ML20151G745
| ML20151G745 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Seabrook  |
| Issue date: | 07/22/1988 |
| From: | Beuchel B PUBLIC SERVICE CO. OF NEW HAMPSHIRE |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20151G732 | List: |
| References | |
| OL-1, NUDOCS 8807290201 | |
| Download: ML20151G745 (21) | |
Text
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
+
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION before the ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD
)
In the Matter of
)
)
PUBLIC-SERVICE COMPANY
)
Docket Nos.
50-443 OL-1 NEW HAMPSHIRE, et al.
)
50-444 OL-1
)
(Seabrook Station, Units 1
)
(On-site Emergency and 2)
)
Plar.ning Issues)
)
AFFIDAVIT OF BRUCE E. BEUCHEL I, BRUCE E. BEUCHEL, being on oath, depose and say as follows:
1.
I am a Senior Electrical Engineer in the Seabrook Project Depart-ment Instrument and Control Engineering Group at Yankee Atomic Electric Company (YAEC) in Framingham, Massachusetts.
YAEC provides Engineering, Scientific, and Technical Services to Seabrook Station.
A statement of my prof essional qualifications is attached and marked os "A".
2.
The purpose of my Af fidavit is to describe the results of an evaluation I performed in which I conservatively assumed that a hypo-thetical RG-58 cable located in a harsh environment failed in such a manner as to cause the failure of all cables routed in the same cable raceway.
This assumption was employed unless a physical walkdown verified that such an assumption was unnecessary. This evaluation was performed to determine if the safety systems relied upon in the current FSAR design basis analysis will be available to perform their safety functions during low power testing assuming such a failure scenario.
8807290201 880722 DH ADOCK 05000443 PDR
3.
The analysis I performed consisted of the following sequential tasks:
(1)
Determination of the cable raceways and corresponding channel where RG-58 could be located.
(2)
Determination of the instrumentation required to sat-isfy the Full Power Accident Analysis.
(3)
Identification and analysis of the instrumentation re-quired to satisfy the accident analysis and to safely i
shutdown the facility from low power.
4.
With regard to the determination of the cable raceway and corre-sponding channel, then see various levels or types of cable raceways throughout the plant used for cable separation, as delineated below:
Cable Type Function Ra ceway Power 15Kv H
SKv J
480V/120Vac/125Vdc K/L Control Rod Drive Power P
Control 120Vac/125dc R
Ins t rume nt Low Signal Level V
Nuclear Instrumentation X
Since the RG-58 cable was purchased for Seabrook Station for use only in low signal level, non-nuclear instrumentation applications, and by review of design and construction records has only been installed in low signal level instrumentation raceways, it was only necessary to review instru-mentation in the "V" level raceway system.
See Af fidavit of Thomas W.
Giovacky at i 8..
5.
The "V" level raceway system consists of four safety-related instrumentation channels as described below:
Instrument Group Racewa y Cable Color Channel I and Train A Red Red Train A Associated Black w/ Red Tracer Channel 11 and Train B White White Train B Associated Black w/ White Tracer Channel III Blue Blue Channel IV Yellow Yellow As indicated in FSAR Sections 8.3.1.3 and 8.3.1.4, the solid color desig-nation (Red, White, Blue, Yellow) is utilized to signify safety-related cable while the striped cable (i.e., Black w/ Red Tracer, Black w/ White Tracer) sig:iifies nonsafety-related cable.
The RG-58 cable purchased for Seabrook is Black with a Red Tracer and is only routed in Train A/
Channel I, "V" level raceways (hereinaf ter Channel I raceways); it was therefore only necessary to review instrumentation utilizing these raceways for the effect of an RG-58 failure.
Cable installations at Seabrook Station comply with the applicable industry guidance and regulatory requirements for separation and independence as described in FS AR Sectior.s 8.3.1.3 and 8.3.1.4.
6.
With regard to the determination of the instrumentation required to satisfy the accident analysis, FS AR Chapter 15 was reviewed to identify 4
both the automatic and manual actions assumed in the associated analysis, i
The Reactor Trip System (FS AR 7.2) and the Engineered Safety Features Actuation System (ESFAS) (FSAR 7.3) represent the instrumentation required to provide automatic actions necessary for accident mitigation.
The Category I Accident Monitoring Instrumentation ( AMI), described in i 9 is j -
the instrumentation necessary to achieve the required manual operator actions in order to saf ely shut down the plant.
For ease of reference, the Reactor Trip System is listed in Attachment 1 and ESFAS Instrumen-tation is listed in Attachment 2, and the Category I Accident Monitoring Instrumentation is listed in Attachment 3.
In addition, a design review of all other safety-related instrumentation has been performed.
Either the Channel I cable connected to the instrumentation was verified by a design review to utilize control or power cable or a walkdown of Channel I raceways was performed as described in 1 14.
7.
The Reactor Trip System automatically keeps the reactor operating within a safe region by shutting down the reactor whenever the limits of safe plant operation are approached.
It consists of sensors, connected to analog circuitry (consisting of two to four redundant channels) that monitor various plant parameters, and digital circuitry (consisting of two redundant logic trains) to complete the logic necessary to automat-ically open the reactor trip breakers.
This allows the control rods to fall into the reactor by gravity and shut down the reactor.
See FSAR Section 7.2.1.1.
8.
The Engineered Safety Features Actuation System uses selected plant parameters, determines whether or not predetermined safety limits are being exceeded and, if they are, provides the mechanism for the actuation of the associated safety function.
The ESFAS consists of two discrete portions of circuitry:
- 1) An analog portion (consisting of two to four redundant channels) to monitor various plant parameters such as the Reactor Coolant System and steam system pressures, temperatures and flows and containment pressures; and 2) a digital portion (consisting of two redundant logic trains) needed to actuate the Engineered Safety
Features. The system is designed, in accordance with NRC requirements, so that any single failure within the ESFAS will not prevent system action when required.
See FS AR Section 7.3.1.1.
9.
An Accident Monitoring Instrumentation ( AMI) list, FSAR Table f
I l
7.5-1, has been developed to define the instrumentation required by the operator for design basis accident events.
The AMI enables the operator to monitor safety functions, take any manual actions required to support the accomplishment of safety functions and to determine the ef fect of c
manual actions during and following a design basis accident event.
(
The subset of FSAR Table 7.5-1 which is included in Attachment 3 is the Category I AMI.
Category I instrumentation is the instrumentation which must be environmentally qualified and for which no single f ailure within the AMI will prevent the operators from being presented the infor-mation necessary to determine the safety status of the plant and to bring the plant to and maintain it in a safe condition.
(FSAR 7.5.4.4).
10.
I reviewed the f unctional application of the devices connected to the 126 RG-58 cables and concluded that none of the devices were used l
in the Reactor Trip System, the ESFAS, to provide indications necessary for manual operator action, or in other safety-related applications.
(Reference Attachments 1 & 2 and Affidavit of Thomas W. Glowacky,1 5).
11.
With regard to the instrumentation required for accident miti-gation and safe shutdown from low power, I have reviewed the instruments required for full power and determined which subset is not required for low power testing.
(See 1 12 below).
Subsequently, I have analyzed the ef fects of the RG-58 cable f ailure on the remaining instrumentation. The conservative low power analysis assumed that a hypothetical RG-58 cable, potentially located anywhere in Channel I raceways, failed if it were,
1 located in an area which could be subjected to a harsh environment.
This was assumed to result in the simultaneous loss of all safety-related cables routed in the same raceway. The results of this conservative analysis is provided in the following paragraphs.
12.
A number of instruments are not required to safely shutdown the plant from low power because their function is either automatically blocked by physical design or their function is not required pursuant to Facility Operating License No. NPF-56, Technical Specifications.
The instrumentation functions that fall into this category are some of the Reactor Trip signals and the Containment Ventilation Isolation Signal.
The specific instrumentation which fall into this category is identified in Attachments 1 and 2.
13.
Some ESFAS actuation signals and AMI do not have a Channel I in-put and therefore would not be affected by the failure of an RG-58 cable in a Channel I raceway.
The specific instrumentation functions which fall under this category are identified in Attachments 2 and 3, respectively.
14.
FJr all other instrumentation which is necessary for safe shutdown f rom low power, field walkdowns of cable raceways was per-formed under my direction to physically verify that the cables servin'g these instruments need not be assumed to f ail either because they (and any active RG-58 cable routed with them) are in a mild environment or be-cause there is no active RG-58 cable routed with them in the same raceway in a harsh environment.
For thooe cables in a mild environment, it was i
also physically verified that active RC-58 cable does not cross the boundary f rom an area which could be subjected to a harsh environment i
into these areas.
See annotations in Attachments 1, 2, and 3.
i i -
i 15.
Based upon my evaluation, even if there is any remaining RG-58 cable located in a harsh environment and even if it f ailed and caused the failure of all safety-related cable routed with it, the instruments r
necessary for safe shutdown of the reactor during 5% testing would still be available.
Bn 1 LAl Bruce E. Beuchel STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE Rockingham, ss.
July 22,1988 The above-subscribed Bruce E. Beuchel appeared before me and made oath that he had read the foregoing af fidavit and that the statements set forth therein are true to the best of his knowledge.
Before me,
'b. a r$n ? OSa,ma Beverly E.._Jilloway, Nogar Public Hy Commission Expires: March 6, 1990,
s "A"
BRUCE E. BEUCHEL SENIOR ELECTRICAL ENGINEER EDUCATION BS Marine Engineering, United States Naval Academy, 1975.
I joined Yankee Atomic Electric Company in March 1985 as a Senior Engi-neer in the Instrumentation and Control Engineering Group of the Seabrook Project Department. My position involves performing engineering evalua-tions and preparing engineering design changes involving instrumentation and control systems for Seabrook Station.
I am experienced in instrument uncertainty determinations and setpoint determinations and NSSS Vendor supplied protection instrumentation.
I came to Yankee Atomic Electric Company from General Electric Company where I was employeed from September 1984 to March 1985.
During this period of time I was in training for and received a Senior Reactor Operator Certificate from the General Electric Company for a Boiling Water Reactor.
I also spent two months as a start-up test engineer at the Shoreham Nuclear Power Station.
Prior to this I was employeed by Public Service Company of New Hampshire as a Senior Engineer in the field of instrumentation and controls.
One of my collateral duties was the development of the station work control program.
Between 1975 and 1980 I was a Commissioned Officer in the U.S. Navy where I went through the nuclear power training program and was assigned as a division officer on a nuclear powered submarine.
I am a member of the American Nuclear Society and the Instrument Society of America (ISA).
I am an active member of ISA Standard Committee SP67.04, "Setpoints for j
Nuclear Safety-Related Instrumentation Used in Nuclear Power Plants."
. _ _ =
l Sheet 1 of 4 ATTACHMENT 1 INSTRUMENTATION PROVIDING AUTOMATIC ACTUATION REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM NO. OF CHANNEL,S INSTRUMENTATION FUNCTION REQ'D/AVAILABLE COMMENTS (Note 1)
REACTOR TRIP (Note 2) l 1.
Manual Trip Switches I of 2 Walkdown confirmed Channel I cabic remains in a mild environment. See 1 14.
2.
Power Range Neutron Flux a.
High Setpoint 2 of 4 Refer to Note 3.
b.
1,ow Setpoint 2 of 4 Refer to Note 3.
3.
Power Range Neutron Flux High Positive 2 of 4 Refer to Note 3.
Rate l
4.
Power Range Neutron Flux High Negative 2 of 4 Refer to Note 3.
Rate 5.
Intermediate Range Neutron Flux 1 of 2 Refer to Note 3.
6.
Source Range Neutron Flux 1 of 2 Refer to Note 3.
7.
Overtemperature Delta T 2 of 4 Walkdown has verified no RC-58 cable in Channel I raceways in harsh environment.
I See 1 14.
8.
Overpower Delta T 2 of 4 Walkdown has verified no RG-58 cable in Channel I raceways in harsh environment.
See 1 14.
l
Sheet 2 cf 4 ATTACHMENT I INSTRUMENTATION PROVIDINC AUTOMATIC ACTUATION REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM NO. OF CHANNELS INSTRUMENTATION FUNCTION REQ'D/AVAILABLE COMMENTS (Note 1) 9.
Pressurizer Pressure - Low 2 of 4 Walkdown has verified no RG-58 cable in Channel I raceways in harsh environment.
See 1 14.
10.
Pressurizer Pressure - High 2 of 4 Walkdown han verified no RC-58 cable in Channel i raceways in harsh environment.
See 1 14.
11.
Pressurizer Water Level - High 2 of 3
-Walkdown confirmed no RC-58 cable in Channel I raceway in harsh environment. See 1 14 12.
Reactor Coolant Flow - Lcw Single Loop (Above P-8) 2 of 3 in One Not required for operation at 5% power since a.
Loop the reactor trip is automatically blocked below 50% power. See 1 12.
b.
Two Loops (Above P-7, Below P-8) 2 of 3 in Two Not required for operation at 5% power since Loops the reactor trip is automatically blocked below 10% power. See 1 12.
13.
Steae Generator Water Level - Low-Low 2.of 4 in any Walkdown has verified no RC-58 cable in Steam Gener:stor Channel I raceways in harsh environment.
See 1 14.
14 Undervoltage - Reactor Coolant Pump 2 - 1/Bes Not required for-operation at 5% power ~ since 4 - 2/ Bus the reactor trip is automatically blocked below 10% power.
See 1 12.
15.
Underfrequency - Reactor Coolant Pump 2 - 1/ Bus Not required for. operation at 5% power since 4 - 2/ Bus the reactor trip is automatically blocked, below 10% power. See 1 12.
m w n s
She:t 3 cf 4 ATTACilMENT 1 INSTRUMENTATION PROVIDING AUTOMATIC ACTUATION REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM NO. OF CIIANNELS INSTRUMENTATION FUNCTION REQ'D/AVAILAELE COMMENTS (Note 1) 16.
Turbine Trip a.
Low Fluid 011 Pressure 2 of 3 Not required for operation at 5% power since this reactor trip is automatically blocked bet.ow 20% power.
See 1 12.
b.
Turbine Stop Valve Closure 4 of 4 Not required for operation at 5% power since this reactor trip is automatically blocked below 20% power.
See 1 12.
17.
Safety Injection (See la through Id I of 2 under Engineered Safety Feature -
Actuation system in Attachment 2) 28.
Automatic Trip and Interlock Logic I of 2 Walkdown confirmed Channel I cable remains in a mild environment. See 1 14.
REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM PERMISSIVES (Note 2) 1.
Intermediate Range Neutron Flux, P-6 1 of 2 Refer to Note 3.
2.
Low Power Reactor Trips Block, P-7 a.
P-10 Input 2 of 4 Refer to Note 3.
b.
P-13 Input I of 2 This signal is not used since the turbine is not in operation for Iow power testing.
See 1 12.
3.
Power Range Neutron Flux P-8 2 of 4 Refer to Note 3.
She2t 4 cf 4 ATTACHMENT I INSTRtfMENTATION PROVIDINC AUTONATIC ACTUATION REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM NO. OF CHANNELS INSTRUMENTATION FUNCTION REQ'D/AVAILABLE COMMENTS (Note 1) 4.
Power Range Neutron Flux P-9 2 of 4 Refer to Note 3.
5.
Power Range Neutron Flux P-10 2 of 4 Refer to Note 3.
6.
Turbine Impulse Chamber Pressure P-13 I of 2 This signal is not used since the turbine is not in operation for low power testing.
See 1 12.
l I
1 NOTES:
)
1.
All paragraph references refer to Affidavit of B. E. Beuchel of 07/22/88.
4 2.
Reference FSAR Section 7.2/ Technical Specification 3/4.3.1.
i 3.
Nuclear Instrumentation System (NIS) cables from the detectors to Control Room cabinets are run in dedicated conduits (X level raceways). The output of the Control Room cabinet is either control cable (R level' raceway) or has been walked down to verify that the Channel I low level instrument cable does not leave a mild environment. See 1 4 and 1 14.
Sh2et I cf 5 ATTACHMENT 2 INSTRUMENTATION PROVIDING AUTOMATIC ACTUATION ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM NO. OF CHANNELS INSTRUMENTATION FUNCTION REQ'D/AVAILABLE COMMENTS (Note 1)
ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM (ESFAS) (Note #2) 1.
Safety Injection a.
Manual Initiation I of 2 Walkdown confirmed Channel I cable remains in a mild environment.
See 1 14.
4 I
b.
Cont ai nmen t Pressure - High-1 2 of 3 No Channel I toput.
See 1 13.
c.
Pressurizer Pressure - Low 2 of 4 Walkdown has verified no RC-58 cable in Channel I raceways in Imrsh environment.
See 1 14.
l d.
Steam Line Low Pressure 2 of 3 in any Walkdown veriff;ed no RC-58 cable in Channel l
Steam Line I raceway in h.irsh environment.
See 1 14.
l 2.
Containment Spray / Phase B Isolation a.
Manual Initiation I of 2 (With Walkdown confirmed Channel I cable remains in Two Coincident a mild enviroanent.
See 1 14.
Switches) b.
Containment Pressure - High-3 2 of 4 Walkdown has verified no RC-58 cable in Channel I raceways in harsh environment.
See 1 14.
i' 3.
Containment Isolation / Phase A Isolation a.
Manual Initiation I of 2 Walkdown confirmed Channel I cable remains in a mild environment. See 1 14.
b.
Safety Injection (See la through Id Above)
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Sheet 2 ef 5 ATTACHMENT 2 INSTRUMENTATION PROVIDINC AllTOMATIC ACTUATION ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM NO. OF CHANNELS INSTRUMENTATION FUNCTION REQ'D/AVAILABLE COMMENTS (Note I) i A.
Containment Ventilation Isolation t
a.
Manual Initiation (Either Containment 4
Spray or Phase A Isolation) (See 2a and 3a Above) b.
Safety Injection (See la through Id Above) c.
Containment On-Line Purge Radioactivity I of 2 Walkdown confirmed no RC-58 cable in Channel I t
1
- High raceway in harsh environment.
See 1 14.
The valves for containment ventilation are closed
}
in accordance with Technical Specification 3.6.1.7.
See 1 12.
's. Steam Line Isolation a.
Manual Initiation I
1.
Individual I/ Steam Line The cable for these switches is routed as control cable. See 1 4.
2.
System I of 2 The cable for these switches is routed as i
control cable. See 1 4.
1 b.
Contsinnent Pressure - High-2 2 of 3 No Channel I input.
See 1 13.
c.
Steam Line Pressure - Low (See ld Above)-
d.
Steam Cenerator Pressure -
2 of 3 in any Walkdown has verified no RG-58 cable in Channel Negative Rate - High steam line I raceway in harsh environment. See 1 14 i
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Sheet 3 ef 5 ATTACHMENT 2 INSTRUMENTATION PROVIDING AUTOMATIC ACTUATION ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM 1
NO. OF CHANNELS INSTRUMENTATION FUNCTION REQ'D/AVAILABLE COMMENTS (Note 1) l l
6.
Turbine Trip a.
Steam Generator Water Level -
2 of 4/ Steam Walkdown has verified no RG-58 cable in Channel High-High Generator I raceways in harsh environment. See 1 14.
l 7.
Feedwater Isc!ation
^
a.
Steam Generator Water Level -
High-High (Sec 6a Above)
Coincidence with 2 of 4 Walkdown confirmed that the Channel I reactor b.
Low RCS TAve Reactor Trip trip input cable remains in a mild environ-ment and that there is no RG-58 ciole in the Channel I raceways in a hars*: environment for the RTDs.
See 1 !4.
Safety Injection (See la through Id c.
Above) 8.
Emergency Feedwater Initiation a.
Manual Initiation 1.
Motor-Driven I of 1 This pump is Train B; therefore, the cables are i
routed in Channel 11 raceways, and not in Channel I raceways. See 1 5.
2.
Turbine-Driven 1 of 2 The cable for these switches is routed as con-trol cabic. See 1 4.
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l l
i F
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She2t 4 cf 5 ATTACHMENT 2 INSTRUMENTATION FROVIDING AUTOMATIC ACTUATION ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTIIATION SYSTEM NO. OF CHANNELS INSTRUMENTATION FUNCTION REQ'D/AVAILABLE COMMENTS (Note 1) b.
Steam Generator Water Level -
Low-Low (See Reactor Trip Function 13)
Safety Injection (See la through Id Above) c.
d.
Loss of Off-Site Power (See Item 10 Below) 9.
Automatic Switchover To Containment Sump a.
RUST Level - Low-Low Coincident 2 of 4 Walkdown has verified no'RC-58 cable in Channel With Safety Injection I raceways in harsh environment. See 1 14.
10.
loss of Off-Site Power a.
Loss of Voltage 2/ Bus The cable for'this signal is run as control cable. See 1 4.
b.
Degraded Voltage Coincident With 2/ Bus The cable for this signal is run as control-Safety Inject *on cable. See 1. 4.
11.
Automatic Actuation Logic and Actuation 1 of 2 Walkdown confirmed Channel I cable remains Relays in a mild environment. See 1 14.
The cable for output relays is run as ccatrol cable.
See 1 15.
ENGINEERED SAFETT FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM PERMISSIVES (Note #2) 1.
Pressurizer Pressure P-Il 2 of 3 Walkdown has verified no RC-58 cable in Channel I raceways in harsh environment.: See 1 14.
2.
Reactor Trip P-4 2 of 2 Walkdown confirmed Channel I cable remains in a mild environment. See 1 14.
w
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Sheet 5 of 5 ATTACHMENT 2 INSTRUMENTATION PROVIDING AUTOMATIC ACTUATION l
ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM 1
[
NO. OF CHANNELS i
INSTRUMENTATION FUNCTION REQ'D/AVAILABLE COMMENTS (Note 1) 3.
Steam Generator Water Level - High-High,,
P14 (See 6a under ESFAS) l' l
t l
l l
l l
l NOTES:
't.
All paragraph references refer to Affidavit of B, E. Beuchel of 07/22/88.
2.
Reference FSAR Section 7.3/ Technical Specification 3/4.3.2 E
Sheet I of 4 ATTACHMENT 3 CATECORY I ACCIDENT MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION NO. OF CllANNELS INSTRUMENTATION FUNCTION REQ'D/AVAILABLE COMMENTS (Note #1)
(Note #2) 1.
Conta i nmen t Pressure a.
Normal Range I of 2 No Channel.1 input.
See 1 13.
b.
Extended Rai e I of 2 Walkdown confirmed no RC-58 cable in Channel I raceway in harsh nvironsent and that Channel I cables interconnecting devices in the Cortrol Room stay within a mild environment.
See 1 14.
2.
Reactor Coolant Outlet Temperature -
2 of 4 (All are Walkdown confirmed no RG-58 cable in Channel 1 THot (Wide-Range)
Channel 1) raceway in harsh environment and that Channel I cables interconnecting devices in.the Control Room stay within a mild environment.
See 1 14.
4 3.
Reactor Coolant Inlet Temperature -
2 of 4 (All are No Channel I input.
See 1 13.
T' Cold (Wide-Range)
Channel II) 4 Reactor Coolant Pressure - Wide-Range 1 of 2 Walkdown confirmed no RC-58 cable in Channel I raceway in harsh environment and that Channel I cables interconnecting devices in the Control Room stay within a mild environment.
See 1 14.
4 3.
Pressurizer Water Level I of 2 Walkdown confirmed no RC-58 cable in Channel I raceway in harsh environment and that Channel I cables interconnecting devices in the Control Room stay within a slid environment. See 1 14.
e i
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Sheet 2 of 4 ATTACHMENT 3 CATECORY 1 ACCIDENT MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION NO. OF CIIANNELS INSTRUMENTATION FUNCTION REQ'D/AVAILABLE COMMENTS (Note #1)
(Note #2) 6.
Steam Generator Pressure I of 2/ Steam Walkdown confirmed no RC-58 cable in Channel I Cenerator raceway in harsh environment and that Channe l I cables interconnecting devices in the Control Room stay within a mild environment.
See 1 14.
7.
Steam Generator Water Level - Narrow-1 of 1/ Steam Walkdown confirmed no RC-58 cable in Channel I Range Generator raceway in harsh environment and that Channel I cables interconnecting devices in the Control Room stay within a mild environment.
See 1 14.
8.
Steam Generator Water Level - Wide-I of 1/ Steam Walkdown confirmed no RC-58 cable in Channel I Range Generator raceway in harsh environment.and that Channel I t
cables interconnecting devices in the Control Room stay within a mild environment.
See 1 14.
9.
RWST Water Level 1 of 2 Walkdown confirmed no RG-58 cable in Channel I raceway in harsh environment and that Channel I cables interconnecting devices in the Control Room stay within a mild environment.
See 1 14.
10.
Reactor Coolant System Subcooling Margin i
Monitor 1 of 2 Walkdown confirmed no RG-58 cable in Channel I raceway in harsh environment and that Channel I a.
Core Exit Thermocouples cables interconnecting devices in the Control Room stay within a mild environment.
See 1 14.
b.
RCS Wide-Range Pressure 11.
Containment Building Water Level 1 of 2 Walkdown confirmed no RG-58 cable in Channel I raceway in harsh environment and that Channel I l
cubles interconnecting devices in the Control Room stay within a mild environment.
See 1 14.
9 4
Sheet 3 of 4 ATTACHMENT 3 CATECORY I ACCIDENT MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION NO. OF CIIANNELS INSTRUMENTATION FUNCTION REQ'D/AVAILABLE COMMENTS (Note II)
(Note #2) 12.
Core Exit Thermocouples 2 of 4/
Walkdown confirmed no RC-58 cable in Channel I Quadae t raceway in harsh environment and that Channel I s
cables interconnecting devices in the Control Room stay within a mild environment.
See 1 14.
13.
Containment Post-LOCA Area Monitor I of 2 Walkdown confirmed no RC-58 cable in Channel I raceway in harsh environment and that Chsnnel I' cables interconnecting devices in the Control Room stay within a mild environment. See 1 14.
4 14.
Neutron Flux 1 of 2 Walkdown confirmed no RC-58 cable in Channel I raceway in harsh environment and that Cissonel I a.
Intermediate Range cables interconnecting devices in the Cnntrol Room stay within a mild environment.
See 1 14.
i b.
Intermediate Range Rat?
i i
15.
Containment Isolation valve Position 1 of 2/
This indication uses control cable. See 1 4.
Penetration 16.
Containment Enclosure Negative Pressure 1 of 2 Walkdown confirmed no RC-58 cable in Channel I raceway in harsh environment and that Channel I cables interconnecting devices in the Control Room stay within a mild environment.
See 1 14.
17.
Condensate Storage Tank Level (As Sensed I of 2 Walkdown confirmed no RC-58 cable in Channel I at EFW Pump Suction) raceway in harsh environment and that Channel I cables interconnecting devices in the Control Room stay within a mild environment. See 1 14.
1
Sheet 4 of 4 ATTACHMENT 3 CATEGORY I ACCIDENT MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION NO. OF CHANNELS INSTRUMENTATION FUNCTION REQ'D/AVAILABLE COMMENTS (Note #1)
(Note #2) 18.
Reactor vessel Level Indicating System I of 2 Walkdown confirmed no RG-58 cable in Channel I raceway in harsh environment and that Channel I cables interconnecting devices in the Control Room stay within a mild environment.
See 1 14.
19.
Contai nment Hydrogen Concentration i of 2 Walkdown confirmed no RC-58 cable in Channel I raceway in harsh environment and that Channel I cables interconnecting devices in the Control Room stay withir a mild environment.
See'1 14.
1, H
NOTE:
i 1.
All paragraph references refer to the Affidavit of B. E. Beuchel of 07/22/88.
+
2.
Reference FSAR Section 7.5/ Technical Specification 3/4.3.3.6.
..