr q J

e I

f (t 4 M-f

n 9

b

~

i

4 si

./

4 g 4 7 7'. 3 '

1

\\

Mr 1

/

5LC TicN 0-0

_I T E M 7 mis is a NUCL E AR S AFETY RELATED t;ctat%f. h3 civiati:% Inatt 11 initiatt: Ct PtaFceut; tit =0J1 taica

-7( ~ / V)

CCCtul%failC% L4 stift!9 &PPf3 tat SOUTH C AROLINt, Ebf RIC & G A3 COMP ANY FCI SIGuAT1JRt3 D D REyl51 CMS SEE $HIET LETTER A FOR TMt PIPE s'JFPCtf INDi(ATED BEL 8 VIRGIL C. SUMWER NUCLE AR ST ATION UNIT e1 3

r i

i SPEET PIP [ Su F T (MCINEER$ & CCHluLT ANTS

[

O 9

GtLBERT ASSOCI AT E5, INC.

04' t

stacinc.Pa.

Ot&eIa6 hUWBER DESCtiP1 ttv.

0 0

6 e" g

.i '. t "

v m a. ---.. W f,

2. 3 _,

i'.,

't. (ryr) q f

h b

a o

_. h _

'd is N,,

b.

e g.,~s

.9 j

-Q

--- - i N

r+ -

Cr-7 N

w i

1

%e y -"7;g l

wf

~(

..L.

ii

\\

i [(TV.)

'/

I

~ ln l HO L.E.

=

00 FEdO) g 7

l 2:f'

~

nga )

.,_.0 4'__ - __8 4h,7 l

O0 l

l I

,.a WM l

i i

40 1

T_

+

i

.f Q --

.i O'N O O 9

- - Q' -

o u

s.

yw 1

o

>Y Ma \\

t

- q(.

_.9

.o

___)_

q ji o

6 *

~

[c,4\\Cg - - Q' - -.'g

'9 i

p

/

s 3

)_

y~

y L,.

M.N.t >

.' b\\

~

,.,/ g,,.)

'y,P)

(It RLQ 00

\\

O,-

g r

P P0 Arit 4 r r Hat, (tw) s i

j !

'# e

(#4 B AO May =AL ra @ t,

!4 s'

_ nam t4LC 7,

rir s

/* -

)

,L6 7 ;

N.- L H4 ITE M b

c fut$ ll &

NUCLEAR SAFETY RELATED C*CLutti, at ttvlaittm Inskt it initiatic et Ptsittett titeht Psica

7 ~ l Q tttLeitfatitm o ; esittle appettal

[

/

50VTH CAROLINA ELECTRIC & GA5 COMPANY F0k SIGa6Tytts ing styisteal $lt $ Mitt t,tfitt A FOR TML PIPE SUPPott thDICattD ttLCo.

YlRGil C. SUMMER NUCLE AR ST ATION UNIT e)

SaltT Pirt 5 Preti i

i GILB ERT A550CI ATES, INC.

g; qg g g 4g j

,, 7 3,,

8,'5_,K I,y s,

ENGlhEERS & CONSULT ANTS a t a Dime., P a.

Oa4mIao aUWIER CE$CtiPTt0a UQ g

2 ' 4

, 3 '- O

2

~

+

m 4

I l

j l

4-

_1 _%$

o

.. g __._

m o

o

,u v

n G

O Vl O

N

' - l3 / HOLE.

ITEM 9

( d RE./0.)

\\..(I'*fdHotu 3 suo)

.2T fl

.. h

- Q -. _ _ g h

t 3

6

l f ,

f

,a.,

l '- M4 i

4 lTEM

-- l'g d H LE b E

(3 REED)

-I4 1.

8.p _

\\ '

Q_.--

9 6'

[']l

, i,

,1 J..

w m.

J '. 5+4 I

w l

_T. T E M 2

g-i l

l q

THl$ l$ A

\\

NUCL E AR S AFETY RELATED CCCthENT. NO CivlAfl0m $ HALL Bt

' ~/,_,. '/ rS IAITIATED 02 P(AF0 Rut 0 tiincui PA10C l

/

000LWENTAfl0N AND 841TTIM A P P id) t A L

~

50UTH CAROLINA ELECTRIC & GA5 COMPANY FOR SIGM ATURES AMD REVISIONS SEE SHEET LETTER A FO TME PIPE SUPPORT IMOICATED BELOW.

YlRGIL C. SUMMER NUCLE AR ST ATION UNIT el i

i SMEET PIPE SUPPORT fD '

~

ENGIN R$ & CONSULT ANTS l

I Rf ADING, P A.

DRAVINO MUW8ER DESCRtPTION 14

=

g.

m o

-1 j

_L_..

rJ (I TP.)

D l' 5 +

7 ITEM 3

C 0" g

lo 4 _10 g

q_ g "

a l

a n h L

QL i

f 5, )4 ig O

.L*

I s

! x

-l[% / Hutt i

l 9

._.)

g,y

[

.4 s _.

0

.I l

iTo EC FiELO DRILLEO AFTER l' PLATL sd CUT 70 s u m.

'_L g___

_. o _

AucN scuts ver n rnuse IN I T oi [.

!f THi$ EDGE)/ I

\\

j '.g'/y 4

CUT ft. To Sv T,%{' 08 A-p:/\\.

T To AUGW l ' f.

( O Atttto e s v F A6 ')

HOLE WITH P IP IN G-FLANG(

I. TEM i 1

l THl3 15 A I

N U Cl. E A R S AF E T Y R E l. A T E D,

00CUutNT. NO DEyl ATICM SHALL 8E lNiilATED CR PEntcaufD st1HOUT PA109'

-[l 00CUutM1AllCN DIO IRllIEN AIIIOYAL SOUTH CAROLlHA ELECTRIC & GA5 COMPAN1 FOR $10 MATURES AJtD REyl510MS SEE SMEET LETTER A FOR TWE PlPE SUPPORT IMDiCATED BELOW.

VIRGIL C. SUMMER NUCLE AR ST ATION UHlf t i PIPE SUPPORT j

j tEET o L5 6-f MK-ftC H 9

4l461 S-321-60I ENGlHEER$ & CONSULT ANT 5 m m me

,u,,E, oE,c.,,1,o, e

go I'- 10 l

-=

-o g ', 7 '/[

g '(*

l R~~

3 (rW) t-7 h>

t 4

i l

n J

+

~+

19 I

1 21 r

n p

+

A.

1%,#Hxts e

(3 seq'o.)

s, P

1 TL H l5

+ l"

-e-

', l F'

x r

.{

o k

-I f

f

'. 3 "

1* TEM l7 f

d I

1 l

TMi$ IS A

\\

NUCLEAR SAFETY RELATED 03CuuENT, MD CEvinfl0N SH ALL 8E 7

^)

INITI ATED CR PERFQtufD fliM0gf PRIOR 6 --

00CUutNiall0M AMD tR11 TEM APPROYAL SOUTH CAROLINA ELECTRIC & GA5 COMPANY FOR SIGN ATURES A.MD REylSIONS SEE SHEET LETTER A FOR THE PIPE SUPPORT IMDICATED BELOW.

l YlRGIL C. $UMMER NUCL E AR ST ATION UNIT 91 i

i SMEET '

PIPE SUPPORT

~bb'M

~

ENGlH R5 & CON 5J ANTS 4[ A F' PA.

DRAWING MUMBER DESCtlPil0N REV

._3 ATERiiL R E F.

J I~ Es No.

PART LCD D E SC RIP TION SPEC.

NOTES si!E N o.

e E CO.

N O.

RIV-19 6

16/8" O STUD (dEE DEnty su 3}

pd '.p.)

l q0 12 H AR DE N ED STE E L w ^ s H E.< - ros

~

16/p ' STU D::,

t 2j 12 STA N DAR D NOTS I 5 p - 8 N

/H Ye' D 1

9 3 6' 5"

3 'b" i

rutt r40. lYg, M - 7A i

'Il. lI f, gg" *.ocro jl l

l I l l

o05 l

i

_DETAL L ITEM A O

__ O

$ E E.

s '-i =_E T O M B.

l i

N OTE. ~ 1NSTALL ATION _LNSTRUCTIONG

{

ARE 50PPLIE.D Wim FCR 15GGS LOCAT10s PLAN e

RE.V. '.3

)

fMI$ l$ A 4

HUCLEAR SAFETY RELATED C0Ceu(MI. NO CEVIAfl0N LMill Il

()

7) coccutNT AticM AMD stif f tN APPROV AL

(

INITlifE0 C4 PitFQtut0 111MC'J1 PRICA SOUTH CAROLtHA ELECTRIC & GAS COMPANY FOR $1GM ATURES DD REYlSIONS SEE SHEET LETTER A FOR THE PIPE SUPPORT INDICATED BELOW.

VIRGIL C. SUMMER NUCLE AR ST ATION UNIT si i

i satt! i PIPE SUPPORT

[

04l 4461 lS-321601 093 J !,MK-RCH - 0939 GILBERT ASSOCIATES, IHC, ENGINEERS & COH5 ULT ANT 5 l

s t A 0g P s.

DRAvino mVWBER DESCRIPT10m sty _

EG&G OUESTION NO. 8 As part of comparing inlet piping configurations of the plant safety valves and the test valves, a comparison between the two inlet piping pressure drops should be made.

Provide a numerical comparison between a calculated plant pressure drop and the test pressure drop. Explain how the plant pressure drop was calculated.

RESPONSE

Table B-3 of "EPRI PWR SAFETY AND REllEF VALVE TEST PROGRAM, GUIDE FOR APPLICATION OF VALVE TEST PROGRAM RESULTS TO PLANT-SPECIFIC EVALUATIONS" lists the inlet piping pressure drops for the different valves / piping configurations tested.

Per Table B-3, the Crosby 6M6 test inlet piping pressure drop for steam discharge is 263 psi.

This value can be compared to the 50 psi inlet piping pressure drop calculated by a plant-specific RELAPS/M001 analysis of the V. C. Summer plant for steam flow conditions.

The guidelines of the EPRI plant-specific evaluations report referenced above indicate that:

"if the plant pressure difference is less than the test pressure difference, the in-plant valve would be expected to have performance at least as stable as the tested valve." Since the V. C.

' Summer SRV's valve / piping configuration pressure drop during steam flow discharge is less than 263 psi, the plant safety valves are expected to perform as stable, or better, as the Crosby 6M6 valves tested.

The plant specific analyses performed were not designed to simulate in detail the pressure wave reflections and interactions upstream of the SRV following valve opening.

The inlet piping pressure drop criteria discussed above is intended, in part, to evaluate the susceptibility of plant-specific SRV valve / piping configurations to these pressure oscillations.

Since the V. C. Summer SRV valve piping configuration meets l

the inlet piping pressure drop criteria, the present design is deemed I

acceptable from this standpoint.

8-1

~

EG&G Ouestion NO. 9 The submittal states that backpressures at the safety valves were analyzed

~

for steady state steam dischage from all three safety valves and were shown to be less than 500 psig.

It does not, however, identify the expected backpressure for loop seal discharge from the safety valves. Provide this value for expected backpressure and assure that it was enveloped in the EPRI hot loop seal discharge tests.

Response

The RELAP 5 analysis was conservatively evaluated assuming all three SRV's are activated simultaneously.

In addition the flow rates used to develop the flow area for the SRV's were increased 17% over design flow (see response to question no. 13). The resulting transient valve backpressure is given in Figures 7.1 through 7.3 (pages 9-2 through 9-4).

In all cases the peak transient backoressure is below 600 psig, and tne steady state backpressure is less than 450 psig.

The results of the EPRI/CE test #917 indicate a peak valve backpressure of 600 psig. Therefore, the V. C. Summer SRV transient backpressure is enveloped by the EPRI hot loop seal discharge.

91

=

G 4

a O

s*

8. T g

' *, ee e

e e

M E

R u

f" @

E i

g s

o c

.=

d b

b s

R i

g y

9 l

I t

E I

e.

R" pi 5

=

e

)

I,

'N l

ICN!/Jnl 000tED9 d E

?

R (s

)

9-2 1

l

0 e

4 e

O #

4-t b

N w

E m

~

E x

I r.i k

V

=

I E

7 N

d g

b

=

p y

8,N 5

a c

y s I

W E

e.

O t

?

d 4,

m

)

'N

=

>=

o (CNl( f I rrsYPn g i

k p.:::.

l s.,

l 9-3 s.

l

-em.-

.e S

0 0

+

m

a E

Sw h

E n

e4

-a 4

c g

0 3

a 1

E es e

ce N

b E

W

-8 m"g l

A:

w I

s w

a f:

W F.

i f

l s5

~

)

l N

I g

..,u mu. =

n i.

9 W

C.i D

94

4 T J+

EG&G Ouestion No. 10 The submittal does not present details of the thermal hydraulic analysis.

Provide a report or other documentation that contains at least the following information:

For the analysis involving discharge of saturated steam with a 380*F loop seal through the safety valves, identify parameters used such as peak pressure, pressurization rate, valve opening pop time, and time step.

Provide rationale for the values used.

Explain how many volumes were used in pipe seguents of the thermal hydraulic model.

Provide a copy of the computer printout from the RELAP 5 analysis of the loop seal / steam discharge through the safety valves.

RESPONSE

The RELAP 5 analysis for the discharge of saturated steam with a 380'F loop seal was conservatively evaluated using the following parameters and conditions:

1.

Pressurizer The highest valve inlet pressure for a pressurizer steam discharge corresponds to a Locked Rotor Transient (Ref. EPRI

' Valve Inlet Fluid Conditions for Pressurizer Safety and Relief Valves in Westinghouse Designed Plants', March 1982)

Pmax = 2592 psia Pressurizer pressure surge rate = 216 psi /sec.

Valve opening pressure = 2499.7 psia.

2.

Valve opening pop time:

The SRV pop time was assumed to be 0.040 seconds based on the valve manufacturer's specifications.

Based on the EPRI/CE tests for hot loop seal discharga the valve opening time in all cases exceeded I

.040 seconds.

10-1

I-The shorter the opening time the more conservative the siialysis becomes. A shorter opening time allows for the loop-seal water slug to maintain more of its integrity and thus produce higher water-slug induced loads.

In aadition, the quicker opening time also results in higher initial fluid acceleration, and therefore, higher piping loads.

3.

RELAP 5 Time Steps:

The maximum time steps were evaluated using the courant limit.

at = e2 V+c where: At = maximum time step AX = minir.um nodal length V = maximum phasic velocity C = speed of sound In addition tre minimum time step used was 1 x 10-7 seconds.

RELAP 5 Time Steps Information Requested Time Step:

5.0 x 10-5 sec.

Minimum (allowed) Time Step:

1.0 x 10-7 sec.

Minimum (actual) Time Step Used: 1.95 x 10-7 sec.

Transient Duration: 0.8 sec.

Total Attempted Advancements:

16756 Total Repeated Advancements: 65 Total Successful Advancements:

15691 Total Requested Advancements:

16000 l

4.

The Safety Relief Valve inlet and discharge lines were modeled using a 168 volume and 169 junction RELAP 5 model. Since all the valve setpoints are 2500 psia, the hydraulic forces were evaluated j

assuming all valves open simultaneously.

The general isometric for the SRV discharge piping is given in 10-2

..e---

m. y~w,-

r-,-.,

_---g.-.+,--,

y.mw---,-,-

..--,._,,,.,,we,-rw,-w.,.-...,-,,~m

,,,%--m,

.-we--e,-,-,,

The general isometric for the SRV discharge piping is given in Figure 10-7.

Tne nodal model from the SRV's discharge to the relief tank are given in the attached figures (Calculation page Nos. 12/61 through 15/61, Attachment pages 10-3 through 10-6).

In guneral nodal spacing is determined as follows:

Near the valve outlet the node size is initially restricted by the geometry of the pipe segment and is typically less than 0.5 feet. As the piping network enters into the main header the nodal lengths are permitted to get larger, typically less than one foot.

The main header nodal lengths gradually increase up to approximately four feet.

5.

Forcing Function Results The forcing function results are given in Attachment pages 10-8

'hrough 10 33. A copy of the compute run is available for review at SoutF Carolina Electric and Gas Engineering offices in Jenkir.sville, South Carolina.

I i

l l

10-2a i

l

h tn u l

P/P U I l

PIFE A2

- - c.

2,,s * '

o 5

o

'l i'

w w

g o

gR 2

'o k

'O,

'e us M.,

g g

h

'O, AI4 q

A O

d pv 4,

f

~

4 7

$g

+

R j

g n

n o

6 o

6 4

4 1

6 0

c 7

PK/K C

i N

4 q'I STEA"i 2 3 4 S &

7 8 9 10 ll IL I

2 5 4 5 & 2 6 4

O II rz s5

+4

!.s 16$

4 Ok l

2 i

f t

t t

U 43.1*

90 90 9)*

q$

25*

by Al 42 A3 LOOP. SEAL u<

I i

o z

R 1

m

\\

t 3

k6 i

4 z

$q A 3-

}

r y 0, P'#EAA I

YO f

s h.

g i

f 0 925,0*

o. e s b3,o*

o ye s, -4S '

O l

s a

-v s e h

% tr J

o s

b

.j o

$\\ C y

)

17 16 19 20 21 22 23 24 2S.% 27 28 29 30 31 32

= To TEE */O.1 c

b

.e u.

(

n, u

5 h>=?

g 5

4 %

2 u

u E

O I.

f

~

a x

o a

o.

4s*

4S*

2 a

.E Af AS 5

.E.

1 5

E ;9 c

H T

o g

4

=

5

_.s o

e j6 REuV5 A/ObCL : Pf217 DitouG4 Sev-A yo 7t E.

Mo. I t

+s 1_l 4. v 4

M TO //t/WE. *17/E.

C}Q /A7 90 Of 7~AC. L'ELA6** /kift/W ist/Ed CthW6L globtL t/SCD A r~

Ts/E.

/

v4Lt/L, THE ADA of r!)'S iA7ain/L W4' At/fh!6CD BL3<NZAl 77/E VM/E D&Pu AD' (.0/47]

h A

un,se eiec mv.IaA or noeu n rat vers or me: vo<us,= ria >,m.m.n

~

.e r,m ce.c..we vasau..

s O

e

O e

. 1 I

ij'/jf;g'y (~;s ppfg, f gj ol[7 >[j;$

ss g pn3g SUDJLCT

. Gilbert Associates,Inc.

M'^'"

' M' & 'l L., j.., _,

I Ld d

2J W

l' uiC a u s :L wto

p. m,

CALCULATION o,,c,,,yo, yg Cgje,jg

,cnit 3 2.R7 4

A f5h a

k TO G U A 1

Q h

. I 70 Str'- C.

h~

1 q

o -

0 R

~

"A" N

u 4

n 9 3lr,4 2.13 s

~

N D

/./ di0

}

.9s 5, O' b

V a

f' o,

M

.415,-90' 4.

3 (fg 47.

)

sh 4

m

.qu z,. gf k

k t

x k

e e

a E

t:

b, b

g R

bl x

g m

.w, o s

s h.

s

.74, 90' Y

N h

1 o

u: -.

y

' ^ 3 *.

~

3 n

/

1 IM g

Y

%g SN & C2'I M s

~

0. ~,o N

f

+

V y

m P

i D

N w

e

?.

t4 l

s I

i

{

r.,

,w

{

i 1

1

,~,

i i

10-4 1

t t,.

sas not ti'41 i dr=it 5 iN r ocu a tion o r cit e t e t a sscCI A f f 5, IN C.

4 0 9 (N ' { E N A L 5[ O hl y

0 BuudECT

'u; paq

// /

/5 s

4 Gilbert Associates. Inc.

m.l y

,i 1J

_g

,. n..

. v.. a..

ei oic,vrituto

==au CALCULkT!ON 3,,c,,,,, c,

f,f, g. g oart 3-4-62

~

r

~

i-

.t E >

E er. >N t-

=-

c_

9 3

r t.

s io,-vo' R

N

,. o,. e I

w u

4 v

j. /0 $,

90 c1 4

b.

m u

L.

u n

ah t'

l o

nw nee::. ~ ra s 1 1.021, 9).

'f k

kx r-R

~

h Y. _

h o

u

~

.a d

4.50 6, 0 m

3 G

6 N

m h

e, =

a 9,

b 4.1%,0 m

k R

4, 59f,0

A E

=

to m

l 8:;

5 3 o r d, &

L%

t-1

't 4.SM,* W V

k 4

4 i

D 4

E M

i.572, 4

.1.

l fg

-4 s

k N

W h

A s

a :A h

s-y 9

~

l '4 k

M b

\\

1

^

o t

i h

N I

V i

D

~

n 1

mh N

%\\,

t N

3

.3 D

h k;

t g:

C a

es k

1

.g

'A t-h s.

a.

k d'

-[A

)

S 10-6 L_.._ __

..c.4. i t..... e n... o,0,,

o, o u, i n. s u i t u e.,. c...... u : s..

. c e

4>

I

_o i

}

N'..

l' I

i I

I 4

o

-u M

u ll,.

e*

,t p,-

..,A.

ia Fe,;

a b

y<

\\j I

I 3.,

h, T.

,)

i 7t a

1 m... 7 y

y

~

l?,;

h F~<*

/

L1

l-

,i 74

/\\'

h.

~

s a

m

)

j;.

I s

~

~.

t-

~

'h,,

i s

4AXx y

I 1

/

!)

~

s.

s t

~,

}

^~

j.*a i-f

/

,I a

/

l.

)

,1

'u

\\

Y

/

~

l

/

.r-----'**

f s

i M

E '.*/ N.

Y 4

\\

_ys L

f L

\\

6 j me/ \\ -)

~

/

l

/

\\

x 7

5

.f

\\

\\.

. O,r-j.-

< 3

/

s e

'.\\

3..

\\.

i:

/

i g

j

9;..

\\ ~ \\, '

~

-e s

$^

ll f{\\

I' f,

,in- -

/\\-

/

A l

f;.'

'l

/

s

/

..e m /

.s. u

\\,

.m.

,.,g,..

i.,

s,. - s

.r..,

e I

g i

l I

. s.n~

l J

1

_t u

I j

F.

a j

=

w 1

10-7 l

t 1

o e

i 8

f TABLE 5-1 SRV NETWORK FORCE CESCRIPTICS (SEE FIriUEE 4 -1) i I

FORCE NO.

FRCM d

l l

l 1

SRV-A Elbow Al i

2 Elbow Al Elbow A2 i

i 3

Elbow A2 El;aw A3 3

4 Elbow A3 Elbow A4 f

5 Elbow A4 Elbow A5 l

6 Elbow A5 Tee al 7

SRV-B Elbow B1 i

8 Elbow B1 Elbow B2 6

9 Elbow B2 Elbow 33 10 Elbow B3 Elbow B4 11 Elbow B4 Tee il 12 SRV-C Elbow Cl i

13 Elbow Cl Elbow C2 14 Elbow C2 Elbow C3 i

15 Elbow C3 Elbow C4 16 Elbow C4 Tee #2 l

17 Tee el Toe v2 i

18 Tee 42 Elbow H1 i,

19 Elbow H1 Elbow H2 i

l 20 Elbow H2 Elbow H3 l

21 Elbow H3 Elbow H4 e

22 Elbow H4 Elbow H5 i

23 Elbow H5 Elbow H6 I

I' 24 Elbow H6 Elbow H7 25 Elbow H7 Elbow HS I

i l

i.

I i

lO-8 i

,w,- c m. e

4 4

{

9 G

G eb 4

=

b s

E~

u

~.

e p

O 9

=

n e

o g

b

=

-0 W

8 h

c M

t g

e h

O B

h E

a-

=

S g.

e y

g I

=

l C

y

.L i

g j

m' y

r w

I i

i I

=

m I

l SW 3 13 IW.

I TIF.

lu-023-WS1DCJt@ AM M m

Uf I

I

?

Io-9 l

1 i

d 9

0 4

e e

4 8g 4

e 5

.~

h E

n

.e n

r g

3 g

6 t

g a

u e

h

=

0 W

B h

s M

t M

- o B

y c-h s

p 1

_F a

e nl 0

l l

w r

_\\

f g

==

.=

n i=.

vs tr4J C:3 &TdDC I

ia I

O I

?

x I

l I

10-10 1

1 w

-.v

,,r--

,._.7.n--,-

.._--,-,-,,=---,w.

6 e

P 9

8

."1 M

ene O

~

n

~

i d

C e

c 5

g e

~

ea n

v

,g 9

h

=

B

W s

5

.e

[

8 W

E

_s

~.

t 8

=

g r,

h

$4 7

n erc,...c3 anwe 9n

,a 3

=

8 l

L e

\\'

i l

l 0 -l l

.~

N=

9 Ek 5

E m

5 6-9 n

Nk

-i9 j g E

g

-g g

O S

h p

B4 W

d E)y d

oc E

h e-e h

-e g$ )

't

y p

4 d

W W

g o si ett 07 n

rs-et>

oil.

f pta WS 633c) bG W M t

a 1

m i

3 k

I O -l 2.

I

e e

.=

b 5

m 5

b m

rhi U

Q O

2,,

5 2

e d

b s a w

g m

5 5

3 E

i W

E' s

O. R- $

t f

a s

9

[

}

l l

)

s

[

Ji 5

l l

=

g n

~*

a g

O tt 3* e 06 00 06-ri-Ott.

p[e gg $mj @ M'4DC r

Ma e

f U

I o-l 3

m.m_.._

l

\\

1 i

1 l

I

~~

I 7

k

~

ii N

d.

h

==tgg 5

a.

ea ce v

9 6

S

W 8

s 5

8 f

I E

l (*e a-

'as h

M E

e mi w

w_

lC h

S 8

e

)<

a i

a p

3 0t 23 s t-c

t.

et s t1 At=

w"s 93 mJ e e.c c s

14 1

I

}

s,.

lo-l 4

9 l

]

O e

e a e

~

1 c

b Pt S.

.c 1, -

C e

g N

Pe O

LJ

==

b

=

0 8

W h

5 m

=

e. r a

i

~

98 F.

8-

=

u n*

E E

i h

e 5

a a

c; p

j w a x

F b

i

.m i

ws t:cau o ww.Dc h

S a

i F

)

t I0-l 5 L

s:

Y

a N

E

~-

ea Ik h

x I

e E k

-y 3

5 j

E d

g s 4

v O

O b

e e

e B

d W

b t

s E

M

?"

s Y

W h

L E

F 8

5~

l 1

er A

9 o

i r-E

-o

+

i l

l g

]

h 9

g9

^

l

'I h

a

'g l'an O'M1 C'O N

OM r

wrt 973CJ D FM p

W N

t E

I.

5

\\.

I o -l 6

.k

- 9.

e i

e Ds e

.e UN Z

5b aEs l

l E

n

.d c

e 5

a M

e e

e 7

4

-e o

E

.li l

t*

[

E W

E 6

9 F.

=b

{

W r

f c.

9 c

H N

g 5

E eO l'EI5 l'XI3 l'EIE M

l'EIE+

86 OM isl5 6M ED+ WM'aDC 3

m i

E 1

4 10-l 7

8 8

e l

G ei w

=

h E

n eh (4

-g-e5 S

U M

8

=

g g

a

?*

?

!yr E

i 1

t

(. f 8

_\\

q I

H i

4 A

g3 s

f f4 s

E-2 d

)

IM 9RD 8W 03 gu.

ID OM et ot n cJ 016 m 4 c g

t a

3 6 '

\\

\\ 0-I8 l

l t

9 6-w E

's i

E2

$x 6

Oc I

.8 I

5 e

~

e es v

g h

c 8

W b

5 m

ta g

G y

I N

V E

i E

e R

o i

f

- ~ 'F e

C l

c.

9 d

4 g

i h

o f

a g

3*l 31 3+

0 G1 0%

05 CT.

0t*

its 1122CJ l!6 wuDO i

m 2

N N

a

%r o

S IO-l9 i

P ww---,~n.e----,m-,.-------,,.,--en c+.

--n,

b a4.:

rm-._.

_e m

4 h

8 4 8

8 6

t M

i i 3..

1 t

e l'

b hemmasm P

p Cw e,

w L ' N O

Op a

"l a Lp-g?

t O

t 8,

1 0

b p

[

6 s

9 s

R 5

g a

t Y

U Yl h

Es l

. l g

E 9

I g

C

(

2' 0

q~W i

g

=

[

b i

i i

i i.

em e,

=.

....m l

r,i ti r J J tt6 d r.si c

.a

?

n i

-E R

a I

l l

10-20 i

4 i

4 O

e j

em

)

I5 R

1 N -

Es x

h$

~

, ~

e) 5 it i

g s e

e n

8

=

F Y

=

a'3 e

ev 1

V E

a.

E b

f g~

=E 7*

li E i

i e

J IY l

a l

l hH s

6 l

r n

w r

eis ev.

f.

pte sti (1DOJ Cf 6 M'MC n

l n

Ea k,

l (0-21 1

1

e s

.5 Y

~

6 3

E*

a n

g

=

gy p8 t

i hN u

g b

e B

W g

A k

a y

a V

E 3

"k

=

a I

6 5

f

\\

~

II ! ]a e

y e

\\

U d

E 4

)

E 9*

5 g

l'8013 l'8ME 01 BM.

SM O MD-WDS 613'M1J 616 WJ1)C

(

2

?!

.l e-IO-P 2

m, a

e_ea i_.e 4

v.

4

--a

.,w

,u

_J.

dy.

=O e.

e a

h o

g b

F a

e.

4We 4

e 5

5 L

I i

4 7

p I,

Pe y

G i

6 r.

ag v

%4' N

1 5

i eIS

=

e t

I I

E 0

i t

9"

.i

_5 i

w s

1 L

y E

9 f.

I l

C

}

i i

c )

1 h4

^

t i

i i

=

g

$

Est g

3rt 33 00 Ch tu. Cut.

wns sirs:; sn u'4Do i

B t

l i

(

)

l

/ O-23 r

l l

=e e

5.*

a E

O 4

E t

n e

1el.

g" G

I 5

~

e 6

v g

N b

=

EU i

8 g

R y

?

a y

[

L E

R a

ce Y

e Ns

)

C e

>E 6

3 0't Ert 0 t-ST OS C T1 F,

,D i =

W 913:e) 916 MTdDC e

M ha 6

I O - 2. 4

e-

+-

N 5

0 1

[?

[

E n

n e

f 8

~

at es e

v g

N h

B W

g s

5 t'

e Iw N

e s

5 s

W e

q w

h i

e 9

6 9

h

t

_a g

4 011 g

0't 00 0't.

t* >

C*v 4

)!'

CS ll33CJ 416 M'.CC e

f E

p Q

10- 2 5

.t.

I at Ek x

d e

n-4 j

t

~.

e

-e n

b E

W B

1 M

E t*

?

c

.W h'

l u

e A

~

F. I 1

E

_.N 4

u

\\

k i

I.

1, I

i "a

et s1 s+

et s ti-(

pts Wrts st3 reDJ 916 m'QLDC W

n I

)

10-2 6

^h O

e 4

e e

3 em G

9

ee' E

3

.e eps

+

s S

4. t n

4' p

De s'

y R

3 5

7 g

4 l

Y I

e g

a

.e E

M i

F-n W

9 i

d E

s

~

n 6

lE4 l

=

i E

E d

3 ow or re ro re-o n-ow.

et*

e sino; si6 e.aua E

i l

Io-2 7 i

i

o e

e

+

i-,

?,

ea E.

S

'e at s

-ne 4

5 r"

I E

~

N

-n c

W b

=

c b

W l

l

=

5

-n c

.IN l

w s

s d

l E

V n

I f4 e

i ai

)

OTI t' t 01 SD STk 0 18-0I' 105OG'ncJCD W.uDC g

=

m I

i l

\\

l 10 - 2 8 I

i l

Q 9

e

' s

+

e h

9 9

e e

Sub k

6 E

-a 4

/

f s

.d

\\'* -

c e

i 5

a em M

E

~

I j

N w

.e b

/

s 5

M 9

e Y.

Y s

r s

6 k

E 9

e O

k i

Y H,,

i e

a g

0 91 0 !!

C's 00 W

0 71-0 14 g

die

@S 1070J 1D M'4LDO 7

e E

I U.

l 10-2 9

a o

e o..

/ t*

+

k 5

E

.U.

L E

8 g

a N

h

k. ".

e l

N

.g W

h S

W ly

/

E 3

y I

W E'

T C

F. g o

In(kN4*

E.

.i 0'S 01 e b-O'6 01

,018 tOS TE3 3 C J O 44tA"4 D C e

I r ' '.

y s.

10-30

4 4

4-e u

9 f'

(

est e

w 5

9 9 8

=

g 6

~

n ai C

s s,.. -

p

>=

W

~

n a

w g

W b

=

E

.d v

g a

e O

se g.

~

C a

~%

q*

T 1

6.

s>

-.o O'It O 61 0's FC 0 d-O 66-SM-0ta mg(233,0Jg3 g 3 g

e EI

(.

.I I

10-31

4 r

,3 'g f,

A N=

P.

at Ek

@x (I(;

U f

8

~

A 6

b E

e w

s h

M g

+

~

1

(

I h

N" g,

6 E a m

I y

t m

h 3

1 d

ej i

l E

s l

m att n

e6 n

n n

{

ple bris 6tTkcJ m w4DC a

fI

(

10-3 2 1

r I

l

I~

p

(

a

4 e

u E

E s

I 2,

k

-=

,s ec

-5 a

5 9

e.

e h

2 W

-8 g

g s

5 R

L I

h 8

w s

=

k h

N I

w i

o E

h 9

H, L,

9 m

e 3

o et eo eo et n

n

(

$I*

W4 S'33d1J D M4DC a

E R

5 I

I0-33

4 EC&G Guestion No, 11 i' "

The submittal presents the loop seal temperature distribution that was used

(

as input to the RELAP 5 analysis, but does not explain how the simmering of the loop seal water through the safety valve was simulated in the RELAP 5 calculations. Explain how the valve flow area was varied in the analysis as water passed through the valve and how long the simmering process lasted before the valve popped open. Specify the resulting water flow rate and explain why this was deemed to be appropriate.

Response

The SRV's were ramped open linearly in.040 seconds.

No simmering was accounted for.

Since the loop seal water temperature is 380'F the water flow through the valve was determined by the RELAP 5 model. The maximum water flow through the valve (i.e., before loop seal clearing) is approximately 437 lbm/sec 0 0.1 seconds, well after the valve is fully open.

The model used for valve opening is considered conservative since the simmering was not taken into account and the valve was fully open in j

.040 seconds.

Simmering would prolong the valve opening time and allow 1

more of the loop seal water downstream of the valve to flash, reducing loads.

i l

I 4

1 l

I 11-1

l EG&G Ouestion No. 12 a

The submittal states that the thermal hydraulic analysis was performed using

(

RELAP 5/M001 and that the RELAP 5 control system was used to calculate the fluid forces.

Identify the methodology used to calculate forces from RELAP 5/M001 and provide additional verification that the methodology produces accurate force histories for similar problems.

1

Response

I The methodology used in calculating forces is attached (Attachment pages 12-2 through 12-12); in addition the same methodology is used in RELAP 5

- FORCE wnere additional comparisons are given for the EPRI/CE test Nos.

1411 and 908 (Ref. RELAP 5-FORCE Verification Manual - UCCEL, 1984).

The above information along with that previously submitted verifies the methodology used in determining the SRV discharge piping fluid forces.

l

)

4 2

}

l i

i l

i i

i 12-1

(

i Appendix n i(

FLUID TRANSIENT INDUCED FORCES CALCULATICN A.1 GENERAL DISCUSSION Calculation of the pipe forcing functions requires..cdelling of the piping system and analysis of the applicable transients with 1

the RELAP5/McD1 prcgram.

While the code evaluates the time dependent thermofluid conditions in the piping, the transient induced forces are not directly evaluated.

These forces can, however, be calculated from the results of the thermofluid calculations as derived below.

A.2 THEORY

(;j.

The force on a piping system can be evaluated by the following equation,3 for homogeneous one-dimensional flow:

2 F=

(P + CVjV!)y y - (P + cV!VI)2 2 * ~

I EYAd*

A~1 A

A x

([n[',)

(net pressure - monentum force)

(acceleration force)

+

c where A = pipe flow area F= force on piping p = pressure

density time t

V= fluid velocity 1,2 = pipe section indices Q.)

as depicted in F:gure A-1.

I I

w u-,

12.-2

\\

Since the fluid conditions are constant *: thin any control

elume,

{

i.

the acceleration force term above may be approximated as:

l t

A dm b,e /x VAdx = "3t (m Lcv)

L A-2

=

cv dt where L

= control volume lenoth cv I

m = control volume mass ficw rate i

Therefore, the total force equation for a constant area con rol I

volume becomes dm F=

(P + OVI V!)1A-

.,P + cVlVl)2A*b

(

o' E A-3 Extending the above expression to a two-fluid case as used by RELAPS/ MOD 1:

.y,

F=

(P + a.

O. V lV1l + a o

VvlV,l)1 A-4

(

l v

v s

(P + o o

VglVgl + c p

VylVyl)2 A

g g

y y

+L

-d ev dt (*1 * "vI where a = void fraction 1 = liquid phase v = vapor phase If more than one control volume exists, the pressure-morentum terms cancel out except at an open end of the pipe as sh0wn in rigure A-2.

Therefore, the force for a straight run of pipe with more than one control volume becomes:

l 4

r = (P - e, 2

v. : v,.

2,,

,. v,, v,/ ; ),. A. :

. _, :- m

. m..) :

m.

1*

j i

.,t i

l M MWeep19 l2-3

\\

4 1

I t

where P, = environmental pressure i

4 If the pipe does not have any open ends, as in the case of an i

operational transient, the force term is simply:

d P=

L (m. +m)

A-A cv dt i.

v i

~

1 l

A.3 APPLICATION AND VERITICATION CF THEORY l

l Gilbert Associatea, Inc. has developed a FELAP5/MC01 prc:esacr i

for the evaluation of equations A-5 and A-6.

Thi: m;;hodology has been verified by analyzing the steam line rupture given in Figure 3-3 which has also been analyzed by Mcody', Str ng and Saschiere3, and Burke and Webb4 Figures A-4, A-5, and A-6 compare the results of the analysis using RELAPS/ MOD 1 with answers reported 4

c previously by Burke and Webb.

The magnitude and timing of the n./

s:

forces compare favorably.

The small differences seen are probably due to the inclusion of f riction in the RELAPS/M001 model, which was not included in the other calculations, i

m u ~..-

l 1-4 4,

_ q

A + 1 J

/*

- 7 ;.

cvA:1 s

X p _,-

- vlv) A + lI dt i.<__

vN A i

t x

t l2 i

F'l60RE A 1 PIPE FCCG ELEkEWT5 Fc2 SlW6LE ( 47. V.fr a'ES

.l#

P, A r p q -

p 7 -

r-T g4

/

i F4 I

-- i L. d At I

/

t i

l

4 fVlVlA l

{

Jt

/

L _ _ 3(.

1. _

I _ _ I _

L __ _I c u e A_:

P, FE AcP Q E.EVrsT.5 C-S W.T. C;icC; _ < a,..,C

\\ f 12-5 4

. = _ - - -. _ _ _ - - _ _ _ _ _ - _ -.. - _ _

t I

i

_ Fr O

-C C 0 l

G4 :T 32 AT j

49 4

3 SUDDEN ELOWDOWN P, s 1000 PSIA

~

SATURATED STENA 2.t;.

C,=

1soo pr/ sac

+

r 1

Gz1FT 1

i

)

i l

2 A=: 00iN i

1

\\

.M

-v u

.,5 4 Pl 6'J C U A -3

?#

FcR LNG FJNcTic N M'lEF O R v e r. c. c o m o m u e -

I 1

)

i 1

l 1

l 12-6 l

J 4

t* * (,

In = t?*

PCCC!^JO f usJc 7tc^): PnecErcn sr.* foc2-ic.J Pncs. :

c ScA'cg 1 m

N 4

l (MAPJ.hets c5 g

Re.vs.% ei

.ci C.,

. o. -

C C

Cc_

i c

C Ce_

o O

-o d

(n = _

a. "

r ii. ' wC

's,,

c e

Ue 1

CC N.,

C~

L i

e i

o

.c C.,

?

Cc

.c_

c

.c.

O c

C

,G

i.. :

..c.

-. g. -

12-7

Fl&.

J1-o FCRCIIXr FVNCTIcA3 /Rc m \\/ggy,y 7tQ FXcS..'

PCh'CG 2

(: ~.

o.

N i

RELAP4/P?oS

?

o0 RGt,. AP S/ MOO).

wN eo

.o.

N eo

e..

oo t.n N.

CL "

(I '

x l.LJ ug c:

CC b

oo E"

I i

oo N

.o co

.=.

i P

o

(.'.,

C 5

.o

'O.00 0'.05 0'.10 0'.15 0'.20 0'.25 0'.30 C.

T IME 'SECCNDS)

}2-8

]

Fl& A -C pofCIH(a R /NC.TicNS PECCGSSCE VEDflCAT/cd PM:8..'

oo f02CE 3 M-RELAF4/ MOOS ea RELAPS/Mooi d.

N CO E'

e C

i d.

O tn c.

a. "

~

ln/,

6 t.u *o U.

CC n.

O~

t.L.

oo I

d~

O Q

d' eo d

e o

0.00 0' 05 0'.10 C'. 15 0'.20 0.25 0'.30 0.35 T IME (SECCNCS) 12-9

t Appendix A REFERESCES 1.

V.

H. Ransom, et.al., "RELAPS/M001 Code Manual," Vols. 1 and 2, EG&G Idaho, NURIG/CR-lS26, March 1981.

2.

F. J. Moody, "Pluid Reaction and I.mpingement Loads,"

Conference on Structural Design of Nuclear Plant Facilities, ASCE, Chicago, 1973.

3.

B.

R. Strong, Jr., and R. J.

Baschiere, "Pipe Rupture and Steam / Water Hammer Design Loads for Dynamic Analysis of Piping Systems," Nuclear Engineering and Design, Vol. 45, 1978, p. 419-428.

$i '

4.

V.

R. Burke, and S.

W.

Webb, "RELAP4/ THRUST Computer Code Manual," March 1980.

t

- >.~.

I 2-10

-v-

-,------,----m--w-S 0

0 e

e n

g 6

E

~

M 1

3_

t C

l N

)

b l

3 i

}

N

~

e

~

N l

gQ e

Y I

4 g

~

1 e

N N

y l

'B I

g n

-E l

8 m

f' f

o

}

D 0

~-

I C

C a

E 6--

w C

I N

~

R

)

5

,a

~

C.D i

Q j

k

& s 1

a N

w r

d I%

g h

}.

g

3 N

h'5 b

- i ame W

1 f

M C

M g

s u

L.

)

ru y

_ - *=* E

g l

(

4.

is

.g

-) ~ = =.~

am g

l.

~

"Cer og w-r

'I_

G I

,.s p

w N

1 x-L lt

=

cu u

Nk l*

,T.

~

t; s

O

=.

i t

i

'l 04 go 0>

c'g.

't.

c<~,t.

O!=

w-gn.mun.; rn.we

.o..: v,c.c J i

w-w-w

,O) t::

I b

m C

12.-l i

s e

s

h..:

=

4 k

~

I A

.9..I 4

w.

s g.

2

='a.

i

~i s

t Ni I

~

N,I I

s

=;;

N:

i Nl l

ie x

~.

I N:

s 4

i v:

7'

==

.=,

. s

.. 5 0

=l 3 j g-Oli

(*s 4*

\\

U}

+I

k.. t 4L 1

m.'

?

w g.

.f.

i.

v.

i 4

Qi t.m. '

t,d y

8 O

og G'

it

^

y u.

C*.

'T

==-

5 ;-

,_s.2.

I

/

s.,

~

w U,.

-===

'.T.

s.'

. - " = =

1

==

w **---

.=.-

,,=m..l g

g

=

r,,

\\,

j l

.C.

g.

C,D i

i=

=

==.

==

m.==

w T

i, y.

-=6.=

N.

1 Y'

g

\\

,I

.a 4

i

.,k 3,

=== # :

2 Y I

k

_"_= _ s"

=. - -

x.

5 wI p

y "l4

""?~{~""

s{.

f;

,~,

H.

s,, * *.,

1 3

.C t

e '.

3 i

D

/

B

/

e U;

s s

4.

.s,..

a e,

v.

N I

s M!

U

~ --

.=

="u.

N.

./.

s

~ =

d$.

7

.:r,,.,==

I

,=,=Q".="*=*.'.**M 1

s

+

.L.

.i

=

e

=-

y' I

si

~ ~..,

s I

y J

.'..__..------.a=1 6

* = ' ' *

= '

k

.P g

p-

__ _ i- -

,,,:=

S s e.

~

f O I

,a

...... ~

r

,R C.C%.*

C...<w w t s....,

{t

7..,

y.

7..

w..,.

/'ar 19 5

e I

e A

I.e 1

4 12-12

EGtG Ouestion No. 13 Report the flow rates through the safety valves and PORV's that were assumed in the thermal hydraulic analysis. Because the ASME Code requires derating of the safety valves to 90% of actual flow capacity, the safety valve analysis should be based on a flow rate of at least 111% of the flow rating of the valve, unless another flow rate can he justified.

Provide information explaining how derating of the safety valves was handled.

Response

The derating of the SRV's and PORV's are handled as follows:

Safety Relief Valves Design Flow Rate = 420,000 lbm/hr 0 2499.7 psig To allow for code derating and 5% margin the flow used to determine maximum valve flow area is 420.000 lbm/hr x 1.05 = 490,000 lbm/hr 0.9 This is a 17% increase over valve rated flow. A preliminary RELAP 5 run was made in order to determine the valve flow area required in order to achieve this flow (0.0197 ft2).

Power Ooerated Relief Valves j

Design Flow Rate = 210,000 lbm/hr @ 2364.7 psig.

Similar to the SRV's a 17% margin was applied. A preliminary RELAP 5 run was made in order to determine the maximum area to achieve this flow 2

(0.0134 ft ).

4 13 1

EG&G Ouestion No. 14 The submittal does not present details of the structural analysis.

Provide a report or ot M r documentation that contains at least the following information: For the analysis involving discharge of saturated steam with a 380 F loop seal through the safety valves, identify a) the time step used in the forcing function time histories, b) the time step used in the integration solution, c) damping values used, d) the cutoff frequency if modal superposition was used, e) and the spacing between lumped masses in the structural model, f) provide rationale for the values,used, g) explain how the connections to the pressurizer and relief tanks were treated in the structural model, h) identify the manufacturer and model numbers of snubbers used to support the safety valve piping (down to the relief tank) and specify tne stiffnesses used in the model to represent the snubbers, 1) provide a copy of the computer printout from the TPIPE and TMRPIPE analyses of the loop seal / steam discharge through the safety valves, j) also, provide clear, readable as-built drawings of the piping configuration from the pressurizer to the relief valve showing dimensions, pipe sizes and locations of pipe supports and snubbers.

Response

Item a)

The time step used in the forcing function time history analysis is 0.0005 seconds. (See rr ?onse to Question #10 for further discussion).

Item b)

The direct integration solution time step used for the GAI analysis is 0.001 seconds.

This is considered to be sufficient since it allows the piping response to adequately account for a dynamic frequency of up to approximately 250 Hz.

It is estimated that one cycle can adequately be modelled by four points allowing up to 250 cycles to be modelled in a one second time period.

For the TES portion of the analysis, a time step of 0.004 seconds was used which was considered to adequately model the dynamic characteristics of the RC03 piping since no dynamic effects of the blowdown could pass beyond the anchor point at the inlet to the SRV's.

Item c)

The damping valves used to formulate the damping matrix

'C' were a

= p = 0.0 for the GAI portion of the analysis. This yields a damping matrix of zero which is both conservative and allows for more refined futun analyses if required. The daeping values used in the TES portion or the analysis were a = 1.106 and p = 0.0000707.

Item d) 14-1 I

2

t The cutoff frequency is not applicable to the analyses under-consideration since direct integration was used rather than modal superposition.

Item e)

The spacing between lumped masses is as indicated on the piping isometric drawings listed under Item J.

In the TPIPE computer code, used for the GAI analyses, all node points are mass points so that reasonable mass point spacing is assured by appropriate and reasonable modelling techniques.

Item f)

Rationale for the above items (a - e) is described above.

Item g)

The flexibility of the pressurizer relief tank was incorporated into the piping analysis of RC01 by means of spring constants. The pressurizer nozzles (three SRV's and one PORV) were all modelled as rigid anchors.

Item h)

Pages 14-3 through 14-7 summarize support data for all supports in RC01/RC03. The manufacturer and model numbers of the snubbers are provided along with other pertinent information. The snubbers were considered rigid in the dynamic analysis of the system.

Item 1)

The requested computer output is identified as follows:

Run ID Date Description ATGRMLS 7/12/82 RC01 SRV Blowdown This copy is available for review at South Carolina Electric & Gas Engineering offices in Columbia, South Carolina.

Item j)

See isometric drawings listed below:

Isometric Owa. No.

Sheet C-314-601 3

C-314-601 1

C-314-601 2

C-314-601 31 C-314-601 32 14-2

0 e

OVERSIZE DOCUMENT PAGE PULLED SEE APERTURE CARDS NUMBER OF OVERSIZE PAGES FILMED ON APERTURE CARDS APERTURE CARD /HARD COPY AVAILABLE FROM RECORD SERVICES BRANCH FTS 492-8989 u

o

Isometn( No.

Analysis Node Snubber Support Mark Teledyne Analyus/

Analyus No.

P. A.

Support Size, IF Support Source of No gal Analysis Code Teledyne/ gal Pipe Size Elev.

Type Applicable Class Member /Stren Ratio Allowable RCH 034 C 314 601-1/31 f.C 01 149/H149 6

482 Spnng 1

3 x3x3/8

/0.35 NF RCH 035 C-314 601-1/31 RC01 145/H 145 6

482 Spong 1

3x3x3/8 (item 3)/0.35 NF RCH 041 C 314 601 1/31 RC01 1461/5146 6

482 Snubber PSA-1.5 1

Stresses Neghgible RCH 042 C-314 -601 -1/31 RC01 1941/5194 6

482 Snubber PS A-1.5 1

Stresses Neghgible RCH 043 C-314-601-1/31 RC 01 1501/5150 6

482 Snubber P5 A-1.5 1

Stresses Negligible RCH 044 C-314 601-1/31 RC 01 1951/5195 6

482 Snubber PSA-1. 5 1

Stresses Negligible RCH 045 C 314 601-1/31 RC01 1421/5142 6

480 Snubber PSA-1. 5 1

Snubber (Item 1)

/0.15 LCD 5heets RCH 046 C 314 601-1/31 RC01 1931/5193 6

480 Snubber PSA-1.5 1

Snubber (Item 1) /0.14 LCD 5heets RCH 047 C-314 601-1/31 RC01 1495/5187 3

477 Snubber PS A-1.5 1

Snubber (Item 1) /0.66 LCD 5heets RCH 048 C-314 601-1/31 RC01 1492/5188 3

477

$nubber PS A-1.5 1

Snubber (Item 1) /0.83 LCD 5heets R C H-049 C 314 601-1/31 RC 01 92/R92 6

477 Rigid 1

Weld (item 1 to 3) /0.70 NF RCH OSG C-314 601-1/31 RC01 962/TR99 6

477 Rigid 1

Hilti-Kwik Bolts (Item 7) /0.87 Mfr. Catalog and IE 79 02 RCil051 C-314 601-1/31 RC01 192/5192 3

477 Snubbar PSA 6 1

Stresses Negligible RCl1052 C-314 601-1/31 RC 01 8301/584 3

477 Snubber PSA 6 1

4x3x3/8 (item 3) /0.54 NF RCH 053 C-314 601-1/31 RC01 8101/5831 3

477 Snubber PS A-6 1

W4x13 (Item 3)

/0.43 NF RCit4015 C-314 601-1/31 RC 01 1609/G117 Viv PCV-477 Two PS A-1.5 1

C4x7.25 (Item 1)

/0.55 NF 4448 Snubbers RCH 4017 C 314 601-1/31 RC 01 1209/G121 Viv. 8000 8 477 Two PSA - 1.5 1

Stresses Negligible Snubbers RCH 4018 C-314 601-1/31 RC 01 1371/V138

\\t;v. 8000 C 479 Two PSA 65 1

C4x7.25 (Item 2)

/0.69 NF

$nubber g -3 Note: Stress Ratios hsted as "Stresses Neghbible" are less than 10'o of their Allowables

~

isometric No.

Analysis Node Snubber Support Mark Ieledyne Analysis /

Analysis No.

P. A.

Support Size, IF Support Source of No gal Analysis Code Teledyne/ gal Pipe Size Elev.

Type Applicable Class Member / Stress Ratio Allowable RCH 4019 C-314 601 1/31 RC 01 1331/V134 Viv 445 8 479 Two PS A-1.5 1

Stresses Negligible Snubbers RCH 4020 C-314 601-1/31 RC 01 8703/87 3

476 Snubber PS A-1.5 1

Snubber (Item 2) /0.85 LCD 5heets RCH 036 C 314 601-1/31 RC01 1282/H128 6

478 Spong NN5 Welded Beam Attch. (Item 4)/.71 LCD Sheets RCH 037 C-314 601-1/31 RC01 66/H66 6

472 Spnng NN5 Welded Beam Attch.(Item 2)/.31 LCD 5heets RCH 038 C 314 601-1/31 RC01 62/H62 6

472 Spnng NNS Welded Beam Attch. (Item 2)/.35 LCD Sheets RCH 039 C - 314 - 601 - 1/31 RC 01 7701/H771 3

477 Spong NN5 Spnng Can (item 5)/.92 LCD Sheets RCH 040 C-314 601-1/31 RC01 107/H 107 6

472 Spong NNS Welded Beam Attch. (Item 1)

LCD 5heets

/0.25 RCH 054 C 314 601-1/31 RC01 114/R114 3

477 Rigid NN5 3" x 3/4" BAR x 0'-111/2" (Item 1)

NF

/0.43 RCH 055 C-314 601-1/31 RC01 113/5190 3

476

$nubber PSA 6 NNS W4x13 (item 4)/0.54 NF RCH 056 C-3'4 601-1/31 RC 01 113/5190 3

476 Snubber P5A 6 NNS Hitti-Kwik Bolts /0.85 Mfr. Catalog and IE 79-02 RCH 057 C-314 601-1/31 RC01 1082/S108 6

472 Snubber P5A-15 NNS Hilti-Kwik Bolts /0 87 Mfr. Catalog and IE 79-02 RCHJ58 C-314 601-1/31 RC 01 1891/5108 6

472 Snubber PS A-15 NNS Hilti-Kwik Bolts /0.39 M fr. Catolog and IE 79-02 RCH 059 C-314 601-1/31 RC 01 1061/S106 6

472 Snubber P5 A-15 NNS Stresses Negligible RCH 060 C 314 601-1/31 RC01 1831/5101 6

472 Snubber PSA 6 NNS Stresses Negligible RCH 061 C-314 601-1/31 RC 01 1822/5182 6

472 Snubber PS A-15 NN5 Stress (s Negligible RCH 062 C-314 601-1/31 RC 01 76/576 6

476

$nubber PSA-15 NNS Snubber (Item 1)/0.78 LCD 5heets RCH 063 C 314 601 1/31 RC01 1314/S131 3

479 Snubber PSA 6 NN5 Stresses Negligible RCH 064 C-314 601-1/31 RC 01 1312/5131 3

478 Snubber PSA 6 NN5 Stresses Negligible l'*

'4 Nnto-strou R atin< l.<tod u "strno n< oloni hihlo" sro 10< < t h ari - 6 of their /\\llnwahim i

~

isometric No.

Analym Node Snubber Support h/ lark Teledyne AnalysW Analysis No.

P. A Support Size, IF Support Source of No gal Analysis Code Teldyne/ gal Pipe Size Elev.

Type Applicable Class Member / Stress Ratio Allowable RCH 065 C-314 601-1/31 RC 01 1273/5126 6

477 Sr.ubber PSA-15 NNS Stresses Negligible RCH O66 C-314 601-1/31 RC01 1031/5103 6

472 Snubber PS A-15 NNS Stresses Negligible ROi067 C 314 601-1/31 RC 01 6701/567 6

472 Snubber PS A-6 NNS Weld (item 2 to item 3)/0.50 NF RCH 068 C 314 601-1/31 RC01 65/564 6

472 Snubber PSA-15 NNS Stresses Negligible RCH 069 C 314 601-1/31 RC 01 6301/563 6

472 Snubber PSA-15 NNS Strenes Negligible RCH 071 C-314 601-1/31 RC01 6101/561 6

4)2 Snubber PS A-6 NNS Snubber (Item 1)/0.62 LCD 5heets RO4-391 C 314 601-1/31 RC01 9721/571 6

474 Snubber PS A-15 NNS Stresses Negligible RCH-392 C-314 601-1/31 RC 01 9171/5171 6

471 Snubber P5 A-15 NN5 Hitti-Kwik Bolts for item 5/0.83 Mfr. Catalog and IE 79-02 RCil397 C-314 601-1/31 RC01 103/5103 6

472 Snubber PS A-15 NN5 Strenes Negligible ROI 398 C-314-601 1/31 RC01 63/563 6

472 Snubber PSA-15 NNS Hilti-Kwik Bo;ts(Item 7)/0 63 Mfr Catalog and IE 79-02 RCH 4000 C 314 601-1/31 RC 01 1003/5111 6

475 Snubber PS A-15 NNS 5trenes Negligible RCH 4001 C 314 601-1/31 RC01 1072/5189 6

472 Snubber PSA-6 NNS Stresses Negligible RCH 4002 C 314 601-1/31 RC 01 5602/5571 6

470 Snubber PSA 15 NNS Strenes Negligible ROI 4003 C-314 601-1/31 RC01 1271/5126 6

476 Snubber PS A-15 NNS Strenes Negligible RCH 032 C-314 601-2/32 RC 01 701/H45 6

472 5pring NNS Welding Lug (Item 2)/0 27 LCD Sheets ROI 033 C 314 601-2/32 RC 01 1601/H163 6

472 Spring NNS Weldless Eye Nut (Item 8)/0.32 LCD Sheets RCH 070 C-314 601-2/32 RC01 1621/5162 6

472 Snubber P5A 6 NNS Snubber (Item 1)0.58 LCD Sheets RO1085 C-314 601-2/32 RC01 7025/5160 6

472 Snubber PS A-15 NNS Hilti-Kwik Bolts (Item 4)/0.73 M fr. Catalog and IE 79-02 ROiO86 C 314 6012/32 RC01 3004/5159 6

473 Snubber PSA-6 NNS

$nubber (Item 1)/0.14 LCD 5heets 14 -S Note. Stren Ratios listed as ~5trenes Neglibible" are len than 10% of their Allowables

~

Iv metnc No.

Analysn Node

$nubber Support Mark Teledyne Analysis /

Analysis No.

P. A.

Support Size,if Support Source of No gal Analysis Code Teledyne/ gal Pipe Size Elev.

Type Applicable Class Member / Stress Ratio Allowable ROI 087 C-314 6012/32 RC01 1672/5167 6

467 Snubber P5A-6 NN5 Snubber (item 1)/0.74 LCD 5heets ROI 088 C 314 601-2/32 RC 01 1674/5167 6

467 Snubber PSA 6 NN5 Snubber (Item 1)/0.92 LCD 5heets ROI 089 C-314 601/2/32 RC01 1612/5161 6

472 Snubber P5 A-15 NN5 Hilti-Kwik Bolts (Item 4)/0.98 M fr. Catalog and IE 79-02 ROiO90 C 314 601-2/32 RC01 1603/5164 6

472 Snubber PSA-15 NN5 Attch. Pad (Item 3)/0.81 NF Roi 091 C 314 601-2/32 RC 01 2001/5165 6

473 Snubber PSA-6 NN5 Snubber (Item 1)/0.43 LCD Sheets RaiO92 C-314 601-2/32 RC01 7722/5196 6

474 Snubber PSA-6 NN5 Snubber (Item 2)/0 44 LCD 5heets ROi093 C 314 601-2,3/32 RC 23/A23 6

480 Anchor 1

Weld of item 8/0 82 NF 01,03 ROI 094 C 314 6012,3/32 RC 1/A1 6

480 An(hor 1

Weld of ttem 8/0 82 NF 01.03 RCH 095 C 314 601-2,3/32 RC 37/A37 6

480 Anchor 1

Weld of item 8/0 82 NF 01.03 ROI 393 C 314 601-2/32 RC01 704/5199 6

472 Snubber P5A-15 NN5 Hilti Kwik Bolts (Item S)/0 84 Mfr. Catalog and IE 79-02 RO4-394 C 314-601-2/32 RC01 9198/5198 6

473

$nubber PS A-15 NNS Hilti-Kwik Bolts (Item 8)/0.77 M f r. Catalog and IE 79 02 ROI 028 C 314 601-2/32 RC01 173/H17 3 12 458 Spring NN5 5pring Can/ 64 LCD 5heets rot 029 C-314 601-2/32 RC01 43/H44 12 450 5pring NN5 Welded Attch.(Item 5)/0 61 LCD 5heets ROI 030 C 314 601-2/12 RC 01 181/R181 12 428 Spong NN5 Welded Lug (Item 1)/0.56 LCD Sheets ROi031 C-314 601-2/32 RC01 169/H169 12 465 5pring NN5 Beam Attch. (Item 8)/0.97 LCD 5heets RCH 072 C 314 601-2/32 RC01 1802/5181 12 428 Snubber PS A-15 NN5 Trunion (Item 4)/0 81 NF ROI 073 C 314 601-2/32 RC01 1793/5180 12 428 Snubber P5A 6 NN5 Snubber (Item 1)/0.84 LCD 5heets

/v -c Note: Stress Ratios hsted as ~5 tresses Neghbible" are less than 10% of their Allowables

O

~

isometrK No Analysis Node Snubber suppor! Mark Teledyne Analysis /

Analysis No.

P. A.

Support Size, IF Support Source of No gal Analysis Code Teledyne/ gal Pipe Size Elev Type Applaable Class Member / Stress Ratio Allowable RCl1074 C 314 601-2/32 RC01 1791/5179 12 428 Snubber PS A-15 NN5 Trumon (Item 4)/0.95 NF RCH 075 C 314 6012/32 RC01 1783/178 12 430

$nubber P5 A-50 NN5 Hilti-Kwik Bolts (Item 4)/0.85 Mfr. Catalog and IE 79 02 RCH 076 C-314 601-2/32 RC 01 1781/178 12 430 Snubber P5A-50 NNS Hitti Kwik (Item 4)/0.98 M fr. Catalog and IE 79 02 RCH 077 C 314 601-2/32 RC 01 1861/5186 12 439

$nubber PS A-15 NN5 Weld item 1 to plate /0.74 NF RCH 078 C-314 601-2/32 RC01 1771/5177 12 448 Snubber P5 A-50 NN5 Hitti-Kwik Bolts (Item 4)/0.79 Mfr. Catalog and IE 79-02 RCH 079 C-314 601-2/32 RC 01 1761/5176 12 450

$nubber PSA-50 NN5 Hitti-Kwik Bolts (item 11)/0.83 Mfr. Catalog and IE 79-02 RCil030 C-314 601-2/32 RC 01 1751/5175 12 452 Snubber PS A-50 NN5 Hilti-Kwik Bolts (Item 3)/0.50 M fr. Catalog and IE 79-02 RCH081 C-314 601-2/32 RC 01 1741/5174 12 453 Snubber PSA-50 NNS Hitti-Kwik Bolts (Item 4)/0.49 Mf r. Catalog and IE 79-02 RCt1032 C-314 601-2/32 RC01 1721/5172 12 458

$nubber P5 A-50 NNS Hiltt-Kwik Bolts (Item 3)/0.66 M f r. Catalog and IE 79-02 RCH 081 C 314 601-2/32 RC 01 170/5170 12 462

$nubber P5 A-15 NNS

$nubber (Item 1)/0.72 LCD Sheets RCH084 C 314 601-2/32 RC01 1301/513 12 469 Snubber P5A-50 NNS Hitti-Kwik Bolts (Item 8)/0 86 M fr. Catalog and IE 79-02 RCH 390 C-114 601-2/32 RC01 40/540 12 456 Two P5 A-6 NNS Hilti Kwik Bolts (Item 8)/0.85 Mfr. Catalog Snubbers and IE 79 02 RCH 195 C 314 601-2/32 RC 01 1801/5181 12 427 Snubber PSA 6 NNS Stresses Neghgible RCtt396 C 314 6012/32 RC-01 NA/RS3 12 427 Rigid NN5 Hitti-Kwik Bolt (item 1)/0 63 Mfr. Catalog and IE 79 02 HCH 399 C-314 601-2/32 RC-01 13/13 12 464 Snubber P5 A-50 NNS Hilti-Kwik Bolt (item 2)/0 81 Mf r. Catalog and IE 79-02 14 -7 Note Strew Ratios hted as ~5trenes Nenlihible" are few than 10N. of their Allowables

~

EG&G Ouestion No. 15 The submittal states that the structural analysis on the piping system was performed using the TPIPE and THRPIPE computer codes.

It further states that these programs have had application on numerous projects in the nuclear industry. Provide verification that these programs have produced accurate results for problems similar to a valve actuation in the safety valve /PORV piping system.

Explain whether the dynamic piping response was obtained using the direct integration, modal superposition, or other solution technique.

Response

1.

TPIPE:

The TPIPE computer code has an extensive testing program to execute all logical options designed into the code. Twenty-eight example combination of options available.(ped to test all the options or problems or benchmarks were develo 1)

Three independent and widely accepted computer :rograms, PIPESD, PISOL, and SAPIV, were employed to prove the accaracy of the TPIPE results.

Each benchmark that considered static or dynamic analysis was modeled and executed with one of the three programs.

The ensuing results were then compared with the corresponding TPIPE results to confirm accuracy.

A benchmark problem involving time history (direct integration) analysis of time varying nodal loads similar to those resulting from a valve actuation in the safety valve /PORV piping is run as part of the TPIPE testing program.

(See response to Question #14 for a description of the methods used in obtaining the dynamic piping response).

Later program revisions are verified by comparison with previously verified benchmark outputs.

2.

THRPIDE:

A letter from TES which illustratas the NRC acceptance of 1MRSAP is attachej (Attachment pages 15-2 and 15-3). TMRSAP is the analytical sub-program of TMRPIPE which performs the stress calculations.

(1)

Reference:

'TPIPE Verificatien Manual', PMP Systems Engineering, Inc.,

500 Sansome Street, San Francisco, California, Revision 1, October 1977.

15-1

O O

P TELEDYNE ENGINEERING SERVICES 9: se:ese..rw e 443,v.issi:. sins :ns.

,4 ' 69: 3JS; "A s ? J24 *!;d May 14, 1986 865-051 Mr. Al fred Hoffert Gilbert Associates, Incorporated P. O. Box 1498 Reading, PA 19603

Reference:

NRC Inspection Report and Docket No. 99900513/85-01 Dated July 11, 1985

Dear Mr. Hoffert:

In response to your request that we provide documentation of THRSAP verification, the following is offered.

On January 7-11, 1985, NRC personnel conducted the Referenced Inspec-tion at our facility in Waltham, Massachusetts.

The purpose of this inspection was to review our Quality Assurance Program in the areas of com-puter code verification, computer code error handling procedures, and pipe support design calculations.

Regarding computer program verification, the following is an excerpt from the Report:

"The development and verification of the computer program THRSAP, which is used by TES in the design of safety-related items was reviewcd during this inspection.

Technical Engineering Proce-dures TEP-1-005, Application Computer Program Development, was reviewed and utilized throughout the inspection of THRSAP.

The computer code TMRSAP, which was developed internally by TES, is used for static and dynamic analysis of linear piping systems, it employs a finite element solution technique with a library consisting of cu.ved and straight pipe elements, and a boundary element for simulation of pipe restraints.

THRSAP provides capa-bility for analysis of such static loading as deadweight, thermal, and pressure elongation loadings.

Capabilities fo r dynamic analysis include response spectrum and time history (both modal and direct) analysis.

Solution methods include Gaussian elimination for static solutions, and determinant search or sub-space iteration for the modal dynamic solutions.

Direct l

integration is performed with the Wilson-0-method, l

l

!h~d ENGitJE E AS M D '.' E T A L L. M ' ~

1eTELEDYNE Mro Alfred Hoffer 8 ENGNEERING SERVICES 865-051 May 14, 1986 Page Two TES verified THRSAP by a comparison of the output of 22 verifica-tion problem solutions with either the results of hand calculations or the output of other computer codes (STAR 0YNE.

EPIPE. ANSYS, and AOLPIPE).

During this inspection all verifica-tion problems were reviewed.

Although the verification of this code was done according to a general design control procedure (Section 3.0 of the TES Quality Assurance Manual), it was found to meet the requirements of the latest TES procedure controlling computer code verification (TEP-1-005), with one exception.

The exception was that the source code listing and computation out.

puts were not included in the verification manual.

However, the computation output includes a

source code listing that was clearly identified in the verification manual and was readily available at the TES office.

No violations or nonconfomances were identified during this part of the inspection."

Please call if you have any questions regarding the foregoing.

Very truly yours, TELE 0YNE rNGINEERING SERVICES

, 7 Richar H. Berks Principal Engineer RHB:sig 9

l l

15-3

EG&G Ouestion No. 16 The submittal states that pressure oscillations in the safety valve inlet piping were reported by EPRI for some fluid conditions and upstream piping configurations. According to EPRI results these oscillations commonly occurred during passage of loop seal water and were in the 170-260 Hz frequency range.

The submittal states that the oscillations have been evaluated and that stresses are within code allowable for the V. C. Summer plant.

It is not clear though whether this evaluation reflects the fact that the pressure oscillations could excite high frequency vibration modes in the piping causing significant bending moments in the inlet piping.

Show that the bending moments caused by this dynamic response do not exceed the allowable bending moment.

Provide the referenced report "Pressure Oscillations in Safety Valve Inlet Piping", EPRI, March 17, 1982.

Response

Based on the attached letter "Pressure Oscillations in Safety Valve Inlet Piping" (pages 16-2 and 16-3), pressure oscillations observed during EPRI testing of safety relief valves (SRV) resulted in a peak pressure of 5000 psia in the inlet piping. This peak pressure was evaluated in the SRV piping by considering it to occur coincident with the specified emergency and faulted (Level C and 0) bending moments.

For the V. C. Summer configuration, no blowdown piping loads are transmitted to the safety relief piping upstream of the valve due to the anchor located at the valve inlet flange. No additional iaoment loadings due to high frequency vibration modes induced by the pressure oscillations were considered in the analysis.

For the emergency condition, the maximum primary stress intensity of 11949 psi occurs at the analysis point 25 (elbow in loop C), well below the allowable of 32000 psi.

For the faulted condition, the maximum primary stress intensity of 12489 psi occurs at analysis point 25 (elbow in loop A),

again well below the faulted allowable of 48240 psi.

The above information is in the attached calculation on pages 16-4 through 16-8.

16 1

s ELECTRIC POWER RESEARCH INSTITUTE l

/

. - ~

~

EPR March 17,1982.

T0:

UTILITY TECHNICAL CONTACTS

SUBJECT:

PRESSURE OSCILLATIONS IN SAFETY val */E INLET PIPING As has been noted in previous comunications, spring-loaded sa fety valve tests at Combustion Engineering with loop seals and certain liquid inlet conditions resulted in high amplitude pressure oscillations.

These oscil-lations were observed just upstream of the valve and appear to have been caused by water-hammer induced by valve flutter or chatter.

This letter transmits a final data package on this subject and also su= art:ed analyses performed by EPRI contractors.

I On two previous occasions EPRI has transmitted data packages en this sub-ject.

The enclosed package contains more information and is considered to be the final version.

In order to better understand the test data, EPRI contractors have ocrformed several analyses.

In the 1400 series tests, the inlet pipe was instrumented s

with axial and transverse strain gages as well as pressure transducers.

S.

Levy incorporatad and Combustion Engineering have analyzed this data from run 1406 (a 6M6 cold loop seal test) to determine the internal pressure required to produce the measured strain.

Based on the hoop strain data, both contrac-tors have determined that the peak internal pressure at the strain gage loca-tion is about 5000 psia.

The S. Levy results show a peak to peak oscillation of 4750 osi about a mean of 2625 psia.

Examination of the axial strain data gives a higherpressure (the S. Levy result is 6000 psia) but both S. Levy and CE agree that this data could be complicated by axial motion of the valve-piping assembly.

For this same run, pressure transducers PT105 and PT12 showed peak pressure of 7000 and 8600 respectively.

Continuum Dynamics and Combustion Engineering have investigated possible signal amplification in the pressure sensing lines. Both have concluded that the sensing lines are likely to amplify the signals:

i.e., the amplitude of the pressure oscillation at the transducer is significantly larger than the pressure in the inlet pipe.

This means that the data for PT12 and PT105 cannot be interpreted as the actual pipe pressure.

It is our best judgment at this time that the actual peak pressure at the strain gage location is 5000 psia which is based on the i

l l6-2 reuna 'ers 34Q %ew AveNe Fes C*f ce 80s QJ'? Pat Ano CA 940:3 '4!5. 355 2000

es UTILITY TECHNICAL CONTACTS March 17,1982.

Page 2 hoop strain measurement.

However, there may be an axial pressure variation along the pipe axis and it is possible that the pressure is higher at other locations. Continuum Dynamics is evaluating this axial variation and we will notify you of the results.

If there are questions, please call.

Sincerely, Anthony J. Wheeler Project Manager Safety and Analysis Department I

AJW/11 Enc.

s I

I

)

16-3 I

t i

9. fl F.

'4, RQ}

2, /2. /8 ll 2 [_

i suun c T EVALUA1 TON OF PRESSI'it!

NE OSCII.LATIONS IN RCO3 CI ASS I PlPII':

V.

C. Si!>C tER 4

dN) Gilbert Associates. Inc.

E or -

acv.l fr.

dj J1 15 O

"* * *** ~

s.m

, c,o, n,,, o CALCULATION

_f vyl_ ___

o,co. y on o4TE

//

5.0 Pressure Oscillation Effects:

The ef fect of the prensure oscillat inns.wcurim'. during saf et y relief valve operation is evaluated by considerine, the peak pressure of approximately 5000 psia vecuring in the niping upstream of the SRV (RC03 piping).

6.0 Consideration of Level C Service Limits:

6.1 Permissible Pressure s

b' hen Level C service linits are specified, the permissible pressure shall not exceed the pressure Pa. calculated in accordance with equation (3) of NB-3641.1, by more than 507..

2 sm t EQ(3)

Pa = (Do-2y tT Where:

Size = 6" NPS Schedule = 160 Material = SA-376 Type 304 Pa = Allowable working pressure of pipe Sm = Maximum allowable stress intensity for the naterial at design temperature.

(16080 psi at 680 F)

Specified wall thickness minus any allowance t a 0.718 in. nom.X 0.875 0.628"

=

I (M.inu f ac t u r e r 's tolerance of approx. 12\\%)

l

!'i l

D. = Outside diameter = 6.625" y = o.4 16-4 t....

l c.. v uoi

s i RCOI

z. ta. is la g r.

suuJLc7 EVALUATION Uf PRESSifRE i.* o

- oc OSCILLATIONS IN RC03 CLASS 1 PIPING V. C. SilM.'tER 5

Cilbert Associates,Inc.

or d:4-

"Ev I d

'j8 d

M 15 C

- - ""~

~A we.o rit ut o pacu 3

CALCULATION o,,,c,,,, r e,,

OAfc

/

Thus: Pa = 2 (16080) (.628) 3300 pst

=

6.625 - 2X0.4X0.628 Allowable Pressure is 150% of l'a

- (1.5) (3300) = 4950 psi l

This is considered to be within acceptabic limits because of l

4 the following:

(1) The 5000 psia pressure oscillation is an approximate result which based on experinental strain gar,e results.

(2) The calculated permissible pressure is within 1% of the pressure oscillation and is well within engineering tolerance.

(3) The actual working pressure within the pressuri:er during SRV operation is much lower than the 5000 psia oscillation.

In addition, the pressure oscillations have only been identified near the valve itself.

(4) The allowable stress is evalua.ted at a design tempera-0 ture of 680 F.

(5) The actual stresses calculated for both the emergency and f aulted conditions are vell below the allowable limits.

Et, J

6-5 L.

- u u,uua nt - m u s a__~mu-1u,mn

- o,000 w ne

V. C. C.

f l!. - (

't.

KC01

'12./3 4

""#CC' EVALUATION OF PRESSt:RI:

'm aaac OSCILLATIONS IN RCO'3 Cl.\\SS I PIPING V. C. SUtDtER 6

w[ Gilbert Associata!. fnc.

"l LG B

g g

1i -

O "c"

cucuurios oaaci~Atoa j

oafi

/

6.2 An11ysis of Piping Components Under the emergency loading condition for which the level C stress limits are specified, the coincident pressure and moments resulting in maximum calculated stresses are evaluated as follows.

The allowable stress to be used for this condition is 2.255, but not greater than 1.8Sy, thus:

+ B3 Do M1 Ih" I#S*'T "I EQ(9)

Bg PDo 2.25 Sm er 2t 2I 1.8 Sy s

a

'n'here the quantities are defined as:

B,B2 = Primary stress indtees 1

Peak pressure (psi)

P

=

Mi = Resultant deadweight moment (in-lb) 4 I

Moment of inertia (in )

=

As per the EPRI load combinations, the penk pressure oscillation of 5000 psia is considered with the sustained deadweight moments obtained f rom Ref. (4).

Table I lists these moments for all com-ponent points in each of the three SRV loops.

In order to evaluate l

l the above equation, the maximum momenta f rom each of the three loops are enveloped and the combined stresses calculated, l

l

e, 0 0 l

16-6

..m.u..

,~,n.c.,,w, -,.

.,n m

.. ~,,, r. ~. ~, e.m.

-,-.iu.,

RC01

2. iz. /a 14 22 V. ('. 'i. f M ! r suoecer EVAI UATION OF PRESSI'RE

W

- GE m

OSCILLATION IN RCO3 CLASS 1 PIPIW:

V. C. SRCiER 7

Gilbert Associates,Inc.

or -

arv.]

We d5

,.J 4 15 a

3 wicnor*Luto I

PACE $

CALCULATION AgSy an,cm.,o, u/rzo -

o.,,

6.3 Results The results of this evaluation are presented in Table II.

The maximum primary stress intensity for the RC03 piping is 11949 psi occuring at point 25 (elbow of loop C).

This stress is well below the allowable 0

stress of 1.8Sy = 32000 psi evaluated at 680 F.

(2.25Sm = 36180 psi) 7.0 Faulted Conditions (Level D Service Limits):

The faulted condition load combinations are presented in Table 1 of 0

Appendix A.

Safe shutdown earthquake selsnic moments equal to 1.5 X OBE are used for the f aulted cendition evaluation and are

.h obtained f rom Ref. (4). There are no additional mechanical loadings due to design basis accident /LOCA or main steam line break specified for this system. Table III lists combined deadweight plus seismic O s moments for all component points in each of the three SRV loops.

The same equation (9) is evaluated with the peak pressure oscillation of 5000 pria and the enveloped moments of each of the three loops.

l l6-7 t-uumums

V.C.b.IlLL CDuf g @)

i 112./8 p*R sussccr EVALUATION OF P8 ESSURE 4 3

GE m

OSCILLATIONS IN RC03 Cl. ASS 1 PIPING V. C. SIMIER 8

g Gilbert Associates,Inc.

"'V I d'

d' O-d8 df 15 or _

V_

wicaoritwea paces p

CALCULATION pg. Q ;

o,,o,,,,o,

//AW oaro

7.1 Results

The results of this evaluation are presented in Table IV.

The maxi-mum primary stress intensity for the RC03 piping is 12489 psi occuring at point 25 (elbow of loop A).

This stress is well below the faulted allowable of 3.0Sm = 48240 psi evaluated at 680 F.

8.0

Conclusions:

The piping componente meet both emergency and faulted stress limits under the application of the 5000 psia pressure oscillation in the RC03 piping system.

s A4 (6-8 m....

-m

i EG&G Ouestion No 17 The submittal presents the load combinations that were considered in the piping analysis.

The combinations listed consider all those that are recommended in the report EPRI PWR Safety and Relief Valve Test Proaram Guide for Application of Valve Test Program Results to Plant-Specific Evaluations except for an upset condition in the Class 1 piping in which PORV discharge transient, OBE, and normal loads are combined. Provide justification for not considering this load combination in the analysis.

Response

During the development of the ASME,Section III, Class NB, Design Specification for the Class 1 pipe, July 1981, the load combinations for the Upset Primary condition were given as:

Design Pressure + Deadweight + OBE Pressure during VTC + Oeadweight + VTC*

The preliminary EPRI issue of March, 1981 had these loading combinations from valve lift.

There are certain plant transients which are postulated by the NSSS to result in PORV lifts. These plant transients are also postulated by the NSSS to be induced by an OBE.

Since the VTC loads are of a very short duration, less than 0.4 seconds, and the OBE loads are of longer duration but multi-frequency, it was judged not to combine these loads for the UPSET Primary Case but to qualify the piping to sustain the loading as given in the Design Specification Note that the Design Specification requires for the Fatigue Condition, that Normal Transients, or Upset Transients, or Test Transients + Weight

+ OBE + VTC loads be combined and equations 10, 11, 12, 13, and 14 of the ASME Code be satisfied.

Therefore, the combination of OBE and VTC is considerp.d in the analysis and more conservatively than the EPRI loading combinations on UPSET conditions.

Valve Thrust Conditions from valve lift I

~

17-1

O' e

EG&G Ouestion No. 18 The submittal states that piping stresses and support loads in both the upstream and downstream portions of the safety valve piping system are acceptable.

It also states that piping stresses and support loads in the PORV system are acceptable. Provide a numerical comparison between the calculated and allowable stresses for the piping and supports for these systems to verify this conclusion. Also, identify the codes and standards from which the allowable piping stresses and support loads were obtained.

Response

A.

Piping downstream of PORV's and SRV's (Non-Safety)

Attached (see page 18-3) is a copy of the stress summary from computer output ATGRNGS (7/12/82), RC01 Post Processor.

This post processor combines stresses from the appropriate load cases to form the proper stress summary for each plant condition.

It then scans the stress ratios [(Actual Stress)/(Allowable Stress)] of every node within a load case and prints tne maximum stress ratio for each load case.

No nodes exceed the allowable ratio of 1.00.

B.

Piping Upstream of PORV's and SRV's (Class 1)

TES reports TR-4813-22 and TR-4813-24 address the stresses in the Class 1 portion of piping upstream of the PORV's and SRV's respectively.

Pages 18-4 through 18-6 summarize the stresses and allowable stresses from these reports.

These reports conclude that all stresses are acceptable.

In the course of performing the calculations for these Stress Reports it became evident that two critical piping components required more detailed analysis. These two components were the 3" l

Sch. 166, Pipe-to-Valve Tapered Transition Joints, and the 6" -

l 1500# Welding Neck Raised Face Flanges of the Pre 3surizer Safety Relief Valves.

The in-depth evaluations of these components are addressed in TES Report TR-4813-23 and TR-4813-25 respectively.

I The subject components are qualified to the applicable design codes and code cases as follows:

o Tapered Transition Joint - largest total fatigue usage factor is 0.880 where the allowable is 1.0.

Weld Neck Flange - largest total fatigue usage factor is 0.448

~

o where the allowable is 1.0.

18 1

C.

Applicable Codes and Standards The conventional portion of the piping utilized upgraded analysis rules and was qualified as per Subsection NC of the 1971 ASME code up to and including the Summer 1973 addenda.

The Class 1 portion of piping was qualified as per Subsection NB of the 1977 ASME code through Summer 1979 Addenda inclusive, and ASME code case N-196-1.

D.

Supports For a comparison of the support leads to allowables, see response to Question No. 14, pages 14-3 through 14-6.

e T

I i

18 2

'a.

s'

~

l 3

e

)

GILBERT ASSO. INC.

V.C. SUMMER HUCLEAR STATION 81 PWR/SRV PIPIHC QEADING. PA. USA.

RCol/EPRI FROM S/RV TO PRES. REL. TANK TPIPE VERSION i 3 8885988888 EPRI/RELAP5/AEA SRVtLS380)+PORVtPV902) 888888 RUN DATE-82/i HPRV-T450/LS-SRV-T380. FROM S.V. AND PORV TO PRES. REL. TAN PAGE 16 A0ME C0DE CLASS 2

STRESS

SUMMARY

3 MEMSER HQ9AL EQH CODE ALLOWA8LE STRESS DESCRIPTION

)

HAME NAME HO.

STRESS STRESS RATIO 3520 m PR55 m 8

9461.

15900.

.60 MAX STRESS 3520

PR56 m 8

9461.

15900.

.60 MAX STRESS RATIO

)

3293 w CEt4 T R m 10 13495.

27475.

.49 MAX STRESS 3290 =

CENTRW 10 13495.

27475.

.49 MAX STRESS RATIO 3290 m CENTR 4 11 17492.

43375.

.40 MAX STRESS 3290 m CENYRN 11 17492.

43375.

.40 MAX STRESS RATIO j

1580 m 24 m 90 15498.

19080.

.81 MAX STRESS 1580 m 24 m 90 15498.

19080

.81 MAX STRESS RATIO 1540 m 27 h 9E 20946.

28620.

.73 MAX STRESS 2540 m 27 N 9E 20946.

28620.

.73 MAX STRESS RATIO s

IS40 m 27 m 9F 20952.

38160

.55 MAX STRESS f O 1540 a 27 m 9F 20952.

38160.

.55 MAX STRESS RATIO 2010 m CENTRE PR 18230.

37244

.49 MAX STRESS

)

I 2010 n CENTRu PR 18280.

37244.

.49 MAX STRESS RATIO y 1540 m

27

AV 24442.

600000.

.04 MAX STRESS 1540 w 27 M AV 24442.

6C0000.

.04 MAX STRESS RATIO TOTAL MUMBER OF PIPE MEMBERS WITH NODAL POINTS GREATER THAN ATHRESHOLD STRESS RATIO OF 1.000 EQUATION 8.....

0 EQUATION 10.....

0 EQUATION 11.....

O y

EQUATION CU.....

0 EQUATION 9E.....

O EQUATION 9F.....

0 PIEE RUPTURE....

O ACTIVE VALVE....

0

~

h

~

CODE CLASS I MAXIMUM STRESS

SUMMARY

SUBSYSTEM RC-03 i

i CODE RESS ALLOW B E STRESS POINT NO POINT ID EQUATION LOAD SET COMMENTS

,i 25 Elbow Equation 9 6460 24120 N/A (Loop B)

(Seismic)

(1.5 Sm) i 10 Nozzle Equation 9 5767 24120 N/A (Loop B)

(Blowdown)

(1.5 Sm) j 10 Nozzle Equation 10 32511 48564 0-4

)

(Loop B)

(Sn)

(3.0 Sm)

)

Equation 12 N/A N/A N/A (Se) i Equation 13 N/A N/A N/A l

g 75 Sockolet Usage N/A Usage Factor 0-4 L

Conn.

Factor U = 1.0 (Ioop A)

U = 0.015 1

NOTES:

i (1)

No emergency condition specified 1

(2)

Faulted condition enveloped by design condition evaluations (Equation 9) i i

CODE CLASS I MAXIMUM STRESS

SUMMARY

SUBSYSTEM RC-01 CODE RESS ALLOW B E STRESS POINT NO POINT ID EQUATION LOAD SET COMMENTS

~

124 Red.

Equation 9 18796 24120 N/A (Seismic)

(1.5 Sm) 83 Elbow Equation 9 18434 24120 N/A (Blowdown)

(1.5 Sm) 83 Elbow Equation 10 51436 54120 5-6

Sm is the average (Sn)

(3.0 Sm *)

value for the load set pair Equation 12 N/A N/A N/A (Se) y Equation 13 N/A N/A N/A 82 GBW Usage Usage Factor 5-6 Factor U = 1.0 U = 0.193 NOTES:

(1)

No emergency condition specified (2)

Faulted condition enveloped by design condition evaluations (Equation 9)

i t

~

CODE CLASS i MAXIMUM STRESS SUMMAR'.' { cont'd)

SUBSYSTEM RC-03 Equations 10,11, and 12 stresses for Branch Cennection Analyzed as per Rev. 4 i

CODE RESS ALLOW B E STRESS POINT NO POINT ID EQUATION LOAD SET COMMENTS (p )

922 BR. Conn.

Equation 10 49999

48564 0-5

Denotes (Sn)

(3.0 Sm) requirements of equation 10, primary plus secondary stress intensity range (NB-3653.1' have not been met; but the requirements of thermal stress ratchet (NB-3653.7),

_y and equations 12 and 13 (NB-3653.6) e have been met 922 BR. Conn.

Equation 12 1520 48564 0-5 (Se)

(3.0 Sm) 922 BR. Conn.

Equatim 13 34947 48564 0-5 (3.0 Sm) 1 L

-

ML20154B031

Text

SUBJECT:

RESPONSE

RESPONSE

RESPONSE

RESPONSE

RESPONSE

RESPONSE

Response

Subject:

Dear Mr. Barbier:

Reference:

SUMMARY

SUMMARY

4.0. SLMCEliTIENCCODI

Dear l'r Braddick:

Reference:

SUMMARY

SUMMARY

RESPONSE

Response

RESPONSE

Response

Response

density time t

Response

Response

Response

Reference:

Reference:

Dear Mr. Hoffert:

Response

SUBJECT:

7.1 Results

Conclusions:

Response

Response

SUMMARY

SUMMARY

SUMMARY

Navigation menu

Search